China-Taiwan Relations: The Persistent Deadlock Amid Cycles of Stability and Change

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CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS:
THE PERSISTENT DEADLOCK AMID CYCLES OF STABILITY AND CHANGE

By Jordan Shremshock

An Independent Study Thesis
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Thank you to my best friend Liz Kittner for constantly helping me see my own worth and potential. Without her encouragement, this process might have killed me.

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ABSTRACT

Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. According to this model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my hypothesis, I implement a theory-guided case study. My first case encompasses the positive feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second case discusses the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. The goal of this study is to explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of negative feedback that stabilizes the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated.

为什么在这六十五年来，中国和台湾的关系还在僵？我用进化生物学的 Model of Punctuated Equilibrium 来回答这个问题。这 PE Model 由两部分做成：正反馈和负反馈。这反馈是一个换得快的过程。这个过程要经过注意力转移和模仿。负反馈是一个自动教程的机制。这个机制均衡任何外力来创造一个稳定的输出。按照这个模型，如果中国和台湾增加他们的破坏性等，美国就会增加他的影响力和提高稳定性，导致减少他们冲突。为了测试我的假设我实现了一个理论制造的个案研究。我的第一个案例包含了台湾第一和第二次台海危机。我的第二个案例讨论了第三次台海危机和 1999 年台湾海峡对峙。我的研究目的是来了解台海的冲突和重建台湾和中国的关系。
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

There have been long-standing tensions between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Taiwan Strait serves as the symbolic epicenter of this tumultuous relationship. Discord was heightened across the Taiwan Strait when the President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui decided to visit Cornell University for a class reunion in June of 1995. The U.S. government under Bill Clinton initially refused this request, but the U.S. Congress passed a resolution to allow President Lee to visit the United States. In response, the People’s Republic of China conducted a series of threatening military exercises from August 1995 into March 1996. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also carried out a set of missile tests less than fifty miles from Taiwan’s major port cities of Keelung and Kaohsiung.1 The United States countered this challenge with the largest display of U.S. military force in Asia since the Vietnam War. The situation was resolved only when U.S. President Clinton formally declared the “three nos” policy: no to Taiwan independence, no to two Chinas, and no to Taiwan joining international organizations that require statehood for membership. The fact that a simple visit to the United States appeared to challenge the PRC’s sovereignty to such a degree that another war in the Pacific looked likely suggests the dire straits of the Taiwan Strait relationship.

Despite this crisis—in addition to two previous Taiwan Strait Crises (in 1954-55 and 1958) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation—relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) remain in a deadlock. China has not been able to conquer Taiwan, and Taiwan still cannot secede from China. These cycles of tension across the Strait have repeatedly threatened to bring the United States into a war against

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China. In light of these crises, will this status quo of deadlock continue? Is Greater Chinese unification a myth or reality? I argue that this rivalry is likely to endure due to the negative feedback cycle instituted by the United States. This study analyzes the changing relations between China, Taiwan, and the United States using the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model) from international relations theory. It builds directly on the work of political scientist Weixing Hu, who examined the cross-Strait relationship using a version of this model. Key questions that will guide this study include: Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for decades persist despite periods of extreme tension and change? How have the foreign policy decisions of each state in the system helped to disrupt or maintain the persistent deadlock? To answer these questions, I will use the PE Model to explore the positive feedback cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and Taiwan Confrontation and the process by which the negative feedback cycle is reinstituted. A positive feedback mechanism, or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to create a stable output.

I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict in accord with the PE theory. The independent variable of study is the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. The intervening variable is defined as the level of negative feedback from the United States. The resultant level of conflict is the

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dependent variable. The operationalization and conceptualization of these variables is discussed in Chapter Three: Methodology.

To test my hypothesis, I use a theory-guided case study approach to analyze the complex and changing relationships among the actors (China, Taiwan, and the United States), and how domestic and foreign policy shifts in each political entity impact the status quo. Specifically, the case studies will examine the policy actions of the United States, China, and Taiwan leading up to, during, and in the aftermath of the three Taiwan Strait Crises and Taiwan Confrontation. I conduct two case studies: the first encompasses the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, and the second examines the Third Crisis and the Taiwan Confrontation. This study draws on secondary source material of historians and political scientists in English and Chinese. In addition, I consult primary sources from the National Security Archive and the Mainland Affairs Council Database. The goal of this study is to explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of negative feedback that deescalates the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter surveys the history of China-Taiwan relations, as well as the scholarship regarding the question of Greater Chinese unification: whether integration of the two polities is likely or if the status quo of deadlock is expected to continue. Next, it reviews literature regarding the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model), beginning with the model’s origins in evolutionary biology, its crossover into social science, and finally its application in the fields of political science and international relations. The chapter ends with a review of scholarly applications of the PE Model, in which I evaluate ideas in relation to my own study.

The PE Model has been applied in multiple ways within the fields of political science and international relations (IR). To describe common foundations of this approach, this chapter surveys different analytical perspectives. For example, I review Michael C. MacLeod’s “The Logic of Positive Feedback: Telecommunications Policy Through the Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of a Regulated Monopoly.” While not directly related to international relations, MacLeod’s methodology will inform my own study. Second, I review Weixing Hu’s “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model.” I plan to build on these studies to more strictly apply the PE Model to specific instances of positive feedback.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Taiwan Strait, also called the Formosa Strait, is an arm of the Pacific Ocean, 100 miles (160 km) wide at its narrowest point, lying between the coast of China’s Fukien province and the island of Taiwan (Formosa). The term ‘cross-Strait relations’ refers to the
intersecting political, military, economic, cultural, and social relationships between Taiwan and Mainland China. Given the politically charged nature of the relationship between Taiwan and China, this phrase is often used to avoid naming either side directly and reproducing a discourse of Taiwan as either differentiated from or as a part of China. ‘Cross-Strait relations’ as a phrase acknowledges only the most irrefutable, empirical facts of geography and the presence of a stretch of ocean between the two coasts. In order to comprehend the complexities of the cross-Strait relationship, it is important to understand several key actors involved and their motivations.

Figure 2.1: Map of the Taiwan Strait

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in 1949 and led by the Chinese Communist Party, claims Taiwan as part of the territory of China. It refers to Taiwan as a

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rogue province. The PRC’s responses to Taiwan’s socio-political development range from emotional appeals to ‘Taiwan compatriots’ to belligerent threats and displays of military power. The PRC has clearly stated its goal of the eventual integration of the two entities. Steven Goldstein explains, “The present policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is primarily to seek peaceful means to achieve a united China through reunification with Taiwan under the rubric of ‘one country, two systems.’” Beijing will only negotiate on the precondition that Taiwan recognizes the “one China” principle.

The Republic of China (ROC) was founded on Mainland China in 1912 at the end of the Qing dynasty. At the time, the island of Taiwan, which had been ceded in perpetuity by the Qing in 1895, was a colony of Japan. Following the Japanese surrender in World War II in 1945, the ROC, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang, took control of the island. In 1947, following eighteen months of corrupt KMT governance, the native Taiwanese rebelled. The bitter legacy of the brutal suppression of the February Twenty-eighth Uprising led to the emergence of the modern Taiwanese independence movement. In 1949, the Nationalists (KMT) lost the Civil War to the Communists and relocated the national government of the ROC to Taipei on Taiwan. A million or more Nationalist refugees and soldiers arrived to live among a hostile population of nearly five million Taiwanese.

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This history continues to influence Taiwan’s divisive and often rancorous democratic politics. National identity is the subject of vigorous debate. Two opposing political coalitions define Taiwan’s domestic and foreign policy. Political opinion is polarized between the Pan-Blue Coalition of parties who support unification and a broader Chinese cultural identity, and the Pan-Green Coalition comprised of those supporting independence, self-determination, and Taiwanese cultural nationalism. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the largest Pan-Green party, espouses the “one country on each side” ideology concerning cross-Strait relations, but in practice supports the status quo so as not to provoke the PRC. The KMT, the largest Pan-Blue party, advocates a “one area” diplomatic truce. They seek to maintain the status quo with the stated goal of unification. The resultant foreign policy of the ROC “has been to maintain a status quo that perpetuates its declared status as a ‘sovereign independent’ state, while remaining open to a future relationship with the Mainland that might be achieved through negotiations.” Taipei has stated it will only conduct negotiations if not forced to address the “one China” issue.

Meanwhile, the United States is another player in the complex affairs of China and Taiwan. The United States seeks to promote stability in the region, because if a conflict were to break out, there is a high probability of American involvement. The United States encourages dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, but avoids a direct mediating role. Due to the relations of the United States with both the ROC and the PRC, it must conduct the balancing act in the region.

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10 Ibid., p. 86.
11 Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait,” p. 86.
12 Ibid., p. 87.
Taiwan and the United States have a long history. The two countries were close allies during World War II and after the ROC relocated to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the United States continued to recognize the ROC as the sole government of China. During the Cold War era and in the aftermath of the Korean War, the United States, as part of their anti-communist foreign policy, signed the Sino-American Defense Treaty in 1954 to consolidate their military alliance with the ROC. U.S. policy towards the ROC experienced major change in 1972, when President Nixon began to normalize U.S. relations with the PRC. On January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. This action, however, did not end the long-standing relationship between the United States and the ROC. On April 10, 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) into law, which to this day remains the cornerstone of the relationship between the ROC and the United States. This document clearly states that U.S. political, security, and economic interests are linked to peace and stability in the Western Pacific.13

Since 1949, the United States and the PRC have also had a complex relationship, evolving from tense standoffs to a complex mix of intensifying diplomacy, growing international rivalry, and increasingly intertwined economies. In the Chinese Civil War, the United States backed the Nationalist government of Chiang. This set the stage for several decades of limited U.S. relations with Mainland China.14 In the spring of 1955, in the midst of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States threatened a nuclear attack on China. In April, China agreed to negotiate. However, crisis erupted again in 1956, 1996, and 1999.

The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 turned the tide of U.S.-China relations. The Soviet Union replaced the United States as China’s biggest threat, contributing to the PRC’s

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14 Ibid.
eventual rapprochement with the United States. 1971 began the era of Ping-Pong Diplomacy, in which China’s ping-pong team invited members of the U.S. team to China. That same year, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to China.\textsuperscript{15} Shortly thereafter, the United States and the UN recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China, endowing it with the permanent Security Council seat formerly held by the ROC. In 1972 President Nixon visited China and met with Chairman Mao Zedong. They signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which set the stage for improved relations by allowing China and the United States to discuss difficult issues like Taiwan.\textsuperscript{16} In the wake of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the United States suspended military sales to China and froze relations. In 1993, President Clinton launched a policy of “constructive engagement” with China. President Clinton signed the U.S-China Relations Act of 2000, granting the PRC permanent normal trade relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{17} Tensions and economic interdependence have only deepened between the United States and the PRC. The hot-cold relationship between the two states can be attributed to their vastly different value systems and governmental structures. However, they are so interdependent that their deepening relations are unavoidable.

The Soviet Union and later Russia provide context for the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. However, due to the subsidiary role it plays in the three Taiwan Strait crises and Taiwan confrontation, this actor falls outside the bounds of my study.

China, Taiwan, and the United States each play a part in the balancing act that is cross-Strait relations, but those roles have changed over time. China has since grown into a

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).”
regional and global hegemon, Taiwan into a budding democracy, and the United States serves as their unwilling mediator.

**CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS:**

**PREDICTING UNIFICATION OR DEADLOCK**

Within the literature about China-Taiwan relations, many political science scholars examine the question of Chinese unification as a potential solution to tensions across the Strait. The unification camp believes that through economic, cultural, and political integration Taiwan will be pulled into the orbit of the PRC. Conversely, the status quo camp argues that the prediction of unification is overly optimistic. Scholars argue that the differences between the two political entities are simply too great to ever overcome the separation.

**UNIFICATION**

Scholars define unification as the eventuality that the two political entities of the PRC on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan will merge into a single political entity. This camp is comprised of researchers who believe that China and Taiwan will overcome the “persistent deadlock” to unite by means of economic, cultural, and/or political integration.

Several scholars argue that Greater China will be unified through economic integration despite the vastly different economic systems and political structures on the Mainland and on Taiwan. These scholars model economic integration after the experience of the European Union (EU), claiming that “economic integration can ramify and generate
spillover effects,”18 into political and cultural areas. These positive spillovers foster an increasingly integrated community. Estrada and Park found evidence that the gap in economic and technological development between the two polities is shrinking.19 Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh argue, “The undoubted benefits of closer economic integration within Greater China are not to be taken for granted…. But many obstacles remain to be overcome if the growth and structural benefits are to be sustained.”20 Economic integration of these two polities could be considered a positive feedback cycle, but only if economic ties truly spilled over into the political arena.

Some scholars contend that unification will occur via cultural integration, that the commonalities among citizens on the ground will overcome the political impasse across the Strait. This is the belief that the shared culture of the citizens of China and Taiwan at the individual level will eventually overcome the overarching forces of ideology and power alignment. Culture such as religion can be a uniting force across territorial boundaries. Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng explain, “From the Taiwan side, accommodation of increasing religious exchanges is instrumental to peace with China, and perhaps to inducing China’s political liberalization. In Beijing, officials use cross-Strait religious ties as a non-threatening means to draw Taiwan closer to unification.”21 The PRC utilizes pre-existing commonalities to bring the two political entities into dialogue. This multi-level integration of religious culture across the Strait combines political science and religious studies scholarship.

