The College of Wooster Libraries **Open Works**

Senior Independent Study Theses

2017

The Search for GTO: Determining Optimal Poker Strategy Using Linear Programming

Stuart Young The College of Wooster, syoung17@wooster.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy

Recommended Citation

Young, Stuart, "The Search for GTO: Determining Optimal Poker Strategy Using Linear Programming" (2017). Senior Independent Study Theses. Paper 7807.

https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/7807

This Senior Independent Study Thesis Exemplar is brought to you by Open Works, a service of The College of Wooster Libraries. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Independent Study Theses by an authorized administrator of Open Works. For more information, please contact openworks@wooster.edu.

© Copyright 2017 Stuart Young

The Search for GTO: Determining Optimal Poker Strategy Using Linear Programming

INDEPENDENT STUDY THESIS

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts in the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science at The College of Wooster

> by Stuart Young

The College of Wooster 2017

Advised by:

Dr. Matthew Moynihan

Abstract

This project applies techniques from game theory and linear programming to find the optimal strategies of two variants of poker. A set of optimal poker strategies describe a Nash equilibrium, where no player can improve their outcome by changing their own strategy, given the strategies of their opponent(s). We first consider Kuhn Poker as a simple application of our methodology. We then turn our attention to 2-7 Draw Poker, a modern variant onto which little previous research is focused. However, the techniques that we use are incapable of solving large, full-scale variants of poker such as 2-7 Draw. Therefore, we utilize several abstractions techniques to render a computationally-feasible LP that retains the underlying spirit of the game. We use the Gambit software package to build and solve LPs whose solutions are the optimal strategies for each game.

Acknowledgements

To my advisor, Dr. Moynihan, thank you. You have consistently pushed me to achieve, and have remained supportive during difficult moments. You have furthered my abilities in mathematics, critical thinking, and writing; these are skills I will always value.

To my parents, Lee Stivers and Peter Young, thank you. Beyond just providing me with this education, you taught me why its so important. Mom, you have inspired my love of scientific inquiry and desire for new knowledge. Most importantly, you are supportive, reassuring, and always there for me.

To my friend and roommate, Parker Ohlmann, thank you. Your constant support over the last 4 years has been invaluable, as you remind me to keep all of this in perspective. I am inspired every day by your dedication, compassion, and kindness in life.

This project, and my time at the College of Wooster, would not have been possible without each of you.

Contents

A	bstra	ct			iii
A	cknow	wledger	nents		v
1	Intr	oductio	n		1
2	Line	ear Prog	gramming		3
	2.1	Basic 7	Гheory	 •	4
		2.1.1	Constraints	 •	4
		2.1.2	Solutions	 •	7
	2.2	Dualit	у	 •	9
		2.2.1	Motivation	 •	9
		2.2.2	Theory	 •	12
3	Gan	ne Theo	ory		17
	3.1	Backgi	round	 •	17
	3.2	Norma	al (Strategic) Form	 •	19
		3.2.1	Equilibrium		23

	3.3	Extens	sive Form	30
		3.3.1	Perfect Information	30
		3.3.2	Imperfect Information	36
		3.3.3	Nash Equilibrium	40
	3.4	Seque	nce Form	41
		3.4.1	Linear Programming Theory	48
4	Kuh	n Poke	er	55
	4.1	Rules		55
	4.2	Extens	sive Form	56
	4.3	Norma	al Form	56
		4.3.1	Strategies	58
		4.3.2	Payoffs	61
		4.3.3	Player 1's Optimal Strategy	62
		4.3.4	Player 2's Optimal Strategy	69
	4.4	Seque	nce Form	72
		4.4.1	Sequences and Information Sets	72
		4.4.2	Payoffs	74
		4.4.3	Strategy Constraint Matrices and Realization Plans	77
		4.4.4	Player 2's Optimal Strategy	79
		4.4.5	Player 1's Optimal Strategy	83
5	2-7 I	Draw P	oker	89
	5.1	Rules		89
	5.2	Abstra	actions	92
		5.2.1	Deck Reduction	92

	5.2.2	Betting Abstractions	. 93
	5.2.3	Bucketing	. 94
5.3	Simul	ation	. 98
5.4	Resul	ts	. 105
	5.4.1	2 Initial Buckets	. 105
	5.4.2	3 Initial Buckets	. 109
6 Con	clusio	n	111
A Gan	nbit		113
B Sim	plified	2-7 Draw LP Results	117

List of Figures

3.1	Generalized Two-player Strategic Game	22
3.2	Prisoner's Dilemma	24
3.3	Extensive Form Game with Perfect Information	33
3.4	Extensive Form Game with Imperfect Information and Perfect	
	Recall	38
3.5	Sequence Form Example	45
4.1	Extensive Form of Kuhn Poker	57
4.2	Player 1's pure strategies in Kuhn Poker	59
4.3	Player 2's pure strategies in Kuhn Poker	60
4.4	Subtree of Kuhn Poker	73
4.5	Payoff function example, with $g(s_{\emptyset}, s_a, s_m) = -1$ shown in blue	75
5.1	Initial Transition Probabilities to 2 Buckets	97
5.2	Initial Transition Probabilities to 3 Buckets	97
5.3	Final Transition Probabilities from 2 Buckets	98
5.4	Final Transition Probabilities from 3 Buckets	98

A.1 Part of the Extensive Form of Kuhn Poker in the Gambit GUI . . . 114

List of Tables

4.1	Solutions to Player 1's LP	85
4.2	Player 1's Optimal Behavioral Strategy	88
5.1	Hand Rankings with Frequencies in Simplified 2-7 Draw Poker .	93
5.2	Initial Buckets	96
5.3	Final Buckets	96
B.1	Optimal Realization Plan for 2 Initial Buckets	118
B.2	Optimal Realization Plan for 3 Initial Buckets	126

Chapter 1

Introduction

Game theory is a unique field of mathematics; it attempts to model the interactions of conflict and cooperation between rational decision-makers. Game theoretic tools are used in a variety of disciplines, including economics, political science, and philosophy, as well as the study of traditional games. While the models retain mathematical rigor, the underlying concepts are rather interdisciplinary. Modern game theory began in 1928, with John von Neumann's proof of the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in zero-sum two-person games [7]. Another major development was John Forbes Nash Jr's proof of the existence of his namesake Nash equilibrium in any non-cooperative game. Developments in game theory have often followed historical context, most notably World War II [4].

Within the broader field of operations research, linear programming is an optimization technique used specifically for problems described by linear objective functions and constraints. Various solution algorithms, such as the Simplex method, offer well-defined methods to find optimal solutions to broad classes of linear programs. Linear programming methods are frequently used to model business operations and models of economic competition. Developments in linear programming were also motivated by World War II; George Dantzig developed the general theory and Simplex method in 1946-1947 in response to personnel and equipment planning problems in the US Air Force [12].

Poker is a fascinating game, requiring both psychological and deductive ability to win. In the last ten years, understanding of poker strategy has undergone a radical shift. What was once viewed as a simple card game based mostly on luck is now seen as a highly mathematical, deductive game with complex strategies. Many of today's top professional players use strategies based heavily on game theory and probability; if they use a strategy superior to their opponents, they stand to make millions of dollars. Poker strategy interests academic researchers, who until recently only made incremental progress in understanding the optimal strategies of commonly played variants. In 2015, researchers at the University of Alberta announced a Nash equilibrium solution to Limit Texas Hold'Em [3]. In early 2017, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University developed a Artificial Intelligence system that resoundingly defeated a group of professionals at No-Limit Texas Hold'Em [10]. While not quite a Nash-optimal solution, it represents a dramatic advance in the understanding of poker strategy. Little formal work has studied games other than Texas Hold'Em.

Chapter 2

Linear Programming

The basic purpose of linear programming is to find the optimal solution to a linear function that is limited by a set of constraints. These methods have a wide variety of applications, including economics, business, and engineering. For example, a factory might use linear programming methods to determine a production schedule that satisfies product demand while minimizing total cost. Fortunately, we can also use them to determine optimal strategies for games such as poker. We present a basic overview of linear programming theory in this chapter, which will be an important technique in our analysis of poker strategy. This section is based on theory from [12], which contains much more detail on linear programming and the Simplex method than we explore here.

2.1 Basic Theory

Every linear program (LP) has a set of **decision variables**, x_j for j = 1, 2, ..., n that we wish to optimize. Decision variables could represent types of products that a company produces, types of raw materials, and production methods, to name just a few. We wish to maximize or minimize some linear function of these variables

$$f(x) = c_1 x_1 + c_2 x_2 + \cdots + c_j x_j.$$

This f(x) is called the **objective function** of the LP. Each $c_j \in \mathbb{R}$ is a coefficient for a particular decision variable x_j . These coefficients can have different interpretations, depending on context; for example, if f(x) is a revenue function, each c_j would represent the unit cost of good x_j . A particular LP can seek to either maximize or minimize this function; a business could want to minimize cost or maximize profit. Fortunately, we can easily convert between a minimization LP and maximization LP by changing the sign; minimizing f(x) is equivalent to maximizing -f(x).

2.1.1 Constraints

This objective function is maximized or minimized according to a set of constraints, which have the general form

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \dots + a_nx_n \begin{cases} \leq \\ = \\ \geq \end{cases} b.$$

For example, an LP that seeks to maximize profit could have a constraint specifiying the minimum number of each product x_j that must be produced in order to meet demand. We can convert between equality and inequality constraints as follows. If we have an inequality constraint of the form

$$a_1x_1+a_2x_2+\cdots+a_nx_n\leq b,$$

we can convert it to an equality constraint by adding a nonnegative **slack variable** *w* such that

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \cdots + a_nx_n + w = b.$$

For a constraint of the form

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \cdots + a_nx_n \ge b,$$

we can convert it to an equality constraint by subtracting a nonnegative **surplus variable** *v* such that

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \dots + a_nx_n - v = b.$$

Finally, an equality constraint of the form

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \dots + a_nx_n = b$$

can be converted to inequality form by replacing it with the two constraints

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \dots + a_nx_n + w \ge b,$$

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \cdots + a_nx_n + w \leq b,$$

since a particular x satisfies both constraints only at equality. The final components of an LP are the **sign restrictions** on each decision variable x_j . For an LP with a maximization objective function, we use the sign restrictions $x_j \ge 0$ for j = 1, 2, ..., n. For a minimization LP, we also use $x_j \ge 0$ for j = 1, 2, ..., n. These sign restrictions are additional constraints, in the sense that they restrict the allowable values of x_j .

We now define the **standard form** representation of a linear program as

Maximize:
$$f(x) = c_1 x_1 + c_2 x_2 + \dots + c_j x_j$$

subject to: $a_{11}x_1 + a_{12}x_2 + \dots + a_{1j}x_j \le b_1$
 $a_{21}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + \dots + a_{2j}x_j \le b_2$
 \vdots
 $a_{i1}x_1 + a_{i2}x_2 + \dots + a_{ij}x_n \le b_i$
 $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \ge 0.$
(2.1)

We can also write the standard form with matrix notation,

Maximize:
$$c^T x$$

subject to: $Ax \le b$ (2.2)

 $x \ge 0.$

where *A* is an *m* by *n* matrix of constraint coefficients a_{ij} , *c* is a vector of length *n* of objective function coefficients, and *b* is a vector of right-hand side coefficients of length *m*.

2.1.2 Solutions

We now consider the solution methods and solution types of LPs. Most LPs are much too complex to solve by hand or by graphical methods. Instead, we typically use the Simplex method algorithm. Broadly, the Simplex method searches the vertices of the feasible region to find the optimal solution. The mechanics of the Simplex method are not a focus of this project and are well documented elsewhere, including in [12].

Using the Simplex method, we can find several different types of solutions. An *n*-tuple (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) specifying a value for each decision variable is a **solution**; it is a **feasible solution** if it satisfies all of the constraints of the LP and an **optimal solution** if it corresponds to the actual maximum or minimum of the LP. The optimal solution is also a feasible solution, by definition. Any solution that fails to satisfy one or more constraints is an **infeasible solution**. The following definitions further detail types of solutions.

Definition 1. A constraint $ax \le b$ is *active* at a particular solution \bar{x} if $a\bar{x} = b$.

Definition 2. A solution \bar{x} is a **basic feasible solution** if it has at least *n* linearly independent active constraints.

Definition 3. A solution \bar{x} is a **basic optimal solution** if it has n linearly independent active constraints and $f(\bar{x})$ is the desired minimum or maximum.

Linear programs that have no optimal solution are split into two

categories. Some LPs have no feasible solutions; that is, the space defined by the constraints is empty. For example, consider the LP

Maximize:
$$f(x) = 3x_1 + 2x_2 + 4x_3$$

subject to: $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \le 5$
 $-x_1 - x_2 - x_3 \le -8$ (2.3)
 $2x_1 + x_2 \le 10$
 $x_1, x_2, x_3 \ge 0.$

Note that the second constraint can be rewritten as $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \ge 8$. This is contrary to the first constraint; there is no (x_1, x_2, x_3) that satisfies $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \le 5$ and $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \ge 8$. Thus, there are no feasible solutions to this LP. We call an LP that has no feasible solutions **infeasible**.

In contrast, some LPs are said to be **unbounded**. An unbounded LP has feasible solutions for arbitrarily large objective function values. For example, consider the LP

Maximize:
$$f(x) = x_1 - 6x_2$$

subject to: $-4x_1 + x_2 \le -1$
 $-x_1 - 4x_2 \le -2$
 $x_1, x_2 \ge 0.$
(2.4)

Let $x_1 \ge 2$ and $x_2 = 0$; any solution of this form satisfies both constraints and is feasible. As x_1 increases, so does $f(x) = x_1 - 6x_2$. Thus, f(x) takes on arbitrarily large values and is unbounded. We can now categorize the solution categories of all linear programs with the following theorem.

Theorem 1. (Fundamental Theorem of Linear Programming) For an arbitrary linear program in standard form, the following statements are true:

- 1. If there is no optimal solution, then the problem is either infeasible or unbounded.
- 2. If a feasible solution exists, then a basic feasible solution exists.
- 3. *If an optimal solution exists, then a basic optimal solution exists.*

For more detail and a proof of this theorem, see [12].

2.2 Duality

For many applications of linear programming, it is useful to consider the **dual LP** associated with a particular **primal LP**. These structures come in pairs; the following section details their relationship. In short, every feasible solution for one of the programs characterizes a bound on the optimal objective function value of the other. In fact, both LPs will have the same optimal objective function value.

2.2.1 Motivation

Before exploring duality theory in general, we offer a motivating example. Consider the following LP:

Maximize:
$$f(x) = 2x_1 + x_2 + 3x_3$$

subject to: $3x_2 + x_3 \le 5$
 $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \le 10$
 $3x_1 + 2x_2 \le 8.$
(2.5)

Denote the optimal solution to this LP x^* , and the corresponding optimal objective function value as $f(x^*)$. Consider a particular feasible solution $(x_1, x_2, x_3) = (2, 0, 5)$, which has a objective function value of z = 19. In effect, this z acts as a lower bound for the optimal objective function value z^* . Since we are attempting to maximize our objective function, the optimal solution must satisfy $z^* \ge 19$. If we cannot find another feasible solution such that this is true, it must be the case that $f(x^*) = 19$ and $x^* = (x_1, x_2, x_3) = (2, 0, 5)$. Thus, each f(x) acts as a lower bound for the optimal $f(x^*)$.

We can also place upper bounds on $f(x^*)$, as follows. Consider the sum of the three constraints,

$$3x_{2} + x_{3} \leq 5$$

$$x_{1} + x_{2} + x_{3} \leq 10$$

$$+ 3x_{1} + 2x_{2} \leq 8$$

$$4x_{1} + 6x_{2} + 2x_{3} \leq 23$$

Since each variable is nonnegative, this sum forms an upper bound on the optimal objective function value; that is,

$$2x_1 + x_2 + 3x_3 \le 4x_1 + 6x_2 + 2x_3 \le 23.$$

Therefore, we have $19 \le f(x^*) \le 23$. We can find other upper bounds by considering any linear combination of the constraints of the LP in (2.5).

We have significantly narrowed the range of possible values for $f(x^*)$, but we can further reduce the size of this interval. Before, we considered a particular linear combination of the constraint vectors. We now consider a linear combination with variables y_1 , y_2 , and y_3 as the respective constants, and find these *y* values that give an upper bound of 0 on f(x). We have

$$y_1(3x_2 + x_3) \le 5y_1$$

$$y_2(x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \le 10y_2$$

$$+ y_3(3x_1 + 2x_2) \le 8y_3$$

$$(y_2 + 3y_3)x_1 + (3y_1 + y_2 + 2y_3)x_2 + (y_1 + y_2)x_3 \le 5y_1 + 10y_2 + 8y_3$$

Assume that each of the x_i coefficients is the same as in the original objective function. That is,

$$y_{2} + 3y_{3} \ge 2$$

$$3y_{1} + y_{2} + 2y_{3} \ge 1$$

$$y_{1} + y_{2} \ge 3.$$

(2.6)

Thus,

$$f(x) = 2x_1 + x_2 + 3x_3$$

$$\leq (y_2 + 3y_3)x_1 + (3y_1 + y_2 + 2y_3)x_2 + (y_1 + y_2)x_3$$

$$\leq 5y_1 + 10y_2 + 8y_3.$$

Since f(x) is bounded above by $5y_1 + 10y_2 + 8y_3$, we can minimize this sum in order to find the most specific upper bound for the original LP. This new

objective function is constrained by (2.6), and we naturally have the dual LP

Minimize:
$$g(y) = 5y_1 + 10y_2 + 8y_3$$

subject to: $y_2 + 3y_3 \ge 2$
 $3y_1 + y_2 + 2y_3 \ge 1$
 $y_1 + y_2 \ge 3.$
(2.7)

This is the dual LP associated with the given primal LP (2.5). Intuitively, the dual LP seeks to minimize (maximize) the upper (lower) bound on the primal objective function, respectively.

2.2.2 Theory

We now present the formal theory of duality, emphasizing the relationship between primal-dual LP pairs and their respective solutions. We also consider the relationship between various solution types and the dual LP.

Definition 4. For a primal LP in the standard form of

Maximize:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{j} x_{j}$$

subject to:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{ij} x_{j} \le b_{i} \quad 1 \le i \le m$$
$$x_{j} \ge 0 \qquad 1 \le j \le n$$
$$(2.8)$$

the corresponding **dual LP** is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Minimize:} & \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i \\ \mathbf{subject to:} & \sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i a_{ij} \geq c_j \quad 1 \leq j \leq n \\ & y_i \geq 0 \qquad 1 \leq i \leq m. \end{aligned} \tag{2.9}$$

Proposition 1. *The dual of a dual LP is the primal LP.*

Proof. To verify this relationship, we must first write the dual problem in standard form. Recall that a standard form LP maximizes its objective function and has \leq constraints. The sign restrictions remain the same. Since minimizing a function is equivalent to maximizing its negative, we have

$$\min\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i = -\max\left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i\right)$$

We can convert the \geq constraints to \leq by multiplying both sides by -1. Thus, the standard form of the dual LP is given by

Maximize:
$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i$$

subject to:
$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} -y_i a_{ij} \le -c_j \quad 1 \le j \le n$$

$$y_i \ge 0 \qquad 1 \le i \le m.$$

The dual of this LP is

Minimize:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} -c_{j}x_{j}$$

subject to:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} (-a_{ij})x_{j} \ge -b_{i} \quad 1 \le i \le m$$

 $x_{j} \ge 0 \qquad 1 \le j \le n,$

which is equivalent to the primal LP given by

Maximize:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{j} x_{j}$$

subject to:
$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{ij} x_{j} \le b_{i} \quad 1 \le i \le m$$
$$x_{j} \ge 0 \qquad 1 \le j \le n.$$

We can also characterize the relationship between the feasible solutions of the primal and dual LPs.

