2017


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IMMIGRATION POLICY DEMANDERS: THE INFLUENCE OF U.S. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE ON MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY PLATFORMS

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An Independent Study Thesis
submitted to the Department of Political Science
at The College of Wooster
March, 2017
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of I.S. Thesis

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Acknowledgements

To my Mom, Dad, and sister: I would not have developed my interest in learning without your constant support, guidance, and love. You’ve inspired me to challenge myself and to care for others. Thank you for always being there.

To my friends who struggled through this project alongside me: we did it! I’m proud of you all. Let the celebration begin.

I must thank my advisor, Professor Moskowitz, for his help throughout the Independent Study process. His patience and encouragement guided my work through successful and unsuccessful weeks. His demanding mentorship as a Professor and advisor has taught me how to successfully manage daunting large-scale projects, which I am thankful for as I set out into the professional world. I will use these lessons for the rest of my life and I hope to one day pass them on.
Abstract

This Independent Study seeks to understand how political parties create their platforms. Specifically, this study examines how, when, and why political parties cater to the interests of interest groups and the electorate regarding immigration policy. Three qualitative case studies are examined: 1984, 2004, and 2016 party platforms and the corresponding policy preferences of interest groups and the electorate. Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties forms the theoretical framework of this study, which claims that parties are likely to cater to interest groups when political salience is low and parties are likely to cater to the electorate when political salience is high. Ultimately, I find that Bawn et. al’s theory applies well to my case studies. This study provides insight into how parties are motivated to change, especially within the context of immigration.
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I: Introduction

The political party is a fundamental vehicle for political participation in America. United States public officeholders, from the local level to Congress, are almost exclusively members of the two major parties. The major parties’ ideologies shape political discourse, policymaking, and American identity. However, parties’ political ideologies and policy stances are dynamic—ever changing due to shifts in public opinion, monumental global events, and party membership, among other factors. This study aims to explain why political parties shift their positions.

In an attempt to explain what drives political parties to shift their policy stances, this study examines the influence of interest groups and the electorate on political parties’ policy stances. In accordance with Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties, this study predicts parties to cater to interest groups when an issue’s political salience is low, but parties are expected to cater to the electorate’s interests when political salience is high.

This study will be viewed through the lens of immigration policymaking. Immigration policymaking was chosen out of personal interest given its relevance in today’s national political landscape.

In Chapter two, the study will present a review of various literatures predominately concerning theories on political parties, as well as U.S. immigration policy.

Chapter three will present the theoretical model of this study, derived from specific components of chapter two’s literature. Here, each variable will be identified and described, along with the hypothesized relationship between the variables.
Chapter four will construct the methodological framework of this study, explaining how data will be retrieved for each variable and how the data will be measured and evaluated.

In chapter five, three case studies are presented. In each case study, a different time period of American immigration policymaking is presented, then the theoretical and methodological frameworks from chapters three and four are applied to each case. For each case study, the theoretical model is analyzed and evaluated for functionality.

Chapter six concludes this study by comparing the theoretical model’s application to each case study, as well as evaluating the study in general. The evaluation will recommend considerations for future research.
II: Literature Review

Introduction

The following will provide an overview on the literature of four topics, in the following order: theoretical explanations of political party structure and behavior, the competing “orders” of race in America, the history of American immigration policy reform, and American identities and the public’s attitudes toward immigration. Ultimately, this review will present the theoretical frameworks, as well as any relevant information concerning American immigration, used in following chapters.

The review will start by discussing theories on political parties, beginning with Anthony Downs’ median voter theory, since it serves as the basis for alternative theories. The review will summarize the theories’ evaluation of influential actors within and outside of parties, claims regarding the electorate’s knowledge of and access to information, and explanations of party polarization.

The evaluation of American “racial orders” will consist solely of King and Smith’s account, which provides an expansive racial framework for evaluating American institutions, policy, and political actors. This racial framework will then be applied to American immigration policy.

In terms of American immigration reform, this review will focus on presenting a brief historical account of past immigration policy. This historical account will include involved policy making actors, as well as differentiating between “restrictive” and “expansive” immigration policy.

The final portion of the review will assess American identity and the public’s attitudes toward immigration. This section will discuss what traits Americans consider
fundamental to being a "true" American, as well as how these attitudes reflect their perceptions about immigration, and ultimately their dispositions on immigration policy.

**The Foundation of Political Party Literature: Anthony Downs**

In his work, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy," Anthony Downs has established the foundation of the literature on political parties and political party agenda creation.

Downsian theory is politician-centered, in which individual politicians are viewed as the main political actors that manufacture political action. In particular, it is centered on politicians’ private motives, as well as their ensuing social functions. Using the analogous subject of coal-miners, whose social function would be removing coal from the ground while privately motivated "by his desire to earn income, not by any desire to benefit others," Downs classifies politicians’ social function as proposing government policy while privately motivated by the income, power, and prestige of being in office (136). Given this social function and private motive of politicians, Downs hypothesizes that, like “an entrepreneur selling policies for votes instead of products for money,” “political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes” (137). However, voters, as the consumers of proposed policy, face their choice while possessing incomplete knowledge and information regarding the products.

If voters were fully knowledgeable and information was costless, Downs asserts that voters would choose “strictly as a means of selecting the government most beneficial to him” (138). In determining which candidate would provide voters with the highest personal “utility income,” voters would compare factual information regarding their “utility income” from each party’s past performances, then modify their analyses according to
estimations for the upcoming term. In anticipation, the government would recognize that every individual voter was fully knowledgeable, so “each citizen’s preferences would carry the same weight as every other citizen” (139). In effect, an electorate with perfect knowledge and access to costless information would motivate candidates to value each citizen’s vote as equal to every other citizen’s.

Of course, the American electorate is not fully knowledgeable on politics and information is in fact costly to the average citizen. According to Downs, these circumstances are “so basic to human life that it influences the structure of almost every social institution” (139). The consequences of this condition, according to Downs, are numerous. He focuses on three: the persuasive nature of sharing information, parties’ use of ideology to attract voters, and citizens’ rational ignorance in the world of politics.

Persuaders—friends, media outlets, campaigns, etc.—target uncertain voters who “need more facts to establish a clear preference” (139). Without the complete knowledge and costless access to information, voters may not understand the complex intricacies of existing and proposed policy, how such policies have or will affect them, or what policies candidates and parties support. This is a point of entrance for persuaders, who provide facts, although likely a biased selection, in aims “to produce a decision that aids their own cause” from uncertain voters (140).

The presence and influence of persuasion within a democracy implies crucial roles for political actors with significant political clout. Firstly, given that some citizens are capable of persuading large numbers of voters, “some men are more important than others politically” (140). This disrupts government’s equal treatment of each citizen under circumstances of complete knowledge and costless information. Rather, politicians are
motivated to cater their policy to those who have the capability of persuading the highest number of voters as possible via financial contribution, media platform, etc.

Second, since government is also burdened by limited access to information and knowledge – in this case concerning voters’ preferences – it must employ representatives that specialize in discovering public opinion, as well as persuading public opinion toward supporting public officials’ policy (140). This extension of government effectively decentralizes the power of federal government.

Next, persuasion is used in the reverse sense – not by the government, but geared toward the government. The citizenry, interest groups, and other non-governmental organizations work to persuade the government “that the policies they stand for – which are of direct benefit to themselves – are good for and desired by the electorate” (140). In turn, once politicians and parties commit to a policy, they subsequently work to persuade the electorate that such policy is “good for and desired by the electorate” (140).

Finally, when persuasion is a valuable tool for both government actors and non-government political actors, lobbying becomes highly rational for all involved actors. Politicians “sell” policy favors in exchange for campaign contributions, favorable editorial policies, and financial support used for television airtime, propaganda, and campaign employees – all of which are utilized to maximize votes (141). In exchange, citizens, advocacy groups, and interest groups receive favorable policy stances from politicians. Persuasion is vital to Downs’ understanding of politicians’ aim of attracting the maximum votes under the conditions of limited knowledge and costly information. These circumstances also shape the way political parties create and advance their ideologies.
Ideologies are key tools used by political parties to cheapen the cost of information for the electorate. Since voters do not have sufficient information to comprehend each policy passed or proposed by politicians, they search for an easier, less arduous way to evaluate candidates and parties. In response, reflecting the previously mentioned motivation of politicians to remain in office, Downs insists that parties “invent an ideology in order to attract the votes of those citizens who wish to cut costs by voting ideologically” (142). Political parties’ creation and adoption of ideologies also force them to comply with some implications. Firstly, since voters are unlikely to support “unreliable parties,” Downs holds that political parties are forced to stand by their ideologies, changing them subtly, but not radically, effectively creating a party “brand”. Second, in order to ensure voters that parties’ ideologies are practical and meaningful, parties must act in accordance with their ideologies. Finally, Downs recognizes that parties’ ideologies must distinguish themselves from competing parties, even when appealing to the same voters’ interests. Otherwise, voters will not be willing to pay the cost of assessing candidates and choosing between them, since their differences would be unrecognizable.

These implications help explain the movement of parties on the ideological scale. Downs expands on Harold Hotelling’s spatial model, which places ideologies on a “left to right” spectrum, decided upon by voters. He explains that parties may shift their ideologies left or right, up until an opposing party’s position on the spectrum is reached. With the private motive of winning votes in mind, a party’s ideology will shift toward the most available votes. In the case of a citizenry that supports ideologies near the moderate middle of the spectrum, Downs agrees with Hotelling, who claims, “parties in a two-party system inevitably converge on the center” (142). In this case, a change in party from one election to the next has a minimal effect on policy change – the electorate is rather close ideologically to either party. However, Downs
counters that if the two most popular ideological stances amongst the citizenry are near opposite poles of the spectrum, then the parties will “diverge toward the extremes rather than converge on the center” (143). In this case, “radical alteration in policy” occurs (143). Furthermore, the continual election of one party may lead to the revolt of the opposition, while an alteration between the two parties may result in social chaos “because government policy keeps changing from one extreme to the other” (143). In the polarized scenario, Downs urges that either ideological stances must shift, otherwise democracy will be replaced by tyranny in which one extreme imposes its will upon the other” (143). Voters’ use of shortcuts to gather political information in a less costly manner may not always guide voters to the “correct” choice – meaning the choice representing a higher “utility income” – although, Downs ensures that it is often completely rational for voters to remain politically ignorant.

In order for a voter to rationally become politically knowledgeable, the return for collecting information must outweigh its costs. The average citizen does absorb some costless information during their daily lives from the newspaper or radio, but in depth policy information remains costly in time and energy to access and understand. According to Downs, the return for becoming politically knowledgeable depends on a voter’s expected gain from voting “correctly” for the party that would provide him or her with the highest utility, compared to voting “incorrectly” for any other party (146). However, Downs states, even if a voter does choose the “correct party,” “unless his vote actually decides the election…he might as well have voted ‘incorrectly’” (146). Given that this is usually the case, Downs sees virtually no marginal return for becoming a knowledgeable voter. He does cite some instances in which the return seems to be significant: the election is extremely close, a citizen enjoys being well informed, the citizen can influence the votes of others and subsequently the election results, the citizen can influence
the government’s assessment of policy preferences, or if the citizen can influence government policy as a lobbyist. Of course, these are not the case for most citizens. Yet, the cost of voting is relatively low, so many can afford to simply vote, albeit often without adequate information to make the “correct” choice.

Downs lays the groundwork for theoretical expansion with his perception of politicians’ private motivation of “income, power, and prestige,” the electorate’s limited access to knowledge and costly information, and political parties’ use of ideology to attract voters taking shortcuts, (137). Many use Downs’ work as the foundation of their explanations of the behavior of politicians and political parties, especially in creating party ideology and agenda setting.

**Alternative Theories**

**The Roots of Party Ideology**

In examining how shifts in party ideology occur, Noel compares the chronology of congressional action and intellectual political dialogue on the subject of race. He finds that intellectuals began developing ideological stances on race prior to their ideologies’ implementation in Congressional action. Beginning in 1910, when liberals were split between pro-black and anti-black supporters, progressive intellectuals were sorting out the foundation for Congress’s ideological split throughout the following decades. By 1930, liberal pundits had unified as pro-black, advocating for political and social equality for all, including blacks. In 1950, liberal and conservative pundits had become polarized in regards to foreign policy, economic, and racial issues (168). Yet, Congress was not nearly as stably polarized on race as pundits were throughout this half-century progression. Not until the 1960’s did Congressional voting reflect the ideological contrast that pundits had established thirty years prior.
The liberal ideology’s adoption of pro-black stances supports the theory that intellectuals craft ideology, rather than politicians’ and parties’ retrospective ideological rationalizations of their policy positions, as described by the Downsian model. In this instance, Noel explains that because the major beneficiaries of progressives’ ideology – blacks and poor whites – were not politically powerful, it’s clear that intellectuals were not concerned with maximizing votes when crafting their stances. Why then would coalitions found themselves on such weak voting bases? Noel is led to conclude, “while ideology does define a coalition, it does not need to build that coalition solely on the basis of voting blocks” (169). However, Noel does provide some nuance between his theory and the Downsian model, explaining that although intellectuals are the first to craft ideological stances, it is “the arguments that best unite the various potential coalition members that became broadly endorsed” (169). Noel’s work clarifies the process of ideological shifts in party agenda setting, placing intellectual pundits’ concern with coalition building ahead of politician and party concern with adopting broadly endorsed ideology.

**Asymmetric Party Theory**

Grossman and Hopkins present a theory that focuses on the differentiation between the Democratic and Republican parties in regard to advancing party agendas. Their theory is based on their analyses of voters’ responses to a survey on party preference and political ideology sophistication. Their findings lead them to an asymmetrical party theory contending that the two parties do not mirror each other in internal structures, nor are they made up of symmetrical social coalitions. In this model, the Democratic Party is found to be “understood as a coalition of social groups seeking concrete government action,” while the Republicans are rather “an agent of an ideological movement whose supporters prize doctrinal purity” (119). Regarding party agenda setting, Grossman and Hopkins find Democrats to discuss more specific policy and marginalized
groups by logrolling among members representing diverse constituencies. According to them, Democrats’ focus on various groups and policies creates an “internally conflicted and disorganized” party structure “due to jostling groups” (129). In contrast, Republicans discuss broader ideological stances, laden with words like “freedom” and language preferring a “limited role for the government” (122). Also in contrast with Democrats, Republicans benefit from a unified party structure surrounding shared policy goals based on ideological purity.

In critique of Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, Hans Noel argues that their perceived asymmetry is overstated. Rather than identifying the Republican Party as purely ideological and the Democratic Party as purely concerned with disadvantaged groups, Noel claims, “both parties have ideologies that serve to reinforce their coalition members’ demands” (Noel, 2015). Noel mostly critiques Grossman and Hopkins’ methodology, which assessed voters’ ideological language as sufficient in qualifying their parties’ functionality. For example, Noel doubts that Republicans’ use of words like “freedom” solely reflects their ideological priority. Rather, he suggests that “freedom” is used to cater to the interests of their coalition groups – business and a majority Christian nation. His same critique applies to Democrats’ discussion of specific issues and marginalized groups. To Noel, their language may be group-centric when they advocate for marginalized populations, but that is because the Democrats’ ideology concerns government intervention to establish egalitarianism. Ultimately, Noel admits that Grossman and Hopkins have acknowledged an important difference between the two parties, but Noel asserts that the group-benefit versus ideological language dichotomy that voters use to describe their parties does not reflect how parties build their coalitions.

“Policy-Demanding Groups”
Bawn et al. concedes Downs’ view that politicians can be motivated by material self-interest, but they also argue that, led by a coalition of various interests, parties can gear themselves toward achieving any range of agreed upon goals, “from material self-interest to high-minded idealism” (571). Bawn et al. terms these party coalition groups, “policy-demanding groups,” that are made up of numerous political interest groups and activists. These groups form a mutually accepted policy agenda of both concrete and broader ideological policy stances, seek politicians who are committed to their program, and work cooperatively to nominate and elect their candidates. The group’s goal is to ultimately select a candidate whose “paramount goal is the advancement of the party program” (Bawn et al. 571). Throughout the coalition-building process, the party creates a “brand” for itself, as Downs discussed as a method of providing voters with an ideological shortcut. Policy-demanding groups influence parties’ nomination and electoral support of candidates as a tool that motivates politicians to represent the groups’ interests and stick to the group’s brand. Since a policy-demanding group’s resources and support (money, expertise, manpower, etc.) can be retracted if a politician is not actively supporting the group’s interests and brand, politicians must push policy along accordingly, not according to the voters’ or their own interests – this is central to Bawn et al.’s argument. The idea of establishing a “party brand” is in accord with Downsian theory, but Bawn et. al differs in explaining how the brand is created, through complying to interest groups and adjusting to an “electoral blind spot.”

**Knowledge and Information**

**“Electoral Blind Spot”**

In accordance with Downs, Bawn et. al recognizes that the electorate is poorly informed and unaware of political contexts. In fact, Bawn et. al even concedes that under conditions of
full knowledge and costless information, parties would resort to the center of the ideological spectrum, chasing the median voter. However, under realistic conditions of incomplete knowledge, they provide evidence that even the ordinary, ill-informed voter can recognize blatant extremism and tends to actively reject it at the polls (577). The point at which voters do recognize extremism is a focal point of Bawn et. al’s argument concerning how parties agenda set to satisfy policy-demanding interests, as well as voters.

Candidates who propose policies that voters do not recognize as extreme are said to be located within the “electoral blind spot” (577). Here, parties are able “to win with candidates more extreme than swing voters would like if they knew better” (577). This is one way that parties can advance their interests without solely catering to the median voter.

Symbolic vs. Ideological predispositions

Reinforcing their asymmetrical party theory, Grossman and Hopkins observe contradictory political preferences within the American electorate. They divide the public’s political predispositions into two camps: symbolic and operational. Symbolic predispositions reflect the public’s opinion on broad issues, like the government’s size and power, while operational predispositions refer to opinions on narrow, specific policy issues (122). Symbolically, a large majority of the public favors a conservative view in support of a small, less powerful government with few services. Yet, operationally, the public is found to be overwhelmingly liberal, possessing leftist views concerning issues like the environment, health, education, and even crime and welfare (122). Ellis and Stimson argue that these contradictory preferences are the result of “many citizens simply misunderstand[ing] ideological terminology” – another example of an electorate that is not politically knowledgeable (123).
In Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the state of public knowledge and opinion has separate circumstances for Democrats and Republicans. For Democrats, this process means that Democratic politicians “must provide concrete benefits to a diverse set of constituents without activating public opposition to ‘big government’” (133). For Republicans, these circumstances mean party members, who’re “constrained by the need to maintain popular appeal beyond the party base, are vulnerable to charges from within [party] ranks that they’ve have strayed from principle and must be forced back in line” (133). This challenge can be seen in Bawn et. al’s description of party coalitions’ ability to revoke resources from a candidate or office-holder that has “strayed” from representing the coalition’s interests.

