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'You Are Who We Say You Are': The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Genocidal Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina

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**‘YOU ARE WHO WE SAY YOU ARE’:
The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Genocidal Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina**

Stephanie Sugars

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of Senior Independent Study
Department of Anthropology and International Relations Program

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Abstract

The establishment of peace in post-genocidal states is vital, as the experience of extreme division and violence can scar a population, contributing to violence and inequality moving forward. Existing literature on post-conflict transition and governance argues that two main systems are typically used: consociationalism and assimilationism. While consociationalism argues for heterogeneity in the state and assimilationism for homogeneity, both of these systems use the institutionalization of identity as a step in post-conflict recovery, through such means as proscribing or privileging particular identities. This study posits that this is inherently flawed, as attempts to institutionalize identity ignore its contextually fluid or fixed nature. In using Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda as case studies for the hypotheses of consociationalism and assimilationism, respectively, this research finds that such institutionalization not only fails to support development towards sustainable peace, but actually inhibits it. This supports the alternative hypothesis proposed by this study, that post-conflict recovery and reconciliation is dependent on 'thick' understandings of local contexts and the honoring of diversity over fixed categorization.

Résumé

C'est très important d'établir une véritable paix durable entre des états durant la période suivant un génocide puisque l'expérience de la division et de la violence extrême peut contribuer de la violence et à l'inégalité dans l'avenir. La littérature sur la transition post-conflit et sur la gouvernance existante affirment qu'il y a deux systèmes utilisés principalement : le consociationalisme, qui préfère l'hétérogénéité et l'assimilationnisme, qui préfère l'homogénéité. Ses deux systèmes utilisent l'institutionnalisation de l'identité dans le processus de la relance après un conflit ; cela se fait en interdisant ou privilégiant certaines identités. Cette étude soutient que ces arguments sont fondamentalement faux, parce que les tentatives d'institutionnaliser l'identité ignorent sa nature qui peut être selon le contexte fluide ou fixe. En utilisant la Bosnie-Herzégovine et le Rwanda comme objets d'études exemplifiant le consociationalisme et l'assimilationnisme, respectivement, cette recherche constate que de telles institutionnalisations ont non seulement échoué à soutenir le développement d'une paix durable, mais, qui plus est, l'inhibe. Cela justifie l'hypothèse alternative proposée par cette étude, selon laquelle le relèvement et la réconciliation post-conflit dépendent de compréhensions 'épaisses' des contextes locaux et du respect de la diversité plutôt d'une catégorisation fixe.

Sažetak

Uspostavljanje mira u zemljama u kojima se desio genocid je krucijalni proces, pogotovo ako u obzir uzmemo činjenicu da razor među stanovništvom i nasilje može da ostavi užasne tragove koji mogu uzrokovati nasilje i usporiti napredak. Postojeća literatura na temu post-konfliktne tranzicije i menadžmenta kaže da postoje dva glava sistema koja se nadopunjuju: konsolidovani nacionalizam i asimilacionizam. Dok konsolidovani nacionalizam zagovara heterogenost države a asimilacionizam homogenost, oba ova sistema koriste institucionalizaciju kao jedan identitet kao korak naprijed u post-konfliktnom oporavku. Kao metodu koriste pripisivanje ili privilegovanje određenih identiteta. Ova studija se zalaže za to da ova metoda ima određenih mana—činjenicu da pri pokušaju institucionalizacije identiteta ignoriše njegov kontekst čvrste ili tečne prirode. Koristeći primjer Bosne i Hercegovine i Ruande u studiji slučaja za hipotezu konsolidovanog nacionalizma i asimilacionalizma—ovo istraživanje kaže da je institucionalizacija nije najbolji način jer ona ne samo da pada ispit po pitanju napretka prema održivom miru, već ga ona spriječava. Ovo podupire alternativnu hipotezu za ovo istraživanje, da post-konfliktni oporavak i pomirenje zavise na pravom razumijevanju lokalnog konteksta i pridavanja više pažnje različitostima neko kategorizaciji.

Saxetak

Успостављање мира у земљама у којима се десио геноцид је круцијални процес, поготово ако у обзир узмемо чињеницу да разор међу становништвом и насиље може да остави ужасне трагове које могу узроковати насиље и успорити напредак. Постојећа литература на тему пост-конфликтне транзиције и менаџмента каже да постоје два глава система, која се надопуњују: консолидовани национализам и асимилационизм. Док консолидовани национализам заговара хетерогеност државе а асимилационизм хомогеност, оба ова система користе институционализацију као један идентитет као корак напријед у пост-конфликтном опоравку. Као методу користе приписивање или привилеговање одређених идентитета. Ова студија се залаже за то да ова метода има одређених мана—чињеницу да при покушају институционализације идентитета игнорише његов контекст чврсте или течне природе. Користећи примјер Босне и Херцеговине и Руанде у студији случаја за хипотезу консолидованог национализма и асимилационализма—ово истраживање каже да институционализација није најбољи начин јер она не само да пада испит по питању напретка према одрживом миру, већ га она спријечава. Ово подупире алтернативну хипотезу за ово истраживање, да пост-конфликтни опоравак и помирење зависе на правом разумијевању локалног контекста и придавања више пажње различитостима неко категоризацији.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Almost twenty years have passed since end of the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with the cessation of mass atrocities came the implementation of new forms of governance. But how do communities that were so violently divided work towards a better future and a sustainable peace? It is this puzzle that drives this research, and its answer impacts both institutions and individuals alike. Living in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina it was common to hear locals speak of the state as caught in a frozen conflict, the war continuing through political and social avenues rather than violent, militaristic ones. But two decades have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, an agreement intended to bring an end to the war as well as set up the constitutional structure of the state in the post-conflict period: one would expect the state to have higher employment, political participation, respect for human rights, and improved inter-ethnic relations. Similarly, the governance system instituted in Rwanda is defined by single-party rule—which some argue reaches the level of authoritarianism—and issues of poverty, inequality, and development persist in Rwanda.

Rogers Brubaker asserts that “institutional design can either exacerbate or ameliorate ethnic and national conflicts... good institutional design can give political actors incentives to work around ethnic and national conflicts, to disregard them for certain purposes, to frame political rhetoric and political claims in nonethnic or transethnic terms” (1998:281). So what exactly is a “good institutional design”? Does the Bosnian consociational system protect the ethnic groups from being dominated, or does it institutionalize ethnicity and discrimination? Does the Rwandan system allow for the population to move beyond the ethnic affiliations that were the basis of such astounding violence, or does it homogenize and suppress dissenting opinions? The answer to these questions can dictate the policy choices made in post-ethnicized

conflict countries so as to ensure that their efforts toward reconstruction and the prevention of future conflict are successful. Thus, the central research question addressed by this study is: *Does the way in which identity is constructed in post-genocidal states affect post-conflict recovery?*

The focus of this study on the importance of identity construction, ethnicity, memory, and communal relations places it solidly within the area of interest of the discipline of anthropology. For example, questions of the fluid versus fixed nature of identity are still of considerable interest to anthropologists, particularly regarding the ways in which conceptions of the self are directed and confined by the influences of a variety of actors: in this case, the state. The importance of this topic to international relations and political science is equally self-evident, as the results of this study can have implications for further research and praxis in peace and conflict studies, development, and international intervention. More significantly, however, this research addresses the ways in which these areas of academic focus overlap: how memory of the past is a vital component of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts; how reestablishing positive communal relations is necessary for sustainable development; and how the manner in which identity is conceptualized and constructed in a state is often a focus when structuring governance systems, especially in post-genocidal states. Ultimately, this research works to address how societies work to recover from genocidal violence and determine which post-conflict structures are more or less effective than others.

This research is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature and theory pertinent to this topic, divided into three sections that focus on identity theory and construction; post-conflict studies; and identity politics in the governance of post-conflict states. In addition, this chapter introduces the two hypotheses proposed by the literature and

tested in this research as well as the alternative hypothesis projected by this study. Chapter 3 explains the methodological design utilized in this study—a comparative case study of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda—which relies on quantitative macro data gathered from existing data sets and statistical analyses and qualitative micro data gathered through interviews, participant observation, and content analysis. Included in this chapter as well is a discussion of ethics of post-conflict research, how the data will be analyzed, and the limitations and challenges posed by the method. Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 present the in depth case analyses performed through analysis of the micro-level, qualitative data of the two states, focusing on four elements determined to be vital for sustainable peace: political design fairness and efficacy, positive communal relations, economic recovery, and transitional justice. Chapter 5 turns to the macro-level, quantitative data, analyzing the results of six data sources, comparing these results to those determined from the micro-level analysis, and, finally, evaluating the hypotheses proposed by the literature and the implications for the alternative hypothesis. And the final Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this research for theory and literature, methodology, and policy, as well as what avenues of future investigation this study reveals.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

Identity, Categorization, and Connection

Following the genocide of the Armenians and the Holocaust in the mid-twentieth century, there have been nearly fifty genocides/politicides, and despite the repeated cries of politicians—“Never again!” and “Not on our watch!”—the world's ability to explain and respond to, let alone prevent, genocide is limited (Harff 2003, 57). While primordialists maintain that deep-seated 'ethnic hatreds' are the root of these atrocities, more recent approaches have taken to looking at genocide as a strategic policy option chosen by those in power to satisfy particular goals. Constructivist theory enriches this approach, adding the additional considerations of “identity and interests and how these can change,” believing that “ideas, values, norms, and shared beliefs matter, that how individuals talk about the world shapes practices, that humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas, and hence that it is necessary to show how identities and interests of actors are 'socially constructed’” (Karns and Mingst 2010, 50). Identity has become ever more politicized in the modern world, with 'ethnic' or 'nationalistic' elements existing in most modern conflicts: take, for instance, the recent case of Crimea, where the population's Russian identification was used as justification for the annexation of the territory. Given this, it is important now to understand the ways in which identities and the groups and categories they are tied to are constructed—particularly if one hopes to prevent the use of identification as a basis of violent internal conflict—as well as the role of identity in post-conflict recovery and governance.

Identity as a Concept

'Identity' is one of the most pervasive concepts in social science scholarship, and is used to explain a daunting variety of phenomena, from nationalism and ethnic conflict to

psychoanalysis, and is oft used in discussions of 'race', 'nation', 'citizenship', 'class', 'tradition', 'culture', 'community', and 'ethnicity'. With this broad usage of the term expanding beyond academic circles with particular force in the 1990s, 'identity' has become so broad as to lose almost all meaning according to Rogers Brubaker (2004). He argues that there are five ways in which identity is used as an analytical term: (1) as noninstrumental and particularistic; (2) as collective and involving an inherent 'sameness'; (3) as deep and foundational; (4) as processual and interactive; and (5) as fluctuating and fragmented. The second and third are often grouped together as hard, or essentialist, understandings of identity, while the fourth and fifth are grouped as soft, or constructivist, understandings. Noninstrumental and particularistic conceptions of identity are compatible with both essentialist and constructivist schools.

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) critique the utility of 'identity' as a categorization altogether, criticizing the seemingly wide spectrum of signification and conceptualization. Believing that the two main uses of identity correspond with the dichotomous distinctions of 'hard' and 'soft' understandings, they argue that neither can meaningfully be applied to legitimate, scholarly research. 'Hard' conceptions of identity, they argue, can only be used to refer to categories of everyday practice—such as ethnicity, nationality, etc.—as this better corresponds to the “bounded groupness” and “self-sameness over time” that fit the core meaning of 'identity' (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 27; 2000, 11). 'Soft' conceptualizations, on the other hand, are seen as “*too* weak to do useful theoretical work” resulting from their efforts to “cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable 'hard' connotations, [and] their insistence that identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, and so on” (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 11). The result, they believe, is a concept too fluid to clearly conceptualize, let alone operationalize.

A number of academics continue to subscribe to this clean division between the

approaches, often at the very least operating under the banner of one of the camps (e.g., Connor 1994, Huntington 1996). This division is, however, a false dichotomy that oversimplifies the nature of identity and its formation. Sökefeld (2001) contests Brubaker and Cooper's dismissal of 'identity' as an analytical term, arguing that the same elements that lead them to reject identity are essential to its usefulness. In his opinion, it is “the duality of essentialist and constructivist readings, of identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis” that gives the term real meaning and utility (Sökefeld 2001, 538). This concept of identity “reminds us strongly that identities, although posed by actors as singular, continuous, and bounded can be shown to be subject to the condition of plurality, intersectionality, and difference” (Sökefeld 2001, 538). Indeed, though identity can be constantly negotiated and may fluctuate over time, elements can calcify or crystallize based on particular influences or forces. In other words, it is not that the elements that comprise one's identity change drastically, but rather their centrality and salience that can and do fluctuate over time and from context to context, all while categories of classification can experience definitional shifts. Heleen Touquet speaks to this process, referring to the process as reification whereby the boundaries between distinct categories are made very strict (2011, 160).

This process of reification is equally as important for the processes of collective identity formation as it is for those driving individual identifications. Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as bounded and homogenous, “but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms,” and one should view “ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes” (Brubaker 2004, 11; see also Nagel 1994). Some take this understanding to mean that identity, race, nationalism, and ethnicity are not real—this is a misguided understanding, for while they may lack an

'objective reality', they are real inasmuch as individuals believe that they have an 'identity' and act upon that assumption (Kertzel & Arel 2004, 20). Therefore, research in areas relating to these identifications and classifications are best served not by disputing the power, reality, or significance of identifications, but rather by illustrating that they are subject to reification, construction, and reconstruction, and are therefore much more complex than either an essentialist or primordialist conceptualization alone would suggest.

Identity Construction

Given the influence of these categorizations and their role as a means of “perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world,” questions of what agents are capable of influencing them and to what ends they are shaped are crucial to a fuller understanding (Brubaker 2004, 17). Analyses performed to this end must focus on the “constructed” elements of identification, looking at the “ways in which ethnic boundaries, identities, and cultures, are negotiated, defined, and produced through social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities” (Nagel 1994, 152). The creation and politics of categories can be studied from above and below. From above, the focus is placed on “the ways in which categories are proposed, propagated, imposed, institutionalized, discursively articulated, or organizationally entrenched;” from below, however, the “ways in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade, or transform the categories that are imposed on them” are emphasized (Brubaker 2004, 13). Individuals, social movements, government, and ethnopolitical entrepreneurs are among the actors that have the strongest impacts on how individuals self-identify and represent themselves in relation to others.

Individuals have a degree of agency when choosing how they self-identify, but in many cases the “set of ethnic identities” from which they choose is “limited to socially and politically

defined ethnic categories with varying degrees of stigma or advantage attached to them. In some cases, the array of available ethnicities can be quite restricted and constraining” (Nagel 1994, 156). This approach to individual self-representation frames ethnicity and, indeed, all forms of self-representation as rational choices—elements of identification can be emphasized or de-emphasized as “part of a strategy to gain personal or collective political or economic advantage” (Nagel 1994, 159). This research posits that the way in which an individual chooses to identify themselves may—and most often does—vary over time and from context to context.

Social movements can promote identification along particular lines, frequently in opposition to existing categories. In these instances, awareness campaigns and public appeals are utilized to gain the support of individuals who feel under-served by the recognized or emphasized identifications. Activists involved in promoting nationalist identities, for example, “believe that the identities they are promoting are primordial, and therefore not a matter of choice. Yet they are concerned that many of their co-ethnics are not fully aware of their own 'true' identity, and so must be reminded of their roots” (Kertzer & Arel 2004, 28). Thus, actors—in many cases NGOs, religious or ethnic groups, or other special interest groups—draw on narratives of subversion and discrimination based on identifications externally imposed (e.g., by the state, political actors, etc.) on perceived members of the group as a foundation for increasing the salience of a particular identity.

Additionally, 'ethnopolitical entrepreneurs' are positioned in such a way as to readily exploit existing or emerging identifications to their greatest personal benefit. These entrepreneurs include those who build, support, or work in association with memorialization efforts as well as collective trauma and memory. While often individuals acting on their own, these entrepreneurs can represent the interests of religious groups, political movements, and

community leaders. This can also include social movements, which mobilize on a grassroots level, advocating along the spectrum of identification, advocating categories from the ultra-national to the civic. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs can not only invoke groups, but in so doing bring them into being, reifying them and therefore contributing to how they manifest in the world. When these efforts are successful, “the political fiction of the unified group can be momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice” (Brubaker 2004, 10). They can then ride the wave, bringing them money and influence.

Ethno-national politicians are similar to ethnopolitical entrepreneurs insofar as they profit from the development and enforcement of boundaries dividing national and ethnic groups. Their efforts are most frequently directed at “generating and sustaining putatively interethnic conflict,” as this is what keeps them in power (Brubaker 2004, 20). It is less that ethno-national politicians are invested in the ethnic differentiation for its own sake, but rather are simply interested in remaining in power, as they are unable to offer other successful-- often economic or political—solutions to existing societal problems, they turn to being elected based on ethnic belonging. Extending beyond the nationalist politicians, the influence of government and official state policies in identification and categorization of the population cannot be exaggerated. Indeed, government structure sets the stage on which all other actors act, and is thus capable of setting or limiting the paths available to these actors. Most directly, state-designated categories are routinely utilized, particularly for official use in censuses. These categorizations have a number of influences, most notably they can:

serve to reinforce or reconstruct ethnic boundaries... The political recognition of a particular ethnic group can not only reshape the designated group's self-awareness and organization, but can also increase identification and mobilization among ethnic groups not officially recognized, and thus promote new ethnic formation. ... Official ethnic categories and politics can also strengthen ethnic boundaries by

serving as the basis for discrimination and repression, and thus reconstruct the meaning of particular ethnicities. ... Political policies and designations have enormous power to shape patterns of ethnic identification when politically controlled resources are distributed along ethnic lines (Nagel 1994, 157-58).

The ability of states and their bureaucracies to “name, refuse to name, count and categorize their populations” grant them the “power to discipline [their populations] into thinking of themselves along the very lines of these categorical ways of counting” (Markowitz 2007, 46; see also Kertz & Arel 2004, 33). The intent behind these categorizations is rarely inherently malicious; categorization is a tool used to classify and compartmentalize the population in a way that is both easy for the state to manage and that preserves or pursues a particular power structure.

Collective/Communal Identity

Elites and states classify and compartmentalize populations out of necessity, as this facilitates governance to a considerable extent. But these groups form in more than name alone, gathering into collective identities under the influence of numerous forces, several of which were mentioned above. A number of scholars—namely Jenkins (1994) and Wimmer (2008)—argue that not only can one identify a distinction between an 'ethnic category' and an 'ethnic group', but that this distinction is clear enough to be used in research. They propose an approach that sees an 'ethnic category' as something that can be imposed from above and an 'ethnic group' as something which is based more on self-identification and feelings of connection and belonging. While there would certainly be overlap between these definitions, this seems like a risky, if not completely unfounded distinction. As the elements that foster feelings of connection and belonging and the definitions used for self-identification shift over time and under the influence of a variety of sources, there is no definitive way to declare one

identification as simply a 'category' while presumably raising another up as a 'group'. In addition, this attempted division bears traces of primordial understandings of ethnicity and group identities, relying on a believed essential or inherent trait or unifying truth with immutable and lasting commonalities and ignoring the ways in which identities can and do change.

The concept of group/collective identity “addresses the 'we-ness' of a group, stressing the similarities of shared attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo 1997, 386). Benedict Anderson uses the term “imagined community” to define nation, though this conceptualization can be applied more broadly to other forms of collective identity. These communities are 'imagined' because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). The nation is understood to be a bounded, sovereign community constructed by its members through assigning it reality which it would otherwise lack.

It is important to remember, however, that these collective identities are not homogenous and individuals can belong to more than one collectivity at a time. Amin Maalouf (2001) argues that rhetoric that speaks to a single, constant, and 'true' essence or identity points to a view of humanity that essentializes and homogenizes, dangerous for its possible use as fuel for spurring inter-group conflict. He speaks to the complex composition of identity from his own experience of not multiple, distinctive identities, but an identity constructed from a variety of elements, influences, and 'affiliations,' writing:

Each individual's identity is made up of a number of elements, and these are clearly not restricted to the particulars set down in official records. Of course, for the great majority these factors include allegiance to a religious tradition; to a nationality—

sometimes two; to a profession, an institution, or a particular social milieu. ... Of course, not all these allegiances are equally strong, at least at any given moment. But none is entirely insignificant, either. All are components of personality—we might almost call them 'genes of the soul' so long as we remember that most of them are not innate (Maalouf 2001, 10-11).

It is reification of elements of identity at certain points in time and under certain conditions that determines the 'hierarchy' of elements of identification which is not immutable, but rather “changes with time, and in so doing brings about fundamental changes in behaviour” (Maalouf 2001, 13).

'Ethnicity', then, can be seen as the present balance of political and symbolic struggles “over the categorical divisions of society” (Wimmer 2008, 985; see also Bourdieu 1991). Indeed, the meanings and expectations assigned to membership in a specific identification, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or other group can shift as the values, goals, and boundaries of those groups move over time as a result of political, social, and cultural changes (Tilley 1997, 511). Take the following examples: the understanding of what it meant to be 'Yugoslavian' shifted as the country began to collapse in 1990 and territories that were part of Yugoslavia gained independence, and the implication behind identifying as “French” may have shifted as staunch nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant political groups have increased in influence. Political actors are able to influence how individuals conceive of themselves as members of a particular community and what benefits or responsibilities that membership entails through affecting the ways in which membership is determined and who is included or excluded by that definition. Thus, the actions of elites, politicians, or other influential actors can have considerable impact not only on how an individual negotiates their identity as members or non-members of particular groups, but also impact the boundaries of those groups

themselves.

Actors outside of the state can also influence the development of social categorizations, often through less direct means, such as the integration or adoption of external identifications and norms or providing an alternative model, though more direct action or intervention are not unheard of. Booth, looking at the modern world and processes of globalization, argues that “identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles” (1991, 542). This research takes the perspective that contrary to what some alarmists in academia have claimed, the rise in globalization and even in a 'cosmopolitan' identification, this shift does not spell the outright decline of nations nor their influence. Rather, echoing Hall's (1991) concept of multiple 'selves', international influences can shift the ways in which identity is understood, framed, and prioritized, but lacks the capacity to single-handedly eliminate an identification.

One of the largest forms of influence on identity formation outside of a state comes through the fostering particular ideologies or norms. Norms are defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors” (Checkel 1999, 83). This begins to explain how international actors can influence the development of identification, relating back to the ways in which changes in values, beliefs, and goals of a group correspond with changes in communal identification, the borders of the identification, and the meanings associated with membership. Historically, the largest example of this is the spread of Western values, particularly concerning nationalism, as these concepts drastically shifted understandings of communal identity and rights as well as relations within states. This influence can also manifest as models of alternative means through which to organize the system, changing the ways in which individuals conceptualize the present state of their group within the broader society as

well as how they envision their future (Göçek 1993). In modern circumstances, while Western influence continues to dominate and spread through soft power and cultural exchange, the rapid improvements in communication and information technology over the past few decades have facilitated dialogue between groups and at such speeds as would have been previously unimaginable (Marden 1997, 44). Additionally, increased ability to connect and communicate with individuals from a variety of backgrounds and experiences changes perceptions of one's identity; it can even serve as fruitful ground for the creation of communal identifications based not around ethnicity, language, or shared history, but rather on shared interests or experiences, such as the large communities that have formed around digital role playing games (Corneliussen & Rettberg 2008).

The ways in which membership is defined and the importance of elements that form the basis of shared identification are altered by shifts in values, goals, and knowledge of the group, unsurprisingly influencing the understood boundaries of the group. For example, since the Balkan wars of the 1990s, there is a considerable importance placed on Serbs practicing Orthodox Christianity, to such an extent that many believe one cannot truly be Serb without being Orthodox. Alternatively, officials are endowed with the power to determine what are or are not 'legitimate' categorizations: take post-genocidal Rwanda—viewed as a step towards reconciliation and recovery for the deeply scarred country, abolition of the ethnic terms 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and 'Twa' was intended to remove their social and cultural salience and force, dramatically shifting not only the terms in which individuals could self-identify but potentially shifting the ways in which communal and social environments were understood.

Max Weber was among the first scholars to discuss the profound impact the formation of ethnic groups has on social realities. He developed a concept of 'social closure' to describe

the establishment of firmer boundaries between groups and their resulting impact on, namely, access to resources, rights, and opportunities. This concept is now supported by a number of scholars and academics (Barth 1969; Lamont 2000; Loveman 1997; Alba 2005; Tilly 2006). This is particularly relevant to this research as it forms part of the foundation for arguing that the ways in which boundaries between groups are drawn—particularly by state officials and elites—are crucial to understanding conditions within that state. Memory is one of the most powerful tools of these actors who, by emphasizing or deemphasizing particular aspects of a (presumed to be) shared history, can change who is or is not included in conceptions of communal belonging, the values and aims of the group, and what group membership entails and signifies.

Collective Memory in Identity Construction

Collective memory is crucial to identity formation, serving as the foundation of tradition, language, religion, and kinship, among others, and emphasizing one aspect of collective memory over another can shift the ways in which membership is understood. Remembering is a powerful creating force as it contributes substantially to identity construction and feelings of belonging; culture is a learned behavior and conceptions of identity, belonging, and the boundaries of 'us' and 'them' are equally learned (Nora 2001, 10-11). Forgetting, too, is a central element of the construction of communal identity; Renan writes, “The essential element of a nation is that all its individuals must have many things in common but it must also have forgotten many things” (Renan 1822 quoted in Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 132). It is through a balance of strategic remembering and strategic forgetting that one can shift the salience of particular identities or their elements within a societal context.

Some of the most influential conversations about memory and the utility of forgetting

were begun by Nietzsche, who argued in favor of a forgetting that entailed the outright cleansing or removal of certain experiences from collective and individual memory. Buckley-Zistel sees a sizable problem with this approach to memory and the past, especially within the context of post-conflict states; she argues that “forgetting, deleting or obliterating [memories of atrocity and pain] takes away people's legitimate urge to articulate grievance and to have their traumas recognised” (2006c, 19). Beyond this, by removing means through which to express and work through this pain can increase the impact of wounds and perpetuate feelings of victimization or marginalization. In the words of French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, “forgetting the extermination is part of the extermination itself” (quoted in Minow 2002).

Gadamer (1975) suggests, as a response to this criticism, that one should not abandon memories of the past but rather reevaluate the way in which these events are remembered. Through the application of the hermeneutic process of understanding (discussed in greater detail in the next section), Gadamer argues that it is possible to change the way in which certain events are remembered, and in turn shift the ways in which these memories are interpreted. When comparing the frameworks of Nietzsche and Gadamer, “one could paraphrase Nietzsche as suggesting 'forget the past, it did not happen', and Gadamer to say, 'look at your past, are there not different ways of interpreting it?'” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 19).

This concept of a flexible history is incredibly important when one remembers that communal identity and feelings of shared belonging are often shaped or encouraged by historical commonalities, shared traumas, and mutual antagonists. When, as previously mentioned, particular actors use their positions of authority or influence to shift the ways in which this history is remembered, they can alter the narratives used to construct both the group identity as well as the identity of the 'others'. These narratives can, in many cases, take the form

of a “cognitive frame,” defined as “a mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others” (Oberschall 2000, 989). This is not an inevitably negative or violent process: while it is possible that this “redefinition of the collective identity” could be based on feelings of antagonism or victimhood at the hands of an (former) enemy, it could alternatively allow for the weakening or increased permeability of boundaries to allow increased opportunities “for a more peaceful co-existence” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 20). Oberschall argues, however, that there are two frames that already exist in the minds of a population: a normal frame and a crisis frame. He argues that both frames are based in private and family experiences, history, culture, and public life and that the level of conflict and crisis determines which frame is dominant and which is suppressed. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs utilize fear and hate to shift the public into the crisis frame, primarily through the use of news, political discourse, education, history, literature, popular culture, and the arts (Oberschall 2000, 990). It is thus crucial for attempts to mediate potentially violent identities to address both frames in a meaningful way.

Identity in Post-Conflict States

Conflict—another rather pervasive term—is used to refer to circumstances in which two actors in contact with one another “pursue incompatible goals, are aware of this incompatibility, and claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular course of action” (Wolff 2004, 1). ‘Ethnic conflict’, therefore, is operationalized as a conflict in which the goals of at least one of the parties to the conflict and the distinction between the parties are defined—in whole or in part—using ethnic terms. “Resolving” ethnic conflict, then, requires addressing the ways in which at least one party felt that their rights to expression, representation, and

recognition as members of this community were infringed upon, due to the fact that once this ethnic lens or 'frame' has been applied to the conflict, at least one party “interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies, along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide” (Wolff 2004, 1). Failure to address this frame and its influences in the post-conflict state can breed future conflict aimed at addressing similarly framed grievances, and a focus on war and security alone obstructs considerations of the socially constructed nature of boundaries and how they facilitate or discourage violence.

So then, what precisely are 'post-conflict' recovery, transition, and reconciliation, and why are they important?

The Opportunity of Post-Conflict

Post-conflict periods are volatile episodes during which identities are in a state of flux. Often “antagonism prevails since the experience of bloodshed and loss has marked people for life, rendering group identity even more relevant than at the beginning of the hostilities” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 8). While this is a period of changeability, often times both or all sides of the conflict end up trapped in narrow, rigid collective identities. This does not mean, however, that there is no opportunity for positive change towards a more stable and peaceful society (Ignatieff 1998; Lederach 1999; Bloomfield et al. 2003). Ultimately, the post-conflict period is laden with the creation of new identities as well as the renegotiation of identities that were central to the conflict, and the task facing legislators, international actors, and scholars is understanding which forms of identity construction perpetuate the potential for future violence and which ones have the capacity to reducing it.

There are risks associated with this volatile period. First and foremost, as was demonstrated by the list and analysis of impact of various actors capable of affecting identity

construction, it is necessary to be cognizant of the power hierarchies at play and which determine the outcome (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 21). It is not enough to simply look at the type of actors that are involved in this renegotiation of communal boundaries, but one must also take into account the political, social, and economic forces that are at play which advantage or disadvantage certain actors or narratives. In relation to this research, this issue is—unsurprisingly—incredibly relevant as it begins to parse out the ways in which approaches to post-conflict circumstances can influence social realities and result in long-term repercussions for political, social, and economic progress. For example, certain approaches to post-conflict transformation approach it as 'closure', which can “put a lid on the constant interpretation of past, present and future;” this can ultimately prevent the “continuous negotiation of self and other necessary conditions for a diverse and vibrant society with space for contestation and dissent” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 16). Lacking this open space, Buckley-Zistel argues, conflict, contestation, and exclusion are inevitable. The more rigid the boundaries enforced by the elite and political system are, the more likely it is that these boundaries will fail to align with personal and individual feelings of belonging, particularly as this closing of the discussion on boundaries leads to a homogenization and narrowing of the 'acceptable' groups (Touquet 2011, 160).

Towards a Post-ethnic Understanding

There is considerable debate as to whether the space dividing 'official' categorizations and individuals' self-identifications is widening or shrinking on a global scale. Given that during most of human history individuals' identification was wholly self-dependent and communal only on the local level, the divide could be said to be narrowing as people become more and more used to and comfortable with the categories that are being imposed on them.

Simultaneously, however, there is considerable opportunity for official categorizations to fail to align or encompass the categories with which individuals identify, as is suggested by Touquet (2011), or for the state to overlook the intersectionality of a variety of identifications as the foundation of the 'self'. This space, whatever size it may be, can prove to be fertile ground for the development of 'alternative' identities, or identities that are excluded from the official categorizations. Social movement research has shown that “collective identities are often formed in opposition to the dominant views and discourses” (Touquet 2011, 160). This reveals an opportunity for bringing state sanctioned categorizations into closer correspondence with the categories that individuals use for self-representation. While ethno-national politicians, ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, and other elites maintain an essentialized, fundamentalist understanding of identification, their opposition has fallen into the trap of the other extreme of the spectrum, creating a good/bad dichotomy with civic identity as inherently good and ethnic identity as inherently bad (Armakolas 2011, 127).