One such scholar, Mayfair Mei-hui Yang examines the “complex interactions among the

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nation-state, popular religion, media capitalism, and gendered territorialization as these are inflected across the Taiwan Strait.”

She points to one specific case of cultural integration and exchange in passing: “In 2000, [a] pilgrimage by Taiwanese worshippers of the maritime goddess Mazu to her natal home in Fujian Province was broadcast live from China back to Taiwan via satellite television.” This pilgrimage transcended territorial boundaries and the high-tension politics of cross-Strait relations. Both the PRC and ROC frame this grassroots religious movement as a common foundation on which other issues can be resolved and consensus built.

A small group of scholars argue unification will occur through political means despite the different political structures that pose a barrier to such an occurrence. Chao explains, “As Mainland China grows in power, nations and sub-national regions in the continental vicinity will be sucked [sic] into its orbit and become satellites.” Examples, and perhaps prototypes, of this occurrence are Hong Kong and Macau. These two territories “are special administrative regions enjoying differing degrees of autonomy and rights.” Perhaps like these two political entities, Taiwan will also be pulled into China’s orbit under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy.

DEADLOCK

However, another camp of literature refutes the prediction that unification will happen at all and predicts “persistent deadlock” in cross-Strait relations. These scholars

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24 Chao, “Economic Integration,” p. 281.
define the status quo of cross-Strait relations as the situation in which China cannot conquer Taiwan and Taiwan cannot secede from China. Steven Goldstein defines the various forms such a situation might take: When parties agree on the rules of the game, the status quo can be peaceful. This is the condition that characterizes some of the periods of détente in cross-Strait relations. A status quo can be tense and “deadlocked when the parties must accept unsatisfying compromises because individually preferred outcomes are not possible.”

The events precipitating the three Taiwan Strait Crises can be described in this way. A final condition of open conflict may occur if parties pursue goals in opposition to the interests of others. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater in the United States is one instance of conflicting interests escalating to open conflict across the Strait. Scholars have attributed the nature of the deadlock across the Strait to various different conditions: different political structures, international pressures, and contending identities.

One set of scholars within this literature argues that cross-Strait relations have reached an impasse due to the vastly different political structures on Mainland China and Taiwan. After analyzing the prospects for unification via economic and political integration, Chien-Min Chao concludes that the political differences between the polities are nearly insurmountable and unification is unlikely. This political difference is also theoretical and ideological. George T. Crane argues that early on in their relationship the PRC and the ROC both claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China: “Contested sovereignty stands in the way of negotiation and political compromise, both prerequisites for deeper

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26 Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait,” p. 85.
27 Chao, “Economic Integration,” p. 304.
integration.” The issue of differing political systems, one democratic and the other authoritarian, is a major obstacle to Chinese unification.

International pressures also reinforce the status quo of deadlock between China and Taiwan. The United States is a key participant in cross-Strait relations. While officially recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of Greater China since 1972, the United States continues to make arms deals with Taiwan. The United States has clearly stated that it supports only a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Wang and Liu explain, “The U.S. has promoted a policy of “double renunciation” in the region, meaning “Taipei would renounce its intention of seeking Taiwan’s de jure independence, in exchange for Beijing’s consent not to use force against the island country.”

Foreign influence in the region on the part of the United States is an important piece of the framework that keeps the deadlock in place.

Other scholars explain the status quo as the result of contending identities both within Taiwan and between the ROC and the PRC. The democratization process that began in Taiwan in 1987 has allowed Taiwanese national identity to flourish and define itself as separate from the Mainland identity. Wang and Liu state: “National identity can be defined as an individual’s psychological attachment to a political community united by characteristics that differentiate that community from others.” For example, each citizen of Taiwan is socialized in a democratic system of government, while each citizen of the PRC is socialized under the new capitalist communism. The co-authors explain that the majority of

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people living on the island of Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo. The political and social culture of the Mainland and that of Taiwan are vastly different and the gap is only widening. According to June Teufel Dreyer, “A sense of identity apart from that of Mainland China has existed on Taiwan for more than a century.” Taiwan has been defined by the cultures of its aboriginal tribes, numerous occurrences of European imperialism, and post-WWII American occupation. The cultural divide has deepened even further under the rule of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. Communism fundamentally changed the culture of China, while Taiwan’s isolation from the Mainland starting in 1949 fostered a vast divergence of political identity and culture. All of these are contributing factors to the perpetuation of the status quo of stalemate. Until China democratizes, the prospects look bleak for unification.

Even now this debate rages on. In February of 2014 China and Taiwan held their first official talks since the end of China’s civil war in 1949. More recently on November 7, 2015, the leaders of China and Taiwan held historic talks in Singapore. According to BBC News, “Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou shook hands at the start of the talks, which were seen as largely symbolic.” The two leaders did not discuss any major agreements, or the South China Sea disputes. However, they did discuss the establishment of a cross-Strait hotline, consolidating the “1992 consensus” agreement. Even as President Ma Ying-jeou pushes for closer ties with China as part of his KMT party agenda, the backlash from the Taiwanese people is increasing. In light of these

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34 Ibid., p. 2.
37 Ibid.
developments, unificationists are hopeful, while scholars who predict continued deadlock are skeptical.

THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRUM MODEL

This section discusses the creation of the PE Model, its crossover into social science, and finally its application in political science and international relations literature. Beginning with an explanation of Niles Eldredges’ Allopatric Model as the forerunner of the PE Model, I go on to describe the collaborative and formative work of “Punctuated Equilibrium: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,” co-authored by Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Next, I survey social science literature in the fields of anthropology, the evolution of human social behavior, and psychobiology. Finally, I examine instances of the PE Model in the fields of public policy and political science.

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY

The Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model) was originally the brainchild of Niles Eldredge in his study, “The Allopatric Model and Phylogeny in Paleozoic Invertebrates.” He describes the appearances and lifetimes of three subspecies of Phacops rana trilobites that characterize the geological stages of the middle Devonian. Each subspecies had a certain number of dorsoventral columns of eye lenses, 18, 17 and 16-15, respectively. The number of eye lenses decreased successively in very quick bursts through Cazenovia, Tioughnioga and Taghanic stages of rock strata. Eldredge concludes:

“The majority of species preserved in epeiric sediments show no change in species-specific characters throughout the interval of their stratigraphic occurrence, and the phyletic model is inapplicable to most of these elements
of the fossil record. Instead, change in, or development of, species-specific characters is envisioned as occurring relatively rapidly in peripheral isolates.”

This means that changes in the trilobite population happened quickly and were separated by long periods of stasis. This observation inspired further development of the PE Model.

Eldredge went on to write an article with Stephen Jay Gould entitled “Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism.” Here the co-authors propose that evolution is not a process of slow transformation, but a process “of homeostatic equilibria, disturbed only ‘rarely’ (i.e., rather often in the fullness of time) by rapid and episodic events of speciation.” They build on the previous work of the Allopatric Model as developed by Eldredge, and survey the other arguments in the field. They argue, and urge other scholars to consider, that evolution occurs in relatively short periods of rare and fast change followed by long periods of stasis, or equilibrium.

Punctuated equilibrium developed in response to gradualism. Gersick explains, “Gradualist paradigms imply that systems can ‘accept’ virtually any change, any time, as long as it is small enough; big changes result from the insensible accumulation of small ones.” In contrast, punctuated equilibrium suggests that for the history of most systems, there are underlying structures that actively prevent change, rather than the gradualist explanation where the potential for change always exists, but is suppressed because there would be no adaptive advantage to changing.

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Eldredge and Gould offer an alternate description of evolution that is supported by the fossil record. Their research question is why does the fossil record seem not to support the theory of gradualism? Their answer is that species remain in stasis due to environmental and internal constraints until the need for change overwhelms the negative feedback mechanisms.

THE STRUGGLE TOWARD SOCIAL SCIENCE

This section reviews literature of the PE Model that attempts to bridge the conceptual divide between evolutionary biology and social science. First, I examine the work of Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, *The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model*, a collection of social science scholarship that evaluates the efficacy of the model. Second, I present the results of three scholars from different social science fields. Then, I present the conclusions of Connie Gersick who, in her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” synthesizes common definitions of the structural elements of the PE Model across a number of disciplines.

In their anthology *The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model*, Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson map the evolution of the model from its origins in evolutionary biology to the social sciences. Somit and Peterson state the two suppositions that natural scientists can agree upon: “First, that species undergo long periods of little or no evolutionary change,” and “Second, that these lengthy intervals of stasis (i.e., equilibrium) are broken (i.e., punctuated) by relatively rapid speciation events.”\(^4^1\) Translated into social

science these processes mirror negative and positive feedback cycles. Somit and Peterson struggle to use the PE Model in the fields of social science because they have not entirely shifted their methodological approach from the evolutionary biology literature.

Within the anthology, Susan Cachel, Allan Mazur, and Brian Gladue all try to answer the question: “Is human behavior the result of punctuational evolutionary processes?” This question is a step towards the model as defined in political science, but is still solidly rooted in the discipline of biology. All three conclude for different reasons that the PE Model has very modest explanatory power for the evolution of human behavior. Cachel in her article, “The Theory of Punctuated Equilibria and Evolutionary Anthropology,” concludes that the inherent difficulties of the model as it applies to the biological evolution of human beings make it unlikely that it will have much impact in anthropology. Mazur argues that while scientists have ample evidence of human physical evolution, they have very little information about the evolution of early human social behavior; therefore, the PE Model cannot be applied due to lack of sufficient data. Gladue believes that the timespan of human evolution is so short that “punctuationism” is not applicable to ongoing behavior in the field of psychobiology. The evolution of human behavior is difficult to examine due to the lack of evidence in the fossil record and the relatively short span of time *Homo sapiens* have existed.

While these social scientists do not find the PE model very useful to explain the evolution of human behavior, Albert and Somit try to use E.F. Miller’s concept of metaphor

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42 Ibid., p. 11.
to explain the leap of the model into social science. E. F. Miller defines metaphor as, “All types of transference of words and meaning from one kind of thing to another.”46 This definition is worded in the broadest sense. Metaphor is key to the development of theory in social science. “Once we see the world from the point of view of a particular metaphor,” Miller writes, “the face of it is changed. Adopting a new metaphor changes our attitude toward the facts.”47 Regarding politics specifically, “Metaphor is necessary to political knowledge precisely because the meaning of reality of the political world transcends what is given to observation…. Metaphors can take us beyond the observable and also make manifest the intelligible structure of the unobservable.”48 The problem of using punctuated equilibrium as a metaphor is that it loses explanatory power as a predictive model and theory. This is the wrong bridge to use to cross the model into social science. The history and evidence of human evolution is not sufficient to draw conclusions using the PE Model, but when converted into a theory used to examine the evolution of man-made institutions, its causal mechanisms are left intact, can be translated, and retain their explanatory power.

Another scholar who looks at the transfer of the PE Model into social science is Connie Gersick. In her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” she compares conceptions of the PE Model from six domains: adult, group, and organizational development, history of science, biological evolution, and physical science to draw out a general definition. Across these disciplines, punctuated equilibrium involves “an alternation between long periods when stable infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of revolutionary

47 Ibid., p. 162.
48 Ibid., p. 169.
upheaval.” Gersick describes this theory of evolutionary change as being made up of three parts: deep structure, periods of equilibrium, and revolutionary periods.

Deep structure is the highly durable underlying order that explains the interrelationship between periods of equilibrium and periods of change. Gersick writes, “This deep structure is what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary punctuations.” Deep structure in the fields she has combined can be defined as the environment. Since there is no equivalent to such a structure in the evolution of man-made policy, I will not include this concept in my study.

Equilibrium periods are characterized by negative feedback loops that actively seek to maintain the deep structure. Gersick says that when systems make adjustments to preserve the deep structure, they do so in opposition to internal and external perturbations, and “move incrementally along paths built into the deep structure.” The pursuit of stability in the deep structure can result in turbulent behavior.

Revolutions are relatively short periods when a deep structure breaks apart. This period of time is only resolved when a new deep structure forms out of the choices of the system. Gersick explains, “Revolutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems’ historical resources with current events, are not predicable; they may or may not leave a system better off. Revolutions vary in magnitude.” The deep structure forms the underlying negative feedback loop that pulls any deviations back into line. Therefore, this structure must be disassembled for any fundamental changes to take place.

49 Gersick, “Revolutionary Change Theories,” p. 10.
50 Ibid., p. 12.
51 Ibid., p. 17.
52 Ibid., p. 20.
Transition periods, are made up of two processes: (1) dismantling the old deep structure and (2) constructing a new one. There are two basic sources of disruption to the deep structure. First, internal changes that “pull parts and actions out of alignment with each other or the environment.”[^53] This may be the effort of an actor in the system to change its relationship with another actor. Second, environmental changes can threaten the ability of the system to access and obtain resources. Gersick notes, “Human systems tend to outgrow the deep structures that govern their perspectives and activities.”[^54] The environment in which the system exists is no longer sufficient to sustain that system. Transition periods in political science are the moments where the positive feedback cycle overtakes the negative feedback structure.