**Party Polarization**

“**Electoral Blind Spot**”

Party polarization, not to be confused with voter polarization, is one implication of a growing “electoral blind spot” cited by Bawn et. al. Parties work to nominate and elect candidates that are extreme enough to advance the party’s interests, yet not extreme enough to be recognized by the ordinary voter. As the “electoral blind spot” grows, as it does when “political excitement runs low,” “members of Congress can take extreme positions with little risk of defeat” (Bawn et. al 578, 2012). Even amid politically salient times, when incumbents are voted out, they’re replaced with equally as extreme candidates from the opposite end of the spectrum (Bawn et. al 590, 2012). To the dismay of voters, this “leapfrog representation” has resulted in a scarcity of centrists in Congress. Not only are legislators more extreme than voters would like, but those in office are able to “appear moderate, yet enact extremist policy under the veil of procedural votes that are ‘too obscure for citizens back home to understand’” (Bawn et. al 584, 2012). Yet, Bawn et. al does cite evidence finding that “better-informed electorates favor
centrists,” but “most voters live in districts in which mass communication about their Representative is likely to be sparse,” meaning voters lack accessible information and political knowledge (583).

**Asymmetric Polarization**

Grossman and Hopkins provide a nuanced view of asymmetrical polarization in accordance with their asymmetrical party theory. They find that, driven by its concern with ideological purity, the Republican Party has polarized in a more organized, mobilized way than the internally conflicted Democratic Party. The Tea Party is used as the contemporary example, founded by supporters of Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign. Yet, Parker and Barreto note that the Tea Party “is simply the latest in a series of national right-wing social movements that have cropped up in America since the nineteenth century,” ensuring that this offshoot of the Republican Party is not irregular, but rather a continuation of ideological polarization from the right (Grossman and Hopkins 122, 2015). Grossman and Hopkins do not find a comparable polarization from the Democratic Party. They explain that this contrast is credited to “the unequal pressure placed on officeholders by their respective popular bases” (Grossman and Hopkins 130, 2015). That is, reflecting their desire for ideological purity, Republicans “consistently voice a desire for their party to become more conservative” (Grossman and Hopkins 130, 2015). Meanwhile, reflecting their concern for compromise to address various groups’ interests, “a majority of Democrats prefer that the Democratic Party become more moderate” (130).

**Racial Institutional Orders**

King and Smith, in their analysis of the two competing racial coalitions in America, the “white supremacist order” and the “egalitarian transformative” order, include components of
both Bawn et. al and Grossman and Hopkins. Their theory focuses not on parties, but rather “racial institutional orders” consisting of state institutions, political actors, and organizations that have “adopted racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together their coalitions…and serve the interests of the architects” (King and Smith 75, 2005). Similar to Bawn et. al’s claim that parties can be controlled by “policy demanders” working toward anything “from material self-interest to high-minded idealism,” King and Smith describe the motivation of “racial institutional orders” to be economic, political, “to quiet social anxieties, or to further ideological goals” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012; King and Smith 75, 2005).

These “racial institutional orders,” like any other coalition, have been “complex and breakable,” changing in membership in order to remain powerful enough to remain effective (King and Smith 76, 2005). The competing racial coalitions’ dichotomy is comparable to the differences in parties described by Grossman and Hopkins.

The “white supremacist order,” referred to contemporarily as the “anti-transformative order,” resembles the Republican Party in Grossman and Hopkins’ study, focusing on ideological purity. Although founded on exclusionary anti-black interests surrounding slavery and segregation, the contemporary “anti-transformative order” aims to “oppose measures explicitly aimed at reducing racial inequalities,” since such measures may stifle their mission for “greater equality in the long run” (King and Smith 83, 2005). This negative ideology, focusing on opposing measures rather than passing them, reflects the “Vote No, Hope Yes” trend in Republican congressional voting in which Republicans couldn’t risk voting in favor of pragmatic measures, like raising the debt ceiling, due to their obligation to protect their personal conservative voting record. The “anti-transformative order,” much like Republicans in Grossman and Hopkins’ account, is “united by rejection of [direct action to reduce material
racial inequalities in the near term]” (King and Smith 83, 2005). Similar parallels can be drawn between the “egalitarian transformative order” and Grossman and Hopkins’ portrayal of the Democratic Party.

The “egalitarian transformative” order was founded as early as America, built against monarchy and aristocracy, rejecting slavery (King and Smith 80, 2005). Yet, it was not always visible, as this order suffers from many of the same problems that Grossman and Hopkins find the Democratic Party to struggle with – finding a comprehensive, unifying agenda within an ideology based on multiple groups’ interests. Based on directly imposing measures to reduce racial inequality, this order’s actors frequently shift their focus and resources between groups and issues. Although all actors within the order are motivated by reducing racial inequality, they do not always agree upon specific issues—economic, political, cultural— or which marginalized groups to focus resources on. Like the Democratic Party’s group-centric structure, the “egalitarian transformative order” has often lacked unity behind a singular cause. Both racial orders play integral parts in advancing their agendas within American politics, as well as solidifying America’s racial identity.

It is worth noting that King and Smith’s theory of racial institutional orders is primarily included within this literature review as a framework to view politics, history, power, which may be useful in future studies, especially regarding policymaking.

**A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Reform**

Literature describes U.S. policy’s attempts at comprehensive immigration reform throughout the 20th and 21st century as an effort by “strange bedfellow” political coalitions, whose memberships consist of what are usually considered to be political rivals. Positions on immigration have even tended to crosscut ideological and partisan lines. This is visible from
pro-immigration conservatives who “value immigrant labor for national growth and prosperity” alongside liberals that acknowledge American democracy’s growth via “welcoming new and diverse immigrants as equal citizens” (Tichenor 42, 2008). Meanwhile, anti-immigration conservatives support restrictionist policy due to “cultural, national security, and sovereignty priorities,” while some liberals wish for “greater economic and social justice for the nation’s least advantaged citizens before extending opportunities to new arrivals” (42). These “strange bedfellow” coalitions have been dynamic, adjusting alongside ever-changing political contexts, but their unique makeup have made comprehensive immigration reform difficult to achieve.

Immigration policy has aimed to address two aspects of immigration: the rate of immigration into the U.S. and the civil and social rights of the immigrants within the U.S. “Restrictionists” support policies aiming to restrict the rate of immigration and, or, the expansion of immigrant rights. In opposition, “expansionists” endorse policies that expand the rate of immigration and, or, immigrant rights. These policies have been advanced with economic, national security, and, or, cultural concerns in mind.

The earliest U.S. immigration policies, from the 19th century to the mid 20th century, aimed to control the rate of immigration into the U.S. mostly by implementing national quota systems. After the Civil War, immigration policies targeted minorities with discriminatory policy ensuring white supremacy over Asians in the West with policies like the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and The Johnson-Reed 1924 Immigration Act, which enacted a quota system that “erected formidable barriers to southern and eastern Europeans and reinforced Asian exclusion” (Tichenor 44, 2008). Strange bedfellow coalitions existed even then, when some African Americans favored such racial discrimination due to their fear of competition from immigrant
labor, meanwhile “as far back as the 1920’s the NAACP denounced all such race-based immigration restrictions as wrongful discrimination” (King and Smith 238, 2011).

Other policies facilitated the importation of immigrants in order to exploit cheap labor. For example, in 1942, the State Department pleased Southwestern growers and other business interests when they worked with the Mexican government on the Bracero Program “to facilitate the importation of Mexican guest workers” to address the labor shortage accompanying World War I (Tichenor 45, 2008). Organized labor lobbied against agribusiness for reform throughout the Bracero Program, citing “depressed wages and destroyed working conditions” that “compromised the ‘security’ of American workers” (Tichenor 46, 2008). As the 1960’s approached, the civil rights movement pushed the parties’ support toward more welcoming immigration policies, ending the Bracero Program in 1963 prior to the 1965 Immigration Act’s termination of the national quota system (King and Smith 238, 2011).

Transitioning from policies centered on national quota systems to those with “priority to family reunification, immigrants with economic skills, and refugees from political oppression,” race-based immigration stances became replaced with “color-blind” proposals. (King and Smith 239, 2011). For Republicans, this meant supporting a large increase of immigrants as an economic stimulus, as well as serving as a “‘haven for the oppressed,’ particularly ‘victims of Communist tyranny’” (King and Smith 238, 2011). Democrats also found an economic value in increased immigration, but centered their stances on anti-discrimination ideals, hoping “‘to implant a humanitarian and liberal spirit in our nation’s immigration and citizenship policies, making them more consonant with ‘the rights of man’” (238). By 1968, both parties supported anti-discriminatory immigration policy, mirroring their acceptance of civil rights bills and ideals.
After the civil rights movement spurred the elimination of the national quota system in 1965, immigration reform turned its attention to undocumented immigration, an issue of increased salience due to a spike in illegal immigration credited to family reunification components of the 1965 Immigration Act.

As illegal immigration became more salient, legislators aimed to address the ensuing problems with the anti-discriminatory “color-blind” policies that became widely accepted throughout the 1960’s, focusing on equal rights and opportunity. From this perspective, policy proposals focused on fears of “a substantial underclass,” in which undocumented immigrants wouldn’t receive “protection from abuse on the job or from landlords, discrimination, disease, or crime; they may avoid education for children, and they are unable or reluctant to assert political or legal rights” (Tichenor 48, 2008). This was visible during the previously mentioned Brasero Program, when the U.S. agreed “pledged that wages, living conditions, workplace safety, and medical services would be comparable to those of native workers,” but employers and administrators played no part in following through (Tichenor 45, 2008). A frequent solution from legislators was, and continues to be, placing sanctions on employers of undocumented immigrants.

Again, support for immigration policy crosscut partisan ties, creating strange bedfellow coalitions. Liberal Democrats worried that undocumented immigrants would “compromise” labor protections and antipoverty programs, while another faction of the Democrats feared that such sanctions “would lead to job discrimination against Latinos, Asians, and anyone else who looked or sounded foreign” (Tichenor 47, 2008). Conservatives were split as well; pro-business advocates deemed that sanctions were unfair to employers, while pro-sanction conservatives demanded the restoration of law and order. With gridlock preventing any effective policy
proposals from gaining traction, drawn out attempts toward comprehensive immigration reform were fruitless throughout the 1970’s and well into the 1980’s.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was symbolic of the previous decades’ coalitional gridlock. With “fierce resistance” from business interests, ethnic and civil rights groups, religious lobbies, immigrant rights organizations, and both the Republican Reagan administration and House Democrats, legislators lacked the consensus necessary for strong policymaking (Tichenor 50, 2008). Given the political pressure from all of these groups, IRCA was only able to enact a “compromised package of watered-down employer sanctions provisions, legalization for undocumented aliens living in the country since 1982, and a new Seasonal Agricultural Worker program to appease grower interests” (Tichenor 50, 2008). In terms of illegal immigration, “IRCA had done virtually nothing to discourage it” (Tichenor 50, 2008). Yet, legal immigration, with little political opposition, was increased extensively.

As “strange bedfellow” alliances continued to hinder progress on successful immigration policy, their presence also shaped the variety of immigration policy that was able to pass. King and Smith compare the alliances on issues of overall immigration levels and their enforcement with alliances on issues of immigrants’ social and civil rights. They find “strange bedfellow” alliances more present within the former. Effectively, this finding supports the claim that “rights restrictionists have had greater success in shaping modern policies than immigration restrictionists or champions of stringent enforcement policies” (King and Smith 241, 2011). This was exemplified in immigration policy passed following IRCA in 1986.

In the early 1990’s a number of events sparked anti-immigration sentiments. The implementation of NAFTA, which promoted Mexican immigration, Islamic immigrants’ bombing of the World Trade Center, and controversy stoked by Haitian and Cuban refugees are
all cited by King and Smith as salient issues within the 1990’s that led to pressure for anti-immigration policy (King and Smith 245, 2011). Amid pressure to “reduce immigration levels, deport the undocumented, deny immigrants public benefits, and limit immigrant social and civil rights generally,” the Republican Party platform aimed to “stop illegal immigration,” and the Democratic Party stood by their anti-discriminatory platform (King and Smith 245, 2011).

Throughout the 1990’s, various Republicans advanced policy proposals to “expedite deportation of undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorism,” “deny immigrants access to public benefits,” “restrict birthright citizenship for children of [short-stay] alien parents,” and “lessen immigration overall” (King and Smith 245, 2011). Democrats followed the Republicans’ lead against illegal immigration, “endorsing denials of ‘welfare benefits’ to ‘illegal aliens’” (King and Smith 245, 2011). In 1996, with overwhelming bipartisan support, substantial policy was passed in the wake of rights restrictionist consensus from both parties: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). In all, these policies expedited deportation of “suspected alien terrorists or criminals,” “made immigrants ineligible for federally funded benefit programs for five years,” and “increased resources for immigration law enforcement, including detentions” (King and Smith 246, 2011). Together in an anti-discriminatory coalition, “Black, Hispanic, and Asian Caucus House members overwhelmingly opposed IIRIRA,” while conservative Democrats supported it (King and Smith 247, 2011). In reaction to this wave of restrictionist policymaking, “a new generation of foreign-born voters…have created fresh electoral incentives for national politicians to guard expansive immigration policies” (Tichenor 58, 2008).
Since the rights restrictionist movement in the 1990’s, immigration has remained virtually unchanged. An “anti-terrorist political climate” followed the 9/11 attacks, which “favored the tougher enforcement views within the governing Republicans,” but employer interests and a growing Latino voter base stood between substantial policymaking (King and Smith 248, 2011). Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the Republican platform “stressed the economic value of immigration, called for immigrants’ ‘cultural integration,’ as well as improved enforcement including a border fence and ‘sweeping new powers to deport’” (King and Smith 247, 2011). The Democrats however, supported various methods of obtaining citizenship, as well as sanctions for employers of undocumented immigrants, while “opposing worker programs” (King and Smith 247, 2011).

The effectiveness of American immigration policy has long been plagued by “the inability of Americans to agree on responses to racial inequities,” which has resulted in incomprehensive reform, unable to address the problem of illegal immigration and favoring business’s desire for cheap, exploitable labor (King and Smith 249, 2011). Not only have Americans disagreed on remedies to racial inequities and illegal immigration, but the “strange bedfellow coalitions” that have made up restrictionist and expansionsist coalitions have limited policymakers’ ability to assemble effective compromises within a comprehensive piece of legislation. Yet, as minority and foreign-born populations grow within the U.S., contemporary policymakers must take into account their generally expansionist preferences.

**American Identity and Public Attitudes Toward Immigration**

**American Identity**

As previously mentioned, King and Smith’s “racial institutional orders,” like any other coalition, have been “complex and breakable” (King and Smith, 2005, 76). These coalitions
have changed to best benefit the interests of their architects, as well as to remain viable amid dynamic political contexts. One important component for racial coalitions’ membership and agendas has been the public’s American identity: attitudes about what it means to be an American and policy preferences reflective of such attitudes.

Citrin et. al examines American identity in order to understand the public’s attitudes on issues like public education, immigration, affirmative action, and voting rights, as well as the rising numbers of Asian and Hispanic minorities (1125). Using symbolic politics theory, based on the role of symbolic cultural attitudes in political predispositions, Citrin et. al analyzes survey responses to the question, “what criteria does the mass public use to define American nationality and what are current attitudes toward the growing number of Hispanic and Asians?” Some of the traditional qualities of American cultural tradition include “liberal” virtues such as “political participation, economic individualism, and egalitarian social manners” (Citrin et. al 1130, 1990). Yet, Citrin et. al also cite “belief in God and competence in English,” as well as “standing up for one’s country against its critics,” as “ethnocultural” characteristics of a more restrictive American identity. A wide array of respondents for Citrin et. al’s survey question allows for a better understanding of what drives American identity.

Consensus is undoubtedly present in Citrin et. al’s findings. Three quarters of their sample found the more “liberal” characteristics of Americanism, such as “treating people of all races and backgrounds equally,” to be “very important” in being a “true American” (1130). “Symbolic” characteristics, like religion or linguistic capabilities, received varying levels of consensus. In terms of religion, consensus was less present; 64% of strong conservatives and 26% of strong liberals found belief in God to be “very important” in making up a “true American” (Citrin et. al 1131, 1990). Attitudes on language did resemble consensus; throughout
respondent groups, English speaking was identified as a “very important” characteristic for Americanism. Even Hispanic and Asian respondents, although at lower levels than others, agreed that English speaking is an integral part to what makes someone American (131). Although Citrin et. al do find a legitimate consensus on a number of characteristics of Americanism, some groups are less likely to find any symbolic characteristics of Americanism.

Educated and wealthy respondents were much less likely to identify symbolic characteristics as vital components of being American. According to Citrin et. al, this disparity between the “elite” and the general public has “the potential for populist outbursts” (1149). For example, in California, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, ballot successful ballot initiatives have made English the states’ official language. Citrin et. al argue that the implications of ideological tension between the elite and general public may depend on “the salience of ethnic issues,” as well as immigrants’ ability to assimilate rapidly to American life (1149). Aside from designating English as the official language, Americanism fuels predispositions on a number of other policy issue areas.

Americanism’s role in founding policy predispositions is confirmed by Citrin et. al’s findings concerning affirmative action, public education, and voting rights. Those respondents identifying symbolic Americanism were found to likely object measures of affirmative action, “presumably because this violates the principle of equal treatment based on individual merit” (1143). In public education, Citrin et. al find that respondents widely oppose bilingual education programs that aim to maintain Hispanic and Asian children’s native tongue. Rather, respondents favor transitional bilingual education that is ultimately taught in English – unless such a program would require a tax hike. So, effectively, “the onus of assimilation is placed on the immigrants themselves” (1143). Lastly, respondents were found to oppose voting rights to those who cannot
read English. Each of these analyses controlled for partisan allegiance, economic standing, and social location, leaving Americanism—or the belief in symbolic cultural identity required to be an American—as the sole independent variable.

