Re-Framing the Slaughter: Remembering the Rwandan Genocide

Jordan C. Broutman

The College of Wooster, jbroutman13@gmail.com
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by

Jordan Broutman

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Supervised by

Ibra Sene

and

Gregory Shaya

Department of History

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I never felt any emotional attachment to the Rwandan genocide until I visited the Murambi, Ntarama, and Nyamata memorial sites in September 2011. I previously watched cinematic depictions such as Terry George’s *Hotel Rwanda* and read such accounts as Linda Melvern’s *A People Betrayed*, but neither caused me to physically shake the way I did after smelling the stench of decomposing bodies. This study builds upon that experience and my overall experience living in post-genocide Rwanda. My journey through Rwanda started in August 2011 through the School for International Training’s (SIT) seminar program “Post-Genocide Reconciliation and Peace Building.” I want to thank everyone from my semester abroad who either directly or indirectly made this project possible. I also express my gratitude to SIT for making that semester one of the best experiences of my life. Specifically, this project represents an end to an emotional journey shared by my eighteen SIT peers. In what I hope remains a life-long bond, thank you to Alexandra, Alicia, Betsy, Claire, Elise, Emily, Gretchen, Hadley, Hannah, Jeline, Laura, Leih, Kim, Kristina, Mackenzie, Mary, Nuki, and Thalie for putting up with me for fifteen weeks.

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Map courtesy of Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
INTRODUCTION

During the 100 days of bloodshed between April and July 1994, ordinary Hutu citizens killed between 500,000 to one million of their Tutsi neighbors in the Rwandan genocide.¹ The killings occurred in churches, homes, street roadblocks, and in the dense Rwandan bush. The killers did not discriminate between child and adult, or woman and man. Many perpetrators committed mass rape and sexual violence and tortured their victims before killing them. Many Tutsi tried to pay for a quick death by bullet in order to avoid being slowly tortured to death. As the murders took place the United States, the United Nations, and the rest of international community actively avoided deploying a sufficient intervention force to stop the murders. The sheer number of murders, the close proximity between victims and perpetrators, the intricate organization of the killings, and the international refusal to intervene makes the genocide one of the most infamous events of the twentieth century. The question remains: How do we understand it?

For many, the events of the 1994 Rwandan genocide were beyond human comprehension. For journalist Fergal Keane, the violence in the genocide represented an unexplainable evil.² Keane reported for the BBC during the genocide’s final weeks, and his writing reflects an individual traumatized by what he witnessed. Tutsi survivor Révérien Rurangwa argues similarly in his memoir that the actions of Hutu génocidaires are beyond intellectualization.³ Such accounts demonstrate the emotional trauma the violence held for witnesses and victims. But they also call for a distinction between using intellectual arguments to apologize for perpetrators’ actions and the need to look at why the genocide occurred. To

¹ The number of people who died during the genocide has been disputed. The number 800,000 is the generally accepted number, however, many scholars and organizations place that number higher and others lower. Alison
view the genocide as beyond comprehension risks what East African scholar Mahmood Mamdani describes as the pitfall of describing the genocide as an “anthropological oddity,” an ahistorical event, and a human cataclysm beyond explanation.  

For others, the genocide originated from a historical ethnic conflict between Hutu and Tutsi. The early European accounts and ethnographies pitted Hutu and Tutsi as inherent rivals. British explorers, European missionaries, and German administrators viewed Tutsi as a superior Semitic race that originated from Ethiopia to subjugate the Hutu negroid masses. The German colonial administration adopted this view that the political domination of Tutsi elites stemmed from an ancient cultural invasion from Ethiopia. Tutsi elites became longstanding members of the German and later Belgian colonial system, their political power rationalized by the colonial view of Tutsi superiority. An influential ethnographer of mid-twentieth century Rwanda, Jacques Maquet, compiled an entire study that assumed that Tutsi invaded from Ethiopia and possessed a different culture from Hutu. Despite speaking the same language and engaging in the same culture, the colonial distinction of Hutu and Tutsi as two separate races caused the West to view the genocide as ethnic violence. As the genocide transpired, the Western press diminished the violence as yet another example of African tribal violence. As put by Mahmood Mamdani, this perspective argues, “two tribes fight because they are different tribes!”

Others contest the tribalism perspective by pointing towards the legacy of colonial rule in contributing to the divisions in Rwandan society. Scholar Aimable Twagilimana emphasizes that the violence of the 1994 genocide emerged partly from the colonialists’ racial interpretation

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of Rwandan society. This perspective focuses heavily on the ways in which colonial rule established and reinforced the stereotypes, myths, and inequalities that made up genocide ideology. Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre co-founder James Smith argues that colonial rule magnified the small differences in Rwandan society. He writes, “The relative harmony that had existed between Hutu and Tutsi was soon eroded after the European colonists arrived.” Colonial rule racialized the “Hutu” and “Tutsi” identities, introduced the idea of foreign Tutsi origins, and established many racial stereotypes adopted by post-independence Hutu politics and genocide propaganda.

Another view argues that the genocide occurred as a result of a double genocide first committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). A rebel group composed of Tutsi exiles that fled from the violence of the early 1960s independence period, the RPF invaded Rwanda in October 1990. The invasion transpired into a four-year civil war between the Hutu government and RPF. Before the genocide, human rights violations occurred on both sides. Hutu citizens in the RPF-controlled north experienced atrocities and displacement at the hands of the RPF. As RPF victory became imminent, the genocide became an increasingly popular plan amongst Hutu leaders for maintaining power. But afterwards as the Hutu community suffered in exile, the genocide became conceptualized as a response to a double genocide explanation. Jason Stearns observed that many aid workers and local Zairian groups in the mid 1990s became influenced by revisionist ideas from within the Hutu community that the RPF and Habyarimana government killed equally in proportion and in method. East African scholar Gérard Prunier notes how the idea of a double genocide has become the mantra for genocide apologists within the former

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This does not dismiss the hundreds of thousands of Hutu who died during the refugee crisis from 1994 to 1999. Many Hutu succumbed to disease, infighting amongst the Interahamwe, and attacks from Congolese rebels. Additionally, many Hutu died during the Rwandan civil war, RPF revenge killings, and in RPF atrocities that occurred during the Rwandan invasion of Zaire. For many, their deaths became a way for rationalizing the genocide and to politically de-legitimize the new RPF government.

In the African and human rights scholarly community, recent efforts have been made to place the genocide and its aftermath within a more complicated political and historical context. Noted political scientist David Apter argues that the attention on the colonial era diminishes the African history that occurred before the arrival of Europeans. He writes, “Colonialism is without doubt a critical benchmark in African history. But it is also an interlude. To forget this is to dilute and diminish the importance of agency by and among Africans themselves.”

Apter’s idea of a much larger history, one that looks beyond colonialism as the only determinant, is an idea embraced by many recent studies. The works of distinguished Rwandan scholars Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, and Jan Vansina highlight the importance in the progression and re-imagination of pre-colonial history in understanding the Rwandan present. Other East African specialists such as Mahmood Mamdani, René Lemarchand, Gérard Prunier, and Filip Reyntjens emphasize that the Rwandan genocide must be contextualized...
amidst a larger East African regional crisis, one in which the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are political identities. Through refugee spillovers, silenced cases of mass atrocity, and guerilla rebel movements, they contextualize the genocide as the most terrifying episode in a larger history engulfing Burundi, present day Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. Scholars such as Daniela Kroslak and journalist Linda Melvern look at the failures within the international community in the complicity and support of the genocide. Following in the footsteps of these scholars, I place my independent study project as an attempt to look at several popular representations of the genocide in light of this greater regional perspective. In this independent study I will look at popular representations of the genocide in cases of official state-sponsored history, in cinematic depictions, and in protest accounts. I will show examples of positive efforts to remember and honor the victims of the 1994 Rwandan genocide while also pointing towards overshadowed and diminished accounts.

HISTORY, MEMORY, AND REMEMBRANCE

An extensive literature already exists concerning the theory of history, memory, and the nation. It is beyond my scope to provide a comprehensive review of this literature. But I will call to attention a selection of studies that have influenced my project. While not writing directly about Rwanda, their insights speak to a larger issue of memory’s relationship with history and politics. I will first attempt to shed some light on the broad concepts of memory and history.

Writing on French national identity, French historian Pierre Nora proposes that memory and history exist as two distinct entities. He defines memory as "a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present" while contrasting history as "a representation of the past." He writes that memory contains a sacred quality, while history exists as an intellectual and secular phenomenon. "Memory," writes Nora, “takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects; history binds itself strictly to temporal continuities, to progressions and to relations between things." Nora sees an overlap between the two in a history of memory model called lieux de mémoire, or sites of memory that preserve traces of the past inside their structures. Archives, anniversaries, monuments, textbooks, national rituals, memorials, or moments of silence all serve as examples of lieux de mémoire. In the French tradition, memory coupled with history to form the pillars of French national identity. Memory, much more than mere reflection, anchors the French past with the present at these sites and presents them for historical interpretation.

World War I historian Jay Winter complicates Nora’s analysis on memory. He criticizes the tendency to misuse the term “memory” as a way of generalizing the past. He promotes the term “remembrance,” arguing that the overly broad term “memory” lazily lumps the past, the personal, and the collective together. He particularly criticizes the misuse of the term “collective memory” as representing a national memory. He writes, “States do not remember; individuals do, in association with other people. If the term ‘collective memory’ has any meaning at all, it is the process through which different collectives, from groups of two to

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17 Ibid.
20 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century (Yale University Press, 2006), 3–4; hereafter cited as Remembering War.
groups in the thousands, engage in acts of remembrance together.\textsuperscript{21} He emphasizes that the memories of individuals build a greater collective community as opposed to a “collective memory” that builds the memories of individuals.

While Jay Winter criticizes the idea of a national memory, Benedict Anderson argues that nations are imagined communities.\textsuperscript{22} He argues that national communities form just as much out of the population’s imagination as they do out of economic and political relations. Writing on the cultural history of nationalism in the early 1980s, Anderson argues that nationalism acquired an “emotional legitimacy” over time that explains the sacrifices made by citizens for the “imagined” nation.\textsuperscript{23} But in order for this “imagined political community” and identity to form, the population often undergoes a state-sponsored process of forgetting or selective remembrance.\textsuperscript{24} Anderson, Nora, and Winter each grapple with the following question: How do we remember? Before analyzing genocide remembrance in Rwanda, I want to highlight three concepts: the power of national forgetting, the memory of violence, and the complexities in national mourning.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Winter, \textit{Remembering War}, 4.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 3-7.
\item \textsuperscript{24} An exploration in the history of nationalism exists outside my study’s scope, but I point out that the re-building of Rwanda comes in conjunction with a larger global obsession with the nation-state. African scholars such as Emmanuel Katongole highlight the pitfalls to this acceptance of the nation-state as the default political model for Africa. Katongole looks at recent African political history in showcasing the sociopolitical consequences to the blind acceptance of nation-state omnipresence. Katongole argues that the current incarnation of the nation-state in Africa promotes the colonial model of promoting African inferiority, exploitation, and negligence to the population. He argues that all structures and relations in modern African society tie back to this nation-state narrative. He advocates for Christian theology as an alternative. See Emmanuel Katongole, \textit{The Sacrifice of Africa: A Political Theology for Africa} (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010).
\end{itemize}
NATIONAL FORGETTING

The phenomenon of forgetting and national amnesia further complicates memory and history. Anderson highlights Ernest Renan’s famous insight on the role of forgetting in French national memory. Renan states in his publication *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*, “The essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common and also have forgotten many things in common…Every French citizen must forget the Saint-Bartholomew Day’s Massacre.”\(^{25}\) Renan argues that French citizens must forget the divisive memories of past atrocities (in this case the Saint-Bartholomew massacre in which Roman Catholics massacred French Huguenots in Paris) in order for a national French identity to form. This argument flattens memory into a clash between events that unite the citizenry and those whose memories divide and embitter. For Renan, forgetting is necessary for the building of the nation.

While national amnesia can gloss over dark episodes of the national past in favor of unity, such forgetting can come at a cost. Henry Rousso critiques the French amnesia over the popularity of and widespread collaboration in crimes committed by the Vichy government in his book *The Vichy Syndrome*. He argues that the French people repressed the memories of collaboration with Vichy (in particular the mass deportation of French Jews) in the decades following the war in favor of a unifying resistance myth.\(^{26}\) President Charles de Gaulle promoted the myth of resistance partly out of national unity, but the myth’s popularity came into question in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a new generation politically challenged the Gaullists.\(^{27}\)


\(^{27}\) Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, 10.
Tony Judt makes a similar point to Rousso, pointing to widespread post-war exaggeration of Nazi resistance in German-occupied territories. But he also writes of a cultural recall of memory that may emerge in later generations due to corresponding shifts in politics and culture. Judt writes how the Jewish suffering and the Jewish voice did not fit into the socio-economic rebuilding plan for Europe. Therefore, the post-war rebuild silenced the memory of Jewish victimization as the Marshall Plan took place. But as time passed and Israel rose to power, newer generations refocused on Holocaust memory. Only at that point did newer European generations begin to historicize the collective responsibility of Europeans in the Holocaust. While the nation may silence memories of victimization, those memories remain in the hearts and minds of individual citizens. As political regimes or cultural norms change, memories of victimization can re-emerge and acquire a new meaning.

REMEMBERING VIOLENCE

Forgetting—in the name of national unity or economic reconstruction—can impede the process of taking responsibility for past atrocities. But the remembering of victimization also carries the risk of preserving and re-politicizing old hatreds. Susan Sontag explores the ways in which the recall of traumatic memory can impede reconciliation. She writes, “But history gives contradictory signals about the value of remembering in the much longer span of a collective history…too much remembering…embitters. To make peace is to forget. To reconcile, it is necessary that memory be faulty and limited.” The forgetting of certain details becomes a way around continuing cycles of violence. Sontag argues that remembering may foster further divisions and that perhaps only a “limited” memory can peacefully bring people together. Her point brings up a larger philosophical question of the value of remembering, especially in cases

of atrocity and victimization. In an interview with the Boston Review, author Phillip Gourevitch goes even farther by arguing that there exists a “fetishization of memory.” He argues that post-conflict societies feel an unquestioned “injunction to remember” beginning with the memorial culture surrounding the Holocaust. He states:

And it [the duty to remember] also comes from…the belief that anything that is not exposed and addressed and dealt with is festering and going to come back to destroy you. This is obviously not true. Memory is not such a cure-all. On the contrary, many of the great political crimes of recent history were committed in large part in the name of memory…Memories can hold you back, they can be a terrible burden, even an illness.30

Gourevitch and Sontag call for a questioning of the duty to remember, not to diminish the suffering or the feelings of empathy for victims, but to acknowledge memory’s role in continuing cycles of violence.

The memory of violence and victimization sat at the forefront of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. In her analysis of post-socialist dead body politics, Katherine Verdery illustrates the national politicization of victimhood in the midst of a nationalist awakening in the former Yugoslavia. The reburial of the Serbian Prince Lazar in 1987, killed by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo (in 1348) coincided with the rise of Serbian nationalism in the breakup of communist Yugoslavia. Lazar’s bones traveled to monasteries that coincided with the borders claimed by the Serbs for their proposed state.31 Similarly, the discovery of Yugoslav political massacre sites from World War II, in this ethno-nationalist awakening, led to a re-framing of the World War II massacres from a conflict between fascist and communist factions to massacres perpetrated between ethnic groups.32 The feelings of ethno-nationalist victimization, ethnic nationalization of dead bodies, and the discovery of mass graves pushed the Croat, Serb, and

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Bosnian ethnic-nationalist groups towards conflict in 1991. The role that memory played in the politicization of old Yugoslav atrocities, conflicts, and massacres should reinforce the fine line between feeling empathy for victims and survivors and the constructing of a national identity through traumatic memory. In the case of Serbian nationalism, the memory of past victimization played a role in the formation and acceptance of extreme Serbian nationalism.

The memory of victimization can also create dual meanings for opposing political groups. Ruth Linn and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev argue that the Holocaust exists as a dual symbol of victimization in Palestinian and Israeli communities. For many Israelis, the Holocaust politically represents the Zionist justification for Israel’s right to exist. In the Palestinian community, the Holocaust represents Palestinian subjugation due to its legitimation of the Israeli state. James Young illustrates the interplay between these two interpretations at the Warsaw Uprising monument. The memory of Jewish martyrdom in the Holocaust becomes a politically symbolic legitimization of Zionism. But the site also holds meaning to the Palestinian community. The Palestinian Liberation Organization laid a wreath at the monument in 1983, viewing the monument’s depiction of the Jewish uprising against the Nazis as parallel to their own uprising against the Zionist state. In both interpretations, the memory of the Warsaw Uprising reinforced later political narratives.

MOURNING

The mourning of victimization exists in many contexts. For the outside observer mourning can be an act of moral empathy. Whether through listening to a survivor, watching a

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testimonial video, or reading a memoir, the confirmation and acknowledgment of victimhood holds value in mourning atrocities. Jay Winter claims that an audience must engage in the act of listening out of morality. He writes, “the act of stopping our own speech acts to allow those who have faced what Kant termed radical evil to tell their tale.”\textsuperscript{36} The survivors may put their memory into writing in order to take control of that period of their life, or to define it for their descendants.\textsuperscript{37} In Primo Levi’s poem that opens his memoir \textit{Survival in Auschwitz}, he aggressively confronts his viewer on the duty to remember. He memorably writes, “Never forget that this has happened. Remember these words. Engrave them in your hearts, when at home or in the streets, when lying down, when getting up. Repeat them to your children. Or may your houses be destroyed, may illness strike you down, may your offspring turn their faces from you.”\textsuperscript{38} He argues that forgetting the suffering of the victim signifies an act of immorality. The memory must transfer from author to reader, who must learn, respect, and preserve its lessons for the sake of mankind.

When mourning collectively as a nation, analyzing remembrance entirely through the lens of the nation risks an overly top-down approach. There exists something extremely personal in remembrance, particularly through the mourning of the dead. In a context such as Rwanda where mass atrocity (whether perpetrated, witnessed, or experienced) became a collective experience, remembrance also possesses a deeply personal meaning. Jay Winter’s study on World War I commemoration serves as an example of the interplay between collective, national, and personal mourning. During the mourning process of commemoration after World War I, families embarked on intensive investigations to find their lost sons. Even if it meant only a


\textsuperscript{37} Winter, “The Performance of the Past.” 19.

\textsuperscript{38} Primo Levi, \textit{Survival In Auschwitz} (Simon and Schuster, 1995), 11–12.
trace, such as the place of death, the truth about how a loved one died outweighed not knowing anything at all.\textsuperscript{39} Even finding the faintest trace or relic of a loved one held a significant place in the mourning process. Families preserved photographs, signatures, and clothes of their lost sons long after the war’s conclusion.\textsuperscript{40} After the war, survivors, friends, and family of the dead went on pilgrimages to war cemeteries and other sites of memory in France. A kinship bond emerged between survivors and victims’ families as people faced the emptiness of loss together.\textsuperscript{41} While Winter acknowledges how over time these sites of memory (whether a memorial, monument, or cemetery) became “reinvested” with a collective and often nationalist meaning, they originally stood as personal sites of mourning.\textsuperscript{42} While the ritual of visiting the dead through the sites could certainly devastate the mourner, it could also help them move on. Commemoration became a ritual in which the mourner came to terms with his or her grief instead of dwelling in “melancholia.”\textsuperscript{43} Despite the emphasis on national forgetting, remembering, and mourning, remembering mass atrocities contains a personal characteristic that transcends politics and nationalism.

RWANDAN GENOCIDE REMEMBRANCE

The Rwandan state exists in the midst of a political conflict that has produced dual memories of victimization. While the genocidal violence inflicted on Tutsi should be commemorated as uniquely cruel and inhumane, many Hutu experienced similar acts of genocide in Burundi. Both innocent and guilty Hutu died during the Rwandan civil war, the

\textsuperscript{40} Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 51.
\textsuperscript{41} Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 52–53.
\textsuperscript{42} Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 94.
\textsuperscript{43} Winter, \textit{Sites of Memory}, 98.
genocide, and the refugee crisis in Zaire. While a different type of violence than the elaborate genocide plan concocted by the Hutu génocidaires, the RPF has been accused as the perpetrators for many revenge crimes, refugee massacres, and acts of political violence. As the RPF embarks on re-building the state, Tutsi victims, Tutsi returnees, Hutu perpetrators, and Hutu victims face the challenge of living side by side with these memories of victimization and perpetration. During this transition, the RPF established a dominant and official history for the purpose of rebuilding the nation-state. Specifically, the official history legitimizes the RPF as an exceptional political liberation movement but also simultaneously silences cases of RPF crimes. While the narrative rightfully mourns Tutsi victimization, it leaves out many memories of Hutu victimization. Additionally, the complex regional crisis has been simplified in the state’s official discourse, and the personal mourning of victims must co-exist with the state’s larger goals of rebuilding the nation-state. We see a silencing of memory within the official history at such sites as the Kigali Memorial Centre exhibition, where Hutu subjugation during colonialism is de-emphasized. This official discourse dominates international representation in film, where dramatizations of the genocide reflect the RPF’s official discourse. The interplay of competing narratives exists at memorial sites where Tutsi survivors’ push to preserve proof of (and mourn) their loss contrasts with Hutu memories of victimization from RPF crimes. We also see dissent from this official view in memoir, where many Tutsi and Hutu victims live in exile because they hold memories or political beliefs that do not correspond with the RPF’s vision. In this independent study, I argue that the complex history of Rwanda has been compressed at many major memorial sites and official representations into one state-sponsored way of interpreting the Rwandan past. While these competing views have in many cases been silenced, they continue to reside under the surface in the Rwandan consciousness.

I center my project around three points that will support my argument. First, Rwanda contains a complex history that transcends simple ethnic or colonial explanations. While
ethnicity and colonial rule play a large role in Rwandan history and mythmaking, they coincide with a Rwandan history featuring complex patronage relationships, elitist dynasties, social inequalities, and regional violence. In chapter one, I consult the vast scholarly literature to give the genocide a historical context.

Second, Rwandan regimes have demonstrated a trend of re-interpreting history for political survival and legitimacy. The current Rwandan government follows this tradition through its official interpretation on Rwandan history. In chapter two, I look at the presentation of this official history at the Kigali Memorial Centre, Rwanda’s main memorial museum of the genocide. In chapter three, I analyze two Western-directed feature films produced in Rwanda—Alrick Brown’s *Kinyarwanda* (2011) and Lee Isaac Chung’s *Munyurangabo* (2009)—that reflect the official narrative’s depiction of the genocide and its vision for the future.

Third, the official history competes with a wide range of dissenting views and provides an outlet for international guilt. In chapter four, I look at the preservation of memory at Rwandan genocide memorial sites. Preservation creates an experience for the international community to learn about the massacres, express shame for not intervening, and to mourn the dead. But the memorial is also an example of official history. Through the preservation of bones and artifacts, the Rwandan memorial sits at a competing intersection between international accountability, personal mourning, perpetrator memory, and Hutu victimization. In chapter five, I will look at four memoirs from Rwandan exiles whose memory of victimization competes with the RPF liberation narrative. This chapter will review the following: Tutsi survivor memory in Révérien Rurangwa’s *Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda*, Hutu rescuer memory in Paul Rusesabagina’s *An Ordinary Man*, post-genocide Tutsi political memory in Joseph Sebarenzi’s *God Sleeps in Rwanda*, and post-genocide Hutu refugee memory in Marie-Béatrice Umutesi’s
Surviving the Slaughter. For my conclusion, I will briefly reassess the current Rwandan reconciliation process in light of competing Rwandan victimization narratives and the alternative South African Truth and Reconciliation model.
CHAPTER ONE
A COMPLICATED HISTORY:
AN OVERVIEW OF RWANDA FROM THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT

In Jean Hatzfield’s collection of Hutu perpetrator testimonies, Joseph-Désiré Bitoto recalled, "I was raised in the fear that the mwami—the Tutsi kings—and their commanders might return; that was because of all the stories old folks told us at home about unpaid labor and other humiliations of that sad period for us, and because of the awful things happening to our brothers in Burundi." For Bitoto, the memory of Tutsi hegemony (while not something he directly experienced) played a large role in why he joined the killers. In Rwanda, memories of victimization and oppression have been handed down from generation to generation in all communities. While these memories hold a sensitive place in Rwandan hearts, Bitoto’s testimony shows how easily they can be used to generate and rationalize violence. For any Rwandan scholar, questioning where these memories originated from historically becomes the key for locating the genocide in a larger historical narrative.

In this chapter, I argue that the genocide occurred in the context of a long-term political, regional, and historical conflict. This chapter will not provide a comprehensive analysis of Rwandan history. Instead, I will point to several key elements in the vast Rwandan scholarly literature that challenges the idea that the genocide emerged from ethnic determinism. One, inequalities in the pre-colonial society occurred independent to colonialism. Two, Hutu and Tutsi are political identities that colonialism racialized and established as its base for indirect colonial rule. Three, the 1959 Hutu revolution occurred due to an emerging Hutu political consciousness that arose out of exploitive labor atrocities that benefited the Belgians and a small

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1 Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak (Picador, 2006), 166.
group of Tutsi elites. Four, the Hutu regimes that followed employed a racist depiction of the Tutsi in order to unite a politically and regionally divided country. Five, the unresolved refugee crisis from independence contributed to a larger regional refugee crisis that eventually produced the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the 1980s. Six, victim and perpetrator are fluid labels between Hutu and Tutsi, as the RPF committed war crimes in tandem with Hutu genocide crimes.

This chapter does not intend to diminish the suffering and victimization of the Tutsi during the 1994 genocide. For 100 days the Hutu—whether ordinary citizens, soldiers, or extremists—participated in one of the most cruel, diabolical, and infamous massacres in human history. Somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsi died. Contextualizing these killing with cases of Hutu victimization does not excuse the actions of Hutu perpetrators; nor does the mentioning of RPF crimes against humanity. The purpose of this chapter is not to argue which group has suffered more historically. Rather, this chapter seeks to contextual the political and historical complexities that surround the genocide.

INEQUALITIES IN PRE-COLONIAL RWANDA

While the violence in Rwanda over the past century may appear to be ethnic in nature, most Rwandan scholars express caution in explaining Rwandan history through the lens of ethnic determinism. The historical myth argues that that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are rival tribes, stemming from an ancient Tutsi conquest of Hutu land. The idea of inherent ethnic opposition as the root cause to the Rwandan conflict assumes that Rwandan culture and identity exists in the

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same state today as it did centuries ago. By looking at regional, dynastic, and client-patron histories, leading Rwandan scholars provide a much richer and more complicated contextualization to the violence of the twentieth century. Pre-colonial Rwanda contained both large kingdoms and local communities, mobile and heterogeneous populations, and distinct religious rituals and traditions. Contrary to the colonial historiography and the Hutu Power propaganda machine, there exists little evidence of an ancient Tutsi invasion from Ethiopia. Pottery evidence suggests that cultural differences originated from different ecological zones, which opposes the idea that high culture transferred during the invasion of a superior racial group. Contrary to this interpretation of long-term racial subordination, the social hierarchy and cultural diversity in pre-colonial Rwanda revolved around several systems of clientship that connected rich lineage groups, clans, and clients. While ethnicity existed, a plethora of other factors explain the social friction observed by German colonizers at the end of the nineteenth century.

Pre-colonial Rwanda consisted of co-existing agricultural and herding economies. While cattle herding is often imagined as an exclusively Tutsi practice, linguistic evidence shows that many different cultural groups possessed pastoral skills and owned cattle. While cattle became associated with ruling dynasties and elite groups for their social value, cattle in the region predated the more contemporary dynasties. This conflicts with the idea that a racially Tutsi group introduced cattle via migration. Herders and farmers originally coordinated with each other on how to use the land, but tensions arose as the population increased and available land

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3 David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 263–266.
4 While “micro-migrations” played a large role in human settlement, the “iron age” technological advances in the region from around the year 1000 A.D. probably occurred via an internal social and economic revolution. This conflicts with the colonial interpretation that “civilization” arrived to the region from the outside. See Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books ; Distributed by MIT Press, 2003), 44–58.
6 David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 268.
7 Ibid.
decreased in the eighteenth century. The use of local political units to dictate land tenure became a necessity in order to deal with these tensions. Local political structures based on ancestry, lineage, and clanship directed the early political structure as opposed to ethnicity or race.

In such regions as Kinyaga in southwest Rwanda, ancestral lineage served as the central political unit. Lineage heads managed disputes and controlled land distribution. Catherine Newbury’s study on client relationships in the Kinyaga area illustrates that before the late 18th century, clientelism worked more toward forging alliances between elites than in subjugating the population. Social relationships such as umuheto, in which patrons of chiefs protected the lineage cattle in exchange for payments and services, were often mutually beneficial. Good relations with the patron meant protection of the lineage’s cattle in the patron’s fields, significant considering chiefs and raiders often stole rival herds. Over time, the umuheto relationship became de-emphasized in favor of the ubuhake contract, which provided a similar system for linking individuals to a patron. Ubuhake consisted of a cattle transfer from patron to client in exchange for services. While ubuhake contracts often benefited both parties, these early client-patron systems in peripheral territories occurred in a context of limited central government. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Tutsi-elite controlled Nyiginya kingdom of central Rwanda expanded and began to centralize these relationships in a more coercive and exploitive manner.

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14 Ibid.
This shift towards a more coercive social climate comes in context with the central Nyiginya kingdom’s expansion beginning in the eighteenth century. In particular, the kingdom was unique in that it established a permanent military, and thereby engaged in brutal military campaigns.\textsuperscript{15} In this political system, the \textit{mwami} (king) held absolute spiritual and political power.\textsuperscript{16} But conflict between the Nyiginya king and aristocratic elites from 1796 to 1802 led to a shift in political power from the king to the aristocracy. The aristocracy outgrew the number of land tenure posts, thereby fostering internal rivalries that the weakened king could not overcome.\textsuperscript{17} The empowered aristocracy embarked on a period of power grabbing during which subjects became increasingly impoverished as the aristocracy and military enclosed land, took control over cattle herds, and demanded tributes.\textsuperscript{18} This period of dynastic rivalry at the end of the eighteenth century also led to conflict in the east over resources for cattle and caused massive immigration to the central and western territories.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Mwami} Kigeri Rwabugiri ruled from the 1860s to his death in 1895 and oversaw a period of intense state violence in pre-colonial Rwandan society. A full analysis of Rwabugiri’s reign is beyond the scope of this study.\textsuperscript{20} A few highlights from his rule include matricide, patricide, the extermination of rival elites, and several bloody war campaigns.\textsuperscript{21} While there may be an inclination to characterize \textit{mwami} Rwabugiri’s reign as the work of a conniving

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item The Nyiginya dynasty is accepted as the traditional Rwandan kingdom. Yet the kingdom only really emerged in the seventeenth century. David Newbury emphasizes that the modern Rwandan state formed from many dynastic units and therefore he cautions against analysis that reduces history to one royal family. He argues that state formation was not linear, but rather contested between many political units. See David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 293. For an analysis of oral history pertaining to the rise of the Nyiginya kingdom, see Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}.
\item Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 37-39.
\item Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 163.
\item Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 163; Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 40–42.
\item David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 297–298.
\item For an in depth analysis of the regime’s influence on Rwandan society, see Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}; Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}.
\item David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 307–310.
\end{enumerate}
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absolute monarch, scholars point out that his behavior came very much in response to growing animosities and political competition from within the aristocracy.\(^{22}\) War existed historically as an “instrument of power” for the Nyiginya kingdom because of its role in bringing new wealth to elites and kings, but Rwabugiri’s atrocities in the late nineteenth century also represented insecurity over the power of elite factions in the royal court.\(^{23}\) The empowerment of the aristocracy at the turn of the eighteenth century evolved into deep elitist factions between rival clans and lineages. This led to an increasingly unstable political environment that factored in Rwabugiri’s violent atrocities in order to maintain power.\(^{24}\)

Even more significantly, state centralization accelerated under the reign of \textit{mwami} Rwabugiri who re-shaped internal social dynamics and created tensions in peripheral communities. As the state centralized, Rwabugiri’s power overran local ritual powers and subjugated a large portion of the population (predominantly Hutu land owners) into a “serf-like” tribute system.\(^{25}\) This centralization produced more exploitive client-patron systems that carried over into the later colonial period. A forced labor system called \textit{ubureetwa} emerged in which clients made a payment of services to the centralized chief for the use of land.\(^{26}\) The power balance between patron and client changed from a more elitist exchange to a system where poor

\(^{22}\) Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 181; David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 310.

\(^{23}\) Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 182–195.

\(^{24}\) This instability of royal power in relation to aristocratic power manifested itself after Rwabugiri’s death in 1895 after his son Rutarindwa succeeded him. Rutarindwa lost power during the 1896 Runcunshu coup led by the rival Abega clan (which held aristocratic power throughout the nineteenth century). The Abega clan placed another Rwabugiri son named Musinga on the thrown. European colonialism arrived during this internal conflict amongst the court. See Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 310. For a detailed study on the role of Queen Kanjogera in the coups, see Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges., \textit{Defeat Is the Only Bad News Rwanda Under Musinga, 1896 -1931}, Africa and the Diaspora : History, Politics, Culture (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).


\(^{26}\) Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 111.
families received loaned goods (such as cattle) from rich patrons in exchange for labor. This system became a tool for the central authority in breaking up and dividing the power of local lineages. Ubuhake also became a more exploitative system as it gradually changed from a voluntary relationship to a more coercive one. The centralization of land tenure contracts after the 1870s further disrupted the local land distribution system, embodying the ways in which late nineteenth century Rwandan violence constituted more of a "center versus periphery affair" as opposed to ethnic rivalry. As a result of increasingly coercive ubuhake practices, peripheral liberation movements emerged from local communities against centralized Tutsi elites, land became centralized, and the ubureetwa practice became exclusively used to contest local (often Hutu) lineages. At this point, the term Tutsi became increasingly associated with centralized elites. Farmers and lineage heads that revolted were labeled Hutu, but they did not contain the collective Hutu political identity and consciousness exhibited by the later Hutu Power movement of the twentieth century.

By the dawn of the colonial state, Rwandan society contained major inequalities and social tensions that originated from historical and political processes independent from the colonists. Internal divisions occurred at the top of royal society, in the contested relationship between central and peripheral communities, and in the internal dynamics of local communities. While Rwabugiri attacked Hutu lineages and local Hutu chiefs both militarily and politically, he did the same with Tutsi elites. An ethnic explanation to the violence shortchanges the complicated political divisions that arose at the end of the nineteenth century. Contrary to the

31 Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom*, 135–139.
modern conceptualization of pre-colonial Rwanda as a harmonious nation-state, late pre-colonial Rwanda was a violent and tense society.\footnote{Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom , 197–201.}

COLONIALISM AND THE RACIALIZATION OF “HUTU” AND “TUTSI”

“Hutu” and “Tutsi”—as terms—contain within themselves long politicized histories. From a simple outsider perspective, “Tutsi” have historically been classified as upper class cattle herders and “Hutu” as a more lower class farming peasantry. But scholars of the pre-colonial period note the role social origins and regionalism play in complicating the terms. While in the modern day many associate all Tutsi with cattle herding, Jan Vansina argues that the term “Tutsi” probably meant a social elite amongst seventeenth century cattle herders.\footnote{Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom , 37.} A similar simplified interpretation associates “Hutu” exclusively with farming. But this interpretation disregards the fact that historically many Tutsi farmed and many Hutu owned cattle.\footnote{Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 53.} The term “Hutu” most probably constituted a “transethnic identity” that referred to subjects of the pre-colonial Rwandan state.\footnote{Mamdani also notes that while Tutsi may have been an ethnic identity, the role of intermarriage made it basically trans ethnic as well. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 74.} Socio-economically, Hutu who gained wealth and political power could achieve Tutsi status, illustrating a social fluidity between the terms that lasted into the colonial period.\footnote{Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 12; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 75.} At the same time, the existence of many rich Hutu lineages and principalities in addition to poor “petit Tutsi” refute the binary of Hutu as poor and Tutsi as rich.\footnote{This further illustrates the political power of the terms in relation to proximity to the elite. While the terms certainly held socio-economic value, this comes in relation to the historical political processes. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 74–75; Fujii, Killing Neighbors, 58; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 21; David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 272–273; Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom , 36–37; Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 10–12.} Hutu and Tutsi lived within the same culture, spoke the same language, and lived side by side.
During the period of Nyiginya state expansion, “Tutsi” and “Hutu” gradually transformed from social identities to political identities. Specifically, “Tutsi” became associated with close proximity to royal court while “Hutu” became associated as an inferior identity. Catherine Newbury emphasizes that while the terms as social identities depended on many different factors including birth, wealth, cattle, and social ties, the political purposes of the identities depended on those in power.38 East African scholar Mahmood Mamdani echoes this assertion by emphasizing the misconception of the terms as ethnic or tribal identities. He argues that first and foremost, the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are not cultural identities, but political identities.39 By Rwabugiri’s reign, the terms became associated with levels of power as the mwami expanded the state and appointed chiefs to formerly autonomous regions.40 Patron-client relationships between Tutsi and Hutu became exclusionary (to Hutu disadvantage), increasing social tensions.41 Tutsi identity became more politically advantageous than Hutu identity as Rwabugiri eliminated the spiritual powers of Hutu abiru court ritualists, imposed ubureetwa exclusively against Hutu, and broke up Hutu lineages.42

The political transformation of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” developed in response to the colonial interpretation of Rwandan society. In particular, the European Hamitic interpretation of Rwandan society and its subsequent racialization of Rwandan society presented drastically different historical pictures. In 1863, British geographical explorer John Hanning Speke published his account of exploring the Great Lakes region in search of the Nile River’s source. Speke viewed the common "agricultural aborigines" that tilled the land as a distinct racial group

from a richer herding class that controlled cattle.\textsuperscript{43} He argued that the pastoral Tutsi chiefs were invaders from long ago who descended from Abyssinia [Ethiopia] and ruled based on racial superiority.\textsuperscript{44} This marked the beginning of the European interpretation of Rwandan society based on race. Speke's observations on origins and migrations come from a Victorian mindset that coupled race, culture, and history.\textsuperscript{45} In this framework, the Europeans interpreted the Tutsi as Semitic descendants of Ham, the cursed son of the biblical figure Noah.\textsuperscript{46} Instead of conceptualizing pre-colonial Rwandan society’s complex clan and lineage structures, Speke and the Europeans emphasized “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as racial opposites.\textsuperscript{47} This racialization made “Hutu” an indigenous identity and “Tutsi” an alien identity, which added (but did not create) another important element to the political relationship between “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” The Hamitic hypothesis became the genesis of the historical propaganda generated by the Hutu propaganda machine of the early 1990s.