Theorem 2. [12] Weak Duality Theorem: If (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) is a feasible solution for the primal LP and (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n) is feasible for the associated dual LP, then $\sum_j c_j x_j \leq \sum_i b_i y_i$. *Proof.* We have the following series of inequalities

$$\sum_{j} c_{j} x_{j} \leq \sum_{j} \left(\sum_{i} y_{i} a_{ij} \right) x_{j}$$

$$= \sum_{ij} y_{i} a_{ij} x_{j}$$

$$= \sum_{i} \left(\sum_{j} a_{ij} x_{j} \right) y_{i}$$

$$\leq \sum_{i} b_{i} y_{i}.$$
(2.10)

For the first inequality, we know that each $x_j \ge 0$ by (2.8) that $c_j \le \sum_i y_i a_{ij}$ for each *j* by (2.9). The second inequality is similar; $y_i \ge 0$ by (2.9) and $\sum_j a_{ij} x_j \le b_i$ by (2.8) for each *i*.

From the Weak Duality Theorem, we know that all of the primal objective function values (for feasible solutions) are less than all of the dual objective function values. For an arbitrary primal feasible solution x, $f(x) \le g(y)$ for all dual feasible solutions y, where f and g are the primal and dual objective functions, respectively. This provides an upper bound for every primal objective function value. Similarly, the objective function value for any primal optimal solution provides a lower bound for every dual objective function value. Therefore, we can characterize the optimal solutions x and y as those for which f(x) = g(y).

We now have the necessary background to draw a connection between the optimal solutions of a primal-dual LP pair. We present the following theorem without proof, as the particular mechanics are outside the scope of this project. For more detail, see [12]. Intuitively, this theorem states that the objective functions for a primal-dual pair of LPs is equal precisely at the optimal solution to each.

Theorem 3. [12] Strong Duality Theorem: For an optimal solution $x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ to a primal LP, there is a dual LP which has an optimal solution $y^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $\sum_j c_j x_j^* = \sum_i b_i y_i^*$.

Chapter 3

Game Theory

This chapter presents several concepts in game theory that are central to this project. We focus on the various representations and types of games, as well as the associated Nash equilibria. These concepts will later be used in conjunction with the linear programming theory of the previous chapter to develop a method of representing and solving two variants of poker.

3.1 Background

The purpose of game theory is to develop mathematical models that represent decision-making interactions among individuals. We assume that these individuals are both rational in their own decisions and take into account expectations of how the other decision-makers will act [7]. Game theory can be used to model a wide range of situations, including business negotiations, political competition, and economic models of oligopolistic competition, as well as traditional 'games', such as chess, checkers, and poker. Game theoretic models are highly abstracted versions of the actual situation. Unlike many other fields of mathematics, the study of game theory attempts to both positively describe how individuals *do* make decisions, and normatively how they *should* under the assumption of perfect rationality.

The modern field of game theory is relatively new, and is generally considered to have begun in the 19th century with Cournot, Bertrand, and Edgeworth's respective work on models of oligopoly pricing [4]. These ideas developed to a more general theory of games in the mid-19th century with John von Neumann's proof of the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum games. He later co-authored the seminal *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* with Oskar Morgenstern [4]. This text considered theoretical results about cooperative games with several players, and offered a axiomatic conception of utility theory that allowed mathematicians to formalize decision-making under uncertainty. Additionally, it introduced the concepts of the normal (or strategic) and extensive forms, as well as a proof of the existence of a maximin equilibrium for all two-player zero-sum games [4].

With zero-sum games fairly well understood, attention turned to the more general case of non zero-sum games, which are perhaps more common. In 1950, John Forbes Nash Jr. proved the existence of an optimal strategy for each player in every non-cooperative game [4]. The Nash equilibrium is a generalization of Morgenstern's maximin theorem for non zero-sum games, and requires that each player's optimal strategy be a payoff-maximizing response to his correct expectation of his opponents strategy. This guarantee was a significant advance in the field, and allowed the study of a broader class of games [4].

3.2 Normal (Strategic) Form

One of the most common representations of a game is the **normal form**, also known as the **strategic form**. Intuitively, it represents a game as a payoff matrix with each player's (pure) strategies as particular rows and columns. The payoffs to each player are determined by their respective strategies. The normal form is the typical representation for small 2-player games with simultaneous decision making, but can be extended to larger games and those that initially appear to have non-simultaneous decision making. The concepts in this section are based heavily on [7]. We begin with the formal definition of a normal form game.

Definition 5. A game in normal (strategic) form is a tuple $\langle N, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$, with

- a finite set of N players
- for each player $i \in N$, the nonempty set of available actions A_i
- a set of action profiles a = (a_j) for j ∈ N, where each a_j corresponds to a particular action in A_j
- for each player $i \in N$, a preference relation \geq_i on $A_1 \times A_2 \times \ldots \times A_j$ for $j \in N$

Any such game with a finite set of actions A_i for each player i is considered finite.

Notice that the preferences of each player *i* are defined over *A*, instead of A_i ; that is, their preferences are defined over each combination of the other player's outcomes, as well as their own. This distinguishes a strategic game from a more general decision problem; players are concerned with their

opponents actions and payoffs, as well as their own. The normal form model of a game is intentionally abstract, allowing it to be applied to a wide variety of situations. The set of players N may consist of individuals, animals, governments, businesses, etc. Likewise, the set of actions A_i may contain only a few simple actions or complicated sets of contingencies over many potential outcomes. The primary restriction on the elements of N and each A is that each player has a well-defined preference relation over all outcomes of action profile combinations. For example, the preference relation for a business might be a function that maps particular actions to profit levels.

This definition considers a generalized preference relation \gtrsim_i ; typically, and for our purposes, we can use a more intuitive payoff function u_i . In this case, we denote a particular game as $\langle N, (A_i), (u_i) \rangle$. This payoff function u_i maps a particular combination of action profiles to a numerical payoff value. These inputs can be represented either as a singular action profile $a \in A$ or as a tuple to highlight the actions of individual players. For example, a particular $u_1(a)$ represents the payoff to player 1 for a particular combination of each player's actions $a \in A$. This action profile a defines a particular action a_i for each player j from their action set A_j . Alternatively, we may wish to highlight particular action profiles from distinct players as separate inputs to u_i . Players typically wish to choose a set of actions that maximize this value, wish could represent profit, utility, etc. The utility function describes how a particular player feels about a particular combination of actions of *all* of the players in the game.

Definition 6. For a game with a set of outcomes $A = A_1 \times A_2 \times ... \times A_j$ for $j \in N$, the function $u_i : A \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ is the **payoff function** with $u_i(a) \ge u_i(b)$ whenever $a \gtrsim_i b$ for

combinations of actions a, $b \in A$.

In a game, players make choices about how they will play. Each of these choices is a particular action take by a player at some point in the game. In a game with more than one such set of action choices, players employ a **strategy**, which is an algorithmic prescription of every action that a player will choose. A particular strategy could be a simple choice between two actions, or a complicated set of prescriptions to choose actions based on various contingencies of how the other players act. These choices may or may not be identical across iterations of the game, motivating the following distinction.

Definition 7. A pure strategy s_i is a deterministic prescription of how an individual will play a game, choosing the same action at every iteration. A strategy set S_i is the set of all pure strategies available to player *i*. A mixed strategy σ_i assigns a probability to each pure strategy.

The probabilities assigned to each pure strategy *s* in a mixed strategy σ are governed by a global probability distribution. For example, let $S_1 = (s_1, s_2, s_3)$ represent the strategy set of player 1 with pure strategies s_1, s_2 , and s_3 in some strategic game. A particular mixed strategy $\sigma = (0.4, 0.1, 0.5)$ represents player 1 employing each pure strategy with the respective probabilities.

A generalized strategic game is presented in Figure 3.2. Player 1 is the row player with choice of pure strategies s_1 and s_2 , and player 2 is the column player with choice of pure strategies s_1 and s_2 . Each player chooses a strategy simultaneously, and each ordered pair represents the respective real-valued payoffs for the set of chosen strategies. For example, if player 1 chooses s_1 and player 2 chooses s_3 , they will receive respective payoffs w_1 and w_2 . Formally,

 $u_1(s_1, s_3) = w_1$ and $u_2(s_1, s_3) = w_2$.

		p_2		
		S_3	S_4	
p_1	s_1	(w_1, w_2)	(x_1, x_2)	
	S_2	(y_1, y_2)	(z_1, z_2)	

Figure 3.1: Generalized Two-player Strategic Game

However, each player need not always play the same strategy in this game. It may be necessary to vary their play in order to optimize their expected payoff. This is the motivation behind the concept of a mixed strategy. Recall that a mixed strategy σ_i is a probability distribution over all of player *i*'s pure strategies. The probabilities assigned to each pure strategy determine the expected payoff of the mixed strategy. For example, consider a particular mixed strategy σ_1 in which player 1 chooses s_1 with probability 0.7 and s_2 with probability 0.3. Player 2 uses mixed strategy σ_2 , where he chooses s_3 and s_4 with equal probability. Then the payoff to player 1 is

$$u_1(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) = 0.7(0.5w_1 + 0.5x_1) + 0.3(0.5y_1 + 0.5z_1) = 0.35w_1 + 0.35x_1 + 0.15y_1 + 0.15z_1.$$
(3.1)

More generally, the payoff for a mixed strategy profile is a linear function of the probabilities assigned to each pure strategy [4]. In (3.1), the coefficient associated with a particular payoff value is the product of the probabilities assigned to the particular pure strategy of each player in their mixed strategy. Player 1 uses pure strategy s_1 with probability 0.7 in his mixed strategy σ_1 , and player 2 uses pure strategy s_3 with probability 0.3 in his mixed strategy σ_2 . In this case, player 1's payoff is w_1 . This occurs with probability $0.7 \times 0.5 = 0.35$. Therefore, the overall **expected value** to player 1 for this σ_1 , σ_2 combination is a weighted sum of the payoffs to each combination of pure strategies.

3.2.1 Equilibrium

In any game, each player tries to maximize their own payoff. Payoffs are dependent on the combination of strategies that each employs. Thus, the decision of which strategy to employ is critical. This section begins by considering the Nash equilibrium of any normal form game, and then considers the more specific case of Maximin equilibrium in strictly competitive games. Both refer to a steady state wherein each player correctly assumes how the other(s) will play and chooses his own strategy rationally in response. Generally, a game is said to be in equilibrium if no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing strategy.

Nash Equilibria

The concept of the Nash equilibrium is well illustrated through the classic example of the Prisoner's Dilemma, as shown through a normal form representation in Figure 3.2. This is a standard example in game theory literature, and illustrates several important concepts. The rules of the game are as follows: Two individuals are arrested by the police, and are suspected of committing a crime together. The police lack sufficient evidence to convict either on the most serious charge, but enough to convict either on a less serious charge. Each individual is offered a choice: betray the other and testify to the police that the other committed the most serious crime, or stay silent and accept the conviction of the lesser charge. If both betray each other, the penalty is reduced by one year for each. The individuals cannot communicate with each other as they decide whether or not to betray their co-conspirator. Unsurprisingly, they each want to minimize the number of years that they spend in prison. The potential payoffs, in years in prison respectively, are shown in Figure 3.2.

		p_2	
		Betray	Silent
<i>p</i> ₁	Betray	(3,3)	(0,4)
	Silent	(4,0)	(1,1)

Figure 3.2: Prisoner's Dilemma

We can determine each player's best strategy by considering the potential payoffs of each of their choices, along with the other player's choices. Each player chooses if they want to confess. If the row player stays silent, he will serve 3 years in prison if the column player also stays silent, or he will walk free if the column player confesses. Conversely, if the row player does confess, he will serve 4 years or 1 year, respectively. In either case the dominant strategy is for the row player to confess, since he will receive less prison time in each contingency of the column player's choice. We can repeat this analysis for the column player, and find that his dominant strategy is also to confess. If both players choose rationally and consider what the other may do, they will both choose to confess. This is the Nash equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

With this intuitive understanding, we can now formalize this logic and develop the theory more generally. This section focuses on the Nash equilibrium of the normal form representation; the concept extends naturally to the extensive form and will be discussed in section 3.3.

Definition 8. A Nash equilibrium of a normal form game $\langle N, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$ is a profile $a^* \in A$ of actions with the property that for every player $i \in N$ we have

$$(a_{-i}^*, a_i^*) \gtrsim_i (a_{-i}^*, a_i) \quad \forall a_i \in A_i, \quad \forall i \in N.$$

For a game with defined utility functions u_i , this condition is

$$u_i(a_{-i}^*, a_i^*) \ge u_i(a_{-i}^*, a_i^*) \quad \forall a_i \in A_i, \quad \forall i \in N$$

In this definition, we denote an optimal action profile for player *i* as a_i^* , and a non-optimal action profile a_i . All players other than *i* are denoted by -i. For a profile a^* to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that no player *i* has an action with an outcome preferable to the corresponding outcome in the optimal a_i^* , given that every other player chooses their optimal a_j^* . Here, we consider a utility function with multiple inputs of action profiles (each representing one or more players), whose union is a member of *A*. Consider the second case, with specified utility functions. Player *i* uses his optimal action profile a_i^* , as do all other players -i. The payoff to player *i*, defined by u_i , is greater than or equal to his payoff when all other players continue to use their optimal a_{-i}^* and he uses a non-optimal a_i . No player has reason to deviate from their strategy, given the strategy of the other players. A similar conception of the Nash equilibrium applies to other game forms.

While this extends to *n*-player games, we are most concerned with the two

player case. Here, the Nash equilibrium criterion is given by

$$u_1(a_2^*, a_1^*) \ge u_1(a_2^*, a_1) \quad \forall a_i \in A_i$$

and

$$u_2(a_1^*, a_2^*) \ge u_2(a_1^*, a_2) \quad \forall a_i \in A_i.$$

The payoff to each player is at least as great playing their optimal action profile a_1^* or a_2^* than by playing any non-optimal a_1 or a_2 . This combination of action profiles a_1^* and a_2^* is a Nash equilibrium.

Maximin Equilibrium

We now turn our attention to the specific case of Nash equilibria for a two-person, zero-sum game. This section is heavily derived from [7], beginning with the following definition.

Definition 9. A strategic game $\langle \{1, 2\}, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$ is strictly competitive or zero sum if for any $a, b \in A$ we have $a \geq_1 b$ if and only if $b \geq_2 a$. For utility functions u_1 and u_2 , this condition is $u_1(a) \geq u_1(b)$ if and only if $u_2(b) \geq u_2(a)$.

Recall that the inputs to each u_i are either elements of A, which are tuples of actions profiles for multiple players, or elements of A_i , which are individual player's action profiles. If player 1's preference relation \gtrsim_1 is given by the payoff function u_1 , then player 2's payoff function u_2 is such that $u_1(s_1, s_2) + u_2(s_1, s_2) = 0$ for any strategies $s_1 \in A_1$, $s_2 \in A_2$, and $(s_1, s_2) \in A$. That is, a payoff gain for either player corresponds to an equivalent payoff loss for the other. This structure influences each player's strategy, as they have no incentive to cooperate.

In a zero-sum game, each player uses a **maximin** strategy in Nash equilibrium. A player *i* **maximinimizes** if he chooses a strategy that maximizes his own payoff, with the assumption that player *j* will choose a strategy attempting to minimize player *i*'s payoff. Each player's loss is the other's gain; therefore, they both assume that they will choose strategies that benefit themselves and hurt the other. In a zero-sum game, a pair of strategies is a Nash equilibrium of and only if it is a pair of maximinimizing strategies. Further, any such Nash equilibria have identical payoffs to each player. We begin with the following definition, followed by several proofs of the relationship between maximin and Nash equilibrium.

Definition 10. Let $\langle \{1, 2\}, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$ be a strictly competitive game. The action $x^* \in A_1$ is a maxminimizer for player 1 if

$$\min_{y \in A_2} u_1(x^*, y) \ge \min_{y \in A_2} u_1(x, y) \quad \forall x \in A_1.$$

An action $y^* \in A_2$ is a maxminimizer for player 2 if

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}\in A_1} u_2(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}^*) \ge \min_{\mathbf{x}\in A_1} u_2(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \quad \forall \mathbf{y} \in A_2.$$

By playing a maximin strategy, each player is attempting to maximize their minimum payoff against all possible strategies that their opponent could utilize. Player 1 chooses a strategy by solving $\max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$, and player 2 chooses a strategy by solving $\max_y \min_x u_2(x, y)$. Since neither player knows how the other will play, they choose their own strategy to optimize their respective worst-case scenario's. This is precisely how we determined each player's optimal strategy in the Prisoner's Dilemma (Figure 3.2).

Theorem 4. For any strictly competitive game with Nash equilibria, a pair of action profiles is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the action profile of each player is a maximinimizer.

In other words, we may find a Nash equilibrium in a strictly competitive game by examining the maximin strategies of each player.

Lemma 1. Let $G = \langle \{1, 2\}, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$ be a strictly competitive strategic game. Then $\max_{y \in A_2} \min_{x \in A_1} u_2(x, y) = -\min_{y \in A_2} \max_{x \in A_1} u_1(x, y)$. Further, $y \in A_2$ solves the problem $\max_{y \in A_2} \min_{x \in A_1} u_2(x, y)$ if and only if it also solves the problem $\min_{y \in A_2} \max_{x \in A_1} u_1(x, y)$.

Proof. Since *G* is a strictly competitive game, we have that $u_1(x) = -u_2(y)$ for any pair of strategies *x* and *y*. For an arbitrary function *f*, $\min_z(-f(z)) = -\max_z f(z)$ and $\arg\min_z(-f(z)) = \arg\max_z f(z)$. These \arg values are the *z* values for which $\min_z(-f(z))$ and $\max_z f(z)$ attain their equivalent minimum and maximum f(z) values. Let $x \in A_1$ and $y \in A_2$ be (not necessarily optimal) strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively. For every $y \in A_2$, we have

$$-\min_{x\in A_1} u_2(x,y) = \max_{x\in A_1} (-u_2(x,y)) = \max_{x\in A_1} u_1(x,y).$$

Thus,

$$\max_{y \in A_2} [\max_{x \in A_1} u_2(x, y)] = -\min_{y \in A_2} [-\min_{x \in A_1} u_2(x, y)] = -\min_{y \in A_2} \max_{x \in A_1} u_1(x, y)$$

Proposition 2. Let $G = \langle \{1, 2\}, (A_i), (\geq_i) \rangle$ be a strictly competitive game.

- (a) If (x*, y*) is a Nash equilibrium of G then x* is a maximin strategy for player 1
 and y* is a maximin strategy for player 2.
- (b) If (x*, y*) is a Nash equilibrium of G, then
 max_x min_y u₁(x, y) = min_y max_x u₁(x, y) = u₁(x*, y*), and all Nash equilibria
 of G yield identical payoffs.
- (c) If x* and y* are maximin strategies for player's 1 and 2 respectively, then (x*, y*) is a Nash equilibrium of G.