**American Identity and The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Immigration**

Much like the policy issue areas described above, national identity plays a telling role in shaping the public’s attitudes toward immigration. In their article, *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration*, Hainmueller and Hopkins look to explain what motivates the public attitudes of developed democracies on the subject of immigration. Among other conclusions, they cite two main patterns: national interest is more influential in forming immigration attitudes than issues of self-interest, and on a related note, perceptions of immigrants’ effect on symbolic group traits (often cultural, but sometimes economic) “are powerful correlates of immigration attitudes” (Hainmueller Hopkins 242, 2014). Concerning the effect of national issues, they provide the example of economic stress. Amid personal economic strife, their respondents did not change their attitudes toward immigration. Yet, amid national economic recession, respondents were found to shift toward “anti-immigration attitudes” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 231, 2014).

Hainmueller and Hopkins cite a variety of influential examples concerning perceived effects of immigration on symbolic group traits and well-being, including ethnicity, religion, language, and although less often than cultural issues, economy. For instance, “Americans who take an ethnocultural view of national identity,” which Citrin et. al cites as a large portion of the American public, “are more supportive of restricting immigration” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 235, 2014). The tendency to support restrictionist immigration policy also applies to “respondents who held more assimilationist conceptions of American identity,” meaning they expect immigrants to learn English and quickly adapt to American norms, rather than living
according to the norms of immigrants’ home country. Such assimilationist conceptions are visible in the respondents of Citren et. al’s survey regarding bilingual education programs. In contrast, those that hold “civic conceptions of identity,” like the widely accepted values of political participation and economic individualism referred to in Citrin et. al, “correlate with less restrictionist attitudes.” This may seem contradictory, since citizens can undoubtedly stand for both ethnocultural and civic conceptions of national identity, but Hainmueller and Hopkins explain that public attitudes toward immigration can shift depending on the political context of the present.

Mass media, stereotypes, and the political salience of national immigration issues are all factors with the potential to shift the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, according to Hainmueller and Hopkins. Stereotypes of immigrant groups are often created through the “portrayals of these groups by parties and the mass media” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233, 2014). Plus, depending on mass media’s coverage on immigration, it can become a salient issue. In this case, Hopkins’ research finds, “at times when immigration is nationally salient, living in a community with a growing immigrant population is associated with more restrictive views. At other times, there is no such relationship, suggesting a role for national politics in politicizing local contexts” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 237, 2014). The salience of immigration is reported to “have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of the electorate,” subsequently; “immigration is thus an issue with the potential to emerge suddenly and to destabilize political alignments” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 232, 2014). Given the previously discussed “threats” that publics perceive immigration to present on their nations and cultures, immigration salience is most expected to shift public attitudes toward restrictionist immigration preferences, as stated by
Hainmueller and Hopkins; “when salient, immigration has the potential to mobilize otherwise left-leaning voters in a right-leaning direction” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233, 2014).
III: Theory

Introduction

This study will examine, in terms of immigration policy, the causal relationship between interest groups’ policy preferences and party platform setting. Based on a review of the literature, I hypothesize that unless immigration becomes politically salient, interest groups will have a significant direct influence on shaping party platforms on immigration policy. When immigration does become salient, however, I would expect for parties’ immigration policy platforms to cater to the electorate’s immigration interests, not interest groups’. This argument is presented in the flow diagram below:

Figure 1

Explanation of Variables

Independent Variable: Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences

In this analysis, the immigration policy preferences of various interest groups will serve as the independent variable. Specifically, the “restrictive” or “expansive” qualities of the interest groups’ policy preferences will be identified. “Restrictive” immigration policy simply intends to restrict the levels of immigration permitted and, or, the civil and social rights of immigrants, for
example: limiting immigrants’ rights to receiving public benefits, getting jobs, and gaining citizenship. Expansive policies intend to do the opposite: raise immigration levels, expedite the naturalization process, facilitate family reunification, and grant asylum to refugees. The interest groups selected for examination will derive from King and Smith’s competing “racial institutional orders.”

King and Smith define racial institutional orders to be first an institutional order: “A coalition of governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors that is bound together by broadly similar senses of goals, rules, roles, and boundaries that members of each order wish to see shaping political life in certain areas” (King and Smith 78, 2005). Secondly, racial institutional orders “seek and exercise governing power in ways that predictably shape people’s statuses, resources, and opportunities by their placement in ‘racial’ categories” (King and Smith 78, 2005). King and Smith identify two main competing racial institutional orders in America; the “anti-transformative order” aims to reject explicit attempt to reduce racial inequality, while the “transformative order” aims to enact explicit means to reduce racial inequality. Both will be taken into account in this study.

Due to the exceptionally broad range of actors within racial institutional orders’ memberships, for practicality’s sake this study will focus solely on interest groups representative of each respective racial institutional order. Plus, as noted in the following Dependent Variable section, Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties places particular significance on the influence of interest groups on political parties.

King and Smith describe “the American state as comprised of multiple institutional orders, including competing racial orders with conflicting ideologies” (King and Smith 76, 2005). So, given the orders’ conflicting nature, the policy preferences of both racial institutional
orders, no matter their motivation, ought to conflict to some extent. Since the coalitions that make up institutional orders are “breakable and complex,” the coalitions’ goals and memberships will shift throughout various eras of immigration policy reform. In fact, at any given time, an actor may not be fully dedicated to a racial institutional order across all policy issues.

Although the members within these orders will have distinctive motives for their membership, whether economic, political, social, or ideological, their collectively shared immigration policy goals define their identity as a coalition, regardless of their motivation for membership. That being said, even if the orders’ immigration policy preferences do not explicitly identify race as an element of their concern, King and Smith assure us that even “features of American politics that may appear unrelated to race,” for instance “modern immigration policies,” can be explained by racial institutional orders (King and Smith 78, 2005).

In fact, immigration policy coalitions have been referred to as “strange bedfellow coalitions” due to their unordinary memberships that consist of what are usually considered political rivals. These coalitions crosscut partisanship, creating shared policy goals between, for example, conservatives concerned with national security and liberals desiring justice for disadvantaged Americans prior to accepting immigrants (Tichenor, 2008). In the case of immigration policy, despite the rivalry that is usually present between the members of “strange bedfellow coalitions,” their shared policy preferences form a coalition that can be evaluated under King and Smith’s theory of racial orders.

**Dependent Variable: Political Parties’ Immigration Policy Platform**

The immigration policy agendas of both the Republican and Democratic Parties will be evaluated as the dependent variable in this study. More specifically, the policies’ restrictive or expansive qualities, as described above, will be measured. This study will analyze the
relationship between the independent variable (racial institutional orders’ immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (the restrictiveness and expansiveness of party agendas’ immigration policies).

In this study, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is founded on theories of political parties from Hans Noel and Bawn et. al. Noel’s theory focuses on parties’ adoption of ideology. He finds that political pundits and intellectuals craft ideologies without regard for electoral acceptability. These ideologies may take decades to become electorally viable for political parties to eventually adopt and implement them. Given the history of American racial institutional orders, Noel’s findings are central to examine the relationship of this study. For example, King and Smith explain that amidst the “xenophobic and racist intentions” of the national quota system that was in place from the 1920’s to the 1960’s, the NAACP acted within the “transformative order,” denouncing the system’s discrimination. Yet, the “transformative order’s” immigration work did not become visible in party ideology until 1965, when immigration policy reform ousted the quota system, prioritizing family reunification and the acceptance of refugees from communist rule. This “lag” in parties’ adoption of ideology will be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties helps explain why parties adopt ideologies and, furthermore, when parties must cater to the electorate, rather than the interests of “policy demanders.”

Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties deems that interest groups and activists, coined “policy demanders,” are central to parties’ organization. Policy demanders form coalitions “to capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self-interest to high-minded idealism” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012). These policy demands influence the
party to create party agendas and nominate candidates. Policy demanders then support the party’s candidates through the electoral process with money, expertise, manpower, and other resources. The coalition’s membership benefits by its ability to “nominate and elect a large number of legislators—possibly even a majority—committed in advance to a program that incorporates the group’s goals” (Bawn et. al 576, 2012). In fact, given the minimal level of political knowledge that Bawn et. al attributes to the electorate, “policy demanding groups” are able to utilize an “electoral blind spot” to advance their party program in extreme ways that the electorate would not actually support with a full understanding of the policy. Immigration policy, however, has not often been an issue of consensus within policy demander coalitions, causing unusual coalition membership in each party, as well as compromised party positions on immigration.

Immigration policy “strange bedfellow coalitions” crosscut partisanship, which is a main reason that efforts toward comprehensive immigration policy reform, no matter the partisan makeup of Congress, have often fallen short. Yet, Bawn et. al’s theory explains that policy demanders’ various, often conflicting immigration policy preferences are formed into a singular, shared party agenda. That is, since policy demanders present opposing preferences concerning immigration policy, in order to please the most policy demanders, or at least the most supportive, parties must stand for a platform that adheres to policy demanders’ preferences in some aspect, while avoiding to neglect opposing policy demanders’ interests. This compromise between policy demanders’ interests has formed weak versions of immigration policy. This explanation of party agenda setting, along with Noel’s theory on parties’ adoption of ideology, provide a framework to examine how racial institutional orders’ immigration policy preferences affect the eventual adoption of immigration policy stances in party agendas.
**Conditional Variable: The Salience of Immigration**

A conditional variable, when present, disrupts the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In this case, the conditional variable is an increased salience surrounding the issue of immigration. For example, national security crises, refugee crises, and national economic depressions are capable of arousing nativist notions of national identity, subsequently shifting both political parties’ agendas toward “restrictionist” immigration policy stances. Such “salient immigration-related threats have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of the electorate,” which, according to both Downsian median voter theory and Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot,” would expectedly affect the agendas of political parties (Hainmueller and Hopkins 232, 2014). As previously mentioned, Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” claims that due to the general electorate’s minimal political knowledge, parties are able to push policy that is more extreme than the electorate would knowingly accept. Yet, amid an increased salience of immigration, the “electoral blind spot” would shrink, meaning the electorate would become more aware and knowledgeable on the issue of immigration and parties’ immigration policy stances. Consequently, Bawn et. al explains that the parties must act according to Downsian median voter theory, shifting their policy stances toward an electorally viable position.

When immigration is salient, restrictionist sentiment would most expectedly ignite, although not always. Shifts toward restrictionist immigration policy amid threats to national security, the economy, or cultural identity can be explained by King and Smith’s racial institutional orders, as well as the ethnocultural state of American identity. King and Smith describe the racial agenda of the “anti-transformative order” as “a negative one,” where “its actors and institutions oppose measures explicitly aimed at reducing racial inequalities” (King and Smith 83, 2005). Furthermore, they explain that the “anti-transformative forces” are “more
united against most changes than egalitarian actors and institutions are united in pushing for any changes,” effectively meaning “both political parties have incentives not to pursue policies that whites find threatening too ardently or openly” (King and Smith 84, 2005). Given the literature on American identity and attitudes toward immigration, threats can range from linguistic differences to national security.

Citrin et. al find an ethnocultural American identity as existent and widely visible in their respondents, including notions that Americans ought to speak English, believe in God, and “stand up for their country amid criticism” (Citrin et. al, 1990). Hainmueller and Hopkins expand on these findings, claiming that those who hold ethnocultural views of national identity are more likely to support restrictionist immigration policy (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Especially within the realm of immigration policy, increasingly salient political contexts can mobilize this electorate.

Hainmueller and Hopkins present the idea of “galvanizing effects,” which have the ability to intensify the attitudes of “those already predisposed to opposed immigration” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014). For example, Republicans with exposure to Spanish speakers are less likely to support “a pathway to citizenship.” In fact, restrictive policy advocates have even had success attracting liberal support when “immigration is framed as a national security threat” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014). Clearly, the salience of immigration-related issues is able to have a significant impact on political opinion toward immigration, as well as party agenda setting on immigration policy.
IV: Methodology

Methodological Approach and Case Study Selection

This study aims to apply Bawn et al.’s theory on political parties to understand the relationship between racial institutional orders and political party agenda setting in terms of immigration policy. A comparative case study will be implemented on a selection of the major party agendas after 1964. This time frame has been chosen due to the revolutionary Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which reshaped U.S. immigration policymaking contexts. The specific platforms included in this study will be from the years 1984, 2004, and 2016. These specific party platforms have been selected due to their place in time, just prior to major congressional efforts for immigration reform.

This method is most appropriate given that the theoretical model will be applied to numerous cases in order to answer process questions concerning party platform setting. Plus, since immigration policy is the subject matter, a limited number of cases are available to examine within United States immigration policymaking. This study can potentially be replicated using future cases, as political contexts and immigration policy will provide new cases.

Independent Variable

The independent variable of this study is the immigration policy preferences of the opposing racial institutional orders. Since racial institutional orders consist of a vast range of governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors, it will be necessary to isolate a select sample of institutions from each order (King and Smith, 2005). To evaluate each racial institutional order’s immigration policy stances, this study will identify
interest groups that consistently represented each orders’ immigration preferences. Then, these findings will be applied to Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties.

King and Smith cite “neorestrictionist groups,” such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA, as interest groups within the “strange bedfellow coalitions” for reducing both levels of immigration and the rights of immigrants. These groups will serve as representatives of the anti-transformative racial order.

Numerous resources will provide measurable data for “neorestrictionist groups”’ immigration preferences, including: testimonies from congressional hearings, historical newspaper articles, and information from interest groups’ own websites and publications.

In the transformative order, “ethnic advocacy groups,” such as the NAACP and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) were cited as members of the “strange bedfellow coalition” against reducing immigration and for the full civil and social rights for immigrants. These organizations will serve as representatives of the transformative racial order. Similar resources to those used for “neorestrictionist groups” will be used to collect data concerning “ethnic advocacy groups’” immigration policy preferences.

Using the data collected on both “neorestrictionist groups” and “ethnic advocacy groups,” each group will be placed on a spectrum, rating their policy preferences’ “restrictiveness” and “expansiveness.” The spectrum will range from “High Expansive” to “High Restrictive,” with less extreme distinctions between the two. Those interest groups with policy preferences consisting of three or more “restrictionist” or “expansive” policies will be designated within the according “High” classification. Interest groups supporting only one policy will be considered “Low.” In the event that an interest group supports both “restrictive” and “expansive” policies, the group’s “net” preference will determine its place on the spectrum. For example, if an interest
group supports two expansive policies and one restrictive policy, then the group would be considered “Low Expansive” on the spectrum. Also, it is important to note, that the quality of policy preferences will be taken into account. For instance, if a policy preference advocates for extremely restrictive or expansive policy content, it will have a greater net worth, consequentially influencing its rating.

**Immigration Policy Preference Spectrum**

![Immigration Policy Preference Spectrum](image)

**Figure 2**

To measure the restrictiveness or expansiveness of these interest groups’ immigration policy stances, this study must distinguish what sort of policies are to be considered “restrictive” or “expansive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictive Immigration Policy</th>
<th>Expansive Immigration Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Decrease immigration levels</td>
<td>• Increase immigration levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase militant border patrol/detention facilities/deportation efforts</td>
<td>• Expansion of granting asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decrease granting asylum</td>
<td>• Allow family reunification in U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limit immigrant access to public benefits</td>
<td>• Expand immigrant access to public benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limit immigrants’ ability to work/work for fair wages</td>
<td>• Expand immigrants’ ability to work/work for fair wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exclude home countries eligible for emigration to U.S.</td>
<td>• Expand home countries eligible for emigration to U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3**

In terms of restrictive immigration policies, these will be considered any policies that aim to decrease the level of immigration, or the social, civil, or political rights of immigrants.
Specifically, these could be policies aiming to increase border patrol or deportation, decrease granting asylum, limit immigrant access to public benefits, or eliminate their ability to work for fair wages.

Expansive policies are considered to work toward increasing levels of immigration or facilitate the full functionality of social, civil, and political rights of immigrants. Specifically, expansive policies could come in the form of expanding asylum granting, family reunification, immigrant access to public benefits and fairly paid work, or eligible countries from which immigrants may emigrate.

**Dependent Variable**

To observe the dependent variable, major parties’ agendas regarding immigration policy, a content analysis will be performed focusing on published party platforms, and presidential acceptance speeches. This data will come from the University of California Santa Barbara’s “Presidency Project,” where speech manuscripts and party platforms have been gathered dating back to the 19th century. These sources will be evaluated by the same standards of immigration policy “restrictiveness” or “expansiveness” detailed above, evaluating both the qualitative and quantitative correlations between independent and dependent variables.

**Conditional Variable**

The conditional variable, an increased salience of immigration, will be measured using polling data on public opinion. Specifically, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research created a data set on the topic of the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act. This data surveys public attitudes about preferred immigration levels, specific immigrant groups, and the criteria for immigrants’ entry into the U.S. Polls categorizing respondents’ groups (social, demographic, partisan) will be included when possible. Even more central to the conditional variable will be
the polls from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research that ask the question, “what do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” This survey data will most accurately identify when immigration becomes salient within the political context.

Specifically, the salience of immigration will be considered present when immigration is in the top five most important issues identified by respondents in the Roper Center data.

**Applying these relationships to Theory**

According to Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties, we would expect the identified interest groups, both from the anti-transformative order and the transformative order, to have legitimate influence on party agenda setting. This would be a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. That is, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect to see interest groups working as “policy demanders,” effectively forming coalitions to successfully advance their interests via the political party. In this case, the result would be visible quantitative and qualitative correlations between the immigration policy preferences of the interest groups and a corresponding immigration policy agenda within the political parties.

It is worth noting, however, with Noel’s theory of party ideology in mind, that party agendas may not reflect policy demanders’ interests immediately. Rather, Noel found that pundits and political intellectuals initially crafted party ideologies long before parties adopted them. So, the relationship between interest groups’ immigration policy preferences and political parties’ immigration policy agendas is expected to potentially exhibit this same delay. This delay, according to Bawn et. al, would be credited to shifts in the balance of power within policy demander coalitions. To verify whether interest groups’ delayed influence on party agendas is due to the dynamics within a party’s policy demander coalition, other “core party groups” will be compared with the selected interest groups. These “core party groups” represent a significant
segment of each party’s policy demander coalition, so by comparing their immigration policy preferences with the selected “ethnic advocacy groups” and “neorestrictionist groups,” each party demander coalition’s dissension or consensus on immigration policy will clarify.

According to Bawn et. al, if the policy demander coalitions were in agreement on an issue, the party ought to act relatively responsively to the coalitions’ interests. In the Democratic Party, large labor organizations’ immigration policy preferences will be evaluated, while the Chamber of Commerce will represent the Republican Party’s policy demander coalition.