The Hamitic myth also developed deep physical and racial stereotypes of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as Europeans settled in Rwanda at the turn of the twentieth century. The Germans claimed the territory of modern-day Rwanda at the 1885 Berlin conference and nine years later arrived to inform \textit{mwami} Rwabugiri that his kingdom was now under German rule. Count Gustav von Götzen, one of the first German explorers in the area, used Speke’s observations of migrations and origins as the basis for his expedition.\textsuperscript{48} German missionaries echoed Speke and

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\item[44] Speke, \textit{Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile}, 137.
\item[45] David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda,” 273.
\item[46] In the Old Testament Ham is exiled to Africa after laughing at his father Noah’s nakedness. European society commonly believed that Africans descended from Ham and therefore carried the curse of Ham that made them racially inferior. The Europeans viewed the Tutsi as a racial group with Semitic physical characteristics that explained why many Tutsi held positions of power. This contrasted with the Hutu farmers who the Europeans characterized as the “common Negro.” See Aimable Twagilimana, \textit{The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide} (University Press of America, 2003), 43–48.
\item[47] The hypothesis of a historical Tutsi invasion further symbolized a European prejudice that equated power in “civilized” native African kingdoms as an external import from a more Caucasian civilization.
\item[48] Chrétien, \textit{The Great Lakes of Africa}, 71.
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other explorers’ racial interpretation of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” in their early ethnographies. Missionary Louis de Lacler, for instance, wrote of the Tutsi, “Their supremacy is not to be contested. What does it rely on? Three elements: the first [is] racial…their physical superiority: they are tall and imposing people…the second is economic: they are magnates whose richness is constituted by herds of cattle…the third is political: they are men born for command.”49 He characterized the Tutsi as encapsulating the European definitions of physical beauty, wealth, and intellect. His description of the Hutu, on the other hand, mirrored European racism of the “Negroid” people. He writes, “[The Hutu have an] average height of 1.67 meters; very dark skin coloring and curliness of hair…flat nose and thick lips…ethnologically and morally sedentary; taste and skills for agriculture…simplicity of manners, sociability and joviality.”50 The first colonizers conceptualized Hutu as simple, morally inferior, short, unfit to lead, and embodying racist black stereotypes. In seeking the origins of the Tutsi genocide, many scholars have looked to the policies of the colonial period that reflected racist European black stereotypes.51 But taking into the account internal divisions that developed in Rwanda in the late nineteenth century, it is clear that colonialism contributed and heightened internal political (as opposed to racial) divisions that already existed in Rwandan society. The colonial racialization of Rwandan society cemented “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as opposing political identities and made them “more volatile than ever in history.”52

The Germans never sought to build a colonial state in Rwanda that matched the Belgian Congo, which managed to enslave much of the Congolese population and extract resources at a

49 Quoted from Josias Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide (Humanity Books, 2003), 117–118.
50 Semujanga, Origins of Rwandan Genocide, 121.
52 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 74–75.
high rate. Instead, the German colonial state delegated power to Tutsi chiefs. This continued the expansion of centralized Tutsi chiefs over Hutu principalities and local communities. While colonial authorities did coerce many Tutsi elites to serve as colonial chiefs, these chiefs acted in their own interest by expanding power through breaking up local ruling systems in order to attain regional authority. Additionally, this group of elite Tutsi held their own internal factions as the colonial state emerged upon a backdrop of a courtly power struggle between elite Tutsi factions and lineages.

When the Belgians took over in 1919 as part of the postwar settlement, discrimination against Hutu increased. The Belgian colonial system heightened tensions by favoring Tutsi in political appointments, the educational system, and the job sector. On a local level, the colonial system eradicated mutually beneficial patron-client relationships like umuheto and consolidated all hill chiefs into one provincial chief of Tutsi identity. As certain positions often went to Hutu, this contested the local political power of many Hutu elites. Quota systems limited the number of Hutu who could enroll in higher education. This inequality left Hutu out of the Western jobs generated by the colonial state in the political and economic sectors. Finally, starting in the 1920s, the Belgians began to use Rwanda as an economic and labor resource for supporting the

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55 This supports the critique that merely labeling chief expansion as “Tutsi” expansion simplifies the historical period along racial lines. Stronger analyses note that conflict existed between lineage factions in the court, central authority and local authority, and socio-economic classes. See Catharine Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 53–54; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 24–29.
56 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 27.
57 At the Astrida College, the demographics of enrollment reflected this exclusion. In 1932, the college enrolled forty-five Tutsi and nine Hutu. In 1945, the enrollment stood at 46 Tutsi and 3 Hutu. In 1959 the college consisted of 279 Tutsi and 143 Hutu. Similar quota figures existed throughout the colonial education system. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 33.
58 Ibid.
Belgian Congo. The pre-colonial practice of _ubureetwa_ became institutionalized into a coercive practice called _corvée_. This forced labor system applied only to Hutu males and became a way for the state to exploit direct labor for revenue-driven projects. Tutsi chiefs became labor recruiters for the colonial enterprise and in doing so, chief-rule became increasingly oppressive. It became more desirable for Hutu to work directly for the Belgians in mining projects in the Congo than for Tutsi chiefs.

**THE RISE OF THE HUTU REPUBLIC**

The period from the 1920s to the 1950s reveal much larger political and social consequences than colonial exploitation. For one, _corvée_ illustrated the role of political identity in colonial society. The central authorities exempted the impoverished _petit Tutsi_, though alike with Hutu neighbors in wealth and culture, from _corvée_. Even though a small group of Tutsi elites ran the political system, the lower _petit Tutsi_ still benefited socially and politically despite living in identical conditions to impoverished Hutu. Two, the Belgian colonial authority eradicated the social mobility of Hutu and Tutsi identities in the early 1930s. The 1933-1934 colonial census classified Rwandans who owned ten or more cows as Tutsi and those who owned less than ten as Hutu. Tutsi could no longer legally fall socially to Hutu status and Hutu could no longer legally rise to Tutsi status. This political difference coupled with the racial

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63 Mahmood Mamdani emphasizes that the legal exemption of the petit Tutsi from forced labor attests to Tutsi political privilege. See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 98–101.
64 Mamdani also notes that the cattle population at the time does not match up to the census numbers of Hutu and Tutsi. Since many of the _petit Tutsi_ owned less than ten cows, he argues that the “ten-cow rule” constituted only one approach to identifying Tutsi legally. Other approaches included data contributed by the church, physical racial measurements, and genealogy. It is also important to note that during this time period the colonial authorities began the practice of issuing ethnic identity cards. See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 98-99.
distinction froze Hutu and Tutsi as legal identities. Three, awareness of Tutsi privilege (in particular the exemption of petit Tutsi from corvée) stirred a political consciousness in rural Hutu communities. “Hutu” became a collective political identity. Exploited and constantly reminded of their “racial” inferiority, a culture of hatred toward Tutsi emerged in the Hutu community. This rising political consciousness reached its peak in the scramble for political power in the late 1950s.

Inequalities persisted even after reforms in the late 1940s and early 1950s abolished the practices of ubuhake and ubureetwa. Despite these changes, Hutu still found themselves in an unfavorable land distribution system that made them dependent on Tutsi chiefs for access to land for cattle grazing and farming. These inequalities heightened anger at individual chiefs and against Tutsi as a collective identity. Tutsi chiefs still held power over land distribution, pasturage, educational opportunities, and wealth. But when the Tutsi monarchy called for independence in the 1950s, Belgian colonial authorities became dissatisfied with the Tutsi monarchy and gradually moved to developing a Hutu political movement. The Catholic Church followed suit in rallying behind Hutu liberation movements. After years of supporting Tutsi, the Catholic Church in the 1950s sympathized with the Hutu community’s struggle

67 Prunier argues that the Hamitic invasion theory grouped all Tutsi (including the poor petit Tutsi) into one collective group instead of directing anger only at top elites. This held politico-legal realities as all Tutsi were exempt from corvée. He also argues that within the Tutsi community a feeling of racial superiority emerged, even from those Tutsi who did not benefit directly. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 38-39.
70 The Belgian began to view the Tutsi monarchy as traditionally backward. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 50.
against an oppressive Tutsi elite.\textsuperscript{71} Forming an education system with a Hutu quota, the Church educated many future Hutu intellectuals and political figures such as the first Rwandan President Grégoire Kayibanda.

The Hutu community finally developed a coherent political voice as Hutu political parties such as Kayibanda’s extremist PARMEHUTU party and the more moderate APROSOMA party emerged in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{72} While one might look at these parties as reflecting a shift in Belgian and church political allegiance, ultimately these Hutu political movements achieved popularity because of the collective political consciousness that linked rural Hutu with centralized Hutu intelligentsia. The anger from rural Hutu masses fueled the national Hutu leadership, not visa versa.\textsuperscript{73} Anti-Tutsi sentiment in the new Hutu political movements served as a rallying point for synthesizing that anger into a more unified Hutu community.\textsuperscript{74}

In response to unequal representation in the government,\textsuperscript{75} Hutu leaders released the Hutu Manifesto in 1957. The Manifesto argued that the Tutsi held a social monopoly over the Hutu and Twa communities and pushed for economic, legal, and political reforms. But at the same time, the Hutu Manifesto explained the political monopoly in terms of race, specifically invoking the idea of an ancient Tutsi invasion.\textsuperscript{76} Tensions exploded in November 1959 when members of the Tutsi monarchist party UNAR attacked Hutu sub-chief Dominique Mbonyumutwa. Hutu mobs then went from house to house attacking Tutsi authorities and

\textsuperscript{72} PARMEHUTU called for the end of Tutsi rule prior to independence. The Tutsi monarchist party UNAR called for immediate independence. This partly explains the more pronounced shift in Belgian allegiances to the Hutu movement between 1957-1960. Belgian military leaders in Rwanda, and Col. Guy Logiest in particular, sided with Hutu political wing. See Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 16–17.
\textsuperscript{73} Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 181.
\textsuperscript{74} Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 213.
\textsuperscript{75} Hutu leaders feared that the High Council would become the independent state’s legislative body. See Catharine Newbury, \textit{The Cohesion of Oppression}, 191.
\textsuperscript{76} Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis}, 45–46.
homes. Tutsi counter-attacked and Belgian authorities responded by implementing military rule. They replaced Tutsi chiefs with Hutu, and as Tutsi persecution increased, thousands of Tutsi fled into exile in neighboring countries. PARMEHUTU won the 1960 communal elections and the 1961 electoral elections over UNAR. Sponsored and supported by Col. Logiest and the Belgian authorities, Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU gained control of Rwanda from the monarchist Tutsi well before formal independence on July 1, 1962.

The power changeover resulted in an adaptation of the Hamitic hypothesis as a source of political legitimization. During colonialism, Tutsi elites utilized the Hamitic hypothesis to their advantage by legitimating their rule through the myth of superior racial origins from Ethiopia. In the aftermath of independence, the myth of superior racial origins legitimated Hutu political power by invoking the threat of Tutsi invasion as a historical precedent. This reframing legitimatized the emerging Hutu Power movement under Kayibanda. An extremist ideology bent on preserving a Bantu state and suppressing Tutsi political power, Mahmood Mamdani argues that Hutu power formed in order to defend (as opposed to acquiring) power since Hutu elites already controlled the state after the 1959 revolution. While a legitimate liberation movement, Mamdani argues that the Hutu Power also tragically preserved the fear of Tutsi privilege and failed to reform the colonial legacy by preserving the native-Hutu/invader-Tutsi binary.

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77 Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 17.
78 The number of refugees reached 130,000 by 1963. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 51.
79 Jean-Pierre Chrétien writes, “The newly redefined Rwandese Tutsi aristocracy was particularly sensitive to the 'scientific' guarantees which could be found for its 'nobility.' Even today, among exiled Tutsi, the myth of Egyptian origins still survives in the heads of people who are now its victims after having thought they were its beneficiaries.” See Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi” in J.L. Amselle and E. M’Bokolo (eds), *Au coeur de l’ethnie*, (Paris: La Découverte, 1986), 146 as cited in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 36.
Independence and Hutu rule came in relation to a larger regional crisis. Tutsi exiles, called *Inyenzi* by Hutu extremists, carried out attacks and raids from across borders that held grave consequences for the Tutsi still living in Rwanda. An attack from Burundi in late 1963 led to a government-induced pogrom that eliminated Tutsi politicians who remained in Rwanda and claimed the lives of 10,000 Tutsi. These massacres strengthened Kayibanda’s personal rule by unifying the Hutu political collective against a common Tutsi enemy. In an example of the larger refugee crisis, the Hutu republic’s political victory affected neighboring Burundi’s internal politics. Tutsi refugees poured into Burundi, bringing with them a politicized ethnic animosity against Burundian Hutu. They subsequently supported and helped legitimate the repressive Burundian government, controlled by a Tutsi military clique. Burundi in many ways became an inverted Rwanda, one in which Hutu Burundians experienced similar political oppression as Rwandan Tutsi.

Historical manipulation and the regional refugee crisis between Rwanda and Burundi reached a violent pinnacle between 1972 and 1973. In Burundi, a failed Hutu coup against the Tutsi military state led to thousands of Tutsi deaths and a government response culminating in a “selective genocide” of anywhere from 200,000 to 300,000 Hutu. Kayibanda used the genocide and refugee spillover to his political advantage and used regional power to operate his

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82 *Inyenzi* is the Kinyarwanda word for cockroach. During the genocide the word became a derogatory term for Tutsi.
83 Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 20–21.
86 These crimes have yet to be tried in an international court. Thousands of refugees flowed into Rwanda and barely any of the Hutu intelligentsia or elite who stayed in Burundi survived. Many of these refugees stayed in Rwanda and joined the *Interahamwe* in 1994. While it does not excuse their crimes against humanity, the role these memories played in the 1994 genocide complicates the perceived Hutu perpetrator identity in a manner that popular representations fail to represent. René Lemarchand, a leading specialist of Rwanda and Burundi, makes these points in describing the historical amnesia surrounding the 1972 Burundi genocide and its regional connection in several works. See Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*, 69-78. Also, *Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory*, edited by René Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
regime, giving most army positions to southern Hutu. 87 The Kayibanda regime used anti-Tutsi sentiment to unify the Hutu community against a common enemy and to deflect regional and internal tensions. 88 In 1973, Kayibanda oversaw a policy of racial purification in which many Tutsi lost their jobs and Hutu mobs terrorized Tutsi by burning down houses and engaging in other acts of violence. But despite these acts of terror, the regional divide between northern and southern Hutu political communities still cost Kayibanda power in the summer of 1973. 89

FROM HABYARIMANA TO GENOCIDE

Northern army chief Juvénal Habyarimana led the 1973 coup and brought an uneasy peace between Hutu and Tutsi. Violence against Tutsi generally ceased and life became stable for the vast majority of Tutsi. 90 But institutional inequalities against Tutsi remained in business, education, and politics. Under Habyarimana, Rwanda became a model for development through a wide range of international partnerships. But like Kayibanda, Habyarimana ruled by personal rule, patronage, and regional favoritism. A northern Hutu clique consisting of Habyarimana, his wife Agathe’s family, and other northern Hutu elites (known as the Akazu, or “little house”) continued the political precedence of elitist and regional rule. Rwanda remained a single-party state that tightly controlled the populace. 91 By the end of the 1980s, the drop in the price of coffee internationally made Rwanda economically vulnerable. Coupled with France’s 1990 La Baule conference (which forced multi-partyism in all Francophone nations), the Habyarimana regime began to lose power.

87 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 24.
89 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 61.
90 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 75–76.
91 Melvern, A People Betrayed, 28.
The unresolved refugee crisis from the 1959 Hutu revolution resulted in the development of Tutsi armed militias, culminating in the highly trained Rwandan Patriotic Army. In Uganda, the diaspora met persecution and violence from the local population due to their oversaturation of land and jobs.\textsuperscript{92} Many refugees made it out of the region, receiving education in Europe and North America. Organizations emerged that pushed for the right of Tutsi to return to Rwanda, also opposing the Habyarimana regime. The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU) became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. The RPF recruited military soldiers mostly from the Ugandan diaspora into its army contingent the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Young future RPF leaders played a large role in Yoweri Museveni’s rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) that defeated President Milton Obote in 1986 after a bloody war in the Luwero Triangle. Paul Kagame (who fled to Uganda on the back of his mother in 1959) became the NRA’s deputy head of military intelligence and his close friend Fred Rwigyema became deputy army commander in chief.\textsuperscript{93} Members of the RPF held high positions in the NRA military and the Ugandan government, which produced tensions with indigenous members of the NRA.\textsuperscript{94} At the same time, land disputes between indigenous ranchers and Rwandan squatters led to a prohibition of Rwandan squatters from owning land or holding political positions in Uganda.\textsuperscript{95} These internal dynamics in Uganda were a factor in the RPF guerilla invasion of Rwanda on

\textsuperscript{92} In 1982, the local Ugandan population brutally attacked Rwandan refugee communities. In 1986, Rwanda announced that it would not allow any more refugees to return. The UNHCR estimated that by 1990, the diaspora population reached 900,000 in the Great Lakes region. See Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 30.
\textsuperscript{93} Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 32.
\textsuperscript{94} Despite the Rwandan presence in the NRA, Ugandan citizenship was not granted to Rwandan refugees. An agreement on naturalizing Rwandan refugees existed in 1986, but the deal fell through as animosity emerged against Rwandan refugees. See Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, 174.
\textsuperscript{95} Mamdani provides in-depth analysis of the land dispute and the political divide between Ugandan and Rwandan officials in the NRA. He argues that the RPF invasion actually originated from internal political and land disputes in Uganda. While there is a tendency to romanticize the RPF invasion as a right to return, Mamdani argues that the RPF leadership also felt that they had worn out their welcome in Uganda. Invasion became the best possible political opportunity. See Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, 172–184.
October 1, 1990, thereby underlining the ways in which the regional citizenship crisis contributed to the RPA invasion.

The RPA invasion triggered a four-year civil war that ended in the 1994 genocide. The reason why ordinary Hutu became killers has been the research question of many studies. While a definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this research, the interpretation of history during the period illustrates the ways in which Hutu extremists made the idea of genocide popular. This is significant because the genocide became the brainchild of Akazu elite as they reacted to the possibility of power sharing (or even defeat) with the RPF. In addition, the forced introduction of multi-partyism in 1990 caused the Habyarimana regime to gradually lose power. Rival Hutu moderate groups, such as the Parti Liberal and the Republican and Democratic Movement (MDR), posed a direct challenge to Habyarimana’s National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND). As acts of internal violence emerged throughout Rwanda, the Habyarimana regime impeded the democratization process by accusing the RPF as the culprits. Cultivating a culture of fear and planning the genocide constituted a last-ditch effort from the departing elitist regime to maintain power.

But even more than the Habyarimana regime’s vilification of the RPF, one must not discount the structural effects of the civil war. The war contributed to the Rwandan population’s embrace of genocide ideology in powerful ways: the loss of agricultural production, the destruction of infrastructure, the displacement of the northern population, the influx of Burundian Hutu refugees from the 1993 Tutsi coup, and a shortage of food. Even more significant, the Hutu rebel groups in Burundi lost the war, thereby bringing disgrace to the

97 Prunier dates the formation to this solution of killing the Tutsi and moderate Hutu population back to 1992. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 168–169. Mamdani defined the génocidaire specifically as factions of Hutu Power who believed that genocide amounted to the most effective way for maintaining power. See Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 216.
98 Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 144.
population. During this context of defeat and fear in the early 1990s, the Rwandan government began arming and training tens of thousands of civilian youth into militia units called the *Interahamwe* (“those who work together”). The violent ideology oriented itself around the idea of a unified Hutu nation-state, creating an “us versus them” effect that pitted ordinary Hutu in a collective struggle against both Tutsi and Hutu political opponents. Simultaneously, Hutu extremist elites made mass purchases of machetes and created death lists of Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians.

As the war raged on, the government and Hutu Power ideologues circulated propaganda that heightened tensions and racial awareness. Racist political cartoons and other propaganda circulated depicted Tutsi as bloodthirsty Hamitic invaders. Among these propaganda publications included the infamous *Hutu Ten Commandments* (see Appendix A). The newly launched radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) spewed hatred through racist presenters, interviews, and songs later decrying the locations of Tutsi they wanted killed. Historian Ferdinand Nahimana, a leading figure in the Hutu Power movement, grounded Hutu Power ideology historically by vehemently arguing that the Tutsi invaded from Ethiopia.

In 1993, Léon Mugesera delivered a speech calling for the Tutsi to be sent back to Ethiopia via

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102 UNAMIR commander describes the preparation of the genocide as “an invisible force.” While Hutu extremists concealed the genocide’s preparation from much of the international community, Dallaire famously found several of the imported arms caches from an informant. But the UN refused to grant him the go ahead to confiscate them. The genocide was prepared over many months through training, location of targets, propaganda, weapons purchases, and weapons distribution. See Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Reprint (Da Capo Press, 2004).

the Nyarbarongo River. Finally, the assassination of Hutu Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye and subsequent violence led to another refugee spillover of Burundian Hutu. Over 200,000 Burundian Hutu lived in southern Rwandan refugee camps by April 1994. They became enthusiastic Interahamwe recruits and carried with them hated memories of Tutsi autocracy. A cease-fire brokered by the UN between the RPF and Rwandan government in August 1993 resulted in the Arusha Peace Accords, which outlined a process of integrating RPA and FAR (Rwandan) military forces as well as holding multiparty elections. Kangura published literature arguing that the Arusha peace talks constituted a Tutsi conspiracy. A UN peacekeeping force led by Canadian General Roméo Dallaire attempted to implement the accords from September 1993 to April 1994.

On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira died after their plane was shot down returning from Arusha. While to this day it remains a point of contention as to which side shot down the plane, radio RTLM reported the RPA as responsible and relayed the signal to commence the killings. The propaganda coupled the Tutsi collectively with the RPA. Colloquially, to kill a Tutsi meant killing an RPA informant. Death squads, armed with lists of ordinary Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians, went from house to house...

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108 It is beyond the scope of my study to provide an in-depth analysis to the international community’s involvement and non-involvement in Rwanda. Several accounts do exist on the subject, in particular memoirs from those at the center of the UN’s operations. UNAMIR commanding officer General Roméo Dallaire provides an insider’s account to the UNAMIR mission that depicts the international community’s complicity in the Rwandan genocide and attempts to bring accountability to its failure. His memoir articulates in great detail how his mission reported many warning signs of genocide to the UN. This included reports from an Interahamwe informant named Jean-Pierre who revealed the location of weapons caches, the construction of Tutsi death lists, and the training of death squads. But the UN failed to respond to this (and many other) reports compiled by UNAMIR. His main point revolves around the fact that the UN and Western powers knew genocide was taking place and refused to intervene when they had the chance. Dallaire argues that the genocide could have been prevented, and proposes a re-evaluation of the international community’s intentions in their peacekeeping missions. See Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*. For an insider’s account on the bureaucratic failure from within the UN during the genocide, see Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Cornell Univ Pr, 2003).
house to kill. Extremist Hutu Power leaders took over the country and eradicated nearly all moderate Hutu political opponents. These killings demonstrate a political agency to the massacres, as killing moderate Hutu illustrated an unwillingness of the MRND to compromise and share power. Many Tutsi sought sanctuary in churches, which had worked in previous pogroms. This time, Hutu politicians encouraged Tutsi to seek sanctuary, only to send in the Interahamwe death squads to butcher them by the thousands. On April 9, 1994, France sent in a force that evacuated all foreign expatriates. While the French soldiers followed strict orders not to evacuate any Rwandans, France did evacuate members of the Akazu. \(^{109}\) Despite frequent reports from United Nations peacekeeping force UNAMIR, the international community did not intervene. For one hundred days, anywhere from 500,000 to one million Tutsi were hunted down and killed at the hands of Interahamwe militias and the FAR. \(^{110}\)

WAR IN THE CONGO, RPA WAR CRIMES, AND THE POST-GENOCIDE STATE

As the génocidaires attempted to cleanse the Rwandan population of Tutsi, the RPF continued to engage the FAR in warfare. As the RPA neared victory, radio RTLM induced panic in its listeners. Hutu began fleeing into Zaire in the hundreds of thousands. When the RPF finally captured Kigali, over 2.1 million Hutu had fled to Zaire. The refugees settled in camps organized by Hutu extremists bent on rebuilding for a counter-attack. \(^{111}\) Ex-FAR soldiers began raiding northwest Rwanda, catching Rwandan citizens in Ruhengeri in the crossfire of massacres

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\(^{109}\) Melvern, A People Betrayed, 161–163.

\(^{110}\) Alison Des Forges provides perhaps the most comprehensive account of the genocide. Derived from all Human Rights Watch reports, she writes in great detail of the ways in which the genocide was organized by Hutu politicians and carried out by ordinary Hutu citizens. She also writes of RPF war crimes during the Rwandan civil war and afterwards in Zaire. See Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

committed by both the RPF and the ex-FAR units.\textsuperscript{112} A cholera epidemic erupted in refugee camps in Goma, killing thousands of Hutu refugees.\textsuperscript{113} Hutu extremists found sympathy from Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko, who helped re-arm Hutu factions.\textsuperscript{114} The RPF attacked the refugee camps in 1996 to alleviate the FAR threat, also training \textit{Banyamulenge} (Congolese Tutsi) in Eastern Zaire, leading to their rebellion, and later supporting the rebel AFDL military group in Eastern Zaire during the first Congolese War.\textsuperscript{115} The RPA cleared refugee camps in 1996 and organized a coalition including Uganda and Zaire that deposed the Mobutu regime and brought AFDL leader Laurent Kabila to power in 1997.\textsuperscript{116} But the clearing of refugee camps came at a high human cost as thousands of Hutu refugees (many of them women and children) were killed by the RPA and its proxies, were forcefully repatriated, or were forced to flee deep into the Congolese interior.\textsuperscript{117}

The Congolese War that proceeded incorporated nearly every country in the region and a plethora of international actors. After Laurent Kabila severed relations with Rwanda and Uganda, the two countries launched another proxy war to oust Kabila from power. This complicated power play of shifting alliances, invasions, and assassinations is beyond the scope of my study, but has been the subject of many comprehensive journalist and scholarly studies.

\textsuperscript{112} Prunier, \textit{Africa’s World War}, 26.
\textsuperscript{113} The epidemic caught the attention of the West as hundreds of journalists descended onto Eastern Zaire. President Clinton soon announced a massive U.S. aid project to alleviate the epidemic. See Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 243–245.
\textsuperscript{114} Prunier, \textit{Africa’s World War}, 27–28.
\textsuperscript{115} The \textit{Banyamulenge} rebellion occurred from a wide range of inequalities, hostilities, and memories specific to the Kivu area. While it is beyond the scope of my study to fully analyze these complexities, I point out that the \textit{Banyamulenge} are of the same ethno-linguistic group as the the \textit{Banyarwanda}. Many \textit{Interahamwe} attacked \textit{Banyamulenge} Tutsi in Zaire. Scholars such as Prunier, Mamdani, and Filip Reyntjens provide in-depth analysis of internal dynamics from within the Kivu region and Zaire entire. See Prunier, \textit{Africa’s World War}; Filip Reyntjens, \textit{The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006}, 1st paperback ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10–22; hereafter cited as \textit{The Great African War}; Mamdani, \textit{When Victims Become Killers}, 234–263.
\textsuperscript{116} Reyntjens, \textit{The Great African War}, 8.
\textsuperscript{117} Marie Béatrice Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter the Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire}, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).
accounts.118 For the purposes of this study, I want to point out elements from the Congolese crisis that point to Rwanda’s involvement in the larger regional crisis. One, the Rwandan genocide caused a Hutu refugee spillover that de-stabilized Eastern Zaire, leading major African powers to prey on the country. The violent aftermath brought forth a regional coalition that ousted Mobutu from power. Rwanda and Uganda became leading actors in the instability of Eastern Congo region. The refugee crisis also illustrated a larger citizenship crisis in the region in which refugee spillovers fed a continuous cycle of violence (which we can still see today with the 2012 M23 rebellion in Eastern Congo). Two, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe cross-border attacks (that have continued to this day) from Eastern Congo demonstrate that the political power play continued past the July 4, 1994 liberation. While the RPF-controlled government officially claims to be building a nation of unity, their political control stems from a crisis in which a large portion of their population and diaspora views them as not politically legitimate.119 And three, RPF war crimes during the civil war, genocide, post-genocide period, and in the Congo created a memory of Hutu victimization that the RPF suppresses both within its borders and in the international community.120

The last point brings forth one of the prevailing debates in analyzing Rwandan genocide memory: how does one remember the RPF? While it is true that the RPF stopped the genocide, this does not place their decisions made before, during, and after the genocide above scrutiny. For one, the RPF chose a military strategy during the genocide that was aimed at military victory

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119 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 4.  
120 This created the popular Hutu conceptualization of the genocide as a “double genocide.” Many Hutu ideologues latched onto this idea to rationalize the actions of génocidaires. But it also attacks the RPF’s political legitimacy. On the other end, RPF ideologues attempt to suppress their war crimes partly for this very reason. There exists an extensive literature on this subject. See Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late 20th Century, African Studies Series 102 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-8; Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 105–106; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; Prunier, Africa’s World War, 8-9 and 31.
as opposed to Tutsi rescue. They pressured the FAR-controlled central and western regions of Rwanda by advancing slowly through weaker regions in east and south. While a brilliant military strategy that presented the best chance of a total victory, thousands of Tutsi died during the slow maneuver. Roméo Dallaire argues that Paul Kagame and the RPF leadership share some blame because their military operations probably sacrificed many Tutsi lives for a total victory. This does not discount the stories of RPF soldiers bringing safety to Tutsi in hiding or the fact that many soldiers had family members killed during the genocide. To make the claim that the RPF did not care about the Rwandan Tutsi is extreme. But the idea that the RPF fought a righteous war of attrition for the benefit of all Tutsi discounts the fact that the RPF’s first objective (as a political movement) involved attaining absolute power of the Rwandan state. While the RPA ended the genocide, they did so in a manner that prioritized a total military and political victory (a point they have covered up in present-day depictions of their liberation). In the larger political history of Rwanda, the RPF followed the example of previous elitist regimes that used the population as a tool to either maintain or acquire power.

In addition, the RPA committed war crimes during the civil war, genocide, and in the Congo that have been largely unprosecuted and ignored by the international community. Alison Des Forges devotes an entire section to unprosecuted RPA human rights abuses in Leave None to Tell the Story (2009). She compiles evidence that accuses RPA soldiers of pillaging, abducting, and killing Rwandan citizens in northeastern Rwanda from 1990-1993. During the genocide, several incidents were reported in which the RPF did not distinguish between

121 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 698-699.
122 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 515.
123 Gérard Prunier makes the claim that RPF viewed many Tutsi as MRND accomplices. He argues that during their massacres they did not distinguish between Hutu and Tutsi. While an extreme claim, the alienation of many Tutsi survivors after the genocide speaks to a de-coupling of the RPF narrative with the lived experiences of Tutsi survivors. See Prunier, Africa’s World War, 5 and 19.
125 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 701.
Interahamwe and civilians during attacks.\(^{126}\) The RPF organized public meetings in which Hutu citizens gathered expecting to hear a political speech or receive promised food. Instead, the soldiers killed the gathered community.\(^{127}\) While an UN-sanctioned (and initially RPF-supported) report by Robert Gersony reportedly estimated that the RPF killed between 25,000 to 45,000 people between April and August 1994, the UN denied the report’s existence in 1996 (probably out of pressure from the RPF).\(^{128}\) While the RPF does not deny killing, they argue that they only killed Interahamwe and FAR soldiers. But massacres persisted after the genocide as well, including the April 22, 1995 Kibeho massacre in a southern Rwandan refugee camp, which left thousands of people unaccounted for, signifying an RPF cover up in which they slaughtered thousands of unarmed Hutu refugees.\(^{129}\) RPF crimes against humanity have been largely handled internally and have not been prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).\(^{130}\)

As RPF war crimes were largely ignored and tolerated by the international community, the RPF formed a government that defined national unity as its mission. The “ideology of national unity” officially contained several key components: colonialism divided a harmonious pre-colonial past; moderate Hutu victimization during the genocide; and moderate Hutu politicians should be included in the government.\(^{131}\) But the recent official dubbing of the genocide as the “Genocide against the Tutsi” signifies an erasing of many Hutu experiences of suffering. While Hutu suffering at the hands of Hutu extremists is recognized, suffering from

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\(^{126}\) Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 704.

\(^{127}\) Human Rights Watch managed to take photos of the mass graves from a September 1994 massacre in the Gitarama prefecture. See Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 705–709. In October 2011, I had the opportunity to visit a refugee camp in Uganda. I talked to several Hutu refugees who told similar stories of being attacked at RPF community meetings.

\(^{128}\) Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 728–731.

\(^{129}\) Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, 40–42.


\(^{131}\) Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 693–697.
RPF atrocities are not. By ignoring the thousands of Rwandans who were killed or assassinated by the RPF, countless studies highlight contradictions to the government’s official ideology in the internal dynamics of Rwandan politics. The government postponed democratic elections because of both the deep political divisions in the country and the RPF’s struggle to maintain control. When elections finally did take place, they took place in an open ballot context.¹³² Kagame won the 2003 presidential election by a landslide, prompting questions to the election’s legitimacy. Speech laws enacted from 2002 to 2008 with loosely defined terms such as “divisionism” and “genocide ideology” repressed pluralism and free speech.¹³³ During the past decade Rwanda has emerged as a star on the western development circuit, receiving enormous amounts of aid from the United States, Britain, and Germany.¹³⁴ But allegations of a “Tutsification” of Rwandan politics and civil society bring forth further questions as to whether or not Rwanda is really democratic. Evidence suggests that contemporary Rwanda is an elitist single-party military state posing as a democracy, much like the Habyarimana regime that preceded it.

CONCLUSION

The politicization of this history makes memory and remembrance both a personal and political act. Catharine Newbury criticizes the idea of a single Rwandan history, arguing rather that there exist competing histories.¹³⁵ Every regime and oppressed group in Rwandan history

¹³⁴ Filip Reyntjens argues that RPF uses a “genocide credit” in which guilt for not intervening in 1994 causes the west to look the other way at RPF crimes. See Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 28.
has re-interpreted and re-framed the pre-colonial and colonial histories in order to legitimize their policies and decisions.\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, each regime suppressed divergent political memories, meaning that certain atrocities are recognized while others are left out. This has held disastrous consequences.\textsuperscript{137} As argued by René Lemarchand, the memory of Hutu moderates and those killed by the RPF has been “thwarted” in the name of national unity, the terms “Victim” and “Perpetrator” have been unofficially cemented as a “Hutu-Tutsi” binary, and acknowledgement of victimization in both communities has been left out of the official narrative.\textsuperscript{138} A single linear view of Rwandan history emerged that conceptualized the pre-colonial society as harmonious, argued that colonialism made the genocide historically determined, and characterized the RPF as liberators toward a path of state-building and development.

By examining the scholarly literature on Rwandan history, we can better understand a more complicated story rather than simply a linear progression from colonialism to genocide. Research conducted on pre-colonial Rwanda dismisses the portrayal of a harmonious pre-colonial past. Jan Vansina argues that modern depictions of pre-colonial Rwanda project a “nostalgic utopia into the past, a past that contrasts with a painful present.”\textsuperscript{139} Tensions existed in the pre-colonial society that pre-dated colonialism. While colonialism introduced racist myths and racial inequalities into Rwandan society, its worse contribution involved the overall racialization of an already unequal society. This does not mean that the genocide was historically determined or random. Power plays between political elites, the exclusion of peripheral classes, the revising of historical relationships, and divergent political memories all centered around preserving power over the nation-state. This volatile political tradition coupled

\textsuperscript{136} Jefremovas, “Contested Identities,” 91.
\textsuperscript{137} For example, the suppression of Hutu victimization and memory in the 1972 Burundi genocide partly contributed to the violence amongst Burundian \textit{Interahamwe} recruits in 1994.
\textsuperscript{138} For an analysis on “thwarted” Rwandan memory, see Lemarchand, \textit{The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa}, 103.
\textsuperscript{139} Vansina, \textit{Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom}, 198–199. Also see Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” 12.
with an equally volatile regional situation in the early 1990s to set the stage for genocide. It took a regional crisis in which genocide occurred in Burundi, a refugee crisis that de-stabilized Ugandan internal politics, and a four-year civil war in order for genocide to become a political option for the survival of the Hutu elite. The connection between violence and the fear of losing power cannot be ignored, and it is therefore impossible to separate post-genocide Rwanda from the rest of Rwandan history. The 1994 genocide occurred in relation to a much larger power conflict that continues in the modern day.
CHAPTER TWO

THE RWandan Memorial Museum:

Official Discourse at the Kigali Genocide Memorial

The first exhibition panel at the Kigali Genocide Memorial (KGM) makes a poignant statement on Rwandan history. The panel reads, “We are one people. We speak one language. We have one history. In recent times, though, genocide has cast a dark shadow over our lives and torn us apart. This chapter is a bitter part of our lives, but one we must remember for those we lost, and for the sake of the future.”¹ Sensitive to the violence and the trauma of survivors, the museum does an admirable job in mourning Tutsi victims. It refuses to sanitize the atrocities, holds the international community accountable for its failings, and emphasizes the need for peace and reconciliation.²

But KGM also leaves out a wide range of divergent memories and competing histories. The audio-tour explicitly states that the first fighting between Hutu and Tutsi emerged in the late 1950s. The audio-tour states, “Those who speak of a century’s long feud are mistaken.”³ Instead, the museum designates the divisions in Rwandan society as beginning with colonialism. In refuting the myth of an ethnically determined struggle between Hutu and Tutsi, the narrative constricts many political and socio-economic factors independent of colonialism that contributed

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ⁱ Jenocide: Kigali Memorial Centre. (London: Aegis Trust, 2004), 8; hereafter cited as Kigali Memorial Centre.
² The Kigali city council began construction of the memorial in 1999, focusing on providing a place for burials. In 2001, Aegis Trust (founding organization of the British Holocaust museum) founders Stephen and James Smith started a partnership with the Kigali city council and raised $2 million for the memorial. KGM’s official mission is to remember the victims, to educate visitors, to document survivor testimony, and to provide support for survivors. The memorial opened in April 2004 as a museum, education center, documentation center, and as mass graves for victims in the Kigali area. All information derived from the following sources: my notes from the audio tour, wall text, and a visual guidebook that can be bought from the reception desk. I also paid a small fee to photograph the interior of the memorial (the garden grounds are free to visitors).
to divisions in Rwandan society. As many prominent Rwandan scholars have explained, this type of interpretation holds a distinct political perspective. The exhibition is successful in remembering Tutsi victimization and the challenges that plague Rwandan society as a result of the genocide. However, it represents an official view of Rwandan history that leaves little room for competing perspectives, and simplifies Rwandan history in its goal of unification and reconciliation.4

This chapter will establish two points. One, I will use the exhibition wall text, audio tour, and memorial gardens as representations of official Rwandan historical discourse. Two, I will point to several key transformations in the Rwandan historiography that Rwandan scholars identify as part of the RPF’s interpretation of the official history. For domestic and international audiences alike, the museum spreads a particular view of Rwandan history. As we shall see, it is less than the complete story.