Proof. We first prove (a) and (b) in conjunction. Let (x^*, y^*) be a Nash equilibrium of *G*. Then $u_2(x^*, y^*) \ge u_2(x^*, y)$ for all $y \in A_2$. Likewise, since $u_2 = -u_1, u_1(x^*, y^*) \le u_1(x^*, y)$ for all $y \in A_2$. Therefore, $u_1(x^*, y^*) = \min_y u_1(x^*, y) \le \max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$. Similarly, $u_1(x^*, y^*) \ge u_1(x, y^*)$ for all $x \in A_1$. Therefore, $u_1(x^*, y^*) \ge \min_y u_1(x, y)$ for all $x \in A_1$, so that $u_1(x^*, y^*) \ge \max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$. Therefore, $u_1(x^*, y^*) = \max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$ and x^* is a maximin strategy for player 1. An analogous argument shows that y^* is a maximin strategy for player 2 and that $u_2(x^*, y^*) = \max_y \min_x(x, y)$, so that $u_1(x^*, y^*) = \min_y \max_x u_1(x, y)$.

For part (c), let $v^* = \max_x \min_y u_1(x, y) = \min_y \max_x u_1(x, y)$. From Lemma 1, we know that $\max_y \min_x u_2(x, y) = -v^*$. Since x^* is a maximin strategy for player 1, we have $u_1(x^*, y) \ge -v^*$ for all $y \in A_2$. Likewise, since y^* is a maximin strategy for player 2, we have $u_2(x, y^*) \ge -v^*$ for all $x \in A_2$. Setting $y = y^*$ and

 $x = x^*$, we have $u_1(x^*, y^*) = v^*$. Since $u_2 = -u_1$, we conclude that (x^*, y^*) is a Nash equilibrium of *G*.

A crucial implication of part (c) is that a Nash equilibrium can be found by solving the problem $\max_x \min_y u_1(x, y)$. For a strictly competitive game, the Nash-optimal strategy is precisely the solution to the maximin problem. If $\max_x \min_y u_1(x, y) = \min_y \max_x u_1(x, y)$, we define this equilibrium payoff to player 1 as the **value** of the game. From Proposition 2, we know that if v^* is the value of a strictly competitive game, then any equilibrium strategy gives a payoff to player 1 of at least v^* and to player 2 at least $-v^*$ [7].

3.3 Extensive Form

A second representation of many games is the **extensive form**. The extensive form represents a game as a directed graph that maps all possible moves and outcomes. The extensive form best represents sequential games of non-simultaneous decision-making. It is particularly amenable to imperfect information games, such as poker, where some information about the game state is hidden from each player. The following section details the theory of the extensive form, including a discussion of the associated Nash equilibrium. We also distinguish between the extensive form games with perfect and imperfect information. This section closely follows [7].

3.3.1 Perfect Information

Definition 11. An extensive form game with perfect information is represented by the tuple $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i \rangle$, where:

- *A finite set N (the set of players)*
- *A set H of sequences (finite or infinite) that satisfies the following three properties:*
 - The empty sequence \emptyset is a member of H.
 - If $(a^k)_{k=1,\dots,K} \in H$ (where K may be infinite) and L < K then $(a^k)_{k=1,\dots,L} \in H$.
 - If an infinite sequence (a^k)_{k=1,...} satisfies (a^k)_{k=1,...,L} ∈ H for every positive integer L then (a^k)_{k=1,...} ∈ H.
- Each member of H is a history; each component of a history is an action taken by a player. A history (a^k)_{k=1,...,K} ∈ H is terminal if it is infinite or if there is no a^{k+1} such that (a^k)_{k=1,...,k+1} ∈ H. The set of terminal histories is denoted Z.
- A function P that assigns to each nonterminal history (each member of H \ Z) a member of N ∪ {c}. This P is the player function, P(h) being the player who takes an action after the history h. If P(h) = c, then chance determines the action taken after the history h.
- For each player $i \in N$, a preference relation \geq_i on Z.

Let *h* be a history of length *k*; the ordered pair (*h*, *a*) is the history of length k + 1 consisting of *h* followed by *a*. For any non-terminal history *h*, the player function *P*(*h*) chooses an action *a* from the set

$$A(h) = \{a : (h,a) \in H\}.$$

At the beginning of any extensive game, this history is empty; no actions have previously occurred. For the empty sequence $\emptyset \in H$, the player $P(\emptyset)$ chooses a

member of $A(\emptyset)$. Each member of $A(\emptyset)$ is an action a^0 . For each of these choices, the player defined by $P(a^0)$ chooses a member of the set $A(a^0)$. For each possible choice in $A(a^0)$, denoted a^1 , player $P(a^1)$ chooses a member of the set $A(a^1)$. This process iterates until the game reaches a terminal history.

The concepts illustrated in this definition are best illustrated through an example, shown graphically in Figure 3.3. This game is the tuple $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i \rangle$, where

- $N = \{1, 2\};$
- *H* has as elements the 11 histories
 Ø, (A), (B), (A, E), (A, F), (B, G), (B, H), (B, G, C), (B, G, D), (B, H, C), (B, H, D);
- $P(\emptyset) = P(B, G) = P(B, H) = 1$ and P(A) = P(B) = 2.
- The respective preference relations defined by $(B, H, D) >_1 (B, H, C) >_1 (B, G, C) \sim_1 (A, F) >_1 (A, E) >_1 (B, G, D)$ and $(B, G, D) >_2 (A, E) >_2 (B, G, C) \sim_2 (A, F) >_2 (B, H, C) >_2 (B, H, D).$

In Figure 3.3, the node at the top of the graph represents the history \emptyset . Here, player 1 chooses between actions *A* and *B*, which are the members of $A(\emptyset)$. These actions are shown as line segments originating from the initial node. Once the first player has chosen either *A* or *B*, it is player 2's turn, P(A) = P(B) = 2. If player 1 chose action *B*, player 2 chooses between the members of A(B), which are the actions *G* and *H*. Then, player 1 chooses between actions *C* and *D*. The preference relations \gtrsim_1 and \gtrsim_2 define the ordering of each player's preference of outcomes; they can also be utility functions u_1 and u_2 with the same ordering.




Figure 3.3: Extensive Form Game with Perfect Information

Definition 12. A strategy of player $i \in N$ in an extensive game with perfect information $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i \rangle$ is a function that assigns an action in A(h) to each non-terminal history $h \in H \setminus Z$ for which P(h) = i.

Definition 13. A particular action in a **strategy** *s* is denoted by $a \in s$. A **strategy set**, denoted S_i , is the set of a game's legal strategies for player *i* with $s \in S_i$. The entire **strategy profile** for a game with *n* players is $S = S_1 \times S_2 \times \cdots \times S_n$.

A strategy is a contingency plan for every possible choice of action in a game, given each choice that another player may make. In the game described in Figure 3.3, player 1 always chooses an action at the initial history \emptyset , and makes a later choice between *C* and *D* if they previously chose *B*. Thus, player 1's 5 strategies can be described as

$$S_1 = (A), (B, (G, C), (H, C)), (B, (G, C), (H, D)), (B, (G, D), (H, C)), (B, (G, D), (H, D)).$$
(3.2)

The interpretation of these last four strategies is important, as they are

contingent on player 2's actions. For example, the strategy (B, (G, C), (H, D)) represents the following contingency plan: after first choosing action *B*, if player 2 chooses *G*, take action *C*. Otherwise, if player 2 takes action *H*, player 1 chooses *D*. Player 2's strategies are simpler, and can be described as

$$S_2 = ((A, E), (B, G)), ((A, E), (B, H)), ((A, F), (B, G)), ((A, F), (B, H)).$$
(3.3)

The strategy ((A, E), (B, G)) is interpreted as follows: if player 1 chooses *A*, choose *E*. Otherwise, if player 1 chooses *B*, choose *G*.

It is important to note that a particular strategy defines the action to be chosen for each history, even if that history is never reached when the strategy is employed. For example, consider the strategy (A, (G, C), (H, C)) for player 1. If he chooses action A, the later choice between C and D cannot happen. Despite this, we still specify what player 1 *would do* in that scenario. In this way, a formal strategy in an extensive game differs from an intuitive plan of action.

Definition 14. A *pure strategy* s_i of player $i \in N$ in an extensive game $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i \rangle$ is a deterministic prescription of how to play a game. A *mixed strategy* σ_i is a probability distribution over all pure strategies.

This concepts of pure and mixed strategies is similar to that in the normal form representation. For the game in Figure 3.3, (3.2) and (3.3) are the pure strategies. We use the following notation to distinguish between the pure and mixed strategies of the various players in any game. We often consider the strategy of a particular player *i*, while holding the strategies of his opponents fixed. Let $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ denote the strategy selection for all other players than *i*, and

write (s'_{i}, s_{-i}) for the profile

$$(s_1, \cdots, s_{i-1}, s'_i, s_{i+1}, \cdots, s_i).$$

For mixed strategies, we let

$$(\sigma'_i, \sigma_{-i}) = (\sigma_1, \cdots, \sigma_{i-1}, \sigma'_i, \sigma_{i+1}, \cdots, \sigma_i).$$

How do players choose which strategy to use? In some games, certain strategies will be clearly superior to others, based on a comparison of the payoffs. For example, consider player 2's choice between moves E and F in Figure 3.3. Since player 2's payoff to E is strictly greater than his payoff to F, he should use an overall strategy that chooses the former. Any pure strategy that prescribes choosing F is inferior to one that prescribes choosing E. This is an example of a strictly dominated strategy, defined below. This game has no weakly dominated strategies.

Definition 15. *A pure strategy* s_i *is strictly dominated for player i if there exists a mixed strategy* σ'_i *such that*

$$u_i(\sigma'_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \quad \forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$$

The strategy s_i *is weakly dominated if there exists a* σ'_i *such that this holds with weak inequality, and the inequality is strict for at least one* s_{-i} *.*

3.3.2 Imperfect Information

Thus far, we have described an extensive form game with *perfect information*, where each player is perfectly knowledgeable about their opponents actions and the state of the game. A generalization of this is games with *imperfect information*, where players are not aware of all relevant information about the game. Poker is an example of this type of game; during a hand, neither player knows which cards the other is holding.

Definition 16. An extensive game with imperfect information is defined as a tuple $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i, f_c, (\mathscr{I}_i)_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \rangle$ with analogous structures as Definition 11, with the addition of the following

- A function f_c that associates with every history h for which P(h) = c a probability measure f_c(· | h) on A(h), where each such probability measure is independent of every other such measure. A particular f_c(a | h) is the probability that a occurs after the history h.
- For each player i ∈ N a partition I_i of {h ∈ H : P(h) = i} with the property that A(h) = A(h') whenever h and h' are in the same member of the partition. For I_i ∈ I_i we denote by A(I_i) the player P(h) for any h ∈ I_i. The partition I_i is the *information partition* of player i; a set I_i ∈ I_i is an *information set* of player i.

In a imperfect information game, players are often uncertain of the exact game state, given that their opponent(s) have hidden information and vice versa. While the player does not know the particular game state, they are aware of its composition, rules, and number of its *possible* states. Chance determines the particular game state. The "Chance player" *c* is represented by f_c , which defines a probability measure for each history *h* such that P(h) = c. For example, consider a card game in which two players hold one of three cards with none repeated. Since there are 6 possible combinations of cards, $f_c(a \mid h) = \frac{1}{6}$ for the relevant history *h*. This probability is uniform across each deal, defining a complete probability distribution.

The final key structures in an imperfect information game are the information partitions \mathscr{I}_i and information sets I_i . Each player *i* has a singular \mathscr{I}_i that partitions the set of histories *H* into information sets I_i . An information set describes all of the histories that are identical from the point of view of a particular player. Of course, these histories are not actually identical; they differ only in the hidden information. Two histories *h* and *h'* are in the same information set only if A(h) = A(h'). That is, the set of actions available for the two histories is identical. Notice that this implies the known information is identical for all elements of an information set; the player cannot distinguish between them.

Definition 17. An extensive form game has **perfect recall** if for each player i we have $X_i(h) = X_i(h')$ wherever the histories h and h' are in the same information set of player *i*.

In a game with perfect recall, no player forgets information that they knew at a previous state. This information includes previous actions and any hidden information known only to that player, as well as previous information sets. Later information sets must refine previous information sets from earlier histories. If this is not the case, then the game has **imperfect recall**. It is not necessary that an extensive form game with imperfect information have perfect recall; some have imperfect recall. However, the variants of poker examined in later sections are both games of perfect recall.




Figure 3.4: Extensive Form Game with Imperfect Information and Perfect Recall

Figure 3.4 shows an extensive form game with imperfect information and perfect recall. In this example, neither player knows which action that the other takes. For example, when player 2 is deciding between actions O and P, he does not know if player 1 has previously chosen M or N. Player 2 has a single information set, comprising both of his decision nodes and all four associated actions. This information set is represented by the first dashed line; at these nodes, he does not know if player 1 just took action M or N. Player 1 has two information sets, each with two nodes and four associated actions. His first information set represents the two possible moves by player 2 (O and P), after he chose action M at the beginning of the game. His second

information set contains the two game states possible after he chose action N originally. Notice that these player 1's information sets refine previous distinctions; there is one set where he previously took action M, and another where he took action N. Further, notice that player 1's possible actions are identical across all nodes in an information set, but are also unique to that information set. He faces the choice between l and r only when he previously chose M, and between L and R only when he previously chose N.

Definition 18. A pure strategy of player $i \in N$ in an extensive game with imperfect information $\langle N, H, P, \gtrsim_i, f_c, (\mathscr{I}_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ is a function that assigns an action in $A(I_i)$ to each information set $I_i \in \mathscr{I}_i$.

Definition 19. A mixed strategy of player *i* in an extensive game with imperfect information $\langle N, H, P, \succeq_i, f_c, (\mathscr{I}_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ is a probability measure over the set of player *i*'s pure strategies. A behavioral strategy of player *i* is a collection $(\beta_i(I_i))_{I_i \in \mathscr{I}_i}$ of independent probability measures, where $\beta_i(I_i)$ is a probability measure over $A(I_i)$.

For any history $h \in I_i \in \mathscr{I}_i$ and action $a \in A(h)$ we denote by $\beta_i(h)(a)$ the probability $\beta_i(I_i)(a)$ assigned by $\beta_i(I_i)$ to the action a. That is, $\beta_i(I_i)(a)$ is the probability that player i will choose action a information set I_i . The collection of these probabilities, for each possible action within each information set, defines a behavioral strategy. This distinction between a mixed strategy and a behavioral strategy illustrates two ways in which a player may choose to randomize their behavior. A mixed strategy uses a probability distribution over all possible pure strategies, whereas a behavioral strategy uses separate probability distribution for each information set. The resulting randomized strategy appears identical to an observer of the game, and may be **outcome** equivalent.

Definition 20. Let $\sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a profile of mixed or behavioral strategies for an extensive game with imperfect information. The **outcome** $O(\sigma)$ of σ is the probability distribution over the terminal histories that results when each player i follows the strategy specification of σ_i .

Definition 21. Two strategies, either mixed or behavioral, are **outcome equivalent** if for every collection of pure strategies of the other players the two strategies induce the same outcome.

Proposition 3. For any mixed strategy of a player in a finite extensive game with perfect recall, there is an outcome-equivalent behavioral strategy.

3.3.3 Nash Equilibrium

We now present a brief theory of the Nash equilibrium for extensive form games with imperfect information.

Definition 22. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of an extensive game is a profile σ^* of mixed strategies with the property that for every player $i \in N$ we have

$$O(\sigma_{-i}^*, \sigma_i^*) \gtrsim_i O(\sigma_{-i}^*, \sigma_i)$$

for every mixed strategy σ_i of player i. A **Nash equilibrium in behavioral** strategies is defined analogously.

This version of the Nash equilibrium is very similar to that of the normal form and the extensive form perfect information case. The optimal mixed strategy σ_i^* has a more preferable outcome *O* than any non-optimal strategy σ_i . No player can benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy. In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we have a probability distribution over each possible pure strategy. In a behavioral strategy Nash equilibrium, we have a probability distribution over the actions in each information set. The following lemma is implied by Proposition 3.

Lemma 2. For an extensive game with perfect recall, the Nash equilibria in mixed and behavioral strategies are equivalent.

3.4 Sequence Form

The final game representation that we consider is the sequence form, which is related to the extensive form. The extensive form describes a imperfect information game, specifying its information sets, actions, payoffs, etc. While the graphical representation allows the reader to quickly understand the mechanics of the game well, it does not allow for efficient computation of an optimal strategy. Typically, an extensive form game must be converted to normal form, and a maximin LP algorithm considers all possible pure strategies of the game. For an example of this process, see Section 4.3. The number of pure strategies is exponential in the size of the game tree; this often makes efficient computation of an optimal strategy infeasible [13].

The purpose of the sequence form is to overcome this disadvantage, and allow the efficient computation of an optimal strategy. It is represented as a matrix scheme, similar to the normal form. However, the pure strategies from the normal form are replaced with **sequences** of consecutive moves. Instead of computing the probabilities assigned to each pure strategy, we consider the realization probabilities of these sequences actually being played. These realization probabilities can be used to construct a behavior strategy, which describes the probability distribution over each information set. These optimal behavior strategies can be found using an LP algorithm; each player's optimal behavior strategy is an optimal solution to the primal and dual LPs, respectively. This section develops the theory of the sequence form, based on the original development in [13].

Many of the structures of the sequence form are similar to those in the extensive form. Recall that an extensive form game has a **chance player** and *N* **personal players**. The chance player governs the chance node(s) by one or more probability distributions, and the personal players govern the decision nodes by their prescribed strategy. The sequence form defines a strategy differently; instead of defining a probability distribution over all pure strategies or over each information set, the player considers each payoff node of the game tree and the sequence of actions necessary to get there. These sequences are the basic unit of analysis in this form.

Definition 23. A sequence *s* of choices of player *i* defined by a node *a* of the game tree, is the set of actions in H on the path from the root node to *a*. The set of sequences of player *i* is denoted S_i .

We now denote *s* as a sequence, instead of a strategy as in previous sections. It is clear from context which is being used. A sequence is defined by the particular set of action labels that a player takes on his path to some node *a*. In a game with perfect recall, members of a particular information set must

have identical histories; thus, a sequence can be defined completely in terms of the actions made to arrive at the given node. The set of all sequences S_i replaces the set of pure strategies S_i in the normal form. We also consider the sequences of the chance player 0, where each chance node has an associated probability distribution. Payoffs are defined by combinations of sequences, including those of the chance player and all personal players.

Definition 24. Let h(a) be a function that maps each terminal node a to a payoff vector in \mathbb{R}^n . The **payoff function** $g: S_0 \times S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n \mapsto \mathbb{R}^N$ is defined by g(s) = h(a) if s is the (N + 1)-tuple (s_0, s_1, \cdots, s_N) of sequences defined by a leaf a of the game tree, and by $g(s) = (0, \cdots, 0) \in \mathbb{R}^N$ otherwise. Note that the chance player sequence s_0 occurs with probability 1 and will always be the first input in g.

