This Independent Study thesis has three main components divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the problem that the thesis aims to answer: namely whether Strong AI is possible. It provides a brief introduction to the terms and issues vital to the understanding of the issue at large, and gives reasons for the process that will be undertaken in the paper. Chapter two, “Dennett’s Mechanical Mind”, and Chapter three, “Searle’s Biological Naturalism”, presents two dominant, yet disparate philosophies of mind pertaining to this issue in order to provide depth and background to the views to which this question gives rise.

Chapter four, “Computations”, and Chapter five “Intentionality”, explore in depth the two most important issues involved in Strong AI. “Computations” attempts to define what it is to be a computational state, and whether it is meaningful to categorize something as computational. “Intentionality” compares the views of intentionality provided from the philosophies of Dennett and Searle, and discusses their implications.

Chapter six, “A Problem and a Solution”, brings to light the problems involved in the previously discussed views of intentionality, and looks toward presenting a better, more sustainable view of intentionality. Finally, there is a chapter dedicated to discussing the implications of this more sustainable view of intentionality, and what that means for Strong AI.


Thomson, Garrett




Philosophy of Mind

Publication Date


Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis



© Copyright 2015 Nicholas L. Cullo