**POLITICAL SCIENCE**

Political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones converted the ideas presented in the PE Model from evolutionary biology into a theory of political science. Their 2002 anthology is comprised of works that use the PE Model to explain U.S. domestic policy and social change. The same arguments and logic that they use to explain domestic policy can be extended to describe international phenomena.

A complete view of the institutions of the domestic and international systems must include attention to both positive and negative feedback processes. In their chapter, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” Baumgartner and Jones explain, in the context of U.S. domestic policy, how the PE Model operates in the field of political science. They state, “At times, government policies seem remarkably resistant to change, following standard

[^53]: Ibid., p. 21.
[^54]: Ibid., p. 21.
procedures, working within norms of consensus among all those involved, attracting little public attention, and deviating little from year to year.”55 The system described here is a negative feedback mechanism in which actors in a system counter each other to create a homeostatic device. In contrast to a negative feedback mechanism Baumgartner and Jones explain, “At other times, or in other areas of public policy, dramatic changes occur: new problems appear on the political agenda; crises require quick government response; new programs are created and old ones are terminated.”56 These are all examples of positive feedback mechanisms whereby rapid, punctuated change occurs. The PE Model combines the efforts of the many scholars studying different parts of the same process. Institutions are endogenous to the model, rather than exogenous. The policy process itself alters the way institutions function. This theory aims to produce a reliable model for longitudinal studies and is comprised of two parts: an understanding of institutionally induced equilibrium (negative feedback) and a theory of institutional development (positive feedback).

APPLICATION OF THE PE MODEL

Some scholars use phenomena in the domestic or international systems to build upon the PE Model. Others use the model to explain a particular policy or subsystem, which either results in a rapid change due to a positive feedback mechanism, or results in a political balancing act. These scholars use the PE Model as a framework in which they integrate additional theoretical models that are more closely related to the subject of study.

Michael C. MacLeod’s article, “The Logic of Positive Feedback: Telecommunications Policy Through the Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of a

55 Baumgartner and Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback,” p. 3.
56 Ibid., p. 3.
Regulated Monopoly,” is an example of the PE Model applied to policy change. MacLeod argues that scholars should be more concerned with positive feedback mechanisms because, “most policy subsystems have undergone rapid changes at some point in their evolution.”

He explains that positive feedback takes many forms in social science literature: “bandwagons, fads, tipping points, vicious and virtuous cycles, conflict expansion, and punctuated equilibrium.” Most studies of these forms of positive feedback focus mainly on mass behavior. MacLeod develops a two-part theory that examines both mass and elite behavior within the framework of the PE Model.

The author uses the lens of positive feedback to analyze political campaigns and collective action movements as well as policymaking. Regarding political campaigns, MacLeod states three important findings of voting behavior to the study of positive feedback: “(1) political campaigns have the strongest impact on those who are undecided; (2) in a situation of low information about one or more candidates, individuals gather information from others like them (and this is a rational strategy); (3) feelings of political efficacy are based on expectations of future success.” These behavioral patterns create information cascades. Similarly, collective actions usually involve some type of threshold or tipping point in addition to information cascades. MacLeod clarifies that a threshold is, “the point at which a given actor will make a decision based on the proportion of other actors that have already done so.”

The main points he gathers from the work of other scholars is that bandwagons occur under two specific and equally necessary conditions: (1) there exists a large group with

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58 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
59 Ibid., p. 53.
60 Ibid., p. 55.
little or no private information about the choices so they have no strong preferences towards one choice or the other; and (2) there is some expectation of success for the outcome of a choice.

These two conditions also apply to positive feedback in policy making with the addendum that elite decision makers are constrained by norms, rules, and procedures. These constraints form a negative feedback cycle of stability. MacLeod argues that these institutions promote short-term equilibriums amid punctuations, involving “the incorporation of new participants, issue redefinition, a loss of jurisdictional control, and changes in institutional structures and procedures.”61 For these forms of disruption to develop into positive feedback cycles in elite decision-making, two conditions must be met: (1) that there exist a significant number of actors who oppose or are indifferent to the status quo; and (2) that there is an expectation of success that the status quo could be changed. Due to the institutional pressures to maintain the status quo, elite decision makers must cross a much higher threshold than in mass behavior.

MacLeod has three hypotheses based on this function of preferences:62

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\text{Probability (decision to challenge status quo)} = (\text{actor preference}) \times (\text{perception of chances of success}) + e
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The following is a summation of his three hypotheses: (1) If a significant percentage of actors come to oppose the status quo, then a positive feedback cycle is more likely to occur; (2) If expectations of successful challenges to the status quo increase, then a positive feedback cycle is more likely to occur; and (3) If an institutional challenge to the status quo

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61 Ibid., p. 57.
62 Ibid., p. 59.
remains unchecked by other related political institutions, then cascades may lead to positive feedback and the destabilization of a policy area.\textsuperscript{63}

In choosing his data, MacLeod first defines the four historical periods of telecommunications policy: “(1) competition from 1900 to 1933; (2) a powerful monopoly from 1934 to 1969; (3) limited competition from 1970 to AT&T breakup in 1984; and (4) full competition thereafter in long-distance service and telephone equipment manufacturing.”\textsuperscript{64} Within this history, there are two periods of positive feedback, the first during the creation of the AT&T monopoly in the 1920s, and the second during the destruction of its monopoly in the 1980s. He operationalizes actor preferences by “coding outcomes of FCC and federal district court cases on telecommunications policy that involved allegations of antitrust violation by AT&T, and by coding the testimony of witnesses from various institutions and interest groups at congressional hearings.”\textsuperscript{65} He uses detailed qualitative case studies of telecommunications policy to double-check the validity of his findings. He operationalizes expectations of success by coding institutional attention to an issue. He performs a simple statistical analysis to create a table titled, “Percentage of Witness Statements at Congressional Hearings Either Supporting AT&T’s Monopoly or Neutral.”\textsuperscript{66} From this data MacLeod finds, “At times perceptions of success are just as important as preferences when accounting for policy outcomes,”\textsuperscript{67} a seemingly uncontroversial statement, but loaded with implications. His hypotheses are all supported by the data and are cross-referenced for validity with historical case study accounts. MacLeod targeted the instances of punctuation within the narrative of a negative feedback cycle to see how policies change overtime.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 59.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., pp. 59-60.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 60.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 71.
One author, Weixing Hu, comprehensively describes the forces that maintain the status quo in one cohesive framework using the PE Model. He examines relationships at the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. He characterizes the cross-Strait deadlock as “economic integration cum political impasse.” His article examines three causal factors of the positive and negative feedback cycles that characterize the cross-Strait relationship: issue cycles, pro-independence leadership in Taiwan, and structural constraints. His research questions include: “Why have cross-Strait relations cycled like this over the past 60 years? How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship?” Hu defines the components of the negative feedback cycle as growing economic ties between the two polities, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development and the recently peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and Washington’s interests and leverage over the PRC and the ROC.

Hu’s explanation of the PE Model begins with Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, two paleontologists who challenged the Darwinist theory of gradualism. They state that there is no evidence for gradualism in the fossil record and that evolutionary change occurs “in localized, rare, rapid events of branching speciation.” Similar to the biological theory, the PE Model in the social sciences is used for longitudinal studies. He explains that there are three relevant insights of the PE Model for this case: (1) to explain the cycles of policy change in Taiwanese domestic politics; (2) to examine the roles of “political

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69 Ibid., p. 934.
70 Ibid., pp. 935-936.
entrepreneurs,” who can set a new agenda within a stabilizing balance of power structure; and (3) to discern the mechanism or moments of transition between the periods of stability and change.\textsuperscript{71} He couples the PE Model with the path dependence theory to better explain “the weight of precedents, institutional separation of power, partisan politics, and interest groups.”\textsuperscript{72}

In his methodology, Hu defines a triangle of actors: China, Taiwan, and the United States. He explains their relationships as a set of three two-level games. Within the large triangular relationship, “there are two important bilateral games that mutually affect one another: (1) the cross-Strait interplay that is deeply rooted in domestic politics in Taiwan and in Mainland China; and (2) U.S.-China relations.”\textsuperscript{73} In addition to these two, two-level games, there is the relationship between the Taiwanese government and its citizens and interest groups. Hu defines six variables: three domestic political processes and three bilateral relationships. Using three case studies, Hu examines the cycles of tension and détente: the first, 1949-1979; second, 1979-1999, and finally 1999-present. He chose these time frames as each contains a “rise and fall of tension over some contentious issue, followed by a period of détente.”\textsuperscript{74} He concludes his article by indicating that he expects another punctuation to the current equilibrium over the issue of reunification.

Weixing Hu provides a comprehensive breakdown of the situation across the Strait; however, he could have used the PE Model more effectively. Breaking down the causes of this situation of deadlock between Taiwan and China into separate parts, while sometimes useful for conceptualization, could be misleading. His conception of the model is rather

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 937-938.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 938.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 939.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 940.
shallow compared to other scholars. Hu focused on three entire periods of both change and stability using three common causal factors, but viewed the status quo as unchanging.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

The status quo of stable tension across the Taiwan Strait, rather than the possibility of unification, is the dominant prediction in the literature and can best describe the major developments of cross-Strait relations over time. Of the theories used to examine cross-Strait relations, the punctuated equilibrium model is the most compelling since it accounts for both incrementalist and non-incrementalist conceptions of policy change. Originally a descriptive model developed by Eldredge and Gould in the field of evolutionary biology, Baumgartner and Jones translate the theory into a causal model of political science. The causal mechanisms are positive and negative feedback cycles. Depending on topic of study, scholars must rely on other theories to explain the causal mechanism of these positive and negative feedback cycles.

My research question is: Why has the cross-Strait deadlock persisted for 65 years? The causal mechanism for stasis is a negative feedback cycle perpetuated by the United States to counter the actions of China and Taiwan. Essentially, the balance of power politics model functions as the negative feedback mechanism. The causal mechanisms for change are attention shift and mimicking, as described by Baumgartner and Jones. These positive feedback mechanisms between China and Taiwan cause tensions to escalate beyond what the negative feedback mechanism can handle.

From the three scholars I reviewed, MacLeod, Cioffi-Revilla, and Hu I will adopt key insights. I will implement MacLeod’s focus on positive feedback cycles by examining the
actions of elite decision makers in both China and Taiwan. My study will build directly on the work of Weixing Hu. Punctuated equilibrium is a model of evolutionary change. Hu only focuses on the negative feedback mechanisms created by growing economic ties between China and Taiwan, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development and the recent peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and U.S. interests and leverage over both polities. I want to build on the instances of positive feedback because the perpetuating mechanisms for the endurance of this rivalry can be best examined when stretched to their breaking point. I plan to examine domestic processes as they relate to cross-Strait relations not only on Taiwan, but also on the Mainland and in the United States. Hu confines his study by only examining relations between China and Taiwan, China and the United States, and the Taiwanese government and its constituents. The United States has an important relationship with Taiwan that merits analysis. Finally, he views the status quo as unchanging, yet the motivations for the deadlock have changed over time. The interests and identities of the United States, Taiwan, and China in respect to one another have also evolved. The PRC has become a relative superpower, Taiwan has recently democratized, and the United States has become a crucial trading partner with Mainland China. The status quo of political deadlock has not changed, but the nature of relations across the Strait has changed. Early in the history of the rivalry, following the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait was in open conflict. However, to fast-forward, increasing the economic dependence of Taiwan on China has changed the status quo into one of peaceful détente. Even as the Strait remains politically deadlocked, the identities and interests of these polities in relation to one another have changed. These changes are the result of positive feedback.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study is to explore the presence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of negative feedback that may deescalate the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated. The research question guiding this study is, “Why has the cross-Strait deadlock persisted for 65 years?” To answer this question I employ the positive and negative feedback cycles of the Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) Model. As stated in the previous chapter, I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their mutually disruptive actions, then the United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. In this chapter, I describe the hypothesis I will use in my study, operationalize each of the three variables, discuss my method, and describe the process of selecting my cases.

HYPOTHESIS OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM

The primary hypothesis of study for this project is: If the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative feedback from the United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict.

Figure 3.1: Primary Hypothesis
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

As noted in figure 3.1, the independent variable for this hypothesis will be the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. I will measure this variable in the two years prior to each crisis (IV2-), during each crisis (IVD), and in the two years after the official end of each crisis (IV2+). These periods of time are shown in figure 3.2. I will compare each of these measures to determine how the positive feedback cycle grew and ended.

Figure 3.2: Timeframes of the Independent Variable

Taiwan

The levels of positive feedback generated by Taiwan can be categorized as diplomatic and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, I operationalize the level of this variable as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption.

Diplomatic disruption is categorized as low, medium, and high. For the purpose of this study I operationalize low diplomatic disruption as Taiwan’s political cooperation with China or an isolationist policy. Isolation entails little communication and, therefore, little chance of conflict breaking out due to a diplomatic issue. Cooperation amounts to
communication in order to foster greater interdependence. Both tactics promote stability across the Strait. Medium disruption of this type is defined as Taiwan pressuring the United States for a defense treaty or to publicly state its intent to defend Taiwan. This level of disruption also includes statements by ROC leaders that China must democratize as a condition of unification. High-level disruption is operationalized as Taiwan seeking recognition as a sovereign state from major powers in the international system, Taiwan’s public condemnation of Chinese actions, and/or threats of force against China.