The tuple $(s_0, s_1, ..., s_N)$ is unique for a particular node *a* in the game tree; therefore, the payoff function *g* is well defined. The number of sequences is at most the number of nodes, which grows linearly with the size of the game tree. In contrast, the number of pure strategies in the normal form grows exponentially, since each pure strategy must consider each combination of actions at all possible information sets. For a two-player game with a known chance player, the matrix *P* is the payoff matrix with each of player 1 and 2's sequences as the rows and columns, respectively. A particular entry P_{ij} is the payoff of sequences s_i and s_j being played by the two respective personal players; that is, $P_{ij} = g(s_{\emptyset}, s_i, s_j)$. Many combinations of sequences between the two players are impossible; they define combinations of actions that cannot occur in conjunction with each other. Thus, the number of non-zero entries in *A* is at most the number of leaves in the game tree. All other entries are 0, since they have no defined payoff.

We must also consider how particular sequences are chosen by a player. For a normal form game, players can use either a pure or mixed strategy; both define a choice of action in every possible contingency of the game. In the sequence form, the player must define a probability distribution for each information set. This distribution determines the frequency of choosing each action, with its associated sequence. For example, consider Figure 3.5; this game is identical to Figure 3.4, but with player 1's initial action known to player 2. Note that player 2 can now distinguish between his two decision nodes, and that the actions stemming from each are now unique. Player 2 must choose between sequences *o* and *p* if player 1 chooses *M*, as well as *O* and *P* if player 1 chooses *N*. For example, he may always choose *o* when player 1 choose *M*, and always *P* when player 1 chooses *N*. This is the pure strategy (*o*, *P*). In terms of sequences, this corresponds to assigning probabilities (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) to his sequences $(s_{\emptyset}, s_o, s_p, s_O, s_P)$. Instead of mixed strategy probabilities, the sequence form uses the realization probabilities of sequences when the player uses a behavior strategy. Intuitively, the realization plan for a particular sequence is a product of individual decision probabilities of the actions *c* necessary to reach that sequence.

Definition 25. The *realization plan* of β_i is a function $r_i : S_i \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ defined as

$$r_i(s_i) = \prod_{c \in s_i} \beta_i(c),$$

where c is an action in a sequence s_i . This r_i follows (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6).




Figure 3.5: Sequence Form Example

Each $r_i(s_i)$ is a real value that represents the product of the individual decision probabilities of the actions leading to s_i . We now explore the particular properties of this r_i , based on [13]. In a game with perfect recall, every member of an information set $u \in \mathscr{I}_i$ of player *i* has an identical history. Let C_u be the set of actions possible at *u*. Consider a particular sequence s_u , which we call the sequence leading to *u*. An action *c* chosen at this information set extends *u*. This extended sequence is given by

$$s_u c = s_u \cup \{c\} \quad \forall c \in C_u.$$

Since the choices made by the player up until that information set are the same, any nonempty sequence is uniquely specified by its last action *c*. We can now formally define the set of sequences S_i , which has $1 + \sum_{u \in \mathscr{I}_i} |C_u|$ elements;

one for each action in each information set, and one for the empty sequence s_{\emptyset} . Each elemenet in S_i is a particular sequence s. Notice that the number of sequences in a game is at most the number of terminal (payoff) nodes; an LP that considers individual sequences will typically have fewer variables than an LP that considers all possible pure strategies.

Definition 26. The set of sequences S_i is defined as $S_i = \{\emptyset\} \cup \{s_u c \mid u \in \mathscr{I}_i, c \in C_u\}$.

In order to account for the non-terminal decision nodes, the realization plan r_i has the following constraints. The initialization of the game, represented by the empty sequence s_0 , has probability 1. Every game has exactly one of these sequences. That is,

$$r_i(s_\emptyset) = 1 \tag{3.4}$$

Since each behavior strategy is a probability distribution over an information set, we know that $\sum_{c \in C_u} \beta_i(c) = 1$. Therefore, the realization probability of a sequence must equal the sum of the realization probabilities for that sequence extended over all of its possible extending actions *c*. We can think of the probability of reaching a particular sequence as being "distributed" over all of these extending actions. Formally,

$$-r_i(s_u) + \sum_{c \in C_u} r_i(s_u c) = 0 \quad \forall u \in I_i \quad \forall s_u \in S_i.$$
(3.5)

Finally, realization probabilities are non-negative:

$$r_i(s_i) \ge 0 \quad \forall s_i \in \mathcal{S}_i. \tag{3.6}$$

The following proposition links a realization plan with a behavior strategy. Recall that a behavior strategy, as opposed to a mixed strategy, defines a probability distribution over all of the actions in each information set.

Proposition 4. Any realization plan arises from a suitable behavior strategy.

Proof. Consider a realization plan r_i with associated behavior strategy β_i , and an arbitrary information set $u \in I_i$. Define the behavior at u by

$$\beta_i(c) = \frac{r_i(s_u c)}{r_i(s_u)} \quad \forall c \in C_u$$

if $r_i(s_u) > 0$ and arbitrarily such that

$$\sum_{c\in C_u}\beta_i(c)=1$$

if $r_i(s_u) = 0$. By induction on the length of a sequence, we have Definition 25 by definition. Thus, any realization plan arises from a suitable behavior strategy.

Definition 27. Any information set u for which $r_i(s_u) = 0$ in behavior strategy β_i is called *irrelevant*.

A behavior strategy does not prescribe any action over an irrelevant information set because it will never be reached, given earlier prescriptions of the behavior strategy. This will be an important point in Chapters 4 and 5; the sequence form linear programming algorithms output initially surprising results for some information sets. These particular values will be irrelevant, as those information sets cannot be realized under the optimal behavioral strategy.

Mixed strategies can also be represented by a realization plan. Recall that a mixed strategy is a combination of pure strategies with probabilities assigned to each. This mixed strategy has a corresponding set of realization plans that follow Definition 25. However, information is lost in converting a mixed strategy to a realization plan, since the later does not need to cover every possible contingency of the game. It only must cover the sequences and information sets that the player will actually need to choose from with their behavior strategy. Fortunately, the realization plan does retain the strategically relevant aspects.

Definition 28. *A set of mixed strategies are realization equivalent if for any fixed strategies (pure or mixed) of the other players, all of the mixed strategies define the same probabilities for reaching the nodes of the game tree.*

Proposition 5. *Mixed strategies are realization equivalent if and only if they have the same realization plan.*

Corollary 1. For a player with perfect recall, any mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a behavior strategy.

Thus, a realization plan corresponds to a behavior strategy, which in turn corresponds to a mixed strategy. By defining a realization plan for each player, we are essentially describing a mixed strategy.

3.4.1 Linear Programming Theory

We now define the necessary linear programming theory to find the optimal strategy for a two-player zero-sum extensive game with perfect recall,

based on [13]. This game is first converted to sequence form using the theory of the previous section. The sequence form structures are used to build a primal-dual pair of LPs. We want to find a pair of realization plans, which can be converted into behavior strategies. The components of an optimal realization plan are probability distributions over each information set. The sequence form translates to a primal-dual pair of LPs, whose solutions are the optimal realization plans for each player.

This section uses the following notation. The realization plans r_1 and r_2 are denoted as column vectors x and y which have $|S_1|$ and $|S_2|$ entries, respectively. The constraint matrices E and F show that x and y are valid realization plans in accordance with Definition (25), with Ex = e and Fy = f. Here, E and F have $|S_1|$ and $|S_2|$ columns, respectively. They have $1 + |\mathscr{I}_1|$ and $1 + |\mathscr{I}_2|$ rows, respectively. Both e and f are unit vectors of the appropriate dimension. The payoff matrix P has $|S_1|$ rows and $|S_2|$ columns, and individual payoff entries are calculated according to Definition (24). The payoffs are with respect to player 1; in this zero-sum game, player 2's expected payoffs are given by -P. The expected payoff to realization plans x and y are $x^T P y$ and $-x^T P y$ for the respective players.

We first consider an LP to find the best response y of player 2 to a fixed realization plan x of player 1. If player 1 plays according to x, then player 2's best response is the optimal solution to the LP

Maximize:
$$f(y) = -(x^T P)y$$

subject to: $Fy = y$ (3.7)

 $y \ge 0.$

In this LP, player 2 wants to utilize a realization plan y that maximizes his payoff given by $-(x^T P)y$. This realization plan must correspond to a legal set of moves, giving the constraint Fy = y. Finally, since each element of y is a probability, we have $y \ge 0$. We also have the dual of this LP, given by

Minimize:
$$f(q) = q^T f$$

subject to: $q^T F \ge -x^T P$.
(3.8)

The dual variables are given by the vector q, which has $1 + |\mathcal{I}_2|$ elements.

We have an analogous pair of LP's for the best response *x* of player 1 given realization plan *y* for player 2. This finds a realization plan *x* that maximizes player 1's payoff $x^T(Py)$. This *x* must satisfy the constraints $x^TE^T = e^T$ and $x \ge 0$ that define a valid realization plan. The primal is

Maximize:
$$f(x) = x^T (Py)$$

subject to: $x^T E^T = e^T$ (3.9)

 $x \ge 0.$

The dual problem uses the unconstrained vector p, which has $1 + |\mathscr{I}_2|$ elements. It is given by

Minimize:
$$f(p) = e^{T}p$$

subject to: $E^{T}p \ge Py$. (3.10)

These LPs describe algorithms for finding the optimal realization plans of one player, given a particular realization plan of the other. We require an LP that generates the Nash equilibrium strategies, in which each player actively considers the other's strategy. Consider that (3.7) and (3.10) have the same optimal objective function value; that is $x^T(Ay) = e^Tp$. This is the payoff to player 1, given that player 2 uses realization plan y. If y is not fixed and can be varied by player 2, he will try to minimize this payoff. Since this is a zero-sum game, player 2 wants to minimize any payoff he gives to player 1, as this will maximize his own payoff. If we consider that y can vary, it must be subject to the same constraints as (3.9). Thus, player 1's optimal strategy is the solution to the following LP:

Minimize:
$$f(y, p) = e^{T}p$$

subject to: $-Py + E^{T}p \ge 0$
 $Fy = f$
 $y \ge 0.$
(3.11)

Player 2's optimal strategy is the solution to the dual LP, given by

Maximize:
$$f(x,q) - q^T f$$

subject to: $x^T(-P) - q^T F \le 0$
 $x^T E^T = e^T$
 $x \ge 0.$
(3.12)

Theorem 5. The equilibria of a zero sum game with perfect recall are the optimal primal and dual solutions of this sequence form linear program whose size, in sparse representation, is linear in the size of the game tree.

Proof. Consider the primal LP in (3.11) with optimal solution *y*, *p* and the dual LP in (3.12) with optimal solution *x*, *q*. Based on previous discussion, the number of nonzero entries of the payoff matrix *P* and of the constraint matrices *E* and *F* grows linearly with the game tree. By definition, *y* and *p* are feasible solutions to (3.7) and (3.8), respectively. Likewise, *x* and *q* are feasible solutions to (3.9) and (3.10). Multiplying the Fy = f constraint in (3.7) by q^T and the constraint in (3.8) gives

$$q^T f = q^T F y \le -x^T P y. \tag{3.13}$$

For player 1, the same process yields

$$e^T p = x E^T p \ge x^T P y. \tag{3.14}$$

We can combine these expressions as

$$e^T p \ge x^T P y \ge -q^T f. \tag{3.15}$$

The inequality in (3.13) is the Weak Duality Theorem (2). The value of the objective function $x^T P y$ from (3.7) is bounded from above by its dual objective function value $q^T f$ from (3.8). Analogously, (3.14) shows this bound for the primal-dual pair of (3.9) and (3.8) and (3.15) for (3.11) and (3.12). Recall the Strong Duality Theorem (3), which states that a pair of primal/dual solutions are optimal only if the associated objective functions are equal. Applying this to (3.11) and (3.12), we have that $e^T p = -q^T f$. This implies that equality holds in (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15). Thus, *x* is an optimal solution to (3.9) and a best

response to *y*, and vice versa. Therefore, *x* and *y* represent an equilibrium.

For the dual LP, any equilibrium x and y are solutions to (3.7) and (3.9). Then, equality analogously holds in (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15), implying that (3.11) and (3.12) are solved optimally.

CHAPTER 3. GAME THEORY

Chapter 4

Kuhn Poker

In this chapter, we consider the simple game of Kuhn Poker [5]. Developed in 1950 by Harold W. Kuhn as an example of a two-person zero-sum imperfect information game, it is an appropriate starting point in our study of general Nash-optimal poker strategy. We present a graphic version of the extensive form, as well solutions using linear programming methods for both the normal and sequence forms.

4.1 Rules


In Kuhn Poker, there are two players and a deck containing the cards Jack, Queen, and King. No card is repeated. First, each player antes one unit. Each player is then dealt one card, and the player with the highest card wins the pot at showdown, provided neither player has folded. After the random deal, the subsequent betting structure of Kuhn poker is as follows. Player 1 can choose to either bet one unit or check. If player 1 bets, player 2 has the option of calling the bet or folding. If player 1 checks, player 2 can either bet one unit or check. If player 2 bets, player 1 can either call or fold. At this point, if neither has folded, the hand goes to showdown and the player with the highest card wins the total pot [5].

4.2 Extensive Form

Figure 4.1 shows the complete extensive form for Kuhn poker. For more information on the extensive form generally, see Section 3.3. Each node represents a history, and each edge is an available action that progresses the game to a new history. The leaves at the bottom of the tree specify the payoff to player 1 of that particular set of actions and dealt cards. Since this is a zero-sum game, the payoff to player 2 is simply the negative of player 1's payoff. For each edge lower than the results of the deal, a move to the left represents a check or fold and a move to the right represents a bet or call, depending on the situation. Each letter adjacent to an edge labels a sequence and each pair of node colors describes a sample information set, both described in Section 4.4. In contrast to the normal and sequence forms in the following sections, the extensive form depiction does not directly translate to a linear program. This background on the extensive form was found in [1].

4.3 Normal Form

In addition to the extensive form representation of Kuhn poker, we can also describe its **normal form** representation. The theory of the normal form and the associated linear program in this section are modeled on [1]. The normal form shows the payoffs of particular combinations of each player's strategy as an entry of a matrix. We first consider all possible strategy



combinations for each player and particular dealing of the three cards.

4.3.1 Strategies

Recall that a **pure strategy** *s* in a normal form game is a deterministic prescription of the strategy set used by a player in a game. A **mixed strategy** σ is a strategy that assigns a probability to each pure strategy. A pure strategy as a special case of mixed strategy, with all but one strategy having probability zero. A player using a pure strategy would play a game the same way every time, while a player using a mixed strategy would vary their strategy randomly with known distribution. For example, in Kuhn Poker, a (poor) pure strategy would be to always bet as player 1. A mixed strategy would be to always bet while holding a Jack or King, while betting with a Queen half of the time.

Each entry in Figure 4.2 represents a complete pure strategy that player 1 could choose, covering all deals and both betting rounds. The prescribed pure strategy for each held card (J, Q, K) is read from the left, and the comma delineates player 1's first round betting strategy from his second round betting strategy. A **P** represents a check or fold , **B** represents a bet or call, and **O** represents a non-existent move option in player 1's second betting round. Player 1 will use the pass *P* to fold if player 2 has just bet, and to check if player 2 has not just bet. For example, PPB, PPO represents player 1 betting only while holding a King in the first round, and folding all hands if player 2 bets. If player 2 chooses not to bet after we check, the hand goes to showdown; in this case, the second half of the strategy above is irrelevant. Note that there is no prescribed strategy (**O**) for having a King in the second round after

player 2 has bet, since this sequence of actions is impossible if player 1 always bets while holding a King in the first round. Player 2 can only call or fold; player 1 would never face a bet from player 2.

PPP, PPB	PPP, PBB	BPP, OBB
BPP, OPB	BPB, OPO	BPB, OBO
PPB, PPO	PPB, PBO	PBB, POO
PPP, PPP	BPP, OPP	BPP, OBP
BBP, OOP	PBP, POP	PBP, BOP
PPP, BBP	PPP, BPP	PPP, PBP
PPP, BBB	PBB, BOO	PBP, BOB
PPB, BBO	PPB, BPO	PPP, BPB
BBP, OOB	PBB, POO	PBP, POB

Figure 4.2: Player 1's pure strategies in Kuhn Poker

These pure strategies are found by manually generating every possible (legal) combination of actions for player 1, including all possible cards held and betting opportunities. Player 1 can hold any of three potential cards, and will encounter up to two rounds of betting for each. Thus, each pure strategy must define what he will do with each card in each betting opportunity. A unique feature to player 1's pure strategies in Kuhn Poker is that he will not always have a second opportunity to bet; this only occurs when he checks and player 2 bets. Thus, any pure strategy that bets with a particular card first need not prescribe an action for this non-existent second round. This is a feature unique to pure strategies in the normal form of a game; in the extensive form, pure strategies must specify an action for every possible contingency. The pure strategies show in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 represent all possible combinations of betting actions for each player.

Player 1 has 27 pure strategies, and player 2 has 64 pure strategies. Each **B**

PPB,PPB	BPB,PPB	PPB,PBB	BPB,PBB	
PPP,PPP	BBP,BPP	PPP,PPB	PPP,BPB	PPB,BBB
BPP,PPP	BPB,BPP	BPP,PPB	BPP,BPB	PBB,PPB
PBP,PPP	PBB,BPP	PBP,PPB	PBP,BPB	BBP,PBB
PPB,PPP	BBB,BPP	BBP,PPB	BBP,BPB	PBB,PBB
BBP,PPP	PPP,PBP	PPP,BBP	PPP,PBB	BBB,PBB
BPB,PPP	BPP,PBP	BPP,BBP	BPP,PBB	BBB,PPB
PBB,PPP	PBP,PBP	PBP,BBP	PBP,PBB	BPB,BPB
BBB,PPP	PPB,PBP	PPB,BBP	PPP,BBB	BPB,BBB
PPP,BPP	BBP,PBP	BBP,BBP	BPP,BBB	PBB,BPB
BPP,BPP	BPB,PBP	BPB,BBP	PBP,BBB	PBB,BBB
PBP,BPP	PBB,PBP	PBB,BBP	BBP,BBB	BBB,BPB
PPB,BPP	BBB,PBP	BBB,BBP	PPB,BPB	BBB,BBB

Figure 4.3: Player 2's pure strategies in Kuhn Poker

and **P** entry has the same meaning, and the comma separates the actions that player 2 will take after player 1 checks from when player 1 bets. The letters to the left of the comma prescribe strategy for when player 1 has just checked, and to the right for when he has just bet. Note that since none of player 2's betting actions are dependent on his own previous actions, all combinations of bets are defined for each round. For example, PPB, PPB represents player 2 always calling or betting while holding a King, and checking or folding otherwise.