THE KGM MEMORIAL GARDENS

Located on the memorial’s grounds, the audio tour begins by taking the visitor around to the various memorial gardens (see Appendix C for photographs). The gardens memorialize such memories as resistance, lost children, and women. Three of the gardens mirror the linear interpretation of Rwandan history, each garden defined by the audio tour as symbolizing a phase in Rwandan history. The three gardens connect via a stream of water meant to symbolize the passage of time. The first garden, called the “Garden of Unity,” symbolizes a harmonious pre-colonial past. The first garden’s circular shape is meant to represent the traditional Rwandan home. The water flows from the garden of unity towards a waterfall that zigzags downwards toward a second garden that rests below. Named the “Garden of Division,” the disjointed stream

4 It is beyond my scope to provide a full evaluation on the government’s influence in the historical construction at KGM. I limit my study to everything presented to the visitor via wall text, panels, the audio-tour, handouts, and published testimony accounts released by Aegis Trust.
and waterfall symbolize a break in the unified harmony caused by colonial rule. Around the fountain sits several statues of animals looking in different directions, meant to symbolize a loss of direction in Rwandan identity. The audio tour at this point addresses the visitor and challenges him or her to sit and reflect on personal responsibility. The final garden, named the “Garden of Reconciliation,” represents the rebuilding of Rwandan society through a return to the unified past. The rocks in the fountain’s centerpiece symbolize the rebuilding of a Rwandan society torn apart by genocide. The five plant holders look away from the center, representing neighboring countries looking out toward the world. One of the five statues, an elephant, holds a cell phone. The audio tour claims that the elephant represents the need for the region to inform the international community to what happened in 1994. In addition to an internal unification of Rwandan society, the garden calls for the international community to recognize its responsibility for the genocide.

The gardens reflect the re-imagining of Rwandan history in the post-genocide state. The memorial gardens place the genocide at the center of Rwandan history. As a metaphor for time, the stream literally flows to and from the garden of division. This interpretation of time makes the genocide a historically determined process descending from colonial rule. The gardens do not represent the regional and political processes that diverge with the linear historical progression. Political violence—whether violence directed specifically at Hutu during colonialism or Tutsi during the Hutu republic—becomes compressed into a collective suffering. The gardens also represent a modern interpretation of the pre-colonial past as a “nostalgic” harmony.5 The unified depiction of pre-colonial Rwanda de-emphasizes the inequalities and violence in pre-colonial society. Specifically, historical processes independent of colonialism (such as the nineteenth-century centralization of client-patron relationships) are forgotten. This

5 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom, Africa and the Diaspora (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 198–199.
interpretation suppresses the equally distorted history in the Hutu narrative of Tutsi hegemony
and invasion. The “one people” mantra challenges the myth of Tutsi invasion, but it also
suppresses the fact that oppression occurred during the pre-colonial era. The linear framing of
history serves as a state building tool. By conceptualizing Rwandan society as an inherently
unified society tampered by colonial rule, the gardens overlook the political dynamics of the
post-genocide state. The pre-colonial narrative reinforces the government’s “ideology of unity”
and development.\(^6\) History becomes an ideological construct meant to rebuild the state as
opposed to questioning internal politics.

THE KGM MUSEUM EXHIBITION

The museum exhibition mirrors the gardens’ linear historical model. The exhibition
consists of the following phases: “Before Genocide,” “Apocalypse,” “Resistance,” and
“Aftermath.” The heart of this exhibition (“Apocalypse” and “Resistance”) provides a powerful
account of the international community’s failings, the horrors experienced by Tutsi victims, and
the resistance of Hutu moderates and rescuers. But the bookends to the center (“Before
Genocide” and “Aftermath”) contain a linear view of where the genocide originated from and a
compressed view of the refugee situation in Zaire. The following section focuses on the three
silences and compressions involving these two exhibition phases: the utopian compression of the
pre-colonial era and the emphasis of colonial introduced divisions,

“Before Genocide” groups the pre-colonial era with the colonial era and emphasizes that
all Rwandans are indigenous to the land.\(^7\) The exhibition sums up the entire pre-colonial era:

“This has been our home for centuries. We are one people. We speak one language. We have


\(^7\) While Aegis Trust released a testimonial account *We Survived Genocide* that referenced mwami Rwabugiri’s
land reforms, the museum exhibition does not deviate from the utopian pre-colonial depiction. See *We
one history.” The exhibition places responsibility for social divisions exclusively with colonialism. The panel “Colonial Times” follows Mamdani’s argument that the colonial era racialized the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The panel argues that the beginning of social divisions was the colonial introduction of the 10-cow identity card system in the early 1930s. The panel states, “We had lived in peace for many centuries, but now the divide between us had begun.” This statement further establishes the utopian perspective. Additionally, the identity card system’s identification of Tutsi as owners of ten cows makes the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi a socio-economical one as opposed to a political distinction.

The exhibition does make reference to the political inequalities. One piece of wall text states, “An imposed identity began to determine an individual’s opportunity in Belgium’s reshaped Rwanda.” Another piece of wall text acknowledges that nearly all the political and privileged positions went to Tutsi. But all political responsibility falls towards the Catholic Church and colonial state. The Tutsi as a collective political unit providing political privilege to “petit Tutsi” becomes de-emphasized, represented instead holistically as the actions of a few Tutsi elites seeking social elevation. Finally, the suffering of the Hutu from corvée does not appear in the exhibition. Instead of emphasizing the political privilege of the Tutsi identity and the subjugation of the Hutu masses, Rwandan society is seen as descending collectively towards genocide.

“But before Genocide” also contextualizes the 1959 Hutu revolution as part of the “final solution.” The exhibition attributes the Hutu revolution as a colonial construct that uprooted the
Tutsi monarchy. This representation ignores the social tensions against the Tutsi elite that built up to the 1950s. Only at this point does the exhibition single out a group as victims. One panel begins, “In 1959 King Rudahigwa died. Thereafter, massacres of Tutsi were organised.” In addition to emphasizing Tutsi victimization and ignoring the Tutsi monarchist party UNAR, the panel links the early Hutu Power movement, the Kayibanda regime, the Habyarimana regime, and the génocidaires together. While all of these political groups imposed racism and violence against Tutsi (and provide dictatorial rule to the rest of the population), the presentation contrasts the entire Hutu political movement elites with a righteous interpretation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

The exhibition depicts the Tutsi exile in the early 1960s and the formation of the RPF as transcending the cycles of power imbedded in the rest of the Rwandan historiography. In this manner, the exhibition reflects a historical interpretation that exists today amongst Tutsi elites. By identifying the 1959 social revolution as the genocide’s beginning, the RPF experience in exile mixes with those Tutsi victimized in Rwanda through the genocide. Finally, this interpretation of the Tutsi exile characterizes the RPF as exceptional liberators as opposed to political elites continuing the overall power play.

The museum defines the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) as the liberators of the oppressed and the importers of democracy (as opposed to an army ousted from Uganda and bent on taking over the Rwandan state). The audio tour explains:

With the commencement of mass slaughter around the country, the RPA mobilized its troops. The soldiers of the RPA saved tens of thousands of people.

13 Kigali Memorial Centre, 11.
14 Ibid.
16 King, “Memory Controversies in Postgenocide Rwanda”, 296-298.
They ended the genocide, defeating the civil and military authorities that had planned and executed the nightmare of killing.\(^{17}\)

The RPF certainly liberated and saved thousands of Tutsi, but they also committed their fair share of controversies. The exhibition makes no mention of RPF crimes, the RPF’s opposition to a broader UNAMIR II mandate, or to the controversy over Kagame’s military strategies effectiveness in saving Tutsi lives.\(^{18}\) In addition, the exhibition glowingly describes the RPF as “intent on re-establishing equal rights and the rule of law, as well as the opportunity for refugees to return.”\(^{19}\) This description gives the RPF moral authority over Rwanda grounded in a right to return in order to spread democracy.\(^{20}\) This view understates the RPF’s history in Ugandan internal politics and its goal of political power. While the brunt of the exhibition focuses on the suffering of Tutsi victims, it also legitimizes the RPF as the liberators of Rwanda from divisionism. While the RPF certainly liberated many cases of oppressed Tutsi, the controversies surrounding their military actions contradict their claim to liberating the population from the genocide itself.

While the museum includes the victimization of moderate Hutu during the genocide, the absence of RPF war crimes simplifies the genocide into a black and white story. The content on the civil war focuses on the extremist propaganda, the Arusha Accords, the genocide planning, and the international community’s failure to recognize the ongoing genocide. All of these details create an intense, informative, and (for the foreigner) sobering learning experience. But the silences of the exhibit—in particular the de-emphasis on the civil war’s economic, regional, and human consequences—makes it impossible to fathom the political motives of the genocide.

\(^{17}\) Audio Guide for Kigali Memorial Centre.
\(^{19}\) Kigali Memorial Centre, 12.
As a regional crisis, both the “Before Genocide” and “Aftermath” sections understate the significance of regional Hutu victimization in Burundi and in the post-genocide refugee crisis in Zaire in the overall historiography. The museum does this in part by defining the regional refugee crisis as an exclusively Tutsi experience. The exhibition states, “The refugees were prevented from returning, despite many peaceful efforts to do so. Some then joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] who, on 1 October 1990, invaded Rwanda.”\(^{21}\) The Tutsi refugee crisis and the denial of a right of return becomes another legitimating factor to the RPF. The narrative also leaves out the 1972 genocide against Burundi Hutu, its effects on Rwandan politics, and the role of Burundi Hutu victimization in Rwanda’s internal extremist politics. For the post-genocide refugee crisis, “Aftermath” collectivizes the Hutu refugee population in Zaire as *génocidaires*. The exhibition includes photos of massacres from border incursions by ex-FAR and *Interahamwe*. Another caption criticizes the humanitarian aid agencies that flocked to Hutu refugee camps, ignoring Tutsi survivors in Rwanda. The panel also briefly illustrates the Hutu extremists’ coercive practices within the refugee camps. But the exhibition does not mention the RPF invasion in 1996 or the subsequent war in Zaire. Such an absence may serve a practical purpose in the museum’s structure, as its mission involves remembering genocide survivors as opposed to those who died in exile. The museum does an excellent job in illustrating the horrors experienced by Tutsi victims and challenges faced by survivors. But by including a limited view of the refugee crisis that does not acknowledge the victimization of innocent Hutu, KGM effectively removes the memory of Hutu refugees from the official discourse.

For the post-genocide period, the “Aftermath” section does a wonderful job in detailing the challenges in reconciliation, justice, AIDS, trauma, and remembering the dead with

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\(^{21}\) *Kigali Memorial Centre*, 12.
dignity. But by overlooking the historical inequalities faced by Hutu, the later Hutu extremist politics appear inherent to the Hutu collective. This does not diminish the scope of Hutu participation, but violence did occur from the RPF-controlled territories that triggered fears preserved over the years through memory and mythmaking. In this manner, one can make the argument that the narrative told in the museum presentation at KGM cements the otherwise historical fluidity between perpetrator and victim by silencing Hutu victimization.

THE RE-FRAMING OF RWANDAN HISTORY

The narrative presented at the Kigali Genocide Memorial comes on the heels of a larger political debate over Rwandan history. For decades scholars debated the origins of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa identity. Mahmood Mamdani describes these scholarly debates as the “search for origins” argument. These debates obsessed over the origins of the Tutsi. Other historians took a very different view that emphasized the unity of Rwandan society and discarded the notion of a Tutsi invasion. These two perspectives caused an ideological rupture further distorted by the post-independent Rwandan governments: (1) Tutsi existed in harmony with Hutu and Twa as a single people in a unified state, or (2) Tutsi (as a separate racial group) migrated and conquered pre-colonial Rwandan society. The Kayibanda and Habyarimana Hutu regimes pressed the latter history through a national discourse and propaganda that played a large role in fueling the genocide. Since the genocide, the RPF shifted the official historical discourse towards the former. The present-day official narrative compresses the political and historical complexities into three historical phases: (1) a unified pre-colonial Rwandan state, (2) a long-term descent to

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22 Kigali Memorial Centre, 36-40.
genocide brought on by colonialism, and (3) the liberation and rebuilding of Rwanda through the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

This historical interpretation must be viewed in the context of the RPF struggle to achieve internal political legitimacy post-genocide. The RPF re-constructed the official Rwandan historical narrative to emphasize national unity.\textsuperscript{25} They embarked on this carefully crafted construction of history through the use of commemoration, memorialization, education, justice, national symbols, and public addresses.\textsuperscript{26} Scholar Villia Jefremoves observed that immediately after the genocide the RPF placed the re-writing of history as a first priority.\textsuperscript{27} In 1995, the Rwandan government banned the teaching of history, citing the practice as contributing to the divisions in Rwandan society.\textsuperscript{28} Considering the ways in which history contributed to the spreading of extremist genocide ideology, such a re-evaluation of education becomes understandable. However, a “more truthful” official narrative came in a context of several controversial government measures. Starting in the 1990s the Rwandan government veered towards single-party rule by banning ethnicities, silencing political opponents with the controversial legal term “genocide ideology,” and overall restricting political liberties.\textsuperscript{29} As the divisions in Rwandan society made democracy a threat to national stability, unity became a political term synonymous with unchallenged RPF rule and the silencing of the Hutu political


\textsuperscript{26} Longman, “Memory and violence in post-genocide Rwanda,” 237-238.


The new narrative that emerged oriented Rwandan history around a few highly politicized events. The RPF used (and continues to use) media, diplomacy, and policy to construct an interpretation of the past, present, and future modeled after an ideal RPF-controlled state.

The official narrative conceptualizes pre-colonial Rwanda as a unified nation-state in which all identities lived in harmony. This new narrative compresses the pre-independence history into a linear transformation from a mythical pre-colonial harmony to a divisive colonial class system. The introduction of colonialism became the source (as opposed to the trigger) of the tensions in Rwandan society. In the preamble to the RPF constitution, for example, the text acknowledges the abuses of elites but never mentions Tutsi elites by name. The preamble states:

The Rwandan leadership was controlled by the colonial masters and worked for their gain instead of the benefit of the Rwandans…The colonial masters used the divide and rule principle in Rwanda, creating falsehoods claiming that Rwandans actually had different origins…all [falsehoods] aimed at dividing the people…[and which] ultimately destroyed their unity.

The constitution never directly mentions Hutu suffering in colonialism, only hinting at the inequalities in labor and education introduced by colonialism. Johan Pottier writes that this re-framed history highlights the ways in which, “Tutsi victimization in the genocide...is now being projected back in time: the good Tutsi elite at the royal court had been unable to continue with its benevolence, after the arrival of the colonialists.” Scholars such as Jan Vansina and Catharine Newbury refute the view that all Rwandans lived in a happy pre-colonial society.

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34 Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda*, 118.
under the rule of “wise kings.” This official history legitimizes a historical Tutsi monarchist rule, places ethnicity as the principle form of identity, and diminishes historical land inequalities, conflict between rival kingdoms, and patronage inequalities that existed independently from colonialism.

By conceptualizing the history as a descent toward genocide, the narrative diminishes the oppressive colonial context by which the Hutu political movement emerged. The Hutu regimes politically abused the memory of exploitation resulting from corvée, remembering the Tutsi collectively as oppressors bent on re-establishing hegemony. In response, the current official history suppresses the memory of corvée, instead emphasizing the colonial state’s reworking of the ubuhake cattle relationship as the genesis of social tensions. The early 1930s colonial state installed a policy of defining Tutsi as those Rwandans with ten cows. The current narrative makes this event a main point of evidence to the colonial installation of division, de-emphasizing the land and labor inequalities that already existed in Rwanda society. Colonialism becomes an interrupter of harmony and the beginning of a long-term path towards genocide.

By viewing the genocide as a long-term historical process, the official history incorporates all preceding historical events as part of a linear path. In particular, the Hutu social revolution becomes a stop on a descent towards genocide as opposed to a liberation movement. The present narrative re-frames the 1959 Hutu social revolution as an act by a few individuals corrupted by colonialism. The RPF constitution states, “The majority of those who

fought for Rwandan independence were Tutsi, so the Belgians began spreading the ideology that Tutsi were themselves foreigners and had originated from Abyssinia. They encouraged Hutu to destroy and burn their homes, kill them and send them into exile.” 41 While certainly not a false statement, this perspective shapes the Hutu revolution as a misguided colonial construct as opposed to a political partnership meant to oppose an elitist Tutsi political threat. To suggest that the injustices committed by the Tutsi elites towards the Hutu masses contributed to the Hutu social revolution does not apologize for the victimization of Tutsi that occurred from 1963 up to 1994. 42 Rather, such an acknowledgment illustrates that Hutu social revolution occurred because of political inequalities that oppressed Hutu for decades. While colonialism cemented these inequalities in the colonial administration, inequalities existed before colonialism.

Furthermore, Mahmood Mamdani argues that the contemporary narrative seeks to couple the entire Hutu political identity with the 1994 génocidaires. He makes a clear distinction between the two. Hutu power came in response to colonial Tutsi privilege, while génocidaire ideology came out of desperation to maintain political power at the end of the civil war. Hutu power looked for political supremacy, an undemocratic response but not necessarily synonymous with the “final solution” strategy embarked upon by the génocidaires. 43 To link the 1994 “the final solution” with the political ideology of the 1950s and 1960s makes the genocide historically inevitable from the time of Hutu political control.

Finally, the de-emphasis on the regional crisis presents the RPF as liberators, thwarts the memory of Hutu suffering, and pressures the international community to support the RPF regime. The RPF’s invasion becomes an effort to liberate Rwanda from tyranny and bring development. Pottier argues that Kagame uses the West's history and guilt over not intervening

41 “Constitution RFF—Inkotanyi.”
42 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 123; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 269–270.
43 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 270.
as “political capital” for supporting the RPF regime. By accepting the RPF’s depiction of events, the international community allows the RPF to get away with war crimes. In this manner, the official narrative thwarts the memory of Hutu moderates and those killed by RPF by cementing the labels of victim and perpetrator with Tutsi and Hutu, respectively. Ignoring Hutu suffering does not diminish the Tutsi experience. Rather, as argued by René Lemarchand, if Kagame wants to claim ownership of the “liberation” narrative he also needs to claim responsibility for the human rights violations that transpired before reconciliation can occur. 

The RPF has viewed history as a battleground for national identity – and it has subscribed to (and popularized) an official history that serves its purposes well. In this history, the memories of Hutu victimization from the pre-colonial to present day are not fully articulated and represented. This interpretation diminishes any victimized or historical memories that can fuel an organized political rebellion. Despite the contradictions from the historical record, the pre-colonial era becomes a model for contemporary Rwandan development and reconciliation. While emphasizing a historical peace and unity does work in dismissing the historically volatile Hamitic myth of Tutsi conquest, the interpretation ends up incorporating many root causes to Hutu oppression. Finally, the romanticizing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front as liberators legitimates the current RPF-led government in the eyes of the international community. But internally, the narrative suppresses any political alternatives—whether it is extremists from the previous regime or lawful democratic alternatives. While the Kigali Genocide Memorial successfully honors the memory of Tutsi victims, by mirroring this political-historical line it also silences many legitimate competing perspectives.

44 Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 47–48.
46 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 104.
CONCLUSION

The Kigali Genocide Memorial exemplifies the official history in Rwanda. The history it tells responds to the Hutu extremist history by conceptualizing tensions as originating from colonialism as opposed to migration. By publicly denouncing a Hamitic migration, KGM honors the memory of victims by fighting the Hamitic myth that fueled the genocide’s propaganda and ideology. While the unity narrative is far from a bad historical message, its implementation washes over the pre-colonial inequalities and cases of Hutu victimization that are remembered within the Hutu community. While many of these Hutu perpetrated, others did not. As a tool of reconciliation, the museum exhibition does not make room for the representations of victimization within both communities. While the memorial’s presentation succeeds in calling for both international accountability and for honoring the memory of Tutsi victims, attention must also be paid to how the official history collectives the entire Hutu identity as extremist perpetrators, cements perpetrator-victim as a binary, and silences the memory of Hutu victimization. As a result of the competing histories at play, the re-building of a unified and reconciled state should not recognize the suffering of one group (no matter how the differences in number or manner of the killings) as a reason for silencing another.\(^47\) To do so risks fueling further sentiments of victimization and the potential for another violent counter-movement.

This can be seen in the historical revisionism of Hutu ideologues. For them, RPF war crimes become part of a “double genocide” interpretation.\(^48\) This interpretation rationalizes the actions of génocidaires as a response to acts of genocide already committed by the RPA and becomes a way of de-legitimizing the Kagame-run state. Instead of honoring the victims as a move towards reconciliation, the victimization of both Hutu and Tutsi becomes part of another

\(^{47}\) Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*, 105-106.

cycle of politicized memory. This became evident on a local level through fieldwork conducted by Elisabeth King that compared the KGM historical narrative with interviews of both Hutu and Tutsi. King provides a disturbing example of the potential consequences in the suppression of competing narratives. She found that many Hutu refused to embrace reconciliation efforts because the official history’s absence of a space to grieve RPF war crimes caused them to look at Tutsi victimization with disdain.49 A more complicated history exists, one in which the personal suffering that occurred in multiple communities has been pitted against each other within a larger political struggle.

49 King, “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 303.
CHAPTER THREE
THE GENOCIDE ON FILM:
FORGIVENESS, FORGETTING, AND LIBERATION IN KINYARWANDA AND MUNYURANGABO

Film director Nick Hughes states on filming the Rwandan genocide, “There are many ways of showing and storytelling, but you cannot describe, you cannot show the true horror of genocide…Some filmmakers look for something that can end on a note of hope…In the real story of the genocide, there is no hope.”¹ Hughes highlights the difficulty filmmakers face in treating the Rwandan genocide. On the one hand filmmakers feel compelled to commemorate the victims; on the other hand they feel the need to tell a story that appeals to their audience. The filmography illustrates this balancing between commemoration and storytelling.

Perhaps the most popular film of the Rwandan genocide, Terry George’s Hotel Rwanda (2004) tells a popular narrative of hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina’s rescue of over 1,000 Rwandans. Michael Caton-Jones directed another Hollywood blockbuster called Beyond the Gates (2007) that followed a similar heroic model. Caton-Jones’ film tells the story of a European priest and young European teacher who decide to stay and save Tutsi who seek refuge at their parish. While Rusesabagina’s story showcases Hutu heroism in the midst of international complicity, Caton-Jones’ use of fictional white heroes teeters on revisionism.² In contrast to the Hollywood blockbuster, several other films have been released in the past decade that deal with the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. Roger Spottiswoode’s adaptation of General Roméo

¹ Nick Hughes, interview by Piotr A. Cieplak, Film and Genocide (Madison, Wis: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 221.
² For a more extensive analysis of the ways in which these type of narrative revise and pose ethical questions, see Alexandre Dauge-Roth, Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History, After the Empire: the Francophone World and Postcolonial France (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2010); hereafter cited as Writing and Filming the Genocide.
Dallaire’s memoir *Shake Hands with the Devil* (2011) produced both a docudrama of the
UNAMIR peacekeeping mission and a moving account of Dallaire’s struggle with guilt and
post-traumatic stress disorder. The HBO-produced film *Sometimes in April* (2005) presented a
similar narrative structure. Raoul Peck’s film centered on the strained relationship between a
moderate Hutu survivor and his extremist brother locked away in an Arusha prison for genocide
crimes. The film looks back at the genocide in flashbacks, and symbolizes a reconciling of Hutu
identity as represented by the two brothers. While these four films will not be thoroughly
analyzed in this chapter, I acknowledge their importance in disseminating popular understanding
of the genocide to a wide film audience.

An extensive scholarly literature already exists that critiques the cinematic
representation of atrocity and genocide. Particularly, many genocide film scholars have
questioned the ways in which cinema sanitizes the Holocaust through cinematic devices such as
redemption, hope, and closure. For instance, Sara Horowitz questions the use of a Christian
protagonist and a Christian redemption narrative in Steven Spielberg’s *Schindler’s List* (1993).³
Rwandan genocide film scholar Alexandre Dauge-Roth similarly argues that the stories of
exceptional figures such as *Hotel Rwanda*’s Paul Rusesabagina and *Schindler List*’s Oskar
Schindler make the "ob-scene violence of genocide bearable" and therefore a more attractive
story.⁴ Dauge-Roth also argues that such examples as Rusesabagina’s heroism and the fictional
Father Christopher’s personal sacrifice in *Beyond the Gates* may divert attention away from
international responsibility, history, and the victims who died away from the cameras of the
press.⁵ Likewise, journalism scholar Frank Van Vree also questions the use of redemptive

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³ Sara Horowitz, “But is it Good for the Jews? Spielberg’s Schindler and the Aesthetics of
Atrocity,” in *Spielberg’s Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler’s List*, (Indiana University Press,
1997), 119-139
⁴ Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide*, 185.
⁵ Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide*, 176-177 and 222-223.
themes in cinematic depictions of genocide. But in his analysis of Holocaust imagery, he also argues such film may present more of a moral viewing experience as opposed to historical one. Building off of this idea of history on film, Madelaine Hron writes that the Rwandan genocide may have been “an impossible history” for one film to fully represent and therefore broke off into several sub-genres. These scholars emphasize that concerning the representation of atrocity on film, critics must pay attention to the type of stories being told and the narrative devices used to tell them. Bearing these critiques on cinematic narrative in mind, I want to focus attention to the connection between redemptive narratives and Rwandan dominant discourse in two recent films about the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath.

For this study I focus on two films that politicize the genocide. Alrick Brown’s Kinyarwanda (2012) heroically depicts the RPF as righteous liberators who bring the rule of law to Rwandan society. But the film also addresses Rwanda’s post-genocide struggle for unity and reconciliation through a non-linear narrative that moves from 1994 to 2004. By incorporating several characters that each present a case for unity and reconciliation, Kinyarwanda provides an excellent example of the official history’s depiction of forgiveness and the role of contemporary politics in conceptualizing the past. Utilizing a different cinematic structure, Lee Isaac Chung’s Munyurangabo (2007) does not visually depict the genocide. Set in rural Rwanda over a decade since the genocide, the film instead shows how the memory of the genocide continues to produce conflict and tensions between ordinary Hutu and Tutsi. The story of a friendship

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8 She argues that the increase in feature and documentary films on the genocide in the last decade produced three sub-genres of Rwandan genocide film: (1) the “retrospective” that attempts to represent specifically the events between April and July 1994, (2) the “post-genocide documentary” that looks at issues facing post-genocide Rwanda in reconciliation and justice, and (3) the “interpenetrative” that illustrates the ways in which the horror and memory of 1994 continues to traumatize present society. See Madelaine Hron, “Genres of ‘Yet an Other Genocide,’” Film and Genocide (Madison, Wis: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 135-137.
between a young Hutu named Sangwa and a young Tutsi named Ngabo, the two embark on a journey to kill genocide perpetrator of Ngabo’s father. The film argues that the memory of genocide victimization destroys friendships, preserves tensions within families and communities, and undermines the RPF government’s overall plans for unity, reconciliation, and development.

In their depictions of the genocide, these two films emphasize the importance of the RPF-led liberation movement, the need for unity and reconciliation, and the pitfall of seeking vengeance. While most Rwandan genocide films center on white characters and the international community, these films are unique in that they center entirely on Rwandans. While directed by non-Rwandans, these movies were filmed in Rwanda with largely Rwandan casts and crew. While neither Brown nor Chung work for the RPF, their films tell a particular point of view that illustrates the challenges in putting the timeless story of Rwanda into a cinematic representation. Stories of conflict and reconciliation can tell an extremely humanistic story, but in a context of politicized history they can also support the dominant political discourse. I argue that while both are moving human stories of conflict, remembrance, and reconciliation, the official history still shapes the narrative structures of these two films.

UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN KINYARWANDA

Alrick Brown’s Kinyarwanda (2011) tells a non-linear narrative centering on the survival of Hutu and Tutsi at Kigali’s grand mosque. The story is presented in a complicated manner, with flashbacks and jumps forward through time. But the film does follow a progression from the genocide, to the RPF liberation, and finally ends at reconciliation. A half-Tutsi, half-Hutu girl named Jeanne falls for a Hutu boy named Patrique. This breaks her Hutu

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9 Alrick Brown, Kinyarwanda (Breaking Glass Pictures, 2012); hereafter cited as Kinyarwanda.
houseboy Emmanuel’s heart. He secretly loves her, and in his heartache joins the Interahamwe. He breaks into her house to attack her, but instead kills her parents when he finds that she is not home. Away at the time of the killings, Jeanne returns to find her parents both dead. Patrique
and Jeanne escape to the Kigali mosque for sanctuary. The Mufti of Kigali decides after much debate to issue an edict prohibiting Muslims from participating in the killings and decides to open all the mosques to Tutsi. Father Pierre of the St. Famille Church survives a massacre at his church and also finds sanctuary at the mosque. Father Pierre and the Imam decide to put aside their religious differences and embrace those differences in the face of death. Minutes before the Interahamwe move to enter the mosque, the RPF arrive and liberate the refugees.

A parallel narrative is interspersed throughout these events involving the RPF’s campaign from Uganda. Lieutenant Rose and Sergeant Fred, both exiled Tutsi from Uganda, fight in order to create a unified Rwanda for their children. After the RPF liberates the mosque, Fred is killed in another rescue attempt. The film shows Emmanuel and other prisoners in a re-education camp ten years later led by Lt. Rose. He initially refuses to express remorse, but after seeing his fellow prisoners express their loyalty to a unified Rwanda he begins to change his mind. At his Gacaca, he expresses remorse to Jeanne and pledges his allegiance to a unified Rwanda. Jeanne forgives him and at the film’s conclusion marries Patrique.

These Rwandan genocide films portray the RPF as heroic liberators seeking to establish a unified Rwanda. The representation displays the RPF soldiers as righteous and civilized. Brown introduces Lt. Rose and Sgt. Fred in a scene in which a RPF soldier beats up a Hutu refugee on the road. Sgt. Fred intervenes and demands him to stop despite the soldier’s insistence that the Hutu refugees are all responsible for the raping and murdering of the Tutsi.

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10 This occurs near the beginning of the film. Emmanuel’s decision to admit to his crimes does not occur until the end.
Lt. Rose approaches and angrily says, “Right now you are more guilty than these men. We didn't see what they did but I see what you are doing. We are not here for vengeance. We are here for justice. These men are our prisoners, but they are men and should be treated as such.” While the scene shows an act of vengeance by an RPF soldier, Lt. Rose’s response portrays the RPF as embodying a moral code of conduct in the face of atrocity. Among the refugees who thank Fred for intervening are Father Pierre, Patrice, Jeanne and the Imam, all representing a multitude of identities thankful to the RPF for restoring order. Rose and Fred’s intervention reinforces the idea of the RPF as more than a rebel group. The RPF are liberators bringing democracy. Coupled with the actors’ use of American accents, the RPF appears Westernized compared to the savage-like image of the Hutu Interahamwe. This American-like portrayal may cause a Western audience to sympathize with the RPF and leave the film without knowledge of the crimes against humanity committed by the RPF.

11 “Chapter Four: Lieutenant Rose & Sgt. Fred,” Kinyarwanda.
Brown further hammers this point to his audience by portraying Rose and Fred as fighting a war of attrition. Lieutenant Rose narrates that there existed many small genocides prior to 1994. Her family fled to Uganda after Tutsi pogroms in her hometown of Nyamata in the early 1970s, and she eventually joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front. She includes in her narration that they fought with the National Resistance Movement (NRA) but ultimately hoped to return to Rwanda. This narration places the conflict in a larger history of conflict that gives an explanation to the RPF invasion. After Fred volunteers to lead a liberation mission of a church, Rose confronts him that he has a baby on the way. He responds, “I want my son to grow up in this land. I want him to have the opportunities that you and I did not have. I know we are not fighting for ourselves. I mean yege [yes] we might receive some of the benefits. But it is more about the legacy we leave for those who come after us. I want my son to grow up in a unified Rwanda.” Fred then receives a call from his wife where he hears the cries of his newborn son for the first time. This portrays the RPF as actively fighting for a unified Rwanda for the next generation as represented in the baby’s cries. This purpose distantly echoes the American dream, which gives an American audience further reason to empathize with RPF. Brown overlooks the RPF’s human rights violations and remembers them as an organization willing to sacrifice for a greater Rwandan future.

Brown further portrays the RPF as heroic liberators of the Tutsi through two rescue scenes. In the first scene (later in the plot but earlier in the film) Fred leads a successful liberating mission of a church filled with Tutsi. But an Interahamwe member murders him with a machete. He looks at his hand covered in blood. Its heavy redness sticks out to the audience amidst the black backdrop of night. As he dies in Rose’s arms, he looks up to the sky and hears

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12 “Chapter Four: Lieutenant Rose & Sgt. Fred,” *Kinyarwanda.*
the cries of his newborn son amidst the gunfire. The second liberation scene occurs just as the 

*Interahamwe* prepare to overrun the mosque. The refugees hear machine gun bullets shot from behind the mosque. Father Pierre and the Imam turn and see Rose emerge up the hill. Brown

Figure 3: Sgt. Fred dying in Lt. Rose’s arms after liberating a group of Tutsi.

Figure 4: Rose arriving with her RPA unit to liberate the Mosque.
shoots this scene in a slower speed, emphasizing her and the other RPF soldiers in dramatic poses. The score pushes this effect as well through a dramatized melody. She announces to the Father Pierre and the Imam that they will take them to safety at a UN controlled refugee camp.

Fred then walks through the front gate with the Interahamwe in the background with their hands behind their head. He walks heroically towards Rose and shakes her hand. The liberated

Figure 5A and 5B: Lt. Rose protecting Tutsi at the Mosque and Sgt. Fred celebrating after defeating the *Interahamwe*.

Fred then walks through the front gate with the *Interahamwe* in the background with their hands behind their head. He walks heroically towards Rose and shakes her hand. The liberated
Rwandans then cheer and sing. The audience leaves the theatre with no knowledge of the RPF’s role in the Congo or of its post-genocide political oppression. Both scenes depict the RPF as liberating Tutsi from places of worship and end focusing on Fred. The first scene promotes Fred, Rose, and the RPF as heroic liberators while the second scene portrays Fred’s sacrifice for his son. Through Fred’s sacrifice, Brown portrays the RPF as sacrificing for all Rwandans.

In addition, Lt. Rose is shown leading a re-education camp for perpetrators in 2004. Her association with the RPF (and the brief glimpse of Paul Kagame’s portrait in the background) portrays the reconciliation process as victor’s justice. Lt. Rose calls for the perpetrators to admit their guilt as a first step towards forgiveness and the rebuilding of Rwanda. Many perpetrators display a willingness to accept unity and confess their crimes in small groups. When Emmanuel remains silent, the other prisoners chide him for it. One prisoner named Sagamba Jerome recalls how the roadblock boss made them all kill a Tutsi family. The boss then took the baby and chopped off his head. Shortly thereafter Jerome attempts suicide by slitting his wrists. As Lt. Rose cries while trying to stop the bleeding, he mutters, “I killed the baby.” Emmanuel stares in shock that a Tutsi like Rose would feel empathy for a killer like Jerome. This scene mirrors Fred’s death in Rose’s arms later in the film. Fred sacrifices his life for a unified Rwanda in the

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13 “Chapter Two: Re-Education Camp,” Kinyarwanda.
next generation. In contrast, Jerome’s admission of guilt coupled with Rose’s attempt to stop the bleeding can be interpreted as symbolizing reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. A more political interpretation may state that Rose’s attempt to stop Jerome’s bleeding symbolizes the RPF heroically holding the society together and allowing the Hutu perpetrators the chance for forgiveness. From this view, reconciliation seems forced and the acknowledgment of guilt one-sided. Nowhere in the film does Brown represent the RPF as anything less than an exceptional organization. RPF atrocities in the Congo and the entire civil war is white washed in favor of Rose’s explanation of a right to return.