Should it be found that Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties is not evident within this relationship, then “policy demanders” would not be found to play the central role in party agenda setting. This would be visible amid a complete lack of interest group and activists’ immigration policy preferences inclusion within party agendas. Rather, amid a typical political context, party agendas may solely reflect electorally concerned politicians’ interests.

The relationship between independent and dependent variables ought to endure amid a somewhat normal political context, but Bawn et. al cites a conditional variable that may interrupt this relationship: an abnormally salient political context. If immigration were to become an increasingly salient political issue, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect a shrinking “electoral blind spot,” within which the general electorate would become increasingly aware of political issues, policy, and politicians’ decisions. When the electorate is more knowledgeable than usual, Bawn et. al claims that it notices and rejects extreme policies (which often benefit policy demanders). Effectively, this means that in order to remain electorally viable, parties must react according to Downsian theory, shifting their policy stances toward the electorate’s preferences.

Considering the literature on the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, an era of abnormally salient immigration issues would provoke restrictionist attitudes from the public
(Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Events like terrorist attacks, refugee crises, or national economic crises are often capable of increasing the salience of immigration. For example, after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, national security became a leading priority for the American public, leading to a spike in those desiring a decrease in immigration levels (Roper Center). It would therefore be expected for the relationship between the Independent Variable and Dependent Variable to be disrupted when immigration became a salient issue.
V: Case Studies

Case #1: Party Platforms of 1984

Narrative

Post 1965: The Rise of Illegal Immigration

In the near-decade following the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, concern grew regarding the ensuing extent of illegal immigration. Although the 1965 act revolutionized American immigration policy by eliminating the national quota system and focusing on family reunification, “the new policy perversely encouraged illegal immigration, especially from Mexico” (King and Smith 239, 2011). Increased illegal immigration resulted from the act’s inclusion of “a numerical ceiling of 120,000 on annual immigration from the Western Hemisphere,” along with the scantily obeyed requirement for low-skilled workers to prove their secured employment prior to achieving legal status (King and Smith 239, 2011). As “back-door” immigration provided cheap labor to U.S. agricultural employers, Mexico’s population was growing while its job market was not. Consequentially, five years after the act’s passage, the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants entering the U.S. doubled (Zolberg 321, 1990). After 1965, lawmakers’ would shift their focus to addressing increasing rates of illegal immigration, although not without a lengthy bargaining process between legislators, parties, and interest groups.

Efforts Toward Immigration Policy Reform

Like many previous attempts toward immigration policy reform, a lack of consensus that crosscut party lines made for arduous legislative bargaining, delaying comprehensive reform until the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). President Jimmy Carter was the first President to take action to address the rising rates of illegal immigration; in 1977, he
proposed a bill to Congress with the foundational components of the eventual 1986 bill.

Although Congress voted against President Carter’s proposal, in response, The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was created in 1978 “to conduct a comprehensive study and evaluation of existing laws, policies, and procedures” (Zolberg 322, 1990). Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, then President of the University of Notre Dame and former Chair of the United States Civil Rights Commission, chaired the commission. Other members included former Florida Governor Reubin Askew, Director of Criminal Justice Planning for the city of Los Angeles Rose Ochi, Cuban immigrant and creator of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement Joaquin Francisco Otero, former Director of the California Rural Legal Assistance Justice Cruz Reynoso, various executive department Secretaries, and members of both Senate and House Judiciary Committees. The commission led to a swift decision in 1980 to separate the refugee admittance process from the immigration process completely, although comprehensive immigration policy reform would take years of frustrating compromising to finalize.

The Simpson-Mazzoli Act

The product of The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, referring to the bill’s authors: Republican Wyoming Senator Simpson and Democrat Kentucky Congressman Mazzoli. The package proposal focused on two main provisions: sanctions directed upon employers of illegal aliens and amnesty for illegal aliens who had resided in the U.S. for a certain minimum amount of time. These proposals met both strong support and opposition from various interests. Organized labor and immigration restrictionists supported employer sanctions, while Hispanics and civil rights advocates cheered the amnesty proposal. Yet, agricultural employers, especially on the West Coast, opposed the original
proposal due to their concerns of labor shortages. They called for the inclusion of a guest worker program to offset the effect that employer sanctions would have on their labor force. However, ethnic rights advocates adamantly opposed growers’ desire for a guest worker program, citing the lack of labor and civil rights granted to foreign workers, along with their inability to apply for permanent residency (Wong 34, 2006). These interests would lobby for years until lawmakers could compromise the conditions of passable policy.

**Success in the Senate, Delay in the House**

The Simpson-Mazzoli Act’s first attempt at passage occurred in 1982, when it was enacted by the Senate, but not the House, where, along with agricultural interests’ dismay regarding a shrunken labor force, Hispanics and civil rights advocates strongly opposed the identification requirements within the employer sanction provision (Zolberg 323, 1990). The House’s inability to pass legislation continued as a trend throughout the bargaining process.

Throughout 1983 and 1984, the House worked toward their second attempt at passage. Agricultural interests lobbied fervently for the inclusion of a guest workers program — they were successful. In 1984, the Panetta amendment was added to the House’s version of the bill, which “liberalized” growers’ ability to “obtain foreign workers on seventy-two hours’ notice” (Wong 34, 2006). As a liberal Democrat from agricultural California, Congressman Leon Panetta’s endorsement placed the left’s stamp of approval on the worker’s program, convincing other Democrats to vote in favor of the bill. In addition, the existing guest worker H-2 program was “expanded from 40,000 temporary foreign crop-pickers a year to between 300,000 and 500,000” (Zolberg 323, 1990). Of course, organized labor was opposed to such an expansion to foreign workers, but they “failed to mount a serious campaign against the amendment.” The Panetta amendment was passed in the House with vast Republican support (138 to 15 in favor)
and reluctant Democratic support aided by Democrat Congressman Leon Panetta’s endorsement (90 to 157 against). With the agricultural sector on board, to ensure Democratic and Hispanic support, the bill’s last amendment “prohibited employers from discriminating against legal aliens in hiring or recruiting workers” (Zolberg 325, 1990). Just prior to the 1984 Democratic National Convention, the House’s bill passed 216 to 211: Democrats against 138 to 125, Republicans in favor 78 to 73 (Pear, 1984).

Conference Committee

Once both the House and Senate versions of Simpson-Mazzoli had passed, the next step was expected to be “to form a conference committee, which would send its compromise bill back to each chamber for final approval” (Zolberg 325, 1990). Despite the House’s last minute efforts to appease Hispanics with anti-discrimination provisions, this plan was obstructed when Hispanic Democratic delegates’ announced that they planned to boycott the first ballot at the DNC in protest of Simpson-Mazzoli. Subsequently, uneasy with his ability to win the nomination without the Hispanic delegation’s support, the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee, Walter Mondale, referred to Simpson-Mazzoli as “harmful,” spurring “over forty House Democrats who had voted for the bill to demand the Panetta amendment be dropped.” This twist threatened the possibility for any compromise or policy advancement, as many Democrats then stood in opposition to Simpson-Mazzoli.

Still, the Senate and House conferenced after the DNC, unsure if any compromise was possible after the Democrats’ 1984 denunciation of Simpson-Mazzoli. In order to get Democrats back on board with any passable legislation, restrictive provisions were diluted in the conference’s version of the bill: visa availability for citizens’ siblings was expanded and the Panetta Amendment was dropped in exchange for the House bill’s expansion of the H-2
Program. Yet, in response to the absence of the Panetta Amendment, “the American Farm Bureau Federation opposed the bill because it did not meet the needs of producers of perishable commodities” (Zolberg 326, 1990). And, in contrast to agriculture’s concerns, the AFL-CIO found the H-2 program expansion far too generous. By the end of the 98th Congressional term, no compromise was made and comprehensive immigration reform seemed improbable.

**Back to Square One**

In the 99th Congress, the determined Senator Simpson used his influential role as assistant majority leader to kick start efforts for immigration reform. Now his third revised edition of the Senate bill, some initial aspects were tweaked: amnesty would be contingent upon a presidential committee’s evaluation of immigration law enforcement, employer sanctions became civil, not criminal punishments, and farmers were given three years to employ undocumented immigrants prior to the implementation of strict employer sanctions. In response, the bill gained support from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who had opposed earlier versions. Yet, in response to the diminished amnesty provisions, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) strongly opposed the bill, while The League of United Latin American Citizens and MALDEF “said they would oppose the new version even more adamantly than the old,” (Zolberg 327, 1990).

On the Senate floor, agricultural interests’ lobbying appeared to pay-off, as Senator Pete Wilson (R-California), proposed a guest workers program allowing for 200,000 to 300,000 annual workers. Liberal Democrats, and some Republicans including Simpson were strongly opposed, citing “greed” as agricultural interests’ motivation for the program (Pear, 1985). With only 15 Democrats in support of the proposal, the amendment to “establish a guest-worker program for perishable crops, with an upper limit of 350,000 workers a year” passed 51 to 44 (Zolberg 328, 1990). Then, with 69 for (41 Republicans and 28 Democrats) and 30 against (11
Republicans and 19 Democrats), the final bill passed in the Senate. Yet, the House was not nearing passage and compromise continued.

Peter Rodino, Democrat New Jersey Congressman and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, led the House’s efforts toward a passable bill. In fact, he introduced his own proposal amid calls to action from reform supporters. The Rodino bill resembled the original Simpson-Mazzoli, including immediate amnesty without the inclusion of a guest worker program. Far from agreeing with the Senate bill’s heavy guest-worker provisions, Rodino delayed compromise until the next year, 1985, allowing for time to prepare for compromise with agricultural interests.

**Compromise in the House**

Democrat Brooklyn Congressman Schumer orchestrated the ensuing compromise between agricultural interests and liberal Democrats, providing the House with momentum toward passable legislation. With the help of Californian Democrats Panetta and Berman, who served as excellent liaisons between Democrats and agricultural interests, the Schumer proposal “was designed to guarantee farmers a ready supply of labor while preventing exploitation of the foreign workers by providing them with the opportunity to become permanent residents” (Zolberg 320, 1990). The proposal was met with support from labor and objection from conservative Republicans against “the ‘giveaway’ of permanent resident status to illegal aliens who worked just sixty days” (Zolberg 320, 1990). Although the Schumer proposal inched the House toward passage, House Republicans preferred the Senate’s inclusion of a guest-worker program to Schumer’s proposals. With only 13 Republicans in support, by a vote of 202 to 180, “the House defeated a resolution to bring the Schumer’s bill to the floor…the bill was dead” (Zolberg 332, 1990).
As the Congressional term neared adjournment, in a desperate attempt for reform, the Reagan administration urged House Republicans to bring the bill back to the floor in order to amend the Schumer provisions, although Democrats blocked their effort 235-177 (230 Democrats against and 5 for).

In response, Senate and House supporters worked on compromise off of the floor. The compromise lengthened the necessary number of workdays necessary for legalization and set a limit of 350,000 foreign workers to be accepted over a three-year transitional period.

**Final Compromise and Passage**

In a quick and dramatic turnaround, given the restrictive alterations to the Schumer proposal’s guest worker provisions, Republicans provided a large enough minority support to pass the bill in the House (Democrats in support 168 to 61 and 61 Republicans for, 105 against). Since the Democrats’ opposition to the 1984 House bill, 30 more joined in support, including five of eleven Hispanic representatives (Zolberg 333, 1990).

The final compromise between the Senate and House again forced compromised between the existing bills. Regarding employer sanctions, serial offender employers would face criminal charges, although the General Accounting Office was given the power “to report to Congress on the effects of sanctions, and if they were found to create severe discrimination or problems for employers, Congress might reexamine and even repeal this portion of the law” (Zolberg 334, 1990). Also, the House’s generous 1982 deadline for immigrants seeking amnesty was adopted. However, the provision mandated those applying to spend a year as a “lawful temporary resident,” then “apply for status as permanent residents if they could demonstrate ‘minimal understanding of ordinary English’ and a basic knowledge of U.S. history and government” (Zolberg 335, 1990). In regard to a worker program, the Schumer proposal remained, albeit
altered; those who worked for at least ninety days in agriculture were eligible for permanent residency after a two-year period as a “temporary resident.”

In the bill’s ultimate passage, then referred to as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the house approved 238 to 173 (look up spread) and the Senate approved 63 to 24 (34 Dems for and 8 against, 29 Republicans for and 16 against) (Zolberg 335, 1990).

**Interest Groups’ Policy Preferences**

**Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)**

FAIR’s stance in support of immigration reform remained steadfast throughout Simpson-Mazolli’s bargaining efforts. Most essentially, FAIR supported the employer sanctions provision of Simpson-Mazzoli, which they referred to as “the heart and soul of any immigration reform proposal. Without employer sanctions, there can be no immigration reform” (United States 268, 1985). FAIR deemed the 1983 House proposal “a jobs bill,” citing the millions of American workers who would gain work given undocumented immigrants “displacement” of Americans in the workforce (718, 1983). Although FAIR thought employer sanctions to initiate progress toward limiting immigration, they continually urged for additional restrictive provisions throughout the bargaining process.

All of FAIR’s concerns with proposed legislation were based on their core argument: all immigration must be limited, including legal and refugee entries. Most broadly, FAIR lobbied for a cap on all immigration, proposing a ceiling of 425,000, including family re-unification efforts. Accordingly, FAIR also publicly rejected all forms of amnesty within any proposals, claiming that the provisions would encourage increased immigration from family members and a disrespect for law and order, while failing to accomplish long-term goals of controlled immigration (719, 1983). In response to generous amnesty proposals, FAIR proposed a more
restrictive version, calling for the eligibility of only “those who have lived in this society productively for many years,” including a cut-off date in the mid-1970’s.

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

Throughout the bargaining process, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stood opposed to Simpson-Mazzoli due to its most fundamental provision: employer sanctions. They argued the bill would “shift the burden of enforcing the nation’s immigration laws from the Federal government to the private sector” (344, 1983). Although, the Chamber endorsed Simpson’s third revision of the Senate’s bill in 1985 as “an improvement,” when employers were relieved of “the burden of verification” and penalties for employment of undocumented immigrants were pronounced civil, rather than criminal (Zolberg 327, 1990).

**Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF)**

Although in support of the included amnesty provisions and legalization programs, MALDEF strongly opposed Simpson-Mazzoli from creation to enactment due to its inclusion of employer sanctions and guest-worker programs.

Throughout the compromises, MALDEF denounced guest-workers programs due to the laborers’ lack of civil, political, social, and labor rights. In the 1979 Immigration policy and procedure hearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a MALDEF representative referred to “the creation of a temporary resident status group that would not be eligible for any social welfare benefits was essentially the creation of a working caste in this country” (United States Commission 8, 1979).

In regard to employer sanctions, MALDEF claimed that the provision would “have a discriminatory impact on Hispanic and recent immigrants whose physical and/or linguistic characteristics are associated with undocumented immigrants” (122, 1985).
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

The NAACP took an in between stance throughout the IRCA compromises, supporting both employer sanctions and amnesty for undocumented immigrants. In respect to employer sanctions, the NAACP hoped to “improve employment opportunities for the low-skilled who are most vulnerable to competition from undocumented workers” (Library of Congress 17, 1983). Given that African-Americans are “disproportionately represented in the ranks of unskilled workers,” it isn’t surprising that the NAACP sided with labor on this issue. For the same reason, the NAACP also rejected any expansion of a guest workers program, “as long as there was high unemployment in the country” (Library of Congress 20, 1983).

However, the NAACP sided with other civil rights groups in support of amnesty. Alongside the American for Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), among others, the NAACP lobbied for an increasingly recent date for undocumented immigrants’ eligibility to receive permanent status. Plus, these groups stood against a 1983 provision of “summary exclusion” that “would have allowed INS inspectors to immediately exclude, without a hearing, aliens without documentation or a reasonable basis for legal entry or who were not requesting asylum” (Library of Congress 18). In fact, then NAACP director Althea Simmons claimed, “summary exclusion strikes the heart of our democratic system.”

The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

The AFL-CIO took a stance similar to the NAACP, supporting employer sanctions to protect the American worker’s job and wage, but labor rejected guest workers programs that did not permit eventual permanent residency (Library of Congress 170, 1983). Labor also supported
legalization efforts that expanded union membership, but urged for cautiousness in increasing legal immigration until illegal immigration was under control.

Public Opinion

1965-1995 Attitudes Shifted Toward Anti-immigration

Amid the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, attitudes toward immigration into the U.S. were positive, even somewhat ambivalent. Then, 33% of the public called for immigration levels to decrease, 39% called for immigration to remain at the present level, 7% supported an increase, while 20% had “no opinion” (Gallup). Yet, as the 1970’s approached, Americans were faced with a slowing economy and refugee crises from Vietnam and Cuba, along with an uptick in illegal immigration.

Illegal immigration, slow job growth, and multiple refugee crises seemingly shifted Americans’ immigration views toward the restrictionist camp. From 1965 to 1986, the population calling for the present level of immigration decreased from 39% to 35%, those calling
for more immigration remained at 7%, and, most notably, the portion of Americans desiring a decrease in immigration rose from 33% to 49%, while the 20% of previously undecided respondents dropped to 9%. It is important to note, however, that given the increases in immigration levels during this 21 year span, those supporting increasing or maintaining immigration levels in 1986 are inherently more supportive of immigration than those in 1965.

But, immigration was not the issue of any election from ‘72 to ‘84

From 1972 to 1984, exit polls have asked voters, “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country?” During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal immigration showed in a reported top response. Overshadowed by issues like inflation, unemployment, and the potential of nuclear war, immigration seemingly took a backseat during these elections.

Opinion on IRCA versions

In terms of public opinion regarding IRCA, in 1986, following almost a decade of policy bargaining, the New York Times reported, “the public supported the broad outlines of the
original Simpson-Mazzoli package but strongly disapproved of guest workers (58 to 36 percent) (Zolberg 331, 1990). The previously noted increase from 1965 to 1986 in public preference for decreased immigration supports the claim that the public supported the broad outlines of Simpson-Mazzoli, which aimed to address high illegal immigration rates.

Regarding race, minorities were much more likely to support generous immigration policy, as 61% of Hispanic respondents supported an increase or maintenance of immigration levels. In contrast, only 39% of Whites supported an increased or maintained immigration levels. Blacks split the difference between Hispanics and Whites—52% supported increased or maintaining immigration levels—resembling the NAACP’s stance: in favor of decreasing illegal immigration through employer sanctions in defense of domestic workers while also supporting legalization programs in the spirit of civil rights advocacy.