The strategy sets S_1 and S_2 contain as elements each of the strategies shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. A particular strategy $s \in S_1$ is an element in the set; for example **PPP**, **PPB**. An action within a strategy $a \in s$ is a particular prescription for a player's action when faced with a particular situation. For example, many strategies prescribe that player 1 bet while holding a King in the first round of betting. Note that many actions are common to multiple strategies, such as this example. Each player in Kuhn Poker has many weakly dominated strategies, which typically stem from a particular action *a* that is never advantageous to do. Since the purpose of our analysis is to determine the optimal strategy for each player, we can ignore these weakly dominated strategies. These can be identified intuitively. For example, we can eliminate all of player 1's strategies involving folding a King after player 2 has bet. Player 1 will always win at showdown with that hand, and gives up their ante by folding. Thus, those strategies are weakly dominated by all others. We also eliminate any player 1 strategy that calls a bet with a Jack, bets in the first round with a Queen, as well as any player 2 strategy that prescribes a bet with a Queen after player 1 has passed. In these last two cases, the player has nothing to gain by betting with a Queen; the opposing player will always pass with a worse hand (a Jack) and bet with a better hand (a King). In each case, the payoff expectation is at least as great if the player passes while holding a Queen. The bolded strategies in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 represent the non-weakly dominated strategies.

4.3.2 Payoffs

In order to find the Nash equilibria of Kuhn poker, we must first calculate the payoffs for the entire strategy set. This corresponds to the normal form representation, shown in (4.1). This matrix represents the payoffs to player 1 for each pair of pure strategies employed, with player 1 as the row player and player 2 as the column player. The value in each matrix entry is the overall payoff of the game to player 1; since this is a zero-sum game, the payoffs to player 2 are simply the corresponding negatives. Each matrix entry is the sum

	PPB,PPB	BPB,PPB	PPB,PBB	BPB,PBB		
РРР,РРВ	0	-1	0	-1		
РРР,РВВ	-1	1	-1	1		
BPP,OBB	0	2	-3	-1		
BPP,OPB	1	0	-2	-3	= P	(4.1)
BPB,OPO	1	-1	-1	-3		(4.1)
BPB,OBO	0	1	-2	-1		
PPB,PPO	0	-2	1	-1		
РРВ,РВО	1	0	0	1		

of all payoff values over the 6 potential deals, {(*JQ*), (*JK*), (*QJ*), (*QK*), (*KJ*), (*KQ*)}.

Player 1's Optimal Strategy 4.3.3

Using the normal form representation, we can use linear programming to determine an optimal strategy for each player. We define a normal form mixed strategy vector σ_i as a row vector with *m* elements, where *m* is the number of non weakly-dominated pure strategies for player *i*. We wish to find the optimal distribution of all pure strategies for each player. For Kuhn Poker, we have

$$\sigma_1 = \begin{pmatrix} a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h \end{pmatrix}$$
$$\sigma_2 = \begin{pmatrix} q & r & s & t \end{pmatrix},$$

where each entry represents a strategy for the respective players, as shown in payoff matrix *P*. Let σ_{1*} and σ_{2*} be Nash-optimal strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively. Note that these could be either pure or mixed strategies. Then,

 σ_{1*}^k is the probability that player 1 will play a particular pure strategy *k*. Note that the sum of all of the pure strategy probabilities must sum to 1;

$$\sum_{k} \sigma_{1*}^{k} = 1 , \sum_{k} \sigma_{2*}^{k} = 1.$$
(4.2)

For example, a valid pure strategy for player 1 would be

$$\sigma_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

and a valid mixed strategy for player 2 would be

$$\sigma_2 = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{2} & 0 & \frac{1}{2} & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

This particular σ_1 denotes always employing **PPP,PBB**, and σ_2 denotes employing **PPB,PPB** and **PPB,PBB** with equal frequency. Note that in both cases the entries of σ sum to 1, as per (4.2).

Let *M* as the normal form payoff matrix *P* with a constant of 4 added to each entry to make each positive. Define z^* as the expected value of the game with payoff matrix *P*, and *z* as the expected value of the game with payoff matrix *M*. Both *z* and z^* are from player 1's perspective. The reason for this modification of *P* will soon become clear; in short, it allows us to define necessary sign restrictions on our LP. This does not change the optimal strategy, as it holds the relative payoffs between the two players constant. However, the optimal objective function value *z* that we find in the LP will differ from the true expected value of the game z^* . We later find z^* through a different method; the purpose of this analysis is to find the probabilities

	PPB,PPB	BPB,PPB	PPB,PBB	BPB,PBB		
РРР,РРВ	4	3	4	3		
РРР,РВВ	3	5	3	5		
BPP,OBB	4	6	1	3		
BPP,OPB	5	4	2	1	= M	(4.3)
BPB,OPO	5	3	3	1	111	(1.0)
BPB,OBO	4	5	2	3		
PPB,PPO	4	5	2	3		
PPB,PBO	3	4	4	5)	

assigned to each pure strategy in an optimal mixed strategy.

Since σ_{1*} and σ_{2*} are the optimal strategies for each player and *M* is the payoff matrix for each combination of those strategies, we have

$$\sigma_{1*}M\sigma_{2*}^T = z. (4.4)$$

That is, the payoff *z* is the matrix product of each player's mixed strategy σ with the payoff matrix *P*. Player 1's optimal strategy σ_{1*} will maximize the minimum of *z* against any of player 2's pure strategies. Since player 1 does not know in advance the counter-strategy that player 2 will use, he wants to employ a strategy that gives the best worst-case scenario payoff. An arbitrary strategy of player 1 will have at best expected payoff *z* against an arbitrary strategy σ_2 ;

$$\sigma_1 M \sigma_2^T \le z. \tag{4.5}$$

In building our LP model, we consider the 4 pure strategies of player 2. These are represented by the vectors

$$\sigma_{2} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
(4.6)

respectively, for each of the strategies denoted by the columns in (4.1) and (4.3). We then find $\sigma_1 M \sigma_2$ for each σ_2 , and combine these four sums with the upper bound of *z* from (4.5). This gives the constraints

$$4a + 3b + 4c + 5d + 5e + 4f + 4g + 3h \le z$$

$$3a + 5b + 6c + 4d + 3e + 5f + 2g + 4h \le z$$

$$4a + 3b + c + 2d + 3e + 2f + 5g + 4h \le z$$

$$3a + 5b + 3c + d + e + 3f + 3g + 5h \le z.$$

(4.7)

Dividing by *z*, we have

$$\frac{4a}{z} + \frac{3b}{z} + \frac{4c}{z} + \frac{5d}{z} + \frac{5e}{z} + \frac{4f}{z} + \frac{4g}{z} + \frac{3h}{z} \le 1$$

$$\frac{3a}{z} + \frac{5b}{z} + \frac{6c}{z} + \frac{4d}{z} + \frac{3e}{z} + \frac{5f}{z} + \frac{2g}{z} + \frac{4h}{z} \le 1$$

$$\frac{4a}{z} + \frac{3b}{z} + \frac{c}{z} + \frac{2d}{z} + \frac{3e}{z} + \frac{2f}{z} + \frac{5g}{z} + \frac{4h}{z} \le 1$$

$$\frac{3a}{z} + \frac{5b}{z} + \frac{3c}{z} + \frac{d}{z} + \frac{e}{z} + \frac{3f}{z} + \frac{3g}{z} + \frac{5h}{z} \le 1.$$
(4.8)

Then, define i, j, \ldots, p as

$$i = \frac{a}{z}, j = \frac{b}{z}, \dots, p = \frac{h}{z}.$$
 (4.9)

Since each *a*, *b*, ..., *h* are probabilities, they are all non-negative. Since we modified the payoff matrix *P* to have strictly positive entries in *M*, we know that z > 0. This gives the sign restrictions $i \ge 0, j \ge 0, ..., p \ge 0$. Combining (4.8) and (4.9), we have

$$\begin{aligned} 4i + 3j + 4k + 5l + 5m + 4n + 4o + 3p &\leq 1\\ 3i + 5j + 6k + 4l + 3m + 5n + 2o + 4p &\leq 1\\ 4i + 3j + k + 2l + 3m + 2n + 5o + 4p &\leq 1\\ 3i + 5j + 3k + l + m + 3n + 3o + 5p &\leq 1. \end{aligned}$$
(4.10)

From 4.4, we know that $a + b + \ldots + h = 1$. Thus, we have

$$\frac{a}{z} + \frac{b}{z} + \dots + \frac{h}{z} = \frac{1}{z} \implies i + j + \dots + p = \frac{1}{z}.$$
 (4.11)

Maximizing i + j + ... + p would minimize z, which is player 1's goal. By combining this objective function with the constraints and sign restrictions, we have player 1's LP,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Minimize: } z &= i + j + k + l + m + n + o + p \\ \text{subject to: } 4i + 3j + 4k + 5l + 5m + 4n + 4o + 3p \leq 1 \\ &\quad 3i + 5j + 6k + 4l + 3m + 5n + 2o + 4p \leq 1 \\ &\quad 4i + 3j + k + 2l + 3m + 2n + 5o + 4p \leq 1 \\ &\quad 3i + 5j + 3k + l + m + 3n + 3o + 5p \leq 1 \\ &\quad i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

$$(4.12)$$

Observe that without the sign restrictions, each variable could be arbitrarily small; since this is a minimization problem, we would have an unbounded LP. The modification of the payoff matrix from *P* to *M* was necessary to guarantee that z > 0, which allows us to define the appropriate sign restrictions. A solution to this LP corresponds to an optimal σ_1 *. Using the Simplex method, we find that there are infinitely many optimal solutions to this LP, all with $z = \frac{3}{11}$. One such solution is $j = \frac{1}{11}$, $n = \frac{2}{33}$, $o = \frac{4}{33}$, with all other variables equal to 0. Since

$$\sigma_{1*} = \begin{pmatrix} a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} iz & jz & kz & lz & mz & nz & oz & pz \end{pmatrix}, \quad (4.13)$$

we can solve these equations to find an optimal strategy for player 1, in terms of his potential pure strategies. This mixed strategy is $b = \frac{1}{3}$, $f = \frac{2}{9}$, $g = \frac{4}{9}$, and is given by $\sigma_{1*} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \frac{1}{3} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \frac{2}{9} & \frac{4}{9} & 0 \end{pmatrix}$. Note that the sum of the entries in s_{1*} is 1, as required by (4.4). These values represent the probabilities of player 1 using each of his pure strategies. He will use pure strategy *PPP*, *PPB* with

probability $\frac{1}{3}$, *BPB*, *OBO* with probability $\frac{2}{9}$, and *PPB*, *PPO* with probability $\frac{4}{9}$. This corresponds to the following mixed strategy. In the first betting round, Player 1 will bet with probability $\frac{2}{9}$ with a Jack, always pass with a Queen, and bet with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ with a King. On the second betting round for player 1, he should always fold a Jack facing a bet, call with a Queen with probability $\frac{5}{9}$, and always call with a King. The other optimal solutions prescribe a similar strategy; player 1 should vary bluffing with a Jack and slowplaying with a King. In poker, slowplaying involves checking with a good hand to induce the other player to bluff with a poor hand.

4.3.4 Player 2's Optimal Strategy

We can also compute the Nash equilibria strategy for player 2, using a similar Minimax LP method. Working from (4.4), we determine the optimal strategy σ_{1*} given any σ_{2*} . The pure strategies for player 2 are given by the columns in matrix *P*, and are abbreviated as *u*, *v*, *w*, *x* respectively. Player 2's optimal strategy minimizes the maximum of *z* against any of player 1's pure strategies. This LP is the dual of (4.12),

Maximize:
$$z = u + v + w + x$$

subject to: $4u + 3v + 4w + 3x \le 1$
 $3u + 5v + 3w + 5x \le 1$
 $4u + 6v + 1w + 3x \le 1$
 $5u + 4v + 2w + x \le 1$
 $5u + 3v + 3w + x \le 1$
 $4u + 5v + 2w + 3x \le 1$
 $4u + 2v + 5w + 3x \le 1$
 $3u + 4v + 4w + 5x \le 1$
 $u, v, w, x \ge 0$

where $u = \frac{q}{z}$, $v = \frac{r}{z}$, $w = \frac{s}{z}$, and $x = \frac{t}{z}$. This LP has a unique optimal solution, $u = \frac{2}{11}$, $x = \frac{1}{11}$, and $z = \frac{3}{11}$. This optimal solution corresponds to

$$\sigma_{2*} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{2}{3} & 0 & 0 & \frac{1}{3} \end{pmatrix}.$$
(4.15)

These values prescribe the probability with which player 2 should utilize each of his pure strategies. He should use *PPB*, *PPB* with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ and *BPB*, *PBB* with probability $\frac{1}{3}$. This optimal σ_{2*} corresponds to a strategy as follows. When holding a Jack, player 2 should always fold when facing a bet and bet with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ if player 1 checks. With a Queen, they should call a bet with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ and always check when facing a check from player 1. When holding a King, they should always call when facing a bet or bet when player 1 checks.

Now that we have the optimal strategies s_{1*} and s_{2*} , we can find the expected value of the game for both the original payoff matrix P and the modified matrix M. This z^* is the expected value of the game to player 1, if each player utilizes strategy. For the original case, we have

$$6z = \sigma_{1*}P\sigma_{2*}^{T}$$

$$= \left(0 \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad \frac{2}{9} \quad \frac{4}{9} \quad 0\right) \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & -1 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 & -3 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 & -2 & -3 \\ 1 & -1 & -1 & -3 \\ 0 & 1 & -2 & -1 \\ 0 & -2 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{2}{3} \\ 0 \\ \frac{1}{3} \end{pmatrix}$$

$$= -\frac{1}{3}.$$

$$(4.16)$$

Since $6z = -\frac{1}{3}$, this implies that $z = -\frac{1}{18}$.

For the modified payoff matrix case,

$$6z + 4 = \sigma_{1*}M\sigma_{2*}^{T}$$

$$= \left(0 \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad 0 \quad \frac{2}{9} \quad \frac{4}{9} \quad 0\right) \begin{pmatrix}4 & 3 & 4 & 3\\ 3 & 5 & 3 & 5\\ 4 & 6 & 1 & 3\\ 5 & 4 & 2 & 1\\ 5 & 3 & 3 & 1\\ 4 & 5 & 2 & 3\\ 4 & 2 & 5 & 3\\ 3 & 4 & 4 & 5\end{pmatrix} (4.17)$$

$$= \frac{11}{3}.$$

Since $6z = -\frac{1}{3}$, this implies that $z = -\frac{1}{18}$. In both cases, we divide the matrix product by 6 to find the average payoff over all 6 possible card combinations. In the modified payoff matrix *M* case, we also subtract 4 from the *z* value. This corrects for the 4 that we added to each entry. Note that the optimal *z*-value is identical in both cases; this shows modifying the payoff matrix in this way has no effect on the optimal solution. Player 1 can expect to lose an average of $\frac{1}{18}$ of a betting unit to player 2 in each hand of Kuhn Poker, provided that both players play their optimal strategies. If either plays a non-optimal strategy, this expectation will change.

4.4 Sequence Form

The normal form representation provides a succinct correspondence with an LP, particularly for small games. However, this model quickly becomes intractable for large games. While the normal form payoff matrix is generally exponential with the size of the game tree, growth in the sequence form is at most linear [13]. As such, the sequence form representation is more appropriate for larger games. This difference is not as apparent in the sequence form representation of Kuhn Poker, as it is a relatively small game. This will become more apparent in Chapter 5, when we consider a much larger game. This section applies the theory of Section 3.4 to Kuhn Poker. We define and solve linear programs to find the optimal strategies (as realization plans) for each player.

4.4.1 Sequences and Information Sets

Recall that a fundamental concept in the sequence form representation is the information set. An information set in an imperfect information game is a set of possible game states that are identical from the point of view of a particular player. In Kuhn Poker, an information set for a player consists in knowing what card they hold as well as the betting sequence thus far in the hand. They do not know what card their opponent holds. Since there is hidden information throughout the game, there are multiple elements in each information set. Note that distinct elements in an information set can represent very different positions on the game tree. Different nodes represent distinct positions on the game tree, but nodes in the same information set are identical from that player's perspective.

In Figure 4.4, the pair of red nodes is an information set. They represent an information set for player 1 where they know that they hold a Jack, and no betting has taken place thus far. Player 1 has identical pieces of information but his place on the game tree is different, as player 2 holds different cards. Note that a player must have an identical strategy across all nodes in his information set; they have no way to strategically distinguish elements of an information set, and must play uniformly across all. Kuhn Poker is an example of an extensive form game with imperfect information and perfect recall.




Figure 4.4: Subtree of Kuhn Poker

Sequences represent an intermediate move within the game tree, as opposed to a full path from the root to a payoff leaf. For example, the sequence x_a of player 1 only defines the action of checking while holding a Jack in the first betting round. Each lettered edge in Figure 4.1 represents a sequence. Note that each player in Kuhn Poker has a unique set of sequences, given by

$$S_0 = \{s_{\emptyset}\},$$
$$S_1 = \bigcup_{i=a}^{l} s_i,$$
$$S_2 = \bigcup_{i=m}^{x} s_i,$$

The S_0 set represents the chance player, who initializes the game at the root by generating a random deal of the cards for each player.

4.4.2 Payoffs

We now turn our attention to defining the payoff matrix *P* in the sequence form representation of Kuhn Poker. Since the payoffs at each leaf are unique to their preceding sequences, the payoff function *g* is well defined. There are at most as many sequences as nodes for a particular player, so the number of sequences is linear in the size of the game tree. Since the number of nonzero entries of this matrix is at most the number of sequences of player *i*, this matrix is sparse. Most entries will be 0, as they represent combinations of sequences that are not possible and have no associated payoff [13]. Consider $g(s_{\emptyset}, s_a, s_o) = 0$; this defines the payoff to player 1 checking while holding a Jack and player 2 betting while holding a Queen after player 1 has bet. Since this combination is not possible, the payoff is 0. Examining Figure 4.1, we can see that most combinations of sequences *s* are impossible and are assigned a payoff of 0 by default.

In Kuhn Poker, we consider $g(s_{\emptyset}, s_1, s_2)$ to be the payoff to player 1 from




Figure 4.5: Payoff function example, with $g(s_{\emptyset}, s_a, s_m) = -1$ shown in blue.

arbitrary sequence $s_1 \in S_1$ and $s_2 \in S_2$. Since this is a zero-sum game, the payoff to player 2 is simply $-g(s_0, s_1, s_2)$. For example, we have $g(s_0, s_a, s_m) = -1$. This represents player 1 holding a Jack and checking, followed by player 2 checking while holding a Queen. The hand would then go to showdown, and player 2 would win player 1's ante. This is shown in blue Figure 4.5.

We now define the payoff matrix *P*, which represents the payoff from player 1's perspective for each combination of sequences played. Since this is a zero-sum game, the payoffs from player 2's perspective for each combination of sequences is simply -P. For the realization plans *x* and *y*, the payoffs to each player are $x^T P y$ and $-xPy^T$, where *P* is a $|S_1| \times |S_2|$ matrix. Each entry in *P* is given by

$$\sum_{s_0 \in S_0} g(s_0, s_1, s_2) r_0(s_0).$$

Each entry in *P* can be computed as follows. Consider a triple of sequences (s_0, s_1, s_2) that corresponds to a payoff leaf on the game tree. This payoff

 $g_1(s_0, s_1, s_2)$ is multiplied by $r_0(s_0)$, which represents the chance probabilities on the path to the leaf. In the case of Kuhn Poker, our chance node representing the random deal of the cards takes each branch (a particular deal) with probability $\frac{1}{6}$. This product is added to the initial zero matrix at position s_1 , s_2 . Any combination s_1 , s_2 of sequences that does not correspond to a legal sequence of moves and has no payoff leaf has a 0 in its corresponding entry. Since most combinations of sequences are not possible, the resulting matrix is sparse. It will have at most as many non-zero entries as leaves of the game tree.