Brown uses nearly every single relationship in Kinyarwanda to convey a message of unity. The theme of unity and reconciliation features prominently in the love triangle between Jeanne, Patrique, and Emmanuel. Coming from mixed parents, Jeanne’s characterization itself represents a union between Hutu and Tutsi. By falling in love and eventually marrying a full Hutu like Patrique, her entire love life occurs without ethnic prejudice.

Figure 7: Jeanne and Patrique
Furthermore, Emmanuel and Patrique come to symbolize two different directions for Hutu male youth. Patrique represents the moderate Hutu; his love for Jeanne leads him to avoid joining the Interahamwe. Emmanuel on the other hand decides to engage in extremist behavior once he sees Jeanne with Patrique. Through the Gacaca process Emmanuel receives redemption. He admits killing Jeanne’s parents and looting their property. He promises if the court pardons him he will work to pay off the damage he inflicted and to work to rebuild the country. He tells Jeanne that he wishes to be her neighbor again if she pardons him. She accepts his apology and immediately walks over to Patrique. Forgiveness completes the film’s narrative and in doing so gives the audience a satisfying ending complete with marriage, forgiveness, and justice. The audience leaves with the impression of Rwandan reconciliation as a clean process. The film characterizes acts of genocide through Emmanuel, but they come not from politics, the civil war, or

14 This brings up a wide range of questions regarding the sexualizing of the Tutsi women. Helen Hintjens points that a sexual obsession with the Tutsi women became predominant themes in extremist propaganda. Tutsi women became viewed as corrupters of Hutu society as a response to Hutu men competed with Tutsi men for Tutsi wives. See Helen M. Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 37, no. 2 (June 1, 1999): 264-265.
victimization but from love. Jeanne’s act of forgiveness comes from a similar motivation. While she does not love Emmanuel, she seems to understand his crimes as originating from love as opposed to hate. The entire *Gacaca* reconciliation process, the reasons why Hutu killed in the first place, and the tensions that continued long after the genocide ended are simplified into a love triangle.

![Figure 8: The Imam and Father Pierre.](image)

The film uses religion as another model of unity. Particularly striking is the use of Christian-Muslim relations to promote unification. When Father Pierre receives refuge at the mosque, he immediately asks another Christian how the Muslims treat them. The Christian says they treat them very well and that he trusts them. The Imam approaches Pierre, welcomes him, and mentions that he heard what happened at Saint Famille church. He says, “I don’t confuse the word of God with actions of man. Often it can be very different. There are people of many faiths
here. Many Catholics and Muslims. Some Tutsi. Some Hutu.” Brown uses this exchange to show unification between different religions and ethnicities. The alliance between the Imam (a Hutu) and Father Pierre (a Tutsi) symbolizes both a religious and ethnic unity. The dual narrative structure of religious unity and RPF liberation exemplifies the ways in which the current regime wishes to portray itself. In this framework, unity officially transcends any divisive religious or ethnic division. While certainly a great message to promote, the focus on religion diminishes the role of politicized ethnicity. The choice for promoting unity between Muslims and Christians diverts attention from the most important challenge facing post-genocide society—reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. While the Muslim council discusses the origins of ethnicity, they describe divisionism as a colonial constructs. But as political identities, the film makes little time for explanation. Such cinematic narrative is perfectly acceptable, however the film’s inclusion of the RPF political narrative makes the film’s point of view highly problematic. The film remembers the genocide from the current regime’s perspective of official unity and neglects the political role of “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” This perspective becomes even more apparent in Emmanuel’s apology to Jeanne. While Emmanuel’s apology comes out of empathy and love, he also has a change of heart when he sees Lt. Rose help Jerome. The over-exaggeration of the RPF as a democratic and judicially enlightened group may occur subtly to the casual viewer, but in light of the larger regional narrative it overruns the “human” stories to the film. While the film may tell inspiring stories in its narrative, the

16 The Imam goes further by pointing out that many people are losing their faith. He asks Pierre to give them counsel. He provides him with a place to hear confession and finds Priest garb for him to wear. In a later scene Brown shows Christians and Muslims praying in adjacent rooms. They become friends and when their death to the militia seems imminent they hold hands. The Imam’s restoration of Father Pierre’s religious duties forms a memory of religious presence and civility during the genocide. Considering the amount of massacres that occurred in churches, this representation (which culminates in survival) creates a redemptive narrative that does not represent the majority of Rwandans who fled to places of worship. Instead of representing the experience of those who died in places of worship, the film focuses on unity and tolerance represented between the two religious leaders.
religious and RPF-driven aspects to the narrative has little to do with the autocratic reality of post-genocide Rwandan state building.

LIBERATION AND FORGETTING IN *MUNYURANGABO*

Lee Isaac Chung’s *Munyurangabo* (2007) tells the story of two young men. Tutsi Munyurangabo (nicknamed Ngabo) and his Hutu friend Sangwa both work in Kigali at the Kimisagara market. After Ngabo steals a machete from the market, the two set out on a journey to the countryside to kill the perpetrator of Ngabo’s father. Chung distinguishes himself by setting his film away from Kigali and in rural Rwanda. His use of handheld camera makes many sequences feel shaky and unstable. In the context of underlying tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, this technique serves as an interesting filmmaking tool. The peaceful scenery of the Rwandan countryside and the close friendship between the two boys feel fragile and foreboding thanks to the shaky camera. The film also does not center on the Rwandan Hutu or Tutsi elite, the international community, or the military. Instead, the film illustrates how the memory of Hutu-Tutsi tensions persists in the post-genocide Rwandan state.

The viewer does not learn whether Sangwa or Ngabo are Hutu or Tutsi until the two make a stop at the home of Sangwa’s parents. While his mother is happy to see him, Sangwa’s father is angry that he abandoned the family. For three years Sangwa lived in Kigali without communicating or sending aid for his younger sibling’s education. During the visit Sangwa attempts to prove himself to his father by working hard in the fields and rebuilding the house’s outer wall. In conjunction with Sangwa’s redemption, his mother overhears the neighbor Gwiza questioning Ngabo on where he and his parents originate. While Ngabo answers with great reluctance, by telling Gwiza his parents died in the genocide he effectively admits his Tutsi identity. This revelation further stratifies the victim-perpetrator binary between Tutsi and Hutu.

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17 Lee Isaac Chung, *Munyurangabo* (Film Movement, 2009); hereafter cited as *Munyurangabo*. 
Many Hutu died in the genocide and left many Hutu orphans (including Gwiza). But unlike Gwiza (a Hutu) who belongs to a community, Ngabo’s role as a strange drifter causes much suspicion in the community. The film portrays the Rwandan rural community as a tight-knit place where everybody knows each other. Ngabo avoids revealing his Tutsi identity in a largely Hutu countryside. Admitting his parents died in the genocide becomes dangerous information. Sangwa’s mother realizes that her son’s friend is Tutsi. The family shuns Ngabo by refusing to give him food.

Chung masterfully allows the visibility of ethnic tensions to correspond with the deterioration of Ngabo and Sangwa’s friendship. In the beginning of the film it appears that their identities don’t matter. They walk down forest paths and busy Kigali streets arm in arm.

Figure 9: Friends Munyurangabo and Sangwa walking through the streets of Kigali. All screenshots from Lee Isaac Chung, _Munyurangabo_ (Film Movement, 2009).

But the reaction by Sangwa’s parents demonstrates the underlying presence of ethnic tensions in the older generations. Sangwa’s father even brings up a victimization narrative within the Hutu community in a conversation with Sangwa. He approaches Sangwa and asks him if he realizes that Ngabo is a Tutsi. He asks, “Don’t you know that all Tutsi are nasty? They have put our people in submission. Now I’m suffering because of them. They tried to put me in prison even
though I’m old. And yet you walk with them. Hutu and Tutsi are enemies, don’t you know?"18

Sangwa’s father challenges his son to blame the inequalities facing the family on Tutsi hegemony. Later Ngabo and Sangwa rebuild the wall around the family home, and

![Figure 10: Sangwa and his father.](image)

Sangwa threatens Ngabo after he playfully pulls one brick down. Ngabo’s action of pulling down a brick may symbolize a disturbance in the family brought upon by his Tutsi identity, further demonstrating how these identities continue to divide communities and families. In this manner, Chung illustrates a competition between Sangwa’s friendship with Ngabo and his loyalty to his family, which on a more symbolic level may represent a conflict between a reconciled Rwandan future and the continuation of Hutu-Tutsi tensions. When Sangwa announces his intentions to stay home long-term, Ngabo lashes out at Sangwa by yelling that it was people like Sangwa’s family members who killed his family. He leaves, but not before telling Sangwa’s father of their plot. After his father brutally beats him, Sangwa tries to continue on with Ngabo. But Ngabo tells him he no longer wants him around.

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18 "Chapter Five: Food for Thought," *Munyurangabo*. 

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After disposing of Sangwa, Ngabo walks through the Rwandan countryside to murder his father’s killer, reflecting on his past. His mother hid in the marshes with him as the *Interahamwe* killed his father. For the first time in the film the genocide is directly referenced with detail. He remembers:

> Back then we saw a lot of dead and many horrors. We saw rivers clogged with bodies, children killing…and the blood covered the earth. Sometimes those days were all I could remember. I remembered my mother carrying me through the marshes below our home. There were voices all around, crying and screaming. My mother burned the photo of my father and I don’t know why. I forgot his face. After my mom died, sometimes I forgot her face too.\(^{19}\)

The story is told in voiceover. By not portraying Ngabo’s past in flashback, Chung represents the legacy of the genocide as a suppressed memory. Chung shoots landscape shots during this narration, creating an effect that paints the suppressed memory and trauma of 1994 onto the current Rwandan countryside. Ngabo’s memory of the genocide in the narration contrast with the cinematographer's framing of the peaceful landscape. This cinematic contrast suggests that the memory of the genocide remains imbedded in the countryside and continues to divide society.

Ngabo’s memory (or lack thereof) of his parents plays a prominent role in his need for revenge. He honors the memory of his father by promising revenge. The film illustrates memory as harmful to peace building. For Ngabo, to remember is to seek revenge. Everywhere he goes Ngabo is consumed by his memory of the genocide. For instance, he tells Sangwa, “The way he [Sangwa’s father] looked at me when I entered your home shows me that he was among them [the killers].”\(^{20}\) His memory of the genocide comes to the surface and reveals the extent to which he feels victimized. Ngabo yells at Sangwa, “Hutus killed my family!” and “My life would have

\(^{19}\) “Chapter Nine: On the Trail,” *Munyurangabo.*  
\(^{20}\) “Chapter Eight: The Dance,” *Munyurangabo.*
been better without them [Hutu].” His journey to his father’s killer becomes an attempt to carry out justice through revenge.

Chung further exemplifies this point in his opening scene that shows an obsession within Ngabo’s sub-consciousness. After stealing the machete in the beginning of the narrative, Chung frames Ngabo sitting on the ground with the machete covered in blood. The camera zooms in on Ngabo’s face and then zooms out back to the machete. This frame shows the machete without

**Figure 11A and 11B: The stolen machete.**

21 “Chapter Eight: The Dance,” *Munyurangabo*. 
blood, signifying that the blood only existed in Ngabo’s sub-conscious. He later admits in an internal narration, “I imagined many times the way I would strike him, the man who killed my father.” These tensions and fantasies of revenge remain beneath the surface, signaling that the cycle of violence will continue into the next generation.

The film takes a sharp turn as Ngabo finally arrives in his hometown. Chung introduces the RPF’s mission of liberation as a peace building solution. Ngabo stops in a bar where a young poet spots his machete in his backpack. Assuming Ngabo’s intentions, the poet decides to share with Ngabo the poem he composed for the upcoming liberation day. The poem advocates for national unity, development, and liberation from Rwanda’s history of violence (see Appendix B for full poem). Nearly ten minutes long, the poem states, “Liberation is a journey.” The poet describes Rwanda from his youth, calling it a place of war, and a place were he considered Tutsi as enemies. He states:

We were given bows and spears and foreign countries gave us guns. Really. Darkness came to Rwanda, machetes in place of peace, I saw people killed,

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23 Liberation is celebrated on July 4th in Rwanda to mark the RPF’s takeover of Kigali on July 4th, 1994.
Muslims and Christians worked together, joined by machetes and their will to kill. And our Rwanda burned. Rivers flowed with bodies and corpses covered fields.²⁴

He does not explain the political and historical complexities of Rwandan politics and ethnicity. Instead, the past appears as a blurred memory of horror and atrocity. His poem does not seek to explain the past, but rather to set up his argument of the need for Rwandans to liberate from the past.

The poet also provides a sympathetic and glowing recommendation of the RPF’s political and military legitimacy in his reflections on liberation. He recites:

> And the RPF army I was taught to hate decided that it was time to defend Rwanda…I will thank them [RPF] wherever I am. Their heroics will be known worldwide from Darfur in Sudan to the Comoros Islands they will be admired…But now that they have conquered, I ask of them, ‘Free us from poverty and illiteracy since liberation is a journey.’ ²⁵

He portrays the RPF as saviors and defenders of Rwanda with their peacekeeping interventions in Darfur and the Comoros further evidence to their heroism.²⁶ Furthermore, the poet places their narrative as the pathway to development. The poem places the RPF not only as the militant liberators of Rwanda but also liberators from the state’s structural issues, underdevelopment, and inequalities. For this historical and economic liberation to occur, the past must be forgotten.

The poet effectively argues Ngabo must forget his vendetta in order to confirm the RPF’s vision. This scene completely changes the direction of the film. When Ngabo decides not to kill the perpetrator in the subsequent scene, the choice becomes less an act of empathy than a political choice. For reconciliation to occur, the film suggests that it must come through the vision of the RPF-led state.

²⁵ Ibid.
²⁶ Considering the emphasis on the RPF’s international endeavors, it is telling that the Eastern Congo is not mentioned.
If Chung did not include the poem in his narrative, the film would still make a moving argument for ending the cycle of violence. Ngabo finds his father’s killer lying on the floor withered, shivering, and begging for water. After deciding not to kill the perpetrator, the film then segues into an imagined conversation between Ngabo and his father. They appear on a hill
overlooking the countryside with their backs turned to the camera. As in Ngabo’s narration, his father’s face remains unseen. His father tells him the origins of his name. He tells him that Munyurangabo was a mighty warrior who fought in front of other in order to clear the path. His father then challenges him by asking, “What is your battle?” This fantasy sequence may symbolize a confrontation of Ngabo’s past. His father reminds him that he has a choice and that nothing is determined. He can move forward and provide an example to those behind him.

Ngabo then dreams of his time spent working with Sangwa at the Kimisagara market and the value of their friendship. He decides to return and fill the killer’s Gerry can. The film ends with a frame of Ngabo and Sangwa looking in opposite directions. Whether or not the scene is real or
imagined remains ambiguous, but as a final frame it illustrates that reconciliation is still incomplete. The two boys symbolize that point by looking in opposite directions, which may indicate that friendship amid such tensions remains a possibility.

While Brown’s *Kinyarwanda* endorsed the RPF, told a story of religious unity, and portrayed an RPF-driven reconciliation process, Chung’s *Munyurangabo* explores the possibilities and challenges of co-existence between Hutu and Tutsi. The film portrays a post-genocide Rwandan society still gripped by ethnic tensions. The film shows a generational gap in which youth of Hutu and Tutsi background show a willingness to become friends. Yet, Chung presents the memory of the past and the prejudices still harbored by older generations as roadblocks to a unified future of peace and friendship. The film makes a case for a selective forgetting because of the suffering felt by all Rwandans. Ngabo feels pity for his father’s perpetrator because he has AIDS. Similarly, despite their prejudices Sangwa’s family is shown struggling in poverty. But the idea of a collective suffering becomes the basis for the RPF liberation narrative. The RPF poet argues that the RPF provides a solution to poverty, to the history of violence, and to illness through the rebuilding of the state. The film shows co-existence as an unfinished project, but it also endorses joining the RPF as a way to move forward. While one might interpret Ngabo’s choice to forgive as breaking the cycle of violence out of human empathy, one might also argue that his decision holds a dual meaning as a political act of complicity to the current regime’s vision.

CONCLUSION

As cinematic remembrances of the genocide, *Kinyarwanda* and *Munyurangabo* coincide with a larger dominant historical representation pervading Rwandan society. For one, the two films grapple with several models for preventing future conflicts. One can certainly read these models from a political view or from a humanist view. By de-emphasizing the importance of
contemporary politics, *Kinyarwanda* becomes a pervasive argument for the role of religion, forgiveness, and unity in re-building a more peaceful Rwandan society. While an inspiring story, the film provides little historical context and neglects to explore exactly why Hutu killed Tutsi in mass numbers. Instead Brown condenses the entire Hutu Power movement into Emmanuel, who kills out of sexual jealousy as opposed to more complicated political reasons. In *Munyurangabo*, Lee Isaac Chung complicates this model by showing how the memory of the 1994 genocide still divides the community in contemporary Rwanda. The forgiveness that Emmanuel seeks and receives does not appear as widespread in Chung’s film. Instead, Chung makes a case for what Susan Sontag described as “limited” memory that forgets in order to avoid divisive memories that prolong conflict.\(^{27}\) Tensions will continue as Hutu and Tutsi will both continue to feel victimized. From a more humanist perspective, Ngabo foregoing vengeance becomes an ethical act. But his denial of vengeance also reflects a scholarly observation that Susanne Buckley-Zistel describes as “chosen amnesia,” in which Rwandans attempt to forget the past for the purpose of social cohesion.\(^{28}\) Both films exemplify a fundamental question in post-genocide Rwandan society: how will Hutu and Tutsi continue to live side by side and avoid future conflict?

But at the same time the political overtones of these films are hard to ignore. In *Kinyarwanda*, Lt. Rose and Sgt. Fred connect the experience of the Tutsi victim with that of the RPF soldier. The RPF become the ones who bring justice and democracy to the Rwandan state. Even the reconciliation process occurs under the supervision of Lt. Rose. In *Munyurangabo*, Ngabo makes his decision to forgive and move on partly after his exposure to the RPF liberation poem. This view that emphasizes development makes Sangwa’s father into an RPF archetype for the Hutu who continues to harbor genocide ideology and thereby impede cohesion. In this

\[^{28}\] Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to Forget”, 131–150.
manner, both movies place post-genocide history as a potential break from the history of violence. The RPF formation and subsequent liberation are represented as transcending the recent political history as opposed to playing a leading role within it. Hutu victimization is present, but not victimization that occurred at the hands of RPF during the civil war, genocide, and Zaire. As a result, the two films disseminate the official history to a wider film audience.
CHAPTER FOUR
GENOCIDE MEMORIALS:
THE PRESERVATION OF A TRAUMATIC PAST

In his analysis of Holocaust memorials and monuments, Jewish studies scholar James Young writes, “A society’s memory, in [the memorial and monument] context, might be regarded as an aggregate collection of its members’ many, often competing memories.”¹ Present day Rwanda faces a similar challenge as groups with a wide range of memories figure out how to remember and commemorate the genocide. The government faces challenges of commemorating the genocide in a population still in the process of reconciling. Tutsi survivors struggle to commemorate their loved ones in communities where perpetrators and survivors live side by side. For innocent Hutus, they too harbor memories of hardship, poverty, and victimization from the civil war and refugee flight to the Congo. Amidst these memories and missions, some competing and others related, many Rwandans strive to remember and commemorate the victims of the 1994 genocide. This chapter will look at one way Rwandan society remembers the past and educates foreign visitors.

Since the genocide ended, the Rwandan government and survivors have made efforts to preserve and document the massacre sites where Hutu perpetrators killed thousands of Tutsi. These massacre sites occurred in churches, schools, and in the Rwandan bush. In this chapter, I will first look at the preservation and presentation of four Rwandan memorial sites from my research visit in January 2013: Murambi, Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. I will then make a case that through preservation of remains and weapons these sites construct an experience of witnessing the genocide for foreign visitors. While this presentation supports a larger theme of

national mourning of the genocide, I argue that preservation also stems from the personal mourning of survivors. Therefore, competing memories and narratives between the government, international visitors, Tutsi survivors, and the Hutu community present different meanings to these sites. While memorial sites present a dominant political view for remembering the genocide, they also present an environment for personal mourning, political protest, and international regret.

CHURCH MEMORIAL SITES

Since 1994, Rwanda has constructed seven national memorials. At these memory sites, the Rwandan government emphasizes the role of preservation. In an April 2012 article, the Rwandan government revealed its hope to implement techniques that will conserve remains for up to 1,000 years. In the same month, the Executive Secretary for the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG) Jean de Dieu Mucyo emphasized in a press release that it “shouldn't be looked at as a responsibility of the government only [to maintain sites]; every Rwandan should have a stake in the maintenance of the memorial sites.” In post-genocide Rwanda, the emphasis on preservation and the push for collective maintenance of massacre sites speaks to the ways in which memorials have been deemed important places in Rwandan society. I visited and photographed three of the most famous church memorials in Rwanda: Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. At each of these sites thousands of Tutsis died through the collaboration of the Interahamwe, gendarmerie, clergy, and the collaboration of local

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2 Hundreds of memorial and mass gravesites exist at the local level. There are also countless personal memory sites designed and observed by victims.
Now each church has been transformed into a national memorial site (save for Nyarubuye, which functions both as a church and as a memorial site). At these sites a tour guide walked me through the preserved structures. All three sites function as a national memorial sites, and they each tell a slightly different story (See Appendix C for photographs of each site).

The sheer numbers of casualties at these churches tell a story in themselves. Around 5,000 people died at Ntarama, 10,000 at Nyamata, and upwards of 50,000 at Nyarubuye. Tutsi fled to the churches to seek sanctuary, only to be brutally murdered inside the churches. In prior Tutsi pogroms in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1990s, any Tutsi who sought sanctuary at these same churches survived the pogrom. In 1994, the génocidaires used this practice to their advantage by rounding up Tutsi in churches in order to make killing more efficient. One survivor of the Nyamata massacre recalls, “It was not yet noon when the Interahamwe arrived singing: they threw grenades, they tore down the railings, then they rushed into the church and started slicing people with machetes and spears…. They struck with swinging arms. They cut anyone, without choosing. People not streaming with their own blood were streaming with the blood of others.” People died alongside their family, friends, and neighbors. The perpetrators killed without mercy. These sites represent a collaboration of the state and the local populace to perform acts of the highest cruelty. These memorials preserve a volatile historical moment.

Preservation creates the illusion of witnessing the massacre for the visitor, creating a space that attempts to transport the visitor back to 1994. At each site, the tour presented me with

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5 The local mayor suggested to the Tutsi that they seek sanctuary in the church. For all previous pogroms Tutsi sought sanctuary at Catholic Churches and were kept safe. See Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), 18. and Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: a Rwandan Journey, 1st ed. (New York: Viking, 1995).

6 Originally a forested area, the Kayibanda regime exiled Tutsi to the uninhabitable Bugesera region after they came to power.

7 Jean Hatzfeld, Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak (New York: Other Press, 2006), 13. The massacres of Nyamata and Ntarama occurred in the Bugesera region from April 14 to April 16, 1994. Before 1959, the area had been heavily forested and nearly uninhabitable. The Hutu government uprooted many Tutsi families and forced them to settle in the area. The physical region itself therefore holds added significance in the memory of Tutsi oppression at the hands of the Hutu government.
physical proof from the massacres. At all three memorials, I encountered the clothes of the victims, which hauntingly reminds the visitor of the number of people who once wore them. At Ntarama and Nyamata the clothes cover the pews and walls of the churches. Both sites preserve the damage inflicted by grenades and artillery against the buildings. At Ntarama, the memorial preserves the structural damage inflicted by grenades and other weapons with large steel roofs that extend over the buildings. This further demonstrates the national effort to preserve these sites. The Nyamata memorial preserves the bloodstains on the walls, the ceiling, and even on the statue of the Virgin Mary. At the altar lie machetes and identity cards next to rosaries and crosses, which contrasts the idea of the church as a house of God with the instruments of genocide. This presentation discomforts the visitor by showing the violation of the churches’ sanctity.

At Nyarubuye most people died outside the church, so (unlike Ntarama and Nyamata) the church remains a place of worship. The artifacts are lined up in one of the former Sunday school classrooms. On a table laid a pile of victims’ shoes with an excerpt of Kangura, the Hutu extremist propaganda publication, placed on top. On another table the guide showed me a pile of different weapons. The guide showed me a blood stained carjack used to kill Tutsis, a meat grinder used for cannibalization, an altered hoe for piercing skulls, and more rusting machetes. The hall also kept several jugs used to hold the hot sauce pilli-pilli. After the tables of weapons, clothes, and shoes sat display cases of skulls and femurs. As at Ntarama and Nyamata, I could discern the ways in which the people died from the types of wounds cut into the skulls. At the end of the hall sat a statue of the Virgin Mary, decapitated because the killers felt it looked Tutsi. Outside the tour guide showed me additional evidence, including a rock used to sharpen machetes, a latrine where bodies had been found, and an outdoor stove used for cannibalization.

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8 Perpetrators placed the burning sauce on the eyes of victims to see if they still lived.
Ntarama, Nyamata, and Nyarubuye each display skulls and bones on shelves or display cases. At Nyamata, the visitor descends into open crypts dug behind the church, where bones are piled on shelves organized by skulls and femurs. The feeling of descent weighs into the experience as the tight space makes for a claustrophobic feeling. At Ntarama the bones sit on shelves inside the sanctuary building. Coupled with broken stain-glass windows from the Interahamwe’s grenade attacks, the coffins of identified bodies in the pews, clothes lining the walls, and the collection of rosaries and machetes near the altar, the contents of the building contradicts the previous function of the church as a place of worship and sanctuary.

The sites also preserve the suffering of children. At Ntarama the guide took me to a wall inside the Sunday school classroom. During the genocide, perpetrators smashed the skulls of children against the wall at that exact spot. The bricks (still discolored from the traces of blood and brain matter) disturb the visitor in a powerful manner. Through various products, the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide and local organizers preserved the spots of blood and brain matter.

These sites also preserve the evidence of rape. Next to the brick spot of children’s brain matter at Ntarama stands a stick used to rape women. The tour guide at Nyamata took me to a chamber dug into the sanctuary’s floor. Built after the genocide, the chamber consists of glass shelves exhibiting skulls and bones. Below the shelf deep in the ground rested a single coffin. In the coffin lies a woman named Mukandoli Annonliata, who was raped multiple times during massacre. She died when her rapists shoved a long stick through her vagina and into her cranium. As of 2004 her skeleton sat visible in the chamber, including the pieces of wood sticking out of her pelvis.9 I found out during my visit that her family requested that she be

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placed in a coffin. Separated from the rest of the skeletons, Mukandoli represents the sexual violence committed against women during the genocide. This representation presents an ethical question on whether or not the visitor becomes a voyeur by looking at weapons and victims of sexual violence.

The construction of memorials in Rwandan churches represents a larger debate between “the preservation of memory and the definition of the sacred space.” Longman and Rutagengwa give an excellent critique by arguing that (while probably not designed as a direct attack on the church) these memorials signify a black mark on the church’s reputation. As a heavily Christian nation, these sites may represent a balancing within Rwandan society between remembering church massacres events and re-defining the sacred space. Longman and Rutagengwa argue that the church memorial creates a new sacred space, one not necessarily for Christianity but for education and remembrance of the victims. Janet Jacobs echoes Longman and Rutagengwa’s point by writing that these Rwandan memorial sites are in the midst of a “re-consecration.” She writes specifically on the intersection between the sacred and the profane. “While the clothes and skeletal remains of the deceased are reminders of horrific death and suffering,” she argues, “they also represent the sacred remains of those whose lives were taken.” She goes further by arguing that the preservation of artifacts, “[in] their realism and authenticity, they construct a separate sphere of remembrance where the sacred and profane

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10 Nyarubuye also displays similar sticks of sexual violence.
11 In a related critique, Janet Jacobs expressed much concern over the ethics of a gendered perspective in Holocaust research. See Janet Jacobs, “Women, Genocide and Memory: The Ethics of Feminist Ethnography in Holocaust Research,” *Gender and Society* 18, no. 2 (April 2004): 223-238.
The visitor is struck by the juxtaposition between the presence of the sacred and the human despair that these sites are meant to commemorate. The church memorial sites take these memories of genocide and place them in a context that inverts the sacred in a way that portrays the genocide as somehow transcending history.

BODIES AT THE MURAMBI MEMORIAL

In the southern prefecture of Gikongoro lies the Murambi memorial, a technical school under construction at the time of the genocide. Major attacks on Tutsi occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in Gikongoro, but the area made it through the early days of the civil war with only a few scattered attacks against Tutsi. Several powerful Hutu elites, including the sub-prefect Damien Binega and retired Lt. Colonel Aloys Simba, played a large role in using their wealth and influence to plan, coordinate, and distribute weapons for the massacres. Officials from neighboring communes promised Tutsi safety at Murambi. However, officials pushed Tutsis to go there mainly because the hill’s isolation and visibility made it vulnerable to attack. The militia cut off the water supply to the not yet finished school, and Tutsi refugees had little food. For close to two weeks they held out before the re-armed militia led an assault in the early morning of April 21, 1994. Survivor Athanase Bugirimfura described the massacre, “The attackers only came once. They came and killed everyone—except those who ran off and

18 Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1999), 304–305.
19 Des Forges provides an in depth chapter on the ways in which Gikongoro elites coordinated the killings in the area. See Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 303–351.
escaped... Those who couldn’t run, they lay there until they were found and killed.”

Somewhere between 40,000 to 50,000 Tutsi died that day. Only a handful of people survived.

The memorial tour begins with a short exhibition designed by Aegis Trust. It includes a short history of Rwanda that follows the linear path towards genocide. The exhibition pays specific attention to France, criticizing Opération Turquoise for refusing to arrest government officials and militia and allowing them to escape into Zaire. Afterwards, the visitor walks through the unfinished classrooms where bodies preserved with lime rest on tables. Shortly after the genocide, survivors and family members of the victims unearthed the mass graves to find the bodies reasonably discernable. They then dosed the bodies in lime in order to preserve them as evidence. Of the 50,000 to 60,000 Tutsi who died at Murambi, the survivors preserved 848 bodies in this manner. The lime gives off a strong smell that parches the nostrils. But at the same time the preservation method is not permanent. The viewer also smells the decomposition of the bodies, slowed by the lime. This preservation method allows the visitor to see the final moments of the dead. The lime preserves the dead’s facial features in their final moments, often their mouths agape in horror. Many bodies hold their arms up to their face, shielding themselves from machete blows. As I passed through the later rooms, I noticed more and more mothers and children. Often the remains of a mother still cradled the body of a child. One room I walked into held only the bodies of babies and young children. Nearly all of them contained machete wounds on their head.

The discernible features of these bodies make Murambi a slightly different experience than Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. Unlike skulls on a shelf or in a crypt, the dead feel present at Murambi. The dead’s last traumatic moments become frozen in place in these rooms, which emotionally connects with the visitor in a manner that a museum exhibition or cinematic

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representation cannot. The memorial allows the visitor to walk up to an individual body and look closely at the dead’s individual features. At the same time, the sheer enormity and anonymity of the amount of bodies makes the memorial overwhelming. The smell stays with the visitor long after leaving the memorial as well. Etched in the nostrils, it creates a sensory experience that even Nyamata and Ntarama cannot provide. When walking through these rooms, the genocide feels less an historical event than a scene from an everlasting hell.

But shortly after walking through the rooms filled with preserved bodies, the tour takes the visitor straight to three marked sites with highly political meanings. The first site marks the place where the French flag stood during the Operation Turquoise encampment at Murambi. A sign written in English, French, and Kinyarwanda marks this spot. Next, the tour arrives at another sign that marks where French soldiers played volleyball in the months after the massacre. Other signs marking mass graves stand next to the former volleyball court. The tour pushes the connection between the French soldiers relationship with the perpetrators and the mass graves. The memorial argues that the French expressed complicity and indifference when camped out on the same hill where 50,000 Tutsi died only two months removed from the massacre. Instead of treating the hill as a sacred ground, they played volleyball near the visible mass graves.

This presentation of Opération Turquoise illustrates the RPF’s greater anger at the French. The French held a close diplomatic relationship with the Hutu regime, incorporating the French-speaking Habyarimana regime into its greater France-Afrique network for several decades. French financial aid to Rwanda tripled during the civil war, and French weapons sales to Rwanda also increased between 1990 and 1994. 22 There exists much evidence of French involvement in actually fighting the RPF during the civil war. A French Special Forces

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22 In 1993 Rwanda received $4 million in military aid from France. See Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Second, 2nd ed. (Zed Books, 2009), 56; hereafter cited as A People Betrayed.
command tailored specifically for Rwanda formed in June 1992. France maintained that the deployment of soldiers in Rwanda had only the sole objective of protecting French citizens. However, French soldiers reportedly took part in engaging with the RPF in combat, operating checkpoints in Kigali, and participating in activity directed against the RPF.\footnote{Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 57.} During \textit{Opération Turquoise}, Hutu draped French flags on street corners, and people chanted “\textit{Vive la France!}” in the streets, embracing the French arrival as a liberation from the RPF.\footnote{Roméo Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda}, Reprint (Da Capo Press, 2004), 437.} The \textit{Interahamwe} and the regime in particular embraced their arrival.\footnote{Gérard Prunier, \textit{The Rwanda Crisis} (Columbia University Press, 1997), 291–292.} While the RPF and French did not clash militarily, the RPF abhorred the intervention for it provided a relatively safe passage for the Hutu militants to Zaire. While France did save, rescue, and protect many Tutsi (especially with the cameras nearby), they also committed their fair share of controversies. Tutsi resisting the militias in the hills of Bisesero came out from their hiding spots upon the arrival of French soldiers. Instead of protecting them, the French left them only to return three days later. The Hutu killers murdered nearly a thousand of them after the French departed.\footnote{Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 239–240.} After the genocide, France allegedly helped fund and train Hutu militias seeking refuge in Zaire. As opposed to disarming the \textit{génocidaire} militias, the French re-armed and continued to maintain contact with alleged \textit{génocidaire} leaders in October and November of 1994.\footnote{Daniela Kroslik, \textit{The French Betrayal of Rwanda} (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2008), 275–276.} France evacuated \textit{Akazu} members such as Agathe Habyarimana to France immediately after the genocide commenced, and many key \textit{Akazu} members continue to walk freely in Paris.\footnote{Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 161.}
The ways in which the Murambi memorial presents France raises questions on the possible politicization of the preserved bodies.29 The tour takes the visitor to the site of the French flag and volleyball courts almost immediately after visiting the preserved bodies. By preceding the French section of the tour, one might interpret the bodies as supporting evidence for a larger moral crime committed by France. There certainly exists great value in informing the visitor of French complicity and the controversies of Opération Turquoise. But at the same time, the French were not present in April 1994 at Murambi nor directly responsible in the murders. The dead become slightly de-emphasized as individuals, instead becoming a form of collective evidence in a much larger national narrative. The Murambi memorial structures a multi-layered experience that at once frames the genocide as a transcending event and calls for international accountability.

THE DEAD AS EVIDENCE, THE VISITOR AS WITNESS

In her evaluation of the Murambi memorial, Susan Cook describes a “freezing” effect in which preservation of remains “[halts] the natural processes of change” and freezes the witness’ sight on a particular moment.30 She writes, “With reference to the aftermath of genocide, then, preserving genocide sites entails making decisions about what to preserve (bodies, buildings, weapons, documents), and at what moment in their history.”31 The decisions made on what to preserve at these sites emphasizes a historical framing around the genocide. The “frozen” site marks the turning point in the current narrative, the lowest moment of the linear descent from the pre-colonial “Eden.” The preservation of “debris of history” holds large consequences to

31 Ibid.
historical remembrance because it partly signifies the genocide’s significance in Rwandan society.\(^{32}\)

But at the same time, there is a risk to overemphasizing the national reading of these sites because of the role of survivors in preservation. Despite the tendency to view memorials from a national lens, Rachel Ibreck dissents partly from the idea that the RPF holds complete control of the memorial narrative by pointing out that survivors actually played a large role in the arrangement of bones in the first place.\(^{33}\) Many of these sites became memorials in the immediate aftermath of the genocide through the efforts of survivors and local politicians. Before leaving Rwanda, forensic anthropologist Clea Koff and her excavation team returned to the Kibuye massacre site to help the Kibuye préfet set up a memorial consisting of two skeletons in a glass display case. The préfet already set up a memorial at the stadium that explained what happened on a large sign next to the uneven soccer field ground where a mass grave lay.\(^{34}\) Only two years removed from the genocide, Kibuye’s local political leadership viewed the displaying of bodies as a part of memorialization.

Survivors played a large role in the preservation of many other large memorial sites. At the time of Susan Cook’s research at the Murambi memorial in 2000, local communities took responsibility for preserving and memorializing many of these sites.\(^{35}\) At Murambi in 1995, local citizens took part in the lime preservation of remains. Similar survivor participation in preservation occurred in Nyamata and Ntarama. In a 1996 article reporting from the Nyamata memorial site, journalist Paul Ames interviewed a Hutu survivor who hid Tutsi in his home and subsequently fled the Interahamwe. In 1996, a memorial existed in a tent beside the church

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\(^{32}\) Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 119–121.

\(^{33}\) Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 110.

\(^{34}\) Clea Koff, *The Bone Woman: Among the Dead in Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo* (London: Atlantic, 2004), 121-125; hereafter cited as *The Bone Woman*.

consisting of bones gathered from the area. The Hutu survivor interviewed explained that they [survivors] did not immediately bury them out of necessity to show the world what happened. While they did begin the process of burying the bodies in more dignified mass graves, the survivors also explained that they viewed the bodies as evidence and necessary for display at memorials.36 At Ntarama survivor Dancila Nyirabazungu serves as caretaker of the memorial, despite losing her husband and two daughters in the massacre.37 She admits to distancing herself from feeling grief through her work and providing for her children. She viewed her work as contributing towards genocide prevention by explaining to visitors what happened.38 Despite the nationalization of the seven largest memorial sites, survivors contribute to their preservation and presentation. The decisions for preservation partly originated in the local community. While reservation on displaying the dead probably existed in the community, the overwhelming fear of the world forgetting the genocide made preservation the main strategy for memorialization.