The disruptive force of Taiwanese military actions is also broken down into low, medium, and high levels. Low-level military disruption is defined as the stockpiling of weapons and offensive/defensive systems. Medium-level military disruption is operationalized as Taiwan aiming missiles at China and amassing troops. High-level military disruption is characterized as Taiwan firing missiles at Mainland China and/or moving troops to strategic positions in order to mount an assault.

**China**

The levels of positive feedback generated by China can be categorized as diplomatic and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, the level of this variable can be operationalized as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption.

First, I will measure China’s diplomatic disruption, which can be defined by levels low, medium, and high. Low disruption is operationalized as China’s diplomatic isolation from or cooperation with the United States and/or Taiwan. Isolation amounts to little communication and therefore little diplomatic conflict, while cooperation entails communication with the intent to establish stable relations. Both states result in increased
stability in the region. Medium disruption defined as China pressuring the United States to condemn Taiwanese actions, the detainment of U.S. soldiers, and insistence on the “one China” principle as a condition for negotiations. High levels of disruption can be observed when China threatens to use force against Taiwan, publicly condemns Taiwanese or U.S. actions, and blocks Taiwan’s entry to international organizations.

Finally, I will measure the disruptive force of China’s military aggression, which can also be defined at low, medium, and high levels. Low-level disruption is characterized as preparatory measures such as stockpiling weapons and installing offensive/defense systems as well as the declaration of a ceasefire. Medium aggression is operationalized as threatening through action to use force against Taiwan or the United States. For example, if China were to aim missiles at Taiwan or begin amassing troops, then tensions in the region would escalate. High levels of disruption occur when China actually fires missiles, mobilizes troops, seeks nuclear capability, or threatens to use weapons of mass destruction against Taiwan.

**INTERVENING VARIABLE**

The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the level of negative feedback from the United States in response to the disruptive actions of China and Taiwan. I will measure this variable in the two years prior to each crisis (IntV2-), during the crisis (IntVD), and in the two years following (IntV2+). These time periods are detailed in figure 3.3 below. I will take measurements during each of these times to see how the forces of negative feedback are overwhelmed and then reinstated. The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the process of reestablishing the negative feedback cycle and the status quo. There are low, medium, and high levels of opposition.
To evaluate the level of U.S. military opposition to Taiwanese disruption I will use Patrick Regan’s six-point scale: (1) troops deployed against Taiwan/for the PRC, (2) naval forces against Taiwan/for the PRC, (3) equipment or aid to China, (4) intelligence or advisors to China, (5) air support to China, and (6) military sanctions against Taiwan. If two of the six can be observed, then there is a low level of opposition. When three of the six exist, there is a medium level of opposition. A high level of opposition occurs when four or more of the six points are observed.

U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwanese disruption can be categorized as low, medium, or high. Low diplomatic opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of Taiwan’s actions, the United States trying to persuade Taiwan to withdraw from the offshore islands, or American citizens advocating for U.S. recognition of the PRC. Medium opposition is operationalized as the United States publicly improving relations with Mainland

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China. This level also includes U.S. reluctance to deepen diplomatic ties with Taiwan. High-level diplomatic opposition of the United States can be observed in the creation of official treaties with China, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break out.

**U.S. Response to China**

Military intervention is defined as U.S. actions that support the sovereignty of Taiwan through military means. To evaluate this variable I will use political scientist Patrick Regan’s six point nominal scale: (1) troops, (2) naval forces, (3) equipment or aid, (4) intelligence or advisors, (5) air support, and (6) military sanctions.\(^76\) If two of the six points are met, then the situation can be defined as low opposition. When three of the six are present, the opposition of the United States is at a medium level. If four or more of the six points are observed, then a high level of U.S. opposition exists.

U.S. diplomacy can also be broken down into low, medium, and high levels of opposition to the actions of China. Low opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of China’s actions, or support for Taiwan. Medium opposition is operationalized as the existence of U.S. informal agreements with Taiwan to protect its security, and therefore its sovereignty, such as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This level also includes U.S. threats to go to war with China in the defense of peace in the region and an unwillingness to negotiate with China. High-level diplomatic opposition of the United States is the creation of official treaties with Taiwan, with other states in the region, or of domestic resolutions in the United

\(^76\) Ibid.
States, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break out in the Taiwan Strait.

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the resultant level of conflict from two years after the official end date of each crisis until four years after that date. This variable, framed in terms of the PE Model, is the transformation of a positive feedback cycle back into a negative feedback cycle. To establish a baseline of the status quo, as it existed before and after each conflict, I will apply the same set of measures from four years prior to the official start date of each crisis until two years prior (DV2-) and to the timespan two years after until four years after (DV2+) the official cessation of each crisis. Figure 3.4 illustrates these timespans. Using military, diplomatic, and economic measures of conflict, as well as a measure of third-party involvement, I will establish what the status quo was in the two years framing the independent and intervening variable measures.

**Figure 3.4: Timespans for the Dependent Variable**
The level of military conflict in the region can be operationalized on a four-point scale of low to high: (1) military conflict is the reduction of defensive capabilities in the region, (2) the de-escalation of offensive forces or threats to use force, (3) cessation of military force (truce or ceasefire) or the mobilization of troops and deployment of weapons systems, and (4) continued armed conflict with casualties. The level of diplomatic conflict can be defined on a similar scale: (1) cooperation and formal negotiation, (2) Within existing channels of communication making negotiations difficult, (3) hostility to negotiation with each other, but open to negotiation with a third party and (4) cessation of communication. The level of third party involvement (TPI) can also be charted on a four-point scale: (1) nonintervention policy, implying that the situation is stable or contained enough to leave alone, (2) brokering peace between China and Taiwan or dissuading Taiwan from inciting further military conflict, and (3) soft support in the form of defending the position of the ROC in the UN and other international organizations and/or trade embargoes against the PRC. This level also includes ambiguous policy, which stipulates unclearly defined parameters for the defense of Taiwan. This level includes the deepening of relations with one or the other party through diplomatic or economic means. The final level of third party involvement is (4) hard support in a threat of foreign troops on the ground or warships and air support in the Taiwan Strait, and/or withholding/blocking military aid to PRC.

**METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

In order to examine the complexity of cross-Strait relations, I employ a theory-guided case study and draw insightful conclusions by comparing the mechanisms of negative feedback and the resultant levels of conflict across cases. With two case studies I can better
understand the details of both the actors and the events to trace how the political deadlock between the PRC and the ROC has continued despite intense periods of positive feedback and change.

The question of why this deadlock across the Taiwan Strait has persisted for 65 years, lends itself to a case study approach. My goal is to discover the process of how a situation of virtual stasis has persisted in a complex and changing environment. There also exist relatively few instances of the positive feedback cycles of crisis I hope to examine because the situation between the PRC and ROC has only existed since the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

Other methodological approaches would not have the same depth of explanatory power as a case study approach. Due to the nature of Taiwan’s lack of statehood, too little data exists in many of the areas I intend to study and measure. Often datasets do not include Taiwan since it is not a universally recognized sovereign state. While statistical studies are often reliable, they lose some validity in their inability to focus on detail and nuance. I will not be conducting a rigorous comparative case study that “vary[s] on the dependent variable,” due to the nature of cross-Strait relations. In these cases I expect the dependent variable to be held in equilibrium by the negative feedback mechanism of counterbalancing state actors.

My methodology combines a comparative case study and a theory guided case study. I will compare the mechanisms of negative feedback across these two cases to see if there are similarities or differences, but I am at the same time trying to explain the puzzle of this particular case as a whole. The theory-guided component of this study is that it does not try

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to generalize beyond the data. Levy explains, “Theory-guided case studies…aim to explain and/or interpret a single historical episode rather that to generalize beyond the data.” This definition points more towards the goal of this study. This method of case study relies heavily on history and aims to explain it in a focused way. My goal is to explain why the status quo is maintained despite the changing identities and interests of the actors involved. This methodology is also known as an interpretive, discipled configurative, or case-explaining case study. Harry Eckstein in his article, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” establishes the importance of “crucial case studies in testing theory, undermining the accepted wisdom in comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better.” I am using the punctuated equilibrium model in much the same way. If my hypotheses are falsified, the PE Model may not be the most appropriate theory with which to analyze this set of cases.

CASE SELECTION

I will examine two instances of positive feedback in the Taiwan Strait: the first encompasses the crises of 1954-55 and of 1958, and the second covers the 1995-96 crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. The variables and their measures defined above will provide a framework to analyze each case. In order to

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examine the causes of this status quo I will perform a focused comparative/theory-guided comparison of the three Taiwan Strait Crises. These crisis situations are instances of positive feedback that stretch the negative feedback mechanisms to their breaking point. Within these periods of extreme tension lie the answers to the question: Why has this deadlock continued to exist after 65 years?

For Case 1, I will combine the first two crises of 1954-55 and of 1958 because they are one instance of positive feedback. I will define the dates of crisis for the first case as the start date of the first crisis and the end date of the second. The First Crisis began on September 3, 1954 when the Communists on the Mainland began artillery bombardment of the Island of Quemoy. The official end of The Second Crisis was October 6, 1958 when the Chinese Minister of National Defense offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the nationalists and announced that the PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week. For my independent variable I will examine the level of positive feedback in the two years prior (IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the conflict (IV2+). I will measure the intervening variable during the same times. For the dependent variable I will examine the two years framing the independent and intervening variable measures. See figure 3.5 for a breakdown of the dates.
The second case study for this project focuses on the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996 and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. These incidents together form one positive feedback cycle. The third crisis began on June 9-10, 1995 when ROC President Lee Teng-hui visited his alma mater, Cornell University in the United States. The official end of the confrontation was May 29, 2000, when President Chen was elected and expressed a desire to return to the status quo. For my independent variable, I will examine the level of positive feedback in the two years prior (IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the conflict (IV2+). I will measure the intervening variable during the same times. For the dependent variable I will examine the two years framing the independent and intervening variable measures. See figure 3.6 for a breakdown of the dates.
SUMMARY

Why has the deadlock across the Taiwan Strait persisted for 65 years? I argue that the model of punctuated equilibrium can offer an answer. I hypothesize that if the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative feedback from the United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. This chapter has discussed the operationalization of the independent, intervening, and dependent variables of study. In order to conduct a comparative/theory guided case study that examines positive and negative feedback cycles in cross-Strait relations, I selected crisis situations for my two cases. The next chapter will examine each case from the initial point of disruption, through the negative feedback mechanisms, until the status quo is reinstituted. In the next chapter I conduct my first case study.
CHAPTER FOUR
CASE 1: TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1950-1962

The first and second Taiwan Strait crises together constituted a time of great tension in East Asia. For the purpose of this study they represent one positive feedback cycle. According to the model of punctuated equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. I argue that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Mainland comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change. Additionally, the actions of the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be characterized as a negative feedback cycle.

As noted in Chapter Three, for this study the independent variable is the positive feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent variable. The bounds of this case are September 1950 to October 1962. In the first section of this chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the history of the two years leading up to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second section will discuss the independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between, and the second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years after the official end date of the second crisis until four years after that time. To establish a baseline for the dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the first
crisis until two years prior to that time. Figure 3.5 in the previous chapter illustrates the timeframe of study.

INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES

In this section I detail my observations of the independent and intervening variables. The first sub-section describes the two years prior to the first crisis. The second section details the two crises and the short span of time in between them. The final section is comprised of the events that transpired in the two years following the second crisis.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1952 – SEPTEMBER 2, 1954 (IV2- & IntV2-)

During this span of time for the independent variable of the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan, I observed a medium level of economic disruption and high levels of diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan. However, Taiwan was the first party to initiate high-level military disruption in the region. The intervening variable of the level of negative feedback from the United States was skewed in opposition to China and general support for Taiwan. There was medium-level of economic opposition, low to medium levels of diplomatic opposition, and high-level military opposition to China during these two years. See figure 4.2 for a breakdown of the independent and intervening variables for this period of time.
Figure 4.1: IV2- and IntV2-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>CHINESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
<th>OPPOSING CHINA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>Military</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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Aftermath of the Chinese Civil War

In the two years preceding the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, tensions between the PRC on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan were high. The Chinese Civil War had just ended and both the PRC and the ROC claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China. The United States was wearily working to keeping the peace between the two opposing governments. In 1952, the Korean truce talks entered a second year, and the Cold War raged between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Truman Administration and the Eisenhower Administration both had a vested interest in containing communism and, therefore, protecting the ROC on Taiwan from falling to the Communists on the Mainland. This show of support for Taiwan was an example of low diplomatic opposition to China.

From 1950 through 1953, the U.S. Navy, looking for enemy resupply vessels, sent reconnaissance planes near the twelve-mile territorial limit of China. To obtain more useful photographs, pilots sometimes strayed over Chinese territory. This report demonstrates a high level of U.S. military opposition to China: naval forces, equipment, intelligence, and air support were all given to the ROC.