A number of scholars and academics stand in opposition to this black and white division, arguing that not only is this a false dichotomy, but also a dangerous one. Both of these perspectives fail to recognize the complex matrix of fluid and crystallized identifications, built in innumerable layers, that comprise the sense of self (Phillips 2002). Phillips notes further that “important questions concerning the comparative significance of different tiers of imagined community for self-identity have been little explored” (2002, 598).

A 'postethnic' understanding may be a useful approach for the study of identification and the forces that have varying levels of influence on their manifestation, extending beyond the simple, dualistic understandings of self-identification. 'Postethnic' theory acknowledges the 'real' foundations for many identifications, while also remaining cognizant of the fact that

identifications are fluid and changeable under particular conditions (Touquet 2011, 157). It is more applicable than many other theories to this research because “a postethnic perspective recognizes the psychological value and political function of bounded groups of affiliation, but it resists a rigidification of the ascribed distinctions between persons that universalists and cosmopolitans have so long sought to diminish” (Hollinger 1995, 107). In the context of this research, a post-ethnic perspective allows for analysis of ethnopolitical systems without discounting the importance of ethnic belonging to individuals and its historical foundations, while also recognizing that communal identification and boundaries can be influenced and shaped by political elites and other actors so as to garner them greater power and influence.

Utility of Deconstruction and Hermeneutics in Post-Conflict Studies

The term 'deconstruction' is inherently associated with such things as demolition, dismantling, or criticism of everything from buildings to existing paradigms of thought. Deconstruction as a philosophical concept strongly argued by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, however, aims to increase awareness of the gaps and missteps of dominant discourses and paradigms (Critchley 1999, 23). Put into other words, it works to reveal that everything—including “texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions,... that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy” (Caputo 1997, 31). This theory simultaneously reveal the ways in which understanding of such 'texts' as ethnicity, tradition, etc. are constructed and understood through particular lenses and challenges the propagation of these theories as singular or ultimate truths. Deconstruction is of particular utility in post-conflict scholarship and policy as it challenges “the relations of power which, in dealing with difference, move from disturbance to oppression, from irritation to repression, and ... from contestation to

eradication” (Campbell 1998, 514). Campbell continues, arguing for the necessity of the “struggle for alterity,” or a society or system in which diversity is not only tolerated but encouraged and valued as a source of additional perspectives and approaches for addressing the challenges of the modern world (Campbell 1998, 514; 1992, 5). And in so doing, deconstruction can revive the voices of the silenced, oppressed, and eradicated (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 7).

But deconstruction does not stand alone as a theory of understanding influential in considerations of identification, particularly in post-conflict circumstances. 'Hermeneutics' is translated directly as 'understanding' or 'interpretation', and can be used in the context of this paper to refer to “how identities change in the process of understanding between self and other, or between parties to a conflict” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 4). This begins to illustrate the connection of hermeneutics to constructivist theories, expanded by Caputo's deceptively simplistic statement that “we understand as we do because we exist as we do” (Caputo 1987, 61). As it pertains particularly to the 'in-between' according to German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer—between war and peace, friend and enemy, the parties to the conflict, and territorial boundaries—considerations of hermeneutics enable engaging with the boundaries and identification, how they change, and how they normatively should be (Gadamer 1975, 295). This normative dimension brings into consideration the ways in which changing identities and boundaries could be directed so as to be 'successful'; Buckley-Zistel (2006c) defines this success as being able to prevent the outbreak of subsequent violence moving forward in the future. This research hopes to recognize the various elements of this somewhat simplistic definition of success. To this end, it argues that a successful conflict resolution and post-conflict transformation is one which not only stops immediate violence, but allows for

representation of all sectors of the society, is economically and environmentally sustainable, and promotes understanding and communication across social divisions and demarcations.

While differing in approach, hermeneutics and deconstruction do not stand in opposition to one another, but rather hand in hand: “in contrast to deconstruction, which seeks to liberate difference, hermeneutics... calls for an engagement with difference” (Buckley-Zistel 2006c, 17). These approaches are certainly compatible and arguably work together to enrich efforts to problematize dominant discourses of identity and boundaries between groups as well as address the ways in which these understandings can change. It is equally important to this research to have both an “opening of space for the other,” as is at the forefront of deconstruction, in addition to “conceptualizing a process of post-conflict transformation” that “ends” the conversation (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 17). This “ending” of conversation is not to say that new, fixed boundaries are established; quite the opposite, the focus of hermeneutics is to challenge existing structures in a way that demonstrates the ineffectiveness of fixed boundaries, particularly as they can be used as fodder or motivation for dissent and eventual conflict. Through opening a space for disagreement and alternative discourses in a post-conflict space, the risk of renewed conflict is mitigated considerably.

Conflict and Its Memories

The ways in which ethnicity is conceptualized and framed within post-conflict states is a crucial aspect of reconciliation, reconstruction, and transformation processes. As was previously discussed, memory—especially in post-conflict contexts—is crucial to understanding what constitutes membership in a particular group and where precisely the line is between 'us' and 'them'. The memory of conflict can be negotiated through a variety of means, though amongst the most common are 'chosen trauma' and 'chosen amnesia'. 'Chosen trauma'

refers to when “a group draws a traumatic event into its very identity in order to reproduce its collective identity,” or, rather, when a group feels victimized and uses that shared sense of persecution as the foundation for a unifying identity in opposition to a particular 'other', which is most often the group they frame as the aggressor of the past trauma (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 8; see also Volkan 1991, Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 134). Alternatively, 'chosen amnesia' refers to when “a traumatic event is deliberately excluded from the discourse in order to prevent a sense of closure and to undermine the drawing of fixed boundaries of who is inside and who is outside a particular we-group” (Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 134). This approach is not inherently negative, as it can open a space for the formation of new groups or less homogenized understandings of groups, but it can also perpetuate feelings of victimization and, in allowing the divisions that fueled the initial conflict to persist, leave the door open to future conflict.

It is, however, a central focus of states in the aftermath of violent internal conflict to address and resolve the antagonisms that fueled the initial conflicts. Many scholars and politicians alike view the extension of forgiveness in some as a necessary step in this process toward recovery. Derrida (2001[1997]) contemplates the concept of 'pure forgiveness', asserting that forgiveness can only be offered by the victim or on behalf of the victim, and does not necessarily have to correspond with judicial or political action or outcomes. Additionally, absolute, pure forgiveness can only be offered when the two parties—the victim and the perpetrator—are involved; with third party involvement, interests in amnesty, reparation, reconciliation, etc. cloud the process and make the offering of pure, unbiased, uninfluenced forgiveness impossible.

Derrida struggles, however, with the division between “pure forgiveness in its impossibility and the practical, political demand for peace that forgiveness, however

illegitimately, satisfies” (Guyer 2001:1115). He challenges the necessity, and perhaps even the validity, of extensions of a 'finalized forgiveness', believing that it is “only a political strategy or a psycho-therapeutic economy” (Derrida 2001[1997]:50). His questions of whether forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation and whether a 'finalized forgiveness' is anything more than a political strategy are of particular relevance to this research. He proposes that “according to the situation and according to the moments, the responsibilities to be taken are different” (Derrida 2001:56). In other words, under some conditions it is necessary to bring to light the particulars of conflict, to fully investigate the human rights abuses, and to never forget the details of the violations and the violators; in others, however, a degree of pushing aside memories is crucial for making progress toward reconciliation. This provides a nuanced understanding otherwise lacking in a field that commonly looks to broadly applicable solutions or a sort of 'copy/paste' policy. Nietzsche and Gadamer's debate is reflected in this nuance, taking a position closer to Gadamer's: memory should not be obliterated as Nietzsche suggests, but rather one must recognize that there are degrees to which forgetting can be used as a means of moving past trauma and not using it as a means to perpetuate antagonistic relationships (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 19). In addition, Derrida's postmodernist focus on language is informative when researching the tactics employed by different governments towards post-conflict reconciliation, as is the purpose of this research.

Ultimately, memory and memorialization lie at the heart of post-conflict and recovery processes, as the ways in which we understand the past undeniably inform the way we perceive the present and move forward into the future. In the words of Buckley-Zistel, “Today's tales of enemies and friends derive at the same time from the parties' visions of their past *and* their future, from where they think they come from as well as where they want to go to. Identity is

therefore negotiated in the constant backwards and forwards movement of past, present and future” (2006c, 15). Thus, the question this research raises is, how does the way in which memories of the past and what this means for identification in the modern state influence the ways in which states move forward, their stability and security, and the communal and social relations between different groups within a state? In this way, 'peace'—or simply the official cessation of violent conflict—is only the beginning of the process towards a peaceful state and society, and understanding the mechanisms detailed in this section is crucial for building a sustainable peace, using the fullest definition of the term.

Governance and Governing Identity

As Wimmer writes:

Obviously enough, only those in control of the state apparatus can use the census and the law to enforce a certain boundary. Only those in control of the means of violence will be able to force their ethnic scheme of interpretation onto reality by killing... or resettling... Discrimination by those who control decisions over whom to hire, where to build roads, and whom to give credit is much more consequential than the discriminatory practices of subordinate individuals and groups (2008, 994).

Wimmer is speaking to the considerable influence of political elites and official policies in the construction of identity and how the degree of influence aligns with power distributions. From this, it should come as no surprise that regime type and governance structure have considerable influence over the development of identifications within the state, in addition to the expected control or influence over the policies and aims of the state as well as the means deemed reasonable or desirable for pursuing these goals. First and foremost, states take control of policies towards identity through such means as 'identity politics' in order to solidify their own bases of power, justify actions being taken or state structures, or direct the policy focus of the

state moving forward. The governance systems advocated by these groups then dictate the means through which representation is possible and the boundaries of officially acceptable identification. In post-conflict states, particularly those where the violence was ethnicized, these structures become all the more vital particularly in regards to the ways in which they influence the structure and tone of communal relations in the state moving forward.

Identity Politics

Identity politics is defined as “the belief that identity itself—its elaboration, expression, or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political work” (Kauffman 1990, 67). Ethnopoliticians use identity politics to perpetuate the identification along ethnic lines that initially led them into positions of power. Ethnopolitics differs significantly from nationalism, however, despite nationalist leaders and ethnopoliticians coming into power under similar circumstances. Ethnopolitics, like nationalism, relies on cultural, racial, or ethnic understandings of communal belonging and it is nationalism that provides it with the tools to “shape and reflect upon political reality, including notions of identity, community and territory” (Sarajlić 2011, 62). Ethnopolitics appears to be more 'democratic' or pluralistic than nationalism, however, as nationalism most frequently aims for the establishment of a 'hierarchy' among the nations within the state, wherein all other nations are subjugated under the domination of a single nation. Conversely, ethnopolitics aims to establish symmetry between the groups through granting considerable autonomy to each ethnic, racial, or cultural group. Ethnopolitics is not truly democratic or egalitarian, instead employing ethnic-based exclusion: this exclusion manifests as the creation of completely separate ethnic spheres (or polities), wherein “a group excludes others from participation in its social and political affairs, but at the same time restrains from participating in common affairs and activities that bring

different groups together, preventing even its own members to participate in the affairs of other groups” (Saraljić 2011, 65). Thus, the ethnopolitical system is inherently based around segregation and division, a perfect example of 'separate but equal', at least in its most idealized form.

Ethnopolitics has come under fire in recent years, as opponents critique its essentialization of identification, classifying and restricting an individual in society based solely on their membership to a particular community or group; this is seen as not only perpetuating and even deepening pre-existing divisions, but also as discouraging “every civic initiative and in a legitimate way... dismisses individual (or citizen) from any political power,” (Mujkić et al. 2008, 18; see also Maalouf 2003, 149). In addition, the identity politics frequently employed for the purpose of perpetuating existing ethnopolitical systems has been faulted for failing to challenge the ways in which categories are socially constructed, for ignoring the intersectionality of identities, for forcing individuals to “privilege some aspects of identity over others,” for disregarding inter-group diversity and, in so doing, imposing a homogenized identity on undoubtedly diverse groups (Bernstein 2005, 57; see also Ryan, 1997; Phelan, 1989; and Alexander, 1999).

Framing and rhetoric are crucial to the process of identity politics. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis argues that “we see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation” (Sapir 1958 [1929], 69). It follows that changes to the language used to refer to certain groups, policies, histories, or actions would be relevant to understanding and predicting how behavior, perceptions, and actions are likely to change. Through the application of this hypothesis and its implications, research into the influence of identity construction and government structure

on post-conflict recovery will be expanded and enriched.

Rhetoric, as defined by Raymond and Olive, is “the 'art of using language so as to persuade or influence others'; it emphasizes the choice of specific words and phrases for purposes of persuasion” (2009, 191). Indeed, numerous scholars maintain that analysis of language and rhetoric, paying particular focus to the words, phrases, and metaphors employed by elites, is vital to its recognition as a crucial instrument of political persuasion and causation (Raymond & Olive 2009; McLeod 1999; Benesch 2004; Gamson 1995). Language used in official discourses can institutionalize particular distinctions, such as 'class enemies', 'counterrevolutionaries', and 'heretics', through the creation of 'frames' that direct “beliefs, ideas, and perceptions of what constitutes 'reality’” (Harff 2003, 61, Raymond & Olive 2009, 196). A frame, then, is “a set of cognitive and moral maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere... [that] encompass definitions, analogies, metaphors, and symbols that help actors to conceptualize a political or social situation, identify problems and goals, and chart courses of action” (Bleich 2002, 1063-64). The question then becomes, how can and do these frames change, how do these discourse frameworks become institutionalized through state structure, and what is the impact of these approaches?

Bleich studied how the “relatively consistent frames” of race and ethnicity that France and Britain maintained in the aftermath of WWII directly impacted their policies and legislation moving forward (2002, 1055). All legislation, unsurprisingly, is dictated by a particular vision of both how the future of the government/society is envisioned as well as what are seen as the politically viable options, given pre-existing structure, history, and frame of understood reality. The differences in legislation in each of these two states with largely similar historical experiences is directly tied to these frames for interpreting reality. Britain acted upon

the belief that ethnic groups are endowed with an inherent reality that cannot be ignored, and that, if attempted, such action would perpetuate inequality and repress minority groups even further (Bleich 2002). Essentially, Britain operated under a 'hard'-er conceptualization of identity, and believed that one must first recognize the realities of ethnicity and difference if one is to mediate discrimination and inequality within society. Thus, British policy used “civil law to penalize acts of discrimination in employment, housing, and provision of goods and services,” which makes conviction significantly easier as standards of proof are lower than required by criminal law; utilized affirmative action; outlawed “indirect discrimination;” and “has begun to collect extensive ethnic statistics, even incorporating an ethnic question into its census” in order to facilitate the acquisition of more accurate data to be used in informing race policy moving forward (Bleich 2002, 1057-58). In many ways Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a similar perspective in its approach to ethnicity following the cessation of violence.

France, on the other, acted upon the belief that ethnicity and race were not only arbitrary but highly dangerous and divisive categories perpetuated by official recognition and conceptual division—by continuing to use the categories, they believed, you add credence to them and perpetuate their relevance in society. This belief is built upon a 'soft'-er conceptualization of identity and ethnicity, as they believe that the mere utilization or disavowal of ethnic categorizations can dictate their salience and influence within the state. Thus, the French implemented policies such as favoring “the punishment of... racist acts by the criminal law” which makes it much more difficult to reach the standards of proof necessary for prosecution; implementing “the French antiracism law of 1990 [which] rendered it illegal to contest the existence of crimes against humanity committed during [WWII];” stopping all use of affirmative action programs and initiatives; and passing “a law in 1978 that virtually

prohibits collection of ethnic data” (Bleich 2002, 1056-58). Rwanda, similarly, chose to eliminate ethnic forms of identification so as to not further validate them.

Clearly, the different ways in which they discuss, conceptualize, and analyze race led to different understandings of their societal problems relating to race, their policy goals, and ultimately the race policies they implemented (Bleich 2002, 1065). A similar process can be seen in post-conflict governance design: the system implemented—though influenced by external actors with their own concepts of what constituted the most effective—is primarily directed by understandings of the past and future of the state and what is considered politically viable. By looking at the mutually influential relationship between individuals and the state system one can understand the ways in which understanding of identity impacts and is impacted by governance structure.

Structuring the State and Designing the System

The system of governance instituted following ethnicized conflict is heavily influenced by existing conceptions of ethnicity: power hungry ethnonational politicians eagerly advocating for system reforms that will both keep them in their positions of power and increase that power; well-intentioned if idealistic attempts at forcing a move into pure democratic systems of equality based on a belief that not talking about ethnicity removes its cultural or societal salience and relevance; and those that believe ethnic differences can simply be repressed (Horowitz 1985). But post-conflict governance systems are not only influenced by existing conceptions of ethnicity, but have the power to influence the ways in which connection, community, and identity are understood, defined, and divided. There are a variety of ways in which these systems are often structured, each with their own basket of strengths, weaknesses, and mid- to long-term impacts.

The main aim of any post-conflict governance regime is (or, at least, should be) to build sustainable stability and peace; most frequently this is done through the implementation of new structures and legislation based on inclusion, “understood in this case as fair representation of categories of citizens defined by societal cleavages” (Simonsen 2005, 302). This is particularly challenging and crucial in societies where the conflict itself was ethnicized—in the eyes of many, ethnicity is an intractable categorization that cannot be chosen or changed, and thus a conflict based around this societal cleavage would threaten the core of one's identity and the elimination of an entire categorization of the citizenry. As has been discussed previously, ethnicity is not so rigid, and therefore particular care must be taken when addressing identity and ethnicity in post-conflict states.

There are three central elements to governance systems: “constitutional design, electoral system design, and (de)centralization/federalism” (Simonsen 2005, 307). A variation of these three elements can be used to develop a kind of design matrix of potential systems that could be implemented in states according to what is best suited for that state's particular circumstances, history, aims, and challenges. These systems are typically approached from a dichotomous spectrum of options of each element: presidential vs. parliamentary, proportional vs. majoritarian representation, and federalism vs. unitarianism. Existing literature on the implementation of governance systems in post-ethnicized conflict states is inconclusive, though there are some aspects where there appears to be agreement. For example, there appears to be “compelling evidence that a presidential system is far from what a divided society might need” (Simonsen 2005, 308). It is believed that such a system may result in domination of the system by a single ethnic group and limit the representation of minorities within the political sphere, whereas a parliamentary system requires cooperation and a more

consensual approach. On the spectrum of federalism vs. unitarianism, it has been found that federalism based around ethnically divided territorial regions has the effect of entrenching ethnic divisions and increasing their already elevated salience (Simonsen 2005, 309). Alternatively, though, it has been found that territorial, rather than ethnic, federalism has the opposite effect and encourages cooperation and moderate politics similar to that seen in parliamentary systems. There is the least conclusiveness on the effects of different voting systems, though most of the literature agrees that simple majoritarian electoral systems in 'divided societies' are deleterious and dangerous for the long-term stability of the state.

Existing Systems

Despite the matrix of possibilities of system design, most post-conflict governance systems fall within two categorizations—consociationalism and assimilative/integrative governance—with more categorized as the former rather than the latter. Much of the academic literature views these two forms as being in dichotomous opposition, a claim which—despite overlooking the similar logic underlying each system—useful in the ways in which it parallels other broadly accepted dichotomies. Consociationalism draws on hard, primordialist understandings of ethnicity as well as a view of identity as singular; assimilative/integrative governance, on the other hand, relies on extreme constructivist, soft understandings of ethnicity built upon an idea of identity as almost endlessly flexible. Often, these dichotomies are framed in such terms as “consociational democracy vs. authoritarianism,” “consociationalists vs. assimilation,” “(consociationalism = accommodation/ [power-sharing]) vs. civil-society” (Dixon 2012, 101; Nagel & Clancy 2012).

Consociational Structure

Consociational 'power-sharing', as it is widely referred to, was admittedly founded on

primordialist principles of national identity, viewing it as historical, essential, and unyielding (Fearon & Laitin 2000, 848). It comes as no surprise, then, that consociational theory promotes power-sharing between otherwise autonomous groups and champions policies “for the segregation of the 'ethnic' or communal pillars and domination of those pillars by the communal elites” (Dixon 2011, 310; see also Samuels 2005, 10). Believing that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reduce ethnicity's salience in divided societies, consociationalists believe that the only way to prevent the resurgence of violence within the state is to engage society in a “voluntary” or “benign apartheid” (Lijphart 1977). To support this division, the consociational system utilizes 1) grand coalitions, 2) segmental autonomy, 3) power-sharing, 4) minority veto, and 5) proportionality in political representation (Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 2001, 172; Simonsen 2005, 310; Nagel & Clancy 2012, 82).

Proponents of consociationalism turn to literature on such things as proportional representation and minority rights to bolster their arguments. For example, at the heart of consociationalism is a belief that “proportional representation (PR) [electoral] systems are preferable for divided societies, given that majoritarian solutions may lead to the permanent exclusion of minorities” (Simonsen 2005, 301; Dixon 2011, 316). Having begun to distance themselves from the theory's primordialist origins, consociationalism no longer claims that ethnicity is essential. Instead, claims are based around an understanding that these divisions are more resilient than constructivist theories would lead one to believe, and that “they must be recognised rather than wished away” (McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 338). By allowing each ethnic group to act in their own 'vital national interest' and ensure their continued recognition by the state, issues of ethnicity become less important. In so doing, a consociational system develops an environment in which the erosion of these identifications can take place naturally

and more easily (Coakley 2009, 145; O'Leary 2005, 19). Kaufmann goes so far as to claim that “certainly ethnic hostility cannot be reduced without separation” (1996, 174).

There have been numerous critiques of consociationalism in recent years, particularly in relation to its sizable failure in Iraq. Ultimately, research into the effectiveness of governance systems of this type have found that “formal executive power-sharing leads to a fragile peace, often without violence but also without reconciling the parties or addressing the underlying tensions” (Samuels 2005, 11). More distressing than this, however, is that rather than contributing to the conditions necessary for the gradual dissolution of ethnic divides as proponents of the theory claim, it has the opposite effect, in many cases not only perpetuating ethnic divisions but entrenching and radicalizing them, freezing the patterns of conflict that led to violence (Samules 2005, 12; Simonsen 2005, 316; Dixon 2011, 311). This takes place significantly through providing no incentives for cooperation and collaboration amongst elites and politicians from the various ethnic groups and even going so far as incentivizing the opposite. The system in many cases enables the focus to remain on fixed percentages and defending solely the interests of their ethnic group rather than pressing national issues, and do little more than transform the government into a new battlefield (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 84). Similar incentives are given to citizens, who can easily fall into a pattern of 'ethnic census' wherein members of a group vote along ethnic lines rather than based on issues. This can be highly unstable as well as discriminatory—when there is a clear majority of one ethnic group over another, “minorities may have representation but little or no real political influence” (Simonsen 2005, 300). With separate polities and the only real voice of the citizens being through membership to an ethnic group, it is difficult if not impossible to consider any issues outside of an ethnic framework.

Assimilative/Integrative Governance

There is little to no agreement in the literature on what this type of approach should be termed, ranging from 'assimilationism' to 'integrative governance,' the 'civil-society approach' to 'social-transformationist approaches'. With this discrepancy in the terminology used to even describe this policy choice, it comes as little shock that there is strikingly little written on this topic, and that which has been written can at best be used to form a patchwork analysis of a governance system consisting of a variety of policy options. Integrative governance, for example, “aims to transcend group differences by encouraging groups to cooperate around common political goals” (Samuels 2005, 11); the aim of assimilationism, however, “is to relegate ethnic identities to the private sphere” so that the public sphere can be “a place where a common civic, non-ethnic realm is developed” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 102). The civil society approach, on the other hand, is classified as “radical instrumentalism” and “emphasises the manipulation of the people by political elites” (Dixon 2012, 102), while social-transformationist approaches “aim to forge a single all-embracing public identity through integration” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 80). These approaches are clearly compatible, and there are even some clear overlaps: the aim is typically to, either through outright abolition or relegation out of the public sphere, remove ethnicity from politics, a charge typically led by (political) elites. Missing, however, is a clear policy prescription or a definition that could be used to determine if a governance system could be classified as a variation of assimilationist design, and, if so, which one it is most similar to.

Even without a clear means by which to categorize or operationalize the utilization of this branch of systems, there are a number of supporters of the general approach, their

arguments based on a belief that “an undifferentiated and singular concept of citizenship facilitates peaceful coexistence between potentially conflicting groups” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 90). This belief is based on a more fluid understanding of identity construction, evidenced by the basing of state policy on the expectation that it could contribute to the reduction of ethnicity's societal salience and relevance. There are, however, critiques to these approaches as well. Most striking is its assumption that the state is capable of a 'civic' identification that can truthfully be described as nonpartisan, secular, etc.—as stated by Nagel and Clancy, “no state is ethnically neutral. ... The formal promotion of a state language, symbols and rituals reflects the hegemonic dominance of one ethno national group over any number of other minority groups” (2012, 90). Bearing this in mind, it becomes clear that despite even the best intentions at achieving this idealistic and clean division between ethnic and civic identifications, between private and public life, such a division is all but impossible; attempts at doing so risk implementing a system of majoritarian politics where minority voices go unheard as the majority group maintains unofficial control over the political system. Additionally, this simplified, uniform approach ignores the intersectionality of identities that can contribute to conflict between groups as well as the interplay of multiple identifications that influences conceptions of the individual and the group.

Impacts of International Action on Governance

In many cases of conflict—including those that have been ethnicized—the international community becomes involved, particularly by means of peacebuilding and reconstruction. The United Nations, for example, has increasingly focused on “promoting democracy and strengthening good governance... [as] core components of post-conflict peace-building initiatives” (Santiso 2002, 555). But these ventures are not always successful, despite their

most idealistic intentions. For example, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake's (2009) article focuses on Aceh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, analyzing the role of the international community in these endeavors; she concludes that their failure to look beyond ethnic framing prevented the creation of a sustainable peace project. She proposes and advocates for an alternative form of inclusive peacebuilding that engages with civil society actors and local communities (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2009:232-233). This is of particular importance to this research as it begins to address questions of how the international community can engage in post-conflict state reconstruction most effectively.

There is a considerable risk during the structuring of post-conflict governance systems of overemphasizing ethnicity during both 'first generation' and 'second generation' engagement, which can ultimately perpetuate the dynamics that initially spurred conflict (Santiso 2002, 562). Rajasingham-Senanayake (2009) problematizes the primordialist currents which frequently run beneath the surface of these policies, challenging domestic and international elites and policy makers to consider the complex causes that lead to the conflict and the multifaceted and sometimes fluid, sometimes crystallized nature of identity when developing goals and policies for the post-conflict state. Given that, “external international forces have a leverage that makes it possible to break the pattern of zero-sum games, sanction extremist behavior, and enforce a level of accommodation that might not otherwise have occurred,” this is particularly important for international organizations who become involved with the process of post-conflict recovery (Simonsen 2005, 301). Bearing this knowledge in mind, efforts for redesigning the governments and institutions of post-genocidal states and international actors involved in this post-conflict process should be increasingly cognizant of the ways in which electoral systems and political structure can shape identification. The United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), for example, view democratization and the promotion of good governance “as a tool for the recognition, prevention, and management of conflicts, especially in ethnically divided countries” (Santiso 2002, 568). The question has now become how well do the policies and strategies employed by UNDP achieve their aims of “forging consensus, protecting human rights, increasing political participation and broadening inclusion, reforming the judiciary, enhancing public security, reforming electoral systems, modernising public administration, and decentralising the state” (Santiso 2002, 573). Relating this back to post-conflict governance structure, is there an operational strategy that could be presented by UNDP as a more effective means of establish a stable system and sustainable peace?

Alternative Structures

Despite the dichotomous presentation of the policies of consociationalism and assimilationism/integrative governance, there do exist alternative means and frames from which to approach the structuring of post-conflict governance system. Indeed, even Kauffman, with his starkly pessimistic outlook on the likelihood of peace without the separation of ethnic groups, stated that as an alternative the “thorough re-engineering of the involved group's political and social systems” (though this research does not support his drastic assertion that this can only be accomplished through “conquering the country and occupying it for a long time, possibly decades”) (1996, 174). Given the earlier discussion of conceptualizations of identity and that consociationalism is associated with hard/crystallized understandings of identification while assimilationsim/integrative governance is associated with soft/fluid understandings, it logically follows that there must exist a policy which abandons this dichotomous division. Surely there must exist a framework that acknowledges that the crystallization and fluidity of identifications varies over time and circumstance, and that the

'reality' is much grayer than the classic dichotomy would have one believe.

At its simplest, Horowitz's (1985) theories revolve around concepts of ethnicity as flexible in their salience and the transformative capacity of state policies and structures to alter this salience and shape the ways in which ethnicity and identity are conceptualized within the state. But not all conflict management methods possess the same capacity to alleviate ethnic tensions and prevent a return to violence. He writes:

Between the naivete of those who would abolish ethnic differences in short order through 'nation-building', the cynicism of those who would simply suppress those differences, and the pessimism of those who would counsel costly and disruptive partition as the only way out—between these goals, there lurk passages that are at once less dramatic, less visionary, and more realistic (1985:599).

He sees five means by which to reduce ethnic tensions in post-conflict states: (1) dispersing political power through federalism; (2) emphasizing intraethnic competition and conflict; (3) incentivizing interethnic cooperation through policies on elections and territorial disputes; (4) encouraging interests-based alignments; and (5) reducing inequalities between groups through redistribution measures. Critical importance is therefore placed on the use of structural incentives to promote conciliatory relations. To this end, Horowitz believes measures that aim to “contain, limit, channel, and manage ethnic conflict rather than to eradicate it or to aim at either a massive transfer of loyalties or the achievement of some consensus,” that “involve living with ethnic differences and not moving beyond them” are the most effective in post-ethnicized conflict situations (Horowitz 1985:600).

This approach has been dubbed 'complexity theory' by other scholars as it “recognises that components are constantly changing [and] challenges the view that a complex item can be understood by reducing it to its constituent parts” (Little 2008, 24). Given that the elements

comprising society vary not only across contexts but over time as well, this approach demands 'deep contextualization' and “acknowledges the inevitability of a multiplicity of rational viewpoints” when approaching construction of an effective post-conflict system (Dixon 2011, 320). In this way, complexity theory more thoroughly connects with constructivist theory that understands that identities may be 'sticky' and hard to change or 'fluid' and readily changeable depending on time and circumstance. The aim is not to come to a final, fixed solution, but rather to develop a flexible system that empowers all facets of society, acknowledges the importance and salience of existing societal divisions, and fosters the development of a uniting identity on its own terms (Simonsen 2005, 207; Dixon 2012, 107-8). The focus must be on accommodating and honoring difference, not subverting it, as “people from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated” (Kymilcka 1995, 189).

Horowitz is extremely critical of Arend Lijphart's consociational theory. Broadly, he faults it for failing to adequately account for why any majority-group leader would willingly engage in the 'grand coalitions' that are central to consociational organization; for overlooking the impact of compromise across ethnic lines on political elites, as counter-elites frame it as selling-out, making it undesirable for incumbents hoping to remain in power; and for ignoring the ways in which institutionalizing cultural autonomy reduces the unity, stability, and effectiveness of the state. He proposes instead that incentives for accommodative and cooperative behavior are key, particularly when offered by the structure of the system itself, such as through electoral rewards that disincentivize ethnocentrism and radicalism and incentivize concessions and moderation (Horowitz 2002:23). An example of such electoral rewards are vote-pooling arrangements—wherein votes by ethnically-based parties are

exchanged so that parties must behave moderately on the issues in conflict in order to receive those votes—or in what Simonsen (2005) proposes as 'centripitalism'. In this system of alternative voting, “voters not only pick their favorite but also rank-order other candidates. And the centripetal spin emerges when candidates moderate their policies in order to be ranked higher by voters outside their ethnic electorate” (Simonsen 2005:311; see also Horowitz 2004, Wilford and Wilson 2006, Nagel & Clancy 2012). There have been, however, disparate outcomes and effectiveness—particularly in the case of Fiji—that have led leading scholars, including Horowitz, to qualify that alternative voting “*can*, but *does not necessarily*, promote moderation” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 92; emphasis added). Ultimately, in spite of the rather dismal image he provides of ethnic disintegration of democracy in innumerable states, Horowitz ends with the optimistic note that “there is no case to be made for the futility of democracy or the inevitability of uncontrolled conflict. Even in the most severely divided society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood” (Horowitz 1985:684).