By preserving the genocide as a historical event, the sites create a “witness” experience. Susan Cook writes that the preservation of these sites demonstrates the fact that humans performed, stood aside, and collaborated in the genocide:

The three dimensionality of a physical location, the sight of hastily dug pits and mass graves, and the smell and look of human remains makes the locations where genocide has taken place haunting reminders that genocide is an artifact of human society, not a natural calamity. Genocide sites, then, often attain special status in the aftermath of violence as places that reveal the truth of what individual members of a society have done to their fellow citizens.39

To witness the atrocity as a human project in a concrete “three dimensional” form causes the visitor to reflect and question whether the international community could have intervened. In this manner, the “freezing” of memory at these sites provides visitors with the illusion of bearing

38 “Many of us may have only a vague recollection of the atrocities that took place,” *Pittsburgh Post - Gazette*, September 24, 2000, sec. WORLD.
witness to what happened in 1994 and causes the visitor to look inward. Coinciding with the abandonment of the international community during the genocide, this model forces the foreign visitor in particular to reflect in a personal manner.

In addition to a reflection on international culpability, the “witness” experience provides a place for grief and a space for personal reflection. Visitors may experience a moral reflection as they visit these memorials because of the illusion in bearing witness that the preservation of bodies and artifacts promotes. Cook establishes this point by arguing that by witnessing the preservation of dead and other debris from genocide, the site pushes the visitor to reflect on an educational, religious, and moral level. Pilgrimages to these sites becomes a way of paying respect to the dead, and for many Western politicians official visits to site of massacre provided an eye-opening re-evaluation of their own personal accountability. Clea Koff recalls Madeleine Albright bringing flowers to the Kibuye excavation site in 1996. The same Madeleine Albright, who only two years prior obstructed any Western intervention, recounted in the documentary *Ghosts of Rwanda* of visiting Kibuye and seeing a skeleton the size of her own grandchild slashed with machete wounds. She expresses her remorse in the documentary that she did not propose an intervention, even though she claims it would never have passed. Anthony Lake expressed similar thoughts upon visiting Nyarubuye. Many memorial tours provide a structured moment for reflection. The audio tour at the Kigali Genocide Memorial invites the visitor to take a moment to reflect on the dead in the memorial gardens. At Murambi, the tour stops for a moment of silence out of respect for the dead prior to walking to the rooms.

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41 Koff, *The Bone Woman*, 48-49.
43 Ibid.
of preserved bodies. In this manner the memory of the dead reaches out to the visitor, creating a gripping emotional response and a time for reflection.

For many Rwandans, the need to preserve the past has become a dominant expression of genocide remembrance. In a 2004 *African Times* article, Rwandan sociologist and survivor Jeanne Murekatete explains, “The Nazi genocide of the Jews was immortalized by abundant works of literature, cinema and various other art forms. We, on the other hand, don’t have much except the victims’ remains.”44 For both Rwandans and foreign visitors, the preserved remains provide the most expressive and vivid link to the past. This link anchors the memory of Tutsi victimization in history and wards off attempts to silence it. Supporting this point, Rwandan Director of Culture Butoto Muhozo states in the same article, “To make these bones disappear would simply mean killing off the memory of the Tutsi genocide.”45 The preservation serves a functional purpose as evidence in addition to a form of expression. As stated by Muhozo, the failure to maintain the sites would mean the failure to preserve the Tutsi memory. In her memoir on the forensic excavation of Kibuye and Kigali massacre sites, forensic anthropologist Clea Koff echoes this point. Her forensic team felt a pressure to recover as much as possible at these sites for future genocide tribunals. But Koff also remarks on the role of remains in fighting genocide denial, “Unfortunately, physical proof is necessary—there really are people who don't believe there was a genocide.”46 While constructed witness experiences, many Rwandans view the visiting of preserved remains by foreigners as a way of acknowledging that they occurred.

Phillip Gourevitch argues that there exists a gap between witness and body. But he also adds an interesting observation on the beauty of the skeleton and the role of the visitor’s gaze.

Arriving two years later, Phillip Gourevitch opens his book *We Wish to Inform You That*

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45 Ibid.
46 Koff, *The Bone Woman*, 86.
Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda with a description of the massacre site at Nyarubuye. The bodies had been left out as part of a memorialization process. He describes the skeletons as hauntingly “beautiful.” He writes, “The randomness of the fallen forms, the strange tranquility of the rude exposure, the skull here, the arm bent in some uninterpretable gesture—these things were beautiful, and their beauty only added to the affront of the place.”47 The exposure of the body speaks of man’s mortality, but it also in this context speaks of the individual. Men, women, and children with individual stories all died. Their bones become a reminder to this individuality. But he also writes of his awareness in a voyeuristic gap between himself and the bodies. He writes, “I couldn’t settle on any meaningful response: revulsion, alarm, sorrow, grief, shame, incomprehension, sure, but nothing meaningful. I just looked, and I took photographs, because I wondered whether I could really see what I was seeing while I saw it, and I wanted also an excuse to look a bit more closely.”48 The role of the visitor’s gaze comes into question in the search for meaning within the bodies. The bodies remind the visitor of mortality, but this ends up conflicting Gourevitch as he tries to think of an appropriate emotional response to the victims’ suffering. Paul Williams writes similarly that the presence of bones may fulfill the visitor’s urge to actually witness the event.49 The preservation of massacre sites creates the illusion of witnessing that fulfills this urge.

This illusion of witnessing may also cause the visitor to experience trauma. Frank Van Vree defines “indigestible” images in the following manner:

As documents, they give proof of and epitomize the atrocious tragedy in its barest form, but as such they are...’indigestible’, not letting themselves be absorbed by a story that takes the viewer away. They don't offer any comfort or opportunity for empathy or understanding, but evoke feelings of shock, shame,

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48 Ibid.
terror, and guilt—images we want to banish from our world...like the mutilated faces of solders of the First World War, the chopped heads of the Rwanda killing fields, or the people jumping from the Twin Towers.\(^50\)

The bareness of the horror in such images shocks the viewer from accepting redemptive narratives. The weight of hopelessness and suffering transferred from image to viewer discomforts and unsettles. Talking about the role of image in Rwandan documentary film, *100 Days*, filmmaker Eric Kabera makes a connection between image and trauma for the viewer that may relate to the emotional experience of Rwandan memorial site visitors. He remarks, “Every time you see a glimpse of a decomposed body on the street of Kigali or Nyamata it brings trauma. At times it brings about an initial blackout. You think to yourself that you don't want to see it and you don't. But ultimately the image is there for people to remember and be remembered.”\(^51\) It is through personal memory that the outsider connects with the image of the dead. The images may stay with visitors, or at the very least they may return after an “initial” blackout. When they do, the feeling of helplessness and hopelessness preserved at these sites may become the visitor’s lasting memory of the dead.

SITES OF MOURNING

While sites of memory often attain larger collective meaning pertaining to the state, the literature also suggests that initially they held a functional purpose as sites of bereavement and mourning. In his analysis of World War I sites of memory, Jay Winter maintains that over time memorials deconstruct the horror of war and “reinvest” it with a collective meaning. He writes that through the memorial, “the dead are no longer individual people. They appear solely as names, inscribed on the war memorial. Their sacrifice thereby takes on the form of an


expression of a general will, a collective spirit embodied in the state. In these memorials, the state affirms its right to call on its citizens to kill and to die.” But Winter also suggests that reading these memorials as mere objects of the state glosses over their functional role as a site of mourning. People traveled to sites of memory because they helped them collectively mourn the anonymous dead. But as time passed and a new generation emerged that did not directly experience loss from the war, these sites of memory shifted to a more politicized and nationalist interpretation. They initially served as a tool of bereavement, and only with the passage of time did they attain other political or social meanings connecting to the state or other historical narratives. The proximity of the genocide as an event with commemoration makes Rwandan memorial sites differ from World War I sites. While many World War I sites initially served as sites of bereavement and then emphasized a nationalist narrative as generations passed, the intersection between the national narrative and personal mourning occurs simultaneously at Rwandan sites.

Commemoration each year begins on April 7, the day the genocide began after President Habyarimana’s plane crashed on the night of April 6. Every year at a memorial site chosen on a rotating basis, President Kagame delivers a speech during commemoration week that reflects the status of the nation. He has addressed everything from issues pertaining to France, the situation in eastern Congo, the necessity for national unity, and Rwanda’s economic development plan. National commemoration officially lasts for one week, but survivor groups perform their own set of remembrance rituals and commemoration through the 100 days. On a local political level,
district politicians often use commemoration to enforce their power or bring up community
issues that relate to the treatment of survivors or the lack of attendance during commemoration
ceremonies.\textsuperscript{56} Like the long-term collective meanings explored by Jay Winter, these
commemorations hold larger national meanings.\textsuperscript{57}

Many Western politicians have paid their respects during April commemoration. For
many Western politicians, the memory of the genocide plays a dominant role in the international
political discourse concerning Rwanda. For American politicians like current U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations Susan Rice—instrumental in pushing against an intervention force during
the genocide—remembering the genocide invokes not only feelings of guilt but also motivation
for future peace building. At the 2009 commemoration, Rice spoke about her personal memory
of visiting massacre sites:

I'll never forget the horror of walking through a churchyard and schoolyard
where one of the massacres had occurred. Six months later, the decomposing
bodies of those who had been so cruelly murdered still lay strewn around what
should have been a place of peace. For me, the memory of stepping around and
over those corpses will remain the most searing reminder imaginable of what our
work here must aim to prevent.\textsuperscript{58}

Partly apologizing for her role in preventing a U.S. intervention force, Rice recalls how the
memorials and commemoration ceremonies caused her to re-evaluate her role in U.S.-Rwandan
relations. Commemoration has also become a stage for Western politicians to promote their
economic development plans. In May 2009, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the
Nyamata memorial as part of launching his “African Governance Initiative.” He expressed his
grief and incomprehensibility of the numbers of lives lost during the genocide. He pledged that
 genocide must never happen again, remarked on what he viewed as the country's transformation

\textsuperscript{57} Ibreck, “A Time of Mourning,” 110.
\textsuperscript{58} Susan E. Rice, “Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice: 15\textsuperscript{th} Commemoration of the Genocide in
Rwanda,” (speech, Kigali, Rwanda, April 7, 2009), Outreach Programme on the Rwandan Genocide and the

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since 1994, and complimented the government for moving past Rwanda’s political status quo by exhibiting compassion for its people. Both Blair and Rice’s remarks symbolize the way in which commemorating the genocide has become a part of the Western world’s relationship with the current Rwandan state.

But commemoration also becomes a time for the remembering of traumatic memories. Many survivors experience trauma during commemoration ceremonies that breaks the barrier between history and the present. Specifically, commemoration through mourning rituals brings the haunting memories of survivors out in the open. In a collection of testimonies commissioned by the Kigali Genocide Memorial, survivor Freddy Mutunguha recalls that only during commemoration in April does he experience traumatic nightmares of Interahamwe killing people. Additionally, many of the commemorative rituals compress time between the genocide as part of the historical past and the present. Rachel Ibreck describes these rituals as including “long walks to memorial sites and all-night rituals replicate aspects of their [survivors’] traumatic experiences during the genocide.” While the Rwandan government stresses unification, the trauma felt by survivors during commemoration symbolize how traumatic memories of the genocide remain fresh in their minds.

Furthermore, these memorials function as sites of bereavement for survivors. During commemoration survivors will often partake in all-night vigils that may include reciting poetry, singing, and listing names of the murdered. They may use the memorial site to lay a wreath or

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60 “Freddy Mutunguha: I want to see us build our nation,” in We Survived Genocide in Rwanda, ed. Wendy Whitworth, Nottinghamshire: Quill Press, 2006, 117.
62 Ibid.
Considering the number of anonymous dead unearthed every year from newly discovered mass graves, the sites serve an important function in giving survivors a place to mourn loved ones lost among the anonymous bodies. The significance of having a site to mourn the dead actually extends mourning sites back to pre-colonial religious traditions in which the living felt an intimate connection to the dead. Longman and Rutagengwa write that both family members and whole communities practiced mourning rituals at commemorative sites (often burial sites) where they thanked the dead for looking after them by providing them with gifts. When Rwanda was heavily Christianized in the 20th century, many of these traditions carried over to the church. Janet Jacobs reinforces this argument by also pointing out that the pre-colonial Animist beliefs of Rwanda included religious rites that called on dead ancestors for protection. Jacobs argues that despite the status of these memorials as sites of terror, they are also sacred spaces for the family of the dead. The tradition of this belief system makes it significant that survivors have a place to reconnect with dead family members.

Additionally, identification whenever possible aids in the mourning process. Clea Koff saw a similar process of identification and mourning around Rwandan remains and relics much like the preservation of relics by widows and parents of WWI dead. She found that the identification of the body helped family and friends mourn their loved ones. She writes, “a body disallows a relative from maintaining that the person is being held in a prisoner-of-war camp or that the person survived but can't get in touch. Similarly, in places where government or military propaganda continually denies that certain people were killed, the exposure of graves and the analysis of remains refutes the 'official story.' Identification both helps the mourner to move on and acts as evidence of the crimes committed against their loved ones. In the case of

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67 Koff, The Bone Woman, 82.
genocide, identification may help the survivor respond to genocide deniers and begin the mourning process. Koff found that even the identification of clothes or a prosthetic limb became a significant part of the mourning process. She cites one example during the Kibuye excavation of a father and daughter (who survived the massacre) who came looking for his wife's clothing. That day Koff and her team only displayed a portion of the recovered clothing, and father and daughter left empty handed and disappointed. Koff remarks that even though the daughter witnessed her mother’s murder, she and her father felt the need to come and claim “that bit of proof or that bit of memory.” Koff found that the identification of the remains of a loved one helped mourners find closure. While Koff’s account principally analyzes the documentation and preservation of evidence for war crimes tribunals and memorial construction, she illustrates how these sites functioned as sites of mourning for survivors.

The intersection between the state narrative and personal mourning comes together again in the reburials that occur during commemoration. This reflects the sad reality that new mass graves are discovered every year. Reburial of remains found in the areas surrounding memorial sites occurs during the commemoration ceremonies. On a practical level, reburial serves a necessary function because bodies are often found in degrading mass graves hastily dug by perpetrators to hide the evidence of the crimes. Reburial rituals become a way of giving the dead a dignified burial. Ibreck argues that the state claims ownership over the dead in this manner by showing them the respect that the previous government lacked. She writes, “it [the state] treats the dead with care and respect, applies the conventions of burial and mourning and demands collective recognition of the victim's humanity. With this act, the past is symbolically laid to

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69 Koff, *The Bone Woman*, 83.
70 Koff, *The Bone Woman*, 102.
rest.” But re-burial represents something more than a symbol of the state. Considering the magnitude of mass graves, reburial becomes a practical necessity every year because of the continuous discovery of mass graves. During my visit to the Nyamata memorial, I viewed a special mass grave that housed the bodies of over 100 people thrown in a nearby latrine. The bodies’ new resting place consisted of a headstone that included the names of every victim who could be identified. On a symbolic level, it restores the victim’s dignity to identify them and provide them a place to rest. To rebury those bodies in such a mass grave echoes Ibreck’s point that reburial serves both a practical purpose (the discovery of bodies called for documentation and identification) and a symbolic purpose by providing a dignified space for mourning.

In addition, commemoration becomes an opportunity for perpetrators and opponents of the government to perform their own forms of protest. While it is important not to generalize the entire Hutu population as continuing to harbor thoughts of genocide, there have been many instances of violence during commemoration involving former perpetrators. Grenade attacks occurred around commemoration directed at memorial sites. There have been high profile cases of mockery of survivors and personal threats, demonstrating that many of the anxieties and hatreds from the genocide still exist and thereby resurface around commemoration. These tensions in the community illustrate some of the challenges to commemoration. The preservation of Rwandan sites of massacre occurs in deeply divided communities in which perpetrators and survivors live side by side. Unlike World War I memorial sites that became sites of pilgrimage, Rwandan memorial sites sit in the middle of a post-conflict struggle for reconciliation.

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Commemoration also breaks the political construction of the genocide by indirectly creating a political space for ordinary Hutu and Tutsi. Ibreck notes that survivors maintain a privileged position during commemoration. They may challenge the issues surrounding Gacaca, noting the challenges in living in the community after giving testimony. They also may challenge the neglect of memorial sites or the reduction of Gacaca sentences. Through voicing these issues, commemoration often creates a political space for survivors in addition to functioning as a site of mourning. By not participating in commemoration, Hutu make a profound political statement. Longman and Rutagengwa found in their interviews that many Hutu felt that the commemoration ignored the suffering of Hutu refugees. They found this clash between competing memories especially prevalent in the northern districts, communities inhabited often by more Hutu survivors from crimes committed during the civil war and in refugee camps than Tutsi survivors from the genocide. This creates tensions during commemoration as Hutu find their memories of victimization silenced by the official commemoration ceremonies. One Hutu woman from their interviews in the northern town of Buyoga explained, “They commemorate the genocide of the Tutsi, but the experience of those who went to the camps [in Congo] is put to the side.” A Tutsi survivor also from Buyoga added that only Tutsi survivors participate in commemoration while Hutu spend the time working in the fields. Non-participation becomes a form of protest against the suppression of competing narratives. While many perpetrators may not participate out of guilt or for continuing to harbor genocide ideology, this one example demonstrates that many do not participate because their own traumatic narratives have been left out of the official commemoration of genocide. After the government’s announcement in December 2012 for a planned RPF liberation

77 Ibid.
museum in the northern town of Mulindi, it will be interesting to see reactions from the local populace. Finally, high profile sites of RPF massacres are not commemorated. At the site of the 1995 Kibeho refugee camp massacre, the memory of Hutu victimization by RPF forces is not commemorated. However, Tutsi victimization did occur at the same site a year prior during the genocide. Longman and Rutagengwa note that the Tutsi massacre has been commemorated, further signifying the official silencing of Hutu victimization from RPA crimes against humanity.

CONCLUSION

Preservation at Rwandan memorial sites falls in line with the view of history promoted by the current Rwandan government. These sites present the genocide at its height and its most vulnerable. But as James Young emphasizes with Holocaust museums, there needs to be attention to the fact they are still constructed sites. The decision to preserve represents a specific political and social choice. By orienting the historical narrative around the 1994 genocide, the government makes a clear distinction between perpetrators and survivors. This is not an accident. Rwanda remains a country with a population still traumatized by 1994. But focusing on these frozen historical moments risks heightening divisions. These are moments of genocide, the highest form of divisionism. Parts of the population ruthlessly murdered other

79 See Longman, “Religion, Memory, and Violence in Rwanda,” 143. While it is beyond the scope of this I.S. to analyze the local reaction to official memory through fieldwork, my research benefited greatly from the works of many Rwandan specialists who conducted fieldwork on memory at the local level. For fieldwork on the role of chosen amnesia in community reconciliation, see Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Africa 76, no. 02 (2006): 131–150. For an analysis of community political reactions during genocide commemoration, see Ibreck, “A Time of Mourning.” For an analysis of Rwandan attitudes to the government narrative, see Longman, “Memory and violence in post-genocide Rwanda,” 236-261. For a framing analysis of the Kigali Genocide Memorial with genocide testimony, see Elisabeth King, “Memory Controversies in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Implications for Peacebuilding.” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 (2010): 293–309.
80 Young, The Texture of Memory, 128.
parts. Taken out of historical context, these sites risk heightening tensions unless they are
directed towards education and prevention. The ruins and artifacts provide proof of the
unimaginable violence inflicted against Tutsi during the genocide. But they also divert the story
away from what occurred after 1994, including the war in the Congo, the pursuit of justice, and
reconciliation attempts. Ironically, the commemoration of the Tutsi who died as the world
looked away may cause another silencing of Hutu victimization. While mourning is a personal
matter, Rwanda’s politics has been largely shaped as a nation in mourning. While, of course, an
understandable occurrence (the genocide occurred less than two decades ago), the
nationalization of mourning makes the acknowledgment of Hutu victimization necessary for
building a unified nation and a lasting peace.
CHAPTER FIVE

RWANDAN MEMOIR:

FOUR EXAMPLES OF COMPETING VICTIMIZATION

This chapter will examine a set of memoirs of the Rwandan genocide: Rêvêrien Rurangwa’s *Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda*, Paul Rusesabagina’s *An Ordinary Man*, Joseph Sebarenzi’s *God Sleeps in Rwanda* and Marie Béatrice Umutesi’s *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*.¹ I decided on these four memoirs not to create a comprehensive sample of Rwandan testimony, but rather to make two distinct points. One, these memoirs expand the definition of genocide victimhood by showing the interplay of competing Rwandan memories. Two, these memoirs simultaneously acts as a form of political dissent against the RPF government and question the international community’s continued support of President Paul Kagame. Before exploring the personal narratives of the four memoirs, I want to acknowledge two influences of Rwandan testimony that I chose not to analyze.

First, I want to briefly mention a few influential collections of survivor and perpetrator testimony from Rwanda. Since 1994, several scholars and organizations released influential testimonies that give voice to both survivors and perpetrators. French journalist Jean Hatzfield in particular released two outstanding volumes on Rwanda. In *Life Laid Bare*, he interviews fourteen survivors from Nyamata and Ntarama.² These interviewees, encompassing a wide range of backgrounds, give heartbreaking and horrifying testimony to their stories of survival. Several of these interviewees actually sought refuge in the churches and subsequently hid amongst the bodies and the surrounding marshes. Hatzfield’s collected testimony showcases the extent

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¹ I recognize some limitations to my choice of texts. For one, I include only one female author. Two, each author holds some sort of elite political or socio-economic status. The exception to this statement is *Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda* author Rêvêrien Rurangwa, who is a Vice-President to the Survivor Organization IBUKA.

trauma, hatred, and a sense of loss pervades in the lives of survivors. In a second collection titled *Machete Season*, Hatzfield presents testimony of several Hutu perpetrators from the same region. He expresses a chilling account of killers who will openly talk about the murders, yet distance themselves from openly expressing any remorse for their crimes. Other works of survivor testimony include the Kigali Genocide Memorial’s *We Survived Genocide in Rwanda* and Samuel Tottem and Rafiki Ubaldo’s *We Cannot Forget*. These collections deliver powerful and traumatic personal narratives in which the act of reading becomes a moral act by the reader.

Second, a study of Rwandan genocide memoir would be incomplete without mentioning Lt. General Roméo Dallaire’s *Shake Hands with the Devil*. Dallaire’s memoir of the UNAMIR mission depicts the international community’s complicity in the Rwandan genocide and attempts to bring accountability to its failure. He served from August 1993 till August 1994, and he writes in great detail of the ways in which the mission traumatized him to the point of a suicide attempt in the late 1990s. His memoir articulates the details of how his mission reported many warning signs of genocide to the UN. This included a report from an *Interahamwe* informant named Jean-Pierre who revealed the location of weapons caches, the construction of Tutsi death lists, and the training of death squads. But the UN failed to respond to this (and many other) reports compiled by UNAMIR. His main point revolves around the fact that the UN and Western powers knew genocide was taking place and refused to intervene when they had a chance. Dallaire emphasizes that principle blame for the genocide belongs to those who planned and carried out the genocide. He calls the atmosphere of extremism a combination of the

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4 Important to note that many survivors who took part in the collection now work for Aegis Trust and Kigali Genocide Memorial. Most of the testimony grapples with whether or not reconciliation or unity is possible in rebuilding the nation. See *We Survived Genocide in Rwanda*, ed. Wendy Whitworth (Nottinghamshire: Quill Press, 2006); *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, edited by Samuel Tottem and Rafiki Ubaldo. (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2011).
colonial legacy, refugee life, racism, jealousy, and power plays that infected both sides during the civil war. But he also places specific blame on Kagame for not speeding up his campaign when the genocide became clear, France for further destabilizing the region with *Opération Turquoise*, and the United States for actively working against UNAMIR. Dallaire argues that the genocide could have been prevented, and proposes a re-evaluation of the international community’s intentions in their peacekeeping missions.

The memoirs presented in this chapter will make a similar call for an international re-evaluation, but from a Rwandan perspective that exhibits the competing memories of victimization in Rwandan society. These books speak to the silences and oversights made by the international community in both the genocide and early post-genocide periods. In a critique of Marie Umutesi’s *Surviving the Slaughter*, Aliko Songolo writes, “Closely linked to a historical event, the memoir personalizes history or historicizes the personal.” In other words, the memoir allows the author to insert the personal narrative into the larger historical narrative. This becomes significant in a context where the RPF regime holds a “monopoly on truth.” Behind the charming elites and impressive development projects lies a regime that killed tens of thousands of its own citizens. In a society filled with silence, complicity, and fear, the personal narrative attains an even greater power as a form of dissent. All four memoirs reviewed in this chapter come from survivors who live in exile, and each tells a story that conflicts in one way or another with the official narrative. They de-couple the RPF narrative from the Tutsi survivor

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6 Dallaire, *Shake Hands*, 513.
7 Dallaire, *Shake Hands*, 515.
10 Reyntjens argues that this number could very well be in the hundreds of thousands. See Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth,” 28.
narrative, speak to the genocide’s greater regional consequences, and portray the RPF as continuing the historical cycle of elitist state power.

TUTSI VICTIMIZATION IN GENOCIDE: MY STOLEN RWANDA

In *Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda*, Tutsi survivor Révérien Rurangwa writes a traumatic memoir that details his family’s murder by a Hutu neighbor. Fifteen years old at the time of the genocide, he describes the genocide as a loss of innocence. Before April 1994 he interacted with Hutu children regularly. While he experienced discrimination from his Hutu neighbors, he never foresaw mass murder. After the massacres began, Rurangwa’s family fled to their church. Forty-three members of his family hid in a twelve square meter shed. Eventually, his Hutu neighbors found their hiding place, tortured them, and then hacked them to death. Severely disfigured and mutilated, he hid among his family’s bodies for days. He places specific attention to the crimes of his neighbor Sibomona. Rurangwa refers to him throughout the memoir as his “murderer,” which considering his survival demonstrates an internal death. While Sibomona did cut off Rurangwa’s arm and an eye, his actions also uprooted Rurangwa from this home and cast him away into exile. He discovers that his pursuit of justice against Sibomona, his visible physical scars, and his will to remember his family makes life in Rwanda in the late 1990s dangerous and unbearable. Therefore, his account demonstrates two important points. One, it reveals the struggle of the Tutsi survivor in finding a place amongst a culture of forgetting in post-genocide Rwandan society. Two, it demonstrates the role of trauma in remembering atrocity.

Rurangwa miraculously survived the massacre and found asylum in Switzerland. Exiled to rural Switzerland, he describes himself as “an uprooted survivor.” He writes on leaving

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Rwanda, “The plane which takes off from the Kigali runway tears me away from my country, which more than ever has come to resemble a head cleaved in two by a machete. It tears me away from all that went to form me over fifteen years and made me the adolescent that I am, now forever traumatized.” But nonetheless he attempted to confront his trauma by returning to Rwanda and seeking justice for his family. He returns to his village and confronts Sibomana, who promptly denies everything. Rurangwa laments that while he possesses proof (his wounds), he lack witnesses to tie Sibomana to the crime because they are either dead or Hutu. The RPF soldiers imprison Sibomana on the spot, but a Hutu mob descends on Rurangwa’s house and threatens him. He flees to Kigali, and the RPF eventually releases Sibomona from the overcrowded prisons. He writes, “Everyone pretends to be pretending to forget, survivors most of all. And then, there are risks inherent in pressing charges. Hundreds of witnesses have been eliminated, by knife or by poison.” Rurangwa found himself stuck in a liminal space between honoring his family by pursuing justice and a present Rwandan society focused on moving on. The perpetrators denial of their crimes and their subsequent use of intimidation causes Rurangwa to seek exile again.

First and foremost, Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda exemplifies the ways in which testimony empowers the survivor. An internal struggle, Rurangwa finds value in remembering because it allows him to fight his perpetrators through the preservation of the word. “The only revenge available for me is to bear witness,” he writes, “This way, we may pay tribute to the victims, offer respect and redress to the survivors, and ensure that the thousands who committed crimes against humanity—including my own assassin—do not get away unpunished.” But Rurangwa expresses his testimony in a vengeful tone. This reflects his frustration with the

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12 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 62.
13 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 72–73.
14 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 71.
15 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 11-12.
flawed justice system for genocide crimes. His perpetrator Sibomona remains free. With institutional justice not an option, memory becomes defiant:

The only revenge that would really matter would be if that murderer who sought to annihilate me after hacking my family to pieces were to read these pages. And then he would say: “I did all that for nothing. He's alive! He's still standing! He will live on! And his people will live on in him!”

Simple existence becomes a form of revenge. Through the written word, his memories fight back. But in this case individual memory falls into a gap between audience and writer. The audience may read the words, but that does not guarantee that they will remember. He adds, “A duty to remember? You make me laugh. In truth, who wants to remember?”

He argues that the duty to remember does not fall with the audience, but with the keeper of memory. Memoir empowers the survivor, articulating the memory into a form that fights back. While his audience may not want to remember, Rurangwa still feels a need to bear witness. By merely telling his story, his testimony demonstrates what Jay Winter describes as the rescuing of “histories trampled on by military dictatorships.”

Rurangwa sums up his mission as exemplifying a “duty to pass it [his story] on. The duty to try to explain what has happened so that such horrors don't happen again—and who cares if no one listens!”

But more broadly, the memoir illustrates a culture of forgetting in post-genocide Rwanda. He argues that Tutsi genocide memory becomes not only an embarrassment for perpetrators, but also many Tutsi returnees. After the genocide, thousands of Tutsi from the diaspora returned and repopulated Rwanda. Faced with a society divided between ambitious entrepreneurs and long-term exiles and a traumatized group of survivors, Rurangwa states that survivor testimony conflicted with Paul Kagame’s goal of national unity. After returning from

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16 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 11-12.
17 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 117.
18 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century (Yale University Press, 2006), 36.
19 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 117.
exile two years later, Rurangwa describes the immediate post-war politics under Kagame as “all about forgetting” because of their focus on re-building the state. He writes:

The new government, led by Paul Kagame...urges the Tutsis in exile to return home: they may have halted the genocide, but not because they want to hear it spoken about. This black page of history needs to be turned, there is a country to rebuild. The exiled Tutsis don't want to hear survivors' laments; nor do the Hutus and for good reason. So survivors are not welcomed by anyone. 20

In his writing, he argues that the culture of forgetting and the silencing of memory is a product of rebuilding of the Rwandan nation-state. He writes that part of this immediate culture of forgetting comes from the arduous task of punishing two million perpetrators. He points out that the prisons are overcrowded. But he criticizes the government for ignoring justice and for not making the Tutsi survivor a priority. This is an extreme accusation that certainly neglects the role of the government in providing reparations to survivors and the reality of the sheer number of perpetrators who needed to be tried. But by making such a harsh accusation, Rurangwa reveals a limit to the survivor’s willingness to forgive. Writing on the hypothetical question of forgiveness, he answers, “No chance of forgiveness while justice has not been done.” 21

While his anger certainly does not typify all survivor opinions on the government, 22 he speaks to an uncoupling of the RPF liberation experience from the Tutsi survivor experience. He expresses that narratives of the genocide become an embarrassment to the Rwandan state if they do not contribute to the rebuilding process. He writes, “We [survivors] embarrass the Rwandans. We sense that it's better not to tell, not to disturb the 'peaceful cohabitation' between the two ethnic groups...The only permitted discourse is along the lines of 'Reconstruction, Reconciliation.'” 23 His “duty to remember” presents a competing view from the RPF narrative.

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20 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 70.
21 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 114.
22 It should be noted that Rurangwa is analyzing Rwanda from afar. There exists a lot of testimony from survivors who actually live in Rwanda that pushes for the rebuilding of the nation. See We Survived Genocide in Rwanda, ed. Wendy Whitworth (Nottinghamshire: Quill Press, 2006).
23 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 117.
RPF liberation may have rebuilt the nation-state, but that does not make it synonymous with the traumatic existence of Tutsi survivors. Rurangwa found the state narrative insulting, especially the culture of forgetting. He cites Kagame as telling citizens, “Shut your feelings in the cupboard and throw away the key.”²⁴ Rurangwa’s memoir stresses disillusionment between traumatized Tutsi survivors and the RPF liberation narrative.

Rurangwa becomes a case study of both mental and physical trauma. Traumatic memory lives within him physically. Horribly deformed, Rurangwa’s body testifies to the crimes committed in his community. Despite his disgust of his appearance, he refuses major plastic surgery on his face in order to preserve the evidence of Hutu atrocities. He explains:

And even if I struggle to cope with my own image, I want to keep the hallmarks of this evil scored into my body. That way, I carry out a double duty of remembering. The Hutus have cleaned up the churches, the fields, all the sites of the genocide, but they cannot take my scars from me. Memorials may display carpets of skulls or carefully piled-up tibias and femurs, but survivors' scars remain the living, bodily, palpable witness to the crimes against humanity.²⁵

Refusing to repair his body becomes a way of re-claiming his body. It also serves as evidence against the perpetrator’s crimes. But he also argues that even the evidence displayed at memorials forgets. While historical artifacts are symbols of cruelty, the individual agents of these crimes cannot be discerned. The wounds testify to the cruelty, the malice, and the humiliation committed in cold blood by members within his community. He knows who committed the murders, and his wounds testify that the crimes occurred. The preservation of his deformities allows him to fight a state-imposed culture of forgetting.

The mental trauma from his experience plays a large role in his mission to remember. The memoir stresses that the memory of the genocide for survivors is continuous. He describes the eyes of his family’s killer [Sibomana] in detail, “The eyes of your assassin. They stay in your

²⁴ Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 77.
²⁵ Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 82.
mind's eye until death. I will never forget the black pupils of Simon Sibomana the moment he brought down his blade on my head. They are seared in my mind forever.”

Rurangwa remembers the hatred, the humiliation, and the cruelty of the perpetrators. This traumatic memory lives within him. He describes his ordinary day-to-day activities in exile as marred by “flashes of butchery.” He plays the scenes of genocide in his mind over and over again. He imagines ordinary people on the streets suddenly attacked by genocide perpetrators. Rurangwa continues to re-live the memory and undergoes a constant cycle of re-traumatization. He cannot forget because the memory lives inside him. Sadly, his story parallels other collectives forced to internalize their memory because of their contradictions to the states’ status quo.

But the preservation of such traumatic memory also risks de-contextualizing the entire conflict. A critique of such traumatic memory certainly can appear cold and cruel, but traumatic memory also risks fostering divisions for future generations to read and re-invest into their own society. Specifically, he writes that the Creator divided Rwanda into “three ethnic groups who cohabitated as peacefully as fingers on the same hand: Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa pygmies.” This narrative supports the interpretation of the pre-colonial era as a harmonious period of history:

In the original paradise, each would be happy with his lot and would give thanks to God for the lot of the others. The Tutsi blessed God for the Hutus’ good harvest and the Twas' bountiful hunting; the Hutu praised God for giving the Tutsis such beautiful inyambo cows and such generous quarry to the Twas.

In this narrative, the divisiveness in Rwandan society originated only with the colonialists. This interpretation conflicts with the scholarly consensus that inequalities did exist in Rwandan society pre-colonialism. Catharine Newbury argues, “the vision that colonialism disrupted a

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26 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 45.
27 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 84.
28 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 29.
29 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 31.
perfectly harmonious system does not concur with the record: pre-colonial Rwanda was a state with serious social inequalities, and some powerful political actors used their power arbitrarily and abusively.”30 The vision of original harmony simplifies the historical interactions between the three identities. The reasons Hutu killed become a mystery that originated with the implementation of colonial rule. Rurangwa writes a reactive response by rejecting the myth of Tutsi invasion, but in doing so the Hutu becomes a sort of inherent evil.

Rurangwa does not hide his hatred of Hutu, and considering his experience that becomes understandable. He writes for instance, “The hatred of one Hutu, of the Hutus, of all the Hutus, bores into me in that instant like the teeth of a harpoon that can never be removed, so deep does it penetrate the flesh.”31 But he also disregards any intellectual responses or historical contextualization to the murder. He argues that no study of the genocide can properly translate the magnitude of the horror because words cannot represent such pain. He uses his personal pain to dismiss the historical agency to the genocide. He writes, “I'm convinced that you cannot simply reduce the explanation of the genocide to political motives, economic rationales, not even to ethnic rivalries.”32 He further argues that the evil unleashed by the genocide remains a mystery that “goes beyond our mental capacities and our powers of analysis.”33 He further de-contextualizes history by confirming the re-framed linear narrative of pre-colonial harmony. The genocide becomes an exceptional phenomenon and a binary between good and evil.

31 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 44.
32 Rurangwa, My Stolen Rwanda, 32.
33 Ibid.
THE HUTU RESCUER IN *AN ORDINARY MAN*

Writing after Terry George adapted his story into the 2004 film *Hotel Rwanda*, Hutu hotel manager Paul Rusesabagina’s *An Ordinary Man* presents a different perspective from that of Révérien Rurangwa. The hotel manager for two major hotels in Kigali, Rusesabagina befriended high level contacts and used favors gathered over the course of several years to help save over one thousand Rwandans at the *Hotel Milles Collines*. As a moderate Hutu married to a Tutsi, his life was in constant danger during the genocide. He sheltered his family in the hotel. Over time, the hotel took in more and more fleeing refugees. He used the hotel’s alcohol supply to keep the *Interahamwe* out. Despite many attempts and threats by the militia to wipe out the hotel’s inhabitants, Rusesabagina used his contacts in the army to avoid any massacres occurring within the hotel grounds. His friends included the likes of Georges Rutaganda, later convicted by the ICTR for genocide crimes. His relationships with such *génocidaires* became a point of controversy in several political and intellectual circles, especially after he expressed several critical comments of Paul Kagame. Nonetheless, the account establishes several important points in conceptualizing the genocide. One, not all Hutu killed. While he certainly does not downplay the fact that the majority of Hutu took part in the massacres, he argues that they still had a choice. This breaks from the rigid conceptualization of the Hutu as inherently evil. Two, he illustrates the role of history and the memory of history in the perpetration of these crimes. Three, he critiques the Kagame regime for participating in the cycle of political elitism.  

