This research adds to the literature by applying a new model to the analysis of the interactions between school districts and teachers’ union. By utilizing an ultimatum game framework, a theoretical model of how the negotiation process between school districts and teachers’ unions influences the allocation of educational resources is created. This theoretical construct is then tested with an empirical model that tests the influence of union power upon the allocation of educational resources and the influence of the allocations of school resources upon educational attainment. This paper finds that although teachers’ unions do have an influence upon the allocation of school resources, those allocations of school resources do not have significant influence over educational attainment. As a result, this paper finds evidence that union power does not influence educational attainment but instead that independent variables outside the control of either party, school districts or teachers’ unions, are the major factors in determining levels of educational attainment.


Burnell, Barbara




Public Economics

Publication Date


Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis



© Copyright 2015 Timothy Duhon