Post-conflict transformation then must, rather than trying to “introduce a new sense of closure which eradicates diversity, potentially leading to a new conflict,” work to foster suppressed voices and encourage diversity over homogenization (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 21). Indeed, it must account for the complexities of inter-ethnic dynamics and keep a ready eye on the long-term impacts of the implemented structure. It is probable that there will be more than one system which will accomplish the aims of complexity theory, given the variety of contexts of societal divisions; it is absolutely certain, however, that there is no single governance design that will work in all states, and attempts to implement a uniform solution across all post-conflict states will almost inevitably end in failure. Timothy Sisk (1998) advocates that mediators conduct analyses of the existing societal divisions and how different governance systems

would relate to and impact those cleavages so as to find a system best suited for that context. Thus, in order to implement a sustainable and effective post-conflict regime, institutional design must “be context-sensitive in a strong sense, that is, sensitive not only to the gross features of differing contexts but to finer details as well,” utilizing “relatively 'thick' understandings of the local contexts in which it is to apply” (Brubaker 1998, 280).

Evaluating Governance Approaches

Despite research on governance systems, there is still uncertainty over the impact of governance choices on post-conflict recovery, in no small part due to the complex interactions of differing institutions, processes, historical heritages, and cultural environments. Research conducted by Benjamin Reilly, however, found a relationship between “ethnic fragmentation and democratic sustainability, with both very low (i.e., highly homogeneous) and very high (i.e., highly heterogeneous) levels of ethnic fragmentation more conducive to democracy than those in between” (2000, 184). If 'democratic' sustainability is equated with 'peace' (a risky and oversimplifying action), then these findings support policy recommendations for both consociational and assimilative/integrative governance and refute or render irrelevant arguments for the emerging complexity theory. Additional studies on the impact multiethnicity and heterogeneity on the likelihood of internal conflict (defined as a conflict in which “the national government is one of the active parties”) is overshadowed by the influence of political regime and socioeconomic development (Ellingsen 2000, 229). This research subscribes to the argument that ethnopoliticians utilize narratives of conflicting identifications as useful frames to draw support for themselves while they (claim to) work towards reforms of the existing system to better address the presumed interests of the ethnic group or to distract the group from the larger systemic problems using ethnic histories. In support of this argument, Mousseau's

research found that “in none of [its] analyses was the variable for ethnic heterogeneity significantly related to higher levels of political violence;” in response to these findings, the research asserted that the impact of ethnicity on likelihood and degree of political violence must be understood through the analysis of the political and economic context of the state (Mousseau 2001, 564-65). It is therefore not an intellectual leap to assert that presence or absence of ethnicity (or the salience of ethnic identity) does not predict stability in post-conflict states and similar forces must be placed on the political and economic context.

This research hopes to shed additional light on the impacts of governance structure—specifically the institutional approach to ethnicity—on the likelihood of stable peace, referring not only to the cessation of outright war, but to improved intergroup relations, economic development with reduced inequality, respect of human rights, etc., in post-genocidal states. To this end, this research will test two hypotheses proposed by the literature:

H₁: If the degree of institutionalized heterogeneity is high, then the degree of peace will be high.

H₂: If the degree of institutionalized homogeneity is high, then the degree of peace will be high.

The first hypothesis aims to test the utility of consociational governance systems, while the second hypothesis tests assimilative/integrative governance systems; if both of these hypotheses can be rejected, this will serve as support for the alternative—complexity theory—and the associated hypothesis:

H_A: If the degree of institutionalization identification is high, then the degree of peace will be low.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Comparative Case Study Methodology

Comparative case study was determined to be the most effective means of testing the research question and hypotheses proposed by this research. Comparative case studies methodologically consist of an “empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its natural context using multiple sources of evidence” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 15). In other words, a specific phenomenon, program, activity, etc. is studied within the spatial and temporal context in which it exists normally, drawing upon such varied sources of data as interviews, existing research, and observation. The approach most frequently suggested as an alternative to this method is large-*n* comparative analysis: many regard this method as superior because of its capacity to control (more) effectively for additional variables. There is a sizable limitation to the utility of large-*n* analysis for this research, however: the population of interest to this study—states that have experienced genocide—is rather small. Even if the entire population was utilized in the study, there may not be enough cases (depending on how genocide is defined) to have the statistically robust number of 30 or more data points.

Comparative case study's usage of a variety of sources of information—both quantitative and qualitative—makes this method particularly well positioned to gather the highly detailed, micro-level data as well as the macro-level data available through larger analyses necessary to account for the nuanced impacts of identity institutionalization in post-genocidal states. This can then be combined with analysis of macro-level data to contextualize and deepen the analysis. In addition, case studies yield strong results, both “inferring and testing explanations that define *how* the independent causes the dependent variable,” which is more difficult when using large-*n* methods (Van Evera 1997, 54). Ultimately, Van Evera states,

there are benefits and drawbacks to both comparative case study and large-*n*, one only superior to the other insofar as it is better equipped to answer a specific question; for example, case studies are more useful when there is a single, dominant hypothesis that can be tested or there are only a few cases but they have been studied in detail (1997, 55).

Model

There are a variety of ways in which case study analyses can vary—as (1) ethnographic, historical, psychological, or sociological; as (2) intrinsic, instrumental, or collective; or as (3) exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive. The method design used by this research would be classified as based in sociology, collective in nature, and explanatory in aim (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 31). The focus of this study is on social institutions and relationships with particular focus paid to the “structure, development, interaction, and collective behavior of organized groups of individuals” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 32). It is collective and explanatory because it not only aims to create a clear theory of the issue, but to go so far as to document a cause-and-effect relationship to better understand what outcomes can be expected from particular actions—in this case, the impact of governance structure and policy choices.

The general model of this research is relatively parsimonious, with the independent variable being the degree of institutionalized identity (heterogeneous to homogeneous), and the dependent variable being 'peace'. This study is structured as a method of difference comparative case study—this means the two cases chosen for analysis will be similar in as many ways as possible, differing solely or most significantly in their values of the 'study variable' (the variable whose causes or effects we seek to establish): the degree of institutionalized identity (Van Evera 1997, 57).

Variable Conceptualization and Operationalization

Institutionalized identity is without a doubt the term most in need of clear definition for effective testing of this research's hypotheses. Identity is understood to be 'institutionalized' when state structures, laws, and policies use strictly defined and delineated categories for identification of the population, and there are disincentives integral to the system against identifying outside of these definitions. The institutionalization of identity ranges between the two extremes of 'homogeneity' and 'heterogeneity'. Homogeneous institutionalized identity is measured through the existence of official state structures that emphasize a single, unitary identification. This can manifest in some cases as such extreme measures as outlawing the usage of particular identifying categories (e.g., 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and 'Twa' in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide) or limiting religious, cultural, or ethnic freedoms in the name of protecting a concept of shared identity (e.g., the banning of hijabs and other obvious forms of religious expression in state buildings in France in the name of *laïcité*). Heterogeneous institutionalized identity, similarly, is measured through the existence of official state structures that base themselves around the division of identities that are presumed to be intractable, historical, and internally uniform. This manifests most clearly as systems that incorporate ethnic quotas in government positions, sometimes taking extreme forms through the division of the state into federal units divided based on ethnic/religious/national differences (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina's Republika Srpska and Federation, and Ethiopia since 1991).

The conception of 'peace' is also of vital importance to this research: it is the ultimate aim of all conflict settlements and a conceptually complex variable, as there exist both 'positive' and 'negative' definitions of peace. Negative definitions of peace are more traditional, referring simply to the absence of war, and termed 'negative' insofar as they speak to the absence of

certain non-peaceful actions, rights violations, etc. This includes the absence of or freedom from such things as political imprisonment, discrimination, forced disappearances, torture, and sexual violence. Positive definitions, however, incorporate ideas of 'rights to': positive peace is conceptualized as “both the absence of war (direct violence) and the absence of social injustice (indirect violence)” (Roberts 2008, 538). This refers to such elements as political representation, access to education, and freedom of expression. This research looks at the presence or absence of positive peace as a more meaningful measure of the degree of peace in post-conflict states and therefore of the success of post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery efforts that have taken place there. To have positive peace, states must have cultivated 'societal legitimacy' which is “central to the creation of state-societal stability” (Roberts 2008, 546).

This research proposes that it is difficult if not impossible to achieve 'societal legitimacy' through an identity institutionalizing system. For the purposes of this research, positive peace will be measured through improvement to such measures as economic development and opportunity, societal cohesion, levels of corruption, political representation, and effective transitional justice as crucial elements towards societal legitimacy. Societal cohesion, for the purposes of this research, refers to the degree to which individuals within the society are living together harmoniously, evidenced by mixed-marriage rates, the integration of communities, and the absence of divided schools.

Case Selection

With the unit of analysis the state-level as this research questions government institutionalization of identity, the population of interest is limited to post-genocidal states. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Rwanda—two of the relatively limited number of countries that have experienced large scale, communal based violence that escalated into

genocide as defined by international law—were chosen for this research for a number of reasons. Most important to answering my research question, however, is that the governance systems implemented in these two cases correspond with the two extremes of institutionalized identity—one being fully heterogeneous, the other fully homogeneous. This is particularly useful in testing each hypothesis proposed by the literature, and to potentially add support to the alternative hypothesis.

In addition to this, the states fit into the method of difference model. The violence took place in both states around similar time frames—BiH, 1992-95, Rwanda, 1994—which allows for easier comparison, as the international context in which they took place, were ended, and worked towards recovery are the same. Indeed, both had international interventions into the country aimed at protecting citizens, often in UN-secured enclaves intended to be safe zones, and these efforts failed to a considerable extent. In addition, both genocides took place during civil wars that had ethnicized elements, as the forces engaged in the conflict were most prominently divided along ethnic lines. From a more practical perspective, these cases were chosen because they are, arguably, the most thoroughly studied of all contemporary cases of genocide. Having the ability to draw upon already collected data will greatly assist in compiling a valid set of data from which to draw conclusions.

There are, however, sizable limitations that prevent these cases from being used in a classic method of difference comparison. Primarily, prior political and historical experiences undoubtedly influenced the design of the political systems implemented as part of post-conflict reconstruction, as one system could be more familiar than another. The geography of the states—particularly the characteristics of the states' neighbors, including their ethnic composition and governance structure—influences what policies are deemed feasible or

desirable. For example, BiH's proximity to and desire to eventually join the European Union influenced what system was believed more desirable. Additionally, differences in the duration and scale of the genocides impacted the rationale behind the different policies instituted in the post-conflict period and their ultimate failure or success, as the degree to which trust between groups and trust in the government had diminished would vary. It would be foolish for this research to imply that there is any single governance system that could be offered as a “fix-all” for any past or future post-genocidal states.

Data Collection in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina

The mixed method approach of this research will draw on a variety of macro and micro data sources. Six macro sources, which are predominantly quantitative in nature, are used in this research: 1) Political Terror Scale, 2) CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 3) Freedom House Index, 4) Corruption Perception Index, 5) Human Development Index and GINI Coefficient, and 6) World Happiness Report. Public opinion data gathered by the World Values Survey during Wave 5 (2007) and Wave 6 (2012) will also be employed, but solely for the case analysis of Rwanda as BiH was only surveyed in one wave (Wave 3 in 1998). Data will be gathered from these sources as available for the last year of violent conflict in each case and for every year following, from the official peace agreements up to the present. This data informs analysis of the degree of progress that has been made in each state on critical indicators for stable peace, including government legitimacy, social cohesion, economic growth, and low discrimination. While the quantitative sources of data will be largely the same for both cases, the sources of qualitative data will differ for each: interviews, formal presentations, and informal conversations were conducted in BiH, while content analysis was performed on blog posts from Rwandan bloggers as well as journalists, activists, professors, etc. who study Rwanda. This population was chosen because

this population typically has higher levels of access to information on the system and a broader outlook that includes the society as a whole as well as local experiences. Such an approach is beneficial to this study as it allows for a systemic analysis that captures not only individual level experiences, but the perspectives of those directly influencing state policy (politicians and employees of the government) as well as those who are most critical of these policies (activists, journalists, academics, etc.).

The choice to use divergent methods leads to limitations on what this research can ask as well as the conclusions that can be drawn from it. For example, because identical interviews were not conducted in both states, there can be no direct comparison between the responses of individuals in each of the states to an identical set of questions. This points to the larger challenge in analysis and comparison: the indirect method of data collection that dominates the Rwandan case analysis. This method of data collection has clear limitations, such as the lack of focus on particular topics or issues that would otherwise be provided by the framework of an interview. However, given the methodological difficulties associated with conducting research in Rwanda, the indirect method may not only be a satisfactory substitute for conducting interviews, but may indeed be better suited to this context (one in which access to participants is low and risk for participants is high). Indeed, the infeasibility of conducting interviews in Rwanda was a driving factor in the decision to use divergent methods, despite the potential limits on the conclusions of this research. As Hintjens addressed in her research, “open criticism of authority remains a taboo,” and therefore there is sizable resistance to discuss the past, politics, or identities (both political and ethnic), and attempt to do so may bring unwanted attention from the Rwandan authorities to the researcher (2008, 7). These conditions have worsened considerably since October 2014, when the British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) documentary film entitled “Rwanda's Untold Story” was released. This documentary brought into question the Kagame regime's narrative of the events of the 1994 genocide. As the BBC has been ejected from Rwanda and the government is pursuing legal action against the corporation, it is a particularly unsafe time for conducting research on the institutionalization of identity and historical framing, not only for the researcher, but for the collaborators as well.

The collection of the qualitative data will primarily be done through ethnography, a method integral to anthropological inquiry. Ethnographic methods most often depend on “immersion in the place and lives of people under study” and include participant observation, formal and informal interviewing, open-ended surveying, and content analysis, which are all then placed “in conversation with prevailing scholarly themes, problems, and concepts” (Wedeen 2010, 257). Of these methods, all but open-ended surveying played a role in this research. Schatz (2009) describes two types of ethnography: noninterpretive and interpretive. Noninterpretive ethnography “focuses on presumed values and then looks for structure and system,” while interpretive “centers on meaning and, at least in many instances, on process and history” (Schatz 2009, cited in Wedeen 2010, 258). This research very clearly takes the interpretivist path, particularly as it aligns quite clearly with international relations theories of constructivism: both perspectives are based around the belief that the world is socially constructed (see Klotz & Lync 2007).

Uniting methods of anthropologists and political scientists does not always proceed smoothly, the greatest sticking point being the naturalist assumptions and avowed objectivity that have long been at the core of political science but have been abandoned by anthropology. Indeed, anthropologists not only challenge the possibility and desirability of objectivity, but

avoid the use of models and hypotheses, are attentive to the ways in which their research can reinforce existing paradigms and inequalities of power, and are wary of the existence of a clear division of the social world into valid data (often so defined because of its replicability) versus invalid (Wedeen 2010, 258). This research tests hypotheses, but applies interpretivism in order to gain the context and meaning necessary to better understand the cases, and maintains a critical perspective of the data received, knowing that it must be interpreted through a lens that takes into account the source and context through which it was collected. Ultimately, this research operates on the belief that ethnography can add immense value and validity to political science research by “providing insight into actors' lived experience (Wedeen 2010, 261).

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)

Twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect data on the BiH case study, conducted across BiH during two different trips to the country for a total of just over four months, first in November to December 2013 and then from May to August 2014. Prior experience with the language, culture, and conducting research within the BiH cultural context as well as access through connections with prominent local NGOs, made it far more feasible to gather information on this case through these means. These interviews were primarily conducted with a range of academics, public officials, museum curators, non-governmental organization workers, activists, artists, and local business people. Initial contact was made through email and by phone, and was most successful when connections to an organization—SIT Balkans, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), and the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC)—were utilized. Notes were taken on encounters with an additional twenty-seven individuals, the informal conversations taking place over dinner or an afternoon coffee, during a formal presentation at an organization's office, or during the long bus rides

through twisting mountain roads. The interviews and informal conversations were conducted in multiple cities around the country, including Sarajevo, Mostar, Iliđža, Banja Luka, Srebrenica, and Vareš, so as to have greater representativeness in the sample. The majority of these interviews and conversations took place in English, but a professional interpreter was utilized when necessary—specifically in Srebrenica—to provide on-the-spot interpretations and written translations of the recorded interview for a more precise transcript.

Rwanda

The primary source of information for the Rwandan case study was blog posts and entries that we posted by Rwandan citizens as well as journalists, scholars, activists, etc. working outside of the state, as this was considerably safer for both the research and the collaborators. *Cry for Freedom in Rwanda*, *African Arguments*, and *Democracy Watch: Rwanda* were the three most used platforms for posts to be analyzed for this research. Content analysis can be defined as a “procedure [which] operate[s] directly on text or transcripts of human communications. ...many words of the text are classified into much fewer content categories... Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed to have similar meanings” (Weber 1990, 10, 12, & 53). These posts were then coded by every second paragraph—unless the piece was five or less paragraphs long—with each noun being circled and each adjective modifying it underlined. The reasoning behind always coding the first paragraph of a piece is that it frequently contains the context, main points, and arguments, made in the bulk of the piece. The coding scheme employed kept phrases that referred to a single concept together (e.g., 'ballot box', 'human being', 'service sector'); did not code for possessive pronouns; and did not include proper nouns, instead making a list of them included at the end of the master count sheet. In analyzing these posts, the focus was placed on the

frequency of terms in order to build an understanding of the manifest themes present in the pieces and then draw a conclusion about the latent themes. Comments posted in response to the posts were also used; while potentially risky—as it has been well documented that typically only extremely negative and extremely positive responses are posted in the comments—they were included in this research to, if nothing else, present the extremes within the discourse.

Analysis of and Reflections on the Data

Post-Conflict Anthropology: Methods and Ethics

Of great concern to this research is the impact that interviews regarding these topics may have on the individuals willing to participate. To protect the participants in this study from unnecessarily painful recollections, the nature of the interviews was fully disclosed prior to starting, and the focus of the questions remained on experiences since the end of the war. Additionally, it was made clear that—if they chose to participate—they could decline to answer any question as well as end the interview whenever they chose. A number of trauma researchers and therapists have suggested “engagement with rather than avoidance of painful, traumatizing experiences as one process in healing” (Staub 2006, 873; see also Herman, 1992, and Field 2006). They argue that, when conducted under emotionally supportive conditions and involving reconnecting and building trust with people, talking about traumatic experiences can be beneficial. While this lends itself to a positive view on the potential impacts of this study's interviews, it fails to take into account the risks that could face individuals who still live in repressive or divided states and communities: the very act of speaking out about, let alone against, the government could put them and their families in danger or lead to sanctioning from the state.

Anthropology in war-torn, repressive, and post-conflict communities is undeniably

infrequent, not in small part to the ethical and methodological challenges that it adds to those already intrinsic to ethnographic field work. Anthropologist Kimberly Theidon (2001) conducted her research in the highland villages of Ayacucho, a region of Peru ravaged by the war between forces of the Shining Path, armed peasants, and the Peruvian armed forces. Having chosen to live amongst the peasants she was studying, she conducted interviews and engaged in participant observation, and her research incorporated insightful considerations of how to conduct ethnographic research during and about times of war. She asserts that “knowledge is not neutral and insisting that one is simply there to ‘study’ keeps people guessing what purpose lies behind wanting to know” and that there “is no neutral position with spoken words” (Theidon 2001, 26). Operating within a “space of death,” words are not simply knowledge or information, but power; power that cannot be attained neutrally because there will come a point when you have to take a side or have one chosen for you.

Theidon argues that in contexts such as these, when social relationships are tense, dangerous, violent, and potentially lethal, it is the anthropologist’s ethical responsibility to “take a stand and make it explicit... to demonstrate that [they] would put the knowledge shared with [them] to a good use, or get out” (2001, 27). Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ ideas of “barefoot anthropology” align with this argument. Ultimately, Scheper-Hughes believes that the field of anthropology must move beyond the passive act of observation to witnessing: this entails adopting an active voice, making judgments, and taking sides, thus becoming “accountable for what they see and what they fail to see, how they act and how they fail to act in critical situations” (1995, 419). Both Theidon and Scheper-Hughes agree that there is no way to conduct purely academic anthropology in the context of violence and war, only activist anthropology. While this research will not be focusing on dynamics of ongoing war, conflict is

ever present and manifests in a variety of forms in post-genocidal states. It is therefore essential that these ethical considerations of the obligations of the researcher direct the approach used in this research, that it recognizes how the lives of my contributors and the individuals living within the society can be affected by the conclusions drawn in my research.

Data Analysis

One of the elements most uniquely characteristic of case studies is the way in which the data analysis is performed. Namely—unlike with other research methods which examine data only once all the data has been collected—case studies “involve ongoing examination and interpretation of the data in order to reach tentative conclusions and to refine the research questions” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 56). This examination and interpretation most often involves summarizing and interpreting the information, and then using it to reexamine and reframe the research question as well as analyzing the new questions raised by the research as it is conducted. This is not to say, however, that the research question is abandoned, but rather that the context in which the research question is understood as well as what constitute the crucial aspects to understanding the question and answers to it can shift as new information is uncovered. This analysis—in most cases—takes the form of “repetitive, ongoing review of accumulated information in order to identify recurrent patterns, themes, or categories,” and it is this approach that will be used to analyze the data collected for this study (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 61).

The challenge with the data analyses for these two cases is comparing them effectively, particularly given the divergent methods used for each of the two cases, while also paying due diligence to the cultural and historical differences of the states. Thus, the analysis undertaken by this research focused on the topics and issues of central importance to the participants (i.e.,

topics that arose frequently in conversations, interviews, posts, comments, etc.), while also attempting to locate the points of overlap: the themes, trends, and contexts that exist in both cases. It is as important to acknowledge the ways in which the two cases differ, as this can reveal relationships between actors and the variables being measured, and ultimately can strengthen or weaken one or more of the hypotheses tested by this research. However, when utilizing macro data sources and comparing the cases, it must be acknowledged that challenges exist; primarily, the definitions used may vary between states, and those used in the collection of the macro data may not be aligned with those used in this research, potentially with variables being simplified in order to gain greater coherence, analytic utility, or parsimony.

A final concern of these case analyses is how to keep this research, given that it is being conducted by a Western, well-educated woman, from falling prey to the 'colonizing impulse'. This refers specifically to the belief that the practices, values, solutions that are privileged in one's society or that have been found to be successful in one context can be taken and applied to a problem in a different context. Additionally, it relates to the very belief that an outsider can determine what the largest problem facing a society is as well as how to address it, often better than those living within the society. For these cases in particular, a sizable concern is the imposition of Western values—such as individual over communal rights—on the analysis of the state. This would take the form, for example, of taking the degree to which capitalism has been implemented in the state as a measure of its post-conflict recovery 'success'. It is thus the aim of this analysis to present as objectively as possible the critiques of the state based on the issues and values that are shown to be of importance to the populations of each country.

Reflection on the Method

The strengths of this methodology largely come from its mixing of methods: each of

the various sources of information will yield new insights on the research question which will, in turn, lead to a more comprehensive and developed analysis. In addition, each method brings its individual strengths to the research. Interviews produce deep, detailed information; content analysis can be replicated; and analysis of public opinion surveys and quantitative data brings a degree of reliability. Yet, each also has its own limitations: all of these methods are quite time consuming; interviews cannot be perfectly replicated; and latent themes in content analysis are quite subjective.

There also exist ramifications—albeit both positive and negative—for the reliability and validity of the data gathered. Semi-structured interviews almost inevitably develop differences in the progression and wording of questions between interviews, which inherently limit or complicate the comparison of different cases. These interviews, with their utilization of scripted questions, do allow a degree of flexibility that is required in order to make participants comfortable and willing to share their true beliefs and impressions, therefore yielding the most accurate and valid information possible. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the data gleaned from interviews is filtered through these individual's personal experiences and, in many cases, through translation (either by the individual or by a professional translator). This is particularly the case when the interviews pertain to perceptions of the government, political atmosphere, etc., as is the focus of this research. While this may raise questions of reliability, the information gained from interviews can be regarded as replicable because “meanings are 'cultural or socially available'... Subsequent research can go to the field, and even if they do not talk to the same people, they can nevertheless be made aware of the range of meaning relevant to a particular phenomenon under study, because meanings are socially, not simply individually, accessible” (Wedeen 2010, 265).

Despite the challenges of reliability in interviews, not to mention replicability, this does not mean that the data gathered from them is not valid. The lived experience of individuals is valid by virtue of them experiencing an event or occurrence in that particular way, as this is informed by the system in which they live and through which they interpret their circumstances and the world. Indeed, as Sustin argues, there is “no *one right* way of saying what is seen,” because “there may be no one right way of seeing it” (1962, 101, cited in Wedeen 2010, 166-67). This recalls the basic strength of ethnography: providing access to this multiplicity while simultaneously providing the tools by which to see the broader patterns and context.

There also exist limitations on the conclusions that can be drawn from this research. First, there are questions of the ability of case studies to adequately account for third variables that could impact the dependent variable, as is possible with other research designs (Van Evera 1997, 51). This, in turn, connects to the general critique of this method, being that while it has considerable explanatory power, it lacks in generalizability and parsimony: the conclusions drawn from the results of one case study are only with great effort applicable to other cases, often limited by the same contextual details that provide this method its greatest strength. This research utilizes comparative analysis in order to counterbalance some of these limitations, though even this strategy is limited as “paired cases are never nearly identical (as the method of difference requires) ... [or] paired cases usually deviate even further from having wholly different characteristics (as the method of agreement requires)” (Van Evera 1997, 58).

Ultimately, this methodological design draws considerable strength from the utilization of various sources of data, as the results from these analyses can be woven together in order to produce a more comprehensive understanding of the ramifications of each state's decision to institutionalize identity as a peace-building strategy. In the words of Lisa Wedeen:

By balancing concrete empirical examples with theoretically motivated discussions... anthropologists unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions and provide us with new language for tackling perennial issues. What makes these writings so compelling is not the ethnographic work per se... but their innovative theses and their attention to mechanisms that induce solidarity, community, prejudice, passion, envy, discipline, strategic choice, and dominance (Wedeen 2010, 268).

This research works to understand the mechanisms through which post-genocidal systems create and define the bounds of the post-conflict society, how these systems are perpetuated by structure and elite aspiration, and how the population experiences and negotiates the population. It is through the incorporation of a variety of data types that the complexities of these ramifications can be understood.

Chapter 4.1: Bosnia-Herzegovina—Consociationalism in Action

History and Context: Bosnia-Herzegovina and the DPA

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)¹ of April 1995 ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) between ethnic Bosniak, Croat, and Serb forces, which spanned from 1991-95.² The DPA, specifically Annex 4 of the peace agreement, was institutionalized as the post-war constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and froze the conflict by territorializing ethnicity and dividing the state into Republika Srpska and the Federation (*Federacija*) (Bieber 2004, 4; Robinson and Pobrić 2006, 238).³ Many regard BiH as a state stuck in a “frozen conflict” that simply preserves an “imperfect peace” and to a considerable extent the war continues in the form of ethnopolitics (Perry 2009, 1).

Indeed, the DPA ended the BiH war without the outright victory of any ethnic group, and not only incentivized identification along ethnicized lines, but created “a structural environment in which only particularistic ideologies based on ethnic identity could gain sufficient political power” (Sarajlić 2011, 64; see also Dimitrijević 1998, 152). The ethnic divisions of the war became the basis for the organization of the new government, as it was designed to function as a consociation—defined as “a system that guarantees all groups in a divided society a share of the power on a permanent basis”—between the three recognized

¹ The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was brokered by the international community, with particular pressure being applied by the USA and Russia. The presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia – Izetbegović, Tuđman, and Milošević, respectively – were gathered in Dayton, Ohio, and prevented from leaving until a peace agreement could be reached.

² Ethnic divisions are determined most significantly by religious differences; while the use of these essentialized divisions will be problematized later in this research, for introductory purposes Bosniaks are Muslim, Croats are Catholic, and Serbs are Orthodox.

³ As an example of the language used within Annex 4: “**1. House of Peoples.** The House of Peoples shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).” This section demonstrates how ethnicity was both institutionalized and territorialized in the post-conflict Bosnian-Herzegovinian state.

nations (Lijphart 1995, 275). Consociations are characterized by a grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional representation and resource allocation, and a minority veto. In BiH, many of the same ethno-nationalist parties elected into power in the early 1990s continue to be in power today, namely the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH),⁴ as “ethnic affiliation often matters more than economic or social platforms” (Bieber 2004, 2). There are, however, political parties such as Naša Stranka (“Our Party”) that advocate in favor of broader civic interests and issues; indeed, these parties have experienced a measure of success in recent elections.⁵

The DPA defined 'official' ethnic categories by only constitutionally recognizing three constituent nations—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—and consequently grouping all individuals who did not or would not fit into these categorizations (e.g., Roma, Jews, Yugoslavs, etc.) as *ostali* or 'others'. This system is highly discriminatory, as it ties political identity to nationality, only granting political representation to the three constituent peoples (*narod*) of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Funk-Deckard 2011, 131). Political competition is between bounded ethnic groups, within this system which is dependent on each “group exclud[ing] others from participation in its social and political affairs, but at the same time restrain[ing] from participating in common affairs and activities that bring different groups together, preventing

⁴ In the 2012 municipal elections, the SDA won the highest number of votes, its candidates winning mayoral positions in 34 of a total of 138 municipalities; the SDS was second, with mayoral positions in 25 municipalities; and the HDZ BiH was third with mayoral positions in 13 municipalities.

⁵ Naša Stranka is regarded by some as “the only serious multi-ethnic party in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (European Green Party, 2012). The party first emerged in 2008, and was very successful in the local elections, gaining 22 municipal councilors, three deputy council chairs, one mayor and one deputy mayor. The results of the 2010 general elections did not match this success, but reemerged onto the political map in 2012, retaining 14 councilors in Sarajevo, winning councilors in two new municipalities and retaining another three councillors from 2008.

even its own members to participate in the affairs of other groups” (Saraljić 2011, 65). The European Court for Human Rights declared with their ruling in 2009 on the Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia-Herzegovina case⁶ that the limitations on who can stand for election into the House of Peoples and for the Presidency violate Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of Protocol 12,⁷ respectively. It is this ruling that spurred the beginning of debates for Constitutional reform in 2011, but no progress has been made towards an agreement (Human Rights Watch 2011).

The question driving this research asks how successful has post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation been in this country? And in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina one sentiment was expressed again and again in interviews and informal conversations: “Bosnians don't have peace, just absence of war.”⁸ (Mahir, professor of Political Science in Sarajevo).

An Introduction to the Collaborators

A considerable number of individuals contributed to the data utilized in this case study, be it through in-depth interview, informal conversation, or formal presentation. All of the names used within this analysis are pseudonyms in order to protect the confidentiality and privacy of all the collaborators. In total, twenty-two individuals were interviewed, which

⁶ Sejdić and Finci are Roma and Jewish, respectively, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who brought separate cases to the court that were later combined. They filed cases contesting the Constitution provisions that limited who can run for election for particular positions in the government to members of the three constituent nations.

⁷ Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is a Council of Europe treaty against discrimination, adopted in Rome in November 2000 and was implemented in 2005 with the receipt of its tenth ratification (Council of Europe, 2000). It currently has 18 member states and 19 signatories. The Sejdić-Finci ruling was the first ruling finding violation of this protocol.

⁸ Maihir; informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo; 13, October 2014.

included politicians, academics, individuals involved with non-profit and non-governmental organizations, census enumerators, and BiH youths. The politicians represented four political parties: Karim and Ivan from SDA; Armin from Naša Stranka; Aleksandar from SDS; and Dževad from SDP. The census enumerators, who worked in and around Srebrenica in eastern BiH, are Lejla and Ensar. The three professors are Harun and Ana, who teach in Sarajevo, and Paul, an academic from abroad who works extensively in and on BiH. Three interviewees worked with non-profits—James, Emir, Zara, and Zuhra—and four worked with NGOs—Jovana, Bram, Marija, and Hana. Zuhra works as a journalist. And the four youths living around the country are: Jasmina and Elma, who live in Sarajevo; Petar, who lives in Mostar; and Emilija, who lives in Brčko. In addition to these interviewees, notes from more than twenty informal conversations were used to supplement the data. The population whose insights informed this research was rather specific. The individuals interviewed and with whom most informal conversations took place are classifiable as 'elites' in that the population is comprised of academics, well-educated youths, politicians, activists, and journalists, all of whom are more inclined towards political awareness and involvement. Therefore, the conclusions that can be drawn from this research must be presented as a derivative of this specific frame and not that of a wider, general opinion of citizens of BiH. This is the same population that informs the data and conclusions for the Rwanda case study of this research, providing parallel structures between the case studies. Without the help and insight of all of these individuals, this research would not be possible.