Rusesabagina describes the genocide as exemplifying the violence of words. He writes, “Words are the most effective weapons of death in man's arsenal. But they can also be powerful tools of life. They may be the only ones.” He emphasizes that words on the radio stations,

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34 He visited Rwanda after the release of *Hotel Rwanda*, but after his critical comments of Kagame he is now considered a *génocidaire*.
newspapers, and militia pushed ordinary people to commit horrifying atrocities. But for
Rusesabagina, he used words to negotiate the safety of 1,268 people. Words consisted of his
only tool for haggling away favors and defusing situations in which militiamen insisted on
killing those inside the hotel. He makes sure to emphasize that he does not view his actions as
heroic. Rather, he prides himself only for keeping his humanity in an inhumane context. He
writes, “I did what I believed to be the ordinary things that an ordinary man would do. I said no
to outrageous actions the way I thought that anybody would, and it still mystifies me that so
many others could say yes.”
Fundamentally, Rusesabagina’s account grapples with the
question of why some people committed atrocities and others did not. He uses his memory from
the genocide to illustrate that morality and empathy did exist in Rwanda. As a result, his
memory fights the idea of using the massacres as proof to an inherent evil in mankind.

Rusesabagina negotiated with the génocidaires in order to save Rwandans. He balanced
negotiations between people who lived in both the “world of machetes” and the world of
“civilized conversation.” He describes the normalcy by which he negotiated for the lives of the
refugees with these military officials as terrifying. He explains that he saw these people not
through an extreme lens of good and evil, but rather a lens of “soft” and “hard.” He writes, “It
was the soft that I was trying to locate inside them; once I could get my fingers into it, the
advantage was mine.” He argues that he saved lives by treating the killers as rationale human
beings. He writes, “If you stay friendly with monsters you can find cracks in their armor to
exploit. Shut them out and they can kill you without a second thought.” He details an instance
where Georges Rutaganda saved several children from the Interahamwe. On the criticism for
maintaining his friendship with Rutaganda, Rusesabagina argues, “People are never completely

good or completely evil.” 39 Even the perpetrators performed acts of empathy. He argues, “in order to fight evil you sometimes have to keep evil people in your orbit.” 40 Rusesabagina does not deny that evil existed within these perpetrators, but he does not describe it as inherent or determined. He demonstrated the ability to manipulate them to feel a bit of empathy.

Ultimately, he seeks to place the good deeds of anonymous Rwandans in the collective genocide remembrance. He writes about other acts of heroism by ordinary Rwandans who saved others, “Their good deeds are lost to history. The murders were anonymous and irrational, but the kindness and bravery were there in scattered places too, and that is a big part of what gives me hope for the future.” 41 He argues that these people viewed the world as a “decent place” and believed in Rwanda’s restoration. 42 He denounces the viewpoint of mankind's inevitability to commit atrocities as “the fundamental perversion of genocide.” 43 In other words, he argues against the idea of an inherent evil in mankind. To remember the genocide in this manner means playing “into the hands of those who excite racial hatreds as a device to acquire more power.” 44 In this manner, Rusesabagina’s account fights genocide ideology by simultaneously fighting the view that the genocide occurred spontaneously and naturally.

In addition to critiquing the rigidity of good and evil, Rusesabagina provides a historical summary that critiques the simplified histories established by Rurangwa, the RPF, and the international community. He argues that any explanation of the genocide must acknowledge the role of history. He states upfront, “History is serious business in my country. You might say that it is a matter of life and death.” 45 He describes Rwandans as obsessed with their own history. He

39 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 129.
40 Ibid.
41 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 201.
42 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 66.
43 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 203.
44 Ibid.
45 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 14.
points out that Hutu extremists used history in their propaganda that demonized the Tutsi, but also that Tutsi used a similar distorted history to maintain power during the colonial period. He also complicates pre-colonial history by pointing to the role of mwami dynasties, royal assassinations, violence, and an emerging cattle-owning class of Tutsi elites. He explains that the duties of the royal advisers involved remembering the national history though poems, songs, and stories. He writes, “In Rwanda, political power has always been linked with control of history.” He calls the ethnic cleavage “artificial political distinction” amongst a relatively unified nation. But he also remarks that the “two groups have been living uneasily alongside each other for more than five hundred years.” While he does not expand his point, this may be interpreted as pointing to larger trends of inequality around land and cattle.

He argues that there is no evidence of two separate races of Hutu and Tutsi; he points to inequalities around wealth. He writes, “In precolonial Rwanda…it wasn’t land that was used to reckon a person’s wealth. It was cows. Those who didn’t have cattle were forced to turn to growing crops for sustenance and took on the identity of Hutu, or ‘followers.’” In this sense, he includes the traditional client-patron relationship of ubuhake into his history. While he confirms the unified national history, he also breaks by showing the emergence of a Tutsi elite surrounding the mwami and points to the significance of ubuhake in the historical narrative.

Like the linear historical model, Rusesabagina places colonialism and the implementation of the Hamitic hypothesis as the turning point in Rwandan history. But instead of focusing on the genocide as historically determined, he showcases the malleability of history by arguing that the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi became racialized into hatred during

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49 Rusesabagina, *An Ordinary Man*, x.
51 Ibid.
He characterizes the past as a competing history in which years such as 1885, 1959, 1973, 1990, and 1994 contain contested meanings to national identity. He cites 1973 as an example to this interplay of competing memories. In 1973, the government expelled his Tutsi friend Gérard from school. When explaining why, Rusesabagina points to Burundian President Michel Micombero massacre of nearly 2,000 Hutu during a Hutu uprising and the subsequent refugee spillover into Rwanda. He contextualizes Gérard’s expulsion as an act of revenge by the Rwandan government for Micombero’s massacre. He points to the ways in which the internal politics of Burundi affected the internal politics of Rwanda, and therefore places the conflict in a much larger regional context. While he does not emphasize Hutu suffering, he at least explains their suffering at the hands of Micombero. In addition, he gives some agency to the government’s expulsion of Tutsi students. This does not excuse the policy (he calls it “idiotic” and expresses his guilt for his political power as a Hutu), but contextualizes it as a racist policy.

that emerged in response to another act of violence by the Burundi government. By linking Burundi and Rwanda into one regional crisis, the reader learns of the double victimization narratives and their subsequent politicization.⁵⁶

He calls this politicization of history an obsession, writing, “We are obsessed with the past. And everyone here tries to make it fit his own ends.”⁵⁷ He establishes the subjectivity of history in pushing Rwanda towards perpetration. He writes:

I am fully convinced that when so many ordinary people were swinging machetes at their neighbors in the awful springtime of 1994 they were not striking out at those individual victims per se but at an historical phantom. They were not trying so much to take life as to actually take control of the past.⁵⁸

He argues for a contextualization of the perpetrators as more than political pawns. They killed for a reason, albeit an incredibly cruel and inexcusable one. By linking memory and history to this explanatory narrative, Rusesabagina does not excuse the actions of perpetrators. Rather, he contests explanations of the genocide that dismisses the perpetrators actions as random. By giving them an explanation for their motives, he signifies that he could also give them reasons to not murder.

This interpretation of history as a political cycle comes to fruition in his conclusion. He severely critiques the Kagame regime. He accuses them of merely setting up another elitist regime instead of embarking on reconciliation.⁵⁹ In response to their claims of democracy, he accuses them of merely employing “Hutus for hire” in order to rubber stamp the illusion of democracy. He writes, “We have changed the dancers but the music remains the same.”⁶⁰ In doing so, he creates a cyclical political narrative. He attributes the “culture of impunity” to a

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⁵⁶ Unlike Rurangwa's demonization of all Hutu, Rusesabagina acknowledges the eradication of moderate Hutu. This further emphasizes the political nature of the killings. Moderate Hutu challenged the regime and therefore experienced the same fate as Tutsi.
⁵⁸ Ibid.
⁶⁰ Ibid.
lack of acknowledgment of the role of power cycles in Rwandan history. He writes, “The dictates of the mwami were followed by the plunder of the country by Belgians and then the corrupt ethnic visions of Habyarimana, with the balance of power always bouncing back and forth between the races, and neither side learning anything from the ashes and bodies.”

These critical statements came in the wake of his controversial lecture tour in which he blasted the Kagame regime. There are reports that the Rwandan government originally liked the film adaptation Hotel Rwanda. Director Terry George wrote an article recalling a private screening in 2005 which Paul Kagame expressed his approval for the film’s role in revealing the genocide to the larger world. But after Rusesabagina made critical comments of the regime, he was persona non grata. In June 2006, Kagame said: “It [the portrayal of Rusesabagina as a hero] has nothing to do with Rusesabagina. He just happened to be there accidentally, and he happened to be surviving because he was not in the category of those being hunted.”

The Rwandan government soon began a smear campaign against Rusesabagina. In 2010, the government accused him of funding the FDLR in the DRC from America. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the legitimacy of these claims, but it appears suspicious that these claims only emerged shortly after Rusesabagina criticized the legitimacy of the 2003 elections. There certainly exists a legitimate question concerning the nature of Rusesabagina’s friendship with such figures as Rutaganda. The portrayal of Rusesabagina as an African Oskar Schindler also raises concerns considering the use of the Mille Collines to save only privileged Hutu and Tutsi. But the government’s criticism of Rusesabagina’s integrity also raises a number of questions. For example, why did the Rwandan government allow the film to be shot on-site in

61 Rusesabagina, An Ordinary Man, 199.
Rwanda in the first place if they so objected to the story? One conclusion that can be made is that by using his fame to challenge Kagame politically, Rusesabagina effectively sentenced himself to a life of exile. Now considered a génocidaire, his exile signifies the politicization of the genocide and its memory.

TUTSI POLITICAL DISSENT IN GOD SLEEPS IN RWANDA

Former Speaker of the Rwandan Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi gives an insider account of the political rise of the RPF in late 1990s parliamentary politics in his memoir God Sleeps in Rwanda. Sebarenzi (a Tutsi) grew up in Kibuye and witnessed the 1973 Tutsi pogroms. Facing discrimination in the education system, his father sent him to a Congolese Island in the middle of Lake Kivu to receive an education. After the Rwandan civil war commenced Sebarenzi, his wife Liberata, and their young children managed to escape Rwanda to Burundi and the Congo. He ended up watching the genocide unfold live on television in Michigan. He lost most of his family. Returning in 1995 he took jobs at non-profits and with USAID, before becoming influenced by friends to run for parliament. He was nominated for the Speaker of the Parliament despite no experience in politics. He served until 1999, despite presenting ideas that conflicted with Kagame and the RPF. He eventually fell out of favor with Kagame in 1999 and was forced to resign. He sought exile. His account complicates the image of the RPF and Kagame. This section should not function as a hagiography of Sebarenzi, but rather a testament to the RPF’s decision to continue the cycle of political exclusion in post-genocide Rwanda.

Sebarenzi opens his account with his childhood memory of the 1973 Tutsi pogroms as a way to introduce the role of cyclical victimization and power abuse. He describes the Rwandan President as historically an authoritarian figure, one to whom Rwandans “listen closely, for what he says could mean the difference between life and death. When you hear him, you don't form
opinions. You nod your head in agreement.” He portrays Rwanda as both a complicit society and violent one. He relays the ways in which political violence played out on the personal level in his memory of 1973, a moment that also served as a loss of innocence due to his exposure to the political meanings of Hutu and Tutsi. In 1973, Hutu raided their Tutsi neighbor’s land and committed mass atrocities as part of a larger political conflict. Many of these neighbors actually protected Sebarenzi and his family due to respect for the father.

While their Hutu neighbors protected their property, other Hutu arrived demanding to kill Sebarenzi and his family. But before they could carry out the act, a distant drum rang through the countryside signifying the end of the pogrom (called *muyaga*). Sebarenzi writes that later he learned of the larger political context of the killings, “The massacre of Tutsi had been going on for several weeks in other parts of the country, precipitated by fighting within the Hutu leadership and growing dissatisfaction with the president's regime. In an effort to rally support for himself, the president mobilized Hutu against a common enemy: the Tutsi.” This does not excuse the perpetrators actions, but rather situates the political violence in a larger, volatile context. This establishes the culture of fear and atrocity as power-related as opposed to historically determined.

By focusing on cycles of power Sebarenzi ultimately expands the definition of victimization by remembering Hutu victimization. When Sebarenzi returned to Rwanda in 1995 after the genocide, he noticed how the power changeover played out in the life of Tutsi and Hutu. As a Tutsi he felt safe in RPF-occupied Rwanda, but he also felt a power shift because many Hutu did not feel safe. He noticed the ways in which human rights violations committed

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66 Sebarenzi, *God Sleeps in Rwanda*, 16.
68 Sebarenzi, *God Sleeps in Rwanda*, 81–82.
by the RPF created a culture of fear among Hutu communities. Just as Hutu political power in the 1970s instilled fear in Sebarenzi’s Tutsi community, the political changeover to Tutsi power produced the same fear for Hutu. This cycle of fear contradicts the RPF’s claim as Rwandan liberators because they partly stem from actual RPF human rights violations during the civil war and in the Congo. They also stem from the emerging RPF autocracy in the late 1990s.

Sebarenzi illustrates a country and political system gripped by fear of Kagame and the RPF, a narrative that flies in the face of the image of the RPF as heroic liberators explored in such films as *Kinyarwanda*, *Munyurangabo*, and *Hotel Rwanda*. Instead, he depicts them as a cunning military organization that disregards the Constitution, the rule of law, and slowly imparted single-party rule in the late 1990s. He reflects:

> When, in the wake of genocide, it [the RPF] didn't take advantage of its military and throw out the [Arusha] Peace Agreement, I believed the RPF was seriously committed to building a country based on rule of law...So when [Kagame] slowly started weakening the parliament, the executive branch, the judiciary, we didn't realize what was happening.  

Instead of openly installing a military dictatorship, Sebarenzi explains how the RPF overruled the Constitution and rule of law bit by bit. Starting in 1997, Kagame (in complete violation of the Constitution) started purging judges in the judiciary in favor of RPF-controlled appointees. Sebarenzi protested the smear campaigns and forced resignations as violating the constitution but to no avail. On these purges Sebarenzi writes, “When Kagame decided that he didn't like someone, they weren't just removed from power, they were ruined. Smear campaigns would begin from which the victim's hardly ever recovered.” Some justices like Vincent

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70 Sebarenzi, *God Sleeps in Rwanda*, 137.
72 Sebarenzi, *God Sleeps in Rwanda*, 159.
Nsanzabaganwa died in mysterious circumstances, others disappeared.\textsuperscript{73} When questioned over violations of the rule of law, one RPF leader lashed out at Sebarenzi by calling the current law “leftovers” from the Habyarimana regime and therefore irrelevant.\textsuperscript{74}

As the transitional government neared its end in 1999, the RPF continued to disrupt the legislature in order to guarantee its interests. In particular, they forced a measure that gave political parties authority over its parliament members.\textsuperscript{75} This allowed the RPF to control the entire parliament by pressuring and intimidating the other political parties into becoming RPF proxies. In a short period of time, the new measure helped sack nearly all parliament leaders who disagreed with the RPF. Most of these former parliament members ended up in prison.\textsuperscript{76} Political leaders and civil society stayed silent throughout this process, and more RPF opponents disappeared as people remained complicit to Kagame out of fear. Sebarenzi writes on this silence, “Our tolerance abetted the growing dictatorship. The international community also kept silent, trading Rwanda's seeming stability for democracy, not realizing that the economic recovery and stability rested on shaky ground.”\textsuperscript{77} This complicity takes a personal tone in the memoir as Sebarenzi writes about his own Kagame-orchestrated smear campaign, his eventual forced resignation, the abandonment of his political allies, and his flight to exile in Uganda. The illusion of stability masked a much deeper political purge as the RPF-controlled executive branch gobbled up the judiciary and legislative branches.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{73} Sebarenzi claims that the RPF needed to put justices on the bench that guaranteed its business interests, including many illegal smuggling practices. See Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 143-144.
\textsuperscript{74} Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 145.
\textsuperscript{75} Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 147.
\textsuperscript{76} Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 150.
\textsuperscript{77} Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 156.
\textsuperscript{78} At this time, tensions between Hutu and Tutsi continued because of the war being waged at the time in the Congo. According to Sebarenzi, these tensions and fears resulted in the relative unpopularity of the RPF in the late 1990s. In fact, by the end of the transitional government in 1999 it remained highly unlikely that the RPF could have won free elections. See Sebarenzi, \textit{God Sleeps in Rwanda}, 152.
God Sleeps in Rwanda presents several important contradictions to the official narrative. One, he paints a picture of Kagame that contrasts with the predominant heroic characterization. He portrays Kagame as a master manipulator. It took Sebarenzi nearly an entire year to schedule a meeting with Kagame (who at the time held the posts of Vice President, Minister of Defense, and Chairman of the RPF party). He describes the meetings as full of contradictions: Kagame often voiced his approval for Sebarenzi’s legislative plans, but afterwards Sebarenzi received threats and orders from RPF members. Kagame’s support of Sebarenzi’s political activities always held a strategic twist. After parliament investigated corruption charges, “I later learned that Kagame supported our investigation of these ministers because he wanted many of them out of office himself. His support was tactical, not principled.”79 The memoir depicts Kagame as a morally ambivalent leader, a master at masking his interests in maintaining power, and dead set on imposing his will and vision on the entire state.80

Two, Sebarenzi’s story distinguishes the Tutsi survivor from the RPF supporter. His childhood attests to the institutional inequalities facing Tutsi during the Hutu republic. Since a majority of his family died during the genocide, his narrative speaks of the widespread sense of lose in the Tutsi community. But he clearly defines the RPF as a political movement that (while it certainly ended the genocide) held interests concerning power independent to many Tutsi. For instance, he writes that many Tutsi circles held unpopular views of the 1990 RPF invasion.81 In the late 1990s, many Tutsi survivors and former RPF financial backers ended up imprisoned or

79 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 155.
80 At the same time, he cites Kagame’s personal background as a reason why he acts this way. Kagame grew up in horrible conditions in Uganda. In his entire life, Ugandans treated him as a second-class citizen, even after he helped Yoweri Museveni win power in the Luwero Triangle and after attaining a high position in the Ugandan military. Sebarenzi writes, “He was raised in a world where human rights were trampled on, and in turn, he trampled on human rights.” See Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 171-172.
81 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 60.
exiled due to ideological differences with the RPF. Sebarenzi’s story certainly demonstrates that the well being of the survivor did not always coincide with the well being of the RPF.

Finally, Sebarenzi emphasizes that democracy will not exist as a long-term possibility until reconciliation occurs. He argues that the current system contains deep flaws that impede reconciliation. He defines reconciliation as bringing enemies together to confront the past, something he sees contemporary Rwanda as lacking. He argues that this did not occur in Gacaca (the local community-led courts for genocide perpetrators), where the objective involved punishment as opposed to restorative justice. He argues that reconciliation must be the principle form of nation building as opposed to Kagame’s brand of elitist capitalist development and single-party rule. While one may argue that he idealizes the reconciliation process, he at least tries to shift attention away from the state’s definition of reconciliation towards a more intimate definition. Otherwise, he argues that Rwanda will remain a state stuck in a historical cycle of power and state oppression.

HUTU VICTIMIZATION IN SURVIVING THE SLAUGHTER

Marie Béatrice Umutesi writes from a different perspective than Rurangwa, Rusesabagina, and Sebarenzi: the plight of the Hutu refugee in Zaire from 1994 through 1997. Leading Rwandan scholar Jan Vansina calls her memoir Surviving the Slaughter: the ordeal of a Rwandan refugee in Zaire a “literary monument” that sheds light on the roughly 300,000 refugees who died between 1996 and 1997 at the hands of the RPF and other armed groups in

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83 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 214.
84 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 217–218.
85 Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda, 209.
massacres and death camps. In his review Vansina writes, “It is a story that has been suppressed by all parties involved: governments, armies, international organizations, and media.” She does not deny the suffering of Rwandan Tutsi, rather her memoir seeks to remember that the thousands of Hutu refugees massacred by the RPF and its proxy armies also fell victim to genocide.

The RPF killed several members of her family prior to the assassination of President Habyarimana. She writes in great detail about her flight through Zaire escaping from the invading RPF and the AFDL rebels. From 1994 to 1998, she fled from refugee camp to refugee camp throughout eastern Zaire. She witnessed malnutrition, atrocity, rape, murder, and theft. As part of the Hutu educated elite and a head NGO worker, she continued her efforts to empower refugees in the Zairian refugee camps. In addition, she details the discrimination that fleeing refugees experienced at the hands of many Zairians. She attests to RPF crimes in the Congo between 1994 and 1997 from her traumatic memories, and she challenges the ways in which the international community ignored the fact that many Hutu refugees were not génocidaires but innocent women and children. She writes, “I have been through Hell, have known horror, and now that I have escaped I want to testify in the name of all the men and women who did not have my luck and who died in Hell.” As a survivor of the RPF’s purges in the Congo, her written word allows her to document the horrors experienced by the dead. Her memory functions as evidence of a conflict overlooked and covered up by both the RPF and the international community.

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87 Ibid.
88 Important to note that the term “rebels” refers to two groups in this memoir. During the Rwandan genocide, “rebels” referred to the RPA. During Umutesi’s flight through the Congo the term referred to Laurent Kabila’s RPF-backed Congolese rebel group the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL).
Umutesi starts her history of Rwanda during the Tutsi-ruled colonial era. Her narrative revolves around the political nature of the Hutu and Tutsi identities. She emphasizes that the colonial system politically marginalized the Hutu and privileged the Tutsi. Utilizing her family history, Umutesi brings up her family's experience of life under Tutsi colonial rule. She describes it as an unfair system in which every Hutu served under a Tutsi ruler in a client-patron system. She writes, “A Tutsi could even throw a Hutu out of his own home and occupy it himself if he wanted to.”\textsuperscript{90} While survivor narratives like Rurangwa’s \textit{Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda} pushes the historical fact that colonialism divided Rwandan society, such narratives often de-emphasize the exploitation of Hutu by the favored Tutsi elite. Umutesi inherited this memory of victimization from her family history. She does not excuse the later violence against the Tutsi by extremist Hutus, but she does provide an explanation by emphasizing that the Tutsi exclusion developed after a particularly exploitive time for Hutus. What emerges is a history of oppression directed toward groups excluded from political power.

Umutesi de-emphasizes the role of ethnicity in the genocide’s origins and places increased emphasis on the role of regionalism, socio-economics ties, and the Tutsi refugee crisis in Uganda. She places the rise of regionalism as an important factor in explaining tensions in Rwandan society, pointing to the President Party’s concentration of power in north.\textsuperscript{91} She also stressed the Hutu Republic’s failure to address the Tutsi refugee situation as another factor because it intertwined the internal affairs of Uganda with that of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{92} She writes that this allowed Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni to use the Rwandan refugee situation to his advantage, “Helping the Rwandan refugees recapture power in their own country was the most appealing solution for the Ugandan president. It allowed him to get rid of these allies, who were

\textsuperscript{90} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 7.
\textsuperscript{91} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 13.
\textsuperscript{92} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 17.
becoming a nuisance, to legitimize his power with the Ugandans and to have a friendly regime in Rwanda.”

93 But she also takes a more bottom up approach by highlighting the food and resource shortages infecting the lower classes of Rwandan society. Economic shortages created a situation during the civil war where peasants murdered each other over small amounts of food and money. She writes, “People did not want to acknowledge that if, for a few thousand francs or a couple of bottles of beer, unemployed youth would kill innocent people in cold blood, people with whom they themselves had no argument, they could kill thousands if given the means.”

94 This dire economic situation became an advantage to political leaders “who used militias to impose their own law.”

95 While on the surface her explanation risks removing accountability from the perpetrators by blaming the system or bad politics, it also serves to re-contextualize the genocide as a historical event that developed out of long-term regional and economic historical trends.

Through this view of oppression on both sides, she reassesses the genocide. She writes, “The Rwandan tragedy is complex. There are not simply victims on one side (Tutsi) and guilty (Hutu) on the other as we have been led to believe.”

96 She immediately refutes the idea of binaries between good and evil. For example, she places responsibility on the RPF’s invasion as a trigger for widespread massacres. She writes:

An attack by the refugee Tutsi would inexorably lead to massacres of Tutsi in the interior of the country…I hoped that the refugee Tutsi would exhaust all possible peaceful means before risking the lives of thousands of innocents. I didn't realize yet that life isn't worth much when power is at stake.

97 She distinguishes the motives of the invading RPF from the well being of the Rwandan Tutsi. Her narrative emphasizes the political power play between the RPF and Hutu extremists as a

93 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 18.
94 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 41.
95 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 37.
96 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 73.
97 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 19.
determinant factor in explaining the context behind these massacres. What benefited the RPF did not always benefit the Tutsi.

Even before the genocide, she experienced a silencing of her family’s suffering in the north. She worked at an NGO with many Tutsi co-workers. They believed the RPF did not commit atrocities. She writes of the day rebels arrived in her mother's village:

Women ran up and down all the streets calling the children, who were screaming and crying, not knowing what was happening... Bodies of the people killed that morning were found in ditches six months later, after the agreements for the withdrawal of the RPF forces were signed and people returned to their homes. Among the dead were my cousins Bizimana Laurent, Kazimana, and many other members of my family. 98

Among her Tutsi friends, she silenced herself from voicing what happened to her family. She writes, “When I denounced the crimes of the RPF, I was treated like a Hutu extremist [by her Tutsi NGO co-workers]. For the most part, to have some peace, I had to bear my sorrow in silence.” 99 Her family’s victimization in February 1993 became internalized. She writes, “No one could speak out loud about his or her pain. Only the victims were blamed. The killers had all the rights. It was only much later, in other circumstances, that I began to speak and write freely about the death of my loved ones.” 100 Her experience showcases the importance of expanding the parameters of victimization not only to the Congo, but to also include the victims of RPF human rights abuses during the civil war.

As the RPF took over Rwanda, Umutesi followed the mass of Hutu refugees into Zaire. For several years she migrated from refugee camp to refugee camp, setting up NGO networks devoted to aid. Her writing details a horrifying existence, from the uninhabitable conditions to the always-present threat of a massacre by rebel or RPF forces. She fills her pages with references to specific massacres, places, and events ignored or forgotten by most of the world.

98 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 24-25.
99 Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter, 34.
100 Ibid.
She unofficially adopts several orphans, suffering the heartbreak of losing them to disease or separation during the mad scrambles to ford rivers. But most of all, Umutesi writes her memory of life on the run in the Congo in a manner that humanizes the Hutu refugee. She argues that the international community did not differentiate between the Hutu perpetrator and the innocent Hutu refugees, especially at the horrifying refugee death camp of Tingi-Tingi. She writes, “I had heard that some countries and international organizations had even declared that there were no more Rwandan refugees in the eastern part of Zaire, apart from some Interahamwe and their families who deserved, it seems, their fate.” Despite the RPF’s stance that they entered the Congo to fight Interahamwe militias (who committed their own attacks on Rwandan soil), many women and children died in the camps and on the run at the hands of the RPF and its sponsored rebel groups.

She uses her account to specifically indict the international press and the UNHCR’s complicity with forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees. She writes of the press:

> When they [the international press] did mention the Rwandan refugees, when they finally accepted that we still existed, the journalists were only interested in the presence of members of the militia at Tingi-Tingi…Of our daily life, of the Hell we had lived in since the destruction of the camps in eastern Zaire, of the horrifying death that awaited those lost in the forest, of the massacres perpetrated by the rebels, not one word.

Eerily similar to the press’ complicity during the Rwandan genocide, Umutesi claims that this time the press paid too much attention to the Interahamwe and not enough on the lives of the innocent refugees. The murder of refugees by rebel forces was white washed. In addition, the UNHCR started forcefully repatriating Rwandan refugees. Umutesi depicts repatriation as effectively a death sentence. Local Congolese even formed bounty groups that made money

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101 Umutesi, *Surviving the Slaughter*, 145.
102 Ibid.
104 Umutesi, *Surviving the Slaughter*, 155.
by turning in Rwandans. On the mission of the UNHCR, she writes, “The UNHCR had only one
goal: repatriate the Rwandan refugees either willingly or by force. The measure of success was
simply the number of people repatriated, and not the welcome that was reserved for them once
they got there or whether or not they wanted to go.”\textsuperscript{105} Ignored by the press and the refugee
organizations, Umutesi discovered that only her legs could make a difference.

While Umutesi eventually escaped Zaire, she depicts her journey on the road as “Hell.”
The sick collapsed and died alone on the side of the road, just as hundreds of refugees passed
them on the side of the road.\textsuperscript{106} She writes of one revelation after coming across a girl of sixteen
abandoned on the road, left for dead, her body devoured by bugs. She writes of her revulsion:

> What crime had all of these victims committed to deserve such a death? Where
was the international community that talked about human rights but withdrew
when they should have prevented the genocide of the Tutsi by the Hutu militias
and when they should have condemned the massacres of the Hutu by the RPF?
Where was this international community…which abandoned us once again and
let us wander in the forest like wild beasts and which allowed this young girl of
sixteen to collapse on the road like a dog, food for the ants of the equatorial
forest?\textsuperscript{107}

She places the Tutsi genocide on par with the Hutu refugee experience, a claim the RPF
continually tries to diminish. Yet, Umutesi questions the difference by bearing witness to the
numerous people who died in silence. This specific image of the girl becomes her mission
statement against her feelings of powerlessness. She concludes, “Even now, more than a year
later [1998], the image of this girl haunts me and with it the feelings of futility and revulsion that
I felt every time that I found myself faced with the death that lurked all around me and against
which I was utterly powerless.”\textsuperscript{108} This image encapsulates the necessity for avoiding
intellectual interpretations of the conflict that set rigid victim-perpetrator binaries or place a

\textsuperscript{105} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 208.
\textsuperscript{106} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 165.
\textsuperscript{107} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 166.
\textsuperscript{108} Umutesi, \textit{Surviving the Slaughter}, 166.
geographic fence around Rwanda. People died on both sides, and neither side’s suffering should be diminished in favor of the other. The refugee spillovers entailed mass death and suffering; Umutesi’s memoir argues against pushing them aside.

CONCLUSION

When evaluating the implications of these memoirs on the historical remembrance of the genocide, several points stand out. To begin with, the genocide extended far beyond the RPF liberation. For many survivors, the mental trauma and physical injuries made living side by side with perpetrators unbearable. While in most cases they endured, Rurangwa presents an extreme example of those who chose exile. The lack of an immediate justice system made life difficult for many survivors. Secondly, the immediate post-genocide Rwandan political environment saw the rise of another elitist regime. While the international community generally hailed the RPF for bringing a visible stability to the country, in reality the RPF merely continued the historical legacy of elitist power. Despite their claims of rebuilding a unified nation state, their trajectory appears eerily similar to the single-party rule of the Habyarimana regime. Finally, the events that transpired in present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo are a byproduct of Rwandan history, of which the memory of Hutu victimization has been silenced. These narratives do not fit in the RPF’s liberation narrative. There exists a more complex history, a story that encapsulates the entire region and where the line between victim and perpetrator is permeable. Unlike official memorials, museums, or state-sponsored films, the written memory finds a way to push beyond the limits of the constructed national history. Written in dissent, these four memoirs provide a glimpse to a more complicated world, a cruel world, and a world in need of re-evaluation from those who seek a full understanding of the Rwandan genocide.
CONCLUSION

René Lemarchand writes that current Rwandan political discourse views genocide remembrance as “remembering to forget.” He suggests a different memory discourse for conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region—a “remembering to forgive.”¹ This project has looked at a major challenge to this idea: the narrowing of competing memories of Rwandan victimization into one official historical and political view. In a context of dual victimization, the official narrative leaves out the memory of atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army. But as a regional phenomenon, this suppression of memory is hardly new. Looking beyond Rwanda’s borders, acknowledging the history of genocidal suffering in the Hutu community may hold as big a role in ending cycles of violence as remembering Tutsi victims.

Part of the problem in implementing reconciliation in Rwanda involves the fact that the region is still living in the aftermath of the forgotten 1972 Burundian genocide. A twin-state to Rwanda, in 1972 the Burundian Tutsi-Hima military killed somewhere between 100,000 to 300,000 Burundian Hutu.² Triggered by a Hutu uprising against the Tutsi-dominated state, the 1972 massacres have been at the center of historical revision. After the violence ended, the Burundian government only recognized the killings of Tutsi during the Hutu uprising as genocide. The Tutsi military rationalized their violence as necessary for preserving power, and they revised the official narrative to make their point. While reports indicate that somewhere around 800 to 1,200 Tutsi died in the uprising, the Burundian government claimed that number reached 50,000.³ On a more global level, the international community ignored the 1972

genocide. When informed of the massacres, President Richard Nixon lashed out at the State Department’s silence:

This is one of the most cynical, callous reactions of a great government to a terrible human tragedy I have seen…Biafra stirs us because of Catholics, the Israeli Olympics because of Jews; the North Vietnamese bombings because of Communist leanings in our establishment. But when 100,000 (one third of the people of a black country) are murdered, we say nothing.4

But despite the outrage, sadly not a single member of the Tutsi-led government or military has been held accountable. The memory of victimization in Burundi played a large role in Hutu extremism during the 1994 Tutsi genocide, and continued to de-stabilize Burundi into the 1990s and 2000s.

But the Hutu refugee experience in Eastern Congo in the mid 1990s presents perhaps the most contested memory facing contemporary Rwanda. After the 1996 RPA invasion and takeover of Hutu-extremist run refugee camps, somewhere from 200,000 to 350,000 Hutu refugees disappeared off the face of the map.5 While the RPA invaded and dismantled Hutu refugee camps out of a legitimate threat of a counter-invasion, the subsequent violence killed innocent Hutu in addition to Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces. The RPF admits to killing thousands of Hutu, but argues that all casualties were génocidaires.6 The RPF maintains that all innocent Hutu had already been repatriated, a claim that has since been disputed. While many Hutu died from disease, many scholars and reports claim that the RPA and its proxy AFDL rebels hunted down, rounded up, and massacred thousands upon thousands of innocent Hutu.7

As remembered by such survivors as Marie Umutesi, many others died from exhaustion fleeing

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6 Lemarchand, introduction to Forgotten Genocides, 15.
from the Rwandan and rebel forces. Lemarchand and Reyntjens note that while the current incarnation of the Hutu génocidaire guerilla force—the FDLR—endures and recruits out of a distorted view of a double genocide, their claim of Hutu victimization at the hands of the RPA are not unfounded.\(^8\) While some might argue that the violence in East Congo was not genocide, the memories of victimization for thousand of Hutu has been suppressed in the current Rwandan state. As indicated by Lemarchand the Reyntjens, the names of such refugee death camps as Tingi-Tingi and Bukavu remain largely unknown to the international community as sites of Hutu victimization.\(^9\) Many Hutu (both innocent and guilty of genocide crimes) live in a Rwandan society run by the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity.

These two events—central to many Hutu memories of victimization—provide for a more complicated narrative than the one presented in Rwandan film, memorials, and museums. Coexistence and reconciliation between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi presents many challenges to peace building. For many scholars, the ways in which the present narrative conceptualizes the conflict calls for a re-evaluation of the current historical model for remembering genocide. Catharine and David Newbury in particular caution against viewing the 1994 genocide as an African example of the Jewish Holocaust. Acknowledging the effect to which the memory of the Holocaust influences interpretation of modern genocidal conflict, they write of a danger in viewing contemporary conflict as mirroring the Holocaust narrative:

> There is a tendency to place emphasis on ethnic divisions and hatred without taking adequate account of the complex internal political and social dynamics that have shaped both ethnic and class divisions, and competition over power in Rwanda…Concentration on ethnic hatred and…comparisons with the Holocaust has led some observers of the Rwandan genocide to assume that all Tutsi were

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\(^8\) Reyntjens, “Mass Murder in East Congo,” 36.

victims and liberators of Rwanda in this conflict, and all Hutu were complicit in mass murder.10

The predominant Holocaust model’s binary of good and evil simplifies the complex political and class history of Rwanda. Lemarchand similarly emphasizes that when assessing the Great Lakes region, the dual memories of genocide in both communities dismiss any simplified “good guy-bad guy” explanations.11 Both Lemarchand and Mahmood Mamdani point out that genocide holds more in common with the challenges experienced in post-apartheid South Africa than post-Holocaust Europe.12 As argued by Mackenzie Hamilton, the current Rwandan government contains frightening similarities in its control of speech and official discourse to the Habyarimana regime.13 Considering the dual narrative of victimization, any state building in Rwanda must acknowledge that mass atrocities occurred in both communities performed by both political and military regimes. The discursive evidence presented in this project adds to an already enormous body of scholarly evidence that showcases the shortcomings of the official historical narrative in making this point.

When looking at the Rwandan model for restorative justice, the need for recognition of dual victimization becomes even more evident. Rwanda decided to implement a justice system called Gacaca as a means of trying genocide perpetrators. Historically, Gacaca had been employed as far back as the 16th century as a grass roots form of justice for reconciling

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community disputes. The traditional system promoted reconciliation in addition to punishment. The system of Gacaca implemented in 2004 by Rwanda modified several elements of historical Gacaca. This included the possibility of sentencing individuals convicted of genocide-related crimes to prison terms, and the sentencing of prisoners who confessed voluntarily to community service. The system contained three categories of genocide crimes. Category one included individuals who contributed to the planning of the genocide or committed sexual crimes during the genocide. Suspects who participated in murder or injury qualified for category two crimes. Finally, category three included those who committed property crimes. The Gacaca law designed these trials to be community oriented. Suspected perpetrators were tried in front of the entire community. Witnesses delivered their testimony in front of the entire community.