Concerning political ideology, nearly half of all Conservatives, Moderates, and Liberals desired a decrease in immigration levels: 57% of Conservatives, 45% of Moderates, and 48% of Liberals.

It is also worth noting that all geographic regions of the U.S., other than the Northeast, supported a decrease in immigration levels.

**Party platforms**

**Democratic Party Platforms**

**1976 Carter**

In 1976, just one year prior to Jimmy Carter’s own proposed immigration reform that spurred the creation of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the Democratic Party platform continued its “anti-discriminatory” stance that it contended amid the 1965 immigration reform, vaguely supporting inclusionary legal immigration from all corners of
the globe. However the 1976 platform’s discussion on immigration is brief. Besides encouraging the welcome of political prisoners from other corrupt nations, little is mentioned regarding immigration. The immigration reform that is mentioned is framed within the “Civil and Political Rights” portion, where the platform calls for one of the fundamental aspects of Simpson-Mazzoli: a legalization program “to facilitate acquisition of citizenship by Resident Aliens.”

1980 Carter

Amid the refugee crises from Vietnam, Cuba, and Haiti, the 1980 Democratic Party platform thoroughly recognized the Carter administration’s progress in addressing the crises. For instance, the Refugee Act of 1980 differentiated the refugee and immigration processes, and the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had been created to evaluate United States’ immigration policy.

In regard to immigration policy, the platform urged for reform that protected the rights of undocumented immigrants and minorities who may be discriminated against due to “neighborhood sweeps” or “stop and search procedures without probable cause.” In addition, the platform denounced any guest-workers program that would “undercut U.S. wages and working conditions…which would re-establish the bracero program of the past.” However, an explicit mention of a legalization program for “resident aliens,” as seen in the 1976 Democratic Party platform, did not appear in the 1980 platform. Rather, a less specific acknowledgement assured that the U.S. “must work to resolve the issue of undocumented residents in a fair and humane way.”

1984 Mondale
Immigration policy reform had become more relevant and plausible by 1984, when sensitive congressional compromise continued over Simpson-Mazzoli. At the 1984 Democratic Convention the Hispanic Democratic Delegation protested Simpson-Mazzoli’s discriminating provisions by threatening to boycott voting on the first ballot for a Presidential candidate.

The 1984 Democratic Party platform was very brief in discussing immigration reform. In fact, behind only the 1980 Democratic Party platform, the 1984 platform was the longest in the Party’s history, yet it included only a couple sentences concerning immigration. Most of the platform discussed the economy and creating jobs during a period of a globalizing economy. The portion that did refer to immigration stuck to the Democrats’ status quo: support for accepting political prisoners as refugees and the denouncement of discrimination amid increased immigration.

The explicit 1976 platform proposal of granting citizenship to “resident aliens” does not reappear in the 1984 platform. In fact, the 1984 platform merely acknowledges the discrimination that immigrants face, but does not mention a solution for undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S.

**Republican Party Platforms**

**1976 Ford**

The 1976 Republican Party platform failed to mention immigration at all. Rather, the platform focused on traditional Republican issues, including “taxes and government spending,” “small business,” “a small and just society,” “the American family,” and “welfare reform,” among others.

**1980 Reagan**

In 1980, like the Democratic Party platform, the Republican Party’s platform touched on the refugee crises, citing America’s open arms and the coordination that ought to occur with
international organizations and governments to solve the refugee crises. The platform does allude to the need for immigration policy reform that “reflects the interests of our national security and economic well-being,” although the provisions that would do so remain vague. The platform does allude to an increased dedication to enforcing immigration law, stating, “Government has a duty to adopt immigration laws and follow enforcement procedures which will fairly and effectively implement the immigration policy desired by the American people.”

**1984 Reagan**

The 1984 Republican Party platform was more straightforward than in 1980. It directly identified illegal immigration as a problem, urging for “responsible reforms of our immigration laws…to enable us to regain control of our borders.” The platform does, however, support family reunification.

**Case Analysis**

**Interest Group Analysis**

**FAIR**

FAIR rates “highly restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. It called for strict employer sanctions, disapproved of legalization programs, and proposed a 425,000 annual cap on immigration that included family reunification and refugee acceptance.

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The Chamber was strongly opposed to employer sanctions, but did support guest-worker programs.

**MALDEF**

MALDEF rates “highly expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The organization stood firmly against employer sanctions’ and guest worker programs’ potentials for discrimination, and supported legalization and family reunification programs.
NAACP
The NAACP rates as “low restrictive,” supporting employer sanctions in support of the black domestic worker. In the same nature, the NAACP stood opposed to guest worker programs, but did support legalization programs.

AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive,” mirroring the NAACP’s support of domestic labor. Like the NAACP, the AFL-CIO supported employer sanctions and legalization programs, but opposed proposed guest workers programs.

1984 Party Platform Analysis

Democratic Party
The Democratic Party platform rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The platform makes little concrete proposals, but does acknowledge increased discrimination against immigrants.

Republican Party
The Republican Party platform rates “low restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Like the Democratic Party platform, this platform fails to propose concrete policy. Yet, it calls to “regain control of the border,” implying increased efforts toward immigration law enforcement, effectively restricting overall immigration levels.

Public Opinion Analysis
Although the public did seemingly become more aware of immigration as an issue (“undecided” respondents to immigration preference surveys decreased from 20% to 9% from 1965 to 1986), for this study’s purposes, immigration is still not considered salient in the 1984 election. Since immigration was not viewed as one of the primary, or even secondary “issues
facing the nation” prior to and during the 1984 election, this study will not consider immigration as nationally salient.

**Case Conclusion**

In this study’s theoretical model, the relationship between the independent variable (interest groups’ immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party platforms) depends on immigration’s salience. In 1984, immigration was not salient, so we would expect for the parties to remain loyal to interest groups, not exclusively the electorate.

This case fits somewhat well into Bawn et. al’s theory, which predicts political parties’ loyalty to interest groups, especially when political salience is low. However, given the “strange bedfellow” coalitions that dominate immigration policy bargaining, parties can’t always take a stance that pleases all of their core interest groups. For example, MALDEF and the NAACP, as ethnic advocacy groups, usually take similar policy stances. However, in regard to IRCA proposals, the NAACP’s support for employer sanctions’ protection of domestic black labor contrasts with MALDEF’s vehement objection to sanctions’ discriminatory potential. In effect, the Democratic Party struggles to please both ethnic advocacy groups and labor advocates. Resembling the same “strange bedfellow” dynamic, liberals and conservatives are often split between expansive and restrictive immigration policy preferences.

Both Republican and Democratic Parties faced the dilemma of appealing to both sides of their interest groups, as well as their electorates. For Republicans, business, represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in this study, preferred somewhat expansive immigration policy, firmly in opposition to employer sanctions. Yet, FAIR argues that employer sanctions are the bedrock of any immigration policy reform. For the Republican Party, this split meant remaining somewhat neutral on immigration, pleasing FAIR’s restrictive interests by calling for increased
enforcement of immigration law, but failing to mention employer sanctions in an effort to appease the business community.

For Democrats, labor-oriented interest groups, like the AFL-CIO and the NAACP, favored employer sanctions’ protection of American jobs. Yet, MALDEF, one of the most visible opponents to Simpson-Mazzoli, opposed employer sanctions due to their discriminatory potential. In response, the Democrats also took a neutral, almost non-stance. Their platform did not call for immigration reform of any kind, although it did acknowledge the prevalence of discrimination amid increasing immigration levels. This position could be interpreted as a defense of MALDEF’s discrimination concerns. Unhappy with the Simpson-Mazzoli proposals of employer sanctions and guest worker programs, the Democratic Party simply decided against even mentioning past or future attempts of immigration policy reform.

Bawn et. al cannot explain the Democratic Party platform’s failure to mention legalization provisions, which were supported by labor and all ethnic advocacy groups, including the NAACP. The only explanation within Bawn et. al’s framework is that the Democrats were so opposed to Simpson-Mazzoli proposals that even alluding to its progress or provisions would undermine MALDEF’s concern with its discriminatory nature. Democrats do not appear to be catering to their electorate’s interests before interest groups’: by 1986, almost 50% of liberals desired a decrease in immigration.

Case #2: 2004 Party Platforms and 2006-2007 Immigration Reform

Narrative

Immigration since 1986

Since the 1986 passage of IRCA, some minor immigration legislation was passed throughout the 1990’s, but efforts toward comprehensive policy reform had not been made by
2004. The 1990’s legislation included the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which “affected immigrant eligibility for federal social programs, increased enforcement efforts, and added [employer] penalties and increased workplace screenings” (Leal 2, 2009). Yet, in the 2000’s, the same illegal immigration concerns from the 1980’s remained, especially concerning the millions of undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. The number of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to approximately 12 million in 2007 (Wasem, 2012).

![Graph of Population Estimates of Immigrants in the Country Illegally in Millions](image-url)


Only a few months into his first term, in July, 2001, President George W. Bush foreshadowed his intentions to engage in comprehensive immigration reform efforts, claiming, The White House “was considering a task force proposal to allow the estimated 3 million
Mexicans living illegally in the United States to achieve permanent legal residence through a guest-worker program” (Wallace, 2001). Although admittedly interested in some sort of permanent residence program that avoided deportation provisions, Bush ensured to clarify that he was opposed to a “blanket amnesty” program. 9/11 and the Iraq War would later delay any federal efforts toward addressing immigration reform, although the programs that the Bush administration alluded to foreshadowed the bargaining stalemate that would occur throughout Bush’s second term.

**Initial proposals**

After the 2004 elections, Republicans controlled the Senate, House, and Presidency. However, throughout their term in control, divisions within the Republican Party stalled immigration reform efforts. In the House, Republicans most sought enhanced border security, as well as the inclusion of a guest workers program. The Senate agreed, although they urged for a legalization program as well. Yet, the Republican divisions that thwarted policy progress were not between the two chambers, but rather between “the business community and grassroots social conservatives” (Leal 3, 2009).

As in the past, the business community pushed for cheap, accessible immigrant labor, especially in the agricultural sector. To protect their interests, business lobbied for an extensive guest-worker program and policy provisions that allowed undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. to remain. Social conservatives were more concerned with the integrity and enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and the preservation of traditional American culture. They perceived undocumented immigrants to be criminals and policies permitting their employment, residence, or eventual citizenship were undermining the law and threatening American culture and national security.
The first proposed legislation came from the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). This bill included severe restrictive provisions, including the criminalization of “illegal presence” in the U.S., which constituted a 366-day jail term. The bill also mandated employers’ usage of a “Basic Pilot” program to verify employees’ legal statuses, and criminalized anyone “offering services or assistance to illegal immigrants,” which Hillary Clinton then claimed would send “even Jesus himself” to prison (Leal 3, 2009). The bill met passionate opposition from immigrants and college students, who protested the bill’s restrictive nature.

Having desired a less restrictive, more comprehensive reform, the Senate’s proposals contrasted from the House’s. Three proposals were presented to the Senate in 2006 prior to an eventual compromise: one from Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter (R-PA), another from Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ), and one from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) (Leal 4, 2009). Frist’s bill mirrored the House’s enforcement heavy proposal, excluding guest worker or legalization programs. He warned Specter, Kennedy, and McCain that if they couldn’t come to a compromise on their less restrictive proposals, then only his bill would be brought to the Senate floor. Frist’s pressure motivated compromise between the Senators, who then needed a supermajority of the Senate’s support to pass their compromise.

The Judiciary Committee’s compromise was passed 12-6; “all eight Democrats and four of the ten Republicans voted yes” (Leal 5, 2009). It included a guest worker program admitting 400,000 annually, Green Card eligibility for agricultural workers, increased border enforcement measures, and possible legalization for immigrants who had arrived prior to 2004 and had completed 11 years of arduous assimilation steps, including learning English. The most
contentious provision was the legalization program, which opposing Republicans deemed “amnesty.” Ultimately, the compromise couldn’t attract enough Republican support in the Senate.

Striving to achieve support for comprehensive reform, Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and Mel Martinez (R-FL) added heavily stringent components to the legalization program in hopes of attracting Republican support. One provision required those who had resided in the United States for between five and two years (about three million)…would have had to return to their nations of origin before applying for a visa,” while those who had resided in the U.S. for less than two years would have been deported (Leal 5, 2009). However, adequate support did not present itself in the Senate.

With encouragement from the Bush administration to reach comprehensive immigration reform, Frist and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) tweaked the Hagel-Martinez compromise, passing the Senate 62-36 (22 Republicans for and 32 against, 39 Democrats for and 4 against) on May 24th (United States Senate). Despite the Senate’s ability to pass a comprehensive reform bill, the House’s restrictive policy preferences made a conference committee’s potential seem bleak—it never happened. The majority-Republican House elected to host hearings on immigration reform rather than appoint compromise conferees, killing reform effort’s momentum. As mid-term elections approached and the potential for compromise dwindled away, “Senate Democrats charged that House Republicans wanted to use immigration as a campaign issue and were not serious about finding solutions” (Leal 6, 2009). Yet, members of both the House and Senate hoped to exemplify their concern with the problem of illegal immigration—especially before the midterm elections—leading to The Border Security First Act.
As the only immigration bill to pass in 2006, The Border Security First Act did not accomplish comprehensive immigration reform. Rather, it enacted the construction of 700 miles of fencing on the US-Mexico border. The bill passed easily in both chambers with unified Republican support and divided Democratic support: 283-138 in the House (Democrats against 64-131 and Republicans for 219-6), 80-19 in the Senate (26 Democrats for, 56 Republicans for).

Democrats Gain Control in 2006

After the Republican-controlled congress failed to pass comprehensive immigration reform from 2004 to 2006, the potential for comprehensive reform resurfaced as Democrats took control of the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm election. With trouble, the Senate was the first to attempt passing a compromise.

The Senate’s proposal featured a mix of restrictive and expansive provisions, but was ultimately more expansive than the Frist-Reid bill. The most expansive provision was unseen in past bargaining efforts; the Z visa “would legalize almost all unauthorized immigrants” (Leal 7, 2009). Although, the Z visa relied on the inclusion of several restrictive provisions: criminal liability for employers of the undocumented, employers’ use of the “Basic Pilot” employee screening system, no citizenship for guest workers, and restrictive family reunification processes. The first Senate proposal was unable to gain enough support for passage, leading to the inclusion of a provision “to commit $4.4 billion for security and enforcement efforts” (Leal 7, 1990).

In June of 2007, after numerous attempts at compromise and revision, the Senate’s compromise failed to pass cloture, needing 60 votes, but receiving only 46 (Democrats 16 against, 37 Republicans against). Lacking support derived from Republicans’ concern about appearing inconsistent if they switched their votes from “no” in 2006 to “yes” in 2007, their fear of a Democrat-led compromise committee with the House, and their rejection of the Z visa’s
generous citizenship provision (Leal 7, 2009). This legislative failure ultimately killed the Bush administration’s hopes for comprehensive reform.

Public Opinion

The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels

In general, the national attitude toward immigration in 2004 resembles that of 1986. The nation was approximately split in half between those supporting present or increased levels and those supporting decreased levels of immigration. In 1986, 35% of respondents desired the maintenance of the present immigration levels, 7% hoped for an increase, and 49% wanted a decrease, while 9% held no opinion. In 2004, 33% supported the present level, 14% an increased level, and 49% a decreased level, while 4% had no opinion. Although the national attitudes toward immigration seem virtually identical between 1986 and 2004 responses, they did not remain completely stable across their near two-decade gap.

Between 1986 and 2004, national attitudes toward immigration shifted toward restrictive positions during the 1990’s. In 1995, 27% of respondents supported the present level of immigration (down 8% from ’86), 7% desired an increase (same as ’86), and 62% preferred a decrease (up 13% from ’86), while 4% did not hold an opinion. The enforcement-heavy policies passed throughout the 1990’s, predominately under Bill Clinton, echoed this shift toward restrictive immigration preferences. Yet, by the 2000’s, attitudes toward immigration rebounded toward the less restrictive 1986 positions; in June of 2001 those preferring the present immigration level (42%) actually out numbered those in favor of decreased levels (41%), while 14% favored increased levels.

The 9/11 attacks halted and reversed this shift toward expansive immigration attitudes. From June 2001 to October 2001, respondents’ attitudes abruptly shifted toward restrictive
positions; those supporting present immigration levels fell by 12% to 30%, those for increased immigration fell by 6% to 8% and those seeking decreased levels grew by 17% to 58%. In the decade following 9/11, attitudes would gradually return to pre-9/11 levels, resembling those of 1986.


Illegal Immigration
Although the nation’s public was essentially split on immigration level preferences in 2004, it achieved consensus concerning illegal immigration: it was a problem in need of a solution. In 2006, 81% characterized illegal immigration as “out of control” (Connelly, 2006). However, the public was very divided in opinion regarding workable solutions to illegal immigration’s spike.

The American public’s policy preferences split concerning how reform generally ought to address the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S.: 32% preferred allowing permanent residency, 32% preferred allowing residency under a guest worker program, and 27% preferred deportation to undocumented immigrants’ home countries (Ilias et al. 745, 2008).

**Talk Radio**

Although the nation as a whole agreed that illegal immigration was a problem that needed to be solved, it became a higher priority than most for far-right social conservatives. This subset of voters’ prioritization of suppressing illegal immigration is evident in the rise of conservative talk radio.

In regard to illegal immigration, conservative talk radio took an extremely restrictive stance, even “denouncing Republican President George W. Bush’s work-permit proposals as ‘amnesty for law-breakers’” (Leal 9, 2009). In 2008, discussing the illegal immigrations’ negative effects made up a significant portion of talk radio’s content: 19% of airtime compared to mainstream media’s 9%. Those discussions “directed intensity toward members of both parties,” expressing their outrage with the “‘invasion’ of foreigners flooding across ‘porous’ US border in flagrant violation of the law” (Leal 9, 2009). Given the intensity and frequency of talk radio’s illegal immigration coverage compared to the mainstream media’s, it is no surprise that
reform opponents tied their votes closely with their views on immigration; “a CNN poll found that 43 per cent of reform opponents said the immigration issue would be ‘very important’ to their vote in 2006, the corresponding figure for reform supporters was 24 per cent” (Leal 9, 2009).