Political Design and Effectiveness

In measuring the impact of institutionalized identity on the post-conflict recovery of Bosnia-Herzegovina, analysis of the constitutional structure itself and its impact is the most

effective place to begin. This “Frankenstein constitution,” as it is referred to by Zuhra, a journalist in Sarajevo, is heeded as the leading source of instability, discontent, and disorder in modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian society.⁹ This structure, Harun—a professor of political science in Sarajevo—argues, has “not only encouraged but entrenched the ethnic divisions, and directed political elites of [BiH] not only to stick with ethnopolitics, but to use ethnopolitics in the achievement of their basic goals.”¹⁰ At its most simplified, the Dayton Peace Accords were instituted with the sole intention of bringing to an end the shocking levels of violence taking place on European soil, particularly after the world was shaken by the Srebrenica genocide. The intention behind the accords was to establish a transitional system that would ease the development and eventual implementation of more permanent structures to govern the state. The system was never reformed, however, and now—particularly with the end of the termination of the use of the Bonn Powers¹¹ by the Office of the High Representative (OHR)—Dževad, a politician with SDP, is just one of many who believe that the Dayton Agreement is the reason why BiH “can't make any kind of progress.”¹²

Constitutional reform is now on the forefront of the political and social mind, having been mentioned in interviews with Harun¹³, Emilija¹⁴, Zuhra¹⁵, Ana—a professor in Sarajevo¹⁶,

⁹ Interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2014.

¹⁰ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

¹¹ The Bonn Powers granted to the OHR by Peace Implementation Council in 1997 were so the body could: 1) implement binding political changes when BiH parties were unwilling or unable to enact solutions of their own; and 2) remove public officials from office who violated the principles of the Dayton Peace Accords or was an obstacle to the creation of a consensus within the body. These powers were heavily used from 1997 to 2008.

¹² Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 28, November 2013.

¹³ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

¹⁴ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

¹⁵ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

¹⁶ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

and Marija—who works with youth NGO in Sarajevo¹⁷, in no small part due to the 2009 ruling on the Sejdić-Finci case by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).¹⁸ Many view the constitution as flagrantly and unapologetically discriminatory, as not only national minorities (e.g., Roma, Jews, and Slovenians) but constitutional minorities (e.g., Muslims and Croats living in Republika Srpska) as well lack representation within many state institutions, explained Marija.¹⁹ In addition, Ana stated, with the visible absence of cooperation and the overwhelming presence of “intimidation that comes from top-down, fear, threat, ... [and] the discourse they are using all of the time,” constitutional reform is appearing more important than ever before.²⁰ Dževad expressed the beliefs of multiple interviewees when he stated that “changing of constitutional law, changing of the political system, will force [the] country to go through forward, to make steps in democracy, in economy, and everything will be much easier.”²¹ Progress in drafting these reforms has been limited, however, as there continue to be dramatically different visions for the future of the state, ranging from the deconstruction of the entity system paired with a single president in the executive position to increased autonomy for each of the entities that could smooth the path to Republika Srpska's aspirational independence.

Ultimately, the constitutional design of Bosnia-Herzegovina failed to specify not only how particular issues would be resolved, but developed the groundwork for the dramatization

¹⁷ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 22, July 2014.

¹⁸ Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a case brought before the ECHR by a Roma and a Jew, respectively, that challenged the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They claimed that the specification that the three presidential seats could only be filled by a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb was discriminatory and a violation of their human rights. The court ruled in their favor on December 22nd, 2009.

¹⁹ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

²⁰ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

²¹ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 28, November 2013.

of ethnic groups conflicting over their 'vital national interests'. These claims of protecting their ethnic group have served as a sanctioned facade for the misuse of the constitution by ethnonational politicians purely interested in remaining in power as long as possible, argues Armin²², a politician with Naša Stranka, and Zuhra²³, a journalist. As Ana²⁴ succinctly expressed, the overwhelming majority of actions taken at the hands of these politicians have proven to be “against the spirit of restoring inter-group trust, or restoring inter-group relations,” and therefore counterproductive to efforts of reconstruction and reconciliation within the state.

Ethnonational extremism has long been rewarded in terms of votes, as radical voices are favored over those calling for consensus; Marko, a professor of political science in Banja Luka, explained that this is in large part because making concessions is seen as a sign of weakness and betrayal of the interests of the ethnic group.²⁵ This is possible because the political system is structured wholly around the concept of ethnopolitics—what Paul²⁶, a scholar on BiH, refers to as “warlord politics”—wherein power is divided between groups based on ethnicity. Because political power is distributed in this way, Zuhra argues, it drives politicians to focus their efforts on fighting for the presumed interests of the group that they represent as well as maintaining identification with that group as it is the only thing keeping them in power.²⁷ The ultimate impact of this focus on identity and ethnicity is perpetuating divisions prevalent in the war and, in some ways, creating new ones (Ana²⁸ & Zuhra²⁹). Indeed, the actions of political elites and institutional efforts at reconciliation have not only failed to

²² Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 18, November 2013.

²³ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

²⁴ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

²⁵ Informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science; October 2013.

²⁶ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

²⁷ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

²⁸ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

²⁹ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

foster improved relations but have contributed to greater instability. Ana argued:

Everything that they have been doing in the last 20 years, or post-Dayton, has been going exactly against the spirit and the essence and the ultimate goal of reconciliation, which is to support more segregation, less contact, more homogenized communities, more fear and inter-group anxiety and mistrust.³⁰

Their concern is not in “heal[ing] the wartime wounds,” states Zuhra, but in setting in stone “that there are three ethnic groups, and this one is this percent, and that one is that percent, and the 'others', we don't care what you do. Because you have ethnic parties which are in power now.”³¹

This ethnic divisioning strongly comes into play in the course of elections, which, Harun explains, function practically as ethnic voting, as the election law “directs, basically, political activity only within one, only within your ethnic group.”³² It is this characteristic that leads to the classification of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan political system as 'ethnopolitical'. Ethnopolitics, as a form of biopolitics, is dependent on “ethnic bodies: it needs ethnic masses. So it's very important to show how many of 'us' there are and how strong we are, explains Harun. “Ethnic mobilization and crystallization has been a vital part of every election process that we have had in the Dayton-Bosnia.”³³ Ultimately this type of electoral and political system has been detrimental to peace and stability within BiH. The focus of election campaigns is consistently placed on issues that have been ethnicized—with particular focus placed on which ethnic group individuals belong to and where they are from—often with the intent to raise fear

³⁰ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

³¹ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

³² Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

³³ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

among the population (Hana³⁴ & Zuhra³⁵). Dževad reported that politicians say such things as, “If you don't vote for me, for Dževad, Samantha will come and she will take all your rights. She's different religion, she will take job from you, you will be forced to speak with her language.”³⁶ In Dževad's mind, if the political system were to be changed, fears about being outnumbered by the 'other' group and fears of being killed would lose all significance or meaning, a sentiment echoed by Lejla³⁷, who was a census enumerator in Srebrenica, and Karim³⁸, a politician with SDA in Srebrenica.

Despite considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of current political leaders and their ability to bring about meaningful reform and change within BiH, James laments, these same politicians are voted into office again and again, many of them having been in office since the end of the war.³⁹ Reflecting on this circumstance, Emilija—a student from Brčko studying in Bijelina—stated that, “Even if they know [the politicians] are not right, [they think], 'But, you know it's my ethnicity, and then I will just go with, let's call them, *my people*'.” Somehow, she explains, citizens across BiH “still have, let's say, faith in those politicians and they still somehow trust their words and go by those words.”⁴⁰ For those who are no longer seduced or convinced by the rhetoric of the major political parties, many have found it easy to give up on politics and elections altogether. Jovana, director of a film and art center in Sarajevo, reflected:

Yes, we have, I think that at some point we have been ignoring the politics, in terms of it being too complicated, it having so many levels, and people were just trying

³⁴ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

³⁵ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

³⁶ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 28, November 2013.

³⁷ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013.

³⁸ Interview; Government Office in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013.

³⁹ Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014.

⁴⁰ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

to... So we were ignoring the politics because it was too much to deal with: every time you deal with it you hit a wall. And then at some point it became very personal and now you see that, okay ten years of seeing rhetoric, seeing people leading, 'leading', the country is not leading anywhere, and people are now, okay, we have elections again. But those elections don't really mean anything, because no matter how you vote, they're going to agree amongst themselves to divide the government and everything.⁴¹

Yet, voting is crucial in the eyes on many BiH activists, such as Jovana, because “if you don't vote, if you don't do anything, they can manipulate with your vote.”⁴² The social obligation to vote balances the need for rights, both of which are crucial for being an active participant in society—rather than simply claiming “I know my rights,” Marija argues that citizens “need to know what [their] rights are, but also what their responsibilities towards society are.”⁴³

Manipulation of election results is but one of the ways in which the existing political system has allowed corruption to flourish. Ana described the systemic problem of corruption in BiH as “an embedded octopus.”⁴⁴ When it has become an integral part of so many institutions—from providing tips and gifts for the doctor who delivers your baby to calling on family connections to get a job in a government office—she questions, “Where do you start? ... And who is going to reveal it?”⁴⁵ Political elites are more than willing to take advantage of the opportunities left open to them by the constitutional structure. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bram—a foreign NGO worker in Sarajevo—notes, the fault lies exist with the system design itself provide “more places for corruption,” while at the same time failing to provide “enough

⁴¹ Jovana; interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014.

⁴² Jovana; interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014.

⁴³ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

⁴⁴ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

⁴⁵ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

mechanisms for control, transparency, accountability, etc.”⁴⁶ Lejla states that the BiH political system is rife with opportunities for ethnopoliticians to exploit the fears of citizens in order to achieve their own ends, be it funneling money to corporations they have ties with or engaging in clientelism in order to prolong their time in power.⁴⁷ Ultimately, many citizens see the corruption of politicians and individuals in positions of power as unavoidable: as Djermina, a youth living and working in Sarajevo, translated from comments on an article from a BiH journal, “Is there anyone in this country who isn't corrupt?’ one person wrote. And someone responded, ‘Only those who haven't had the chance to be.’”⁴⁸

Communal Relations

In the aftermath of atrocity—particularly when the violence was inter-ethnic in nature—it is vital that reconstruction and reconciliation efforts pay particular attention to the regeneration of stable, peaceful, and healthy communal relations. Dealing with the past is crucial for a “sustainable and peaceful future,” Ana argues, but is often avoided in post-conflict states: it “is not a really welcoming process because it brings about a lot of negativity of your own group and atrocities, and it's kind of a threat of who you are and your group. People will generally tend to avoid dealing with the knowledge that members of your own group harmed innocent people in the past, etc.”⁴⁹ When asked about the status of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society and the progress that had been made toward repairing relationships that were destroyed in the early 90s, the comments, though mixed, were largely negative. Legacy issues that remind people of their 'side's' perspective on the events of the war persist throughout BiH society,

⁴⁶ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

⁴⁷ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013.

⁴⁸ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013.

⁴⁹ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

largely perpetuated through historical framing, memorialization, and ethnic homogenization at the hands of politicians and enabled by the constitutional structure. As Karim described it, “The sad part of this country is that we have 3 peoples, 3 stories, 3 truths... Under such conditions, it's hard to find a common denominator.”⁵⁰

The problem, many interviewees identified, is that everything in BiH is ethnicized; an employee at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), James, noted, “You read the newspapers, it's often focused on ethnic-based issues; when you hear the politicians, it's often ethnic-related issues.”⁵¹ Indeed, Jovana argues, ethnic divisions suit the government “because then everybody can steal and point the finger at the other one, because if you have too many layers you can't find who's not doing his job.”⁵² Students at a faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka in the RS believe that de-ethnicizing politics and the creation of a civic identification is impossible because “[they] fought a war over that only a few years ago,”⁵³ and because declaring such an identity would be “dangerous” and seen as a “betrayal” of one's ethnic group.⁵⁴ SDS politician in Srebrenica, Aleksandar, agrees, stating, “It is very difficult, even taken from the perspective of history—at that point the real problems would start, if we could have one single civic identity.”⁵⁵ In addition, such an effort effectively ignores the influence of BiH's powerful neighbors—Croatia and Serbia—and the undeniable influence that they have on ethnic identification and political orientation within Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Interview; Government Office in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013.

⁵¹ Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014.

⁵² Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014.

⁵³ Stefan; informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013.

⁵⁴ Đorđe; informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013.

⁵⁵ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013.

⁵⁶ The desire of Croatian and Serbian politicians to have control over predominantly Croat and predominantly Serb territories of BiH was one of the main contributing factors to the war from

Ava—a scholar from BiH now working in Beograd, Serbia—does not see much hope for reconciliation, certainly not in the near future. She reflected, “We are never going to get to a point where they're going to agree on what happened.”⁵⁷ Indeed, the lack of a single history, or even discussion of the different histories remains a considerable source of conflict in present day BiH. “My friend, she said one time, 'They have their own history, we have our own history. Until we have one history accepted by both sides there will not be reconciliation here',” Hana, a director of a youth NGO in Ilidža, told me. “And it's really that we're denying things they point out and they deny things we point out, and it's this did happen, this did not happen.”⁵⁸ History books differ from canton to canton due to the existence of thirteen Ministries of Education who each have a degree of autonomous control, just one example of the layers of bureaucracy that exist in the BiH system. This has lent itself to considerably large differences between the histories told in each of the entities, and this inconsistency has a profound impact on youths, particularly those who are growing up in ethnically homogenized villages and have no independent memory of the war. For example, Jasna, a director of a human rights NGO in Sarajevo, spoke about she was scared “to see these young generations in Republika Srpska following the trial of Karadžić⁵⁹ who have been so seduced by this media and believe, truly, that he is a hero.”⁶⁰

Just as significant as education to constructing memories of the past is the impact of

1992-95. Serbian politics and culture still have considerable clout in Republika Srpska, for example influencing their opinions on NATO membership, a major point of contention in BiH politics where questions of EU membership and integration into security networks including NATO are at the forefront of debate.

⁵⁷ Ava; informal conversation; Belgrade, Serbia; October 2013.

⁵⁸ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

⁵⁹ Radovan Karadžić—President of Republika Srpska during the fall of Yugoslavia—is currently on trial at the ICTY in the Hague, charged with war crimes committed against Bosniaks and Croats during the Siege of Sarajevo as well as ordering the Srebrenica genocide.

⁶⁰ Informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; June 2014.

knowledge gained from family, friends, and the media, which has been heavily informed by ethnic homogenization under the Dayton Accords. Aleksandar spoke about the ways in which today's youth are gaining information about the past through their families that inherently biases their perspective, as there is not opposing view or history to which they can compare this telling of events. He said:

Many things I didn't know even in the secondary school, but now my child and children of all others they know who is who, who are Muslims, what were war events. They get quickly information within their families. And the different stances of our historical happenings in the war, it creates even bigger differentiation. For example, I tell to my child who was killed in our family but I don't say who was killed in other families, and that's the same thing, the same procedure that happens on the other side. They say who was killed in their family but not who was killed in Serb families. So our children are kind of very well informed into that to be Serbs, Bosniaks, or Croats. It's how grounds are prepared even for bigger differences and differentiation than there used to be before. It's a gradual process, was also shown throughout history and in post-history.⁶¹

When entity-level narratives of the past contain similar levels of division—take, for example, the fact that the Srebrenica genocide⁶² is denied by most Serbs living in the RS and July 13th is only a day of mourning in the Federation—differentiation and conflict can become common. Marija, goes so far as to assert that “institutions just don't recognize historic facts as they were,

⁶¹ Aleksandar; interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH: 2, December 2013.

⁶² Also known as the Srebrenica massacre, this event was described by the UN Secretary General as the worst crime on European soil since WWII. Srebrenica was declared a “safe area” under UN protection in April 1993. However, in July 1995, units of the Army of Republika Srpska under the command of Ratko Mladić amongst others—including members of a Serbian paramilitary group known as the Scorpions—took over the town. They proceeded to massacre more than 8,000 Bosniaks, mainly men and boys, and forcibly displaced between 25,000 and 30,000 Bosniak women and children from in and around the town of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. These atrocities were unanimously ruled an act of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2004.

but just manipulate the numbers, the facts and events and people and everything.”⁶³

The RS is not alone in this ethnic framing, however. Emilija pointed out that while it is necessary to have people from Republika Srpska “come to Srebrenica and say, 'Yeah, this is where the genocide happened',” it is also necessary to have similar recognition of the suffering of Serbs from Bosniaks and Croats living in the Federation.⁶⁴ This is one way in which she sees Brčko as succeeding where the rest of the country has failed. Because of its unique design—being the only district in the entirety of the state where the statute of the city is designed around all three constitutionally recognized groups live together—emphasis was placed from its formation of the recognition of all people's voices. Reconciliation efforts have made considerable progress in Brčko, and it's the “only city that has a monument for all three ethnic groups for the victims from the war. In [the] center they are standing next to each other: one is for the Bosniak civilians, one is for the Croat civilians, and one is for the Serb civilians.”⁶⁵ Memorialization in much of BiH is highly political. In building a commemoration park in Sarajevo for soldiers who died in the war, Hana—a director of a youth NGO in Ilidža—offers as an example, politicians are willing spend millions of dollars “because they get more votes if they do because all veterans will vote for them.”⁶⁶ This sort of prioritized memorialization and remembering of the past is encouraged and institutionalized by the BiH constitutional structure wherein ethnopoliticians are given incentives to keep ethnic unity and identification at the forefront of the public mind. Considerable progress has been made, however, through the work of NGOs based in BiH such as the Post-Conflict Research Center and Humanity in Action, which often direct their efforts towards youths living in ethnically

⁶³ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

⁶⁴ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

⁶⁵ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

⁶⁶ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

homogeneous communities. These programs typically encourage youths to be critical of their own beliefs and interrogate the basis and reasoning behind why they believe what they do: whether it is grounded in what they have been told by their family, the media, politicians, or on information gained through careful consideration of the various 'truths' that exist within the state.

In many places around BiH, “ethnic identity dominates in the representations of reality,” explains Harun. “It has become... commonsensical thing to view the reality through the lenses of ethnic identity, so it's very hard. How do you, easy can you change the common sense of any people?”⁶⁷ This “common sense” is unsurprisingly reinforced by news media, as newspapers and TVs are limited to the local area. Because of this, Ava states, news reports are often ethnically framed, employing “blaring headlines that fit the narrative that this or that ethnic group is bad,”⁶⁹ and catering to prejudices of the population that they believe will be reading their paper possess.⁷⁰ It is also not unheard of to have political parties or powerful politicians with ties to the ownership or management of news agencies. For example, the editor-in-chief of *Nezavisne novine*⁷¹ is the daughter of the Serb member of the Presidency of BiH (Hodžić 2013).

The perpetual ethnicization of the news and politics that these ties contribute to is but one way in which narratives of 'us' and 'them' persist in BiH, leading many, including Hana, to believe that there has been no work towards reconciliation at all, that it has simply been

⁶⁷ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

⁶⁸ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

⁶⁹ Ava, informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; October 2013.

⁷⁰ Zuhra; interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.


⁷¹ A newspaper based in Banja Luka (Republika Srpska), BiH. It was, however, the first Bosnian Serb paper to—in 1999—report on war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs during the war.

“shoved under the carpet.”⁷² The importance of ethnicity varies regionally, however, and there are considerable differences between larger cities such as Sarajevo and smaller, often times ethnically homogeneous, or divided, communities such as Mostar, Gornji Vakuf, and Vareš. Living in Sarajevo, Ana explains, youths have become a “product of a globalized society with different needs ...different interests.”⁷³ Many interviewees—Jovana⁷⁴, Ana⁷⁵, Lejla⁷⁶, and James⁷⁷—expressed that they and their peers place much less importance on ethnic identity, especially in their personal lives.

Conditions are considerably different in the smaller villages, however, as a result of the ethnic homogenization that was codified by the DPA. In many ways, the “leopard skin” of Bosnia is gone, as the creation of the two entities by the Dayton Accords finalized the ethnic

Illustration 1

Ethnic make-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, before and after the war



Source: Office of the High Representative

⁷² Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

⁷³ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

⁷⁴ Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014.

⁷⁵ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

⁷⁶ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013.

⁷⁷ Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014.

cleansing that was largely the intention of the war (Illustration 1). Marija has noted that “people who come from a mono-ethnic community, they have sometimes trouble grasping 'diversity' as a phenomena, because they're used to living... they don't really... they have trouble accepting the different and the diverse.”⁷⁸ These youths do not know how to interact with one another and often grapple with a fear of the 'other' which has been ingrained in them by their families, media, and politicians. Even in ethnically heterogeneous communities, all boundaries between groups have not been removed. In Brčko, explains Emilija, while boundaries preventing friendships between individuals of different ethnicities have been removed, “the question mainly is having relationships in means of emotional relationships or marriages between Bosniaks and Serbs and Croats and Serbs.” She continues, “To be honest I'm not sure, but I haven't heard of multi-ethnic wedding in Brčko in, like, I don't know, in the last three or four years I'm sure.”⁷⁹ And in Sarajevo, journalist Zuhra believes that while all cultures, religions, and ethnic groups are respected:

when you look at the structure of Sarajevo—there are still no concrete data about the ethnical structure of the population—but I would say that it's more than 90 something percent Bosniaks. So in fact you do have a multiethnic Sarajevo, but in numbers you don't have that. Croats and Serbs are respected here, and Jews and other minorities, but in fact the majority of population is not reflecting that feeling of multiculturalism and ethnicity.⁸⁰

Ultimately, having experience with the 'other' is important, argues social psychologist at the University of Sarajevo, Ana. While people who grow up in very homogeneous communities lack opportunities for contact with the 'other' and therefore have higher rates of prejudice and

⁷⁸ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

⁷⁹ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

⁸⁰ Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

misunderstanding against the 'other', Ana has found that those from more heterogeneous communities “have a different reality and have more positive effect in inter-group relation.”⁸¹

An activist in Sarajevo, Emir, explained what he believes to constitute ethnicity and what that means in BiH:

Okay, there are four pillars of ethnicity: culture, language, religion, and tradition, I think, or history. Okay, so the history/tradition is the same. Culture, I don't see a difference, maybe near Eid, but I don't see it. Language, obviously. Religion—so religion is what is left. But then you cannot only claim it for religion because religion is kind of, you know, it should be a unifying factor more than a differentiating factor. So what's left is hatred. It's not in these pillars, but it's always there. So how do you establish ethnicity in Bosnia? It is by hating the 'other', that's the only differentiation you get. What makes you a Bosniak? I hate Croats and Serbs. What makes you a Serb? I hate the others. What else is the sole component of your differentiation from the others?⁸²

Ana argues, however, that the absence of differences in culture, tradition, and language has lent itself to the absence of “psychological, cultural, physical differences between communities,” and she believes that the people of BiH are “willing to cooperate ...willing to live together ...willing to work together.”⁸³

There exist NGOs, such as that run by Marija, that work to open the minds of youths from these homogenized communities through forcing them to interact with the 'other'; one such program places three kids—one from each ethnic group—together in a room for the duration of the program. She reflects, “It's very hard, but after just spending one night in the same room and after two days of being together, they just work as a group, you have no

⁸¹ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

⁸² Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014.

⁸³ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014.

differences whatsoever. It's just amazing how they click, how they realize they have more in common than they have differences among them.”⁸⁴ Others, as *Zašto ne?* did in the run-up to the census in October 2013, are working towards the construction of a civic identity that would unite people in opposition to these ethnicized politics. They agree with Ana that moderating levels of nationalism and identification are important to building a stable and sustainable peace.⁸⁵ Many, explains an NGO worker,⁸⁶ see the protests of February 2014 as a sign that individuals are coming together across ethnic lines to raise their voice about issues that are of importance to all citizens: “issues such as unemployment, issues such as corruption, that are totally crosscutting—totally crosscutting in terms of covering the whole country and not really being with any ethnicity or nationality.”⁸⁷ It is therefore vital to understand the ways in which BiH politics have centred on ethnicity and have therefore played a role in the economics and transitional justice of the state.

Economic Recovery

The reinvigoration of the economic system in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been strained at best. Existing economic conditions are defined by stagnation, high levels of unemployment, rampant corruption, and growing inequality. Hopes are turning to these poor economic conditions to act as the catalyst in sparking broader institutional reforms, explained Lejla who believes that the population of BiH can be united against “this bitter, awful economic situation... because they don't have other options.”⁸⁸ In the face of these systemic issues there is rising domestic pressure on politicians to shift their focus to the economy, most clearly manifesting

⁸⁴ Marijia; interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

⁸⁵ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014

⁸⁶ Interviewee did not want to be identified.

⁸⁷ Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014.

⁸⁸ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013.

in the protests that took place in February 2014 across BiH.⁸⁹ The design of the constitutional structure had and continues to have a profound impact on the economic system, as the stagnation that results from the ethnicized blockades and the ethnicization of all politics and policies has blocked almost all projects aimed at the common economic good. For example, Hana notes, in many issues of economic reform, the questions arise: “How much money will go in the Federation, how much money will go in Republika Srpska?”⁹⁰ While ethnopoliticians adopt this vision for its utility in furthering their political aspirations, Melica—a student of political science in Banja Luka—points out that they would find an increased focus on economics “pleasing to all of the three groups.”⁹¹ This, however, would diminish the importance of these ethnic distinctions: as Melica explained, “If we were all able to live better materially, these differences would be less important.”⁹² When working within the ethnopolitical system has become the only way to “try to find a way around, to get by, just to find some kind of better conditions for your life,” Lejla told me over coffee, you are willing to accept the corruption and politicization.⁹³ Up to a point, that is. What will be the impact, for example, of the disastrous effects of the May flooding⁹⁴ on the willingness of citizens to accept the poor economic conditions and restricted opportunities? As OSCE employee James

⁸⁹ The protests were a series of demonstrations and riots that began in Tuzla, Federacija, on February 4, 2014, quickly spreading to cities around the Federation including Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar, Jajce, and Brčko, though the same level of unrest was not seen in Republika Srpska. The protests began in reaction to the privatization and shutting down of a number of factories around Tuzla but grew into a reaction against the political inertia of the past 20 years.

⁹⁰ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

⁹¹ Informal conversation; Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013.

⁹² Informal conversation; Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013.

⁹³ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013.

⁹⁴ Between 14 and 18 May, 2014, a low pressure cyclone brought heavy rainfall and the worst floods in over a century to BiH, Croatia, and Serbia. Approximately 1.5 million people in BiH—nearly 39% of the population—were affected, with the worst damage taking place in the northeast of the state near Bosanski Šamac, Odžak, Orašje, Doboj, Bijeljina, Brčko, and Maglaj (Assessment Capacities Project 2014).

reflected:

Some of these places were still recovering from the consequences of the war when they were hit with a terrible natural disaster. On top of infrastructure and industry being damaged, huge amounts of personal property were damaged or destroyed. It's going to be very difficult for people to recover because of the financial issues. With unemployment being so high, it's terribly difficult. I was up in Bijelina, up in the northeast, pretty much where the Sava and the Drina Rivers come together. There was flooding in the town center, but some of the rural communities were absolutely devastated. Many people live off what they can grow, and the agriculture sector was severely damaged along with many homes. In many ways, it's putting the country back many years, especially for the rural areas. Not to mention the landmine problem which will remain an issue for years and years to come due to the fact that some suspected mine areas inevitably shifted.⁹⁵

When taken in the context of high unemployment and growing income inequality—particularly between those who work for the government and those who do not—it is unsurprising that most of the demands made during the February protests and the subsequent plenums were focused on economic conditions and the failings of politicians to properly attend to the needs of the majority of the population.

Unemployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina has skyrocketed: more than 60% of youth are unemployed (World Bank 2013). This statistic is particularly relevant when taken in the context of the 2007 World Bank regional report that stated that unemployed youths are less likely to transition into the workforce leading to prolonged stagnation within the state. In addition to this, “initial spells of unemployment or joblessness appear to have lasting adverse effects on earnings and employment,” which is referred to in the report as “scarring” (World Bank 2007). In addition, Bram spoke to the additional fear that unemployed youth, at worst, are at risk of

⁹⁵ Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014.

falling into crime or radical groups, while at best they do not contribute to prosperity or development.⁹⁶ Thus, extended periods of high youth unemployment pose sizable risks for long-term problems in the state.

The conditions of youth unemployment in BiH, Bram continued, are “linked with political situation, stability, corruption, [and] complicated bureaucratic procedures for new businesses or foreign investments.”⁹⁷ First, the absence of employment opportunities has enabled corruption in myriad ways. For example, connections—particularly through membership in a political party—is often seen as necessary for finding employment as a youth living in BiH. Jasmina, a youth reflecting on her own experience of looking for a job in Sarajevo, said, “they have to go to political parties to get a job they have to have connections and without connections you, I think, it is just the luck that you get a job but without connections you’re are like 2% of a chance to get it.”⁹⁸ As politics has been tied to ethnicity via the constitutional structure, employment has been ethnicized I addition to being politicized. While not the norm, Petar—a youth attending university in Mostar—explained, it is not uncommon to have “nationality [play] a big role in getting a job,” though, he clarified, connection remains more important than ethnicity in finding employment in BiH.⁹⁹ Nowhere is the impact of ethnicization felt more than in divided cities, such as Mostar. Petar described the situation:

in Mostar when you're catching up for a job and when you're searching a job on the west side, where the Croat is, and on the east side, where the Bosniak is, when they see you may be a Croat and searching for a job on the east side, yeah, that's going to be a problem. And it's the other way too, when you're a Bosniak searching

⁹⁶ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

⁹⁷ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

⁹⁸ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

⁹⁹ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

for a job on the west side. For you say your name, you're not a Croat—that's a big minus to you. I think it's still a problem for the youth and for the employment of the youth in Mostar.¹⁰⁰

This practice of ethnicized hiring is simply another way in which the institutionalization of ethnicity by the Dayton Accords continues to impact the lived experiences of BiH residents. With ethnopolitics as the sole form of politics, allowing absolute domination by ethnonational politicians, and given the economic stagnation, politicians are able to play on the “economic stability” card, both in their campaigning and in securing support for their party. Thus, Lejla argues, what is one to do when “they promise you a job and you have no other option to get a job unless they allow you to have, because there is no opposition, no real opposition, to any of the ethnopolitical parties in Bosnia”?¹⁰¹ This is but one of the ways in which ethnopoliticians are able to exploit the constitutional structure, resulting political culture, and economic stagnation to serve their own interests. Thus, a “ruling class... composed of no more than 10,000 people who own and run everything” now dominates BiH, explained Paul.¹⁰² Hana believes this upper echelon of BiH society controls the flow of resources, unaware of “how normal, ordinary citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina live and what [they have] to face.”¹⁰³ Instead, they perform calculations in order to maximize the political and economic benefit, resulting in rising inequality in the state. Hana continues, “They are just doing politics—they're not doing public service. But they are public servants, or they should be.”¹⁰⁴ Until the political structure, particularly the constitutional design, incentivizes or requires better social safety nets, decreases inequality, outlaws clientelism, and drives out corruption, the economic conditions

¹⁰⁰ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

¹⁰¹ Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013.

¹⁰² Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

¹⁰³ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

in BiH will remain stagnant. And stagnant waters breed dissent.

