This paper examines the new Financial Fair Play policy instituted by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). The breakeven requirement introduced by Financial Fair Play stipulates that all teams involved in UEFA competitions must not spend more money than they make in a three-year period. The theoretical section of this paper explains how the current market might encourage overspending and further, that the three-year time horizon may not allow teams enough time to breakeven under the Financial Fair Play requirements. The empirical section of this paper uses a series of one-way ANOVA tests to determine whether the three-year time horizon is more efficient than other varying horizon lengths for pursuing UEFA’s ultimate goal of competition. The results of the one-way ANOVA test are insignificant, suggesting that the varying time horizon lengths do not affect the profitability of English Premier League teams subject to Financial Fair Play.


Mellizo, Philip


Business Economics


Soccer, UEFA, Financial Fair Play, FFP

Publication Date


Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis



© Copyright 2015 Philip J. Dalman