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Effects of McCarthyism in the United States

In 1953 the United States deepened ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. When President Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected 1953, he decided to allow Chiang to attack the Chinese Communists. On February 2, in his State of the Union message, Eisenhower announced that he would be “issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China” from possible attack by Nationalist forces, adding that “we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.”\(^{85}\) In addition to supplying the ROC with naval forces, equipment and aid, intelligence and advisors, and air support, the United States issued this military sanction against the PRC. This statement is also an example of the low-level diplomatic opposition by publicly condemning China’s actions in Korea.

Despite the stabilizing actions of the United States, ROC leader, Chiang was still intent on taking the Mainland from the Communists by force and wanted to garner U.S. support for an invasion of the Mainland. In response to the news that Eisenhower was withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, on February 12, 1953, Chiang declared that he believed the Nationalist forces could attack Communist China at any time without UN sanction or fear of Soviet intervention.\(^{86}\) This indicated a high level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption of the system. However, Chiang did not immediately order any military action.

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The United States was still navigating the aftermath of the Korean War and continuing their anti-communist policy in 1953. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War armistice was signed, deescalating much of the tension in the region.\(^87\) Weary of the Chinese Communists, on September 2, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that if China were to renew the Korean conflict or send Communist forces into Indochina, the United States might declare war against the Mainland.\(^88\) This diplomatic action helped to stabilize the region.

Military tensions only escalated after the United States publicly declared its intention to defend peace in the region. In August 1954, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 15,000 to Matsu.\(^89\) This movement of troops to mount an assault of the Mainland was a clear indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. On August 11, 1954, PRC Premier Zhou En-lai declared that Taiwan must be liberated, warning that “foreign aggressors” who intervene would face “grave consequences.”\(^90\) This public statement was evidence of a high level of Chinese diplomatic disruption. Six days following this declaration, the United States warned China against attacking Taiwan in an attempt to stabilize the Strait.\(^91\)

**Conclusion**

Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruptions, as well as Chinese diplomatic disruption during this period were all observed at high levels. The intervening variable of

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\(^{87}\) Ibid.  
\(^{88}\) Address by the Hon. John Foster Dulles before the American Legion, St. Louis, Missouri, 2 September 1953, in *United States-Vietnam Relations*, Vol. IX, Part V, pp. 142-43.  
\(^{91}\) Pike, “First Taiwan Strait Crisis.”
negative feedback from the United States was mostly directed at China. By aiding the ROC on Taiwan, U.S. military opposition to China was high. At the beginning of this period, U.S. diplomatic resistance to Chinese actions was low, but then increased to a medium level as conflict between the two polities increased.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1954 – MAY 1, 1955 (IVD1 & IntVD1)

The independent variable of study, the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan, was initially very high in this period as illustrated in figure 4.2. Taiwanese and Chinese military disruptions as well as Chinese diplomatic disruptions were at high levels. Toward the end of the crisis, these measures can be observed at medium and low levels. The intervening variable of the level of negative feedback from the United States was generally high during this period. U.S. military and diplomatic opposition to China were high, while diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was at first medium then at low levels.

Figure 4.2: IVD1 and IntVD1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
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<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>MED</td>
<td>~HIGH</td>
<td>LOW/MED</td>
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The First Taiwan Strait Crisis

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis began with the highly disruptive and aggressive military acts of the Chinese Communists. On September 3, 1954, the Chinese Communists
began artillery bombardment of the small Nationalist-held offshore island of Jinmen (Quemoy) and the Nationalists returned fire.\textsuperscript{92} Chiang then began to pressure the United States for a mutual defense treaty, only to discover that supposedly sympathetic leaders in Washington were unwilling.\textsuperscript{93} By bombing the offshore islands, PRC Chairman of the CCP Mao Zedong intended to deter a defense treaty, create friction between Washington and Taipei, and force the international community to pay attention to the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{94} However, as a result of the bombing of the Offshore Islands, Dulles had no choice but to sign the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{95} A second U.S. reaction to the bombardment of the offshore islands came on September 4, when Dulles ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet back into the Strait.\textsuperscript{96} In addition to the military equipment and intelligence the United States supplied naval forces to Taiwan, indicating a medium level of military opposition to China. This was not only a measure to censure China, but also to constrain Chiang.

Despite U.S. containment efforts, the crisis deepened. On September 7, 1954, the Nationalists began large-scale air strikes against the Chinese Mainland.\textsuperscript{97} The following day, the United States joined seven other countries in signing a regional defense treaty, establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).\textsuperscript{98} This institution was formed to combat the spread of communism in Asia. On September 12, The U.S. Joint Chiefs of

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp. 1505-1507.
\textsuperscript{97} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”
Staff recommended the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China.\textsuperscript{99} In addition to the military support the United States already gave to the ROC, this additional military sanction against the PRC showed high-level U.S. military opposition to the Chinese Communists.

Later in 1954, the PRC not only opposed Taiwan, but also began to target U.S. operations in the Strait. In November the PLA began a campaign of bombing the Tachen islands.\textsuperscript{100} In retaliation for U.S. support for the ROC, China sentenced 13 U.S. Airmen, shot down over China in the Korean War, to long jail terms on November 11. This prompted further consideration of nuclear strikes against China.\textsuperscript{101} In the first days of December 1954, at the urging of Senator Knowland, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalist government on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{102} This treaty pledged American support for Taiwan against any attack from Mainland China. In response, the ROC made clear that it would not attack Mainland China without first consulting the United States.\textsuperscript{103} This measure made clear to the PRC that the United States would defend the ROC, but also placed a check on the actions of Chiang. Following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, on December 8, Zhou En-lai warned that the United States would face “grave consequences” if it did not withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, adding that Chinese “liberation” of Taiwan was “entirely in the purview of China’s sovereignty and a purely internal affair of China.”\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{99} Pike, “First Taiwan Strait Crisis.”
\textsuperscript{100} Elleman, \textit{High Seas Buffer}, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{104} Liu, “38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel Leads Straight to Taiwan.”
The Formosa Resolution

In 1955 the escalation of Chinese military aggression resulted in the Formosa Resolution. In January, Chinese Communists attacked Nationalist-held islands in the Taiwan Strait. In response, the Nationalists bombed Communist shipping along the China coast.\textsuperscript{105} On January 18, Mainland Chinese forces seized Yijiangshan Island, 210 miles north of Formosa and, completely wiped out the ROC forces stationed there.\textsuperscript{106} Six days later on January 24, Zhou En-lai reiterated his intention to invade Taiwan.\textsuperscript{107} In light of these escalations, the Formosa Resolution passed both houses of U.S. Congress on January 29. The resolution authorized the president to employ American forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, along with other territories as appropriate, to defend them against armed attack.\textsuperscript{108} The ambiguity of this resolution helped cool the heels of both Zhou En-lai and Chiang. Chinese Communists did not want a war with the United States and Taiwan was not sure which islands the United States would help defend.

Following the Formosa Resolution, the United States began a campaign opposing Chinese aggression to try and deescalate the Taiwan Strait using nuclear deterrence. On February 7, 1955, Nationalist troops began the withdrawal from the Dachen Islands with the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.\textsuperscript{109} Two days later, the Senate ratified The U.S.-Nationalist Chinese Mutual Security Pact, which did not apply to islands along the Chinese


\textsuperscript{108} Pike, “First Taiwan Strait Crisis.”

Mainland. In a nationally televised address on March 8, Dulles warned China not to underestimate U.S. determination to meet aggression in East Asia, adding that the United States could employ “new and powerful weapons of precision.” At a National Security Council meeting on March 10 Dulles stated that the American people have to be prepared for possible nuclear strikes against China. These statements became increasingly public. On March 15, Dulles publicly stated that the United States was seriously considering using atomic weapons in the Quemoy-Matsu area. The next day, Eisenhower publicly stated, “A-bombs can be used…as you would use a bullet.” This talk of nuclear weapons grew so intense that on March 25, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral stated that the president was planning “to destroy Red China’s military potential,” predicting war by mid-April.

Gradual De-escalation

Even as they prepared for war against China, the Eisenhower Administration feared that such a war could lead to war with the Soviet Union. While Eisenhower was prepared for a war against China, some domestic constituents in the United States advocated for U.S. recognition of the PRC. In the spring of 1955 Eisenhower sent a mission to persuade Chiang to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu because they were exposed. The President was

114 Liu, “U.S. Unilateralism.”
115 Pike, “First Taiwan Strait Crisis.”
unsuccessful; Chiang would not withdraw. Subsequently Eisenhower provided the Nationalists with air-to-air missiles that enabled them to sweep Mao's MiGs from the skies over the Taiwan Strait, and sent to Quemoy and Matsu 8-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells.\textsuperscript{116} In an article in \textit{Foreign Affairs} published in March, Arthur H. Dean, a U.S. negotiator in the Korean armistice talks and former law partner of Dulles, advocated for U.S. recognition of Communist China.\textsuperscript{117}

The Chinese Communists also had no wish to go to war with the United States and sought to negotiate an end to the crisis. On March 23, 1955, China stated at the Afro-Asian Conference that it was ready to negotiate on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{118} Zhou En-lai stated that Communist China did not want war with the United States and was willing to negotiate with the U.S. government. The United States responded that it would agree to negotiations if Nationalist China participated in the discussion as equals.\textsuperscript{119} This was a large milestone towards the end of the crisis, which demonstrated that Chinese diplomatic disruption was declining to low levels. On May 1, 1955, the shelling of Quemoy-Matsu ceased, ending the crisis.\textsuperscript{120}

\section*{Conclusion}

During this period, the independent variable of positive feedback generated between the ROC and the PRC generally started at high levels and gradually decreased in intensity. Chinese military and diplomatic disruptions began at high levels and decreased as the desire

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Liu, “U.S. Unilateralism.”
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to go to war with the United States waned. Taiwan demonstrated a high level of military disruption and a medium level of diplomatic disruption. U.S. military opposition to China was high and its diplomatic resistance showed both medium and high levels. The United States opposed the Taiwanese with high levels of military deterrence and low and medium levels of diplomatic resistance.

MAY 2, 1955 – AUGUST 22, 1958 (IVD2 & IntVD2)

The time between the crises was uncertain for the ROC, the PRC, and the United States. As seen in figure 4.3, ROC and PRC military disruption during this period reflected both low and high levels. Taiwan’s diplomatic disruption was at a medium level. China’s diplomatic disruption can also be observed at low and high levels. The intervening variable, divided into opposition to Taiwan and Chinese actions was similarly turbulent. U.S. diplomatic opposition is observed at medium levels for both China and Taiwan. Consistently, the United States indirectly opposed the Chinese Communists with a high level of military resistance by aiding ROC military efforts.

Figure 4.3: IVD2 and IntVD2

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<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
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<td>MED</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>MED</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis

In the time directly following the ceasefire, which ended the second crisis, the PRC worked to keep their diplomatic disruption at a low level. On August 1, 1955, in an attempt to improve relations with the United States, China released the 11 captured airmen previously sentenced to jail terms.\(^{121}\) Zhou En-lai proposed a meeting with Dulles to discuss Taiwan and other problems the following year.\(^{122}\)

Despite the deescalating disruption of the PRC, the United States, due to its anti-communist predilections, was reluctant to negotiate with them. In addition to this reluctance the United States had a vested interest in maintaining its relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. On June 12, 1956, Dulles rejected the Chinese offer of discussions because of the short notice and because 13 captured Americans were still imprisoned in China.\(^{123}\) Even after the Communist government on the Mainland decided it would not want a war against the United States, Chiang still had designs to take back the Mainland by force. In the summer of 1956, Chiang initiated a secret “Plan K” for joint navy, marine, and army landings in Fujian and Guangdong provinces. Scaled back from proposals to attack Shanghai or the Shandong peninsula, nearer Beijing, this venture, Chang argued to Washington, would recoup losses in Vietnam and Korea. Washington refused to assist.\(^{124}\) One last illustration of the conciliatory agenda of the PRC and the distrustful nature of the United States in the period was an incident involving visas for newsmen. On August 7, 1956, one day after the Chinese government offered visas to 15 American newsmen who had requested them, the U.S. State

\(^{121}\) Ibid.
\(^{122}\) WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1955-1959.”
\(^{123}\) Ibid.
\(^{124}\) Tucker, *Strait Talk*, p. 15.
Department announced that it would continue to bar travel to China as long as it held American “political hostages.”

The United States continued its policy of denying travel to and from Mainland China into 1957. On June 25, 1957, Eleanor Roosevelt revealed that the State Department had denied her permission to travel to China and interview Chinese leaders. Dulles authorized 24 news organizations to send correspondents to China for a seven-month trial period on August 22, but would not issue reciprocal visas to Chinese newsmen. In response, on August 25, the Chinese People’s Daily denounced the State Department’s plan as “completely unacceptable to the Chinese people.” The PRC had finally had enough of U.S. policy and on October 15, 1957, signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union to develop Chinese nuclear capability.

At the same time as this secret nuclear deal, several civil and political leaders within the United States called for improved relations with the PRC. In the October 1957 edition of Foreign Affairs, Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) called for a new foreign policy toward China, describing existing U.S. policy as “exaggeratedly military” and “probably too rigid.” On December 12, the United States suspended on-again off-again Geneva talks with China.

