Abstract
In this paper, I adopt the framework of the political business cycle to derive a model of politician decision making with regard to international trade policy. To test my model, I estimate a probit regression using a unique data set of 18 U.S. Senate votes on trade liberalization from 1993-2011. My regression measures the impact of impending reelection on an incumbent politician’s trade policy choice, controlling for the capital-labor distribution and employment make-up of the politician’s constituency, as well as the politician's personal ideology. I find empirical support for my hypothesis that, all else equal, a politician within two years of an election is less likely to vote in favor of trade liberalization.
在本文中，我采用了政治经济周期的框架，以获得关于国际贸易政策的政治家决策模型。为了测试我的模型，我用概率回归分析了一个包含从1993年至2011年间，十八次美国参议院就贸易自由化的表决的独特数据集。我的概率回归测试了以下几个方面：即将到来的再次选举对于现任政治家的贸易政策选择的影响，对于控制资本劳动分配和选区内就业组成的影响，以及对于政治家个人的意识形态的影响。我发现了实验证据来证明我这个假设：在一切平等的情况下，一位在两年内即将参与再选举的政治家不太可能就贸易自由化投赞成票。
Advisor
Moledina, Amyaz
Department
International Relations
Recommended Citation
Plews, Lincoln, "The Political Business Cycle and Trade Policy Formation: How Do Electoral Incentives Impact Trade Policy?" (2015). Senior Independent Study Theses. Paper 6671.
https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/6671
Disciplines
American Politics | Economic Theory | International Economics | International Relations | Political Economy | Public Economics
Keywords
Trade, Public Policy, Electoral Incentives
Publication Date
2015
Degree Granted
Bachelor of Arts
Document Type
Senior Independent Study Thesis
© Copyright 2015 Lincoln Plews