Abstract

This paper tries to discover whether countries supplying high risk dual-use nuclear technologies make some of the same calculations as countries that intentionally supply nuclear weapons development assistance to other countries. Alternatively, suppliers of these risky technologies might behave more similarly to countries that supply less risky civilian nuclear assistance. I use data from the Correlates of War and other datasets to find relevant situations of nuclear assistance involving HEU, uranium enrichment technologies, and uranium reprocessing technologies. These three technologies are risky because access to them can allow a state to develop nuclear weapons quickly. This paper looks at the exchange of one or more of the aforementioned technologies from France to Japan in 1971, Russia to Germany in 1998, and Germany to Brazil in 1979. I use interviews, archival data, and statistics to conduct an in-depth analysis through case studies. A structured, focused comparison of cases will yield valuable information about the motivations and implications of nuclear proliferation in the 21st century.

Advisor

Lantis, Jeffrey

Department

Political Science

Disciplines

International Relations

Keywords

Political Science, International Relations, Nuclear

Publication Date

2019

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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© Copyright 2019 Isaac Shore