In 1958 the levels of the independent and intervening variables fluctuated. On January 1, 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward on the Mainland, aimed at

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130 John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, October 1957.
accomplishing the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly faster pace
and with greater results. Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies. The
"soft" foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, to which China
had subscribed in the mid-1950s, gave way to a "hard" line in 1958.\textsuperscript{132} In May of that year,
the Americans for Democratic Action called for negotiations toward diplomatic recognition
of Communist China “as a means of establishing the normal channels of communication
between the two nations.”\textsuperscript{133} Despite these sympathizers, the Administration continued to
mistrust and oppose the PRC.

In June 1958, the Chinese Communists demanded a resumption of Sino-American
ambassadorial talks,\textsuperscript{134} even while China’s first atomic reactor began operating.\textsuperscript{135} In July, the
Chinese Nationalists began to anticipate a Communist move against the Offshore Islands.
Urging the United States to commit itself publicly to the defense of the Offshore Islands, they
also sought modern equipment for their armed forces, including the delivery of American
Sidewinder missiles.\textsuperscript{136} While the United States refused to issue a public statement indicating
that it would defend Quemoy, it did increase its military assistance to the Government of the
Republic of China (ROC) and began intensive contingency planning for a crisis in the
Taiwan Strait. The basic policy of the American government was that it would help defend
the Offshore Islands only if necessary for the defense of Taiwan. American officials in the
field were authorized to assist the ROC in planning the defense of the islands, and assumed

\textsuperscript{133} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1955-1959.”
\textsuperscript{134} M. H. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (U), Memorandum RM-4900-ISA
December 1966, abridged RM4900,” sponsored by the Department of Defense, (Rand Corporation, Unclassified
March 18, 1975) p. v.
p. 99.
\textsuperscript{136} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. v.
that nuclear weapons would be used to counter anything but very light probing by the Chinese Communists.\textsuperscript{137} This is evidence of high-level military opposition to the PRC.

\textbf{Renewed Military Conflict}

In July 1958, the first military action came in the form of air clashes over the Taiwan Strait and the Chinese Mainland.\textsuperscript{138} On July 22, China announced the start of a campaign to “liberate” Taiwan and began building up forces opposite the island.\textsuperscript{139} In early August, officials in Washington became concerned with the possibility of a crisis, although they did not expect the Chinese Communists to launch a major military attack. A consensus developed that a high-level decision should be made as to what the American reaction would be to an air-sea interdiction against the Offshore Islands. There was also strong pressure for a diplomatic warning to the Chinese Communists that the United States would not tolerate the fall of Quemoy.\textsuperscript{140}

The United States and China briefly attempted to improve relations in order to deescalate the situation. On August 1, 1958, the United States and China began the first ambassadorial talks aimed at improving Sino-American relations. The talks secured the release of American POWs and spies in China and Chinese scientists detained in the United States during the Korean War. The talks, held first in Geneva, and after 1958, in Warsaw, continued on and off until 1972. They were the only point of direct contact between Beijing and Washington for 16 years.\textsuperscript{141} Despite this channel of communication, tensions continued

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1955-1959.”
\textsuperscript{140} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” pp. v-vi.
to mount. On August 22, the U.S. government decided it would participate in the defense of the Offshore Islands if they came under attack. This demonstrated the high-level military opposition of the United States to the PRC. It was agreed that, as an attempt to deter a Chinese Communist move, a public statement clarifying the American position would be issued in the form of an exchange of letters between Dulles and Representative Thomas Morgan.\textsuperscript{142}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The independent variable of study broken into Chinese and Taiwanese disruption varied during this time. Taiwanese and Chinese military disruption as well as Chinese diplomatic disruption were observed at both low and high levels during this period. The ROC was diplomatically disruptive at a medium level. The United States matched this and diplomatically opposed Taiwan at a medium level. There were high levels of U.S. military opposition to China and medium levels of diplomatic opposition.

**AUGUST 23, 1958 – OCTOBER 6, 1958 (IVD3 & IntVD3)**

In the beginning of this period the independent variable—positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan—began at high levels in both military and diplomatic categories. Chinese Communist disruption began to taper off once they learned the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons, while Chiang was more difficult to pacify.

\textsuperscript{142} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. vi.
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

The crisis officially began with Chinese military disruption. On August 23, 1958, at 6:30pm Taiwan time, the Chinese Communists resumed a massive artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, and threatened invasion.143 The initial fire was directed at a ceremony welcoming the Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister to Quemoy. Artillery fire remained heavy during the first two weeks of the crisis and was directed mainly at incoming convoys. At the same time, a number of air engagements took place in which the Chinese Nationalists very quickly demonstrated their superiority over the Chinese Communists.144 Chinese patrol boats blockaded Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts. This was accompanied by an aggressive propaganda assault on the United States, threats against American naval ships, and a declaration of intent to "liberate" Taiwan. Quemoy, which lies about 10 kilometers from the Mainland, had been used by the Nationalists to mount raids on Mainland China.145

The United States in response to this outbreak of violence, had to decide to what extent they would be involved in the crisis. From August 23-24, 1958, officials in the Pentagon and the State Department worked on position papers for a meeting to be held at the White House on the 25th of August. The basic position paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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143 Ibid., p. vi.
144 Ibid., p. viii.
145 Pike, “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.”
urged the United States to involve itself in the defense of the Offshore Islands, stating bluntly that, although initial operations might have to be conventional for political reasons, atomic strikes against the Chinese Mainland would eventually be necessary if the Chinese Communists were to be stopped effectively and quickly.\footnote{Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. vii.}

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists showed only signs of increasing the conflict. During the first two weeks of the crisis, Chinese Communist propaganda tended to downplay the events in the Taiwan Strait. \textit{The People’s Daily} simply reported what was in fact taking place. Soviet propaganda followed the same line by denying that a major crisis was occurring.\footnote{The Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center, \textit{Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 452.} The Chinese Communists, however, did begin to beam a series of radio broadcasts at Quemoy, calling upon the garrison to surrender and warning that it was cut off and isolated.\footnote{Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. viii.}

Once a decision had been made in Washington, the level of military resistance to the Chinese Communists was maintained at a high level, with the naval and air support, intelligence, and equipment and aid sent to the ROC. After deliberation on August 25, approval was given to the Navy paper authorizing the Commander in Chief of Pacific Command (CINPAC) to reinforce American capability and to prepare to escort supply ships to the Offshore Islands. CINPAC was also authorized to prepare to assist in the event of a major assault against Quemoy. Aware of the problems that would arise if the Chinese Nationalists were to know the full extent of U.S. commitment to the Offshore Islands,
Washington ordered the Taiwan Defense Commander not to inform the ROC of planned American moves.\textsuperscript{149}

Towards the end of August, U.S. military actions in the Taiwan Strait and in the Far East in general were substantially increased in order to publicize U.S. determination to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Nationalists, who were reacting favorably to the steps taken by the United States, continued to press for a public statement that the United States would regard an attack on Quemoy as an attack on Taiwan. They also asked for a U.S. convoy to Quemoy and stand-by authority for the Taiwan Defense Commander to participate in the defense of Quemoy in the event of an all-out Chinese Communist assault.\textsuperscript{150} On August 28, American officials in the field were reporting that the critical issue was the supplying of Quemoy, and attention then came to be focused on this problem.\textsuperscript{151} The following day, a second meeting at the White House authorized American escorts for ROC convoys to within three miles of Quemoy. This decision was immediately disclosed to the ROC, and plans were made for such convoying.\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{U.S. Consideration of Nuclear Weapons}

In early September, Chinese Communist military action against the Offshore Islands began to taper off,\textsuperscript{153} yet the U.S. government began discussing the use of nuclear weapons. On September 2, 1958, Dulles met with members of the Joint Chiefs and other top officials to formulate the basic American position on the crisis and to define American policy in the

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. vi-vii.
\textsuperscript{150} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” pp. vii-viii.
\textsuperscript{152} U.S. Department of State, “Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt),” Office of the Historian (Washington, D.C.), August 29, 1958.
\textsuperscript{153} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. ix.
event of a Chinese Communist invasion of the Offshore Islands. At this meeting it was debated whether or not Quemoy could be defended without nuclear weapons. Additionally, they discussed the more general question of the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence. The consensus reached was that the use of nuclear weapons would ultimately be necessary for the defense of Quemoy, but that the United States should limit itself initially to use conventional forces.154 The Chinese Communists brought their artillery action to a virtual ceasefire after this date.155

The United States wanted to make clear to the PRC that they would defend the Offshore Islands. The Chinese Communists responded with low and medium level diplomatic measures. On September 3, 1958, the next meeting Dulles called with the Joint Chiefs and other top officials authorized a formal paper urging the President to agree to an American defense of the Offshore Islands.156 At the same time it was recognized that it was important to make unmistakably clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States was prepared to intervene in order to deter a possible Chinese Communist move. Following this, Eisenhower met with Dulles at Newport,157 and then the President returned to Washington for another White House consultation on the crisis. The following day, Chinese Communists laid claim to all waters within 12 miles of its coasts, including the islands of Jinmen (Quemoy), Mazu (Matsu) and other Nationalist-held islands in those waters. The same day, Dulles issues

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a statement that the United States “would not hesitate” to use armed force “in insuring the defense of” Taiwan.\textsuperscript{158}

**Gradual Reduction of Disruption**

The conflict began to deescalate when Communist China expressed a willingness to negotiate; however, China also continued to call for the liberation of Taiwan. On September 6, Chinese Communist Premier Zhou En-lai issued a public statement offering to reopen the Sino-American ambassadorial talks.\textsuperscript{159} The United States agreed to the talks the same day.\textsuperscript{160} The Chinese Communist *People’s Daily* devoted most of its front page to Zhou’s statement and thereafter began to publicize the developing crisis. Meanwhile, the Mainland Chinese inaugurated a series of public meetings calling for the liberation of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{161}

Chiang sought to bring the United States into a war against the Chinese Communists in an effort to take back Greater China by force. The ROC, with U.S. military assistance and convoy support starting September 7, gradually improved its ability to land supplies on Quemoy. It also continued to press for greater U.S. involvement in the crisis and for permission to bomb the Mainland. While ROC officials still affirmed that they would try to honor their commitment to consult the United States before attacking the Mainland, they stressed that attacks on the Mainland might be necessary. Apparently the ROC was still trying to manipulate events so as to draw the United States into a greater military involvement against the Chinese Communists. U.S. officials in the field, attempting to

\textsuperscript{158} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1955-1959.”
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 222.
\textsuperscript{161} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. x.
develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, sought to aid the ROC resupply effort and to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the United States would be involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands. In addition, military officers were engaged in crash planning for possible large-scale conventional operations in the Taiwan Strait. This contingency planning produced a bitter reaction among some officials, who felt that large-scale conventional operations were unrealistic.\(^{162}\)

During September, public opposition to American involvement in defense of the Offshore Islands continued to mount in the United States and abroad. American officials were aware of this opposition and felt constrained by it. The United States sought to answer its critics in a series of public statements and to warn Beijing that the United States would be involved in the defense of Quemoy.\(^{163}\) On September 11, 1958, Eisenhower indicated that Quemoy would not be permitted to fall. There was considerable uncertainty in Washington during September as to whether or not the Communist blockade could be broken by American-escorted convoys.\(^{164}\) After some further negotiations with the Chinese Communists as well as the Chinese Nationalists, U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam held the first of the renewed Warsaw talks with Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang on September 15. During this and subsequent meetings, the United States pressed for a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait while the Chinese Communists demanded that the United States withdraw from the Taiwan area.\(^{165}\) Though no consensus was reached, the crisis subsided over the next few weeks. In mid September Chinese Communist propaganda appeared to be aimed at

\(^{162}\) Ibid., p. xiv.

\(^{163}\) Ibid., p. xiv.


minimizing the consequences of their failure to take Quemoy and, at the same time, at exacerbating U.S.-ROC relations.\textsuperscript{166} Even while tensions were subsiding, the political deadlock between the PRC and the ROC was settling into place.

The United States and China wanted to end the conflict, while Chiang was still adamant about recovering the Mainland. On September 25, U.S. officials concluded that the Chinese Communist blockade could be broken and that there was no need to pursue a diplomatic course toward a political settlement.\textsuperscript{167} On September 30, Dulles told the press that it would be foolhardy to sustain large deployments on the precarious Offshore Islands if a ceasefire could be negotiated.\textsuperscript{168} Dulles compelled Chiang to agree to a communiqué declaring that Taiwan would rely on political means to recover the Mainland.\textsuperscript{169} In a radio broadcast from Beijing on October 6, 1958, Chinese Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the nationalists and announced that the PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week, if the United States ceased to escort ROC convoys.\textsuperscript{170} This temporary ceasefire officially ended the crisis.

**Conclusion**

The independent variable of positive feedback between China and Taiwan began at high levels of military and diplomatic disruption in this period. Chinese disruption deescalated once they realized that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons; Chiang was more difficult to deter. The United States maintained a high level of military

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\textsuperscript{166} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. xiii.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., p. xv.
\textsuperscript{169} Tucker, *Strait Talk*, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{170} Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis,” p. xvi.
\end{flushright}
opposition to Chinese disruption through their aid to the ROC and medium and high levels of diplomatic opposition.