Consider the matrix entry $P_{am} = -\frac{1}{6}$. To calculate this, we first observe that the payoff of the sequence combination s_a and s_m is -1. We then multiply this value by the probability that the players will have an opportunity to play these sequences. That is, we consider the chance node outcomes necessary. The random deal of the cards represents the only chance node. This sequence combination can only occur if player 1 is dealt a Jack and player 2 is dealt a Queen, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{6}$. We multiply this by the direct payoff of -1 to find $P_{am} = -\frac{1}{6}$. All of the other entries in P are calculated by the same method; the complete payoff matrix P for player 1 is shown in (4.18).

	θ	т	п	0	р	q	r	S	t	и	υ	w	x		
θ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
а	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
b	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	0		
С	0	0	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0		
d	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$		
е	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0		
f	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$	= P	(4.18)
g	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	0	0	0		
h	0	0	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	0	0	0		
i	0	0	0	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0		
j	0	0	0	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	$\frac{2}{3}$	0	0		
k	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$-\frac{1}{6}$	0	0		
1	0	0	$\frac{1}{3}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	$\frac{2}{3}$	0	0		

4.4.3 Strategy Constraint Matrices and Realization Plans

The final structures necessary to construct the sequence form LPs for Kuhn Poker specify the legal ways to play the game. We define the vectors x and y to be realization plans with $|S_1| = |S_2| = 13$ entries each, for each sequence of the respective players. Each entry in x and y corresponds to a particular sequence s of the respective players, which are the rows and column heading in (4.18).The two strategy constraint matrices E and F, which define x and y as realization plans. The vectors p and q, which represent the dual variables in each LP; they have $1 + |\mathscr{I}_1|$ and $1 + |\mathscr{I}_2|$ entries respectively. Finally, we have vectors *e* and *f*, which are unit vectors of an appropriate dimension that satisfy Ex = e and Fy = y. These elements are based on the properties of realization plans in (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6).

The strategy constraint matrices *E* and *F* define the legal combinations of sequences that each player can choose. The dimensions of *E* and *F* are $(1 + |\mathscr{I}_1|) \times |\mathcal{S}_1|$ and $(1 + |\mathscr{I}_2|) \times |\mathcal{S}_2|$. Since each player has 6 information sets and 13 sequences, both matrices are 7 × 13. Each row in these matrices represent a particular information set, and each column represents a particular sequence. The fact that both matrices are the same size is a coincidence based on the structure of Kuhn Poker, as both player 1 and player 2 happen to have 6 information sets and 12 sequences. The first row in *E* and *F* represents the 0th information set corresponding to the random deal, and the first column represents the sequence s_{\emptyset} of the random deal.

These matrices can be constructed as follows. We place a 1 in this first entry to initialize the game. For each subsequent information set row, we place a -1 in the sequence that is required to happen before the player is in the information set. Then, we place a 1 in each sequence in the information set. For example, sequence s_a must occur before player 1 can be in information set 4 where he can choose to play sequence *g* or *h*. Since the previous "move" for player 2 is the random deal θ , each information set row in *F* initializes with a -1 at θ . Using this process, we have *E* and *F* as shown in (4.19) and (4.20).

	θ	а	b	С	d	ť	е	f	8	h	i	j	k	1		
0	1	0	0	0	0	()	0	0	0	0	0	0	0)		
1	-1	1	1	0	0	()	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
2	-1	0	0	1	1	()	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
3	-1	0	0	0	0	-	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	= <i>E</i>	(4.19)
4	0	-1	0	0	0	()	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		
5	0	0	0	-1	0	()	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		
6	0	0	0	0	0	_	-1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1)		
		0			_		-		_	,						
		θ	т	п	0	р	q	r	S	t	и	v	w	x	`	
	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	1	-1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	2	-1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	3	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	= F	(4.20)
	4	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		
	5	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		
	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1)	

4.4.4 Player 2's Optimal Strategy

We now have all of the necessary theory and structures to write the sequence form representation of Kuhn Poker. Recall from Section 3.4.1 that

player 2's optimal realization plan is the solution to

Minimize:
$$f(x,q) = -q^T f$$

subject to: $x^T(-P) - q^T F \le 0$
 $x^T E^T = e^T$
 $x \ge 0.$
(4.21)

With the structures defined in the previous sections, our LP is

Minimize: q_0

subject to:
$$q_0 - q_1 - q_2 - q_3 \ge 0$$

 $\frac{1}{6}x_m + \frac{1}{6}x_r + q_2 - q_4 \ge 0$
 $-\frac{1}{6}x_0 + \frac{1}{3}x_p - \frac{1}{6}x_s + \frac{1}{3}x_t + q_1 \ge 0$
 $\frac{1}{6}x_q - \frac{1}{6}x_u + q_2 - q_5 \ge 0$
 $-\frac{1}{6}x_s + \frac{1}{3}x_t - \frac{1}{6}x_w - \frac{1}{3}x_x + q_2 \ge 0$
 $-\frac{1}{6}x_m - \frac{1}{6}x_u + q_3 - q_6 \ge 0$
 $-\frac{1}{6}x_o - \frac{1}{3}x_p - \frac{1}{6}x_w - \frac{1}{3}x_x + q_3 \ge 0$
 $\frac{1}{6}x_n + \frac{1}{6}x_r + q_4 \ge 0$
 $\frac{1}{3}x_n + \frac{1}{3}x_r + q_4 \ge 0$
 $\frac{1}{6}x_r + \frac{1}{6}x_v + q_5 \ge 0$
 $\frac{1}{3}x_r - \frac{1}{3}x_v + q_5 \ge 0$

$$\frac{1}{6}x_{n} + \frac{1}{6}x_{v} + q_{6} \ge 0$$

$$-\frac{1}{3}x_{n} - \frac{1}{3}x_{v} + q_{6} \ge 0$$

$$x_{\emptyset} = 1$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{m} + x_{n} = 0$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{o} + x_{p} = 0$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{q} + x_{r} = 0$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{s} + x_{t} = 0$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{u} + x_{v} = 0$$

$$-x_{\emptyset} + x_{w} + x_{x} = 0.$$

Using Mathematica's built-in LP solvers, we find the optimal solution

$$x_{0} = 1 x_{m} = 1 x_{n} = 0 x_{o} = \frac{2}{3} x_{p} = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$x_{q} = 0 x_{r} = 1 x_{s} = 0 x_{t} = 1 x_{u} = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$x_{v} = \frac{1}{3} x_{w} = 1 x_{x} = 0 q_{0} = -\frac{1}{18} q_{1} = -\frac{1}{3}$$

$$q_{2} = -\frac{1}{9} q_{3} = \frac{7}{18} q_{4} = -\frac{1}{6} q_{5} = -\frac{2}{9} q_{6} = \frac{1}{9}.$$
(4.23)

This optimal realization plan directly corresponds to an optimal behavioral strategy. Each optimal *x* value corresponds to the frequency with which player 2 should utilize the corresponding sequence *s*. For each information set, the *x* values represent a probability distribution. For example, consider the optimal values $x_a = 1$ and $x_b = 0$. These values correspond to the sequence s_a and s_b , which represent player 2's choice of checking or betting when holding a Queen, after player 1 has checked on the first betting round. In this optimal

strategy, player 2 should always choose sequence s_a . This makes intuitive sense; if player 2 bets in this situation, player 1 will always call the bet when holding a King, and fold when holding a Jack. In both cases, player 2 is better off choosing not to bet. The action of player 2 betting while holding a Queen after player 1 has checked to him is an example of a weakly-dominated action.

This solution does not prescribe a pure strategy for every information set; instead, optimal strategy sometimes prescribes a mix of actions. For example, consider $x_c = \frac{2}{3}$ and $x_d = \frac{1}{3}$. The corresponding sequences represent player 2's betting choice when holding a Queen, and player 1 has just bet. Optimal strategy dictates that player 2 should pass with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ and bet with probability $\frac{1}{3}$. The non-deterministic strategy in that information set means that the optimal strategy for player 2 is a mixed strategy.

In addition to describing the optimal strategy for player 2, the solution to this LP also shows the value of Kuhn Poker from player 1's perspective. The value of the game is the optimal objective function value, which in this case is simply $q_0 = -\frac{1}{18}$. Note that this is identical to the optimal *z* value found using the normal form LPs. In each hand of Kuhn Poker, player 1 can expect to lose $\frac{1}{18}$ of a betting unit. Note that this is player 1's expectation only if both players utilize their Nash optimal strategies; if either deviate, his expectation can change significantly. It is not surprising that optimally-played Kuhn poker inherently favors player 2; it is well known that players who act after their opponent hold an advantage. This is a concept known as "position", and is particularly important in poker variants with more rounds of betting.

4.4.5 Player 1's Optimal Strategy

To find the optimal strategy for player 1, we solve the dual of player 2's LP. This LP is given by

Minimize:
$$f(y, p) = e^{T}p$$

subject to: $-Py + E^{t}p \ge 0$
 $Fy = f$
 $y \ge 0.$
(4.24)

This corresponds to the following LP, where each *y* corresponds to a particular sequence *s*,

subject to: $p_{0} - p_{1} - p_{2} - p_{3} - p_{4} - p_{5} - p_{6} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{6}y_{a} + \frac{1}{6}y_{e} + p_{1} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{6}y_{g} - \frac{1}{3}y_{h} - \frac{1}{6}y_{o} + \frac{1}{3}y_{p} + p_{1} \ge 0$ $\frac{1}{6}y_{b} + \frac{1}{6}y_{f} + p_{2} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{3}y_{b} + \frac{1}{3}y_{f} + p_{2} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{6}y_{a} - \frac{1}{6}y_{c} + p_{3} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{6}y_{g} - \frac{1}{3}y_{h} - \frac{1}{6}y_{k} - \frac{1}{3}y_{l} + p_{3} \ge 0$ $\frac{1}{6}y_{b} + \frac{1}{6}y_{d} + p_{4} \ge 0$ $-\frac{1}{3}y_{b} - \frac{1}{3}y_{d} + p_{4} \ge 0$

Maximize $-p_0$

$$\frac{1}{6}y_{c} + \frac{1}{6}y_{e} + p_{5} \ge 0$$

$$-\frac{1}{6}y_{k} + \frac{1}{3}y_{l} - \frac{1}{6}y_{o} + \frac{1}{3}y_{p} + p_{5} \ge 0$$

$$\frac{1}{6}y_{d} + \frac{1}{6}y_{f} + p_{6} \ge 0$$

$$\frac{1}{3}y_{d} + \frac{1}{3}y_{f} + p_{6} \ge 0$$

$$y_{\emptyset} = 1$$

$$-y_{\emptyset} + y_{a} + y_{b} = 0$$

$$-y_{\emptyset} + y_{c} + y_{d} = 0$$

$$-y_{\emptyset} + y_{c} + y_{f} = 0$$

$$-y_{a} + y_{g} + y_{h} = 0$$

$$-y_{c} + y_{k} + y_{l} = 0$$

$$-y_{e} + y_{o} + y_{p} = 0.$$

While player 2 has a single optimal strategy, player 1 has infinitely many optimal strategies. Mathematica's Linear Programming function has three optional methods to compute numerical solutions, Simplex, Revised Simplex, and Interior Point. The first two methods compute the endpoint solutions, while Interior Point finds the midpoint solution. With these methods, we can characterize all possible optimal strategies. These are reported as behavior strategies with a probability distribution defined on each information set. The value of each *y* is the probability that player 1 should utilize the corresponding sequence *s* when in the relevant information set. The particular *p* values are unimportant in this analysis. These results are shown in Table 4.1.

As these results demonstrate, player 1 has infinitely many optimal

	Simplex	Interior Point	Revised Simplex
y_{\emptyset}	1	1	1
y_a	1	<u>5</u> 6	<u>2</u> 3
y_b	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
y_c	1	1	1
y_d	0	0	0
y_e	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
y_f	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
y_g	1	<u>5</u> 6	$\frac{2}{3}$
y_h	0	0	0
y_i	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
y_j	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
y_k	0	0	0
y_l	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
p_0	$-\frac{1}{18}$	$-\frac{1}{18}$	$-\frac{1}{18}$
p_1	0	$-\frac{1}{18}$	$-\frac{1}{9}$
p_2	0	$\frac{1}{9}$	<u>2</u> 9
p_3	$-\frac{7}{18}$	$-\frac{7}{18}$	$-\frac{7}{18}$
p_4	0	$-\frac{1}{18}$	$-\frac{1}{9}$
p_5	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{6}$
p_6	0	$\frac{421}{5000}$	$\frac{1}{6}$

Table 4.1: Solutions to Player 1's LP

strategies. Since the Simplex and Revised Simplex solutions represent the endpoint solutions, all intermediate solutions are also optimal. We can characterize player 1's optimal strategies as dependent on a parameter $\alpha \in [0, \frac{1}{3}]$, which is the probability that they will bet on their first turn while holding a Jack. When holding a King, player 1 should bet with probability 3α on their first turn. When holding a Queen, player 1 should always check on their first betting round. If player 2 bets after this check, player 1 should call the bet with probability $\alpha + \frac{1}{3}$. Finally, player 1 should always fold a Jack and call with a King when facing a bet from player 2.

Unlike player 1's LP solution (4.1), player 2's LP solution does not correspond neatly to a behavioral strategy. Recall that the optimal values calculated by the sequence form LP describe a **realization plan**, which are relative to the **realization probability** of an information set. Consider that player 1 will not always have a second choice to bet; this only occurs when he checks and player 2 bets. There are many other paths down the game tree that do not involve these moves, such as both players checking or player 2 folding to player 1's bet. Since player 2 always faces a decision to check, bet, or fold regardless of player 1's action, the sum of each pair of sequences s for each information set is 1. The same is not true for player 1, who will not always get to play sequences s_g through s_l . Consider the optimal $y_a = \frac{5}{6}$ in the Interior Point solution ($\alpha = \frac{1}{6}$). Since player 1's potential later choice between s_g and s_l is dependent on him also playing s_a , $y_g + y_l = \frac{5}{6}$ in the solution to the LP. We use a similar process to convert each of the values in the realization plan to a full behavioral strategy. In a sense, the probability of the base sequence $(y_a = \frac{5}{6})$ becomes the new "1" for its subsequent sequences further down the game tree. In player 1's optimal realization plan, some sequences will never be used. Consider the sequences s_k and s_l , both with realization probability 0 in the Revised Simplex solution. Both are members of the same information set, in which player 1 was dealt a King, checked initially, and now faces a bet from player 2. However, he will never reach this information set if he plays according to other elements of his optimal realization plan. In the Revised Simplex solution, $y_e = 0$; that is, he never checks initially while holding a King. Since s_e is necessary for both s_k and s_l , he will never face the choice. Therefore, an optimal realization plan does not have to specify frequencies for these actions. Table 4.2 shows the optimal realization plan converted to an optimal behavior strategy as above, with *** denoting sequences that are never reached.

The Simplex solution represents the case $\alpha = 0$. In this case, player 1 always checks in the first round; that is, $y_a = y_c = y_e = 1$ and $y_b = y_d = y_f = 0$. Since he chooses to never bluff (by betting when holding a Jack), he must balance his strategy by also never betting a King for value. He must call a bet from player 2 while holding a Queen with probability $\frac{1}{3}$. The Revised Simplex method gives the other endpoint solution, with $\alpha = \frac{1}{3}$. In this strategy, player 1 bluffs with a Jack with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ ($y_b = \frac{1}{3}$), and always value bets with a King ($y_f = 1$). He always checks with a Queen in the first round ($y_c = 1$), and calls a bet from player 2 with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ ($y_j = \frac{2}{3}$). In all optimal strategies, player 1 folds with a Jack and calls with a King when facing a bet. He cannot win a showdown with a Jack, and cannot lose a showdown with a King; thus, any strategy that did not prescribe these sequences is weakly dominated by those that do. The Simplex solution ($\alpha = 0$) represents player 1's most conservative strategy, as he never bluffs with a Jack and never value bets with

a King. Conversely, the Revised Simplex solution ($\alpha = \frac{1}{3}$) represents player 1's most aggressive strategy, as he frequently bluffs with a Jack and always value bets with a King.

	Simplex	Interior Point	Revised Simplex
s_{\emptyset}	1	1	1
s_a	1	<u>5</u> 6	$\frac{2}{3}$
s_b	0	$\frac{1}{6}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
s_c	1	1	1
s_d	0	0	0
s_e	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
s_f	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
s_g	1	1	1
s_h	0	0	0
s_i	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
s_j	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
s_k	0	0	***
s_l	1	1	***

Table 4.2: Player 1's Optimal Behavioral Strategy

Chapter 5

2-7 Draw Poker

Although Kuhn Poker serves as a useful example in understanding concepts in game theory and the method of the sequence form, it bears little resemblance to actual variants of poker. Other variants play with more cards, more betting rounds, and more players. In turn, these games are much more complex to analyze; for comparison, 2-player no-limit Texas Hold'em has approximately 10¹⁶⁰ information sets [10]. That is many more atoms than exist in the known universe. While games of this size are significantly beyond the capabilities of this approach, we are able to analyze abstracted versions of more complex games. In this chapter, we develop an abstracted version of 2-7 Draw poker and use the sequence form LP methodology to determine an optimal strategy.

5.1 Rules

While poker variants such as Texas Hold'em and Omaha have become very popular in recent years, variants such as 2-7 Draw still have a loyal following. Its structure and game play are very different, and little previous work has been published on game-theoretic optimal play. As such, it is a fruitful area of research. This section details the rules of full-scale, two player 2-7 Draw based on [8]. 2-7 Draw is a **lowball** variant, meaning that traditional hand rankings are reversed; the worst traditional hand wins the pot, if the hand goes to showdown. Additionally, as the name suggests, it is a **draw** variant. Each player is dealt a private hand, and has the opportunity to discard and redraw any number of their own cards after each betting round. These features contrast with games such as Texas Hold'em and Omaha, where players share a common set of community cards and the highest hand wins.

At the start of each hand, each player is dealt 5 cards. There is a round of betting, where each player has the option to check, bet, raise, or fold, depending on the actions of previous players. Betting in 2-7 Draw games can have a **limit structure**, with fixed bet sizes, or a **no-limit** betting structure, where players can bet any amount. Then, each player discards any or all of their hand, and replaces them with cards from the deck. 2-7 Draw is most commonly played with one or three discard rounds; our version uses one discard round. If there is more than one person who has not previously folded, the hand goes to showdown, and the player with the worst hand wins the pot. Thus, a hand of 2-7 (Single) Draw has the following structure:

- 1. Five cards are dealt to each player
- 2. Betting round #1
- 3. Discard and redraw (up to 5 cards)
- 4. Betting round #2

5. Showdown (if necessary)

Hand rankings in 2-7 Draw are reversed in comparison to poker variants such as Texas Hold'em and Omaha. From best to worst, they are as follows:

- 1. No Pair
- 2. One Pair
- 3. Two Pair
- 4. Three of a Kind
- 5. Straight
- 6. Flush
- 7. Full House
- 8. Four of a Kind
- 9. Straight Flush
- 10. Royal Flush

Within each of these categories, there is a further ordering. The best possible No Pair hand is 7, 5, 4, 3, 2, not of the same suit. The best possible One Pair hand is 2, 2, 5, 4, 3, which is worse than all No Pair hands. Ordering in each category is determined first by the highest card (or pair), and subsequently by the next highest card. For example, 4, 4, 4, 2, 2 beats 4, 4, 4, 3, 3. Each category admits a similar ordering structure.