While appearing on the surface as a successful example of grass roots justice, the justice system silenced the memory of Hutu victimization from RPA crimes by not bringing RPA perpetrators to trial. In Max Rettig’s fieldwork on the Gacaca court system, one Hutu woman’s private testimony from 2007 gives an example to this silencing:

Hutus were killed after 1994. Some were shot in the camps; others in their homes. RPA soldiers killed people in Sovu and Maraba and in the camps. RPA soldiers killed people in Sovu and Maraba and in the camps. People were taken away from their families and they never came back. There should be justice for the crimes committed by the Inkotanyi [RPA] in 1994, 1996, and 1997. Some survivors even came with the Inkotanyi to kill people in the camps and in homes.

One can argue that Gacaca provided a feasible justice model for a context in which the number of Hutu perpetrators outweighed the judicial resources for conducting all trials in the official law enforcement system.

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court system. But at the same time one can also argue that *Gacaca* continued the use of victor’s justice in its silencing of RPA crimes.

The suppression of RPA crimes carried over to the larger international criminal court set up for trying Rwandan genocide crimes. The United Nations formed the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try genocide perpetrators, but the UN negotiated exclusively from the beginning with the government of Rwanda in determining whom to prosecute. This marked a stark contrast to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), which tried war crimes committed by both the Croat and Serbian governments that fought in the Balkan wars.\(^\text{17}\) Instead, the UN formed the ICTR seeking to create a strong alliance with the Rwandan government.\(^\text{18}\) An argument can be made that the Rwandan government used its victim status as leverage by threatening to pull out after the ICTR attempted to try the RPA for war crimes.\(^\text{19}\) In both the local and international justice systems for trying Rwandan *génocidaires*, the RPF government dictated whom to prosecute.

A truth and reconciliation model presents one theoretical option for finding a de-politicized middle ground between Hutu and Tutsi victimization. The end of South African apartheid in 1994 brought the challenge of how to transition to democratic rule. South Africa was transitioning specifically to majority rule, which meant that the minority whites needed to give up power to the majority blacks. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) commission sought to reveal the crimes committed during apartheid on both sides and seek forgiveness as a means for unifying the nation. Instead of victor’s justice, the commission sought to open up dialogues between the two sides. In addition, crimes committed by the ANC


\(^{18}\) Ibid.

were also disclosed. By granting amnesty, the commission sought to implement an environment that disrupted the cycle of violence between the whites and blacks.\(^{20}\)

While not a perfect model, South Africa chose a reconciliation and state building strategy that valued the revealing of African National Congress (ANC) and Afrikaaner crimes over capital punishment. Writer Antjie Krog observed many of the challenges, pitfalls, and triumphs of the TRC model in her account *Country of My Skull*. The amnesty clause for perpetrators endured major criticism from the ANC and the families of victims. Krog recalls Minister of Justice Dullah Omar emphasizing, “But to humanize our society we had to put across the idea of moral responsibility—that is why I suggested a combination of the amnesty process with the process of victims' stories.”\(^{21}\) Krog observed that part of this humanizing and healing of South African society came from the revealing of long-suppressed testimony. Krog writes, “Now that people are able to tell their stories, the lid of the Pandora’s box is lifted; for the first time, these individual truths sound unhindered in the ears of all South Africans.”\(^{22}\) While debates over amnesty generated politicized tensions in the country, in many cases amnesty and truth created individual cases of forgiveness and reconciliation between whites and blacks. A widow whose husband died at the hands of a notorious Afrikaaner police officer felt a need, “to hold him by the hand, and show him that there is a future, and that he can still change.”\(^{23}\) An anonymous letter from an Afrikaaner delivered to Archbishop Desmond Tutu expressed, “I don’t know what to say, I don’t know what to do, I ask you to forgive me for this—I am sorry about all the pain and the heartache. It isn’t easy for me to say this. I say it with


\(^{22}\) Krog, *Country of My Skull*, 60.

\(^{23}\) Bangura, “The Politics of the Struggle to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda,” 159.
a heart that is broken and tears in my eyes.” At the same time, the TRC allowed white victims of ANC attacks the opportunity to tell their stories of victimization.

Will directly transplanting the South African TRC model into Rwanda guarantee reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi? No, each conflict contains its own distinct set of variables. First and foremost, the Rwandan conflict produced more perpetrators than victims while the South African conflict produced the opposite. In addition, the transparency between perpetrator and victim is not as clear in the Rwandan case as in the South African case. While the ANC did commit acts of violence against the whites during apartheid, the South African conflict possesses a clearer distinction of identifying whites as perpetrators and blacks as victims. Only whites held power in South Africa, while both Hutu and Tutsi took turns holding power in Rwanda. This muddies the reconciliation process considerably in Rwanda because, as Mahmood Mamdani points out, “the identification of perpetrator and survivor is contingent on one’s historical perspective.” A new reconciliation model that takes into account these distinctions will need to be designed. What the South African TRC model does illustrate is the need for a shift in discursive and philosophical tone in any future Rwandan reconciliation model.

Krog writes on this shift in South Africa brought upon by the TRC:

The human rights of black people were violated by whites, but also by blacks at the instigation of whites. So the Truth commission was forced to say: South Africa’s shameful apartheid past has made people lose their humanity. It dehumanized people to such an extent that they treated fellow human beings worse than animals. And this must change forever.

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24 Krog, Country of My Skull, 62.
25 In one heartbreaking example, Krog writes of a gripping testimony from a White man who lost nearly his entire family in one land mine attack. See Krog, Country of My Skull, 64.
26 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 267.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Krog, Country of My Skull, 77.
While a more inclusive narrative may not be possible as long as the RPF remains in power, the philosophy of the South African TRC shows the possibilities in a reconciliation process that opens its doors to all competing narratives. As Rwanda comes to terms with its dark past in the post-genocide era, this I.S. project confirms the necessity for a more inclusive official narrative and reconciliation model as a means for preventing future conflict.
APPENDIX A

THE HUTU TEN COMMANDMENTS, 1990

1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Muhutu who:
   • Marries a Tutsi woman;
   • Befriends a Tutsi woman;
   • Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine

2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, secretaries and more honest?

3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.

4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor
   • Makes a partnership with Batutsi in business;
   • Invests his money or the government’s money in a Tutsi enterprise;
   • Lends or borrows money from a Mututsi;
   • Gives favors to a Batutsi in business

5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Bahutu.

6. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.

7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.

8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.

9. The Bahutu, whoever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.
   • The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers;
   • They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;
   • The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.

10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor.

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Liberation is a journey,
Rwandese of Rwanda and Rwandese outside of Rwanda,
All you speak Kinyarwanda,
We descend from a common culture.
Come, we’ll sit here in Rwanda,
Immersed by the culture of Rwanda.
Let’s remember how liberation came,
Unleashing heavy burdens in my youth.²

When I was young and just a child I played in mud and heard of hate.
Rwanda readies children for war,
Children chosen and armed against enemies.
I heard that Tutsi were roaches and should be stomped,
With tails like snakes, they should be killed.
We were given bows and spears,
And foreign countries gave us guns,
Really.

Darkness came to Rwanda, machetes in place of peace,
I saw people killed,

¹ “Chapter Ten: The Poet,” Lee Isaac Chung, Munyurangabo (Film Movement, 2009)
² The poem begins emphasizing a common culture, a historical perspective pushed to combat the distorted myths of Tutsi migration.
Muslims and Christians worked together,
Joined by machetes and their will to kill.
And our Rwanda burned. Rivers flowed with bodies and corpses covered fields.
Rwanda’s youth led the battle.

Don’t you know that this is injustice?
That out Rwanda, its beautiful river and pools,
Its beautiful fields with roads and no famine,
Became a cemetery and a shame,
Don’t you know that this is injustice?

And the RPF army I was taught to hate,
Decided that it was time to defend Rwanda.
Should Rwanda die?
Should there be widows?
Should the dead be shamed?
They said, “no!”
War began in Kinigi, in the heat.
Everyone was involved, so understand my children,
It wasn’t about guns or weapons.
It was about a fight for truth.
I will thank them wherever I am.
Their heroics will be known worldwide,
From Darfur in Sudan, to the Comoros Islands,\(^3\)

They will be admired, and I’ll see them the way the Pope sees his church.

But now that they have conquered, I ask of them.

Free us from poverty and illiteracy since the liberation is a journey.

I’ll start with the family, the foundation,

I condemn that many men don’t allow their wives to have a voice.

They hit them and think they’re mindless.

Who gains from this?

Man of mustache and small mind,

Hairy chest and without pity.

You burden your wife to stay in the house.

You are killing our vision of being a strong nation.

And the children I see, working so hard,

Everywhere picking tea and coffee, but they can’t even afford soap.

What a shameful image of Rwanda.

Give children what he needs and he can become a king.

His parents will live in peace and his family will be safe.

Young girls miss school and are given a broom,

And they die in the valley because education is only for their brothers.

A wife works and her husband hits her.

Who will save her?

Where will liberation be?

\(3\) The RPF sent military intervention forces to Darfur and Comoros. The stanza overall portrays the RPF as a liberation force.
And men work hard, sweat pours down,
But he makes no money and it’s never enough.
Don’t you see that this is injustice?⁴

Let liberation come, and let liberation be a journey.
Away from prostitution and toward wisdom.
To new projects done with fervor, the rich one can prepare a gift to give the poorest one.
And how poor is he?
A house of wheat and bed of wheat,
And he eats just wheat, and he’s thrown out like wheat.
Really.
Our beautiful Rwanda with beautiful river,
Beautiful pools and fields with roads,
And no famine.
Tell me. Will it remain a cemetery without justice?
Don’t you see this is injustice?

Let me speak further.
What happens in the village genocide courts?
Let just justice liberate, let truth replace lies in Rwanda.
Sitting together on the grass without division or hate,⁵
Without lying to each other.
And we live in peace and the guilty seek forgiveness.

⁴ The stanza reflects the RPF’s development goals.
⁵ “Sitting together on the grass” refers to the community Gacaca courts.
Our future is already failing, unless we begin our journey well,

Helping widows and orphans.

And fool for the man in runs with nothing.

What is left is to share everything.

As we battle against hate, I wish you all the best.

And so I close here, a poet will speak again.

Peace to you in Rwanda, peace everywhere.
I used my Copeland Fund to travel to Rwanda for three weeks from December 17, 2012 to January 8, 2013. Upon my arrival, I submitted and attained official permission from the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG). I met with an official in genocide research in order to introduce myself and present my proposal. CNLG’s Executive Secretary Mr. Jean De Dieu Mucyo signed off on a research permit that allowed me to conduct research at the following memorial sites: Gisozi (Kigali Genocide Memorial), Murambi, Nyamata, Ntarama, and Nyarubuye. Specifically, the permission allowed me to photograph the sites. The photos I took are disturbing. As described in chapter four, these memorials preserve bodies and skeletons of victims. As I visited these sites, I wondered on the ethical implications in taking photos of anonymous dead bodies. Sharing these photos with friends, family, and fellow scholars also caused me to question my purpose in taking these photographs. I share these photographs for educational purposes. In particular, they show how visiting these sites can be a traumatic experience for visitors. As Rwanda moves on into the post-genocide period, these sites have become important places of mourning and education for both Rwandans and foreigners.¹

¹ All photographs that appear in this Appendix are the property of Jordan Broutman.
Figure 1A: The protective roof over the church.
Figure 1B: Broken stained glass windows from the massacre.
Figure 2A: Blood on the ceiling from machete attack.
Figure 2B: Shelves of skulls and bones inside the former church.
Figure 3A and 3B: Site on brick wall where perpetrators smashed the skulls of children. The memorial uses product to preserve brain matter.
Figure 4A and 4B: Damage from grenade attack.
Figure 5A: A Tutsi identity card displayed at Ntarama.
Figure 5B: Rosaries recovered from the remains of victims.
Figure 6A: Machete from attack.
Figure 6B: Preserved clothing of victims draped on the walls.
Figure 7A and 7B: The attacks from April 14 to April 16, 1994 killed around 5,000 Tutsi in the church grounds alone.
Figure 8A and 8B: Damage from grenade and artillery fire.
Figure 9A and 9B: The Nyamata memorial preserves the clothes of victims in the church’s pews.
Figure 10A and 10B: Like at Ntarama, the Nyamata memorial preserves the blood that spurted onto the ceiling during the attacks.
Figure 11A and 11B: Rwandan church memorials present conflicting messages of the sacred. The former altar at Nyamata displays machetes, identity cards, and victims’ rosaries, which compliments the victims’ clothes in the pews. The memorial illustrates how the sanctuary of the church did not save Tutsi during the 1994 genocide.
Figure 12: The Virgin Mary surrounded by a bloodstained wall from the attacks.
Figure 13: The tomb of rape victim Mukandoli Annonliata inside the memorial chamber dug into the church’s foundation after the genocide.
Figure 14: The Nyamata memorial includes a mass grave that visitors can walk through. Bones are stacked on several stories of shelves.
Figure 15A and 15B: Around 10,000 Tutsi died at the Nyamata church in mid-April 1994. Visitors can often see the way the victim died based on bone lacerations.
Figure 16A and 16B: The Murambi memorial preserves the remains of Tutsi victims by dosing the bodies in limestone casts. The bodies are slowly decomposing however, a process that can be seen underneath the table in 16A.
Figure 17A and 17B: The preservation technique allows visitors to see the last moments of the victims. Often victims raised their arms over the heads to ward off machete blows, a moment that Murambi preserves.
Figure 18A and 18B: Some rooms are filled with mothers cradling their children.
Figure 19A and 19B: The bodies of babies are particularly devastating to the visitor.
Figure 20: Immediately after viewing the rooms of preserved remains. The tour moves to a site marking where a French flag stood during *Opération Turquoise*. The French had an army camp next to the mass graves.
Figure 21: Site where French soldiers played volleyball. Mass graves sit next to the volleyball court.
Figure 22: The sticks sitting in the hallowed out log were used as sexual weapons by perpetrators.
Figure 23A: The *pilli-pilli* sauce jug.
Figure 23B: The Nyarubuye memorial displays the multitude of weapons chosen by the perpetrators.
Figure 24A: A car jack stained with blood.
Figure 24B: A cartoon from the Hutu extremist propaganda publication *Kangura* sitting amongst a pile of victims’ shoes.
Figure 25: Somewhere between 40,000 to 50,000 are reported to have died around the Nyarubuye church grounds.

Figure 26: A rock used by Hutu perpetrators to sharpen machetes.
Figure 27A: A stove claimed to have been used by the *Interahamwe* to cook Tutsi carcasses for cannibalization. Figure 27B: The severed abdomen of a Virgin Mary statue. The *Interahamwe* thought the statue looked like a Tutsi.
Figure 28: Mass graves for reburials. Bodies discovered in the area surrounding Nyarubuye are reburied with respect in these mass graves.
Figure 29: The Garden of Unity.

Figure 30: Stream descending from the Garden of Unity to the Garden of Division.
Figure 31: The Garden of Division.

Figure 32: The Garden of Reconciliation.
ANOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES


In this interview with the Boston Review, We Wish to Inform You author Phillip Gourevitch discusses the challenges of remembering atrocity. He speaks of a “fetishization of memory,” or an unquestioned belief in a duty to remember atrocity. He makes a case that such memory risks fostering grudges and divisions. Gourevitch also answers criticisms to his writings that hold Paul Kagame to a high regard.


Journalist Paul Ames reports from the Nyamata and Ntarama massacre sites in 1996. He interviews a Tutsi survivor and a Hutu survivor. At the Nyamata church, community began to bury bodies in a pit dug into the sanctuary. The Hutu survivor hid Tutsi in his home and subsequently fled the Interahamwe. In 1996 a memorial at Ntarama existed in a tent beside the church consisting of bones gathered from the area. The Hutu survivor interviewed at Ntarama explained that they did not immediately bury them out of necessity to show the world what happened. While they did begin the process of burying the bodies in mass graves, the article demonstrates that bodies were still viewed as evidence and necessary for display at memorials. Memorials thus become not only a place of grief, but also constitute a place of evidence and documentation.


The audio guide for KGM takes the visitor first to the memorial gardens and then through the memorial museum. The gardens’ commemorate various victim groups from the genocide, presents a linear historical representation, and provides time for the visitor to reflect. The memorial museum provides a similar linear historical progression. The exhibition’s main focus is to account for the international community’s failure to intervene and to commemorate the dead.


The 2004 PBS Frontline documentary Ghosts of Rwanda highlights the failure of the international community to intervene. The film interviews Paul Kagame, Roméo Dallaire, Madeleine Albright, and many other key members of the international community. The film illustrates how the international community knew that genocide was occurring and did next to nothing. The film does not mention RPA war crimes or a Rwandan historical context. The film appears to have been produced to shock a Western audience.
In a New York Times article, journalist Andrew Blum (a second generation Holocaust survivor) describes visiting the Gisozi and Nyamata genocide memorials. He begins the article by describing his visit to the site of the Wansea conference. He came to the memorial site expecting to learn more about the Holocaust, but instead he left feeling unable to make rational sense of what happened. He went to Rwanda with the hope the ‘freshness’ of the Rwandan genocide might provide him with more answers to the concept of genocide. Instead, he found contradictions between the historical perspective of the memorial and the genocide’s reality in every day Rwandan life. He describes visiting the bodies and decaying artifacts represented at the Nyamata memorial as “relieving.” The overwhelming nature of the stench somehow exempted him from having to understand what happened. Instead of a rational explanation of the genocide, the experience became a ‘mere’ overwhelming sensory experience. Guyer cites this specific idea in her article “Rwanda’s Bones.”


Alrick Brown’s feature film *Kinyarwanda* tells the story of the survival of Hutu and Tutsi at Kigali’s grand mosque. The film interweaves many interconnected episodes in which the Kigali Catholic and Muslim communities come together to survive the genocide. The RPF liberates them before their inevitable demise at the hands of the Interahamwe. The film depicts the RPF favorably and as fighting a war of attrition for a unified Rwanda. The film thematically promotes national unity and reconciliation as the only way for creating a unified and reconciled Rwanda.


Michael Caton-Jones depicts a fictional story of European heroism in his feature film *Beyond the Gates*. The film tells the story of a Catholic Priest and a young English schoolteacher who choose to stay behind and rescue their Tutsi friends. While the young schoolteacher ends up leaving at the last moment, the white Priest ends up sacrificing his life to save a handful of Tutsi children. While the film showcases the international community’s abandonment, the martyrdom of the Priest provides for a questionable redemptive narrative considering his sacrifice did not actually occur. The audience leaves the film with the image of white heroism as opposed to a full emphasis on the international failure.


Reporting from the Nyamata site in 1997, journalist Diana Cahn briefly sketches the burial process at Nyamata. Initially the Catholic Priest refused to allow for burials within the church, even thought the building was no longer used as a place of worship. Residents expressed initial hesitance to burial in first few years in order to show the international community what happened. Additionally, the community had little money
for the mass burials. They received money from the government and other organizations to dig a crypt inside the Church and eight crypts outside. The article interviews one local official who describes this process of burial as necessary for creating a place for people to mourn and pray for their loved ones. Proper burial becomes a way for giving the dead dignity. The article’s brief interviews with residents describe the genocide as an unavoidable reality. People are forced to live their daily lives despite their traumatic memories.


Lee Isaac Chung’s 2009 independent film focuses on post-genocide Rwandan rural society. The film tells the story of two boys (one Hutu and the other Tutsi) who journey through the countryside. Stopping at the home of the Hutu boy, Chung reveals that the two are on a mission to kill the genocide perpetrator of the Tutsi’s father. The film interweaves themes of RPF liberation, development, reconciliation, and forgiveness into a narrative structure that questions the value of remembering the genocide.


The RPF constitution includes a preamble that depicts the pre-colonial past. The preamble views the pre-colonial era as a harmonious utopia and the constitution overall legitimizes the RPF as a liberating institution.


Lt. General Dallaire’s 2003 account of his tour leading of duty leading UNAMIR serves as an eyewitness account to the international community failure in 1994. He provides a detailed narrative that bares witness to the UN’s negligence of the UNAMIR command in spite of evidence of genocide. He showcases the emerging political extremism in the political and military dynamics during the months before April, 1994. His account goes into great detail to attest to the UN and international community’s failure to intervene. He also showcases his own personal descent towards PTSD through detailing the horrifying scenes of genocide and its effect on his memory.


This BBC monitoring article re-prints a May 2009 New Time article reports Tony Blair's visit to Rwanda in May of 2009. Blair visited the Nyamata Genocide Memorial and expressed his grief and incomprehensibility of the numbers of lives lost during the genocide. He pledged never again, but also remarked on what he views as the country's transformation since 1994. He describes the country as exhibiting compassion for its people, which in his view represents a change in its history. This visit coincides with Rwanda's entrance into the commonwealth and reflects the developing partnership between the Anglophone community and the current Rwandan government. Blair
traveled to Rwanda in 2009 in order to launch his "Africa Governance Initiative." His visiting the Nyamata memorial symbolizes the ways in which the public memory at these memorials is used as part of the state's interactions with foreign diplomats.


This July, 2012 article from AllAfrica.com briefly announces Rwanda's proposal for UNESCO world heritage site status at several genocide memorial sites. The sites include the Kigali Genocide memorial, Nyamata, Bisceero, and Murambi. The status would pay Rwanda funds for preservation and security at sites. This article reflects a lot of the structural and monetary limitations I observed first hand at memorials such as Bisceero. It is expensive to maintain these sites.


The Rwandan daily The New Times reported a bombing at the Kigali Genocide Memorial on March 26, 2007. The bombing illustrates that the memorials exist as a site of contention amongst Rwandans. Only thirteen years removed from the genocide at the time, the bombing hinted at a society still struggling to reconcile.


Terry George’s Hotel Rwanda dramatizes Paul Rusesabagina’s story. Maybe the most popular cinematic representation of the genocide, the film portrays the ways in which Paul helped save over 1,000 Rwandans at the Hotel Mille Collines. The film provides little historical context other than blaming division on colonialism, but the film does break binaries by showing a Hutu man as a hero. The film’s finale consists of an RPF liberation scene, a process mirrored in more recent films like Kinyarwanda.


Hotel Rwanda director Terry George wrote this editorial after the RPF launched a smear campaign against Paul Rusesabagina. George noted how the government considered Rusesabagina a hero during the Kigali premier of the film. Kagame himself expressed his approval to George for the film’s accuracy. Once Rusesabagina started speaking out against Kagame, he became persona non grata and was accused of being a génocidaire. This serves as a great example to the ways in which the Rwandan government deals with their detractors.


An additional attack a year later at KGM showcased a continued discontent amongst Hutu at commemoration. The attack occurred amongst several acts of mental and physical violence performed by perpetrators against Tutsi survivors and commemoration sites.
American journalist Phillip Gourevitch’s account brought the Rwandan genocide to a mass western audience in the late 1990s. Gourevitch arrived in post-genocide Rwanda in 1996 and gathered various stories from survivors and perpetrators. He brought such stories as Paul Rusesabagina’s story of protecting over a thousand Rwandans at the Hotel Mille Collines. He interviews several génocidaires living in exile and current President Paul Kagame. His account examines RPF war crimes, but also rationalizes them as mostly stemming from ex-FAR forces threatening the RPF state in refugee camps and in the Congo. For this reason, many leading scholars such as René Lemarchand criticized Gourevitch’s role as a Kagame apologist.


In *Life Laid Bare*, French war correspondent Jean Hatzfield interviewed fourteen survivors from the Nyamata and Ntarama villages. The book tells their story, specifically stories of surviving the genocide and the challenges presented afterwards in continuing on with their lives. Several interviewees either survived the church massacres or had family who died inside. These survivors explain what the memorials mean to them. Overall, Hatzfield’s journalist account gives voice to a traumatized Tutsi population in one of the most infamous massacre regions from the genocide.


In his second collection of Rwandan testimony, French journalist Jean Hatzfield presents testimony of several Hutu perpetrators from the same Nyamata region as *Life Laid Bare*. He presents a chilling account of killers who will openly talk about the murders, yet distance themselves from openly expressing any remorse for their crimes. Interviewed in prison, the killers talk rather about the organization of the killings, the feelings of collective community during the murders, and how the killings felt like any other job. The work complicates any study attempting to discern why the Hutu perpetrators chose to kill.


A compilation of primary sources from genocidal conflicts, *The Holocaust and Other Genocides* includes “The Hutu Ten Commandments” propaganda document. The document illustrates the Hutu extremists’ political, economical, racial, and even sexual discrimination against the Tutsi. While the compilation does not go into great detail on the Rwandan genocide, it does provide interesting documents for the beginning Rwandan scholar.
Nick Hughes, director of the film 100 Days, talks about the ethical questions of representing the Rwandan genocide on film. He specifically criticizes the use of redemptive narrative that makes the audience feel better and provide a happier ending. A journalist during the genocide, he brings an interesting perspective to the filmmaking industry.


The memorial exhibition booklet includes all major panels and nearly all the wall text. The panels follow the linear historical perspective described in the audio tour and in the museum gardens. The exhibition does not mention RPA war crimes and depicts the RPF as a liberation movement.


This article from the Rwandan daily The New Times announced a RPF liberation museum in the northern province of Rwanda. Northerners suffered during the war. Many suffered at the hands of the RPA, while other got caught in the crossfire and moved away into refugee camps. A RPF museum re-emphasizes the ways in which the government applied the official narrative at will. It remains to be seen how northerners react to the museum.


This article looks at the debate between Rwandan civil society and the Catholic Church over burying victims in the Nyamata church. The Archbishop of Kigali cited canon law stating that only the Pope and bishops can be buried within church premises. The local community pulled together to build the Nyamata gravesite, and with government support wanted to turn the church into a shrine for the dead. Prime Minister Celestin Rwigema describes it as a way to make Rwandans aware of the barbarity they inflicted on each other in the past. The shrine strategy in this sense seems to take on a national character. By giving the dead an almost spiritual character, one may read the national government instituting a culture of guilt in order to maintain moral power over a divided society. But a more local perspective states that the dead died in the church, so they should be buried in the church as a memory to its failure to protect them.


Irish BBC journalist Fergal Keane reported from RPF and RGF territory at the tail end of the genocide. In his account he bares witness to the aftermath of the Nyarubuye massacre and seeks out the Hutu bureaucrat responsible for orchestrating it in a
Tanzanian refugee camp. He observes the RPF in action and then visits RGF territory. While in RGF controlled Butare he joins a convoy of Tutsi children sent by Butare bureaucrats to Burundi for safety. His account argues that there existed an unexplainable and unsettling evil in Rwanda. He emphasizes that his failure to find the source of this evil effected him long after he left Rwanda. Despite his attempts to remain neutral, the account is very pro-RPF. He endorses the RPF government in 1995 and his view of history corresponds with the linear narrative perspective.


Forensic anthropologist Clea Koff was part of the UN Tribunal team that exhumed bodies at massacre sites in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Her account details the exhumation and identification process in Kibuye, Kigali, Croatia, and Kosovo. She argues that the bodies provide physical proof against genocide denial, but they also contain a personal significance to relatives and survivors. Relatives and survivors came out determined to identify the remains of their love ones. Her book also shows that officials and survivors on the local were determined to create memorials without a presence from the national government. These sites don’t appear at first to be a part of nation building. The book also acknowledges the continuing war in Zaire as Koff witnesses an RPF execution of two Hutus trying to re-enter Rwanda by Lake Kivu.


South African writer Antjie Krog writes of her experience reporting on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in her 2000 account. She provides several significant insights. She reflects on the politicization and controversies over the amnesty clause for perpetrators. But her most important point revolves around the humanization of South African society through testimony. She argues that the unveiling of the horrific crimes committed in the past can pave the way for national healing, even when the past becomes strenuous. Her insights on the South African TRC provide an interesting model for contexts like Rwanda with dual communities who have undergone victimization.


Jewish-Italian Holocaust survivor Primo Levi writes of his experience as an Auschwitz prisoner in his 1947 account. Originally titled *If This Is a Man*, Levi opens his memoir with a poem arguing that the reader has a moral obligation to meditate and remember the horrors of Auschwitz. His memoir depicts the camp social structure, a moral conflict amongst prisoners, and philosophically questions the goodness in man.
In this April 2012 article, CNLG Executive Secretary Jean de Dieu Mucyo expands memorial site preservation from a government responsibility to a collective responsibility. He states, "It shouldn't be looked at as a responsibility of the government only; every Rwandan should have a stake in the maintenance of the memorial sites." Bisesero in particular has fallen into disrepair. The article explains that Bisesero raised concerns of collapsing in 2010, and renovations slowly commenced in 2011. CNLG claims that renovation of one memorial site costs rfw100 million. As a result, the article advocates for citizens to take initiative at local memorials. This article reveals the memorial sites budgetary issues pertaining to preservation. At the same time, the language used by Mucyo demonstrates how the government speaks to the public with a collective voice. This does not leave public space to debate against their model of memorialization.


This 2003 article from the time of Rwanda's first Presidential elections provides a glimpse to how Kagame used the memory of the genocide to campaign for President. The article reports that at one rally he asked the crowd to remember those who died in 1994 and to "confirm those who brought you peace and security." He also said that by voting for him "you will be protected." The article also reveals Rwanda's descent to a one-party state. Kagame's moderate Hutu opponent Faustin Twagiramungu explains that Kagame has instituted a culture of fear and obedience that impedes the democratic process. His party was outlawed and many party observers arrested.


Journalist Rodrique Ngowi interviews Dancila Nyirabazungu and Tharcisse Mukama at the Ntarama and Nyamata memorial sites in this 2004 article. They both give detailed accounts of their survival in the massacres. They both speak of having their hearts let go of the past, but they still cannot forget what happened to them. The article provides an interesting account of survivors' attitudes to memorial sites.

This April 2012 AllAfrica.com article announces Rwanda's plan to construct a “modern” memorial site at Nyarubuye. The article quotes a CNLG official who announces that they have only identified 28,000 of the 51,000 bodies for proper burial at Nyarubuye. He complains about the lack of help from the community in identification. The article also explains that the new memorial structures will preserve the remains for over 1000 years. The article provides a glimpse to the expensive challenges and long-term goals of the CNLG's official mission towards preserving these sites.


Raul Peck’s HBO production tells a story of two Hutu brothers. One, a moderate Hutu named Augustin is married to a Tutsi. The other Honoré, works for RTLM. Peck’s interweaves between Honoré’s trial in Arusha in 2004 and the death of Augustin’s family in 1994. The reconciliation between the two brothers potentially mirrors a reconciling of Hutu identity.


President Paul Kagame released an announcement that Hotel Rwanda contained many historical inaccuracies. Kagame called Paul Ruseabagina’s presence at the hotel an accident and downplays him as merely a survival opportunist. Kagame decried the ways in which the film “re-wrote” history. The detraction came after Rusesabagina began speaking out against the government.


US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice commemorated the 15th anniversary of the genocide by giving a speech in front of the KGM memorial. Rice spoke of her experience walking through memorial sites and how the experience emphasizes the need to prevent future conflict. Rice is generally considered a Kagame apologist, and is well known for pushing against a U.S. intervention during the genocide.


Tutsi genocide survivor Révérien Rurangwa recounts his family’s massacre by Hutu perpetrators in April 1994. He describes the horror as his neighbors mercilessly killed his family and left him severely disfigured. He also writes of his experience living in exile in Europe. He criticizes the Kagame government’s response to the genocide, arguing that Rwandan is “all about forgetting.” His book illustrates his bitterness as his Hutu perpetrators remain at large. He makes angry claims at an inherent evil in Hutus that comes from his continued torment by Hutu exiles in Europe.

Written after the release of *Hotel Rwanda*, Paul Rusesabagina gives his account of the survival at the Mille Collines. He answers his critics for his collaboration with Bernard Rutaganda and Augustin Bizimungu during the genocide, arguing that only through dialogue was he able to bring out empathy from perpetrators and save the Mille Collines refugees. Like Rurangwa, he criticizes the RPF post-genocide policies. He expresses particular anger at RPF war crimes that he witnessed in their aftermath. He argues that humanity did exist during the genocide and that arguing that violence is humanity’s norm plays into the hands of the génocidaires.


This 2004 African Times article briefly sketches the country’s debate over preserving remains at massacre sites. The article reports that the Government and family members of victims believe that burying bones might remove proof of the genocide and minimize the memory of the massacres. They advocate preservation as both a provider of evidence and as an expression of memory. Opponents include genocide perpetrators who worry that continued preservation could create further ethnic tensions for future generations. Other Rwandan consultants believe that these sites could eventually lead to international disapproval. The article also includes a short description of the Nyamata rape victim’s tomb in 2004. While not overly detailed, the article does show public debate on the memorials around the year 2004.


In October 2010, the Rwandan government accused Paul Rusesabagina of funding the FDLR from his home in Belgium. Rusesabagina dismissed the allegation as simply part of a ridiculous smear campaign.


Joseph Sebarenzi, former speaker of the Rwandan parliament, writes a harrowing insider’s account of Rwandan politics in the late 1990s. The heart of his memoir rests in his insider’s view of the RPF and Paul Kagame. He illustrates the Rwandan government’s descent towards single party rule. Sebarenzi tells stories of politicians who opposed the RPF and their subsequent disappearances. Eventually, Sebarenzi’s opposition to a bill that effectively gave the RPF control of the legislature led to an ugly smear campaign. Ousted from power, he fled for his life to Uganda. Paul Kagame emerges as a manipulative politician with precise control over the state and bent on preserving power. Sebarenzi uses his life story to theorize on a better reconciliation model bent on inclusion as opposed to victor’s rule.

John Hanning Speke, British explorer and geographer for the Royal Geographical Society, writes one of the first ethnographies of East African civilization in this account from early 1860s. On a mission to find the source of the Nile River, Speke encountered many of the major kingdoms of pre-colonial Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Speke looks at East African civilization from a Victorian racial lens. Shocked at the centralization of several of the kingdoms, he assumed that the rulers originated from a lost Semitic race of Ethiopia. His account became a guide for the later German and Belgian colonizers, and he is now considered one of the founders of the Hamitic hypothesis.


Canadian director Roger Spottiswoode adapts Gen. Dallaire’s memoir to the cinema in this 2011 docudrama. Spottiswoode’s film on one level faithfully adapts Dallaire’s observations from his memoir. On a second level, he shows Dallaire reflecting in flashback in a therapist’s office in the late 1990s. The film in this manner centers on both post-traumatic stress disorder and the international failure in Rwanda. But Spottiswoode also shows Paul Kagame in a heroic light, a point that Dallaire does not necessarily agree with in his memoir.


Hutu refugee Marie Béatrice Umutesi details her flight from the RPF from 1994 to 1997 in her memoir *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire*. Her account dissents from the RPF-dominant narrative by attesting to RPF war crimes in the Congo. She argues that her experience qualifies as genocide as RPF and its proxy Banyamulenge rebels hunted her and other Hutu refugees for several years as the international community did nothing. Her memoir brings to light the silenced memory of the Hutu refugee and argues that the genocide must be looked at as a regional conflict.


Totten and Ubaldo conducted interviews with survivors during the summer of 2006 in the midst of the Gacaca process. Originally researching Gacaca, Totten and Ubaldo decided to expand their research and focus on their subjects’ personal backgrounds. *We Cannot Forget* is the end result to their expanded research that lasted until 2009. They focused on Tutsi interviewees, and the book reveals the discrimination facing Tutsi before and the challenges in re-adapting to society post-1994. Themes of loneliness and fears of additional reprisal violence appear heavily in the interviews.


This Aegis Trust–released volume of testimonials includes an introduction from museum founder James Smith. Smith’s introduction mirrors the museum’s representation of
Rwandan history. The testimonies in the book come from several tour guides and memorial directors’ who survived the genocide. The testimonies provide a diverse array of stories from different regions of the country. Many of the testimonies conclude by emphasizing the need for unity and reconciliation. Others provide a more skeptical perspective, pointing out how hard it is to forgive.

SECONDARY SOURCES


Benedict Anderson, Professor Emeritus of International Studies at Cornell University, provides an interesting perspective on the history of the identity and the nation. Despite all the writings on nationalism, he points out that there haven’t been a lot of good definitions of the term. The concept of the nation and national identity has been accepted without much challenge. Anderson defines nationalism as imagined political communities. He also includes a chapter on memory and history that provides an interesting perspective on the role of history in the formation of French post-revolution identity. He quotes Renan’s argument that a nation must learn to forget divisive events in order to become one. At the same time, these events often become part of a “family history.” This book will help me define terms and provide secondary citation to the history of nationalism.


David Apter, deceased Professor of Political Science at Yale University, traces the emergence of the bureaucratic class in Ugandan colonial and post-colonial history. His 1997 introduction to the study provides an interesting re-evaluation of the scholarly interpretation of colonialism. He argues that while colonialism is a critical point in African history, too much focus on colonial rule diminishes the broader African historical processes that occurred before and independent of colonialism. He argues that the scholarship is shifting away from viewing colonialism as the fulcrum of African history.


Noted multi-disciplinary scholar Abdul Bangura looks at the role of Acholi reconciliation practices in northern Uganda and provides a comparative analysis to *Gacaca* and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While the three different contexts make a comparison problematic, he illustrates how they each provide alternative models to an international justice model. He emphasizes that the South African model emphasized the breaking of cyclical violence, an approach that does not always necessitate capital punishment.
Michael Barnett, International Relations Professor at the University of Minnesota, writes of the bureaucratic failure of the UN during the Rwandan genocide. A member of the US mission to the United Nations during the genocide, Barnett writes of how the Security Council refused to label the conflict a genocide in order to avoid legal ramifications. But he also argues that the UN was not necessarily heartless or amoral. Rather, the limitation upon the UN from the leading world power made non-intervention feel like a moral option to many UN officials. Barnett does not excuse this weakness, rather he contextualizes it as originating in bureaucracy that allowed its members to slip through the cracks.

