Abstract

Why do some states give up or decline to pursue nuclear weapons? This question is a puzzling one because on the surface, it would appear that giving up nuclear weapons does not make sense for any state from a security standpoint. After all, nuclear weapons provide the ultimate deterrent against potential invasion or other hostilities. However, there are other factors at play that drive nuclear restraint. This study will look to identify these factors by applying hypotheses rooted in 3 separate theories of international relations: constructivism, defensive realism, and neoliberalism. The main constructivist hypothesis argues that international norms and reputational concerns guide states toward nuclear restraint: In instances of nuclear restraint, if the reputational concerns of a state government and the factors shaping its identity align with the nuclear non-proliferation norm (NNPN), then the influence of the NNPN is the primary driver of that restraint. Meanwhile, the defensive realist hypothesis maintains that if external pressures, incentives, and disincentives from great powers create material costs that outweigh the benefits of proliferation and increase the benefits of nuclear restraint, then material-based cost-benefit calculations explain that restraint.. The neoliberal hypothesis, on the other hand, holds the perspective that institutions are what primarily compel states to engage in restraint: If institutional material incentives and economic interdependence provide sufficient material compensation, then institutional/economic incentives explain restraint. These hypotheses will be tested against one another across 3 separate case studies: Iran, Ukraine, and Libya. By going over the history of each case, this study will determine which theoretical framework best explains instances of nuclear restraint.

Advisor

Kille, Kent

Department

Political Science

Disciplines

Defense and Security Studies | International Relations

Keywords

nuclear, nuclear weapons, norms, proliferation, nuclear proliferation, nuclear restraint, restraint

Publication Date

2026

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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© Copyright 2026 Thomas J. Abrams