Many policymakers and academics have argued that harsh military strategies are counterproductive in the fight against terrorist forces. Using the behavioral economic constructs of the Dove-Hawk game and Monitoring theory, this paper strives to prove that cooperative strategies have the potential to improve results for both the government and the terrorist organization. Monitoring theory makes the theoretical claim that the firm and the employee can gain through mutual capitulation and increased exchanges of wages for effort. Similarly, this paper argues that both the government and the domestic terrorist organization can gain by utilizing more cooperative, incentive based policies, and less militaristic strategies. The thesis concludes with an empirical test of the model's hypotheses using panel data on domestic terrorist attacks in 112 countries over the years of 1997 to 2009.


Warner, James


International Relations


Behavioral Economics | International Relations | Political Science

Publication Date


Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis



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