5.2 Abstractions

In order to analyze a poker variant using the sequence form LP method, it is necessary to reduce the size of the game. There are several types of these abstractions, all of which aim to simplify the game without losing the underlying strategy. The abstractions that we use to simplify 2-7 Draw are outlined in this section, and are based on ideas from [2].

5.2.1 Deck Reduction

One abstraction technique to reduce the size of the game is to reduce the number of cards in the deck. This simplifies the game by drastically reducing the number of potential hands and, by extension, the size of the game tree. For example, a 52 card deck has

$$\binom{52}{5} = 2,598,960$$

unique 5 card hands. In using this type of abstraction, it is important to choose a deck size that maintains an equivalent ordering of hand strengths. In other words, the frequencies of each hand category must remain generally consistent between the original game and the abstraction. For example, One Pair must be more common than a Straight, which in turn must be more common than a Flush. To accomplish this, we experimented with several combinations of deck size and hand size. We settle on a 21 card deck with 3 card hands for each player. This deck contains the cards 2 through 8 of each of three suits: clubs (\clubsuit), spades (\bigstar), and hearts (\heartsuit). This deck has

$$\binom{21}{3} = 1,330$$

unique 3 card hands. The hand rankings for this abstraction and their relative frequencies are shown in Table 5.1. While these hand rankings do not correspond precisely to the original game, they retain enough similarity to make valid strategic comparisons between the two games.

Hand Type	Example	Combinations	Probability
Three of a Kind	(6♣,6♠,6♡)	7	0.005
Straight Flush	(4*,3*,2*)	15	0.011
Flush	$(7\heartsuit,4\heartsuit,2\heartsuit)$	90	0.068
Straight	(6♣,5♣,4♠)	120	0.090
Pair	(8♠,8♡,4♡)	378	0.284
High Card	(8♡,6♣,5♣)	720	0.542

Table 5.1: Hand Rankings with Frequencies in Simplified 2-7 Draw Poker

5.2.2 Betting Abstractions

We can also simplify the game by changing the number and structure of betting rounds. In a typical game of 2-7 (Triple) Draw, there are up to three opportunities (provided at least two players do not fold) for players to discard and obtain new cards. Players can discard and redraw up to 5 cards each time. Before the first and following every discard, there is a round of betting in which players can either bet a fixed amount or any amount; 2-7 Draw can be played as a limit or no-limit game, respectively.

Each round of betting and subsequent discard exponentially increases the size of the game tree. We simplify this by allowing a single discard round,

preceded and followed by a round of betting. Additionally, we specify that each player must discard exactly one card. While this discard rule is a significant deviation from the original rules, it is necessary for our game to be tractable. Additionally, we suggest that this does not deviate radically from actual strategy; it would be unusual for a player to receive such a good hand in the original deal that they have no desire to draw any cards. It is not possible to give this a precise probability; it would depend on the player's strategy and their opponent's strategy.

Additionally, we impose a limit betting structure, with no raises possible. This is identical to the betting structure of Kuhn Poker. In each betting round, player 1 first decides to check or bet. If player 1 checks, player 2 can also check or bet. If player 2 bets, player 1 must fold or call. If player 1 bets originally, player 2 must fold or call. The elimination of raising, where one player increases the previous bet, represents a significant strategic deviation in our simplified game. Raising gives players more opportunities to bluff and win the pot.

5.2.3 Bucketing

The most important abstraction technique is known as **bucketing**, where each possible hand is partitioned into one of several equivalence classes ('buckets') through a many-to-one mapping function. Instead of considering the optimal strategies for individual hands, we group them by strategic similarity and find the optimal strategy for playing each bucket as a whole. If the hands are grouped into buckets in a cogent way, all hands in a bucket can be played identically without significant issue [2]. Note that each of these sets of buckets are particular to the game state; in our case, there is one set of buckets for hands determined by the initial deal, and another for hands after the discard round.

The most intuitive method of bucketing is by raw hand strength; that is, by the absolute hand rank relative to all possible hands. Using this method, bucket composition would be determined by simply partitioning the ordered set of all possible hands into some number of equivalence classes. This is an appropriate method for the second set of buckets, when no new cards will be drawn. However, this method loses any conception of hand potential, which is critical in early stages of the hand. A player may be initially dealt a hand with poor **absolute hand strength**, but with a high probability of improving significantly during the discard round. This hand is said to have high **roll-out hand strength**. Conversely, a hand with poor roll-out hand strength has little chance of improving to a absolutely strong hand after the discard and redraw. Thus, we categorize the first set of buckets according to roll-out hand strength, and the second according to absolute hand strength. The process of determining bucket composition is detailed further in Section 5.3.

In both sets of buckets, the number of member hands is not uniform. Buckets representing hands of middling strength are larger, and buckets representing very strong or very weak hands are smaller. This is done in order to better discriminate hands that should be played very aggressively or those that should be folded early in the hand. The sizes and characteristics of the respective buckets are shown in Table 5.2. Given the computational restrictions of Gambit, we develop simplified games with 2 and 3 initial buckets, each with 3 final buckets. The first set of initial buckets are denoted A

Bucket	Size (# of hands)	Example Hand
Α	444	(7♡,3♠,3♡)
В	886	(7♡,6♠,5♠)
C	331	(7♡,2♠,2♡)
D	668	(6♠, 4♠, 2♠)
Ε	331	(7*,7*,4*)

Table 5.2: Initial Buckets

Bucket	Size (# of hands)	Example Hands
1	332	(8*,6*,4*)
2	666	(3♣, 2♠, 3♡)
3	332	(5,3♠,2♡)

Table 5.3: Final Buckets

and B, the second set C, D, and E, and the set of final buckets 1, 2, 3. The best initial buckets are A and C, and the best final bucket is 3.

Finally, we need sets of transition probabilities that model the move into the initial buckets from the original deal and from the initial to the final buckets. In this abstract game, there are no individual cards, only buckets. The effect of the original deal node is to determine the probability of initialization to each pair of initial buckets. Likewise, the effect of the discard round is to determine the probability of moving from one pair of initial buckets to one pair of final buckets. Conceptualizing the game in this way drastically reduces the number of nodes; instead of

$$\binom{21}{3} * \binom{18}{3} = 1,085,280$$

possible initial deals, there are only 4 or 9 bucket combinations, depending on the model.

The first set of transition probabilities, is an $n \times n$ matrix, where *n* is the

	Bucket A	Bucket B
Bucket A	(0.437	0.229
Bucket B	0.229	0.105

Figure 5.1: Initial Transition Probabilities to 2 Buckets

	Bucket C	Bucket D	Bucket E
Bucket C	(0.057	0.126	0.066)
Bucket D		0.251	0.125
Bucket E	0.066	0.126	0.058)

Figure 5.2: Initial Transition Probabilities to 3 Buckets

number of initial buckets. Since each matrix represents a probability distribution, $\sum a_{ij} = 1$, where each a_{ij} is the matrix entry representing the probability of player 1 being dealt a hand in the *i*th bucket and player 2 being dealt a hand in the *j*th bucket. Since each player has an equal likelihood of receiving a particular hand, transition matrices are symmetric; that is, $a_{ij} = a_{ji}$ for all *i*, *j*. For computational feasibility, our simulations iterate over a subset of all possible hand combinations. Therefore, the matrices shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are only approximately symmetric.

The second set of transition probabilities is an $(n \times n)$ to $(m \times m)$ transition network, where *m* is the number of final buckets. In these $m^2 \times n^2$ matrices, each column represents a probability distribution. That is, $\sum_j b_{ij} = 1$, where each b_{ij} is the matrix entry representing the probability that the players move from initial bucket combination *j* to final bucket combination *i* with the discard round. Each ordered pair represents the pair of buckets each player's hand is in, respectively. For example, the transition probability from state *A*, *A* to 1, 1 is 0.174. This is interpreted as follows: given that both players are

	(A, A)	(A, B)	(B, A)	(B, B)
(1, 1)	(0.174	0.100	0.103	0.068
(1, 2)	0.170	0.168	0.098	0.108
(1, 3)	0.077	0.149	0.046	0.089
(2, 1)	0.167	0.100	0.17	0.107
(2, 2)	0.154	0.158	0.154	0.145
(2, 3)	0.069	0.134	0.074	0.137
(3, 1)	0.079	0.046	0.143	0.089
(3, 2)	0.072	0.078	0.144	0.128
(3, 3)	0.038	0.067	0.068	0.129)

Figure 5.3: Final Transition Probabilities from 2 Buckets

	(C, C)	(C, D)	(C, E)	(D, C)	(D, D)	(D, E)	(E, C)	(E, D)	(E, E)	
(1, 1)	(0.257	0.164	0.111	0.167	0.125	0.09	0.109	0.083	0.059)
(1, 2)	0.197	0.194	0.204	0.14	0.142	0.152	0.103	0.091	0.105	
(1, 3)	0.056	0.122	0.172	0.035	0.09	0.131	0.026	0.06	0.084	
(2, 1)	0.199	0.156	0.103	0.192	0.14	0.088	0.198	0.149	0.109	
(2, 2)	0.157	0.161	0.165	0.165	0.145	0.153	0.165	0.143	0.15	
(2, 3)	0.039	0.107	0.143	0.037	0.095	0.131	0.042	0.111	0.134	
(3, 1)	0.045	0.038	0.021	0.129	0.094	0.061	0.17	0.13	0.089	
(3, 2)	0.042	0.034	0.042	0.11	0.102	0.104	0.145	0.138	0.137	
(3, 3)	0.008	0.024	0.039	0.025	0.067	0.09	0.042	0.096	0.133)

Figure 5.4: Final Transition Probabilities from 3 Buckets

initially dealt hands in bucket A, the probability that they will both have hands in bucket 1 after the discard round is 0.174.

5.3 Simulation

An important element of our simplified version of 2-7 Draw is the transition probabilities between each game state, conceived as the associated buckets of each player's hand. Recall that in this game, we do not consider individual hands as nodes in the game tree, only pairs of buckets. However, the probability of the game being in each of these bucket combination states is not uniform. Therefore, we must determine the individual transition probabilities between each bucket pairing through simulation. This section presents an overview of the algorithms necessary to model this and other elements of the game, before we use the sequence form LP method to find the optimal strategy. All of the following code was written in Python.

The first step is to generate an ordered list of all possible 3 card hands, based on hand strength. There are

$$\binom{21}{3} = 1,330$$

total hands. The ordering of the hands has two levels. First, we place the hands into the ranking categories shown in Table 5.1 such as Three of a Kind, Flush, One Pair, etc. This is done through conditional statements based on card values and suits of each hand. Within each of these categories, we then sort based on the highest card in the hand to create a sub ordering. This process is repeated for each ranking category, and the ordered categories are appended to an overall list *OrderedHands*. Algorithm 1 shows a schemitization of this process for the Three of a Kind category.

for AllHands do
 if Card1Value = Card2Value = Card3Value then
 Append(Hand) to ThreeKindList
 end
end
Sort(ThreeKindList);
Append(ThreeKindList) to OrderedHands
 Algorithm 1: Hand Sorting Algorithm

Recall that the particular hand composition of our initial buckets is based on the roll-out strength of each hand, given all possible draw possibilities. We iterate each hand over all possible draws and determine the average final hand ranking, based on its index in *OrderedHands*. In order to determine which card to discard, we use the following rule: if their hand is a pair or three of a kind, discard one those cards. Otherwise, discard the highest card in the hand.

A general version of this process is shown in Algorithm 2. First, we remove each of the three cards in the original hand from the available *Deck*, since players cannot redraw a card that they discard. Then, if the original hand is a Pair or Three of a Kind (*PairsThreeKind*), that card is replaced with one from the *Deck*. Otherwise, the highest card is replaced with one from the *Deck*. We then find the *Strength* of the new hand, given by its index in the *OrderedHands*. This process iterates for each of the 18 possible cards to be drawn. Then, for each hand, we compute the average *Strength* and place the hand into a bucket with similar *Strength* values.

for OrderedHands do

Hand=Card1, Card2, Card3; Remove(Card1, Card2, Card3) from Deck; for Deck do if Hand in PairsThreeKind then Replace PairCard with *Deck*_i end else Replace HighCard with *Deck*_i end Strength = OrderedHands.index(NewHand) end **if** *Average*(*Strength*) < *value* **then** Append(Hand) to BucketA end else Append(Hand) to BucketB end Add(Card1, Card2, Card3) to Deck; end

Algorithm 2: Roll-Out Hand Strength Algorithm

Now that we have defined the composition of individual buckets following the initial deal, we can determine the frequency of each pair of bucket combinations for each player. For example, we want to determine the probability that both players will have a hand in bucket A after the initial deal. For each of the 1330 possible *Hands*, first remove each card from the remaining *Deck.* Then, generate each 3 card combination of the *Deck* as the list structure *Combos.* For each of these, the ordered pair *HandPair* is the combination of the original *Hand* and an element of *Combos.* This pair of two hands is then sorted into the appropriate paired bucket, based on the original membership of each of its component hands. For example, if both *Hand* and a particular element of *Combos* were originally members of bucket A (defined in Algorithm 2), this *HandPair* would be appended to *BucketAA*. Then, the probability that *BucketAA* is reached after the initial deal is $\frac{1}{Length(BucketAA)}$. A generalized version of this process is shown in Algorithm 3.

for Hands do

Hand=Card1, Card2, Card3;

Remove(Card1, Card2, Card3) from Deck;

Combos = Combinations(Deck, 3);

Sort(Combos);

end

Add(Card1, Card2, Card3) to Deck;

end

end

Length(BucketAA) Algorithm 3: Initial Bucket Probability Algorithm

We now turn our attention to the second set of buckets, representing game states after each player has discarded and redrawn. Their hand is now fixed, and we can consider a new set of buckets based only on the strength of their hand. These buckets are defined in Table 5.3, and we define these in our code by iterating over all 1,085,280 two-player hand combinations and sorting based on the respective indices in *OrderedHands*. The result is a set of 9 list structures, *Bucket11*, *Bucket12*, etc, which contain pairs of hands meeting the criteria for each single hand bucket. For example, if both players held a hand in the top 25% of overall hands, it would be placed in *Bucket33*.

With this second set of buckets defined, we now determine the transition probabilities for moving between each first round bucket pair (defined in Algorithm 2) and each second round bucket pair. This is the most computationally intensive step of this simulation process, and required time-saving measures at multiple points. This algorithm is shown in generalized form in Algorithm 4 First, we initialize a counter *Count11*, representing the number of hand pairs that fall into *Bucket11*. For each hand pair in *BucketAA*, remove each of the six cards that one of the players holds from the available *Deck*. Then, generate all permutations of *Deck* of length 2. This is an ordered pair representing the cards that each player will receive after they discard one card, respectively. For computational efficiency, randomly select one of these and assign it to *Draw*. Then, replace one card in each player's hand with one of the cards in *Draw*. The particular card to be replaced is determined by the same discard rule: if holding One Pair or Three of a Kind, discard one of those cards. Otherwise, discard the highest card. With the resulting pair of hands, check the membership of each in the previously defined final buckets and increment the corresponding counter. For example, if the both of the hands are in the strongest category in *Bucket11*

after the particular *Draw*, add 1 to *Counter11*. Then, $\frac{Counter11}{1,085,280}$ is the approximate probability that given original membership in *BucketAA*, the players will end in *Bucket11* after the discard and redraw. This value has a corresponding entry in Figure 5.3 or 5.4 for the 2 and 3 initial bucket cases, respectively.

```
Count11=0;
```

```
for BucketAA do
```

```
HandPair = [(Card1, Card2, Card3), (Card4, Card5, Card6)];
```

```
P1Hand = (Card1, Card2, Card3);
```

```
P2Hand = (Card4, Card5, Card6);
```

```
Remove (Card1, Card2, Card3, Card4, Card5, Card6) from Deck;
```

```
Draws = Permutations(Deck, 2);
```

Draw = RandomSample(Draws, 1);

```
if P1Hand in PairsThreeKind and P2Hand in PairsThreeKind thenReplace P1PairCard with Draw(1) and P2PairCard with Draw(2)
```

else if *P1Hand in PairsThreeKind and P2Hand not in PairsThreeKind* then Replace P1PairCard with Draw(1) and P2HighCard with Draw(2)

else if *P1Hand not in PairsThreeKind and P2 in PairsThreeKind* **then** | Replace P1HighCard with Draw(1) and P2PairCard with Draw(2)

```
else
```

```
Replace P1HighCard with Draw(1) and P2HighCard with Draw(2)
```

```
FinalPair = (P1Hand, P2Hand);
```

```
if FinalPair in Bucket11 then
```

| Count11 = Count11 + 1

end

Add(Card1, Card2, Card3, Card4, Card5, Card6) to Deck; Algorithm 4: First to Second Round Transition Probabilities Algorithm

5.4 Results

We solve the sequence form LP of Simplified 2-7 Draw using the Gambit software package, for both the 2 and 3 initial bucket cases. The solutions to these LPs are the optimal realization plans for each game. These LPs also compute an expected value of the game, which is simply the optimal objective function value. Gambit's sequence form LP algorithms compute only one optimal solution; there may be other optimal realization plans for Simplified 2-7 Draw. This section provides a brief discussion of Gambit's computed solution; for more detail, see Appendix B.

5.4.1 2 Initial Buckets

For the 2 initial bucket case, both player's optimal realization plans characterize a relatively conservative strategy. We begin by discussing player 1's optimal play. Player 1 is first dealt a random hand, which is a member of either Bucket A or Bucket B. Hands in Bucket A have a higher average roll-out hand strength than hands in Bucket B. On his first opportunity to bet, player 1 should always check. If player 2 bets after player 1 checks, player 1 should always call the bet. Thus, player 1's strategy for the first round is simple: regardless of Bucket, check and call a bet if necessary.

After the first round of betting, each player discards and redraws one card from the remaining deck. At this point, player 1's optimal realization plan becomes more complicated. It defines optimal play for each combination of original bucket and final bucket. Recall that in the final round, hands are sorted by absolute strength into Buckets 1 - 3, in ascending order. Hands in Bucket 3 are superior to those in Bucket 2, which are in turn superior to those in Bucket 1. If player 1's hand was originally in Bucket A and both players checked in the first betting round, he should bet with probability 0.178 while holding a hand in Bucket 1, always check with Bucket 2, and always bet with Bucket 3. If he does check and player 2 then bets, player 1 should always fold with Bucket 1 and always call with Bucket 2. Notice that this optimal realization plan does not specify what player 1 should do with a hand in Bucket 3 after player 2 has bet; since it is optimal for player 1 to always bet with Bucket 1 initially, he will simply never be in this situation. These irrelevant sequences are denoted *** in the full table of results in Appendix B.

