Abstract

Discusses that Moral Particularism and Moral Phenomenology require one another, and that this requirement may have some inconsistencies when given full consideration to their implications. Moral Phenomenology requires a moral objectivity due to its requirement for error and mis-perception, while Moral Particularism requires some the inclusion of non-cognitive elements in the discernment among reasons. This combination results in a trilemma, where either the connection between Moral Particularism and non-cognitivism, between Moral Phenomenology and moral objectivity, or between Moral Particularism and Moral Phenomenology must be denied. The connection between motivation and reason recognition, moral decisions and attitude, and emotions and attitude are discussed in order to look closely into the connection between non-cognitivism and Moral Particularism. The connection between Moral Phenomenology and Objectivity are led to question, as well as the typification of that objectivity with regard to the particular non-cognitivism of moral particularism, in order to come to some position which is both plausible and consistent.

Advisor

Thomson, Garrett

Department

Philosophy

Disciplines

Epistemology | Ethics and Political Philosophy

Keywords

Moral Particularism, Phenomenology, Quasi-Realism, Cognitive Expressivism

Publication Date

2020

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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