Conservative talk radio, its listeners, and legislators responding to their restrictive policy preferences are credited for preventing comprehensive immigration reform. Talk radio became “an advocacy machine…that long buttressed Republican efforts to defeat Democrats and their policies” (Leal 9, 2009). In the case of immigration reform, this advocacy machine’s efforts also directed pressure toward moderate Republicans willing to compromise with Democrats.

The Nation’s Most Important Problems

From 1996 to 2004, exit polls asked voters, “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country?” During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal immigration appeared in the top five reported responses. Overshadowed by issues like the war in Iraq, crime, the economy, gas prices, and unemployment, immigration did not take center stage leading up to these presidential elections.

Interest Group Policy Preferences

Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)

Due to their stern opposition to amnesty, FAIR criticized comprehensive immigration reform efforts throughout 2006 and 2007. Aside from pathways to citizenship, which FAIR undoubtedly opposed as “amnesty,” the group was also dismayed with the idea of a guest workers program, especially one allowing permanent residency or applications for citizenship. FAIR argued that guest workers programs were only beneficial due to the cheap, exploitable labor they provided for American business, but “once immigrants receive permanent residence,
they can’t be exploited as readily as illegal immigrants.” Furthermore, for FAIR, such a guest worker program would invite illegal immigrants, which FAIR identified as the source of “enormous, incalculable costs imposed on society at large—public education, emergency medical care, housing assistance, housing itself and criminal justice costs” (Katel, 2005).

Foreshadowing the congressional gridlock that would plague comprehensive immigration reform efforts, especially within the Republican Party, FAIR ensured that their policy preferences reflected those of “the average American voter” (Katel, 2005). Then President of FAIR, Dan Stein framed the debate between “elites, major financial interests and global economic forces arrayed against the average American voter, warning, “the depth of anger should not be underestimated” (Katel, 2005). These remarks are telling given many far right Republicans’ hesitancy to support any immigration reform with provisions resembling amnesty.

FAIR’s place in the Republican Party’s base has not always been central, but as illegal immigration became an increasingly important issue for far-right social conservatives, FAIR’s perspectives became more foundational in Republican policy stances.

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce backed comprehensive immigration reform efforts, especially those proposing “the expansion of temporary visa programs for essential workers, while ensuring that temporary workers would not take jobs being filled by U.S. citizens” (Rosenblum, 2007). The Chamber of Commerce was concerned with any increased bureaucracy at borders that would “impede the movement of legitimate cargo and travelers” (Rosenblum, 2007).

**Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF)**
MALDEF supported comprehensive immigration reform efforts, lobbying for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S., permanent residency for participants in temporary guest workers programs, family reunification, immigrants' due process rights, and the DREAM Act, which proposed to grant citizenship to children who were brought illegally to America if they completed two years of college or military service. Although, MALDEF did oppose increased border patrol that was included throughout comprehensive reform efforts, claiming, “the continuous buildup of forces along the border has done little to curb unlawful immigration” (United States, 2007).

AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO opposed comprehensive reform efforts that proposed increased temporary guest workers programs, claiming “workers here on a temporary basis are more vulnerable to labor violations…some temporary workers will stay in this country illegally rather than go home when their visa expires” (Rosenblum, 2007). Although hesitant to support a guest workers program due to the potential to undercut domestic laborers, at minimum, the AFL-CIO desired guaranteed permanent residency or a path to citizenship for guest workers.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

The NAACP stood somewhere between MALDEF and the AFL-CIO, siding with MALDEF as a civil rights organization and with the AFL-CIO as an advocate for black domestic labor. Though, in the debate on immigration, the NAACP stood alongside MALDEF as fellow members of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), a coalition of civil rights organizations. The LCCR submitted a detailed explanation of the “complicated relationship between the African-American community and immigrant
“communities” to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law (United States, 2007). The explanation detailed LCCR’s concern with immigration’s effect on African-Americans’ employment levels, especially in unskilled positions. Yet, LCCR also notes that although advocates of restrictive immigration policy often claim to protect the African-American laborer, the same advocates of restrictive immigration policy “inconsistently show their concern for the welfare of African American on the whole,” citing their opposition to the Voting Rights Act’s reauthorization. In fact, LCCR states, “it is clear that immigration restrictionists are not—and never have been—our friends” (United States, 2007).

Ultimately, the NAACP sides with MALDEF more than the AFL-CIO, standing with the LCCR’s support for “more open vacancy notification systems…to fill low-wage jobs,” while ensuring “strong labor, health, wage and safety protections, and there must be an opportunity for such workers to become legal permanent residents and get on a path to citizenship” (United States, 2007).

**Party Platforms**

**Democrats**

**1996 Clinton**

In response to concerns over illegal immigration, the 1996 Democratic Party Platform called for a continued increase in border patrol and an increase in the criminal and civil punishments for employers of undocumented immigrants. Plus, the platform opposed eligibility for undocumented immigrants in welfare programs, accompanying the Republican Party in assigning financial responsibility for immigrants to their sponsors. However, in opposition to
Congressional Republican sentiment, the platform did explicitly support the right to education for U.S. born undocumented children.

Regarding legal immigration, the Democrats call for continued efforts with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) toward “streamlining procedures, cutting red tape, and using new technology to make it easier for legal immigrants to accept the responsibilities of citizenship and truly call America their home” (“Political Party Platforms,” 2016).

It is also worth noting that although this platform urged “everyone in America to learn English so they can fully share in our daily life,” it “strongly opposed divisive efforts like English-only legislation, designed to erect barriers between us and force people away from the culture and heritage of which they are rightly proud.”

2000 Gore

The 2000 Democratic Party Platform shares the 1996 platform’s solution to illegal immigration: improved border patrol and stringent employer sanctions.

In regard to legal immigration, this platform calls for an increasingly efficient citizenship application screening process, a focus on family reunification, and guest workers programs guaranteeing the workers’ protection. The proposed guest worker programs aim to “address only genuine shortages of highly skilled workers” and to “assure an adequate, predictable supply of agricultural labor while protecting American farm workers who are among the poorest and more vulnerable in our society” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). Explicit language is included denouncing “guest worker programs that lead to exploitation” of labor, additionally advocating for the “adjusted status of immigrants with deep roots in the country.” In addition to this legal immigration platform, a sense of cultural assimilation is expected from legal immigrants, which
is reflected in the Democrats’ support for resources directed toward English language learning courses for “newcomers.”

2004 Kerry

To address illegal immigration, the 2004 Democratic Party platform focuses on increased border patrol and paths to citizenship. The platform fails to mention employer sanctions, but includes improved border patrol as a matter of “strengthening homeland security.” Regarding the 7 million undocumented immigrants estimated to have been residing in U.S., this platform argues for earned citizenship: “undocumented immigrant within our borders who clear a background check, work hard and pay taxes should have a path to earn full participation in America” (Frieden, 2003).

In addressing legal immigration, aside from supporting paths to citizenship for undocumented residents, the platform backed family reunification for parents, children, and spouses, as well as cultural assimilation efforts including English-language and civic education programs.

The 2004 platform does not mention a guest workers program, but the previously cited statement supporting citizenship for working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented immigrants seemingly applies to any potential guest workers as well.

Republican Party Platforms

1996 Dole

To thwart illegal immigration, the 1996 Republican Party platform stresses the need to “increase border patrol, accelerate deportation of criminal aliens, toughen penalties for overstaying visas, and streamline the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). Plus, the platform explicitly cites Republican opposition to undocumented immigrants’ use of “expensive welfare programs” and their support for Proposition 187 in
California, which aimed to “bar illegal immigrants and their children from receiving government services like a public education” (Nieves, 1999). More radically, the platform urges for a constitutional amendment that would reject automatic citizenship for “children born in the United States of parents who are not legally present in the United States or who are not long-term residents” (“Party Platform,” 2016).

In a stringently restrictive nature, this platform objects to legal immigrants receiving public aid, assigning the responsibility of immigrants’ “financial well-being” to the immigrants’ sponsors. The platform likens sponsors to “deadbeat dads” who “must provide for the children they bring into this world”: “deadbeat sponsors” ought “provide for the immigrants they brought into this country” (“Party Platform,” 2016).

2000 George W. Bush

In addressing illegal immigration, the 2000 Republican Party platform cites economic development in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as the long-term solution, but increased border patrol as the short-term solution, especially targeting smugglers and producers of fake documents. The platform endorsed the recommendations of the U.S. Commission of Immigration Reform, including increased border patrol, refined family reunification guidelines that limit extended relatives’ eligibility, and reform of labor certification programs to increase employers’ access to qualified foreign workers.

The 2000 platform is undoubtedly in support of expanding guest workers programs, although without mention of participants’ pathway to citizenship. The platform supported the expansion of both H-1B and H-2 visas, ensuring available labor in both high-tech, specialized
positions and “urgent” agricultural work. In describing these programs, the platform explicitly refers to these workers as “temporary,” implying they would not eventually gain citizenship.

2004 George W. Bush

The 2004 Republican Party platform provides thorough and specific solutions to the problem of illegal immigration. Framed as an issue of national security, the predominant component of the platform’s solution is increased border patrol, including “reconnaissance cameras, border patrol agents, unmanned aerial flights,” and the US-VISIT bio-metric data system, which tracks the entry and exit of foreign travelers at airports and land border crossings. Another aspect of intensified border patrol is the platform’s support of “Border Patrol agents’ ability to deport illegal aliens without having first to go through the cumbersome process of allowing the illegal alien to have a hearing before an immigration judge” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). The platform also calls for “tough penalties” on employers of undocumented immigrants, while denouncing amnesty as encouraging future illegal immigration.

This platform endorses President Bush’s “new temporary worker program that applies when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs.” The guest worker program would allow the participation of present undocumented immigrants and would provide them with an opportunity to apply for legal citizenship.

Case Analysis

Interest Group Analysis

FAIR
FAIR rates “high restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. FAIR represented the far-right portion of the Republican Party, strongly opposing amnesty and also any guest workers program conceding permanent residency.

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. They do support guest workers programs, especially when employment opportunities cannot be filled with domestic labor. However, a pathway to citizenship is much less important to the Chamber than a steady stream of adequate labor for business.

**MALDEF**

MALDEF rates “high expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. In comprehensive reform, they lobby against increased border patrol and in support of pathways to citizenship, as well as a guest workers program complete with provisions allowing permanent residence or citizenship.

**NAACP**

NAACP rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Torn between protecting African-American labor and immigrants’ civil rights, NAACP’s membership in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights displays their distrust of immigration restrictionists. They reluctantly support a guest workers program, but only under the circumstances that immigrant labor is protected and granted a pathway to permanent residency.

**AFL-CIO**
The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Labor’s protection of domestic workers motivates their opposition to guest workers programs, especially given the possibility that temporary workers may overstay their visas, becoming exploitable labor that could undercut domestic laborers.

**2004 Party Platform Analysis**

**Democratic Party**

The Democratic Party platform rates “high expansive.” The platform’s sole restrictive quality is found in the vague and brief mention of improved border security, which is framed as a national security issue. Concerning improved border security, the platform states, “we will work with our neighbors to strengthen our security so we are safer from those who would come here to harm us” (Presidential Platforms, 2016). Restrictive provisions that were included in the 1996 and 2000 platforms are left out in the 2004 Democratic Party platform, including provisions for employer sanctions and those denying welfare benefits for undocumented immigrants.

The most expansive portion of the platform is the provision for earned citizenship for working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented immigrants. This is a very inclusive stance considering the 7 million estimated undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. The platform additionally promotes family reunification efforts.

In defense of this platform’s “high expansive” rating, it should be noted that the vague provisions for heightened border security is significantly less essential to the platform’s characterization than the more concrete provisions for an earned pathway to citizenship.

**Republican Party**
The Republican Party platform is rated “high restrictive.” Its restrictive qualities include its support for increases to border patrol, including heightened technological resources and accelerated deportation capabilities, as well as its firm opposition against amnesty. Specific technological improvements to border patrol are mentioned within the platform, including cameras, drones, and a bio-metric data system. Regarding deportation efforts, the platform aims to suspend habeas corpus for undocumented immigrants, relieving U.S. border patrol’s obligation to send undocumented immigrants through immigration courts prior to deportation. The platform also supports stricter penalties for employers of undocumented immigrants, smugglers of undocumented immigrants, and producers of fraudulent identification documents.

Although provisions concerning undocumented immigrants’ restricted access to public benefits did not appear in the 2000 platform, due to the radical nature of the 1996 proposals it is worth mentioning that the 2004 platform also leaves out the extremely restrictive provisions that were included in the 1996 platform.

The 2004 platform includes few expansive qualities. Although, relative to previous platforms, the guest workers program included in the platform is more expansive. The program is standard in that foreign guest workers would only temporarily work and reside in the U.S. However, the program also permitted undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. to participate. Those participants would be eligible to submit an application for citizenship. Yet, this expansive provision is negligible in comparison to the extent of restrictive proposals riddled throughout the platform.

Public Opinion Analysis
For this study’s purposes, given polling data’s evaluation of the public’s perceived “most important problem facing the nation,” neither immigration, nor illegal immigration will be considered salient, at least at a national scale. However, for the portion of socially conservative Republicans, often conservative talk radio listeners, the issue of illegal immigration was undoubtedly salient.

**Case Conclusion**

In examining the relationship between the independent variable (interest groups’ immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party platforms), this study must first consider public opinion concerning immigration. In the case of 2004, immigration is not considered salient, so we would expect the parties to remain loyal to interest groups’ policy preferences. It is important to note, however, that immigration was found to be salient within a far-right socially conservative portion of the Republican Party. Given this exception, we would not consider the model flawed if the Republican Party is found to cater to the socially conservative portion of their electorate with which immigration became salient.

Bawn’s theory of political parties, which expects political parties to promote the policy preferences of core interest groups in times of low political salience, applies well to the 2004 party platforms and the corresponding interest group policy preferences.

For Democrats, their platform toes a fine line in adhering to the interests of both civil rights organizations and labor. The Democratic Party platform is rated “high expansive” as it proposed a pathway to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. who “clear background checks, work hard, and pay taxes.” The platform also mentions the party’s
commitment to family reunification efforts. These proposals align well with the policy preferences of MALDEF and the NAACP, the civil rights organizations in this study.

The Democratic Party platform also makes an effort to please labor’s interests. Although the AFL-CIO rates “low restrictive” in this case, the Democratic Party platform pays attention to labor’s concerns with proposed immigration reform. But labor’s main concern is the implementation of a guest workers program that would exploit undocumented immigrants’ labor (especially if workers overstay their visas), simultaneously undermining American citizens’ employment. However, the Democratic Party platform fails to mention a guest workers program. The only mention of immigrant employment is the platform’s call for a path to citizenship for those that work hard—a provision that labor would support, given that a path to citizenship protects laborers from exploitation and undercutting wages of citizens.

The Republican Party platform also aims to appease two relatively contradictory interests: business and immigration restrictionists. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, representative of American business interests in this study, desires a guest workers program that provides a steady source of labor for American businesses, while opposing employer sanctioning. The platform finds no trouble in catering to business’s desire for a guest workers program, as President Bush proposed a temporary worker program in 2004. However, the platform does endorse stringent employer sanctions, which the Chamber of Commerce firmly opposes. The Republican Party’s decision to favor restrictionist policy over business interests gives light to their recognition of immigration’s salience within their far right, socially conservative supporters.
In Bawn et. al’s model, when an issue becomes salient, the “electoral blindspot” decreases in size, meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’ positions, effectively forcing parties to shift toward appeasing their electorate rather than their core interest groups. For the Republican Party in 2004, the “electoral blindspot” shrunk surrounding the issue of immigration, causing the party to serve their core electorate before considering business’s interests. The decreased size of the “electoral blindspot” was due to far-right social conservatives’ heightened attentiveness to immigration, especially illegal immigration. As mentioned previously in the “public opinion” section, talk radio programs fueled the far-right social conservatives’ outrage against proposals of “amnesty” and in support of increased border security proposals. This resulted in a Republican platform rich with restrictive measures closely aligned to the interests of FAIR, including various methods of intensifying border patrol, deportation, and a stated opposition to amnesty. Bawn et. al’s model fits in this instance, explaining the Republican Party platform’s favor of FAIR’s policy preferences over business’s as an effort to chase votes amid amplified political salience, not as the party serving one interest group over another.

**Case Study #3: 2016 Party Platforms**

**Narrative**

Following the failed comprehensive immigration reform efforts of 2006 and 2007, Obama boldly announced his intention to achieve comprehensive reform within his first year as President. Immigration reform had become a political hot potato in the previous term, especially within the socially conservative right wing of the Republican Party, which staunchly opposed “amnesty” provisions that were perceived as “gifts” of citizenship to criminal trespassers. Yet,
in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Obama boasted about his Senatorial record as a persistent supporter of immigration reform, helping him earn 67% of the Hispanic vote (Lopez, 2008). Despite his electoral support, Obama’s immigration reform attempts resembled those of the past: plagued with congressional gridlock.

Obama’s promise to achieve immigration reform within his first year went unfulfilled, without visible progress. In fact, “the administration sought to prove it was tough on illegal immigration by ratcheting up deportations” (Ball, 2014). At last, in 2010, the Dream Act was presented to Congress. Although not comprehensive reform, The Dream Act hoped “to permit young people brought illegally into the U.S. by their parents the opportunity for citizenship…contingent on them completing two years of college or military service” (Brandt, 2010). After passing the House 216-198 (Democrats 208 for and 38 against, Republicans 8 for and 160 against), Senate Democrats failed to get the 60 votes necessary to pass the Dream Act with a supermajority (55-41, Democrats 50 for and 5 against, Republicans 36 against and 3 for), effectively killing the bill’s congressional life amid a Tea Party congressional take-over in the 2010 mid-term election.

In response to the Dream Act’s congressional failure and the inability to work with an increasingly conservative Republican congress, Obama took matters into his own hands in June 2012, issuing an executive order, referred to as the Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to “stop deporting young illegal immigrants who entered the United States as children if they meet certain requirements” (Cohen, 2012). The order additionally instituted an opportunity for eligible individuals to apply for a work visa, but did not include a path to citizenship. Following the highest number of annual U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) deportations in history and the administration’s failure to meet its promise of immigration reform in its first year, Obama’s order aimed to appease Hispanic dissatisfaction. Many Congressional Republicans were up in arms over what they perceived to be an “unlawful and unconstitutional policy,” as well as a political move to attract Hispanic votes only months prior to the 2012 presidential election (Cohen, 2012).

