This project examines the modern tradition of the philosophy of time from its conception around the turn of the 20th Century. The argument begins in the first chapter with the simple observation that our discussion of time fails to adequately account for the content that time appears to either be composed of, or contain. An examination of McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time reveals the usefulness of a dual-aspect consideration of time, while critiquing where McTaggart makes his division. In the third chapter I make my argument for the two types of content, relational and phenomenological, governed by different conceptions of time, that can fit into this dual-aspect theory. Next, I look at how this construction of time compares to established time models. I argue for a recast of the growing block, that encompasses only the time of phenomenological content and not relational content, so the progression of phenomenological or ‘kairotic’ time can be considered as an accumulation of intentionally formed, meaningful content. The second aspect of time is time as the fourth dimension, which is simply another mode of extension that characterizes physical relations, and is not concerned with phenomenological content. I then set this dual-aspect theory of time against arguments in physics and philosophy that misconstrue or conflate the relationship between these two different types of time to point out the problems that having this distinction can help solve.


Schiltz, Elizabeth




Continental Philosophy | Metaphysics


time, spacetime, McTaggart

Publication Date


Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis



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