OCTOBER 7, 1958-OCTOBER 7, 1960 (IVD2+ & InvtVD2+)

In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, there was initially some on-and-off conflict coming out of the ceasefire, but then tensions diminished. The Chinese Communists suspended their fire for a final time and the Soviets annulled their promise to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and medium levels of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition to the PRC.

**Figure 4.5: IV2+ and IntV2+**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>CHINESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
<th>OPPOSING CHINA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>~HIGH</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>~HIGH</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Slow Process of Reinstating a Political Truce

In the two years following the second crisis there was a brief period of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On October 13, 1958, the Chinese Communists announced that they were continuing the ceasefire for another two weeks.\(^{171}\) The Chinese Communists announced that they were resuming fire on October 20, because an American ship had

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intruded into Chinese Communist territorial waters. On October 25, the Chinese Communists said that they were again suspending their fire. This time they declared that they would not fire on even-numbered days against airfields, beaches, and wharves if there were no American escort. Following this latest ceasefire, Chinese Communist propaganda took the line that they had never been interested in capturing only the Offshore Islands but were determined instead to capture both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands at the same time.

In 1959, the crisis situation cooled off. On June 20, 1959, the Soviet Union annulled its secret October 1957 promise to help China develop a nuclear arsenal. On December 7, the Rockefeller Report on future U.S. foreign policy needs called for improved relations with the Chinese people, while acknowledging China’s hostile stance towards the United States. Public opinion in the United States in 1960 continued to advocate for U.S. recognition of the PRC. On May 23, 1960, the “Liberal Project,” a group of House members, scholars and scientists, released a study advocating opening direct communications with Beijing and withdrawing U.S. opposition to U.N. membership for the PRC. There was some backlash from interest groups who were still staunchly anti-communist. The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations called on the American public to support its campaign opposing concessions to the Beijing government on June 16, 1960. The Eisenhower Administration was still a firm supporter of the ROC on Taiwan. In a visit to Taiwan on June 18, Eisenhower told a rally, “The United States does not

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recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Beijing to speak for all the Chinese people. In the United Nations we support the Republic of China, a founding member, as the only rightful representative of China in that organization.\footnote{WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1960-1964.”}

**Conclusion**

In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, after minimal conflict coming out of the ceasefire, tensions diminished. The Soviets annulled their promise to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and medium levels of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition to the PRC.

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE**

The dependent variable of study is the level of conflict. This section discusses the dependent variable in the two years following the independent and intervening variables. Additionally, this section examines the two years prior to the independent and intervening variables.

**OCTOBER 8, 1960-OCTOBER 8, 1962 (DV2+)**

In the period DV2+, diplomatic conflict can be observed at level two: China and Taiwan were open to third-party mediation but closed to negotiating with one another. Third party involvement (TPI) can be observed at levels two, three, and four.
During this period, both the United States and the PRC showed a desire to negotiate, while Chiang remained militant. On March 17, 1961, Sino-American ambassadorial talks between the United States and the PRC resumed in Warsaw. In the spring of that year, Chiang’s military chief sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. The U.S. refusal to supply the shells shut this plan down.

While the United States would not support the military designs of the ROC on Taiwan, it continued to defend their position as the representative of China in the United Nations. In August 1961, President Kennedy secretly promised Chiang that the United States would veto any UN decision to seat the Beijing government, and agreed to cooperate with Chiang’s forces in covert operations against the Mainland. On December 1, 1961, there was debate in the UN General Assembly on whether to admit the PRC. This was the first time since 1950 that the question of China’s admission made it to the General Assembly. However, on December 15, the UN General Assembly rejected this proposal.

In 1962 the Sino-Indian War broke out, leaving the PRC few resources to deal with Taiwan. The U.S. Air Force in Taiwan established the Taipei Air Station. On June 27, 1962, President Kennedy stated in a press conference:

One possibility is that there might be aggressive action against the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In that event, the policy of this country will be that established seven years ago under the Formosa Resolution. The United States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. In the last crisis in the Taiwan area in 1958, President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would not remain inactive in the face of

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181 Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 19.
any aggressive action against the offshore islands, which might threaten Formosa.\textsuperscript{185}

He went on to state that he was opposed to using force in the region, but would do so in order to protect Taiwan.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1950-SEPTEMBER 2, 1952 (DV2-)

During the period prior to the independent and intervening variables, third party involvement quickly escalated from low to high on a four-point scale. Diplomatic conflict was observed at a level three and military conflict at a level four.

In 1950, the U.S. government considered the conflict between the ROC and the PRC to be self-contained. The United States would not aid the ROC in any other way than ensuring they retained their seat in the UN General Assembly, but only to ensure that the Chinese Communists were barred from entry. As a result of their disillusionment with the ROC due to its corruptions and inefficiencies, the Truman Administration issued a statement on January 5, 1950 that they would not intervene for the defense of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{186} On the 19\textsuperscript{th} of September, the PRC was barred once again from taking China’s seat in the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{187}

As the war in Korea was breaking out, military conflict in the region escalated. On the 30\textsuperscript{th} of September 1950, Zhou En-lai warned that China would not stand idly by if “the imperialists wantonly [invaded] the territory of North Korea.”\textsuperscript{188} South Korean troops crossed


\textsuperscript{188} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”
the 38th parallel into North Korea on October 1.\textsuperscript{189} The next day, Zhou En-lai formally notified the Indian ambassador to China that if the United States entered North Korea, China would intervene.\textsuperscript{190} In response, U.S. troops, led by General Douglas MacArthur, cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.\textsuperscript{191} In November, Chinese troops attacked U.S. forces on both Western and Eastern fronts. The U.S. forces withdrew.\textsuperscript{192} On November 26, as UN troops, led by General MacArthur, approached Korea’s northern border, Chinese troops entered the war in force, driving MacArthur south of the 38th parallel.\textsuperscript{193} On December 8, the U.S. Commerce Department announced a total trade embargo on China. It would remain in place for 21 years.\textsuperscript{194}

By 1951, the United States military was fully invested in the region and in the struggle against Communist China. On February 1, 1950, at the urging of the United States, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution branding China an aggressor in the Korea conflict.\textsuperscript{195} On April 11, President Truman dismissed General MacArthur from all commands in East Asia after repeatedly ignoring White House orders not to publicly demand that the war be expanded against Communist China.\textsuperscript{196} Shortly after that, the U.S. Defense Department announced the appointment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group for Taiwan, on whose recommendation the United States resumed direct military aid to the Nationalists.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{189} Liu, “38th Parallel Leads Straight to Taiwan.”
\textsuperscript{190} Dean Acheson, “Congressional Testimony, June 1, 1951,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.
\textsuperscript{191} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., p. 232.
\textsuperscript{196} WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
The U.S. government used the Nationalists on Taiwan as a tool against Communist China. On May 18, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk set the tone for U.S.-China policy for the next two decades when he stated, “The regime in Peiping [Beijing]…is not the government of China… We recognize the national government of the Republic of China, [which will]…continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.” The UN unanimously adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for “every state” in the world to withhold arms or strategic materials from Communist China. On the 10th of July 1951, truce talks began between a U.S.-led delegation and North Korean-Chinese Communist representatives. Korean truce talks entered their second year in 1952.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables in terms of the levels of military and diplomatic disruption in a total of five time periods. I expect overall trend of the level of disruption to form a bimodal curve. Tensions escalated in the two years prior to the first crisis, reached a peak during the first crisis, subsided by a small degree, then increased again during the second crisis. In the two years following the second crisis, tensions deescalated once more. This sequence of events points to a positive feedback cycle. The actions of the United States to quell the conflict across the Taiwan Strait formed the negative feedback cycle that eventually reinstated stability. The next chapter will cover Case 2: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation.

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198 Liu, “38th Parallel Leads Straight to Taiwan.”
200 Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, p. 233.
201 Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE:  
CASE 2 THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1991-2004  

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Taiwan Confrontation together constituted one positive feedback cycle for the purpose of this study. According to the model of punctuated equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. I argue that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Mainland comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change. Additionally, the actions of the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be characterized as a negative feedback cycle.

As noted in Chapter Three, the independent variable of this study is the positive feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent variable. The bounds of this case are June 1991 to May 2002. In the first section of this chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the history of the two years leading up to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second section will discuss the independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between, and the second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the Taiwan Confrontation. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years after the official end date of the confrontation until four years after that time. To establish a baseline for the dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the third crisis until two
years prior to that time. Figure 3.6 in Chapter Three: Methodology illustrates the timeframe of study.

Due to the complexity of organizations and historical figures in this chapter, I briefly summarize here the relevant actors. Several significant events have transpired in the period of détente between the second and third Taiwan Strait crises. Taiwan lost its seat in the UN to the PRC in 1971. Even as the United States cultivated its relationship with China, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act “provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability.”

The United States, seeking to promote democracy around the world, continued to aid Taiwan with arms deals and foreign direct investment. Taiwan democratized in the early 1990s and the process was complete with the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian in 2000, ending the Kuomintang’s (KMT) monopoly on power.

Relations between China and Taiwan began to improve in the late 1980s and early 1990s when both polities expressed interest in deepening economic and diplomatic relations. On the 21st of November 1990, the ROC created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) as a semi-official organization to handle technical and business matters with the PRC. Though

204 Ibid.
207 “Taiwan Country Profile,” BBC News.
technically a private organization, it is funded through the government and controlled by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of the ROC central government). Following suit, the PRC created the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the 16th of December 1991 for the same purpose as the SEF. This context situates the events of the next section into an overarching history.

INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES

In this section, I discuss the independent and intervening variables concurrently. The independent variable is the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan, while the intervening variable is the level of negative feedback from the United States. This chronology of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis is divided into three sections for the independent and intervening variables: in the two years prior, during, and in the two years following the crisis.

JUNE 9, 1993 – JUNE 8, 1995 (IV2- & IntV2-)

In the period of time between June 9, 1993 and June 8, 1995, diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan grew increasingly complicated. While both the ROC and PRC publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, each wanted unification to be carried out on its own terms. The differences in the demands of each political entity caused tensions to rise and the United States to seek greater involvement.
Early Attempts at Cooperation

In late June 1993, the ROC and PRC governments entered negotiations to discuss technical and business related issues across the Taiwan Strait. On June 24, 1993, Jiang Zemin took over as the director of PRC Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group. The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) published a White Paper, “the Taiwan Problem and the Unification of China,” on August 31, 1993. This paper reiterated both the opposition of the PRC to the entry of Taiwan into the UN, and the support of the PRC for peaceful reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework. This document demonstrated a high level of Chinese diplomatic disruption by implying the subordinate status of the ROC to the PRC. Despite this view and in ignorance of ROC conditions for unification, on December 18, 1993, officials of ARATS came to Taiwan for negotiations for the first time.

In early 1994, the political organs on Taiwan and the Mainland demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with one another on a variety of issues. On January 7, 1994, MAC announced the “Guiding Principle on cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges at the Current Stage,” stressing the need to promote cross-Strait cultural exchanges, for mutual benefit and the

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210 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
cultural development of the two sides.\textsuperscript{211} The first Chiao-Tang talks were held in Beijing on February 2, between officials at the vice-chairman level of the SEF and the ARATS. The meeting ended on February 5, and the two men issued "the joint press release by Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and Tang Shubei."\textsuperscript{212} Even as both sides were seeking to foster interdependence, the process was not without snags. At the fourth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang Talks held in Beijing on March 25, the two sides discussed three issues but failed to make any breakthrough.\textsuperscript{213}

\textbf{The Qiandao Incident and Its Effects}

PRC attempts at diplomatic cooperation fell on deaf ears after the Qiandao incident. On March 31, 1994, twenty-four Taiwanese tourists were kidnapped and murdered in the Qiandao Lake scenic area, in Zhejiang, PRC. Insensitive treatment by the local government and police force following the event, including censoring information and unprofessional criminal investigating procedures, led to public backlash in Taiwan against the PRC government.\textsuperscript{214} On April 9, ROC President Lee Teng-hui publicly criticized the Communist Party of China as acting “like bandits,” and claimed that the case was robbery committed by Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers, as had been claimed by Taiwanese intelligence. This spurred an increase in public support for independence.\textsuperscript{215} On April 30, Lee spoke of

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
“the sorrow of the Taiwanese” for being deserted by the international community and without any international status.\(^{216}\)

In light of these events the United States tried not to exacerbate tensions in the region. The United States did not afford Lee typical diplomatic courtesy when he was refueling his jet in Hawaii on May 3, 1994. According to *The Los Angeles Times*, “Lee was limited by the Clinton Administration to only a short refueling stop in order not to offend the People's Republic of China.”\(^{217}\) Later in the month of May, MAC made public the "Position Paper on Direct Transportation between the Two Sides," noting that direct transportation would be launched only when the dignity, order, and safety are ensured for the two sides.\(^{218}\) In a move that indirectly opposed the actions of Taiwan, on May 31, 1994, the United States decided to de-couple the issues of China’s human rights record and the Most Favored Nations treatment.\(^{219}\)

Pro-independence sentiment continued to increase on Taiwan. In June, the World United Formosans for Independence passed a draft constitution of the Republic of Taiwan, chose a new national flag, and composed a new national anthem.\(^{220}\) Official diplomacy, while on the surface in the spirit of cooperation, was in reality a demonstration of the near-insurmountable differences between Taiwan and the Mainland. On July 25, MAC published the white paper, “Relations Across the Taiwan Straits”\(^{221}\) in eight languages.\(^{222}\) This

\(^{216}\) Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
\(^{218}\) “Chronology: 1994,” *MAC*.
\(^{219}\) Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
\(^{220}\) Ibid., p. xiii.
document stated, “The fundamental reason why China [could not] be unified [was] not, as Peking would have it, that a section of the Taiwan population [wished] to separate itself from China, neither [was] it due to the interference of certain foreign forces.” Instead, it was due to the political and early economic disasters of the CCP regime. The ROC rejected the “one country, two systems” doctrine, preferring one country, two political entities.

