Following World War I, military planners were searching for a doctrine that moved away from trench warfare, which limited army movements and resulted in heavy casualties. During the inter-war period, British commanders J.F.C. Fuller and Sir Basil Liddell Hart, along with France’s Charles de Gaulle, were the first to study armored warfare. German general Heinz Guderian further expanded upon Fuller and Liddell Hart’s ideas and developed an armored doctrine that became the blueprint for Allied commanders. After studying Guderian, Patton formulated an American tank doctrine that maximized German strategy and American resources.
Although Fuller, Liddell Hart, de Gaulle, and Patton argued during the inter-war period for implementing an armored doctrine, their leaders opted to maintain the current static strategy, which focused on the infantry. Meanwhile, German commanders undertook the changes necessary to integrate armored doctrine into the armed forces. Germany’s quick success in Poland and France led the Allied nations to adapt their style of warfare to include an armored doctrine. Their adaptation of the German model eventually led the Allies to victory in World War II.
Logsdon, Christopher M., "In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of the Formulation of Armored Tank Doctrine in World War II" (2016). Senior Independent Study Theses. Paper 7099.
Bachelor of Arts
Senior Independent Study Thesis
© Copyright 2016 Christopher M. Logsdon