Transitional Justice

“The political situation now is not only as bad as in 1992, but worse,” reflects Zenon, a professor of political science in Sarajevo. “If this generation were to wage a war now they would be even more violent than in the last one.”¹⁰⁵ Many of those who contributed their perspectives to their research expressed that “things are the same as just before the war started,”¹⁰⁶ or that the war is still being waged, simply “without weapons.”¹⁰⁷ This is undoubtedly a concerning sentiment, given the fact that reconciliation and reconstruction efforts have been underway in the state for nearly twenty years. Much of the discourse remains the same: “What is my territory? What is my share? That's not your place, that's my place,” which has led many—like Hana—to regard the current conditions as an “artificial peace,” as at present, no one wins.¹⁰⁸ But dissent is rising in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the summer of 2013 protestors took to the streets over the JMBG—identity numbers assigned to children at birth—as a symbol of the political and social dysfunction of the state.¹⁰⁹ However, the level of protesting escalated during the protests in February 2014, Jovana explained, because “people don't have anything to loose” which is “a very ugly situation for the government.”¹¹⁰ While politicians can ignore 5,000 people on the street, Jovana argues, they cannot ignore burnt

¹⁰⁵ Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

¹⁰⁶ Informal conversation; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; June 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Almir; informal conversation; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; May 2014.

¹⁰⁸ Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Thousands took to the streets in June after the death of three-month-old Berina. Bickering between Bosnia's ethnoational politicians permitted the assignment of Unique Master Citizen Numbers (*Jedinstveni matični broj građana*—JMBG) to expire over a dispute on cantonal borders, not allowing children after February to receive the JMBG numbers necessary for obtaining medical cards and passports. Without these documents, young Berina could not leave the country to receive the medical treatment necessary to save her life. This was the first protest the united citizens across ethnic lines since the war.

¹¹⁰ Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014.

government buildings, and that is precisely why protestors adopted such 'radical' tactics. Marija wants to see more of this type of action, stating:

So I miss this rage within people, I just miss it. There needs to be a rage where we say, 'I'm fed up, I'm going to do what I can to change it.' But we don't really realize that the power lies within each of us, so we tend to think, *What can I change?* If 30,000 people who think *what can I change?* actually do something, then you have 30,000 people who've actually done something. While on the other hand we have 30,000 people who just didn't do anything because they don't think they can. So it requires, really, a great shift in the way we think.¹¹¹

Petar believed he saw the beginning of this shift in the public psyche during the February protests, referring to it at its outset as a “social revolution.”¹¹²

But, as these protests developed, politicians took advantage of the circumstance to redirect the blame for the current turmoil towards opposing politicians and political parties, typically those from the ethnonational parties of the other ethnicities. In so doing, politicians perpetuated narratives of having the interests of the national group in mind, narratives that place them as the sole protectors of the communal interests and values in the face of an oppositional and oppressive 'other'. But, Harun claims, their assertions that they “protect peoples in their identities and their existence” fell flat because “when concrete human beings—members of these peoples—start to die, it's not a problem,” it's not a priority.¹¹³ This tendency reveals a disheartening trend of ethnopolitics:

What ethnopolitical entrepreneurs and elites actually protect is their abstract notions of the people. So if I'm protecting abstract notion of people I don't have to protect you personally as a member of this or that group. These protests were very important because they show how ordinary citizens of this country—beyond all

¹¹¹ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

¹¹² Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014.

¹¹³ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

these discourses of the ethnic rights—actually are literally thrown into what Hanna Arand says: “rightlessness.” You're nobody. You don't have rights. You cannot have rights. You cannot have freedoms. You don't belong, truly, to any organized political state, because, as you know, human rights and freedoms are protected by the state. This clearly shows that Bosnian citizens are much like, in essence, immigrants from Syria, or precarious workers, immigrant workers, who are thrown into rightlessness, as Hanna Arand says. And that is very scary.¹¹⁴

Thus, Harun is arguing, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have no rights outside of their membership in one of the three constitutionally recognized national groups, and even then only part of the time. This leaves most in BiH—particularly minorities—without protection or voice. Summarized succinctly by Armin, “the segment of the population that has been really discriminated by the Dayton Constitution and everything that derives from the Dayton constitution is basically we as individuals.”¹¹⁵

Under these conditions fear flourishes. There exists an overarching mistrust in the state, and Ervin—a Sarajevan living in Belgrade—like many others, sees the “goals of the war [as being] accomplished—[they] live in separated areas living afraid of the 'other'.”¹¹⁶ With social trust having been destroyed by the war and the general failing of efforts towards reconstruction and reconciliation in the post-conflict period, it is unsurprising that mistrust persists. Ethnonational politicians frequently utilize “a card of security” to extend their power and the existing political system: by calling on people's existing fears that “they are preparing the final solution, final attack on us, we have to be aware, we have to beware of their hidden intentions and all that,” explains Harun, people are more likely to vote for their ethnonational party.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

¹¹⁵ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November, 2013.

¹¹⁶ Informal conversation; cafe in Belgrade, Serbia; October 2013.

¹¹⁷ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

People are truly afraid that “somebody [is] going to attack their kid in the street because they have... a Serbian accent,” far more, stated Marija, than they worry about having friendships or even romantic relationships with the 'other'.¹¹⁸ But for Emilija, the major point of worry is that youths who have no personal memory of the war, who've only heard stories of it from friends, family, the media, and politicians still think that way, which to her is exceedingly dangerous.¹¹⁹

This fearful mindset is perpetuated by a number of factors in the judicial system. First, while approximately 250 cases of war crimes have been completed in BiH since 2003, there continues to be a backlog of approximately 1,200 (Džidić 2014). The slow rate of prosecution has had myriad negative impacts, not only because evidence and memories fade as time passes, but also because it has inhibited, claimed an NGO worker, “coming to terms with the past, reconciliation, when perpetrators are wandering the streets.”¹²⁰ It has been shown that war crime tribunals can be very valuable to the post-conflict recovery process. By knowing who is guilty for the acts of violence committed during the war, argues Ahmed—a reporter for an independent news source in BiH—it is easier to reconnect with neighbors of a different ethnicity.¹²¹ But, Jagoda—an activist whose work focuses on the monitoring of war crimes trials in BiH—believes that BiH has “put too much emphasis on judicial proceedings as just one of the mechanisms of transitional justice. ... Just by investing so much emphasis on this, to place so much pressure and expectation on it, we may be keeping it from working.”¹²²

In the rush to prosecute crimes of genocide, for example, the Court of BiH used the 2003 criminal code rather than the 1976 Yugoslav code which was in place during the war;

¹¹⁸ Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014.

¹¹⁹ Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014.

¹²⁰ Interviewee did not want to be identified.

¹²¹ Informal conversation; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013.

¹²² Informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; May 2014.

because of this, numerous convicted war criminals were released until they could be retried under the correct legal code. Worse than their release, however, was that many of these men returned to a hero's welcome. The blow of this is deepened by the fact that one of these receptions—that of Dario Kordić in Visovač—was attended by the chairman of the House of People of the State Parliament, the delegate in the House of Peoples in the State Parliament, and the Chairman of the Club of the Caucus in the Federation House of Representatives, as well as some military leaders, reported Emir.¹²³ When acts such of this are permitted to take place under the constitutional structure without repercussion of any kind, Emir, stated, “they are glorifying a war criminal and not sending any peace or reconciliation messages.”¹²⁴ In the face of this, it is unsurprising that many BiH citizens are still fearful, distrustful, and wary of the government and politicians.

Conclusion

Analysis of the status of political, communal, economic, and transitional justice reconstruction and recovery within Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that progress has been slight and met with much resistance, primarily on the part ethnopoliticians. This is to be expected in the context of the constitutional structure in place in the state—the power of these ethnonational politicians is dependent on an ethnicized population, and it is therefore not in their best interest to strongly pursue reconciliation and reconstruction within the state. Implementing policy that would increase the influence of minorities, bolster a sense of unification as citizens of the state, or decrease corruption, clientelism, and nepotism would threaten the power of ethnicized political parties. The institutionalization of identity through

¹²³ Interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014.

¹²⁴ Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014.

the Dayton Peace Accords, specifically Annex 4 of the document, has led to the ethnicization of the politics and government of BiH. Not only are ethnicity and politics inexorably linked—leading them to be largely equated in the public discourse—but this ethnicization/politicization extends to all aspects of life, from education to medicine, and almost always to negative ends.

Ethnopoliticians' efforts to normalize this discourse and protect the status quo have not gone wholly unchallenged, however. As was demonstrated by the JMBG and February protests, citizens are increasingly crossing ethnicized divisions to oppose the mismanagement, corruption, and discrimination of the BiH government, and call for systemic change. Harun is exceptionally hopeful for the potential impact of constitutional reform, stating, “Definitely institutional design creates new rules of the game, and I think that we would then be more hopeful in opening up the spaces for other forms of political articulation than strictly ethnic.”¹²⁵

But for Armin the situation is more desperate. He states:

As long as we have ethnopolitics we will not have Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified factor. And Bosnia-Herzegovina will essentially dissolve if certain groups are excluded from having their rights in this country... So we really have to move away from nationalism, it's going to destroy us completely—not only economically and socially, but it is really going to disintegrate the country politically. And the only option is the option of focusing on how we can make this country be a better place for everyone.¹²⁶

As society in BiH works to construct a new “social contract,” in the words of Emir, questions of who holds the power—whether there exists an “ethnic-based society, civic-based society, or some model that's in between the two”—will be of continued importance, influencing societal, economic, and transitional structures within the state.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013.

¹²⁶ Armin; interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November, 2013.

¹²⁷ Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014.

Chapter 4.2: Case Study Analysis—Rwanda

History and Context: Rwanda and the RPF

It is important to establish that—as is also the case with the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the violence in Rwanda did not stem from so called “ancient hatreds.” Rather, it came about through “overt political manipulation, ruthlessly orchestrated by a morally bankrupt elite. Factors such as the growing landlessness, disparities between rich and poor, the ambitions of an increasingly ruthless elite losing their grip on power, regional politics and regional dynamics played a central role in the genocide and political slaughter” (Jefremovas 1997, 102). When the new government was established in July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) affirmed its commitment to the Arusha Accords and the power-sharing structure it established.¹²⁸ However, over a considerably short period of time, the RPF unilaterally passed amendments that established a strong executive presidency, redistributed the composition of parliament, and thoroughly imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government.

Elections in post-conflict Rwanda are strictly regulated, and the degree to which they provide citizens with free choice or the opportunity to challenge the RPF's vision for political development in Rwanda is questionable (Beswick 2010, 234). In this way, Rwanda arguably returned to *de facto* one-party rule, what Reyntjens (2004) argues constitutes a dictatorship. This argument gathers strength from the banning of the Democratic Republic Movement (MDR); the arrest of former President Pasteur Bizimungu; the evidence that limits within the

¹²⁸ The Arusha Accords were a set of five protocols signed in August 1993 by the government of Rwanda and the rebel RPF, under mediation, to end the three-year civil war. However, implementation of the Accords was delayed by the shooting down of an airplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi—Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, respectively—on April 6, 1994. This incident became one of the major catalysts for the Rwandan genocide.

constitution restrict freedom of expression and association and reinforce the RPF's dominance; the arrests and 'disappearances' of opponents; and the intimidation of civil society more broadly. Indeed, “political opposition and criticism has been criminalized, and for stating their beliefs about the government, Rwandans can now be imprisoned, disappear, be forced into exile, or killed” (Hintjens 2008, 10).

The RPF has also introduced legislation, such as the Organic Law of 2003 and the Law Regulating the Punishment of Genocide Ideology, that established new categories of thought and speech crimes, including 'divisionism', 'ethnic ideology', and a 'genocide mentality'. While grounded in admirable intentions born from the events of the 1994 genocide, these laws, have made open criticism of authority (i.e., the RPF) taboo if not outright illegal, and established a gilded stability that is largely maintained through the suppression of dissent and limiting citizens' civil and political rights (Hintjens 2008, 11). This has made post-conflict Rwanda fertile ground for growing grievances as structural violence breeds anger, resentment, and frustration, all at greater risk for renewed violence (Reyntjens 2004, 210).

In conjunction with legislation proscribing “genocide invoking” thought and speech, usage of the monikers of 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and 'Twa' were banned as the new government officially rejected ethnic discrimination and even the notion of ethnicity. Instead, there are now only “officially sanctioned categories of social and political identification... The main categories are: (1) survivors; (2) old caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; [and] (4) suspected *genocidaires*” (Hintjens 2008, 14). This is a dramatic demonstration of the power of officials and elites to name and refuse to name. Categorization was utilized to direct the development of the post-conflict society, driven by a belief that formal disavowal of ethnic division would reduce the salience and therefore the potential ability of such identifications to once again

inspire such extreme violence.

Introduction to the Rwandan Blogosphere

The information on the conditions of peace in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide used in this case analysis is sourced entirely from blog posts from eleven authors—seven academics, one journalist, one activist, one employee in the Office of the President in Rwanda, and one youth writer. Six of these authors are either from or currently living in the region. The topics they address are varied, as interview questions could not guide the discussion. This analysis is supplemented with comments that were made on some of the posts by a variety of individuals living within and outside of Rwanda, as doing so goes further towards honoring Rwandan voices and opinions without constraints of imposed Western values. As there is no means by which to know or confirm their identities, all of these responses must be taken with a grain of salt, particularly as the Rwandan government has a long history of using social media to promote its own messages covertly.

The individuals blogging as well as those who were able to comment on the posts can certainly be classified as 'elites;' first, because the population is comprised of academics, well-educated youths, politicians, activists, and journalists, all of whom are more inclined towards political awareness and involvement, but second, also because access to internet is quite limited in Rwanda. Therefore, the conclusions that can be drawn from this research must be presented as a derivative of this specific frame and not that of a wider, general opinion of citizens of Rwanda. This is, however, the same population that informs the data and conclusions for the Bosnia-Herzegovina case study of this research, providing parallel structures between the case studies.

Political Design and Effectiveness

The political system of Rwanda is undeniably defined by the domination of the political scene by the RPF and President Paul Kagame, who has been in power since winning the war taking over the government in 1994. The blog posts of activists, journalists, and academics within and focused on Rwanda used the term 'regime' almost as frequently as 'government' when talking about the political culture of the state—twenty-five versus thirty-four uses. While the term 'regime' is not necessarily laden with negative associations, when the regime is directly called a 'dictatorship' thrice and the adjective 'authoritarian' is used six times by four authors in reference to such varied elements as 'government', 'rule', 'character', and 'regime', suspicions grow. Kris Berwouts took this classification a step further when he likened the African state to North Korea in its paranoia and violence.¹²⁹ Along the same vein—though considerably softer—commenter Michael Chambers referred to the governance structure as a “benevolent dictatorship.”¹³⁰ Indeed, the most common adjectives used to describe the system are 'dictatorial' and 'inflexible'. Tales of expulsion, imprisonment, and banning of political opponents, not to mention accusations of extrajudicial killings, abound. Identifying himself as MCDOWELL KALISA, one commenter told his story in response to the post:

I did join RPF as a soldier in 1991, after the genocide I continued to serve in the army up to 1997. In 1996 I started to sense RPF was going against what they were preaching during the war. I did choose to go neutral, as a journalist that's when they started to real feel uncomfortable with me, I was arrested, beaten many times, at the end am in exile paying the price of being neutral.¹³¹

Kris Berwouts argues that “the independent press ceased to exist many years ago,” and because of this the RPF—and therefore Kagame—has absolute domination over the political culture of

¹²⁹ Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On,” 21, March 2014.

¹³⁰ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 10, October 2013.

¹³¹ Comment; “Taking Sides in Rwanda” by Steve Terrill; 7, May 2014.

the state and is able to define “what is politically admissible,” managing public opinion with “an effective mixture of repression, social pressure and self-censorship.”¹³² Much of this is attributable to the governance structure following the 1994 genocide: with the victory of the RPF and the halting of violence against the Tutsi and Hutu moderates, News Rwanda asserts, Kagame “has worked tirelessly to maintain a dauntless narrative that depicts him as a white night,” indeed, as the 'messianic savior'.¹³³

Blogger News Rwanda contradicts this narrative, arguing that “the current dictatorial tendencies that stifle dissent are unlikely to take us to the promised land.”¹³⁴ While the government is described by the writers as 'not blameless' and 'repressive', it was just as frequently referred to as 'ethnically inclusive', 'forward looking', and 'progressive'. What, then, is the truth of the current Rwandan system? Can it be defined by a 'visionary character', 'benevolent' and 'competent' leaders, and as having 'good' and 'democratic' governance? Or, rather, is it a state defined by 'political conformity', 'unprecedented' and 'complete' state control, 'narrow partisan' interests, and 'bad leadership'? The discourse surrounding the Rwandan state is bipolar, with little space for objective evaluation: researchers are framed as either with or against the government. In so doing, coupled with the implementation of judicial law defining and prosecuting 'genocide-related crimes', Kagame has established a system in which it is illegal to contradict his narrative or stand opposed to his government, lest risk being condemned as a genocide sympathizer or denier. This is the mechanism by which “image-conscious Rwanda insists on a level of political conformity that is almost unprecedented anywhere,” according to News Rwanda.¹³⁵

¹³² Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014.

¹³³ Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

¹³⁴ Blog post; “Rwanda & Reconciliation: Collective Forgiveness?”; 23, July 2013.

¹³⁵ Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

This extends out of the political sphere and into the lived experience of individual citizens, explains Bert Ingelaere in a comment, in that the RPF 'saturates' all parts of life. He explains that given this “deep penetration of RPF authority in the lives and minds of Rwandans, ... there is no other option but to practice self-censorship in case you are inside Rwanda and you get a better picture of how it is on the ground.”¹³⁶ Yet the results of the World Values Surveys in 2007 and 2012 show a new trend: Rwandans are increasingly likely to participate in lawful means of protest and dissent within the state. For example, there was a sizable increase in the percentage of respondents who stated that they 'might' join in boycotts or attend lawful demonstrations—an increase from 8.5% to 42.2% and an increase of 16.2% to 47.5%, respectively. In addition, while no percent change can be calculated, in 2012 38.2% of the participants stated that they might join in an unlawful strike; this indicates that a significant portion of the society is willing to join in unlawful protest and dissent as well (World Values Survey 2015). Coupled with whispers of growing dissatisfaction, this trend may point towards a new push for change in the state.

The existence of 'opposition' parties in Rwanda is mostly limited to “satellite parties,” states Kris Berwouts in a blog post, “whose main reason for existence is to create the illusion that Rwanda has a political system of active multiparty competition.”¹³⁷ World Values Survey data about self-placement on a scale from left (liberal) to right (conservative), however, shows a startling shift. While the majority of Rwandans classified themselves as being on the conservative side of the spectrum both in 2007 and 2012, 49.1% rated themselves as 'true moderate' (defined here as either a '5' or a '6' on the spectrum) in 2012, a 29.3% increase from

¹³⁶ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 9, October 2013.

¹³⁷ Kris Berwouts; blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014.

the number in 2007. Similarly, while only 32.2% of Rwandans polled classified themselves as 'moderate' (being between a '4' and a '7' on the spectrum) in 2007, more than 70% defined themselves this way in 2012, an increase of 40.1% (World Values Survey 2015). While it is uncertain precisely what this means for the politics of Rwanda, it is worth noting that there are growing divisions within the RPF between moderates and hard-liners that may be related to this this growing moderate base (Clark 2014).

Elections in Rwanda are referred to as '(s)elections' or simply 'selections' by three different bloggers, constituting a contestation of the validity or the freedom of the regularly held elections that have garnered Rwanda praises from much of the Western world. Describing the recent parliamentary elections that took place in September 2013, Susan Thomson, blogger for Democracy Watch, writes:

The RPF handily won the most recent round of parliamentary elections... with 76% of the vote. In theory, it was contending with nine other parties. In practice, Rwanda's nearly six million voters had little choice on the ballot. A total of 98% of the votes went to the RPF and its four coalition parties. The continued dominance of the RPF in the electoral realm projects a semblance of political pluralism while masking the fact that all parties are expected to acquiesce to the ruling party. Two actual opposition parties have been banned and their leaders jailed.¹³⁸

The negative sentiments and descriptions of the elections are reflected in the rhetoric of the writers, which describes the elections as 'false', 'predictable', and 'predetermined'. Yet these sentiments were contradicted by Rwandans through the comments section on some of the blog posts. One, identified as Gerald Mbanda, wrote, "Susan knows very well that Rwandan MPs are elected by the people of Rwanda and not hand picked and therefore have all the powers

¹³⁸ Blog post; "Rwanda's Twitter-Gate;" 17, March 2014.

and authority to carry out their mandate as empowered by the constitution.”¹³⁹ But, the reflections of other Rwandans contradict this positive outlook on the validity of elections: Theogene Rudasingwa, Kagame's former Chief of Staff now living in exile in the United States, for example, published in a recent book that “the outcome of the first election had to be 're-fixed' because Kagame had won by more than 100%.”¹⁴⁰ Denials of this 'fixing' of elections seem weaker when taken in conjunction with claims from the US embassy, reported by News Rwanda, that “the elections were marked by irregularities, which 'undermined the integrity of the vote.' The irregularities included the presence of security officials in polling rooms (their presence is to 'guide' the population as they vote).”¹⁴¹ When asked about the validity of elections by the World Values Survey in 2012, the results were dubious to say the least. In only one category—'How often in your country's elections are votes counted fairly'—was 'I don't know' not the most frequent response: 29.1% of the population responded that they are counted fairly 'very often', while 27.6% responded that they 'don't know'. The highest percentage of responses to all the other questions in this category about frequencies during elections—“opposition candidates are prevented from running,” “TV news favors the governing party,” “voters are bribed,” “election officials are fair,” “voters are threatened at the polls,” and “voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections”—was 'I don't know'. Response percentages of “I don't know” to these questions varied from 44.4% responding to 'How often are voters offered a genuine choice in the elections,' to 57.6% stating that they don't know 'how often voters are threatened with violence at the polls' (World Values Survey 2015). These results suggest that the respondents did not feel comfortable or safe answering the questions truthfully or

¹³⁹ Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 18, March 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Jennifer Fierberg; blog post; “Rwanda, M23 and the UNSC;” 27, August 2013.

¹⁴¹ Blog post; “After Years of Silence, US Embassy Speaks Out;” 23, November 2013.

potentially a lack of trust in government: if they trusted the government, they would believe statements from politicians, while if they do not trust the government, it is likely they would express doubt about what is being reported.

This raises questions about corruption within and the efficacy of the governance system in Rwanda. The diction used within the blog posts revolved around such topics as the 'heavy arm of the government', 'little real political authority', 'bigotry', 'unprecedented diplomatic crisis', 'mockery of democracy', 'strict policies of exclusion', and a 'fundamentally flawed political process'. Outside observers such as Pamela Abbott argue that “the country is not democratic and there is evidence of human rights abuses.”¹⁴² Yet there are almost as many mentions of 'political expediency', 'normal, democratic practices', and 'remarkable progress', with commenters such as Michael Chambers stating that, “It would seem that to whatever degree Africans may regret Rwandan democratic backsliding it is outweighed by their appreciation of Rwanda's capacity to get things done.”¹⁴³ This being said, News Rwanda defines the past twenty years as “Kagame's reign of terror in Rwanda and DRC,” and sees Kagame as “a symbol of the current oppressive system and the RPF machinery, which many (rightly) feel is responsible for killing a good share of Rwandans.”¹⁴⁴ Thus, it is important to interrogate the source of the arguments being made—particularly by Western voices—as it is no secret that the government of Rwanda has willfully and frequently engaged in disinformation and propaganda through social media and the news.

To search out the truest information about Rwanda, this research follows the narrative told by the widest variety of sources. For example, News Rwanda's opinions of Kagame are

¹⁴² Comment; “Rwanda’s Untold Story” by Filip Reyntjens; 24, October 2014.

¹⁴³ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF;” by Magnus Taylor; 10, October 2013.

¹⁴⁴ Blog post; “Rwanda & Reconciliation;” 23, July 2013.

echoed by Filip Reyntjens, a preeminent Belgian scholar on Rwanda, who describes Kagame as “probably the worst war criminal in office today.”¹⁴⁵ In addition, reported Theogene Rudasingwa, former Chief of Staff to Kagame and ambassador to Washington for Rwanda, stated, “If you differ strongly with Kagame and make your views known from the inside, you will be made to pay the price, and very often that price is your life’.”¹⁴⁶ While “Rwanda is rated Africa's least corrupt country by the watchdog Transparency International,” Mark Weston admits that “many people [he] spoke to during [his] stay in Rwanda were afraid to discuss politics at all; others warned [him] against asking questions.”¹⁴⁷ This calls into question the validity of international, macro-level data on Rwanda, and calls for a deeper, personalized analysis of conditions of the lived experience of Rwandan citizens.

Communal Relations

Memorialization and historical framing contribute significantly to post-conflict recovery and reconciliation efforts, and these forces are particularly relevant in Rwanda: as Steve Terrill, a journalist and editor of Rwanda Wire wrote, “Impression management is an obsession in Kigali.”¹⁴⁸ The RPF government has crafted a particular, official narrative that they keep ‘well-guarded’ against “attempts to complicate” it, described Magnus Taylor, an editor of African Arguments.¹⁴⁹ Words such as ‘[disinformation] campaign’, ‘narrative(s)’, ‘story(-ies)’, and ‘[idealized and invented] version’ appear more frequently when discussing Rwanda than ‘history’ does, reflecting the pervasive belief that the Rwandan government manipulates or frames the past in particular ways that serve their political interests.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in “Howard French is Right” by News Rwanda; 13, January, 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Howard French, quoted in News Rwanda, “Howard French is Right,” January 13, 2013.

¹⁴⁷ Blog post, “Rwanda Twenty Years On,” February 24, 2014.

¹⁴⁸ Blog post, “Taking Sides in Rwanda,” May 6, 2014.

¹⁴⁹ Blog, “Debating Rwanda under the RPF,” 13, October 2013.

The greatest and most-used tool in the government's toolbox is memorialization through state sponsored events, initiatives, and campaigns. 'Commemoration(s)', 'event(s)', 'memorials', and 'ritual(s)', are common, and described as 'annual', 'big', 'commemorative', 'historical', and 'perfectly directed'. But some also believe them to be 'meaningless'. As is the case with discourse on the political reality in Rwanda, opinions on the history as it is told by the government is extremely polarized. Commenter Elizana wrote, “Here in Rwanda; we are used of people like you, who are rumour mongering especially in this period when we are preparing to commemorate our loved ones who perished as the result of people like you who are just ignorant of the reality.”¹⁵⁰ Similarly, commentor Gerald Mbanda asserted that accusations of historical manipulation or framing are a tool of powerful Western forces to discredit the Rwandan government, stating that “it's an old story meant to re-write the Rwandan history, paint a negative image of the Rwandan President both at home and abroad.”¹⁵¹ On the other side of the debate, the actions of Kagame and his government are seen as deliberately misleading, a means of manipulating 'appearance', 'legacy', and 'image' through 'broader patterns of disinformation' and the utilization of 'rosy' language and perception. Blogger News Rwanda is a boisterous opponent to the way “genocide memorials and the annual commemoration” have been used by the Rwandan government, as the insistence “on a level of political conformity that is almost unprecedented anywhere,” these frames of the past “privilege a certain narrative while killing diversity of memories.”¹⁵² Blind acceptance of this narrative, they assert, fails to question “Who is being remembered and why? How does this contribute to the reconciliation agenda that Kagame claims to have achieved?”¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate;” by Susan Thomson; March 18, 2014.

¹⁵¹ Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate;” by Susan Thomson; March 18, 2014.

¹⁵² Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

¹⁵³ Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

The narrative propagated by the Rwandan government is one of a 'rehabilitated nation' that has experienced 'much needed reconciliation', utilizing campaigns like Kwibuka20 and 'simple disinformation strategy'.¹⁵⁴ To contradict this narrative will have you labeled as a 'revisionist' and likely be accused of crimes such as 'genocide ideology' or 'divisionism'. As is demonstrated by the experiences of Victoire Ingabire, a political opponent of the RPF, resisting these narratives can quickly lead to official sanctions. Howard French described her case:

When she returned to Rwanda that year, having lived 16 years in exile, to prepare a run for president, her first stop was at the official genocide memorial. 'We are here honoring at this memorial the Tutsi victims of the genocide. There are also Hutu who were victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes, not remembered or honored here,' she said in a prepared statement. 'Hutu are also suffering. They are wondering when their time will come to remember their people. In order for us to get to that desirable reconciliation, we must be fair and compassionate towards every Rwandan's suffering. ... Ingabire was promptly arrested and accused of 'genocide ideology'.¹⁵⁵

Her story demonstrates the firm hold Kagame and his government work to maintain on the official history of the state. But questions do still remain about what is the 'true' history of the events of 1994 and the years that followed. While the internationally pervasive history speaks to there being 800,000 victims in the genocide, commenter Leslie McTyre claims to have been working for a "UN Agency in Rwanda" immediately following the genocide, and, based on the results of a "survey [that] was flawlessly carried out notwithstanding the difficult conditions," they "obtained a total of 1,230,000 killed by the genocidaires."¹⁵⁶ In addition to

¹⁵⁴ *Kwibuka* means 'remember' in Kinyarwanda, and "describes the annual commemoration of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi" (Kwibuka 2014). Kwibuka20 was "a series of events taking place in Rwanda... lead[ing] up to the national commemoration of the genocide in Rwanda, which [began] on 7 April 2014" (Kwibuka 2014).

¹⁵⁵ Quoted in News Rwanda; "Howard French is Right;" 13, January 2013.

¹⁵⁶ Comment; "Rwanda: Why claim that 200,000 Tutsi" by Marijke Verpoorten; 30, October 2014.

disagreements over the number of victims—which has yielded such comments as, “if u want to get the truth go and count the skulls. Our lost ones had names and they are all known”¹⁵⁷—there is considerable frustration over the fact that no “Rwandan will raise questions that relate to RPF's criminal responsibility.”¹⁵⁸ News Rwanda claims that failing to address these crimes ensures that “their victims will remain silenced in a dark cloud of mystery,” and that “the ritual of forgiveness... will remain a one way traffic that begins with a Tutsi victim and ends with a Hutu perpetrator.”¹⁵⁹

This opens the door to the ways in which the genocide is discussed and the impact this has on identities within the post-conflict state. Narratives of the genocide center on rhetoric of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' that extend beyond the individual to encapsulate entire communities and identities through 'collective guilt' and 'collective victimhood'. This dichotomy has been institutionalized through state support of 'institutionalized forgiveness', placing culpability and innocence upon certain groups and framing Kagame as the 'hero' of the persecuted minority. As News Rwanda describes, “The 'voluntary' contributions that are offered by the impoverished masses to support survivors during this period further emphasizes this difference. It is an event for some (Tutsi survivors) and not an event for all.”¹⁶⁰ This bipolar division of society has readily apparent, ethnicized dimensions. Indeed, despite official state policy being the abolition and denial of ethnic divisions, the means by which it has defined the categories of 'survivor', 'perpetrator', and 'returnee' have crystallized distinctions along these same ethnic lines, even if the categories have been given different names. This is reflected in the way all

¹⁵⁷ Gs, comment, on “Rwanda: Why claim that 200,000 Tutsi died in the genocide is wrong,” October 27, 2014.

¹⁵⁸ News Rwanda; “Ndi Umunyarwanda;” 29, November 2013.

¹⁵⁹ News Rwanda; “Ndi Umunyarwanda;” 29, November 2013.

¹⁶⁰ Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

the blog posts discussed these categories. For example, five out of the seven times the word 'survivor(s)' is used in the blog posts, it is referring specifically to 'Tutsi survivor(s)'. This choice in diction completely invalidates the lived experience of Hutu moderates who survived the violence of April 1994, as that population was also a significant target of the genocidal violence. Take for example this passage from a blog post by Marijke Verpoorten:

The range of 150,000-300,000 *survivors* is commonly used. At the end of July 1994, head counting in refugee camps resulted in an estimated 105,000 *Tutsi survivors*. According to Gerard Prunier, 25,000 *survivors* who did not go to camps should also be added, and HRW adds another 20,000 *surviving Tutsi* in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania. This gives a total of 150,000 *Tutsi survivors*.¹⁶¹

Verpoorten switches back and forth repeatedly between 'Tutsi survivors' and simply 'survivors'—this indicates that to her mind there is no difference and that they can be equated. This equating of 'survivors' with 'Tutsis' has also been undertaken by Kagame and his government, just as 'Hutu' has been equated with 'perpetrator'; these conflated concepts are what perpetuates the importance of ethnicity in Rwanda, as the status and role of Rwandans in society is still (if indirectly) based on ethnic affiliation. A commenter, Paul, reflected these beliefs: “While many of us rightly feel it uncomfortable talking about the Hutu-Tutsi polarities, to pretend that ethnicity isn't an important factor when discussing Rwanda is naïve at best and destructive at worst. Naïve because politics is organized along these identities and destructive in the sense that it denies (rather than challenges) a potentially explosive reality.”¹⁶² This too is a bipolar discussion, not only within Rwanda, but amongst the academics, journalists, and

¹⁶¹ Blog post; “Rwanda: Why claim that 200,00 Tutsi died in the genocide is wrong;” October 27, 2014 (emphasis added).