If player 1's hand was originally in Bucket A and the betting sequence of the first round was player 1 checks, player 2 bets, and player 1 calls, player 1 should bet with probability 0.122 while holding a hand in Bucket 1, always check with Bucket 2, and always bet with Bucket 3. If player 1 checks and player 2 bets, player 1 should always fold with Bucket 1 and always call with Bucket 2. If player 1's hand was originally in Bucket B and both player's checked in the first round, player 1 should always check with Bucket 1, bet with probability 0.233 with Bucket 2, and always bet with Bucket 3. If player 1 checks and player 2 bets, always fold with Bucket 1 and call with Bucket 2. If player 1's hand was originally in Bucket B and the betting sequence of the first round was player 1 checks, player 2 bets, and player 1 calls, player 1 should always bet with Bucket 1, check with Bucket 2, and always bet with Bucket 3. If player 1 checks and player 2 bets, always call with Bucket 2.

Player 2's first round strategy is more aggressive and complex than player 1's. If player 1 checks, player 2 should always check with Bucket A and always bet with Bucket B. If player 1 bets, player 2 should call with probability 0.983 with Bucket A and always call with Bucket B. The discard and redraw follows this round of betting. If player 2 originally had a hand in Bucket A and both players checked in the first round, and player 1 bets in the final round, player 2 should always fold with Bucket 1, call with probability 0.891 with Bucket 2, and always call with Bucket 3. Since player 2 never checks in the first round with Bucket B, we need not define a realization plan for the second round.

If player 2 originally had a hand in Bucket B, the first round betting action was player 1 checks, player 2 bets, and player 1 calls, and player 1 checks after the discard and redraw, player 2 should always bet with Bucket 1, bet with probability 0.435 with Bucket 2, and always bet with Bucket 3. Instead, if player 1 bets, player 2 should call with probability 0.415 with Bucket 1, and always call with Buckets 2 and 3.

If player 2 originally had a hand in Bucket A, the first round betting action was player 1 bets and player 2 calls, and player 1 bets after the discard and redraw, player 2 should call with probability 0.664 with Bucket 1, always with Bucket 2, and with probability 0.640 with Bucket 3. If player 1 checks, player 2 should always check with every Bucket. If player 2 instead originally had a hand in Bucket B, he should always call with Buckets 1 and 2, and with probability 0.595 with Bucket 3. If player 1 checks, player 2 should always check with every Bucket.

When each player uses these optimal realization plans, the value of the game is approximately $-\frac{14}{100}$. This value is from player 1's perspective; for each hand of Simplified 2-7 Draw played according to these optimal realization plans, player 1 can expected to lose $\frac{14}{100}$ betting units to player 2. Recall that the

value of optimally-played Kuhn Poker is $-\frac{1}{18}$. In Simplified 2-7 Draw, player 2 has an even greater advantage than in Kuhn Poker. This is likely due to an even greater positional advantage; player 2 acts second on two rounds of betting, instead of only one. In each round, player 2 can observe player 1's actions before making his own decision.

Some parts of these optimal realization probabilities are surprising, while others square with previous intuition about poker strategy. The most surprising results are player 2's optimal probabilities in the final betting round, after a first round in which the betting action was player 1 bets and player 2 calls. In this situation, the LP results dictate that player 2 should sometimes fold while facing a bet and always check back while holding a hand in Bucket 3. This is extremely suprising; since Bucket 3 is the strongest possible bucket, player 2 can never outright lose the hand. Therefore, we would expect that he should want to bet as much as possible. The reason for this prescribed strategy is not clear; it may be a coding error or an inherent issue related to the structure of the game.

However, the majority of these optimal realization plans are congruent with our intuitive sense of poker strategy. For example, player 1 consistently folds a poor hand from Bucket 1 and calls a strong hand from Bucket 3 when facing a bet in the final round. For the most part, each player follows a strategy of betting with a combination of bluffs (Bucket 1) and strong hands (Bucket 3). In addition, they often call with medium strength hands (Bucket 2), hoping that their opponent is bluffing. These strategies are similar to those in Kuhn Poker; Buckets 1,2, and 3 play similarly to a Jack, Queen, and King, respectively. Finally, it is notable that little folding should occur in the first betting round. Player 2 folds with probability 0.017 when holding a hand in Bucket A when player 1 bets. Otherwise, each player's optimal realization plan involves always remaining in the hand until the final betting round. This highlights the importance of the discard and redraw phase, where each player's hand strength can change dramatically. Each initial buckets contained plenty of hands that could become very strong after the discard and redraw; this was simply more likely with Bucket A. This feature illustrates a considerable issue with the abstraction techniques that we used to reduce 2-7 Draw to a tractable size. It is likely that more specific buckets, a bigger deck, bigger individual hands, and more betting rounds would incentivize players to fold more often before the final betting round.

5.4.2 3 Initial Buckets

We hypothesized that a different version of Simplified 2-7 Draw with an additional bucket in the first betting round would provide a more robust set of initial betting strategies. However, the computational limits of the Gambit software package made this difficult. When solving a sequence form LP, Gambit allows the user to specify computation using rational or non-rational values. The rational method is more accurate, but the computation time required is much greater. One of Gambit's developers notes that the use of floating point arithmetic can lead to numerical instability, and strongly recommends using the rational algorithm [11].

We initially attempted to solve our 3 initial bucket model using the rational method; after 4 days, the program did not output a solution. It is not

clear how long a game of this size would take to run, but we were surprised that the algorithm could not finish. The 2 initial bucket LP with 80 information sets computed a solution rationally within 20 minutes, and the 3 initial bucket LP only has 120 information sets. Fortunately, the non-rational algorithm for the 3 initial bucket LP finishes within an hour. However, these results are clearly flawed, and are shown in Appendix B. Many of the supposed optimal probabilities cannot even be such; they often do not sum to 1 in each information set, are negative, or are greater than 1. We report these results for the sake of completeness of the project, but they cannot accurately describe an optimal realization plan for the game. Future versions of Gambit and more powerful computers may be able to find the exact rational solution.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This Independent Study is an exposition of the use of linear programming and game theoretic techniques to find optimal poker strategies. Game theory represents games in a variety of forms, some of which can be used to find the Nash equilibrium strategies using linear programming techniques. In particular, we used the sequence form representation to find Nash-optimal strategies for Kuhn Poker and a novel, simplified version of 2-7 Draw. The Gambit software package was a critical tool, in both constructing and solving the sequence form LPs. The particular optimal strategies for Simplified 2-7 Draw are less robust than we hoped; they prescribe a relatively simple strategy for both players. These strategies may not be particularly applicable to the actual game of 2-7 Draw, given the degree of abstraction and simplification necessary in our model.

These results could be extended in several ways. For example, we could consider a version of Simplified 2-7 Draw that uses more buckets, more rounds of betting, or more cards. Any of the abstraction techniques presented in Section 5.2.2 could be modified to create a more realistic game. While our version is a reasonable approximation, it loses many key facets of the game. For example, players are not actually required to discard and redraw a card at every opportunity, nor by our specific discard rule. Thus, a natural extension of this project is to analyze a version with fewer abstractions.

Computational constraints played a significant role in our analysis of Simplified 2-7 Draw, and considering a more accurate version would require better computational tools. The current version of Gambit can compute solutions for medium-sized games like ours, but quickly fails when faced with truly large-scale games. The current version of Gambit is unable to find optimal strategies of large games using the sequence form LP method, but may be able to using other methods. Although not discussed or utilized in this project, Gambit does have a variety of other methods of finding optimal strategies [6]. Building the sequence form LPs manually, instead of automatically with Gambit, would be difficult and prone to error. However, they could be solved using external solvers, which are much more able to handle large LPs. For example, a sequence form LP with over 1.1 million variables was used to solve an abstracted game of Rhode Island Hold'Em with external LP solvers [9]. Future work based on computational improvement could use a more advanced version of Gambit, a different solution method, or external LP solvers.

Appendix A

Gambit

The primary computational tool used in this project is Gambit, an open-source library of game theory tools [6]. It allows construction of finite strategic and extensive games using both an intuitive graphical user interface (GUI) and a set of command-line tools for larger games. These tools allow the full specification of a game, including players, actions, strategies, information sets, etc. In addition, Gambit has a variety of solution algorithms that compute the Nash equilibrium of a given game. Most relevant to this project is its sequence form LP method, which converts an extensive form game to sequence form and solves an LP based on the theory of [13]. The author of this paper, Bernhard von Stengel, was directly involved in the development of Gambit.

Figure A.1 shows a portion of the Kuhn Poker extensive form game tree constructed in the Gambit GUI. It allows the user to specify and label players, actions, nodes, information sets, and payoffs. Since Kuhn Poker is relatively small, we compute the Nash equilibrium both using the sequence form LP




Figure A.1: Part of the Extensive Form of Kuhn Poker in the Gambit GUI

method in Gambit and by building the LP manually and solving in Mathematica. Gambit can also generate and calculate the equilibria for normal form games, albeit with a different methodology.

Although greatly simplified relative to the original game, our version of 2-7 Draw is much too large for the GUI to construct and analyze. The version with 2 initial buckets has 80 information sets, 160 sequences, and 1009 total nodes, while the version with 3 initial buckets has 120 information sets, 240 sequences, and 2269 total nodes. Building a game of this size graphically causes the program to crash. Fortunately, Gambit offers a set of command-line Python tools that perform the solution algorithms on a game manually designed and imported through an external text file.

Designing a text file to accurately describe the game of Simplified 2-7 Draw Poker was a significant undertaking within this overall project. The Gambit websites describes the specific format for an extensive form game (.efg) text file, representing each player, chance, or terminal node as a line with particular actions, payoffs, information sets, etc. The required formatting is very specific, and is described in more detail on Gambit's website. To generate this .efg text file, we utilize an original Python script that utilizes several types of symmetry present in the game tree. Since the betting structure is uniform across different bucket combinations, appropriate *for* loops can be used to iterate over the entire game tree. These files also specify the transition probabilities for each chance node, as detailed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.3. These scripts are developed for both the 2 and 3 initial bucket cases. The results of the scripts are text files that are 1135 and 2550 lines, respectively.

These text files are then imported to an installed Python environment containing Gambit's solver algorithms and other commands. The *gambit.nash.lp_solve()* command generates and solves the sequence form LP and returns complete Nash-optimal behavior strategies for each sequence. For many of the information sets, optimal play dictates taking a particular action with probability 1. For any such information set, sequences later in the game that require the other action are reported as being played with the default probability 0.5. For example, the optimal strategy in the 2 initial bucket case includes always checking in the first betting round as player 1. Consequently, any sequence in the second betting round that involves player 1 previously betting in the first betting round are reported as 0.5. Since these later information sets will never be reached, these values are irrelevant in our analysis.

The first version of Simplified 2-7 Triple Draw that we developed involved combinations of 5 buckets for the first round of betting, transitioning to combinations of 3 buckets for the second round. This is in contrast to the 2 and 3 initial bucket versions for which we present solutions in Chapter 5. The 5 bucket case is more complex, with 200 information sets, 400 sequences, and 6301 nodes. Attempts to find a Nash equilibrium for this game with Gambit return an unexplained error. Direct correspondence with Gambit developer Theodore Turocy suggests that a solving a game of this size is infeasible in Gambit's current version [11].

Appendix B

Simplified 2-7 Draw LP Results

The following tables show the results of the Simplified 2-7 Draw sequence form LPs. Each row denotes an information set for a particular player, each of which has two possible actions. The **Information** column denotes the previous action and information known to the player; this describes the information set. The **P(C/F)** column lists the probability that the optimal player should check or fold, depending on context. The **P(B/C** column lists the corresponding probability that of the other action, either betting or calling. For example, information set 1 for player 1 prescribes checking with probability 0.822 and betting with probability 0.178, given that player 1 initially had a hand in Bucket 1, then both players checked, and now he has a hand in Bucket 1. Many of the information sets with 'optimal' probabilities of 0.5 for each action is a history that the player will never face, given the other prescriptions of strategy. For example, consider information set 14 for player 1. In the associated history, player 1 bet after the initial deal; since he always checks in the situation per information set 0, he will never face the choice of actions in information set 14. We denote these irrelevant sequences with ***.

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	0	Deal to Bucket A	1	0
1	1	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0.822	0.178
		Bucket 1		
1	2	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	3	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 2		
1	4	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	5	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3		
1	6	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	7	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet	0	1
1	8	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.878	0.122
		p1 call, Bucket 1		

Table B.1: Optimal Realization Plan for 2 Initial Buckets

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	9	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	10	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 2		
1	11	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	12	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 3		
1	13	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	14	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 1		
1	15	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	16	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 2		
1	17	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	18	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 3		
1	19	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	20	Deal to Bucket 2	1	0
1	21	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1		
1	22	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	23	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	0.767	0.233
		Bucket 2		
1	24	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	25	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3		
1	26	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	27	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet	0	1
1	28	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 1		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	29	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	***	***
		call, Bucket 1, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	30	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	1	0
		call, Bucket 2		
1	31	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 2, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	32	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3		
1	33	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	***	***
		call, Bucket 3, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	34	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 1		
1	35	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	36	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 2		
1	37	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	38	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 3		
1	39	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
2	0	Bucket A, p1 check	1	0
2	1	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0.900	0.100
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	2	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	3	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0.879	0.121
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	4	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0.109	0.891
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	5	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	6	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	7	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	8	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	9	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	10	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	11	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	12	Bucket A, p1 check, p2 bet,	***	***
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	13	Bucket A, p1 bet	0.017	0.983
2	14	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	15	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.336	0.664
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	16	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	17	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	18	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	19	Bucket A, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.361	0.639
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	20	Bucket B, p1 check	0	1
2	21	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	22	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	23	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	24	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	25	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	26	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 check,	***	***
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	27	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	28	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0.585	0.415
		call, Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	29	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0.565	0.435
		call, Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	30	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 2, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	31	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	32	Bucket B, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	33	Bucket B, p1 bet	0	1
2	34	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	35	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	0	1
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	36	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	37	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	38	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	1	0
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	39	Bucket B, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.405	0.595
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		

While Table B.1 describes cogent realization plans based on Gambit's rational computation for the 2 initial bucket case, Table B.2 describes the raw results of Gambit's non-rational computation of the 3 initial bucket case. Due to numerical instabilities, we strongly suspect that these results are incorrect.

Notice that the values do not describe probability distributions over each information set; they sometimes do not sum to 1, are greater than 1, or less than 0. The values in Table B.2 are unedited, and directly reflect Gambit's output. We do not identify irrelevant sequences, but these are likely to be information sets where both sequences are played with probability 0.5.

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	0	Deal to Bucket C	1	0
1	1	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1		
1	2	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0.907	0.093
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	3	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 2		
1	4	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	5	Bucket C, p1 cheeck, p2	0	1
		check, Bucket 3		
1	6	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		

Table B.2: Optimal Realization Plan for 3 Initial Buckets

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	7	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet	0	1
1	8	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 1		
1	9	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	10	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 2		
1	11	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	12	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 3		
1	13	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	14	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1		
1	15	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	16	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2		
1	17	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	18	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3		
1	19	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	20	Deal to Bucket D	1	0
1	21	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0.8852	0.1148
		Bucket 1		
1	22	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	23	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 2		
1	24	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	25	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0.2705	0.7295
		Bucket 3		
1	26	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	27	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet	0	1
1	28	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.3701	0.63
		p1 call, Bucket 1		
1	29	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	30	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	1	0
		p1 call, Bucket 2		
1	31	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	32	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 3		
1	33	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	34	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1		
1	35	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	36	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2		
1	37	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	38	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3		
1	39	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	40	Deal to Bucket E	1	0
1	41	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1		
1	42	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	43	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 2		
1	44	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	45	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3		
1	46	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	47	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet	0.5	1
1	48	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	1	0
		call, Bucket 1		
1	49	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	1	0
		call, Bucket 1, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	50	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	1	0
		call, Bucket 2		
1	51	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 2, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	52	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3		
1	53	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0.5	0.5
		call, Bucket 3, p1 check, p2		
		bet		
1	54	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1		
1	55	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0	-35.323
		Bucket 1, p1 check, p2 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
1	56	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2		
1	57	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	-0.013	0
		Bucket 2, p1 check, p2 bet		
1	58	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3		
1	59	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0	1.074
		Bucket 3, p1 check, p2 bet		
2	0	Bucket C, p1 check	0	2.093
2	1	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	2	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0	0
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	3	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	4	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	-1.02	0
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	5	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	6	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 check,	0	-0.424
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	7	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	-0.211
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	8	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	-9.932	0
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	9	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	1
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	10	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	-1.423
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	11	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	-11.206
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	12	Bucket C, p1 check, p2 bet,	0	0
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	13	Bucket C, p1 bet	1	0
2	14	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	15	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	16	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	17	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	18	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	19	Bucket C, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	20	Bucket D, p1 check	1	0
2	21	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0.522	0.478
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	22	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	1	0
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	23	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0.661	0.339
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	24	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0.126	0.874
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	25	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	26	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 check,	0	1
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	27	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	28	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 1, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	29	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	30	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	31	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	32	Bucket D, p1 check, p2 bet,	0.5	0.5
		p1 call, Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	33	Bucket D, p1 bet	1	0
2	34	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	35	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	36	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	37	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	38	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	39	Bucket D, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	40	Bucket E, p1 check	0	1
2	41	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	42	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	43	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	44	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	45	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	46	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 check,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	47	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	48	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0.572	0.4278
		call, Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	49	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0.676	0.324
		call, Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	50	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 2, p1 bet		

Player	Info Set #	Information	P(C/F)	P(B/C)
2	51	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	52	Bucket E, p1 check, p2 bet, p1	0	1
		call, Bucket 3, p1 bet		
2	53	Bucket E, p1 bet	1	0
2	54	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 check		
2	55	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 1, p1 bet		
2	56	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 check		
2	57	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 2, p1 bet		
2	58	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 check		
2	59	Bucket E, p1 bet, p2 call,	0.5	0.5
		Bucket 3, p1 bet		

Bibliography

- Rickard Andersson. Pseudo-Optimal Strategies in No-Limit Poker. Master's thesis, Umea University, 2006.
- [2] D. Billings, N. Burch, A. Davidson, R. Holte, J. Schaeffer, T. Schauenberg, and D. Szafron. Approximating Game-Theoretic Optimal Strategies for Full-Scale Poker. *Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 2003. University of Alberta.
- [3] Michael Bowling, Neil Burch, Michael Johanson, and Oskari Tammelin.
 Heads-up Limit Holdem Poker is Solved. *Science*, 347(6218):145–149, 2015.
- [4] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. *Game Theory*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, MA, 1995.
- [5] Harold W. Kuhn. *Contributions to the Theory of Games*, pages 97–103. Princeton University Press, 1950.
- [6] Richard D. McKelvey, Andrew M. McLennan, and Theodore L. Turocy.

Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory, Version 15.1.0, 2014. http://www.gambit-project.org.

- [7] Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. *A Course in Game Theory*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994.
- [8] Pokerstars. 2-7 (Deuce to Seven) Single Draw Lowball Rules, 2017. https://www.pokerstars.com/poker/games/draw/2-7/single/.
- [9] Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin. Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em Poker. National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Intelligent Systems Demonstration Program, 2005.
- [10] Byron Spice. Carnegie Mellon Artificial Intelligence Beats Top Poker Pros. 2017. https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2017/january/AIbeats-poker-pros.html.
- [11] Ted Turocy. Personal correspondence. Gambit Technical Support, 2017. https://github.com/gambitproject/gambit/issues/211.
- [12] Robert J. Vanderbei. *Linear Programming: Foundations and Extensions*. Springer US, Boston, MA, 2014.
- [13] Bernhard von Stengel. Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 14:220–246, 1996.