Obama’s executive order proved well received from Hispanics, as he earned 71% of the Hispanic vote in his 2012 re-election, the largest share since 1996 (Lopez and Taylor, 2012). However, Janet Marguía, President of The National Council of La Raza, a high-profile Mexican-American rights advocacy group, didn’t forget the Obama administration’s increased deportation rates and its failure to deliver comprehensive immigration reform after hopeful campaign promises; she referred to Obama as the “deporter-in-chief” (Ball, 2014). After Obama’s 2012 re-election, comprehensive immigration reform efforts continued, but the trend of congressional gridlock sustained.

Republicans cited immigration as an issue that may have cost them the 2012 Presidential election. To regain lost ground, with support from the business community and a large share of their party base, Republicans were eager to exhibit their concern with illegal immigration. In their 2012 autopsy concerning their 2012 presidential election loss, the Republican Party admitted, “among the steps Republicans take in the Hispanic community and beyond, we must embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform”, fearing, “if we do not, our Party's appeal will continue to shrink to its core constituencies only” (Franke-Ruta 2013). In 2013, a bipartisan group of eight Senators, including Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Dick Durbin (D-Ill), Michael Bennet (D- Colo), Marco Rubio (R-Fla), John McCain (R-AZ), and
Lindsey Graham (R-SC), created an immigration proposal. The proposal was truly a compromise, aiming to “clear the way for millions of undocumented residents to have a chance at citizenship, attract workers from all over the world and devote unprecedented resources for security along the US-Mexico border” (Min Kim, 2013). The proposal passed the Senate with room to spare (68-32, all 52 Democrats in favor, 14 Republicans in favor, 32 against) (“S. 744,”). With 14 Republican Senators willing to compromise, comprehensive immigration reform seemed incredibly plausible. Yet, conservative House Republicans proved less willing to compromise than those in the Senate, exposing a growing divide between the Republican Party’s establishment and the Tea Party.

In the midst of a “fight for the soul” of the Republican Party, immigration compromise was an opportunity for the far-right Tea Party to make a case for its “angry, oppositionist, populist strain” of the GOP against moderate mainstream “pragmatists” (Ball, 2013). Indeed, socially conservative Republicans, along with moderates weary of the political risk of immigration reform including amnesty provisions, pressured House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) to deny the possibility of a compromise with the Senate’s proposal. Ultimately, Boehner defended the House’s refusal to advance with immigration reform by expressing their distrust for the administration’s execution of the law, citing overreaching executive orders as threatening to any potential immigration reform. By early 2014, the possibility for comprehensive reform had again withered.

Amid a spike in the number of unaccompanied, undocumented children arriving at the United States’ southern border, the immigration process seemed more in need of reform than ever (Park, 2014). Like Obama’s disappointing first year in office without immigration reform,
he again failed to deliver on his promises for reform throughout the summer of 2014, blaming “Republicans’ extreme politicization of the issue” as “harmful to the long-term prospects for comprehensive immigration reform” (Ball, 2014). Without the ability to compromise with Congress on comprehensive reform, Obama again pledged to act himself. Yet, concerned with numerous red state Democratic Senators’ chances in the mid-term elections, the Obama administration decided to delay any executive action until after November of 2014.

In late November of 2014, after Republicans gained control of the Senate and retained control of the House in the midterm elections, Obama presented numerous executive orders aiming to expand his previous executive action on immigration. The orders aimed to “grant up to five million unauthorized immigrants protection from deportation, expand Obama’s 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and enact Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA), a deferral program allowing approximately 4 million undocumented parents of American citizens or legal permanent residents to avoid deportation” (Parlapiano, 2014). Yet, this time, the courts challenged Obama’s use executive power. In February of 2015, “a federal judge in Texas halted Obama’s executive orders on immigration,” citing an inadequate understanding of the public’s opinion on the order (Greenblatt, 2015). Republicans applauded the continuation of deportations and the check on Obama’s executive powers. By June 2016, a 4-4 tie in the Supreme Court upheld the Texas ruling, ultimately concluding Obama’s mostly failed efforts at immigration reform (Liptak and Shear, 2016).

In 2015 and 2016, both parties’ eventual Presidential candidates established their immigration stances. Most notably, Donald Trump announced his candidacy in June, 2015, “with a pledge to build a ‘great wall’ on the Mexican border,” build a “massive deportation
force,” and “humanely” deport 11 million undocumented immigrants (LoBianco, 2015; Lyons, 2016). Trump faced fierce opposition from fellow Republican candidates like Jeb Bush and John Kasich, who referred to Trump’s proposals as “a silly argument.” In contrast, Democratic Party candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders “promised to integrate legal immigrants and help more gain citizenship while ending deportations” (Lyons, 2016). Aside from concerns regarding illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America, numerous terror attacks spurred debate regarding the national security implications of immigration policy.

Throughout 2015 and 2016, several high-profile terror attacks, coupled with a Syrian refugee crisis, “prompted fear in the United States about terrorists slipping into the country by posing as Syrian refugees” (Lyons, 2016). Public officials responded in various ways, including Congress’s reaction to a shooting of 36 by a Pakistani visa-holder in San Bernardino, California: passage of “legislation requiring those with dual citizenship in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria to apply for a visa for temporary visits to the U.S.” (Lyons, 2016). This legislation was passed with overwhelming support (497 to 19), preventing “those who have visited those countries in the last five years, from traveling to the United States without a visa” (Edwards, 2015). In the week following the San Bernardino attack, Trump proposed a highly contentious plan: “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” (Vitali, 2016). The acceptance of refugees and the protection of Americans from terrorism became central issues throughout the 2016 presidential election.

In a surprising upset, Donald Trump won the Presidential election in November of 2016, claiming to be the “law and order candidate.” By January 27th, one week into the Trump presidency, an executive order was signed “that promised to keep ‘radical Islamic terrorists out of the United States of America’” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016). The order “took immediate
effect to bar admission to the U.S. of all people with non-immigrant or immigrant visas from seven countries—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—for 90 days.” The order also included “an indefinite ban on refugees from war-torn Syria” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016). All of the countries included in the executive order were Muslim-majority nations, leading many critics to cite the order’s intent to ban Muslims, as Trump had claimed he would during his Presidential campaign. The order was met with massive protests at airports in response to the hundreds of refugees and immigrants being held upon arrival across the nation, “caught in communications limbo between the White House and the Department of Homeland Security—” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016). The Washington state Attorney General filed a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court, ultimately leading to the Ninth Circuit court’s unanimous decision to disapprove of the order, citing Trump’s previous promises to implement a Muslim travel ban and an absence of evidence that supported the national security dangers of suspending the order. On March 6th, Trump signed a second executive order, removing Iraq from the list of home countries barred from entry, along with the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. This order has also met challenges in the courts, where it remains as of this writing.

In addition to Trump’s executive orders, he has since advanced his most anticipated immigration policy: plans to construct a border wall on the southern border. In his proposed budget, Trump “includes a $2 billion down payment on his signature border wall, one of the single largest investments in the budget plan,” along with plans “to hire 100 new government lawyers, add 1,500 law enforcement officials and spend more than $1 billion on detention and deportation” (Fandos, 2017).

**Public Opinion**
The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels from 2004 – 2016

Between 2004 and 2016, the national attitude toward immigration levels remained generally steady, gradually shifting toward an increasingly welcoming stance on immigration. In 2004, the nation’s post-9/11 shift toward more restrictive immigration level preferences was still visible; 33% of respondents favored present immigration levels in 2004 compared to 42% in June of 2001 and 49% favored decreased immigration levels in 2004 compared to 41% in June 2001 (Gallup). Following the restrictive shift after 9/11, beginning in approximately 2003, national attitudes toward immigration levels began to rebound, more closely resembling pre-9/11 attitudes. By 2016, attitudes toward immigration levels were actually more expansive than pre-9/11 levels: 21% favored increased immigration levels compared to 14% in June, 2001 and 38% favored decreased levels compared to 41% in 2001.

In all, by 2016 Americans overwhelmingly accepted immigration as a “good thing for this country today”: 72% of American adults cited immigration as a “good thing,” the highest portion of respondents from 2001 to 2016 (Gallup). A small racial divide was visible between respondents’ attitudes toward immigration: 70% of white respondents, compared with 76% of blacks and 79% of Hispanics thought immigration to be a “good thing,” while 27% of whites, compared with 18% of blacks and 17% of Hispanics called it a “bad thing.” These racial divides became starker regarding attitudes toward specific immigration policy proposals, as described below.

Immigration Policy Proposals

Deportation
A large majority of Americans opposed proposals to deport all undocumented immigrants residing in America (Gallup). Yet, Whites responded more supportively to the proposal than Blacks and Hispanics. In the Summer of 2016, 32% of American adults supported the proposal to deport all immigrants living illegally in the U.S., while 66% opposed the proposal. Whites were more likely than the average American adult to support this proposal; 36% of whites declared their support for deportation while 62% opposed it. Blacks and Hispanics were less likely to support deportation proposals: 23% of blacks and 21% of Hispanics were in support, while 76% of Blacks and 78% of Hispanics were in opposition.

**Building a Wall**

Trump’s plans to build a border wall on the southern border were also generally opposed nationally (Gallup). However, whites were found to be more likely to support Trump’s border wall than Black and Hispanics. In the summer of 2016, nationally, one third of adults supported building the wall, while two thirds opposed the proposal. 41% of Whites, 23% strongly so, supported the wall’s construction, while 59% opposed the proposal. In contrast, only 18% of Blacks and 16% of Hispanics supported the wall’s construction. In fact, included within the 82% of Blacks and Hispanics who opposed a wall’s construction, 55% of Blacks and 40% of Hispanics “strongly opposed” the wall proposal.

**Path to Citizenship**

In general, national public opinion supported a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. Nationally, 84% supported “allowing immigrants living in the U.S. illegally the chance to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements over a
period of time” (Gallup). Again, a slight racial difference was visible between whites’ support compared to blacks’ and Hispanics’. In this case, Whites were as likely as Hispanics and Blacks to support paths to citizenship, but not with the same enthusiasm: 82% of Whites supported a pathway to citizenship with 37% declaring “strong support,” while 84% of Blacks and 92% of Hispanics supported a pathway to citizenship, 48% of Blacks and 42% of Hispanics declaring “strong support.”

**Obama’s Executive Orders**

The starkest racial difference regarding immigration policy support appeared when respondents gauged their approval of the “executive actions President Obama plans to take” (Gallup). In this instance, American adults, responding in late 2014, were more likely to disapprove than to approve of President Obama’s planned executive orders. However, Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to express approval than disapproval of Obama’s executive orders. The gap between White support and minority approval was wide. Only 30% of whites claimed their approval, compared to 68% of Blacks and 64% of Hispanics.

Partisan Opinions

Immigrants’ Contributions

In 1994, 30% of Republicans and 32% of Democrats agreed with the following claim: “immigrants today strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents” (Jones, 2016). By 2006, Democrats’ acceptance of this positive view toward immigrants grew to 49%, while Republicans’ positive views increased, but at a slower rate to 36% (Figure 9). Then, over the next decade, Democrats’ likelihood to agree with the statement on immigrants’ positive contributions to the country spiked, but Republicans’ remained stagnant: 78% of Democrats and 35% of Republicans agreed with the statement in 2016.
The Wall

The partisan differences on immigration policy preferences were exceedingly visible in levels of support and opposition for the construction of a border wall. Trump supporters (84% in support) were the most likely to favor the border wall proposal, while Bernie Sanders supporters (91% in opposition) were the most likely to oppose the proposal. Supporters of more moderate candidates, such as John Kasich (53% opposed, 45% in support), were more mixed in support or opposition for the wall.

The Nation’s “Top Problems”
In 2016, 7% of respondents to the question, “What is the most important problem facing the country today” answered “immigration/illegal aliens” (Gallup Poll, 2016). This was the 3rd most prevalent answer behind “economy in general” with 18% of respondents and “unemployment/jobs” at 8%.

![Table](http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844) (March 26, 2017).

**Figure 11:** “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org,” procon.org.
FAIR

FAIR was a staunch opponent to Obama’s executive orders on immigration, urging “the next president to make it a priority to reverse the damage done by a rogue administration” (O’Brien et. al 2, 2016). They deemed Obama’s orders to represent “amnesty programs” that “reward law-breakers and punish those who have followed the law” (O’Brien et. al 3, 2016).

FAIR published a document that presented their opinion of how the winner of the 2016 Presidential election ought act on immigration in their first year in office. Not surprisingly, these proposals focused on enforcing existing immigration laws, especially on the border, restricting rights for undocumented immigrants, and limiting immigration overall.

In terms of enforcing immigration laws and securing the nation’s borders, FAIR advocated for the construction of a “physical barrier on the Southern border,” ending all “catch and release” policies that do not immediately require police to deport undocumented immigrants, and securing the northern Canadian border in order to “remain vigilant that third country foreign nationals do not exploit the northern border in an attempt to enter the U.S. undetected” (O’Brien et. al 2016, 6). The proposals also supported increased punishment for repeat immigration law-breakers. Plus, FAIR denounced sanctuary cities that expressed leniency in enforcing immigration law. Rather, FAIR advocates for the restoration of cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration law.

In addressing the undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S., FAIR vehemently opposed their access to public benefits. They opposed amnesties of all kind, advocated for strict visa overstay policing, hoped to end “birthright citizenship,” opposed free
healthcare for the undocumented, and wished to vigorously prosecute undocumented immigrants’ employers.

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

As expected, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was most concerned with immigrants’ role in the American workforce. Regarding guest workers programs, the Chamber was in support of expanding both programs for both low-skilled and high-skilled foreign workers, especially aimed toward U.S.-educated STEM graduates.

Concerning the enforcement of immigration law, the Chamber supported the improvement of E-Verify, the employer verification system that allows employers to check on immigrants’ citizenship status. Previously the Chamber had been opposed to E-Verify’s implementation because it shifted the responsibility of law enforcement onto American businesses, but by 2016 the Chamber had embraced the program, supporting its improvement.

To address the undocumented immigrants within the U.S., the Chamber denounced deportation and self-deportation as viable options, instead supporting an earned pathway to citizenship consisting of criminal background checks and national security clearances, a fine, progress toward English proficiency, and the government’s implementation of a mandatory electronic employment verification (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2015).

MALDEF

Amid Donald Trump’s election, MALDEF released a statement regarding his immigration policy proposals, in which MALDEF denounced the border wall, claiming it “threatened to bankrupt the nation’s treasury” (MALDEF, 2017). MALDEF also declared its
opposition to increased border security, charging “aggressive interior enforcement” to be “an abject failure, delivering tremendous upheaval and harm to families, schools, and workplaces” (MALDEF, 2017).

NAACP

Throughout the 2016 election season, the NAACP sided with civil rights organizations to defend immigrants’ rights. In this spirit, the NAACP pledged to “join with allies to show Congress that a broad, diverse coalition of conscience demands a fair and common sense path to citizenship” (Hesson, 2013).

In reaction to President Trump’s executive order’s ban of citizens from seven Muslim-majority nations, the NAACP released a statement denouncing the orders, claiming they “indicate a callous disregard for civil liberties and the basic values of a nation born of immigrants” (NAACP, 2017).

AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO supported a “roadmap to citizenship, not just temporary status, for all workers” since “a broken immigration system ‘drags everybody down’ including wages for all workers” (“AFL-CIO Hopes,” 2015). It supported Obama’s executive actions, as exemplified by the AFL-CIO’s workshops that helped immigrants capitalize on DACA’s provisions for deportation relief, as well as ensure their knowledge of workers’ rights (“AFL-CIO Hopes,” 2015).

The labor union also explicitly opposed President Trump’s immigration proposals, including “building a wall on our border, scapegoating immigrants and refugees, and shutting out
people of Muslim faith,” which it claimed would “sow fear of raids among workers, promote racial profiling and erode core constitutional protections” (AFL-CIO, 2017).

**Party Platforms**

**Democrats**

**2008 Obama**

The 2008 Democratic Party platform describes a general plan for comprehensive immigration reform, including efforts to stifle illegal immigration, such as improved border patrol and enhanced employer sanctions. Specifically, the platform endorses the development of a method that allows employers to easily access potential employees’ legal statuses. Plus, the platform includes provisions aiming to facilitate the integration of undocumented immigrants, such as increased work visas that promote family reunification. With the domestic laborer in mind, the work visa provision does explicitly focus on family members of immigrants and “immigrants who meet the demand for jobs that employers cannot fill, as long as appropriate labor market protections and standards are in place.” The platform also calls for a pathway to earned citizenship for undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. The earned citizenship requires that immigrants “pay a fine, pay taxes, learn English, and go to the back of the line for the opportunity to become citizens” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).

**2012 Obama**

After Obama’s first term, the 2012 Democratic Party platform urged Congress to compromise on comprehensive immigration reform and highlighted President Obama’s successes in immigration reform despite congressional gridlock. Overall, this platform proposes heavily expansive immigration reform, mainly regarding legal immigration and undocumented
immigrants already residing in the U.S. Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s progress in managing illegal immigration.

Regarding expansive reform, the platform calls for an earned pathway to citizenship, continued efforts toward family reunification, and increased English language learning resources for immigrants. The earned pathway to citizenship includes learning English and paying taxes. Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s support for the DREAM Act, which was defeated by Republicans, along with President Obama’s executive order that provided temporary relief from deportation for undocumented children. The explicit mention of earned citizenship for undocumented children could be considered a proposal for future immigration policy reform.

In terms of addressing illegal immigration, the platform boasts Obama’s successes, claiming the Southwest border to be “more secure than in the past 20 years,” while “unlawful crossings are at a 40-year low” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). It continues to support Homeland Security’s “prioritization of deporting criminals over non-threatening immigrants” and claims the “Border Patrol is better staffed than at any time in history.” The platform does ensure that the administration is pro-employer sanctions, claiming that “we are continuing to hold employers accountable for whom they hire,” but without mentioning potential improvements or changes.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the platform explicitly opposes “states that sought to interfere with federal immigration law by passing local measures targeting immigrants, which the Obama administration challenged in court” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).

2016 Clinton
The 2016 Democratic Party platform proposes extremely expansive immigration reform. The lengthy list of expansive proposals included: a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S., support for family reunification, support for Obama’s DACA and DAPA executive orders, granting driver’s licenses and in-state college tuition to DREAMers, investing in English education programs, ending deportation raids of families and children, guaranteeing “government-funded counsel for unaccompanied children in immigration courts,” providing accessible healthcare to all, ridding government contracts with for-profit private prisons and detention centers, rejecting any “religious tests” required for immigration, and objecting to Donald Trump’s proposal to build a border wall (“Party Platforms,” 2016).