¹⁶² Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 14, October 2013.

activists who work on and study Rwanda. Many bloggers and commenters—including Dave Poole,¹⁶³ Helen Hintjens,¹⁶⁴ David Himbara,¹⁶⁵ and Ndorigus¹⁶⁶—reflected in comments that they believed continued research on Rwanda within terms of ethnic divisions were outdated and lazy at best and potentially divisive at worst. Richard Karugarama Legero, a lawyer currently working in the Office of the President of Rwanda declared that “modern Rwanda articulated and implemented a vision of co-existence between Hutus, Tutsis and Twa which emphasizes the virtues of being Rwandan. The dividends from collective reconciliation and nation rebuilding have resulted in unprecedented social, economic and political transformation.”¹⁶⁷ News Rwanda agrees with Helen, who wrote that “the disagreements over the present regime are political,”¹⁶⁸ but asserts that:

The other explanation is that it shows us what everyone (including US diplomats) know but are reluctant to say in public: that ethnicity remains a salient if manipulated aspect of Kagame's Rwanda. That far apart from the usually sold image of ethnic harmony, the reality remains stark. Power is instrumentalized along ethnic lines and programs that would suggest women or youth emancipation are actually a deliberate ploy to obscure this 'hidden' reality.¹⁶⁹

'Hutu(s)' and 'Tutsi(s)' are mentioned in the blogs twenty-six and thirty-six times, respectively. Two of the five mentions of 'elites' refer specifically to 'Tutsi elites,' and 'Hutu' is most often used to describe 'civilians', 'compatriots', 'extremists', 'ideology', 'majority', and 'masses'. Indeed, many, including Professors Ingelaere and Verpoorten, argue that despite government

¹⁶³ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 11, October 2013.

¹⁶⁴ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 13, October 2013.

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Kris Berwouts, “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On,” March 21, 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 11, October 2013.

¹⁶⁷ Blog post; “In Rwanda it is Economic Development that Demonstrates Government's Respect for Human Rights,” 14, March 2014.

¹⁶⁸ Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 13, October 2013.

¹⁶⁹ Blog post; “Ndi Umunyarwanda,” 29, November 2013.

attempts to build a single national identification, “Rwandan society is bi-polar, with a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority,” that is, that “feelings of ethnic belonging are not redundant, and that they remain a central factor in Rwandan 'social identity'.”¹⁷⁰

It is not only in spite of government attempts that ethnic identity still has relevance in Rwandan society, but also partially as a result of their strategic programs and narratives. Quoted in a post by Kris Berwouts, a Rwandan woman named Rose described the situation:

'The regime is very ambiguous about the division between Hutu and Tutsi,' says Rose. 'For years and years, they explained to us that Hutu and Tutsi were categories that the Belgians had invented to silence and divide us and to maintain their control. It became a crime even to pronounce the words Hutu and Tutsi. They labeled you as a divisionist. You wanted to divide the community. Or worse, you became a nostalgic for the old regime and still adhered to the ideology of genocide. But now they come forward with their new program *Ndi Umunyarwanda* (I am Rwandan). They want individual Hutus to ask for forgiveness on behalf of all Hutus, and individual Tutsis to forgive them in the name of all Tutsis. ... I must admit I can't follow anymore. Do Hutu and Tutsi exist, or are they mere inventions?'¹⁷¹

News Rwanda reflected similar sentiments, questioning “Does the government of Rwanda honestly believe that people are stupid not to notice that you can't talk about 'genocide against the Tutsi' while denying the existence of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda?”¹⁷² In order for the country to move forward, News Rwanda continues, the discourse must move away from dichotomies of good and evil and the focus on Tutsi survivors and Hutu killers, as such narratives “inevitably create difference, which in turn imputes superiority and inferiority, guilt and innocence.”¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Blog post; “Rwanda: Could State-led Mass Killings Ever Happen Again?”; 2, June 2014.

¹⁷¹ Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014.

¹⁷² Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

¹⁷³ Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014.

Opening a free discourse within Rwanda has been strained due to the present atmosphere in the country: Richard, a commenter, describes it: “Dichotomies, dualities, polarisations—familiar indeed! And very regrettable as is the shrinking or quasi disappearance of the middle way, the home of complexity, compromise, negotiation, discovery, dialogue, and change.”¹⁷⁴ The authors of the posts (though very possibly representing a biased population) were keen to find means of having a voice, demonstrated by the use of 'debate', 'dialogue', 'discourse', 'forum', 'all sides', 'voices of reason', and 'words' throughout the posts. Many appear to be desperate for thoughtful and nuanced discussion, but, according to News Rwanda, “Like many things in Rwanda, you either take it for face value or you don't. Serious evaluations are almost taboo.”¹⁷⁵

'Media' is especially important to achieving these ends, particularly Twitter as it seems to already be playing a significant role in enriching the dialogue in Rwanda. 'Twitter', 'bloggers', 'film', 'internet', 'media', 'tweets', 'Twitter-trolls', and 'website' were all terms utilized in the posts. Often, according to commenter Monique, “African voices are ignored and their narratives are disregarded as it does not make better reading.”¹⁷⁶ With the utilization of social media such as Twitter, however, these voices have a platform and an audience that is interested in their experiences and insider knowledge, as digital media has become one of the most effective and possibly best ways to broach 'forbidden subjects' and break the pervasive 'deep silence' that has come to characterize the Rwandan discourse. This technology is not only being used by dissidents and civilians, however. The Rwandan government, reports News Rwanda, has not only a “journalist for hire, Andrew Mwenda” but also a “Twitter corps—a fanatic but

¹⁷⁴ Comment; “Taking Sides in Rwanda” by Steve Terrill; 17, May 2014.

¹⁷⁵ Blog post; “Rwanda has the Highest Incarceration Rates;” 3, April 2014.

¹⁷⁶ Comment; “Rwanda’s Untold Story” by Filip Reyntjens; 24, October 2014.

well paid group whose only task is to tweet and retweet Rwandan propaganda.”¹⁷⁷ Exposure of this network of Twitter accounts under the employ of the Rwandan government has been labeled “Twitter-gate,” and has been described by Susan Thomson as:

“the first crack in the armor of the RPF's longstanding disinformation campaign that has relied on exchange students, public relations firms, commemorative events, and a whole host of other techniques to craft an idealized and often invented version of what Rwanda was like before the onset of colonialism and what has become since the 1994 genocide.”¹⁷⁸

This is a promising step in deconstructing and problematizing the narratives propagated by the government, as well as opening the door to more complex narratives of the past that move beyond the dichotomous labeling of the 'good' and 'innocent' Tutsi and the 'bad' and 'guilty' Hutu.

Economic Recovery

Discussion of the economic conditions within post-conflict Rwanda all take into account the fact that there has been sizable economic growth—particularly in GDP per capita—over the past twenty years. As was discussed by Ingelaere and Verpoorten, there have been promising improvements attributable to “good technical governance of development programs, massive international aid, increased budget shares for agriculture and social sectors, as well as post-genocide catch-up and the rise of global coffee prices.”¹⁷⁹ It is no secret that a sizable portion of the revenue of the state is from international donors, demonstrated by the frequent use of such terms as '(foreign) aid', 'development assistance', 'contributions', 'donor dollars', 'donor(s)', 'foreign aid lifeline', and 'budget(ary) support'. Indeed, Rwanda is even referred to

¹⁷⁷ Blog post; “Hutu phobia, Salma Kikwete and Kagame's Propaganda,” 20, August 2013.

¹⁷⁸ Blog post, “Ingabire's Verdict?”; July 29, 2014.

¹⁷⁹ Blog post; “Rwanda: Could State-led Mass Killings Ever Happen Again?”; 2, June 2014.

as 'darling of donors' and one of the 'most effective aid users'. Reports from international monitoring organizations and businesses have had almost entirely positive things to say about the economic progress that has been made in Rwanda since 1994. As mentioned by Dr. Richard Karugarama Lebero:

The depth of reforms and the increasing levels of efficiency are well captured in numerous governance and business surveys conducted periodically by reputable institutions. On the basis of the reforms, Rwanda ranks favorably across most indicators. For instance, in the 2014 World Bank 'Doing Business Report', Rwanda is ranked as the second most improved country in the world and the second easiest place to do business in Africa.¹⁸⁰

Rwanda has received international acclaim for its remarkable economic rebound, which has sometimes been referred to as an 'economic miracle', and is often praised by Western observers as an exemplary model for the rest of Africa. Disagreements arise, however, once focus is turned from the pure numbers to discussions of corruption, inequality, and respect for human rights. Concerns have been levied, for example, by commenter Monte McMurchy—who writes from Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo—about the ability of the economic system to deal with “demography and the explosion in the African population coupled with extreme unemployment and youth” dominated society.¹⁸¹

One of the most significant ways this pressure is felt is through the tension between urban and rural populations, as the divide between the lived experiences of these groups has been expanding in the past decade. According to News Rwanda, more than 93% of the population of Rwanda is rural dwelling, while “much of the touted 'economic miracle' seems to have benefited Kigali (the capital) at the expense of everywhere else. This is strategic for

¹⁸⁰ Blog post; “In Rwanda it is Economic Development;” 14, March 2014.

¹⁸¹ Comment; “Rwanda Twenty Years On” by Mark Weston; 28, February 2014.

Kagame's PR purposes. Far from this facade, however, most of the country's villages remain chronically destitute.”¹⁸² The blog posts spoke to 'economic hardship', 'economic inequalities', 'malnutrition', 'impoverished masses', 'economic uncertainty', 'chronically destitute villages', 'relative winners' and 'relative losers', and the 'rich' and the 'poor(-est)'. Once again, the bipolar discourse in Rwanda is present, manifesting in debates over the level of development and poverty in rural areas. Commenter Lexa Ngira wrote, “The poor are there, just getting less poor every year.”¹⁸³ This broaches important questions about the extent to which progress is being made and whether or not the rate that it is taking place is acceptable. Mark Weston argues that it is not, writing:

Corruption and a growing gap between rich and poor have fanned the flames—Rwanda has addressed the first of these, but inequality is increasing and the failure to make a significant dent in the poverty rate (which fell from 67% to 62% between 1990 and 2011) suggests that the impressive growth in gross domestic product has benefited only a small urban elite.¹⁸⁴

If it is indeed true that the economic growth that has taken place within the country has been concentrated almost solely in urban centers—particularly Kigali—it is rather likely that a 'peasant resistance' will develop and gain strength. Ingelaere and Verpoorten see this potential for discontent, arguing that “systemic transformations in the structure of the rural economy may lead to... (relative) winners and losers, and in the case of Rwanda, involve coercive measures and policies that peasants find difficult to adapt to (such as mono-cropping, land consolidation and villagization).”¹⁸⁵

Many critiques of the economic structure in Rwanda are centered on this question of concentrated economic gains: whether the purpose behind this was to serve the interests and

¹⁸² Blog post; “UK Terminates Rwanda Aid,” 1, December 2012.

¹⁸³ Comment; “Hell and Healing” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

¹⁸⁴ Blog post; “Rwanda Twenty Years On,” 24, February 2014.

¹⁸⁵ Blog post; “Rwanda: Could State-led Mass Killings Ever Happen Again?,” 2, June 2014.

improve their quality of life of political elites or to present a polished and idyllic public face to current and potential donors, the opinions vary. In response to these critiques, many, such as commenter Peter, cite to the reports of “objective foreigners” and urge their opponents to look to such publications as the “world bank doing business report, Corruption index by transparency international, etc.”¹⁸⁶ However, another commenter, Sam, calls into question the validity of the data collected and published by the so-called 'reputable organizations'. He argues that their statistics are based on numbers falsified and reported by the government and then reinforced by images of “Kigali where the towers are being constructed by the contributors of RPF on detriment of people who don't agree with dictatorship in the country and who can't even succeed with a small business because of being systematically harmed by RPF in anyway.”¹⁸⁷

The RPF's authoritarian and repressive tendencies undoubtedly impact the way in which economic reform is felt and distributed across Rwanda. Indeed, modern Rwanda can be described rather succinctly as “orderly but repressive” (Gettleman 2010). As is discussed by News Rwanda, “Kigali may be the only capital in the world that is 100% free of homeless people. However, don't be deceived! This is hardly a proof of social progress. Rather, it is a reminder of the lingering repression.”¹⁸⁸ This cleanliness was possible in part because the poorest citizens are not allowed into the city and many beggars, homeless people, and assumed petty thieves were sent without trial or legal processing to an island in the middle of Lake Kivu to be 'rehabilitated' (Gettleman 2010). Incidents such as these have contributed to arguments that in Rwanda “economic development has been achieved at the expense of human rights.”¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶ Comment; “Rwanda's Twitter Gate” by Susan Thomson; 18, March 2014.

¹⁸⁷ Sam; comment; “Debating Rwanda Under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 11, October 2013.

¹⁸⁸ Blog post; “UK Terminates Rwanda Aid,” 1, December 2012.

¹⁸⁹ Dr. Richard Karugarama Lebero; blog post; “In Rwanda it is Economic Development,” 14, March 2014.

The continued presence of socio-political and economic inequalities in the face of an authoritarian and repressive regime calls up memories of the early 90s, and it is not a stretch to say Rwanda is still steeped in its violent past. Not all of the blog posts were as critical of the regime, instead calling upon the reader to recognize the hypocrisy in expecting exemplary rights protections from a state that is still very much in a post-conflict, transitional period. Richard Karugarama Lebero¹⁹⁰ and Kishore Mahbubani¹⁹¹ argue that economic development is a crucial first step to be achieved even before implementing more comprehensive rights protections. Lebero, a lawyer employed in the Office of the President, writes:

In essence, human rights can only be enjoyed when people are liberated from the scourge of hunger, insecurity, disease and poverty. It is also too simplistic to argue that emerging countries such as Rwanda are advancing economically at the expense of human rights. The premise of this argument overlooks the fact that strides in economic development are intertwined with respect for human rights.¹⁹²

It is indeed important to be cognizant of how a Western perspective can influence the ways in which certain programs, policies, and conditions are evaluated. As the data from these blog posts have demonstrated, however, the successes of the Rwandan government in improving economic conditions have not been felt by all members of the population. Thus, the exploitative nature of the state's policies and the negative repercussions they continue to have on the poorest sections of the population challenge the validity of arguments that human rights can only be protected after economic gains have been secured.

Transitional Justice

The process of reconciliation in Rwanda has largely revolved around issues of

¹⁹⁰ Blog post; "In Rwanda it is Economic Development;" 14, March 2014.

¹⁹¹ Quoted in "In Rwanda it is Economic Development" by Dr. Richard Karugarama Lebero; 14, March 2014.

¹⁹² Blog post; "In Rwanda it is Economic Development;" 14, March 2014.

transitional justice, particularly trials through the ICTR and the communal *gacaca* courts that were used to prosecute lesser perpetrators of violence in 1994. In addition to these courts, Kagame and his RPF government codified new categories of thought and speech crimes, most notably 'genocide ideology'¹⁹³ and 'divisionism'.¹⁹⁴ These continue to be important concepts in the Rwandan discourse, demonstrated by the frequent usage of such terms as 'genocide denial/denier', 'genocide minimisation', 'ethnic divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' laws, and 'revisionist'. But despite the normative value as laws such as these, News Rwanda argues, they have been perverted and used as “custom, ready-made charges for anyone even remotely critical of Kagame. Once accused, the individuals have faced the heavy arm of the government or have been sidelined into oblivion.”¹⁹⁵ Indeed, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among others, have been demanding that these crime laws be updated (Human Rights Watch 2008).

Because of this corrupted use of these laws, there is shrinking confidence in the justice system, demonstrated in the results of the World Values Survey (2013). A comparison of the 2007 and 2012 percentages for “Confidence in the justice system,”¹⁹⁶ shows an increase in respondents lacking confidence in the system (responding 'not very much' or 'none at all') from

¹⁹³ 'Genocide ideology' was not officially a crime until 2008, but was used loosely to refer to crimes specified in the Constitution of 2003, articles 9, 13, and 33, with the idea of *Ibengabyitekerezo bya jenocide*,” meaning literally the ideas that lead to genocide. These ideas included revisionism, negationism, and minimization were punishable by law, as were all ethnic, regionalist, and racial propaganda.

¹⁹⁴ 'Divisionism' was initially referred to as 'sectarianism', and is defined in Rwanda law no 47/2001, article 3 as: “The practice of sectarianism is a crime committed by any oral or written expression or any act of division that could generate conflicts among the population or cause disputes;” the French version is clearer, however, reading: “La pratique du sectarisme est un crime commis au moyen de l’expression orale, écrite ou tout acte de division pouvant générer des conflits au sein de la population, ou susciter des querelles.”

¹⁹⁵ Blog post; “Steve Hege Victim of Kagame Propaganda Machine;” 3, December 2012.

¹⁹⁶ Respondents were asked to rate their confidence level as 'a great deal,' 'quite a lot,' 'not very much', and 'none at all'.

20.7% in 2007 to 39.8% in 2012: an almost 200% increase. Additionally, less than half of those who responded that they had 'a great deal' of confidence in 2007 responded the same in 2012 (a decrease from 33.0% to 14.7%, to be exact). Results such as these are supported by the blog posts describing the courts as 'not fair' and 'not free', with 'politically motivated' charges, 'corruption', 'little evidence', 'hypocrisy', 'untrained judges', and 'unbelievably crowded prisons'. Indeed, News Rwanda went so far as to assert that arrest and “harassment by the Rwandan state are already part of an ongoing trend” within the country.¹⁹⁷ A number of bloggers also alluded to government interference in judicial processes, using the trial of Victoire Ingabire as a pertinent example. A political opponent who returned from exile only to be placed in prison since 2010 for 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism', Susan Thomson wrote of her case:

The judge adjourned court until Wednesday, citing the need for competent interpretation, yet, on Twitter, the Government of Rwanda has declared victory in the case, stating that it (not the prosecution) has documents to prove her ties to 'terrorists' groups in the region, and thus her guilt. Nice to see the government being **this** transparent on its interference in the judicial system.¹⁹⁸

Subjected to long, murky prison sentences for crimes that are vaguely defined, imprisoning of opponents, dissidents, and opposition is one of the most effective tools in Kagame's repertoire. Ultimately, Aloys Habimana states, “Programs like *Ndi Umunyarwanda* now and the *gacaca* courts before... They all exposed one side of the story. They don't help our country to move forward and they do not bring the people closer together. ... I really think the community participates in these programmes just because they are forced to; not because they believe they

¹⁹⁷ Blog post; “What's changed in Rwanda since April;” 23, September 2014.

¹⁹⁸ Blog post; “Ingabire's Verdict?”; 29, July 2014 (emphasis in original).

can help.”¹⁹⁹

More troubling for many, however, is the fact that the RPF has skirted justice for the crimes it committed during the four year war that led up to the genocide of 1994, leading some to assert that the ICTR was simply an exercise in 'victor's justice'. Multiple bloggers spoke out about this particular issue. Commenter Muckeracker wrote, “The only thing the world should demand is an open assessment without Kagame govt interference so that perpetrators Hutus or Tutsis and in particular those protected by the Rwanda's RPF govt be held accountable.”²⁰⁰ Commenter RBRM concurred, writing that they believe that “the PRF hasn't been, but should be held accountable for the massacres we all know they committed.”²⁰¹ The lack of equitable enforcement of the law within Rwanda enabled by the political design is all the more worrisome when one takes into account the fact that RPF crimes did not take place solely before April 1994, but that they have, according to News Rwanda, committed and gotten away with crimes “that include assassinations, mass murder and even genocide.”²⁰² Howard French wrote about the experiences of Timothy Longman, a director for a human rights organization in the years following the genocide:

A year after the genocide had ended, blood was still being spilled, recalls Timothy Longman, then the country director for human rights. “People would take me around and say, 'There's a mass grave right over here,' and you would ask, 'From when?' And they would say, 'Just from a few weeks ago—not from the genocide,’” says Longman, who now directs the African Studies Center at Boston University.²⁰³

More recently, according to Susan Thomson, “The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has all but

¹⁹⁹ Quoted in “Hell and Healing” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

²⁰⁰ Comment; “Rwanda: Why Claim” by Marijke Verpoorten; 29, October 2014.

²⁰¹ Comment; “Rwanda's Untold Story” by Filip Reyntjens; 21, October 2014.

²⁰² Blog post; “Karegeya is Dead;” 4, January 2014.

²⁰³ Quoted in “Howard French is Right” by News Rwanda; 13, January 2013.

claimed responsibility for the murder of its former Spy Chief Patrick Karegeya in Johannesburg in January [2014].”²⁰⁴ With such sweeping influence over the outcome of court cases, particularly who is and is not charged with crimes, the RPF has largely given its members and supporters free reign.

Between the violence of the war, the genocide, and the repression that have taken place in since the 90s, News Rwanda argues that “Anyone who lived in Rwanda through the last 20 years has a valid reason to be afraid.”²⁰⁵ And many Rwandans are afraid. 'Army', 'assassination', 'mass atrocities', '[another/grenade/revenge/shameful/unprecedented' attack(s)', 'grenade blast', 'bloodbath', 'brutality', 'carnage', 'chaos', 'danger', and 'unbelievable havoc' are just some of the many words about security, vulnerability, and fear that infiltrate almost every single blog post. Aloys Habimana sees this perpetuation of fear as an expected result of the potential for violence persisting, haven only been pushed under the surface, not eliminated, by the pressure and intimidation of the state. He argues that the continued existence of a “policy of exclusion... the elimination of political opponents and critical voices in general... [and] greed” as elements of the lived reality of Rwanda are what prevent the system from “get[ting] the risk of violence under control.”²⁰⁶

But not all have such a pessimistic and fearful outlook on the state of affairs within Rwanda—yet another manifestation of the polarized discourse that is pervasive throughout Rwandan society. Mark Weston argues that: “Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned from the Congo, Burundi and Tanzania and been reintegrated into their communities. The justice system has convicted most of the worst genocidaires, while those who committed lesser

²⁰⁴ Blog post; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate;” 17, March 2014.

²⁰⁵ Blog post; “Ant-Tutsi sentiments in Central Africa?”; 28, July 2013.

²⁰⁶ Aloys Habimana; quoted in “Hell and Healing” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

crimes have paid their dues and returned to their villages.”²⁰⁷ However, Habimana argues that a considerable number of refugees are remaining abroad because they do not feel safe in Rwanda.²⁰⁸ As security is the primary concern of most Rwandan citizens, it is not inconceivable that, according to News Rwanda, if the government is able to offer more security for the present as well as moving forward, “many people will tend to forgive the agony of the past.”²⁰⁹ In many ways this parallels opinions of the state in terms of economic improvements: many appeared to be willing to overlook the missteps, authoritarianism, and repression of the state as long as quality of life improves economically and in terms of security.

Given the growing importance of the internet and media to social and political life in Rwanda, it is no surprise that many are concerned by persisting restrictions on freedom of speech, particularly through the crimes of 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism'. These are amongst the most common terms used in the blog posts, including such phrases as 'denial of liberties', '[free/open/political] expression', '[restricted] freedom [of expression/of speech]', 'online harassment', 'severe restriction of free speech', and 'deep silence'. Indeed, freedom of expression was the only human right mentioned specifically by name in any of the blog posts. Kazungu, a commenter, wrote: “We in Rwanda know the truth. The only problem is that we don't have the luxury to speak it out. Even when we make online comments, we, like @Goldstone, use fake names for fear of (fill the gap).”²¹⁰ This usage of fake names is directly related to the “program of online harassment of journalists, human rights workers and diplomats... being run from inside the Office of the President of Rwanda” that was uncovered

²⁰⁷ Blog post; “Rwanda Twenty Years On,” 24, February 2014.

²⁰⁸ Quoted in “Hell and Healing” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

²⁰⁹ Blog post; “Ant-Tutsi sentiments in Central Africa?” 28, July 2013.

²¹⁰ Comment; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 21, March 2014.

by journalist Steve Terrill.²¹¹ Under these conditions there is essentially no space for critical journalism or independent voices, which contributes significantly to the polarization of the discourse on post-genocidal Rwanda. “The independent press ceased to exist many years ago,” concludes Kris Berwouts, “the RPF defines what is politically admissible and public opinion is managed by an effective mixture of repression, social pressure, and self-censorship.”²¹²

Ultimately, there is little way to know the 'truth' of what is taking place in Rwanda, as there is little means by which a researcher or journalist can gain information about the state of affairs from someone living within the country. As a commenter Sam explained: “If you really want to know the reality of the country you don't speak with the people inside the country unless you guarantee a full security afterwards because nobody will dare risk his life to tell the truth, ... so no Rwandan inside country will tell you the different story from what the government tells.”²¹³ Drawing from a variety of sources that have found platforms on which they feel comfortable being honest and comparing these perspectives to find a common middle ground, this research hopes to have found that which is nearest to the truth.

Conclusion

Analysis of the status of political, communal, economic, and transitional justice recovery efforts in Rwanda has shown that discourses surrounding the progress of the state over the past twenty years is polarized. The constitution has endowed the RPF immense authority—particularly in regards to constructing and enforcing narratives of a singular, official narrative of the past—that has allowed it to have de facto single-party rule and

²¹¹ Blog post; “Taking Sides in Rwanda;” 6, May 2014.

²¹² Blog post; “Elections are too important;” 18, September 2013.

²¹³ Comment; “Debating Rwanda Under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 11, October 2013.

perpetuated authoritarianism and repression within the state. The institutionalized absence of ethnic identity has resulted in the substitution of ethnic monikers for the categorizations of 'victim', 'perpetrator', and 'returnee', along these same lines, utilizing ideas of 'collective victimhood' and 'collective guilt'. Many of the bloggers found this system to be responsible for persisting high poverty rates, consistent inequality, and violations of human rights through restrictions of free speech, repression of opposition and opponents, and even extrajudicial killings and other violence. In this polarized debate, those who see primarily progress towards post-conflict recovery—including Marc Hoogsteys²¹⁴ and Lexa Ngira—argue, “who is anyone to judge Rwanda's reconciliation—tell me where it has been done before... come on, name on a place where it has worked or even been tried.”²¹⁵ The other side of the debate, such as News Rwanda and Susan Thomson, maintains that the progresses of the state are being used to mask the human rights abuses of the RPF as well as “long-standing political tensions, unresolved resentments, and the rise of an authoritarian regime.”²¹⁶

While there is little space for balanced, critical analysis, the voices that approach this type of discourse—for example, commenter Kazungu—acknowledge the successes of the state but argue that they cannot and should not be used to mask the human rights violations. They write:

Being great in the Doing Business index and killing opponents are two different issues. One is very good and the second one is very evil and doesn't get erased by the first. If you stifle the press and make good roads, you have still stifled the press. If you detain every political opponent and give every Rwandan insurance coverage, you have still oppressed opposition. If you send squads to kill opponents

²¹⁴ Quoted in “Hell and Healing” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

²¹⁵ Lexa Ngira; comment; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On” by Kris Berwouts; 21, March 2014.

²¹⁶ Susan Thomson; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate;” 17, March 2014.

and send thousands of troops to keep peace in Darfur, you remain a killer.
Period!²¹⁷

There remains considerable hope for uncovering the truth of post-genocidal Rwanda, however, harkening in part back to a proverb in Kinyarwanda that translates to “‘Truth goes through fire but doesn't get burnt.’ It might take long but time will tell.”²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Comment; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 21, March 2014.

²¹⁸ Paul Williams; comment; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 17, March 2014.

Chapter 5: Moving from Micro to Macro—Case Comparisons

Prior analyses of state progress towards development, post-conflict recovery, and, ultimately, the idealized 'end goal' of political, social, and economic progress, have often relied on macro-scale data. Drawing on such data sources as state- and NGO-produced reports, macro data yields a broad image of the general conditions within a state, and, because of the standardized coding rules utilized in the construction of the dataset, these results are more commonly used for longitudinal analyses. For the purposes of this study, results yielded from six macro datasets are used to evaluate the progress of post-conflict recovery programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Ultimately, this chapter compares 1) Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, 2) micro and macro data sources for each state, 3) the explanative power of the two hypotheses proposed by the literature and implemented as policy in the states, and, finally, 4) these two hypotheses and the alternative hypothesis proposed by this research design.


Political Terror Scale

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) data codes the annual reports on human rights published by the US State Department and Amnesty International to determine two scores communicating the level of 'terror' *within* a state during that particular year, ranging from least prevalent (1), to most prevalent (5). In the context of this measure, 'terror' refers to “state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment” (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, & Haschke 2012).²¹⁹ Analysis of PTS data from 1994-2013 shows that levels of terror have been decreasing consistently in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda since 1993, though there has been slight increase in scores in both countries from 2012 to 2013 (Figure 1). This

²¹⁹ By and large, the focus is only on activities within a state, but exceptions are made for grievous rights violations, such as Guantanamo Bay.

being said, political terror has consistently been higher in

Figure 1: Political Terror Scale



Rwanda than in BiH, with 2008 being the only exception. These results argue that the conditions in both states have decreased from the highest level (5) of political terror to levels where violations persist but some improvements have been made.²²⁰ These results are elucidated by comparing them with those compiled by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, which uses the same data sources (Amnesty International and US Department of State reports), but takes a different approach, attempting a greater degree of precision in measuring abuses.


CIRI Human Rights Data Project

The CIRI dataset breaks down the political terror measured by PTS and expands its scope as well, utilizing four categories: physical integrity rights, civil liberties, women's rights, and independent judiciary (Cingranelli & Richards 2014). For the first two of these, scores are taken for elements that fall into these categories and then aggregated into a final 'physical

²²⁰ A rating of 5 is defined as: “terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, & Haschke 2012).


integrity' or 'civil liberties' score—the aggregated physical integrity scores are shown in Figure 2. This data shows that BiH has maintained higher respect for physical

Figure 2: Physical Integrity Rights (Aggregated)



integrity rights overall and that this respect has been relatively consistent over time. The disaggregated data for BiH (Figure 3) shows that while there has consistently been very low numbers of disappearances, extrajudicial killings, or political prisoners, it has had considerable


Figure 3: Physical Integrity Rights (Disaggregated)



fluctuations in the use of torture. This accounts for the improvement shown from 2003 to 2008 in the aggregated data and its subsequent decline. On the other hand, while the Rwandan government improved its respect for these rights overall from 2004 to 2007, it has steadily

declined since, returning to 2003/2004 levels. Looking at the disaggregated data for Rwanda, however, a much different story is told (Figure 4). Rwanda's


Figure 4: Physical Integrity Rights (Disaggregated)



data show no sustainable progress made towards improving respect for any of the rights; the most significant, however, has been in reducing rates of extrajudicial killings, which have decreased since 2000.

Turning to respect for civil liberties, the CIRI dataset presents significantly different

Figure 5: Civil Liberties (Aggregated)



results that point to a closing of the gap between the scores of Rwanda and BiH (Figure 5).

While Rwanda's initial score was significantly lower—only a 3 out of a possible 14—than that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the gap between the two has declined, albeit unsteadily, as respect for civil liberties has increased in Rwanda overall since 2001 and decreased in BiH, though it has remained relatively stable since 2007). Analysis of the disaggregated data for each of these states yield disparate results. In the case of BiH, the data for each variable differs significantly (Table 1). For example, electoral self-determination remained at a steady, moderate level from


Year	Association and Assembly	Foreign Movement	Domestic Movement	Speech	Electoral Self-Determination	Religious Freedom	Worker's Rights
2001	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
2002	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
2003	2	1	1	1	1	0	2
2004	1	1	2	0	1	0	0
2005	2	1	2	1	1	0	0
2006	2	1	2	1	1	1	0
2007	2	2	0	1	1	1	0
2008	1	2	0	1	1	2	0
2009	1	2	1	1	1	1	0
2010	1	2	1	1	1	1	0
2011	1	0	2	1	1	1	0

2001 to 2011, while there was high volatility in levels of freedom for domestic movement. Ultimately, while there was moderate improvement to freedom of speech and religion, there was also sharp declines in foreign freedom of movement and worker's rights, with no consistent improvement in any other variables. Looking to the disaggregated data for Rwanda, the story is mixed as well (Table 2). While there has been moderate improvement concerning domestic freedom of movement, there has been an overall decline in respect for worker's rights and religious freedom, and persistent volatility in freedom of speech and electoral self-determination.

