Abstract

Since the mid-twentieth century, nuclear weapons have played a major role in the policies of the states who wield them. Until the beginning of the twenty-first century, many scholars believed that nuclear weapons were a staple for deterrence due to their destructive power, namely Strategic Nuclear Weapons and especially regarding relations with states who also held nuclear weapons. This was due to a fear of mutual assured destruction. This project analyses the effect nuclear weapons (namely Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Nuclear Weapons) have on deterrence. I use Perfect Deterrence Theory as well as a number of statistical models to determine if nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent and if there is a difference in deterrence for the type of nuclear weapon a state controls. For this project, my primary research question is: how do Tactical Nuclear Weapons affect deterrence when compared to Strategic Nuclear Weapons?

Advisor

Bowling, Jeremey

Department

Political Science

Disciplines

International Relations

Keywords

Deterrence, Nuclear Deterrence, Perfect Deterrence

Publication Date

2017

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

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© Copyright 2017 Bradley Van Tyne