Abstract

This Independent Study thesis is divided into an introduction and three chapters. The introduction lays out the problem I am attempting to tackle. Namely, that too many accept a position towards ethics that moral claims are not truth-apt. I assert that this is false because moral realism is a stronger position philosophically, but that also there is a pragmatic use in accepting a moral realist position in fighting injustice.

Chapter One is meant as an introduction to metaethics. Some important distinctions are made such as the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Chapter one is meant to simply lay out a basic introduction to the philosophical field in which this paper is focused.

Chapter Two focuses on some recent stronger arguments for non-cognitivism (the view that moral claims are not truth-apt) and why I come to the conclusion that they fail philosophically. This chapter mainly focuses on projectivism and quasi-realism.

Chapter Three moves on to my pragmatic argument for moral realism. It should be noted that nothing I argue for in the third chapter points towards the truth of moral realism, rather it talks about what the pragmatic benefits are of accepting a moral realist position. I argue that non-cognitivism has so infiltrated the ideological superstructure in modern society, and that in turn we focus so much on the supposed “fact/opinion” distinction, which results in the downplaying of moral claims as being true and important.

Advisor

Rudisill, John

Department

Philosophy

Disciplines

Philosophy

Publication Date

2020

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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© Copyright 2020 Henry C. Lehmann