Table 2: Civil Liberties Rwanda (1993-2011)							
Year	Association and Assembly	Foreign Movement	Domestic Movement	Speech	Electoral Self-Determination	Religious Freedom	Worker's Rights
1993	2	2	0	1	1	2	1
1994	0	1	1	1	0	2	2
1995	1	1	0	1	0	2	2
1996	1	1	2	0	1	2	1
1997	1	2	2	1	0	2	1
1998	1	2	2	0	0	2	1
1999	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
2000	1	1	0	1	0	0	2
2001	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
2002	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
2003	0	2	1	0	1	0	0
2004	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
2005	1	2	1	0	1	0	0
2006	1	2	2	1	1	0	0
2007	1	2	2	0	1	0	0
2008	1	1	2	0	0	0	0
2009	1	2	2	0	0	0	0
2010	1	2	2	0	0	0	0
2011	1	2	1	0	0	1	0

Turning to the fourth element measured by the CIRI dataset, women's rights, one can see that while BiH has maintained stable, moderately high levels of respect for women's rights,


Figure 6: Women's Rights (Aggregate)



with the highest levels of variation being in respect for women's economic rights, Rwanda has consistently increased its level of respect (Figure 6). The moderate level of respect for women's political rights in BiH is attributable to women consistently making up less than 30% of the legislature. In Rwanda, similarly, there has been variable gains in women's economic rights, but the state has had continuous gains in women's political rights, with women now constituting more than 30% of the legislative body.²²¹

Analysis of the final aspect of the database does not yield promising information for judiciary independence after genocidal violence (Figure 7). Both states had moderate levels of judiciary independence, each with dips into complete dependence or domination from the government, but little to no progress has been made, remaining at a coding of '1'.²²² This is particularly concerning in these two states where issues of justice, truth, and accountability have very much been brought to the forefront of political and social discourse.

Figure 7: Independent Judiciary




²²¹ Indeed, Rwanda is the first and only country in the world to have a female-majority parliament (Dudman 2014).

²²² In the coding scheme utilized by CIRI, the score of one (1) is utilized when “there are structural limitation on judicial independence... without active government interference or involve occasional or limited corruption and judicial intimidation from non-governmental actors” (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay 2014).

Freedom House Index

Utilizing a variety of sources—including “news articles, academic analyses, reports from non-governmental organizations, and individual professional contacts”—Freedom House assigns each country two ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties (Puddington 2014).²²³ Looking at both the legislative protections and how effectively they are implemented, the average of these two scores is used to determine each state's Freedom Rating, and it is this rating that was used to compare the states of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Figure 8). As this graphic shows, there has been gradual but clear improvement in the levels of freedom in each state. That being said, neither states has changed 'brackets', meaning that BiH is still classified as 'partly free', as it was in 1998; and, similarly, Rwanda is still classified as 'not free'. Overall, BiH has maintained a freer status than Rwanda, and has made more significant progress towards improving the degree of freedom within the state.




²²³ '1' representing the most free and '7' the least free; these ratings are based on the country's scoring on 25 more detailed indicators (Puddington 2014).

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Analysis of change over time in perception of corruption in each country tells a somewhat perplexing story (Figure 9). Perceived corruption has gone down significantly in

Figure 9: Corruption Perception Index



Rwanda from 2005 to 2011, while the perception of corruption in BiH has remained by and large the same (Transparency International 2014). This result is puzzling when taken in parallel to the results shown in other macro datasets, for example the CIRI Civil Liberties measure and the Freedom Index. CIRI data showed that while there was a decline in respect for civil liberties in BiH from 2001 to 2011, Rwanda's increase during the same time frame did not lead to higher respect for civil liberties than in BiH. If the CIRI data were to complement that of the CPI, one would expect to see an increase of perceived corruption (corresponding to a lower CPI score) or greater stability in respect for civil liberties, rather than, for example, the drastic decline in respect for worker's rights beginning in BiH in 2004. The Freedom Index data shows only moderate improvement in both countries since 1998, offering no parallel trend to complement the shrinking corruption perception in Rwanda.

Alternative Measures of Development

In recent years, alternative means of measuring development have come into greater prominence, including the Human Development Index (HDI)—which measures life expectancy, education, income, and standard of living so as to move beyond solely economic measures of development—and the GINI Index—which aims to measure income distribution and thus inequality within a state. As these indexes are still recent in their creation, the coding and calculation rules have been undergoing refinement, making more longitudinal comparisons difficult. That being said, Table 3 displays the data available from these two measures for

Table 3: GINI Coefficients and HDI Values 2001-2013									
		2001	2005	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013
GINI Coefficient	BiH	28.03	#####	33.04	#####	#####	#####	#####	36.2
	Rwanda	46.68	#####	#####	#####	#####	50.82	#####	50.8
HDI Value	BiH	#####	0.715	#####	0.727	0.726	0.729	0.729	0.731
	Rwanda	#####	0.391	#####	0.432	0.453	0.463	0.502	0.506

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. The HDI values show that both states have been improving in human development measures, though this process has been moving faster in Rwanda. That being said, Rwanda is still classified as having “low human development,” while BiH is classified as having “high human development” (UNDP 2014). While these results parallel those found by the CPI—little to moderate improvement in BiH, but more significant progress in Rwanda—that is the only macro dataset analyzed for this research to show this same trend.

Turning to the GINI Index, the data shows worsening income inequality in both countries (World Bank 2014). While likely attributable to the communism of the Yugoslav era, income inequality began and remained far lower in BiH than in Rwanda. Yet, the change in Bosnia-Herzegovina's GINI coefficient from 2001 to 2013 was much higher than Rwanda's. All the GINI Index numbers must be considered with caution, as it is a relative measure and

does not take into account per capita income as a whole, preventing it from making meaningful statements about quality of life or economic opportunity. It does, however, speak to the ways in which wealth—particularly after violent conflict—is distributed within the country, and may speak to levels of corruption or the misallocation of foreign aid funds.

World Happiness Report (WHR)

The World Happiness Report is the newest of these macro datasets, and because of its methodological process it only has data beginning from its founding in 2012; thus, only data from 2013 is utilized for this study. This data is compiled using surveys that have participants rate their subjective well-being on a ladder (10 being the best possible life, 0 being the worst), while also measuring emotional state (did you laugh yesterday, etc.), life expectancy, community support, perception of corruption, prevalence of generosity, and freedom to make life choices (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs 2014). The 2013 data—which presents the averages of the three years 2010-2012—gives BiH a happiness score of 4.813, and Rwanda a score of 3.715. Comparing these to the adjusted numbers of the years 2005-2007, BiH experienced little change—decreasing by 0.087—while Rwanda experienced a more drastic shift—decreasing by 0.500. This shift in Rwanda roughly corresponds with the data proposed by CIRI, matching trends with decreased respect for the civil liberty of electoral self-determination as well as a general decline in respect for physical integrity rights in Rwanda from 2007 to 2011 and on.

Comparison to Micro Data

Analyzed independent of the in depth, micro case studies, the macro-scale data often times lacks coherency and connection, the indexes and databases contradicting one another as often as they would be complementary. In addition to this, the results they do offer lack the contextualization necessary for them to be explanative and ultimately for them to be applied

to implementing practical policy strategies. For example, the CPI rather accurately captures the stagnation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrating the way in which corruption is perceived to be consistently high with little change. What it fails to elucidate, however, is how the political structure has fed into, allowed, and perpetuated this stagnation by incentivizing the maintenance of the status quo by political elites. Similarly, while CIRI data demonstrates that there has been a decline in respect for freedom of speech in Rwanda, it does not draw comparisons to the similar declines seen in political integrity rights within the state, particularly disappearances and political imprisonment, all of which can be tied together as actions of an authoritarian state bent on suppressing the dissident voices of opponents and the opposition.

There are other limitations to the capacity of macro-level data to measure and explain the post-conflict status of states. Most problematical to the particular focus of this research is the fact that none of these macro datasets effectively address issues of communal relations following genocide, which is truly vital to a meaningful discussion about transitional justice in these societies following communitarian violence. In addition, almost all of the macro datasets privilege Western ideals of capitalist, liberal democracy, which bears colonizing tendencies. Freedom House, for example, explicitly states that a key assumption driving their methodology is “that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies” (Puddington 2014).

This research has found that macro-level data can serve as a useful complement to data gathered at a micro-level and analyzed through in depth case study. In so doing, the themes that emerge from individual observation, opinion, and experience are supported by larger trends evidenced by macro data, and micro data can explain the trends apparent in macro data

and connect across variables to make more meaningful analyses and conclusions. This process of merging the macro- and micro-level data to make the most comprehensive and substantive conclusions for the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda is undertaken in the next section.

Evaluation of Hypotheses

Bosnia-Herzegovina

If nothing else, the case analysis of BiH yielded this conclusion: everything is politicized or ethnicized, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina these are the same process. The ethnic-framing of the political structure has effectively entrenched the ethnic distinctions that divided the country during the war of the early 90s, offering politicians incentives to preserve the status quo. Significant amounts of the power and wealth of BiH is distributed according to the power divisions between the same political parties that were in power during the conflict, and corruption and clientelism remain rampant. Perceptions of corruption in the government have remained high due to politicians continuously blocking the political process to achieve their ends, and it is this stagnation in the political system that led citizens to take to the streets in February of 2014 in protest. The CIRI dataset shows that respect for civil liberties has decreased in the state over the past decade, and many, for example, now view the elections as little more than symbolic exercises and 'mini-censuses'. As politicians have concentrated wealth among their ranks, they have built themselves into a ruling elite, demonstrated in part by rising inequality within the state and the deepening urban-rural divide. The economic stagnation within the state—epitomized by persistent high unemployment rates, particularly within the youth population—and worsening respect for worker's rights has only contributed to citizens' dissatisfaction. The emphasis on security concerns as a crucial tool of political parties for preserving their positions of power has preserved fear and mistrust within the

population despite manifest improvements in respect for physical integrity rights (with the exception of rates of torture). Further, efforts towards justice through the prosecution of war crimes and war criminals has yielded disappointing results, through both the exceptionally large backlog of cases as well as the warm receptions multiple convicted war criminals have received upon returning to their homes after serving their sentences.

These persisting problems within the state despite the stated institutional goals are most clearly demonstrated by the lack of rights and protections outside strict definitions of ethnic belonging, as the preservation of these divisions is of paramount to the interests to the ruling elite. It is within this context that the institutionalized heterogeneity hypothesis must be evaluated. This hypothesis as proposed by the literature is:

H₁: If the degree of institutionalized heterogeneity is high, then the degree of peace will be high.

Evaluated using Bosnia-Herzegovina as a case study, it is clear that this hypothesis fails. Despite the moderately positive subjective well-being of citizens, the system implemented in BiH in the aftermath of genocide has failed to effectively make progress towards political, communal, economic, or transitional justice elements of peace. In conclusion, this hypothesis can be rejected using the data provided by the micro- and macro-level data of this case.

Rwanda

Analysis of macro- and micro-level data for Rwanda has produced similarly disheartening results. The state is characterized by authoritarian and repressive governance whose claims of ethnic blindness are almost completely farcical. The RPF regime itself is built upon ethnic divides, as it grew from a Tutsi resistance force, and the narratives of the past that are foundational to the policies and actions of the state supplant the categories of 'Hutu' and

'Tutsi' with those of 'victim' and 'perpetrator'. In enforcing this narrative, freedom of expression is severely restricted, and rates of disappearances and politically-motivated imprisonment are high. The authoritarian nature of the regime carries through to heavily regulated elections with low respect for electoral self-determination amongst the population. In working to mask these tendencies of the state, perception management—particularly at the international level—is high, defined by the utilization of development projects in the capital and high respect for women's rights as tools to assure continued aid and international support. Yet economic recovery has been uneven, with low respect for worker's rights and consistently high levels of inequality, which have worsened the urban-rural divide. Indeed, poverty levels remain high within rural communities, contributing to the continued 'low human development' status of the state. The perception management at the hands of the state is not only responsible for broad suppression of freedom of speech, but has led to the development of a bipolar discourse that prevents critical discussion of conditions within the state or government policies. This divide may also partially account for inconsistencies between the macro datasets, particularly in regards to respect for physical integrity rights and whether or not judicial actions within the state are anything more than 'victor's justice'.

Ultimately, the state's position is that development is the preeminent concern in the post-conflict period, as adequate development is vital in order for true respect and enjoyment of human rights to take place. It is within this context that the institutionalized homogeneity hypothesis must be evaluated. This hypothesis as proposed by the literature is:

H₂: If the degree of institutionalized homogeneity is high, then the degree of peace will be high.

Evaluated using Rwanda as a case study, it is clear that this hypothesis fails. Beyond the subjective well-being of citizens being exceptionally low, the system implemented in Rwanda

following the genocide has also failed to effectively make progress towards political, communal, economic, or transitional justice elements of peace. Thus, as was the case with the hypothesis on institutionalized heterogeneity, this hypothesis too can be rejected using the data provided by the micro- and macro-level data of this case.

An Alternative

Both of the hypotheses presented by the literature and tested using the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda rely upon the principle of rigid institutionalization of identity, despite taking oppositional stances on what type of institutional identity is preferable. This research proposed an alternative hypothesis, that:

H_A: If the degree of institutionalized identification is high, then the degree of peace will be low.

As both of the hypotheses proposed by the literature were rejected through the case study analyses in this research, it is clear that institutionalized identification does not contribute significantly to higher levels of peace. Indeed, the sizable institutional roadblocks and limited respect for rights that persist in each state actually lend support to this alternative hypothesis. The limits of peace in each of these states indicates that not only is it the case that neither of the often implemented constitutional structures successfully bolster peace within the state, but these structures actually inhibit progress towards sustainable, comprehensive peace. Given this, it is clear that an alternative constitutional structure is required, which would not only lack institutionalized identity, but would work to foster suppressed voices and encourage diversity over homogenization.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This research aimed to answer the question: Does the way in which identity is constructed through governance in post-genocidal states affect post-conflict recovery? Through in depth case study analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, it tested the hypotheses proposed by the literature and implemented in policy that institutionalized heterogeneity and institutionalized homogeneity, respectively, were the foundations of sustainable peace. The analysis of post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that politicized ethnicization dominates all aspects of life, resulting in high levels of corruption and inactivity in the political system; economic stagnation exemplified by persisting high levels of unemployment; persisting communal divisions built on politically perpetuated and exploited fear and mistrust; and questionable progress in achieving true transitional justice. In the case of Rwanda, analysis indicated that the single-party rule of the RPF has resulted in sizable restrictions on freedom of expression, human rights, and political dissent and opposition, all in the name of economic development which has been restricted to urban areas; the creation of a bipolar discourse on the conditions of the post-conflict state; and the perpetuation of ethnic divisions masked by monikers of 'survivor' and 'perpetrator'.

Given these results, this research was able to dismiss these two hypotheses, in turn lending support to the alternative hypothesis proposed by emerging complexity theory and advocated for by this research. This hypothesis posited that institutionalization of identity was actually detrimental for the establishment of sustainable peace, defined through negative (i.e., absence of physical integrity violations, absence of political oppression, etc.) as well as positive (i.e., presence of freedom of association and assembly, presence of economic opportunity, etc.) definitions of peace.

The outcomes of this research have implications for the theory and literature of identity, post-conflict, and constitutional design studies. Pertaining particularly to fluid versus fixed nature of identity, this research demonstrates that identity can be both, depending upon the contexts of individual and state-level factors. The Bosnia-Herzegovina case study speaks to the flexibility of identity: if identity were rigidly fixed, civic identification movements such as that promoted by Naša Stranka in the lead up to the census would have no support and individuals would continue to strongly identify with ethno-religious categories. Both of these were shown to not be the case within this context. In Rwanda, the rigidity of identity became apparent: despite governmental proscription of the use of ethnic categories, the lived experiences of citizens with privilege, discrimination, and marginalization demonstrated the persistent relevance of these categories. With these results this research bolsters the conception of contextually dynamic or fixed identification, and that these identifications are subject to reification, construction, and reconstruction, making them more complex than proposed by primordialist consociationalism or absolute constructivist assimilationism believe.

In terms of post-conflict studies, this research complicates and problematizes the focus of many post-conflict theories, which often place emphasis on the importance of addressing and resolving the antagonisms that fueled the initial conflicts. But, in heedlessly pushing for post-conflict states to decide on the definitive truth of what happened, supporting the concept of 'pure forgiveness', and thus attempting to close discussion, post-conflict theory and literature have enabled and in some cases supported the establishing of new, fixed boundaries. These boundaries, in turn, can often and have been used as fodder or motivation for dissent and eventual conflict. Such was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where resistance to the ethnicization of everyday life was a significant contributing factor to the protests in July 2013

and February 2014. James Scott—who found this same everyday resistance present in Rwanda—describes these as 'hidden transcripts', wherein individuals subtly and (largely) symbolically resist the existing power structure and undermine the authority of the regime in often unexpected ways (Scott 1990).

The most significant theoretical implication of the results of this research is the way in which they challenge existing literature on consociational and assimilative systems. The principal behind both of these constitutional designs is that the system will make representation more fair and equitable within the state, and in so doing reduce the likelihood for violence as all citizens will feel that their voices are heard and their rights respected. Consociationalists believe that this is achieved through ensuring representation for each ethnic group through reserved seats and minority veto; assimilationists believe that this is best done by encouraging civic identification or a single national identification so everyone is treated equally. As was demonstrated by these case studies, however, neither system had high levels of electoral self-determination, never reaching above a '1', indicating a lack of transparency, voter fraud, electoral irregularities, intimidation, harassment, and government manipulation of voter registration lists (Cingranelli & Richards 2014). Clearly these systems failed in their most basic of tasks: ensuring equal representation and protection for all citizens under the law.

The impacts of this research on the literature and theory of this topic has direct implications for policy as well, particularly as the international community continues to be actively involved in many of the peace settlements brokered in conflicts around the world, either through direct state-to-state involvement or through international organizations such as the United Nations. From these positions of influence, states and institutions have the opportunity to influence the governance structure instituted within the state: this was seen

directly in the cases of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, for example. Thus, this analysis advocates on behalf of Horowitz's conception of five means by which to reduce ethnic tensions in post-conflict states: (1) dispersing political power; (2) emphasizing intraethnic competition and conflict; (3) incentivizing interethnic cooperation through policies on elections and territorial disputes; (4) encouraging interests-based alignments; and (5) reducing inequalities between groups through redistribution measures. Through deep contextualization that recognizes not only geographic variation—meaning that the solution that worked perfectly in one state will likely not translate into a sustainable solution for another state—and recognition of the “multiplicity of rational viewpoint” the implementation of Horowitz's policy recommendations could affect real change (Dixon 2011, 320). The focus must be on accommodating and honoring difference, not subverting it, and this must be reflected throughout the conflict resolution and post-conflict processes.

Beyond literature and policy, this research has implications in terms of the methodology and focus of research moving forward. The most significant of these is the usage of blogs and comments as an alternative to interviews with individuals on the ground. This research successfully demonstrated that content analysis of blog posts yields comparable results to those compiled from in-country interviews. This is significant in that it opens the doors to new possibilities of digital anthropology, particularly in cases where it's not only feasible to use these as data sources but perhaps even desirable, such as was the case with Rwanda. Physical presence in the country would actually have placed limits on what populations there was access to and asking the questions that were the focus of this research could have put collaborators in danger and received negative response from the government and expulsion from the state. Thus the usage of blogs and other forms of digital media (i.e., Facebook posts, tweets, Tumblrs, and

Instagrams) as primary sources analogous to interviews could increase access to regions or communities that would have previously been inaccessible. Take, for example, the case of Syria. Through the utilization of cell phone videos, tweets, and blog posts, not only could a study of the conditions within the state be conducted, but one would have access to information from individuals living across the territory rather than a limited number of locations that the researcher would have had access to.

In explaining the methodology of this research, the potential challenges and limitations of this study and its potential conclusions were addressed. Returning to this discussion, the first of these concerns was that the design might not adequately account for alternative variables that might impact the result, for example, the sizable differences in geographic location, historical background, and duration of the genocidal violence (though the events of April 1994 in Rwanda did follow four years of civil war, bringing the total war years closer together). Ultimately, this research argues that these elements are primarily antecedent variables that would most significantly influence a state's decision to implement one constitutional structure over another. That being said, they may have additional direct influence on the development of sustainable peace within the state—for example, the influence of Croatian and Serbian nationalist parties in bordering Croatia and Serbia have undoubtedly had continued impact on the lived experiences of people living in BiH as well as the politics of the state. Therefore, there certainly needs to be additional research on this subject moving forward.

A second foreseen limitation of this research is that the utilization of case study as the means of analyzing these hypotheses would—while having high explanatory power—diminish the generalizability and the parsimony of the conclusions. While it is true that the data itself is very case-specific, there are general trends that emerged across the two case studies that points

to the possibility that it may have greater generalizability. Most significant among these is that both cases indicate that when identity has been institutionalized this crystallization is exploited by politicians and political parties to reinforce their narratives of the past and preserve their claim to power and authority. Indeed, in the constitutional and political structure's assertions of what constitutes acceptable identification, it dictated who the acceptable bearers of this power and authority are and lead to the concentration of wealth and development among an elite class based in urban areas.

In addition to answering the research question first proposed by this study, this research has asked many more. How do geographic location, historical heritage, influence of neighboring states, or duration of conflict impact the degree of peacefulness within a post-conflict state twenty years after the official cessation of violence? Would similar results have been found for the Rwandan case study had interviews been conducted within the state? Do cases exist where elements of Horowitz's complexity theory have been implemented in the aftermath of ethnicized conflict and, if so, what impact have they had on the development of sustainable peace? Further research would do well to address these puzzles, for example by conducting interviews on the ground in Rwanda and comparing them with the results of this study. This might be feasibly done by a researcher with the access and thorough knowledge of the socio-political and cultural context to indirectly ask questions to get at the state of affairs in modern Rwanda, as was done by Bert Ingelaere in his recent study (2010). Additional research could also be done to investigate the lived experience of rural populations in the years following genocide and the implementation of a new constitutional structure and government, so as to more fully understand the variance and division between urban and rural populations, which emerged as a prominent theme in this research. Further expansion of James Scott's work

on hidden transcripts could contribute to the conclusions of this research, offering a potential mechanism through which populations in post-conflict states resist state institutionalization of identity. And finally, exploring topics of post-conflict governance and identity more broadly, there is ample opportunity to ask questions about the process of identity construction in post-conflict states, with particular focus being given to inter-ethnic communal relations and the relationship of the population to the state-level and community governments.

Ultimately, this research made great strides in answering questions about the impact government instituted identity construction in post-genocidal societies, concluding that existing paradigms of governance fail the populations they claim to serve and radical reconceptualization of these systems is necessary for a true, sustainable peace. A new avenue of ethnographic research was explored, as the utilization of social and alternative media has risen in use around the world and may serve as a useful window into societies in addition to its present usage as a new form of community and platform for construction of the self. This study contributes to the extensive literatures on identity, post-conflict society, and governance, and calls for approaches that rely on 'thick' understandings of local contexts and that these contexts can develop and change over time, invigorate suppressed voices, and honor diversity over fixed categorization.

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Annex I: Content Analysis Count Sheets and Articles

Susan Thomson—Democracy Watch Rwanda

	ability		international		future
	abroad		of Kagame		of women
	abuses		of the RPF		gender-equality
	human rights		defense		genocide
	access		delegation		Rwandan
	accessories		demands		1994
	of power		continued		government
	account		democracy		authoritarian
	official		Western-style		ethnically inclusive
	Twitter		denial		forward looking
	actions		of liberties		progressive
	duplicitous		politically-		repressive
	administrations		motivated		groups
	successive		diplomats		terrorist
	U.S.		resident		growth
	anniversary		Rwandan		economic
	twentieth		three		guess
	armor		documents		guilt
	assessment		dollars		harassment
	attack		donor		misogynistic
	attempt		dominance		home
	bungled		efforts		house
	third		government		lower
	audiences		elections		host
	Western		parliamentary		whole
	ballot		presidential		inequalities
	campaign		entry		economic
	disinformation		events		socio-political
	Kwibuka20		commemorative		influence
	longstanding		public		limited
	case		two		inquiry
	chief		evidence		international
	army		excesses		insight
	former		exclusion		intention
	spy		of youth		interference
	choice		experience		interpretation
	little		expression		competent
	colonialism		free		intimidation
	constituents		open		ire
	country		political		journalist(s)
	free		eye		foreign
	stable		blind		judge
	court		fact		justice
	crack		firms		international
	first		public		two-faced
	crisis		relations		language
	diplomatic		fodder		rosy
	unprecedented		freelancer		laws
	critics		American		ethnic divisionism
	foreign		friends		genocide ideology
	criticism		American		leader(s)

		de facto		Rwandan		strategy
		imprisoned		power		disinformation
		leadership		little		simple
		visionary		pluralism		stretch
		life		political		conceptual
		member(s)		poor		students
		several		practice		exchange
		staff		president		sympathy
		minimum		Rwandan		international
		murder		propaganda		maximum
		narrative(s)		government		system
		nation		prosecution		judicial
		rehabilitated		questions		task
		need		reaction		primary
		number		reality(-ies)		techniques
		office		political		other
		onset		realm		tensions
		opposition		electoral		longstanding
		political		reason		political
		others		instrumental		theory
		parliament		regime		ties
		parliamentarians		authoritarian		diplomatic
		female		Kagame-led		formal
		male		RPF		timing
		women		region		crappy
		party(-ies)		resentments		total
		actual		unresolved		trial
		all		response		trope
		coalition		-muted		of authoritarianism
		four		responsibility		of genocide
		nine		rhetoric		tweets
		opposition		of development		mocking
		other		of reconciliation		reactionary
		political		of reconstruction		Twitter-gate
		ruling		rise		illustrative
		past		role		recent
		violent		central		Twitter-trolls
		patterns		room		users
		broader		little		Twitter
		of disinformation		round		version
		pendant		recent		idealized
		people		ruin		invented
		some		semblance		victory
		perception		series		violations
		rosy		sign		human rights
		period		any		massive
		intense		someone		visas
		piece		space		visitors
		opinion		limited		visit(s)
		short		specialists		U.S.
		pillar		American		visitors
		another		Bristish		U.S.
		points		PR		voices
		of weakness		stability		vote(s)
		policy		political		voters
		politics		story		million

	six		Human Rights Watch		Sonia Rolley
	website		Johannesburg		State Department
	week		(Kayumba) Nyamwasa		(Steve) Terrill
	women		Kigali		(@steveinaftica)
	visible		Office of the Rwandan		Twitter
			President		United Nations
			Patrick Karegeya		Victoire Ingabire
			President (Paul) Kagame		@RichardGoldston
			Radio France International		@PaulKagame
Proper nouns					
	AfricanArguments.org		Rwanda		
	Americans		post-genocide		
	Amnesty International		Rwandans		
	Democratic Republic of		Rwandan Patriotic Front		Number of documents analyzed: 3
	the Congo	(RPF)			
	France		ruling		