The platform fails to mention virtually any restrictive proposals, even the most basic: increased border patrol. This differs from the 2012 and 2008 party platforms.

**Republicans**

**2008 McCain**

The 2008 Republican Party platform includes a significant portion on immigration and illegal immigration, most of which included restrictive policy proposals. The platform calls for increased border patrol and deportation efforts, restrictions to undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, defunding sanctuary cities, declaring English the official national language, and opposing amnesty in all forms.

Specifically, the platform focuses on enforcing “the rule of law” (“Party Platforms, 2016). Most directly, the platform urges for the employment of several thousand additional law enforcement officers, accelerated deportation efforts, as well as the completion of The Border Security First Act’s border fence. The platform clearly articulates that the party considers efforts
advancing undocumented immigrants’ ability to assimilate to undermine the rule of law. Access to drivers’ licenses, in-state college tuition, and social security are mentioned within the platform as examples that would encourage further illegal immigration.

To improve previously implemented employer sanctions, the platform supports the use of the E-Verify, an internet-based software aiming to “empower employers so they can know with confidence that those they hire are permitted to work” (“Party Platforms,” 2016)

**2012 Romney**

The 2012 Republican Party platform resembles the 2008 platform in its heavily restrictive nature, but an additional focus on guest workers programs was absent in 2008. In 2012, the platform calls for an increase in “granting more work visas to holders of advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering, and math from other nations,” as well as “the utility of a legal and reliable source of foreign labor where needed through a new guest worker program” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). It also adds, however, that the guest workers programs would “encourage illegal aliens to return home voluntarily, while enforcing the law against those who overstay their visas.”

Like in 2008, the “highest priority” for the 2012 platform was “to secure the rule of law both at our borders and at ports of entry.” The restrictive provisions from the 2008 platform are echoed in 2012, yet intensified. For example, the 2012 platform reiterated the 2008 platform’s support for the completion of the still incomplete border fence and for accelerated deportation processes, but the 2012 platform went on to support aerial surveillance efforts on the border and “long-term detention authority” for the Department of Homeland Security.
Provisions restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits also resembled the 2008 platform. Although the 2012 platform fails to mention limiting undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses or social security, it does include support for the S.A.V.E. Program. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (S.A.V.E.) program is “an internet-based system that verifies the lawful presence of applicants—prior to the granting of any State or federal government entitlements or IRS refunds.” The platform also endorses the Everify system for employers.

Per usual for the Republican Party, the 2012 platform rejects all forms of amnesty.

2016 Trump

The 2016 Republican Party platform continues the trend for Republican platforms, claiming again, “Our highest priority, therefore, must be to secure our borders and all ports of entry and to enforce our immigration laws” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). The restrictive provisions included in the 2012 and 2008 platforms remain in the 2016 platform, but additional plans are included to respond to Obama’s executive orders, to combat “Islamic terrorism,” and to address an influx in refugee admittance.

Like previous Republican Party platforms, the 2016 platform opposes all forms of amnesty, endorses the E-verify and S.A.V.E. programs, and supports accelerated deportations and stricter penalties for immigrant smugglers and manufacturers of fraudulent documents. New to the 2016 platform is the proposal for a border wall that would “cover the entirety of the southern border…sufficient to stop both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.” Plus, the platform supported states that had enacted laws targeting undocumented immigrants, while advocating to
strip federal funds from cities considering themselves “sanctuary cities” for undocumented immigrants.

The platform makes a point to denounce President Obama’s executive orders on immigration, referring to them as “unlawful amnesties.” Obama’s executive orders are framed as irresponsible given the perceived amount of “terrorism, drug cartels, human trafficking, and criminal gangs” plaguing the U.S. Furthermore, the platform opposes Obama’s orders and any other provisions resembling amnesty because “the presence of millions of unidentified individuals in this country poses grave risks to the safety and sovereignty of the United States.”

The 2016 platform also includes provisions concerning refugee admittance and its supposed connection with “Islamic terrorism.” To address these concerns, the platform exhibits concern with national security, explaining, “refugees who cannot be carefully vetted cannot be admitted to the country, especially those whose homelands have been the breeding grounds for terrorism.” Drawing on terrorism’s place in American history, the platform urges for “special scrutiny to those foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States from terror-sponsoring countries or from regions associated with Islamic terrorism. This was done successfully after September 11, 2001, under the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which should be renewed now.”

**Case Analysis**

**Interest Group Analysis**

**FAIR**
FAIR rates high restrictive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. FAIR supported restricting overall immigration levels and exclusively restrictive immigration policy, including the construction of a border wall, intensifying immigration law enforcement domestically, and restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits.

**U.S. Chamber of Commerce**

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates low expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The Chamber supported expanding guest workers programs, as well as an earned pathway to citizenship, albeit a difficult one, for undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S.

The Chamber did support the expansion and improvement of the E-Verify program, a digital program that allows employers to verify the citizenship status of potential employees. This is considered a restrictive program since employer sanctions limit undocumented immigrants’ ability to gain employment.

**MALDEF**

MALDEF rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. MALDEF supported President Obama’s executive orders that provided deportation relief, but also supported pathways to citizenship. MALDEF strongly opposes all of President Trump’s immigration proposals, including heightened domestic immigration law enforcement, the construction of a border wall, and his executive orders banning visas.

**NAACP**
The NAACP rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. Their allegiance alongside other civil rights organizations in support of immigrants’ rights and in opposition to President Trump’s highly restrictive immigration policy proposals exemplifies the NAACP’s support for expansive immigration policy. Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and black domestic workers in mind, the NAACP supports full citizenship for immigrant workers.

**AFL-CIO**

The AFL-CIO rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. With an increasingly Hispanic membership, the AFL-CIO expresses concern with President Trump’s potentially discriminatory policy propositions. Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and domestic workers’ interests in mind, the AFL-CIO supports full citizenship for immigrant workers.

**2016 Party Platform Analysis**

**Democratic Party Platform**

The Democratic Party Platform rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The platform proposes exclusively expansive immigration policy. These expansive policy proposals include provisions for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, expanded access to public benefits for undocumented immigrants, and ending private detention centers and prisons. The platform fails to mention restrictive policy proposals, even the most basic: border enforcement. This platform also endorses Obama’s executive orders, which provided deportation relief for undocumented immigrant children.

**Republican Party Platform**

The Republican Party Platform rates high restrictive on the immigration policy preference spectrum. The platform proposes exclusively restrictive immigration policy. The
platform opposes amnesty, proposes the construction of a border wall, supports employer sanctions, hopes to deny undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and suggests reinstituting post-9/11 vetting programs that aim extreme scrutiny on refugees from “areas associated with Islamic terrorism” (“Party Platform” 2016).

Public Opinion Analysis

This study considers immigration to be salient in 2016 given its consideration as a “top problem facing the country today.” Given immigration’s salience, we’d expect party platforms to cater to public opinion ahead of interest groups’ interests.

As in the 2004 case study, immigration is especially salient for the socially conservative portion of the Republican Party base. Given the effective grassroots activism that socially conservative voters and activists have demonstrated in the past, most notably using far-right media, it would not be surprising if the Republican Party catered to this group’s interests above other portions of the party’s base.

Case Conclusion

Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties applies well to immigration policy preferences of 2016. The theory would predict that amid heightened political salience and a shrinking “electoral blind spot” concerning immigration, political parties would cater to their electorate before pleasing interest groups. In the case of immigration policy in 2016, this study’s findings support this hypothesis; both the Democratic and Republican Parties shift their focus toward pleasing the electorate first.
The Democrats crafted an extremely expansive party platform in response to Democratic voters’ massive shift toward accepting immigrants as positive contributions to the country. Moreover, the Democratic Party fervently rejected Donald Trump’s restrictive immigration proposals. Reflecting the party’s attention to Democrats’ shift toward accepting immigrants, the platform does not mention proposals for increased border security or improved employer sanctions, both of which were restrictive policies included in past Democratic Party platforms. The platform’s increased thoroughness on immigration and its exclusively expansive policy proposals can be credited to immigration’s rise in salience.

The Democratic Party’s immigration stances align with both civil rights advocacy groups’ and labor’s immigration policy preferences. In supporting pathways to citizenship and denouncing President Trump’s restrictive policies, the Democratic Party pleases their core interest groups. It is worth noting that labor-oriented groups like the NAACP and AFL-CIO undoubtedly shifted toward more expansive policy preferences in the 2016 case study. Historically, these groups have supported some restrictive immigration policy, such as employer sanctions, and opposed some expansive policy, such as guest workers programs. However, immigration’s context in 2016 can explain these shifts. In the past, labor-oriented groups have supported restrictive policy provisions during congressional efforts toward comprehensive immigration reform. Contrastingly, in 2016, immigration is framed in a restrictive nature and discourse is often framed in response to Trump’s restrictive policy proposals, leading to policy preferences that are contrastingly expansive.

The Republican Party platform also appears to cater to the electorate, only from the opposite side of the immigration policy preference spectrum. The Republican platform includes
extremely restrictive immigration policy proposals, some of which did not appear in previous party platforms. These restrictive policy stances included support for the border wall’s construction, hopes to limit undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and stringent opposition of Obama’s executive orders’ deportation relief.

The Republican Party platform aligns well with FAIR’s interests, while the U.S. Chamber of Commerce seems to be overlooked. This is telling considering the Chamber historically acted as a primary core interest within the Republican Party. However, this shift doesn’t necessarily mean the Republican Party hoped to please FAIR over the Chamber.

This study considers the Republican Party’s shift toward FAIR’s restrictive policy preferences as an attempt to cater to a socially conservative electorate amid immigration’s heightened salience, not a shift in the party’s core interest groups. As exemplified by House Republicans’ hesitancy to engage in immigration reform compromises that include amnesty provisions, the fear of receiving electoral backlash from socially conservative voter bases has pressured Republicans to take hardline restrictionist immigration stances. The New York Times’ story, “Steve Deace and the Power of Conservative Media,” demonstrates the shrinking “electoral blindspot” surrounding immigration policy, especially within the Republican Party: “the people who tune in daily to Deace (a popular grassroots conservative radio personality from Iowa) and his ultraconservative peers are also the ones most likely to vote and to follow closely the politicians they elect.” (Calmes, 2015). The Republican Party’s submission to socially conservative voters makes sense given the ultra-right media’s tendency to “leave Democrats virtually unscathed in favor of attacking Republicans — the damned party ‘‘establishment,’’ in particular” (Calmes, 2015).
Although the Republican Party autopsy after the 2012 presidential election encouraged the party to welcome comprehensive immigration reform in an effort to attract Hispanic voters, it appears this strategy was abandoned in 2016 in an effort to appeal to the party’s mostly white core constituents. As described in the public opinion section, whites were much more supportive of Donald Trump’s plans to construct a border wall and they were more than doubly opposed to Obama’s executive orders than blacks and Hispanics. The Republican Party’s acceptance of Trump’s exceedingly restrictive immigration policy appears to be a plea to its core constituents in order to remain electorally relevant, as expected within Bawn et. al’s theory amid immigration’s high political salience.

VI: Comparative Analysis

Did the model work?

This study considers Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to apply well to the selected case studies. The selected cases revealed that in periods when immigration’s political salience was low, political parties catered to core interest groups ahead of the electorate’s interests concerning immigration, and vice versa when immigration’s political salience was high.

The most demonstrative example of Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” in action was the Republican Party’s response to immigration’s increased political salience in the 2004 case study. As political salience increases regarding an issue, Bawn et. al claims that the “electoral blind spot” surrounding the issue shrinks, meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’ decisions and more knowledgeable on the salient issue. In 2004, immigration was not nationally salient, but it did become salient for a portion of the Republican Party voter base: the socially conservative. Given grassroots social conservatives’ electoral influence as effective grassroots
activists, the Republican Party’s immigration policy stances become more restrictive in order to cater to socially conservative voters.

Some cases more clearly exhibited Bawn et. al’s theory in action. The 2004 and 2016 cases showcased instances when immigration became politically salient, at least within a portion of the electorate. For this reason, the study’s variables were more visible, allowing for more information upon which to evaluate the application of Bawn et. al’s theory.

In the 1984 case, immigration was not politically salient. In effect, party platforms were brief and vague when referring to immigration policy. This made it difficult to evaluate parties’ allegiance to core interest groups or the electorate. This study was still able to analyze cases when immigration was not politically salient, but the analyses were based on less supportive evidence than in cases when immigration was politically salient. Ultimately, this study concluded that the vague 1984 platforms were partially due to political parties’ aims to please as many core interest groups as possible, some of which possessed conflicting interests concerning immigration policy.

Variables

**Independent Variable:** Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences

This study’s independent variable, interest groups’ immigration policy preferences, was measured qualitatively through analyzing interest groups’ publications, congressional hearing statements, and newspaper reports. Data was generally easy to find, especially given the case studies’ temporal proximity to immigration policy reform efforts.

One weakness in this study’s evaluation of interest groups is the absence of measuring interest groups’ influence on political parties. Campaign contribution data is not available for all interest groups and even when it is, many interest groups provide support to political parties non-
financially, through other forms of activism. This study could more clearly evaluate the relationship between political parties and interest groups with a better understanding of how influential each interest group is to each political party.

Another weakness in evaluating interest groups was specific to some of the Democratic Party’s core interest groups: ethnic advocacy groups. Ethnic advocacy groups served as a somewhat problematic variable because their interests were identical to a large portion of the electorate’s interests due to the advocacy groups’ inherent missions to represent their peoples’ interests. That is, when the electorate’s interests shifted, ethnic advocacy groups’ interests shifted identically. This made it difficult to decipher whether the Democratic Party was catering to either the electorate or core interest groups. Thankfully, in this study, MALDEF and the NAACP did not have identical interests since the NAACP is generally more concerned with domestic labor than MALDEF. This provided some differentiation in the Democratic Party’s motives.

**Dependent Variable:** Political Party Immigration Policy Stances

To measure this study’s dependent variable, political parties’ immigration policy stances, party platforms were analyzed for each case study. Given this study’s goal, to examine political parties’ adherence to interest group and electorate interests, party platforms are useful because they explicitly announce the party’s support or opposition to ideologies and policy proposals.

One weakness of using party platform to evaluate political parties’ policy stances is the fact that platforms are only published in Presidential election years. For this study, this limits the ability to evaluate parties’ stances during periods between elections. For example, in the 2004 case study, the parties’ immigration policy stances were evaluated from the 2004 party platforms, but immigration reform efforts took place mostly in 2006 and 2007.
Another weakness of party platforms is the lack of exposure platforms receive. Most voters do not thoroughly examine each party’s platform prior to voting, so parties’ incentive to publish their most accurate stances may be limited.

**Conditional Variable: Immigration’s Political Salience**

To measure this study’s conditional variable, immigration’s political salience, national polling concerning “the nation’s most important problem” was examined. This was a successful methodology, although throughout the research process, it became clear that national salience does not provide a complete understanding of whether an issue is politically salient. In the 2004 case study, for example, immigration was not found to be nationally salient. However, within the socially conservative portion of the Republican Party’s base, immigration was immensely salient. It is important for future studies to consider numerous voter subsets’ issue prioritization, not only the issue’s salience on a national scale.

**Immigration Policy Framework**

Using immigration policy reform as a framework to apply Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties presented both benefits and weaknesses to this study. The main weakness in using immigration policymaking as a framework is the “strange bedfellow coalitions” that divide traditional partisan coalitions when debating immigration policy reform. For example, the Republican Party’s core interest groups, business and the socially conservative are usually in agreement on issues of governance. However, in regard to immigration policy, the business community thrives off of immigrant labor and encourages welcoming immigration policies, while the socially conservative often take stringent positions concerning the enforcement of law and order that restrict immigration and immigrants’ ability to work and live in the country. These “strange bedfellow coalitions” place political parties into a difficult position, forcing them to either choose to support some, but not other interest groups’ interests, or to toe the line of
compromise between interest groups. To avoid dismissing any interest group’s interests, parties may make vague claims regarding immigration policy. Such vague party policy positions make it difficult to understand parties’ true policy stances.

“Strange bedfellow coalitions” were also beneficial to this study’s analyses. Amid immigration’s heightened political salience, when Bawn et. al predicts a decreasing “electoral blind spot,” parties are pressured to articulate concrete policy positions. When parties’ policy positions become more clear, it is easier to evaluate parties’ loyalty to interest groups versus the electorate. Since “strange bedfellow coalitions” split parties’ bases, parties are bound to favor one portion of their base’s interests over another when establishing concrete policy preferences. If Bawn et. al’s model applies well, parties ought to favor the portion of their base that is more electorally influential. For instance, in the 2016 case study, immigration was considered nationally salient. However, the Republican Party’s policy proposals undoubtedly favored the socially conservative portion of their base over the business community portion. This makes sense according to Bawn et. al’s model considering the socially conservative electorate’s known ability to organize electorally to advance their interests concerning immigration.

**Implications for Future Work**

For studies like this one, which applies Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to cases of immigration policymaking, it may be beneficial to simultaneously apply Bawn et. al’s theory to a supplemental policymaking issue besides immigration. Immigration’s “strange bedfellow coalitions” create non-traditional policymaking adversaries and allies, often splitting parties’ core bases. Simultaneously examining a policymaking issue that promotes more traditionally partisan coalitions may promote a better understanding for parties’ motives in immigration policymaking. For instance, in the case of immigration policymaking, parties sometime
resorted to vague immigration policy stances in order to appease their divided base. If contrasted against another issue, parties’ motives may become clearer depending on how parties cater to core interest groups in other policymaking arenas.

Party polarization is another important consideration for future work. As seen in this study’s 2016 case, each party, amid high political salience, resorted to extreme positions on opposing sides of the political spectrum. The Republican Party resorted to extreme stances prior to the Democratic Party in order to appease the grassroots activists of the Party’s socially conservative base. As pointed out in Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the Democratic Party does not have an equivalently radical subsection of their base. When applying Bawn et. al’s theory, it is important to consider not just national salience, but also issue salience within voter subsets.

One final consideration for future research concerns racial institutional orders, which are discussed within chapter two as a framework of understanding for American issues, including immigration. King and Smith described two competing racial institutional orders within American policymaking: the white supremacist order and the egalitarian order. Especially within the context of immigration reform, this framework could be a useful dichotomy to frame policymaking battles as racial divides become stark, as seen in the 2016 case study regarding support for specific immigration policy proposals.
Works Cited


