Abstract

Government corruption is rampant in many countries around the world, including Russia. This multidisciplinary thesis explores the economic theory related to motivations of corrupt behavior and applies both this theory and experimental evidence to a comparative film analysis of two Russian films released in 2014 and 2015. Theory and laboratory research have suggested there is a connection between the size of a public official’s wage and their corruptibility. This thesis takes a step back and examines whether the presence of a salary has any impact on corruptibility. A laboratory experiment in which participants are tasked with distributing public funds between three constituents who have the ability to send bribes yields the result that the presence of a small salary in the treatment group has no systematic effect on the corruptibility of public officials. The experimental design is inspired by the structures of governance during the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire during which time public officials were not always given salaries, and when they were, it did little to stop the corrupt practices people had become accustomed to. The results from the experiment along with theories relating to trust, reciprocity, inequity aversion, and greed are used to gain a deeper understanding of how the nuanced motivations behind corruption are portrayed in the Russian films Leviathan (2014) and Soulless 2 (2015).

Advisor

Mellizo, Phil

Second Advisor

Filimonova, Tatiana

Department

Economics; Russian Studies

Disciplines

Behavioral Economics | Film and Media Studies | Political Economy

Publication Date

2022

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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