News Rwanda

	ability		aspect		beyond despicable
	absence		disturbing		case(s)
	abuses		assassination		genocide
	human rights		attack(s)		growing
	academics		another		numerous
	some		fourth		challenges
	access		grenade		historical
	accountability		revenge		two
	acronyms		shameful		champion
	many		attention		chaos
	actions		audacity		character
	activist		author		shady
	opposition		authority		charade
	admirers		little		charges
	additional		political		politically-
	advice		real	motivated	
	terrible		backbone		ready-made
	agencies		backdrop		cheerleaders
	security		base		chief
	agenda		basket case		army
	reconciliation		being		former
	sole		bill		Rwandan
	agreements		blast		children
	peace		grenade		Rwandan
	successful		bloggers		choices
	agony		Rwandan		clear
	aid		boat		citizens
	all		breakdown		ordinary
	allies		ethnic		civilians
	former		business		Hutu
	analysis		every		'ordinary'
	analysts		businessman		claims
	some		Chicago		'clean streets'
	ancestors		buzz word		coins
	wise		byproduct		some
	answer		of discrimination		colleagues
	anyone		usual		combination
	anything		cabinet		commemoration(s)
	anywhere		split		annual
	apology		28-member		genocide
	appearances		cable		community
	regular		US		international
	television		calamity		companies
	areas		humanitarian		RPF
	arm		campaign		competence
	heavy		any		complicity
	of the government		(not) bottom-up		conduct
	army		(not) conciliatory		conference
	arrogance		(not) engaging		any
	article		political		damned
	same		candidates		reconciliation
	artist		capital		conformity
	young		carnage		political

		same		last		unnecessary
		unprecedented		deception		embassy (-ies)
		Congolese				US
		consciousness		grand		end
		collective		decision		enemy
		consequences		defeat		enslavement
		unpredictable		demise		political
		consultant		descendants		entity
		senior		desire		other
		UN		dictator(s)		entrepreneurs
		contempt				of violence
		contention		heinous		epitome
		contributions		dictatorship		of cowardice
		'voluntary'				of weakness
		control		one-man		essence
		complete		Rwandan		establishment
		state		difference		
		unprecedented		dignity		Rwandan
		construction		direction		estimates
		conversation		director		some
		counterpart				'ethnic card'
		Burundi		country		ethnicity
		country		disagreements		event(s)
		courts				commemoration
		(not) fair		major		historical
		(not) free		discourse		main
		creation		disdain		political
		crime(s)		disorder		everywhere
		genocide-related				evidence
		criticisms		genetic		little
		major		dissidents		evil
		critics		distress		immense
		cry				exception
		far		intense		excesses
		culmination		diversity		existence
		culpability				'peaceful'
		curse		ethnic		ex-journalist
		custom		of memories		expediency
		cycle		done deal		political
		election		donor		expense
		(s)election				explanation
		danger		bilateral		
		data	sponsored	leading		last
		census		doubt		extent
		day and age				facade
		daylight		little		fact
		broad		dwellers		simple
		days				factors
		two		rural		unknown
		death		dynamics		family
		slow		'economic miracle'		fan club
		debate(s)		effort		
		heated		government-		Kagame
		littler richer		egos		fate
		political				realistic
		decade		oversized		similar
				elections		terrifying
				compulsory		uncertain
				false		fatigues
				parliamentary		
				presidential		
				upcoming		
				electricity		
				elite(s)		
				mostly Tutsi		
				Rwandan		
				embarrassment		

	military		of goodwill		ideal
	fears		goal(s)		identity
	feeling				ethnic
	feminists				ideology (-ies)
					anti-Tutsi
	international				perpetual
	fighting				vilest
	continued				ilk
	figures				image
					improvement
	economic				impressive
	leading				incarceration
	political				lengthy
	religious				increase
	several				indication
	wild				any
	finger				individual(s)
	fire				both
	flavor				rich
	folks				
	forgiveness				inferiority
					initiative
	institutionalized				innocence
	form				innocent
					insights
	of criticism				(no) valuable
	of election				insult(s)
	some				interests
	forum				narrow
					partisan
	serious				internet
	frames				irony
					irregularities
	larger-than-normal				issue
	picture				dividing
	freedom(s)				key
					jail
	basic				journalist(s)
	of speech				mercenary
	restricted				judges
	friend(s)				untrained
					kind(s)
	close				all
	Twitter				of rumors
					killers
	fronting				potential
					killing(s)
	of women				more
	fund				of opponents
					kudos
	sovereign				labor
	future				hard
					lawyer
	post-Kagame				exiled
	unified				leader(s)
	gains				Hutu
					indisputable
	hollow				
	gem				
	latest				
	'gender revolution'				
	gene				
	genocidaires				
	genocide				
	another				
	1972				
	1994				
	genocide denier				
	gesture				

		moral			only		news
		opposition			members		most sensational
		Rwandan			several		norm
		Tutsi			unsuspecting		note
		'visionary'			memorials		
		legacy			genocide		
		legitimacy			men		number(s)
		more			convicted		
		political			'forgiven'		
		lessons			innocent		objectives
		worthwhile			some		
		level			mercy		gender parity
		of slaughter			merit		oblivion
		one			message		observers
		levers			private		
		of power			midst		
		liberation			military		careful
		political			militias		most
		liberator			ethnic		of Rwanda
		messianic			minds		occasion
		lies			minister(s)		office
		pure			Hutu		
		lifeline			prime		every
		foreign aid			ministries		officials
		light			key		
		line			most		government
		official			minority		security
		lives			persecuted		old wine in a new bottle
		Hutu			mission		one(s)
		logic			mockery		
		loyalists			of democracy		another
		loyalty			moderates		loved
		machination			Hutu		operatives
		majority			Tutsi		
		large			monitors		eloquent
		of Rwandans			RPF		opinion
		of women			monster		international
		majority population			more		opponents
		malnutrition			motivations		
		man			motive		of Kagame
		marked			another		other
		manipulation(s)			sinister		unlucky
		cynical			murder(s)		opportunity
		many			macabre		
		marriage			mass		equal
		massacre(s)			myth		opposition
		Kibeho			Kagame		
		masses			narrative		exiled
		Hutu			certain		oppression
		impoverished			reconciliation		
		matter			well-guarded		ethnic-based
		another			nationalism		optimism
		meaning			ethnic		others
		political			Tutsi		outsiders
		serious			neighbors		overdrive
		medium			nemesis		
							panic
							panel
							of advisors
							parliament
							parliamentarians
							female
							part
							small
							participant
							active
							participation
							democratic

	party(-ies)		president		international
	Hutu		Rwandan		poor
	opposition		press release		sinister
	ruling		official		recovery
	Tutsi		prison(s)		'miraculous'
	past		unbelievably		refugese
	criminal	crowded			regime
	murderous		process		non-democratic
	pattern		fundamentally		RPF
	(no) pay	flawed			region
	people		political		reign
	internally displaced		'prodigal sons'		of terror
	many		professor		relatives
	more		programs		report(s)
	three		many		another
	Tutsi		protector		compelling
	4,000		of Tutsi		credible
	percentage		punishment		damning
	preponderant		purposes		excellent
	period		PR		latest
	commemoration		push		some
	perpetrator		apparent		UN
	PhD		question(s)		representation
	piece		bold		good
	place		endless		researchers
	point(s)		important		responsibility
	main		more		rest
	hardly reassuring		one		restrain
	two		parting		unprecedented
	police		puzzling		restriction
	policy		silent		of free speech
	consistent		quotas		severe
	politician		required		result
	'good'		rate		predetermined
	politics		incarceration		return
	polity		reality		revelation
	poorest		(no) reason(s)		revisionist
	very		another		ritual(s)
	population		credible		past
	portion		little		of forgiveness
	position(s)		reasoning		role
	high		reverse		any
	of power		reasons		destabilizing
	senior		more		rooms
	post		reassurances		polling
	different		more		rumor(s)
	last		rebels		Rwandans
	power		M23		exhausted
	more		Rwanda-supported		few
	real		Tutsi		many
	PR		recognition		most
	Rwandan		increasing		ordinary
	practices		reconciliation		other
	democratic		much needed		(not) stupid
	normal		record		sake
	presence		callous		salary

		current		stability		tomorrow
		meager				tool
		starting				traces
		\$50		state		of genuineness
		scam				traffic
		science				one way
		political		statement		transformation
		scientists				comprehensive
		seats				institutional
		Secretary General				systemic
		section				trap
		selection(s)				lingering
		manicured				partisan
		self-invention				trial
		sense				tribes
		of invincibility				hostile
		sentence(s)				truth
		long				much needed
		murky				Tutsi(s)
		series				disloyal
		servants				senior
		public				800,000
		shadows				'Tutsification'
		of death				'Tutsi terror'
		shame				tweets
		shortfall				Twitter
		signs				tyranny
		clear				unification
		loud				recent
		obvious				unity
		ominous				national
		silence				upper hand
		deep				urgency
		skill				users
		slaves				aid
		slumber				most effective
		1994-induced				value
		'smoking gun'				any
		smooth-talk				verdict
		society				one
		someone				victim(s)
		something				of the regime
		more important	level			Tutsi
		sort				victimhood
		of posturing				collective
		space(s)				view
		political				conventional
		safe				refreshing
		speak				villages
		ethnic				chronically
		speakers				destitute
		English				voices
		speech(es)				of reason
		keynote				walks
		spouses				all
		non-Rwandan				of life
				today		

	way(s)		Auke Loostama		Kayumba
	criminal		Bamporinki (Eduard)		Kigali
	many		Barack Obama		(President) (Salma) Kikwete
	websites		BBC		Loostama
	all		Bisengimana		(Mr..) Mandela
	government-owned		Britain		Rwandan
	weekend		Burundi		M23
	weeks		Canada		Ndi Umunyarwanda
	few		Celestin Rwigema		New York Times
	six		Christian Davenport		Philip Gourevitch
	West		CNDP		RCD
	westerners		Colonel Karegeya		Rene Lemarchand
	unsuspecting		Congo		Revi Mfizi
	who		DRC (Congo)		Rick Warren
	wife		neighboring		Rudatsimburwa
	of a man		East African		Rwanda
	will		Edouard Bamporinki		most
	political		Esther		Rwanda National Congress
	willingness		biblical		Rwandan Patriotic Army
	window-dressing		Evoid Uwizeyimana		Rwandan Patriotic Front
	new		FAR	(RPF)	
	women		FDLR		Susan Thomson
	workers		weakened		Sylvain Sibomana
	miracle		Frederick Mutebi		Tanzania
	world		optimistic		Tony Blair
	gullible		pro-Kagame		Uganda
	year(s)		Ugandan		United Kingdom (UK)
	last		Gacaca		UN
	two		Habyarimana		UNDP
	18		Hege		US
			Howard French		(Miss) Victoire Ingabire
			Human Rights Watch		
			Interahamwe		
			Joe Ritchie		
Proper nouns			(President)		
	Allan Stam				Number of documents analyzed: 14
	Andrew Mwenda	Kagame			

Articles

- 1) What's Changed in Rwanda since April
- 2) Rwanda has the Highest Incarceration Rates. Can we Talk About Reconciliation?
- 3) Questions we ask in Silence on the Rwanda Genocide
- 4) Karegeya is Dead but Should Many More Follow?
- 5) To President Kagame: Free Victoire Ingabire
- 6) Ndi Umunyarwanda: Desperate Re-branding of the Last Kicks of a Dying Horse?
- 7) After years of silence, US embassy speaks out against election fraud in Rwanda
- 8) Exhaustion in Rwanda Amid a False Election
- 9) Hutu phobia, Salma Kikwete and Kagame's propaganda
- 10) Anti-Tutsi sentiments in Central Africa?
- 11) Rwanda & Reconciliation: Collective forgiveness?

- 12) Howard French Is Right On Rwanda's Paul Kagame.**
- 13) Steve Hege Victim of Kagame Propaganda Machine for Daring to Speak Truth**
- 14) UK Terminates Rwanda Aid: Kagame you Reap what you Sow**

Marijke Verpoorten

	academics			unreliable			factual
	two			506,000			independent
	administration			finding			(not) solid
	local			genocide			widely available
	Rwandan			government			share
	allegation(s)			Habyarimana			signatories
	argument			Rwandan			international
	controversial			groups			prominent
	baseline			genocide survivor			signatories
	book			Rwandan			38
	scientific			growth			sources
	camps			population			data
	refugee			Hutu			diverse
	census			importance			two
	national			of Tutsi			speculation
	of 1978			journal			story
	population			scientific			suggestion
	prior			letter			absurd
	Rwandan			another			surveys
	1991			open			various
	claim(s)			lies			survivors
	several			match			Tutsi
	comparison			almost perfect			150,000
	critics			minimisation			150,000-300,000
	osme			genocide			system
	data			none			gacaca
	census			number(s)			justice
	insufficient			of men			transitional
	local			of women			toll(s)
	national			of Tutsi			death
	necessary			underreported			important
	population			UNHCR			reliable
	1952			organizations			Tutsi
	1990			genocide			total
	denial(s)			survivor			Tutsi
	blatant			outrage			surviving
	genocide			piece			200,000
	documentary			African Arguments			620,000
	(no) documentation			recent			underreporting
	emotion			population			of Tutsi
	end			province(s)			version
	estimate(s)			all			French
	conventional			one			website
	higher			Rwandan			whole
	200,000			quality			of Rwanda
	evidence			range			years
	of underreporting			plausible			later
	exaggerations			report			twenty
	extrapolation			Human Rights			of 1987
	fact	Watch		(HRW)			
	figure(s)			1999			
	much lower			research			

Proper nouns		Democratic Republic of the		Tanzania
	Alison Des Forges		Congo	
	(Professor) Allan Stam		HRW	
	BBC		(Professor) Philip Rejntjens	Number of documents analyzed: 1
	(Professor) Christian		Rwanda	
Davenport		Rwanda's Untold Story		

Rwanda: Why claim that 200,000 Tutsi died in the genocide is wrong – By Marijke Verpoorten
 (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/10/27/rwanda-why-davenport-and-stams-calculation-that-200000-tutsi-died-in-the-genocide-is-wrong-by-marijke-verpoorten/>)

Marijke Verpoorten is Associate Professor, University of Antwerp.

Mark Weston

	agriculture		demography		inhabitants
	aid		demons		400
	foreign		buried		jobs
	anniversary		differences		available
	twentieth		direction		kilometer
	anthem		wrong		square
	national		division		land
	new		tribal		spare
	backers		donors		language
	Western		key		newsletter
	background		drinks		official
	balance		dues		leaders
	fragile		English		opposition
	bars		erosion		letup
	blind eye		soil		man
	bodies		events		Tutsi
	dead		extreme		young
	boundaries		horrific		manoeuvre
	provincial		weather		massacre
	budget		everywhere		members
	annual		evil		800,000
	bursting point		necessary		moderates
	camps		expression		Hutu
	refugee		free		thousands
	change		extremists		month(s)
	climate		Hutu		each
	of heart		farming		of violence
	children		over-intensive		three
	five		fear		murders
	Rwandan		fertility		critics
	surviving		high		extrajudicial
	100%		flag		nation-builder
	communities		new		great
	compatriots		food		neighbour
	Hutu		frustrations		volatile
	conflict		genocidaires		northerner
	contexts		worst		young
	country(-ies)		genocide		outlet(s)
	densely populated		another		out-migration
	neighboring		Rwandan		outsider
	stable		government		parties
	crimes		group		political
	lesser		ethnic		parts
	of donors		Tutsi		body
	days		hands		peace
	Umuganda		hilltop		people
	death		every		young
	decades		hundreds		period
	peaceful		of refugees		post-genocide
	prosperous		of thousands		policy-makers
	two		Hutu		politics
	deforestation		increase		population
			significant		large

	youth		sign		unfavorable
	president		size		village(s)
	Rwandan		slope		violence
	pressure		every		vulnerability
	problem		space		woman
	process		spree		
	progress		killing		
	remarkable		stains		
	questions		stay		
	rainfall		steps		Proper nouns
	resources		strains		Ataturk
	available		streets		Bernard Ntaganda
	risk(s)		supporters		Burundi
	of explosion		survey		Commonwealth
	rivals		system		Congo
	roads		justice		East African Community
	room		third		Paul Kagame
	diminishing		threat		Rwanda
	scapegoat		times		northern
	schools		good		Tanzania
	setbacks		tinderbox		United Nations
	economic		trees		UNICEF
	shock(s)		Tutsis		Victoire Ingabire
	other		few		
	some		other		
	unforseen		variations		

Number of documents analyzed: **1**

Rwanda Twenty Years On: The Dangers of Demography – By Mark Weston

(<http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/24/rwanda-twenty-years-on-the-dangers-of-demography-by-mark-weston/>)

Mark Weston is the author of The Ringtone and the Drum: Travels in the World's Poorest Countries. **He lives in Tanzania.**

Steve Terrill

	accomplishments		emails		plain-clothes
	other		hundreds		officials
	account(s)		embassy		cooperative
	official		extremes		opposition
	airport		political		paradise
	Kigali		foreigners		pariah
	ambassador		friend(s)		passport
	arrest		pro-government		valid
	drug		Rwandan		path
	(no) battles		gate		(no) middle
	benefit		genocide		people
	of listening		government		opposition
	bigotry		group(s)		phone
	(no) blood		all		picture
	brutality		inherently evil		complete
	call		inherently good		police
	candor		one		PR
	categories		other		praise
	opposition		harassment		credible
	pro-government		of journalists		prison
	strict		online		problems
	cell		hills		program
	jail		thousand		pushback
	center		history		noticeable
	chief		hotbed		readers
	former		of controversy		relationship
	spy		hours		friendly
	choice		idea		tense
	obvious		immigration		report
	civilians		institution		news
	Hutu		journalist		outdated
	unarmed		neutral		reporters
	colleagues		objective		guilty
	pro-government		visiting		other
	Rwandan		land		roadblocks
	commemorations		leader		room
	consular		benevolent		little
	American		competent		savior
	contact		loyalty		set
	conversation		minutes		another
	bipolar		five		first
	polarized		moderates		of victims
	Rwanda		movement		side(s)
	country		(so) evil		all
	peaceful		Hutu-power		someone
	prosperous		murder		staffers
	criminal		narratives		communications
	war		conflicting		government
	criticism		objectivity		stance
	credible		office		story(-ies)
	dichotomy		communications		big
	false		government		larger
	diplomats		officer		streets

	subject		human rights		Rwanda Immigration
	of Rwanda		years		Service
	suggestion		two		Rwandan Patriotic Front
	thing				(RPF)
	first				Tutsi-led
	time				South Africa
	tweet	Proper nouns			United States (US)
	strange		Kigali		US Embassy
	tyrant		Office of the Pres of		Vitriol
	visionary		Rwanda		
	waiver		President Paul Kagame		
	visa		Rwanda		Number of documents analyzed: 1
	work		Rwanda Government's		
	workers		Communications Office		

Taking Sides in Rwanda – By Steve Terrill (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/05/06/taking-sides-in-rwanda-by-steve-terrill/>)

Steve Terrill is an independent journalist and editor of Rwanda Wire. This article is republished from Al Jazeera Digital magazine.

Richard Dowden

	Americans		planned		same
	anniversary		Rwandan		stories
	20 th		Germans		time
	appearance		government		same
	balance		grounds		tribe(s)
	Belgians		ideological		(not) different
	bloodbath		hills		'Hutu'
	card(s)		same		'Tutsi'
	folded		Hutu		Tutsi(s)
	green		independence		superior
	identity (ID)		interest		vehicles
	small		intervention		armoured
	two		journalists		unused
	chance		top		Walloon
	only		language		weeks
	change		same		several
	of policy		media		world
	class		misreadings		
	ruling		dreadful		
	colony		ignorant		
	Belgian		moment	Proper nouns	
	former		any		Africa
	culture		occupation		Blackhawk Down
	same		ones		Britain
	deaths entence		point		Central African Republic
	dictatorship		population		Communist Party
	difference		power		France
	only		reasons		Kigali
	election(s)		two		Mogadishu
	democratic		regime		Nigeria
	first		Clinton		northeastern
	Europeans		incoming		Paris
	event		religion		Rwanda
	big		same		Somalia
	firefight		roadblock		South Africa
	Flemings		rule		Syria
	force		colonial		
	tiny		soldiers		
	UN		American		
	genocide		space		

Number of documents analyzed: 1

Death and Identity in Rwanda – By Richard Dowden (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/04/08/death-and-identity-in-rwanda-by-richard-dowden/>)

Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society and author of *Africa; altered states, ordinary miracles*. Follow Richard on twitter @DowdenAfrica

Jennifer Fierberg

	abandonment		goals		remarks
	accusations		stated		reports
	new		guilt		unflattering
	action(s)		history		result
	antithetical		of destabilization		scholars
	collective		well-documented		seat
	analysts		home		situation
	political		hour		sympathy
	appointment		darkest		tenure
	two year		hypocrisy		time
	argument		journalists		transparency
	assistance		level		greater
	development		increased		violations
	atrocities		of scrutiny		human rights
	mass		likelihood		vision
	book		slim		vote
	chief		meeting		weak
	former		UNSC		years
	of staff		move		last
	claims		signature		two
	of bias		officials		
	paranoid		government		
	community		Rwandan		
	international		outcome		Proper nouns
	country(-ies)		ploy		Dem Rep of the Congo
	known aggressor		(not) effective	(DRC)	
	neighboring		politics		Louise Mushkiwabo
	powerful		position		Minister of Foreign Affairs
	small		current		(Paul) Kagame
	decision		power		Rwanda
	election(s)		president		Security Council (UNSC)
	first		ranks		Theogene Rudasingwa
	two		record		United Nations
	event		human rights		United States
	horrific		poor		
	exile		regime		
	genocide		autocratic		Number of documents analyzed: 1
	1994		region		
	'genocide guilt'		eastern		

Rwanda, M23 and the UNSC – By Jennifer Fierberg (<http://africanarguments.org/2013/08/27/rwanda-m23-and-the-uns-ty-jennifer-fierberg/>)

Jennifer Fierberg is a journalist with a particular focus on Rwanda.

Filip Reyntjens

	authority		males		subject
	barriers		adult		thoughts
	book		all		dire
	campaign		Hutu		tragedy
	RPF		memory		training
	claim(s)		minimisation		paramilitary
	four		genocide		truth
	second		notion		shared
	'untenable'		number		Tutsi(s)
	contents		limited		use
	country		objective		victory
	Courts		main		military
	Rwandan		one		way
	data		parts		website
	insufficient		party(-ies)		wing
	denial		former		youth
	genocide		other		words
	distinctions		political		other
	documentary		single		
	doubts		percent		
	serious		70		
	dupes		programme		Proper nouns
	bigger		quarter		BBC
	entity		last		recklessly
	examination		of a century		irresponsible
	critical		question		dallaire
	extremists		real		Davenport
	Hutu		region		Director-General
	figures		Great Lakes		Interahamwe
	film		research		Kagame
	genocidaires		solid		RPF
	genocide		return		Rwanda
	Hutu		shots		'Rwanda's Untold Story'
	issue		all		Stam
	fourth		signatories		
	journal		38		
	scientific		situation		Number of documents analyzed: 1
	killers		status quo		
	letter		pre-1959		

Rwanda's Untold Story. A reply to "38 scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians" – By Filip Reyntjens (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/10/21/rwandas-untold-story-a-reply-to-38-scholars-scientists-researchers-journalists-and-historians-by-filip-reyntjens/>)

Dr. Filip Reyntjens is Professor of African Law and Politics at the Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp.

Bert Ingelaere & Marijke Verpoorten

	actions		on authority		of a Republic
	aid		circumstances		ethnicity
	ambition		civilians		eve
	visionary		colonialism		of the genocide
	anniversary		community		factor(s)
	20 th		international		central
	aspects		complexities		important
	economic		of interventionism		'false bargains'
	ethnic		consequences		fear
	interlinked		consolidation		features
	political		land		main
	attempts		constitution		feelings
	recent		continuity		fertility
	authoritarianism		country		force
	autocrats		creation		dividing
	awareness		crisis		functioning
	hidden		political		of the state
	Hutu		crystallization		genocide
	of ethnicity		culture		Rwandan
	background		civic		goals
	historical		peculiar		government
	key		political		Hutu-dominated
	barriers		cycle		grievances
	little		conflict		hardship
	institutional		Rwandan		economic
	belonging		decades		hierarchy
	ethnic		decline		of drives
	(not) redundant		density		history
	benchmark		population		of violence
	bet		descendants		Rwandan
	dangerous		development		hundreds
	call		discontent		of thousands
	capacity		widespread		of Rwandans
	conflict resolution		dissemination		idea
	locally owned		domain		identity(-ies)
	sufficient		political		ethnic
	cards		donors		national
	ethnic		driver		Rwandan
	identity		primary		single
	case(s)		economy		Tutsi
	of Rwanda		rural		ideology
	recent		Rwandan		Hutu
	Rwandan		elections		industry
	change(s)		presidential		aid
	gradual		2017		inhabitants
	potential		elite(s)		800
	transformative		political		insecurity
	character		Tutsi		insight
	authoritarian		end		inspiration
	visionary		episode(s)		utopian
	checks		first		institutions
	genuine		historical		global
	institutionalized		establishment		involvement

	killings		path-dependency		rule
	genocidal		peasants		exclusionary
	large-scale		people		rulers
	mass		policy(-ies)		colonial
	of civilians		coercive		run
	reprisal		preventive		scale
	state-led		politics		of Rwanda
	kilometer		Rwandan		security
	square		poor		existential
	layers		population		situation
	leader(s)		dense		key
	visionary		growing		political
	leadership		power(s)		'social identity'
	new		countervailing		Rwandan
	lives		presence		society
	of Rwandans		high		bi-polar
	losers		of authority		civil
	relative		presidency		Rwandan
	losses		prices		spark
	majority		coffee		sphere
	Hutu		principle		civil
	meaning		for violence		spirit
	very specific		organizing		of ethnicity
	meantime		process		of sectarianism
	measures		decolonization		start
	coercive		democratization		state
	media		too rapid		post-genocide
	mentalities		programs		Rwandan
	Rwandan		progress		status
	minority		economic		royal
	Tutsi		objective		step(s)
	monarchy		project(s)		concrete
	Rwandan		political		one
	Tutsi		societal		short-term
	mono-cropping		visionary		structure(s)
	monopoly		question		longstanding
	Hutu		ranks		hierarchical
	power		ethnic		state
	months		reconstruction		studies
	genocidal		regime(s)		few
	of 1994		authoritarian		subordination
	murder		research		successes
	mass		comparative		support
	politically		on genocide		budget
motivated			restructuring		conditional
	norms		of power		extensive
	international		revolution		supremacy
	onset		Hutu		Hutu
	opposition		1959		system
	political		rich		political
	origins		rights		term
	others		same		final
	outburst(s)		risk		presidential
	of violence		high		theories
	overview		of polarization		comparative
	of explanations		room		on genocide

	threats		large-scale	
	time(s)		mass	Proper nouns
	of crisis		thinkable	Africa
	tragedy		vision	Belgium
	Rwandan		appealing	Darfur
	transformations		strong	Germany
	systemic		war	Ivory Coast
	Tutsi		civil	Office of the Special
	mostly ethnic		warfare	Advisor for the Prevention of
	two sides of the same coin		guerilla	Genocide (OSAPG)
	uncertainty(-ies)		rural	United Nations
	economic		way	(Paul) Kagame
	undertaking		peaceful	Responsibility to Protect
	delicate		weakness	(R2P)
	upheaval		wealth	Rwanda
	political		window	post-genocide
	values		three-year	Rwandan Patriotic Front
	certain		winners	(RPF)
	political		relative	Uganda-based
	villagization		world	Syria
	violence		zone	William Easterly
	ethnic		risk	
	executable			
	justifiable			

Number of documents analyzed: 1

Rwanda: could state-led mass killings ever happen again? – By Bert Ingelaere & Marijke Verpoorten

(<http://africanarguments.org/2014/06/02/rwanda-could-state-led-mass-killings-ever-happen-again-by-bert-ingelaere-marijke-verpoorten/>)

Bert Ingelaere is postdoctoral research fellow at Yale University, University of Antwerp and KU

Leuven:www.bertingelaere.net

Marijke Verpoorten is Assistant Professor at the University of Antwerp, and free researcher at

the University of Leuven:<http://www.uantwerpen.be/marijke-verpoorten>.

Kris Berwouts

	activities		unaccustomed		fault line
	normal		courts		features
	political		gacaca		important
	age		crime		fields
	of seven		critics		most diverse
	agreement		most		forward
	peace		of the regime		functions
	anything		culture		high-profile
	army		dead		future
	attempt		death		garden
	every		decades		genocide
	authorization		two		government
	backdrop		decor		Rwandan
	balance		debate		greed
	certain		open		grievances
	basis		political		past
	Belgians		public		grip
	camps		decision making		firm
	refugee		democracy		groups
	Rwandan		developments		two
	candidates		a lot		healer
	individual		positive		best
	categories		dialogue		health care
	causes		diaspora		high quality
	of conflict		difficulties		heart
	of genocidal		several		hell
violence			division(s)		hills
	root		divisionist		home
	cell		education		hours
	(no) chance		high quality		few
	change		eighties		households
	generational		early		ten
	little		elections		houses
	churches		(too) important		so many
	citizen(s)		legislative		Hutu(s)
	ordinary		predictable		individual
	classmates		elimination		marginalized
	climate		environment		million
	intoxicated		entirely controlled		moderate
	community		political		two
	same		event		ideology
	Tutsi		impressive		of genocide
	competition		meaningless		implementation
	democratic		perfectly directed		indication
	political		everybody		some
	congratulations		everything		individuals
	control		example		institutions
	counter-power		experience		strong
	country (-ies)		very alienating		intellectuals
	beautiful		fact		polyglot
	entirely destroyed		fair share		interests
	(not) more		families		common
democratic			father		intimidation

	inventions		nostalgic		Rwandan
	mere		number		Tutsi
	issue		organizations		very ambitious
	Hutu-Tutsi		charity		repression
	key		opponents		respect
	of refugees		political		responsibilities
	judgment		opportunities		high-profile
	kind		many		result(s)
	some		(no) option		hardly relevant
	land		palace		some
	so many		part		spectacular
	leaders		one		rights
	leadership		other		human
	post-genocide		parties		risk
	quite effective		genuine		of violence
	responsible		individual		Rwandans
	level		opposition		scene
	lowest		two		mass
	of government		past		political
	of nyumbakumi		patriarch		scores
	of repression		old school		sense
	life		Tutsi		of injustice
	public		people		seventies
	lifestyle		afraid		late
	lines		common		shadow
	fault		ordinary		short
	majority		(no) place		siblings
	Hutu		plane		thirty
	makeover		policy(-ies)		side
	total		of exclusion		one
	marriages		strict		society
	mixed		politics		deeply traumatized
	massacre		Rwandan		Rwandan
	unprecedented		poor		soil
	means		potential		Congolese
	conventional		power		sources
	political		pressure		best documented
	meetings		priority(ies)		most critical
	men		first		space
	younger		problems		spheres
	mentality		process		all
	metamorphosis		top-down		of life
	military		profile(s)		other
	ministers		different		state
	mistrust		program(me)(s)		North-Korean-style
	complete		new		one-man
	moments		quality		one-party
	morning		democratic		paranoid
	early		quarters		violent
	movie		three		story
	better-than-average		rebels		strengths
	bible		Tutsi		many
	MPs		reconciliation		struggle
	new		regime		armed
	name(s)		current		suburbs
	nobody		old		successes

	summit		version		year(s)
	regional		African		next
	supporters		victims		six
	surface		victory		twenty
	system		overwhelming		
	political		violence		
	taboo		equal opportunity		
	huge		genocidal		
	task		vision		Proper nouns
	complex		Singapore-shaped		Aloys Habimana
	nearly impossible		voices		Belgium
	technocrats		critical		Brave New World
	ambitious		voters		Burundi
	well-trained		76%		Congo
	terms		votes		David Himbara
	of education		war		(President) Habyarimana
	of health		waves		Interahamwe
	tensions		of violence		Kagame
	ties		past		Kenya
	social		way(s)		Liberal Party
	time		many		Ndi Umunyarwanda
	last		whichever		Obote
	same		way out		Rwanda
	second		wedding		Rwandan Patriotic Front
	time bomb		another	(RPF)	
	trouble		where		Social Democratic Party
	truth		whims		Tanzania
	entire		of voters		The Great African War
	Tutsi(s)		whip		Uganda
	all		window dressing		
	individual		women		
	million		younger		
	one		words		

Number of documents analyzed: 2

Hell and healing: Rwanda twenty years on – By Kris Berwout (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/03/21/hell-and-healing-where-does-rwanda-stand-twenty-years-after-the-genocide-by-kris-berwouts/>)

Elections are too important for Rwandan government to leave to the whims of voters – By Kris Berwouts (<http://africanarguments.org/2013/09/18/elections-are-too-important-for-rwandan-government-to-leave-to-the-whims-of-voters-by-kris-berwouts/>)

Kris Berwouts has, over the last 25 years, worked for a number of different Belgian and international NGOs focused on building peace, reconciliation, security and democratic processes. Until 2012, he was the Director of EurAc, the network of European NGOs working for advocacy on Central Africa. He now works as an independent expert on Central Africa.

Magnus Taylor

	attempts		of argument		results
	any		lack		scholars
	backgrounds		latter		something
	different		majority		speakers
	believers		model		very critical
	case		'consensual'		very loyal
	conference		of politics		spectrum
	academic		narrative		(no) surprises
	contributions		official		system
	all		nature		of governance
	credit		of debate		post-genocide
	days		non-believers		thoughts
	couple		organizers		time
	strange		conference		visions
	debate		panel(s)		work
	international		different		academic
	Rwanda		same		earlier
	sterile		paper(s)		write-ups
	detail		various		of conferences
	environment		position		years
	fairly controlled		clear		many
	extent		positioning		
	some		presenters		
	fair game		most		
	gap		product		
	fundamental		necessary		
	generations		quality		
	government		high		
	RPF		reaction		
	Rwandan		intimidating		
	vigilant		regard		
	groups		regime		
	particular		RPF		
	history		research		
	explosive		empirical		
	political		researchers		
	kind		other		

Proper nouns

Anastase Shyaka
Kris Berwouts
Paul Kagame
RAS
Reyntjens
Rwanda
Rwanda Conference
SOAS

Number of documents analyzed: 1

Debating Rwanda under the RPF: gap between ‘believers’ and ‘unbelievers’ remains wide – By Magnus Taylor (<http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/08/debating-rwanda-under-the-rpf-gap-between-believers-and-unbelievers-remains-wide-by-magnus-taylor/>)

Magnus Taylor is Editor of African Arguments.

Richard Karugarama Lebero

	anger			state		economic
	approach			instruments		rebirth
	one-size-fit-all			intervention		resilience
	attacks			colonial		respect
	unprecedented			journey		unprecedented
	challenge			killing		rights
	citizens			extrajudicial		important
	colonialists			labels		other
	commentary			law		rule
	misleading			leadership		authoritarian
	(not)			bad		Rwandans
	unprecedented			lessons		ordinary
	commentators			level		scourge
	some			certain		security
	confidence			of development		society
	corruption			liberties		deeply divided
	country(-ies)			personal		spiral
	African			life		state
	first world			lives		material
	post-conflict			million		structures
	third world			one		government
	decades			loss		survey
	five			meaning		Gallup
	democracy			means		tensions
	dent			of labor		entrenched
	development			measures		ethnic
	economic			all		theme
	dignity			minimum		transformation
	disharmony			of 30%		trust
	social			narrative		Tutsi
	equality			opportunity		understanding
	gender			order		sufficient
	expense			pain		vacuum
	of human rights			parliament		wellbeing
	experience			part		social
	extent			any		women
	failure(s)			past		world
	governance			people		years
	systemic			ordinary		last
	freedom			period		twenty (20)
	of expression			colonial		
	genocide			place		
	1994			safest		
	horrors			point		
	of 1994			politics		
	human rights			ethnic		Rwanda
	Hutu			poll		modern
	identities			Gallup		
	ethnic			most recent		
	importance			poverty		
	improvement			practice		
	evident			privacy		
	institutions			prosperity		

Proper nouns

| Africa
 ||||| Rwanda
 || modern

Number of documents analyzed: 1

In Rwanda it is economic development that demonstrates government's respect for human rights – By Dr. Richard Karugarama Lebero (<http://africanarguments.org/2014/03/14/in-rwanda-it-is-economic-development-that-demonstrates-governments-respect-for-human-rights-by-dr-richard-karugarama-lebero/>)

Dr. Richard Karugarama Lebero (PhD) is an Investment/International Law Lawyer currently working in the Office of the President of Rwanda.

Annex II: Interview Transcripts

The full transcripts are not included in order to protect the confidentiality of the participants, as many are identifiable from details provided within their interviews. For access, a request must be submitted to the author:

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