Abstract

This independent study explores the relationship between wealth and economic policy outcomes in state legislatures in the United States. How do state legislators’ varying wealth and income levels affect their voting behavior on issues of economic inequality? I hypothesize that the wealthier a representative is, the more likely they are to vote on bills in such a way that advances economic inequality and opposes economic equality. Descriptive representation and self-interest are outlined as the causal links between legislator wealth and economic voting behavior.

To study this question, I gathered wealth and income data for every state legislator in Washington and Florida during their 2016 legislative sessions, along with a plethora of personal, constituency, and political control variables. Voting behavior was operationalized as ratings from interest groups concerned with economic inequality. I found that wealth is correlated with voting behavior in Florida, but neither wealth nor income is correlated with voting behavior in Washington. After controlling for all variables in a multivariate linear regression, the effect of wealth on voting behavior disappeared in Florida. I proposed a mediated relationship through party identification, which I found evidence for. Due to the normative implications for democratic representation and the results of this study, the relationship between wealth and legislative voting behavior is an important and promising direction for future research.

Advisor

van Doorn, Bas

Department

Political Science

Disciplines

American Politics | Political Science

Keywords

economic inequality, state government

Publication Date

2019

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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© Copyright 2019 Nicholas Shiach