Susanne Buckley-Zistel of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt argues that many Rwandans utilize chosen amnesia in order to co-exist locally. She conducted fieldwork in areas near memorial sites such as Nyamata district and Gikongoro. She argues for three reasons to this chosen amnesia: government coercion, fear of other group, and pragmatism. Overall, she argues that there has been an internalization of prejudice akin to decades of resentment internalized before 1994. She argues that Rwandans resume their daily life only through a chosen amnesia, or in other words remembering of what to forget. She argues that Rwandans don't necessarily deny what happened, but to internalize the division as a coping mechanism. This chosen amnesia risks covering up tensions and becomes vulnerable to manipulation by future dictatorships. She argues that most reconciliation studies focus too much on a macro perspective and not on a local perspective. This study emphasizes a bottom approach as Buckley-Zistel concludes by arguing that the micro level should influence all nation wide justice and reconciliation models.

Pat Caplan of Goldsmiths College writes a brief article and analysis of his trip to the Kigali Memorial Centre and the Ntamara and Nyamata memorials. The article provides a good bibliographical summary of key studies in dead body and memorial secondary literature. The article mentions the political significance of the bodies and that many scholars argue that the RPF is using the bodies to create a singular narrative. The article concludes that there is no right way for memorializing the Rwandan genocide, as visitors will read the memorials from different perspectives. While the bibliography is useful, Caplan does not provide much of an argument.

Cieplak interviews 100 Days producer Eric Kabera as part of his critique on the effect of image on memory. Kabera argues that “image is memory,” arguing that the image of places like Nyamata transports trauma to the viewer. He also speaks of the ways in
which image forces the viewer to acknowledge memory, a philosophy that can be seen at Rwandan genocide memorials.


East African scholar Jean-Pierre Chrétien of the University of Paris traces two thousand years of East African history in this 2003 study. In doing so, Chrétien contextualizes the recent violence in the region with centuries worth of anthropological, archaeological, historical, linguistic, and political data. His book succeeds in contextualizing the history of the East African civilization that European explorers of the Nile River “discovered” in the mid-nineteenth century. He shows how both the racial influence brought upon by Europeans and the pre-colonial legacy influenced the political violence of the present day. René Lemarchand has critiqued his works on the Burundian genocide for its overuse of the double genocide perspective.


Noted scholar of *Gacaca* Phil Clark provides a historical and political context around the court system. He illustrates the historical tradition of *Gacaca* as a significant factor in the government’s choice of a justice system. He also provides an informative discussion of the different categories of crimes tried at the courts. Overall, he emphasizes that the results are complicated and often vary from community to community.


Susan Cook of the University of Pretoria conducted field interviews with officials and visited memorials in 2000. The Rwandan government was still in the planning stages for memorialization and commemoration. She observed three strategies at genocide sites: the preservation of human and structural remains, memorialization and commemoration of victims, and documentation and research of events. She describes her experience visiting Murambi in detail. She differentiates between preservation and restoration. She argues that the decisions made on these two concepts will construct a frozen moment of historical time at the site. The article seems a bit biased to the RPF. She buys their vision on long-term education and forging international partnerships in remembrance. But she acknowledges her research as incomplete as it came out in the beginning of the memorialization phase in 2000. She acknowledges that the meaning at these sites change over time.

Alexandre Dauge-Roth, Associate Professor of French at Bates College, looks at the complexities and memory implication to representing the Rwandan genocide in writing and in film. For his section on cinematic depictions, he provides detailed analysis of such films as *Hotel Rwanda*, *Beyond the Gates*, and *Sometimes in April*. He shows the potential pitfalls in looking at these representations as history lessons. As cinematic images, they represent a past with relatively little historical footage. He argues that such constructed representations run the risk of indirectly fostering forgetting and genocide denial. By trying to make a comprehensive genocide story, the leaving out of certain details, events, and evidence can be viewed as genocide denial. If it didn't appear in the film, it is left out of the constructed memory. In other words, Dauge-Roth says that the genocide’s reality is contingent on the film’s representation of truth. Instead of an interpretation, the film becomes a reality. How the genocide is represented becomes accepted as a historical truth. He calls attention to the types of narratives such films choose to tell, as their construction often shapes the viewers understanding of the history.


Alison Des Forges, the late historian and human rights activist, writes a detailed account of Rwandan history from the 1896 royal coup to mwami Musinga’s removal from power. Des Forges in particular illustrates the role of inter-clan rivalry and Queen Kanjogera’s role in securing power for her son. Parallels from Des Forges’ account of the 1896 power grab can be applied to the current power play.


Alison Des Forges writes a comprehensive account of the genocide compiled from Human Rights Watch reports. Des Forges’ narrative depicts how the génocidaires planned, organized, and perpetrated the massacre of Tutsi. Her account provides a detailed narrative of the organized massacres of entire prefectures such as Gikongoro and Butare. She also devotes an entire chapter that supplies evidence that the RPF performed unprosecuted massacres and human rights violations before, during, and after the genocide.


Le Ann Fujii of the University of Toronto Mississauga argues against the dominant view that long simmering ethnic hatreds caused people to commit genocidal acts. She devotes an entire chapter that reviews the literature illustrating that ethnicity not as important as regional and political relationships in Rwandan history. Ethnicity is part of a constantly
developing elitist ideology. Through field research, she argues that local ties and group dynamics determined whether or not people joined or abstained from the killings. Her argument adds to the literature by illustrating how the "local" contributes to larger processes like genocide. She aims to discard the tendency to group collective groups (i.e. the Hutu) as "the masses." She presents a radical argument that ethnic hatred a consequence as opposed to the cause of genocide. She acknowledges the pitfall of conducting research in a politically repressive environment, but she also presents a case for the authenticity of her interviews.


Sara Guyer, associate Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, attempts to analyze the structure of Rwandan genocide memorials. Specifically she asks simply whether or not they memorialize the genocide. Several Rwandan genocide memorials display the bones of victims in crypts open to the public. She argues that this structure attempts to create a ‘witnessing’ experience of genocide atrocities. She looks at the accounts of journalists Andrew Blum and Phillip Gourevitch at the Nyamata, Nyarabuye, and Murambi memorials. She emphasizes that anonymity of these bodies makes the official remembrance narrative a representation of a population as opposed to individuals. She (and long list of scholars) argues that this makes the bodies political objects that justify the unquestioned power of the RPF. But she argues that displaying the bones alone does differentiate between genocide and mass murder. In addition, she argues that the anonymity of the victims fits the genocide’s ideology of dehumanization. Overall, she articulates that the mere inclusion of bones and the overwhelming ‘sensory’ experience does not lead to a greater understanding of genocide.


Emerging Rwandan scholar Mackenzie Hamilton of Smith College analyzes the suppression of free speech in post-genocide Rwanda. Hamilton argues that the censorship techniques utilized by the RPF mirror the same techniques employed by the Habyarimana regime before the genocide. Through analysis of Rwandan law and through various human rights reports, Hamilton calls for the international community to play closer attention to the RPF’s suppression of Rwandan civil society.


In her UNESCO paper, Lyndsay Hilker of the University of Sussex writes of the challenges in teaching history in post-genocide Rwanda. While she reports on education in general, she also writes specifically how history is a discipline completely controlled by the RPF. The teaching of history was actually outlawed in the mid-1990s until a government-sanctioned official history could be implemented. Overall, her paper looks at the ways in which political, social, and economical inequalities make the teaching of history a challenge and a work in progress.

Helen Hintjens, faculty member of the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), traces the ways in which racial mythologies, colonial legacies, and threats to power created the context in which the genocide occurred. She argues that genocide is similar to Nazi Holocaust, a point that has been refuted by the scholarly community as two separate historical contexts and processes. Such scholars as Johan Pottier have heavily critiqued Hintjens’ writings, arguing that she follows the RPF official line. While Hintjens does center the narrative on the colonial inheritance, her perspective is much more complex than Pottier gives credit. Hintjens grew up in Rwanda, and her perspective provides a detailed account to the multitude of reasons why the genocide occurred.


American author Adam Hochschild writes a powerful re-evaluation of the Belgian-Congo colonial state. He analyzes how Belgian King Leopold basically created a private colony to fund his kingdom. He used the state as a labor reservoir that killed thousands upon thousands of natives and depleted the environment of many natural resources. Hochschild’s work illustrates how colonialism created and accelerated many of the political and social problems that plague the area to the modern day.


Horowitz, Professor of comparative literature at the University of York, critiques Spielberg’s depiction of Jews, Gentiles, and women in *Schindler’s List* (1993). She argues that Spielberg depicts classical stereotypes of Jews throughout the film. She also critiques the eroticization of the Jewish female and the perceived re-establishment of Jewish tradition through Christianity. These criticisms reveal break down the perception of the film as a comprehensive historical representation. Rather, she argues that despite the documentary-like tone to the film, it should be examined as a film filled with aesthetic choices filled with biases.


Madelaine Hron, Associate Professor at the Wilfrid Laurier University, argues that the increase in feature and documentary films on the Rwandan genocide in the last decade produced three sub-genres of Rwandan genocide film: (1) the “retrospective” that attempts to represent specifically the events between April and July 1994, (2) the “post-genocide documentary” that looks at issues facing post-genocide Rwanda in reconciliation and justice, and (3) the “interpenetrative” that illustrates the ways in which the horror and memory of 1994 continues to traumatize present society. She reviews all
three sub-genres in her article. She argues that ultimately the Rwandan genocide may be an impossible history to depict in a comprehensive narrative, thereby breaking into smaller sub-genres over time.


An expert on Rwandan commemoration, Rachel Ibreck argues that while the Rwandan government uses genocide memory through commemoration to create a conception of politics, commemoration actually opens up the political space. Ibreck analyzes important components to commemoration such as ritual, official discourse, survivor trauma, and participation. Her methods include participant observation at commemorations at Murambi and interviews with Rwandans. She provides a slightly different interpretation than Lemarchand and Vidal, who argue that the RPF holds monopoly over public discourse. While Ibreck doesn’t deny the RPF’s grip on civil society and the state, Ibreck argues that commemoration of the genocide actually creates a social moment that breaks the RPF’s illusion of stability.


Janet Jacobs, Professor at the University of Colorado, analyzes the politicization of memorials and the "social construction of memory" at Ravensbruck, Ntarama, and Nyamata. She touches on arguments over the presence of religion at sites of terror, traditional belief systems, preservation of artifacts, and the national politicization of sites. She argues that these sites combine the feelings of the sacred and the profane to create a sacred sense of human despair. Her argument ends by stating that by remembering the visitor recognizes the power of life amongst the tragedy of human suffering. While I agree with her reading of the memorials, I question whether recognizing one’s individual life should be what the visitor feels at these sites. She clearly states that what is being interpreted as sacred is human despair. But I think her ending conclusion could be expanded into an analysis on the issues that these redemptive conclusions create in relation to genocide memory.


Janet Jacobs, Professor at the University of Colorado, critiques her methodology performed during research on a feminist ethnography of gender and Holocaust memory. She acknowledges the ways in which ‘double vision’ created ethical concerns. Her role as observer doubled as perpetrator. The heart of her article rests on her conscious emphasis on a feminist lens to her research. She expressed concerns of portraying the same voyeuristic tendencies relating to gender as the Nazis. She also explains that her approach created ethical concerns by diminishing the suffering of men and children. She concludes by questioning the possibility of actually conducting a feminist ethnography.
She acknowledges the concerns with “representing the victimization of women through the lens of sociocultural objectification.”


Villia Jefremovas, Professor at Queen’s College, writes of how ethnicity has been historically as a means of exclusion. She traces this process from the pre-colonial through the colonial and post-colonial eras. Jefremovas provides an excellent guide for understanding the historical fluidity of the terms meanings. Her review of the historiography provides an interesting parallel to the modern day, where she notes how the RPF felt the need to re-write a “correct” history.


Recently deceased New York University European History Professor Tony Judt argues that the ways in which Europe remembers the Holocaust defines the continents’ restoration and redemption from the legacy of World War II. He also emphasizes that this “Holocaust factor” did not begin in the immediate aftermath of the war. Judt, in his lifetime a European Studies Professor at New York University, contends that this influence developed over time. He maintains that the continent did not discuss Holocaust memory immediately after the liberation. To support his claim, he distinguishes between World War II memory and Holocaust memory. He cites “Vichy Syndrome,” referring to the collective selective memory of post-war memory as a continent wide occurrence that blurred out the memory of the Holocaust. Instead, exaggerated memories of resistance to German occupation in many occupied territories dominated the widely accepted historical narrative. References to the Jewish suffering and the Jewish voice did not fit into the rebuilding of these territories. But as time past and Israel rose to power, newer generations refocused on Holocaust memory. At that point, subsequent generations began to historicize the collective responsibility of Europeans in the Holocaust. Judt does well in emphasizing the changing historiography of Holocaust memory. He also succeeds in demonstrating that the effects of the Holocaust did not end with the liberations. Guilt, continuing prejudices, and overall shock all contributed to the suppression of the Jewish voice for several decades. In that regard, the book holds value in creating a lens for historians in sifting through the full out lies, half-truths, and missing voices on Holocaust memory.


Emmanuel Katongole, Associate Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame, re-evaluates the role of church and the nation-state in his 2010 account. An Ugandan who witnessed mass atrocity in his youth, Katongole argues that colonialism and the introduction of the nation-state violently changed the African discourse. He proposes a shift away from the legacy of the colonial nation-state (an exploitive, de-humanizing relationship) in favor of a Christian narrative of humanization. He posits a solution for solving violence as not only an embrace Christianity, but by separating it from the national discourse.

Elisabeth King of Columbia University argues that the Rwandan government only emphasizes memories of violence that coincide with their official narrative. She compares testimony completed in 2006 with the public memory presented at the Gisozi genocide memorial. The memory presented at Gisozi divides society into a Tutsi as victim and Hutu as perpetrator binary. Tutsi and Hutu memory that does not coincide with the RPF’s narrative are left out. This includes Hutu victims of RPF crimes, Tutsi who feared the RPF, Tutsi who resent the success of Tutsi returnees, and mixed Rwandans. King argues that this narrowing of the narrative impedes reconciliation and justice. The article demonstrates the ways in which an exhibition like Gisozi mirrors the official political narrative.


Daniela Kroslik, Africa Research Director of the International Crisis Group, analyzes French complicity in the 1994 genocide. She asks the question as to what extent can external countries like France be held responsible for the genocide. Her book provides evidence that France took an active role in the civil war, gave resources and training to the génocidaires, knew about the genocide, and did not respond in an ethical manner. She concludes that the French should collectively be held responsible, and argues for an international re-evaluation of international policy. She expands her argument in this manner by criticizing America and Britain for complicity of RPF war crimes in the Congo.


Ruth Linn and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, Professors at the School of Education at the University of Haifa, argue that the Holocaust exists as a symbol to both Arabs and Israelis. For Arabs, the symbol portrays the Jews as Nazis and the Palestinians as Jews. The Holocaust becomes the spark that allowed Zionists to take over Israel in the late 1940s. For Israelis, the symbol of the Holocaust justifies Israel’s existence in the first place. Linn and Gur-Ze’ev incorporate voices from the Arab community to illustrate how the Arab Holocaust narrative does not end in 1945. Rather, the Arab community claims that they are the resulting victims to the Holocaust due to Palestinian subjugation after 1948. This shows an alternative to Israeli memory of the political use of Holocaust memory.


René Lemarchand, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, writes of the ways in which the 1972 Burundi genocide has been ignored and discounted in studies of eastern Africa. He succeeds in summarizing the factors that sparked the
genocide, and looks at how the Tutsi-dominated government framed the conflict as an exclusively Hutu-perpetrated atrocity. He argues that the 100,000 to 300,000 Hutu who disappeared in 1972 have been effectively written out of history by the Burundi regime. As a result to this suppressed memory, a lot of recent Hutu extremist groups have politicized that memory in their ideology. He illustrates how the suppression of memory contributes to the cycle of violence in Burundi.


René Lemarchand traces the evolution of Burundian conflict in this 1994 study. His study extends from the pre-colonial era to 1994 to illustrate the distinct state building processes that led to the post-independence autocracy. In particular, he shows how the process of kingship rivalries transformed into political identities during colonialism. Overall, he emphasizes that the recent violence in Burundi came from a combination of colonial and independent historical processes.


René Lemarchand analyzes the cycles of violence pervading Burundian, Congolese, and Rwandan societies in his comparative study. His essays on Burundi and Rwanda look at their relationship as “genocidal twins,” specifically in comparative memories of the 1972 Burundian genocide and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. For Burundi and Rwanda, he also looks at the role of politicized forgetting and the shaping of official history. His chapter on Rwandan political memory argues that the RPF-led government “thwarts” the memory of Hutu victimization, a claim that made him persona non grata to Rwanda. Overall, this work from Lemarchand is one of the best recent accounts on contemporary East African political conflict.


René Lemarchand provokes debate over the framing of the genocide as primarily a conflict against Tutsi. He argues that understanding 1994 and the Hutu refugee killings in the Congo by the RPF cannot be done without looking at the regional memory of Burundi 1972 and Burundi 1993. The 1993 conflict in Burundi is framed primarily as genocide against the Tutsi, when in reality it was as much against the Hutu. There has been re-writing of history in Burundi to portray as Ndadaye as planning a genocide against the Tutsi, thereby warranting his assassination. In Rwanda, Hutu extremists are pushing a double genocide interpretation and that the source comes from the RPF invasion. Lemarchand calls this the same mindset as holding all Tutsi collectively responsible for human rights violations in Burundi. He calls for a South African style truth and reconciliation.
commission to get the truth out of what happened and to avoid the creation official mythologies into the collective memory of Hutu and Tutsi.


Noted Rwandan scholars Timothy Longman and Théoneste Rutagengwa argue that the RPF framed its interpretation of Rwandan history to correlate with its political goals. They conducted fieldwork in three Rwandan communities to look at how Rwandan react to the government narrative. In their bid for legitimacy, they interpret pre-colonial Rwanda as a unified nation-state. This history places all the blame for divisionism on the colonial legacy. The article argues that this demonstrates an attempt by the RPF to re-shape the Rwandan collective memory formed under the former regime. The RPF used such tools of memory as commemoration, memorialization, education, justice, national symbols, and public addresses to create a new, unified national identity. Longman and Rutagengwa point out that this official narrative competes with the RPF's own violent history and post-genocide political oppression meant to establish political authority. There are no commemorations of victims of RPF massacres. In their bid to change the collective memory of Rwanda, Longman and Rutagengwa argue that many Rwandans express much cynicism to the contradictions between the official narrative and the government’s bid to leave out certain parts.


Rwandan specialists Timothy Longman and Théoneste Rutagengwa examine the role of the church in Rwandan genocide memorialization in this 2006 scholarly article. The church committed widespread atrocities against Tutsi both historically and physically inside during the genocide. As a result, Longman and Rutagengwa argue that the church exists in between the preservation of memory and the sacred space. They argue that memorials contain political meanings, but they also symbolize a grappling with the meaning behind the sacred in Rwandan society. They also argue that the suppression of memory at the Kibeho church, the site of a 1995 RPF massacre against Hutu refugees, signifies a forgetting of those who lost their lives to the RPF even at church memorial sites.


Mahmood Mamdani, at the time a member the Makerere Institute in Kampala, contextualizes Idi Amin’s expulsion of Asians in the early 1970s through Ugandan class formation. Employing a neo-Marxist approach, he argues that the Ugandan classes that emerged in colonialism directly served the British metropolitan economy. He highlights how the divisions in the state emerged from colonial constructed inequalities in labor, land, and military power. Overall, his account refutes studies that utilize tribalism in their explanations.
Mahmood Mamdani, East African political scientist at Columbia University, re-evaluates the preceding literature on Rwandan ethnicity and political history in *When Victims Become Killers*. Seeking to make the genocide understandable, Mamdani argues that “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are first and foremost political identities. He also argues that the genocide must be framed in a larger regional context and citizenship crisis, one that incorporated Burundi, Uganda, and Congo. His chapters on the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the 1959 Hutu social revolution, and political meanings of Hutu and Tutsi provide an informative argument for explaining how the genocide developed.


Ethnographer Jacques Maquet’s *The Premise of Inequality* provides one of the first major studies on Rwandan community, kinship, and clan structure. His account, gathered from field data compiled in the 1950s, provides informative data on the complexities in Rwandan society. But he also writes from a perspective that distinguishes Hutu and Tutsi as separate races. While he does not characterize Tutsi as invading in a colonial manner, he assumes that Tutsi originated from a distinct race in Ethiopia. At the same time he shows Hutu and Tutsi culture an interrelated and extremely similar. Emblematic of historiographical attitudes of the mid-twentieth century, Maquet’s account has been critiqued heavily by Catharine Newbury, David Newbury, and Jan Vansina as an example of scholarship that does not question the historical progression to Rwandan ethnicity.


British *The Sunday Times* reporter Linda Melvern writes a detailed journalist account of the genocide’s planning. She plays particular attention to the development of propaganda through publications and radio. Her account provides an excellent description of the meticulous planning on the part of génocidaires in the months prior to the genocide.


Linda Melvern provides an investigative account of the international community’s failure to intervene in the 1994 genocide. She traces the ways in which the West abided and aided (whether directly or indirectly) the génocidaires. She devotes an entire chapter to explaining the role of the Akazu, emphasizing that the idea for a genocide emerged as the FAR began to lose the war. She also focuses on the UN and the Western powers refusal and active avoidance to apply the Genocide Convention policy for international intervention. She shows that the genocide should have been prevented. She does not
explore RPF war crimes in the Congo or the post-colonial state, which perhaps weakens her account. But overall, *A People Betrayed* stands alone as a comprehensive report of an international failure.


Catharine and David Newbury, Professors Emeritus of Smith College, outline the dangers in making direct comparisons between the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. They illustrate the similarities first and then delve into the contextual distinctions. They highlight how the genocide holds more similarities to South African apartheid than the Holocaust. They caution in viewing new conflicts from a Holocaust lens, arguing that such a framework often simplifies complicated political conflicts into binaries.


Catherine Newbury, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Smith College, analyzes the long-term transformation of Rwandan patron-client relationships in the Kinyaga region. She argues against the primordial assumption of ethnicity by illustrating the ways in which client-patron relationships changed with the expansion of mwami Rwabugiri’s central authority and the arrival of colonialism. She shows how these relationships, while originally mutually beneficial, became increasingly exploitive over time. She shows a rural population increasingly exploited by Tutsi chiefs, and she argues that the late 1950s Hutu revolution arrived partly from the political awakening of the Hutu rural periphery. She uses oral testimony and history to illustrate the early social relationships of pre-colonial Rwanda and then gradually shifts to colonial documents to show the political relationship between the Belgium and the Tutsi elites. Her research comes in response to primordial literature that argues that ethnic groups largely unchanged from the pre-colonial to the colonial.


Catharine Newbury argues that contemporary Rwandan society consists of competing histories. She showcases the ways in which different regimes and ideologies re-shaped the pre-colonial and colonial history. For recent Tutsi ideologies, the pre-colonial era becomes a romanticized utopia. For the former Hutu political regime, the Hamitic myth of Tutsi migration and annexation became a part of their political discourse. Newbury illustrates that these debates continue to hold a large presence in Rwandan society.


Rwandan historian David Newbury of Smith College sketches the historical complexities of pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda. In particular, he shows the historical misconceptions of cattle, ethnicity, and dynastic rule. He draws from ecological,
geographical, linguistic, and oral history to articulate a multitude of local and dynastic identities. He shows that local cultural identity existed in conjunction with national identity even up to the year 1900. By the time the Europeans showed up in late nineteenth century, Rwanda was in the midst of an intense internal conflict derived from regional and military rivalry and conflict. He places these factors as more important than “ethnic determinism.” Overall, his sketch applies an excellent comprehensive introduction to the pre-colonial history that moves away from the accepted colonial interpretations.


Pierre Nora, a French historian of new history, looks at the role of memory and history at memory sites in the introduction to his multivolume work Les Lieux de Mémoire. He distinguishes memory from history, calling history a representation of the past and memory as crystallized link to the present of a historical moment. He briefly traces the history of the link between memory and history, arguing that the two were at one point connected and helped establish national identities. He argues that presently there is a disassociation of memory from history. Memory is viewed as a private matter and history an analytical discipline. Les Lieux de Mémoire (memory sites) are places in which memory attached itself in order to serve a material, symbolic, or functional purpose. He argues that these sites represent our present day view of memory as an archival memory. These sites become rituals in our remembrance of the past. Instead of focusing on their immediate reality, they call upon a self-referential memory. While Nora makes many interesting points, there exists a body of literature that refutes the clear distinction between memory and history. In addition, his analysis comes from the highly nationalistic tradition of French history that scholars such as Jay Winter finds limiting.


Victor Peskin, Professor at Arizona State, looks at the international justice models employed at the ICTR and the ICTY. He argues in the case of the Rwandan ICTR, the model reflects a grave case of victor’s justice. He points to RPF’s strong-arming of the UN into not prosecuting RPA criminals as particularly alarming. Overall, Peskin provides an interesting perspective on the state of international justice.


Johan Pottier, Professor of Anthropology at the University of London, highlights how journalists, diplomats, aid workers, and scholars re-contextualized the events that occurred between 1994-1996 in Rwanda and East to coincide with a narrative that supported the RPF. The book looks at the presentation and consumption of events transpiring in Rwanda and East Zaire by the international community. Pottier argues that the international community (ranging from journalists to politicians to scholars) consistently hesitated in looking at a detailed historical and social context to the
situation. This re-imagining and legitimizing of the RPF came in relation to international sympathy, thereby giving them a “clean slate” (or “genocide credit” in the words of Filip Reyntjens) for halting the genocide. He argues that international opinion needs to re-contextualize these recent events into a more complicated politico-historical narrative.


French scholar Gérard Prunier from the University of Paris analyzes the greater regional crisis brought on by the Congolese war in his 2009 study. His book articulates the ways in which the Rwandan genocide contributed to the Congolese refugee crisis and the subsequent continental wars in the Congo. His book traces the evolution of the Congolese conflict from the genocide to 2009, arguing that the genocide represented a symptom of international indifference and the failure of the African nation-state.


Gérard Prunier provides a comprehensive account of the genocide that spans from the pre-colonial through the post-genocide refugee crisis. He argues against the idea of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict as ethnically determined. Rather he shows how elites, peripheral groups, and myths created a violent and exclusionary society. Prunier provides exhaustive detail on how the social and political transformations of Rwanda from Rwabugiri to the genocide, which debunks any perceived randomness to the genocide. He argues that the genocide emerged as a distinct political process related to the Uganda refugee crisis and the power play between the RPF and the Habyarimana regime.


Max Rettig looks at the controversies surrounding the *Gacaca* justice system. He conducts interviews with a wide range of participants to illustrate how RPA war crimes do not stand trial, inequalities exist amongst the justices, and witnesses often feel intimidated by the public nature to their testimonies. He reports that in particularly bad cases some Rwandans use genocide accusation for their self-interest. Overall, Rettig provides an interesting contradiction to the official discourse concerning *Gacaca*.


Reyntjens and Lemarchand illustrate the silencing surrounding the East Congo conflict that began after the RPA invasion. While acknowledging the threat the RPA faced from ex-FAR forces, the paper argues that the RPA covered up major human rights violations of Hutu civilians. While they admit to killing many Hutu, they argue that they only killed guilty genocide perpetrators. The study highlights the suppression of Hutu victimization in eastern Congo and the ways in which perpetrators in the FDLR forces feed off this sense of victimization to continue their fight against the RPA.

Filip Reyntjens, Professor of African Law and Politics at the University of Antwerp, provides a detailed critique of the Kagame-led Rwandan post-genocide government. He declares the regime a repressive dictatorship through anecdotal, economical, historical, judicial, political, and scholarly evidence. He details specifically how the RPF manipulated its way out of answering for widespread human rights violations in the Congo, unfair elections, and the suppression of free speech. He argues that the RPF are masters in creating an image that impresses Westerners, but suppresses their own people.


Filip Reyntjens follows the works of his contemporary Prunier by writing on the political dynamics of the Congolese conflict. He emphasizes the role of Rwanda, specifically how a guilt-ridden “genocide credit” emerged amongst Western powers in its foreign policy with Rwanda. In other words, the West looked the other way as the RPF government committed atrocities in the Congo because of the RPF government’s skill in making the international community feel guilty over not intervening in 1994. Overall, Reyntjens provides a detailed explanation to how these dynamics played out in the Congo.


Influential French historian Henry Rousso posits a groundbreaking re-evaluation of the Vichy Regime. He critiques the French myth of a widespread resistance during the occupation, arguing that after the war the French people repressed the memories that demonstrate the popularity of Vichy (in particular the mass deportation of French Jews) in favor of the resistance myth. He spends particular attention to the ways in which the myth of resistance attached itself to ideologies and political movements (such as the Gaullists). As a larger historical work, Rousso brings forth a wide range of questions pertaining to the role of mythmaking after conflict and the suppression of divisive memories in the name of national unity.


Independent scholar of cultural history Wolfgang Schivelbusch examines the role of post-war defeat and memory in *The Culture of Defeat*. He draws from three cases to make his argument: the American South post-Civil War, France after the Franco-Prussian War, and post-World War I Germany. Particularly in his introduction, Schivelbusch illustrates how victors will use the memory of defeat to vanquish the previous regime. But for the losers, the memory of defeat may become a part of national identity, culture, and worldview. Schivelbusch moves away from victor’s history and
argues that cultural history should also acknowledge the role of defeated communities and societies in national and social identity.


Canadian-Rwandan scholar Josias Semujanga examines the ways in which a discourse of hatred overtook modern Rwanda. His study includes several helpful citations from the early German missionaries and explorers. Like Twagilimana, Semujanga de-constructs the origins of the Hamitic myth. He acknowledges the difficulty in classifying the social meaning of “Hutu,” “Tutsi,” and “Twa” in the pre-colonial era. While Semujanga does well in de-constructing Hamitic myth, he appears to fall in line with the RPF narrative by linking Filip Reyntjens (*persona non grata*) with the Hutu extremist historian Ferdinand Nahimana. He argues that one ideology existed in the pre-colonial era, an argument that falls in line with the RPF official history.


Aliko Songolo, Professor of French and African Languages at the University of Wisconsin, writes of the ways in which Marie Umutesi’s *Surviving the Slaughter* humanizes the conflict in eastern Congo. The book review also posits the question of accepting that another Rwandan genocide occurred in eastern Congo. Songolo’s concept of a personal memoir that historicizes the personal illustrates the significance of the personal written word in finding justice for silenced memories.


American writer, scholar, and activist Susan Sontag analyzes the cultural effects of visual images from atrocities, disaster, and war. Her analysis of photography in particular brings up many ethical questions on bearing witness from a distance. Amongst her many insights, Sontag questions the duty to remember divisive events in a culture that circulates divisive images to a wide audience. She theorizes on a limited memory, one that will bring people together to make peace as opposed to preserving divisions for the next generation. While many memoirs and testimony assumes a duty to remember atrocities, Sontag critically analyzes the implications of such an assumption.


American writer Jason Stearns writes of his experience reporting from eastern Congo in his 2011 account. Stearns uses a combination of interviews, history, and his reports to detail the wide range of actors involved in the Congolese war. He divides the conflict into three phases: the first war, the second war, and (at the time of the book’s writing) an uneasy limbo between war and peace. The book provides great detail into how the internal politics of Rwanda played out in the Congo.
Rwandan scholar Aimable Twagilimana deconstructs the Hamitic hypothesis in his 2003 study. Twagilimana argues that both Tutsi and Hutu elites utilized the Hamitic myth to their own advantages. He emphasizes the ways in which the Hamitic myth masked the role of regionalism in the political power play. Overall, Twagilimana adds a formidable study to the historiography that informs the reader on the ways in which the Hamitic myth changed over time politically.

Peter Uvin, Tufts University’s Henry J. Leir Professor of International Humanitarian Studies, looks at the donor, justice, and human rights issues facing Rwanda. Specifically he lays out the competing arguments between Kagame apologists and critics. In their analysis, critics often point to the Tutsification of civil society and Congolese human rights abuses. Apologists look make a practicality argument, arguing that the regime cannot use Western justice to try everyone due to its magnitude and that the country is not ready for democracy. He concludes that the donor community has become too involved in the post-conflict Rwandan agenda. Uvin goes as far as saying that Rwandan development almost resembles colonialism. He calls for more donor transparency and dialogue with the people on the ground.

Van Vree, professor of journalism and culture at the University of Amsterdam, researched the use of concentration camp footage and images as a representation of moral thinking. He provides detailed descriptions of Night and Fog, Fateless, and footage shown at Nuremburg with thoughtful analysis. But his main argument remains unclear until the final few pages. He moves from examining the role of concentration camp footage and images as baring witness and providing evidence to Nazi atrocity to analyzing the formation of memory through these horrific images. He cautions against narratives that use Holocaust memory as a form of melodrama, instead emphasizing the need to use these images to present a narrative that offers zero comfort. He concludes that archival memory and working memory have been blurred together, meaning that our knowledge and memory of the Holocaust stems from these images. While a perfect representation is impossible, he argues that Holocaust representation is meant to promote moral thinking. As a result, “indigestible” images that reflect on such questions become an appropriate use for cinematographic Holocaust works.

Jan Vansina, leading scholar of pre-colonial Rwanda from the University of Wisconsin, traces the history and development of Nyiginya kingdom through the use of oral
histories. He argues that the emerging power in the aristocracy diminished kingly power and led to internal rivalries. He provides a general overview of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century Rwanda, playing close attention to the ways in which internal rivalries fostered a culture of violence in which the majority of the citizenry suffered as a result. While he does not directly challenge the modern interpretation of a harmonious pre-colonial Rwandan past till his conclusion, his argument denounces the idea that pre-colonial Rwanda as a harmonious nation. In addition, he argues that the social divisions formed independent of the emerging colonial enterprise.


In his book review of Marie Umutesi’s *Surviving the Slaughter*, Jan Vansina calls her account a “literary monument.” He commends the book for humanizing the Hutu refugee and accounting for the atrocities committed by the RPA and AFDL rebels during their flight through the Congo. Vansina speaks of the significance of such an account in light of the silencing of the Hutu refugee experience in the Congo.


Anthropologist Katherine Verdery of the University of Michigan analyses the politicization of dead bodies in Eastern Europe. She uses dead bodies as a lens for arguing that Eastern Europe underwent a cosmic transition during the post-socialist movement. She argues that understanding Eastern Europe's transformation requires more than simply analyzing new governments, economics, and pluralism. She argues that dead bodies contain political and social symbolism. The book covers how such concepts as re-burial and preservation helped re-orient people’s worldview concerning moral order, history, and national identity. She demonstrates that political and cosmic worldviews are inter-related. This book provides an excellent theory for analyzing dead bodies for societies in political and social transition.


Paul Williams looks at the global trend of commemorating atrocity through museums and memorials. His scope ranges from Holocaust museums, 9/11 commemorations, Cambodian genocide memorials, to Native American remembrance. For Rwanda, he looks specifically at the role of objects and their conceptualization as evidence. He looks specifically at Nyamata and argues that the presence of bones fulfills an urge within the visitor of actually witnessing the event. His book provides an interesting comparative study of various memorial settings that use similar storytelling tools to commemorate the past.

Jay Winter, Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale, in this 2010 introduction argues against the predominant French scholarship conclusion of differentiating memory and history as separate concepts. He discusses how both are “performative” and “constative.” The act of remembering and/or documenting history both adds and preserves from the narrative. Winter asserts that mankind continually recreates, reclaims, and reshapes history through memory performances. The article briefly touches how historical recreation, memoirs, film, museums, and drama are all a part of historical remembrance. He defines historical remembrance as “a story about a shared past, the shape and content of which tell a group of people who they are and from whence they came.” His focus is not to focus on the historical errors in memory, but rather to push for historiographical responsibility in its interpretation.


Jay Winter, Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale University, examines the relationship between the twentieth century memory phenomenon and World War I. Leading scholar of World War I history, he argues that “memory boom” came out of a need to acknowledge and commemorate the suffering experienced from victims of war. He provides thoughtful definitions over the broad terms of memory and collective memory. He argues against the idea of a state memory, instead arguing that memory is an individual process that can be shared by collective of people. He offers the term “historical remembrance” as a way of bridging the gap between history and memory. In this model, history and memory check each other for inconsistencies and inaccuracies.


In this 1995 work, distinguished WWI scholar Jay Winter dissents from the modernist interpretation of the initial European WWI memorialization. Through an analysis of European culture, he argues that Europeans used traditional (classical, romantic, and religious) themes to remember and bereave the dead. He analyzes film, monuments, poetry, literature, and art to showcase the cultural effects from the war. In line with his argument on traditional bereavement, he argues against the strict interpretation of memorials as national symbols. Rather, he argues that World War I sites of memory initially served a functional purpose as a site of morning and collective grief. As new generations emerged having not lived through the war, Winter argues that then did the more nationalist interpretations grasp onto these memory sites. While one should exercise caution against applying this argument to memory sites outside of World War I, many of the same mourning elements exist at Rwandan memorial sites.


James Young, Associate Professor of English and Judaic Studies at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, details a wide set of complex issues within Holocaust memorials in Europe, Israel, and the United States. Ranging from concentration camp memorials, museums, and monuments, Young shows the ways in which Holocaust
memorials suppress and re-imagine the Holocaust. He plays close attention to role of politics in the shaping of memorials. He argues that a wide range of political, social, and contemporary factors constructs public memory. His work corresponds with the issues facing Rwandan memorials, and his constructivist argument provides further questions to any Rwandan study that critiques the Rwandan genocide memorial model.