**Continued Diplomacy**

This policy difference did not stop the negotiation between the ARATS and the SEF that was already in motion. On July 30, 1994, the fifth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang Talks was held in Taipei. The second Chiao-Tang Talks ran from August 4 to 7 in Taipei, where the SEF and the ARATS vice chairmen discussed the repatriation of criminals, illegal entrants, and hijackers; as well as the settlement of fishery disputes.

Even while the talks between the ARATS and the SEF continued, domestic policy and decision-makers in the ROC veered towards escalating conflict. Because the Mainland military had staged exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province, and Beijing used a zero-sum attitude to isolate and oppress the ROC’s bid to accede to the United Nations and participation in the Asian Games, on September 23, 1994, Premier Lien Chan said the cross-

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224 Ibid.


Strait relations could not advance into the middle-stage under the “Guidelines for National Unification.”

Due in part to these increasing tensions, on September 27, 1994, Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs announced “The Taiwan Policy Review” of the United States. In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he stated that the United States neither wanted to “interfere in nor mediate” the unification process of China and Taiwan, but would “welcome any evolution in relations between Taipei and Beijing that [was] mutually agreed upon and peacefully reached.” Lord went on to say that despite China’s transition to a market economy, it still adhered “to a repressive political system.” After this policy review the United States continued to provide material and training to Taiwan to promote its self-defense capability, as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales remained consistent with both the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué. In closing, Lord stated that the administration strongly opposed Congressional attempts to legislate visits by top leaders of the ROC to the United States, for fear that it would destabilize relations with the PRC.

The United States was pressured to increase its involvement in the Taiwan Strait when USS Kitty Hawk and China’s submarine and jet fighters had a brief military encounter in the Yellow Sea. China served notice through a U.S. military official in Beijing that the

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228 “Chronology: 1994,” MAC.
229 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
231 Ibid.
232 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
next time such a situation arose, China's orders would be to shoot to kill.233 Regardless of these events, in late December, the sixth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang Talks was held in Nanjing from December 22 to 27. However, no agreement was reached.234

In early 1995 this breach between the SEF-ARATS negotiations and relations between decision-makers in the PRC and ROC governments continued to widen. On January 1, 1995, Jiang Zemin announced his Eight-Point Taiwan policy.235 First, Jiang opposed Taiwanese independence and would “not promise not to use force. If used, force [would] not be directed against our compatriots in Taiwan, but against the foreign forces who [intervened] in China's reunification and [went] in for the independence of Taiwan.”236 Jiang then announced the PRC’s desire to promote economic interdependence and to accept invitations to visit Taiwan. In response on April 8, President Lee responded with his own Six Points.237 “Two of his points paralleled Jiang’s: increasing bilateral exchanges based on Chinese culture (Lee’s Point 2) and enhancing economic relations.”238 Lee not so subtly called the Mainland an “economic hinterland.”239 He called for unification based on the reality that the two sides were governed by two governments, neither subordinate to the other (Lee’s Point 1). Lee then suggested in Point 4 that both sides could meet in a natural manner on international occasions. This last, was directly contrary to Jiang’s eighth point, which repudiated third-party involvement in Chinese domestic affairs.

234 “Chronology: 1994,” MAC.
236 Ibid.
237 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
239 Ibid., p. 38.
The Tipping Point

This stalemate grew increasingly fragile when on May 22, 1955, the U.S. Congress agreed to issue ROC President Lee a visa for a visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. Too early to formulate a response to this U.S. action, the ARATS and the SEF met as normal and began to make progress. On May 27, the ARATS’ Tang Shubei came to Taiwan for talks. The first preparatory consultation for the Second Round of the Koo-Wang Talks reached eight items of consensus, and decided to hold the second round of preparatory consultation talks in June in preparation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks in Beijing.

Despite this line of diplomacy the actions of President Lee derailed further negotiations between the ARATS and the SEF. ROC President Lee visited his alma mater, Cornell University on June 9, 1995 provoking the PRC. On June 15, ROC Premier Lien Chan embarked on visits to Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary where he had private meetings with his Czech counterpart and with President Vaclav Havel. This provoked strong protest from China. On June 16, 1995, the ARATS decided in a letter to postpone the second Koo-Wang talks due to a “series of actions taken by Taiwan.” The following day, MAC announced its hope to continue regularized consultation across the

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240 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
241 Ibid., p. xiv.
243 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
244 Ibid., p. xiv.
Strait, and to hold the preparatory consultation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks as planned. This hope would be in vain.

On June 22, 1995, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, representing the State Council, declared Seven Points on Hong Kong-Taiwan relations. In this declaration he made clear to Hong Kong and Taiwan that the central government in Beijing was in control of Hong Kong’s relations with Taiwan. The handling of Hong Kong’s relation with Taiwan after 1997 was not part of the autonomous rule of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR); rather, it had to comply with the decision and arrangements made by the Beijing government. On June 30, the ARATS telephoned the SEF its decision to postpone the regularized cross-Strait consultation.

Conclusion

In this section, Chinese and Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to the cooperation of the ARATS and the SEF or high due to the expression of ideological divides by politicians higher up each government’s hierarchy. Taiwanese domestic disruption grew to medium levels due to increased public support for independence. Chinese military disruption was measured at a medium level due to PLA military exercises carried out opposite the Island of Taiwan. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was observed at a medium level, while U.S. opposition to China grew from a low to high level.

248 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
250 “Chronology: Cross-Strait Dialogue (May 1995-April 1998),” MAC.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in the period between June 9, 1995 and March 23, 1996. Diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan ground to a halt. While the ROC publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, the actions of ROC President Lee Teng-hui incensed the PRC. The contradictory diplomatic demands of the PRC and ROC caused tensions to rise and the United States to seek greater involvement.

**Figure 5.2: IVD1 and IntVD1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>CHINESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
<th>OPPOSING CHINA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Diplomatic, MED</td>
</tr>
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begin{table}

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

Beginning July 21, 1995 the PRC fired missiles in waters near Taiwan. This bombardment lasted for five more days. In an attempt to pacify the PRC, President Clinton sent PRC President Jiang Zemin a private letter on August 1, promising “no support for Taiwan independence.” Despite this assurance, or perhaps due to it, the PRC launched missiles from August 15 to 25. Further provoking the PRC, Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian on September 23, said the two sides would move to “one country on each side” after the popular direct presidential election.

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251 Ibid.
252 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
254 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
The ROC government remained divided on the issue of independence. On January 24, 1996, ROC Premier Lien Chan reiterated that the ROC government did not wish to see cross-Strait relations strained at issuing statements and creating publicity. He wanted the two sides to open lines of communication and negotiate. On January 30, PRC Premier Li Peng made a statement that only when Taiwan authorities abandoned creating "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan" both in rhetoric and in practice could cross-Strait relations normalize.

In March 1996, President Bill Clinton reacted to Chinese missiles plunging into waters just off Taiwan’s coast by dispatching two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the scene. This action demonstrated a high level of military opposition to China. Before that, government officials, members of congress, and the media had not been paying much attention to Taiwan. On March 5, the PRC made a statement in the early morning that it would launch a military exercise during March 8 through 15, firing ground-to-ground guided missiles into waters 20 to 40 nautical miles due east of Keelung, and 30 to 50 nautical miles due west of Kaohsiung. Lasting from March 8 through 23, Beijing launched the third round of missile tests and military exercises on the eve of the ROC presidential election. The Pentagon confirmed that USS Independence and USS Nimitz had arrived at the Taiwan Strait on March 11.

These military threats from the PRC continued through the end of March. Starting on March 12, the PRC staged live-fire exercises in a sea and air maneuver off the coastal areas

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256 Ibid.
257 Tucker, Strait Talk, p. 2.
258 “Chronology: 1996,” MAC.
259 “Chronology: Cross-Strait Dialogue (May 1995-April 1998),” MAC.
260 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiv.
stretching from Xiamen, Fujian Province, to Shantou, Guangdong Province.\footnote{261} In the following days, the PRC fired more missiles in waters near Kaohsiung harbor,\footnote{262} dispatched a joint force maneuver in the sea near Pingtan, Fujian Province,\footnote{263} staged a landing exercise on a small islet,\footnote{264} and practiced an air strike exercise.\footnote{265} Despite all of this intimidation from the PRC, on March 23, the citizens of the ROC popularly and directly elected Lee Teng-hui for president and Lien Chan for vice president.\footnote{266}

**Conclusion**

In summary, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to the SEF’s desire to cooperate, or high due to the rhetoric of President Lee Teng-hui. Chinese diplomatic disruption was mostly high, because of both threats to use force and an unwillingness to negotiate due to Taiwan’s course of action. Taiwanese domestic disruption grew to high levels when President Lee won reelection. Chinese military disruption was measured at medium and high levels due to military maneuvers and missile tests being carried out near Taiwan’s coast. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan can be observed at a medium level, while U.S. opposition to China was measured as high.

**MARCH 24, 1996 – JULY 8, 1999 (IVD2 & IntVD2)**

In the period of time between March 24, 1996 and July 8, 1999, diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan continued their complicated trajectory. While the SEF and the
ARATS supported negotiation and deeper relations, the executive branches of each
government wanted unification to be carried out on its own terms. The differences in the
demands of each political entity caused tensions to rise and the United States to increase their
diplomatic relations with China and continue arms sales to Taiwan.

Figure 5.3: IVD2 and IntVD2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>CHINESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
<th>OPPOSING CHINA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>LOW/HIGH</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions Over the Use of Force

In the wake of the March 23\textsuperscript{rd} elections on Taiwan, the PRC generated a high level of
diplomatic disruption. On April 23, 1996, Vice Chairman of the PRC Central Military
Commission reiterated that Taiwan was “an inseparable part of China.”\textsuperscript{267} He insisted on
"reunification by peaceful means, one country, two systems" and further asserted that the
PRC would resort to the use of force should Taiwan declare independence or face foreign
intervention.\textsuperscript{268} Despite this threat of force, the SEF on Taiwan continued to call for talks. On
April 29, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS suggesting the resumption of the Koo-Wang
Talks and regularized consultation.\textsuperscript{269} The PRC, displeased with Taiwan’s conduct, refused
this request in a letter on May 2.\textsuperscript{270} A few days later, MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh said it

\textsuperscript{267} “Chronology: 1996,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} “SEF, letter to ARATS,” \textit{MAC}, 29 April 1996,
\textsuperscript{270} “ARATS, letter to SEF,” \textit{MAC}, 2 May 1996,
was the PRC that erected barriers against the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations. Since the ARATS replied negatively regarding the resumption of negotiations, the government would not seek other ways to express its willingness.271

The newly reelected President Lee called for peace, but continued to press the contentious issues that triggered the PRC’s aggression. On May 20, 1996, in his inaugural speech, President Lee noted the developments related to cross-Strait relations. First, the two sides should agree on how to eradicate the hostility in their relationship. Second, both should note the reality that the two belong to separate jurisdictions and accept the common goal of national unification. Both should strive to foster a system in which “Chinese help Chinese.”272 In the days following, Mainland Xinhua News Agency published an article titled “The one-China principle is inevitable,” criticizing ROC President Lee's failure to mention “one China” in his inaugural speech.273

PRC President Jiang Zemin also called for normalized relations while pushing his own agenda. Giving an interview to the media while visiting in Spain on June 26, 1996, Jiang said that the two sides could enter into cross-Strait negotiations for peaceful reunification and follow the principle of “one China” to terminate the hostility between the two sides. Asked to comment on a meeting between leaders of the two sides, Jiang said he would welcome the Taiwan leader to visit the Mainland in an appropriate capacity.274 Diplomatic tensions continued to rise when the PRC issued a thinly veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. On August 5, Sha Zukang, PRC representative for negotiations on nuclear weapons, told the American media that the PRC had given an unconditional commitment on no-first-

271 “Chronology: 1996,” MAC.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
use of nuclear weapons on any foreign countries including the United States. Taiwan was just one province of China, not a country. Therefore, the PRC's commitment did not apply to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{275}

**International Recognition of Taiwan**

Even as Taiwan sought peace with the Mainland, domestic decisions disrupted the status quo. The National Development Conference was held in Taipei among the KMT, DPP, and New Party from December 23 to 28. One major development was that the DPP joined the KMT in support of President Lee’s policy of seeking to enhance Taiwan’s separate diplomatic standing by winning international recognition.\textsuperscript{276}

In early 1997, Taiwanese diplomats and statesmen continued to express their interest in a more interdependent and peaceful cross-Strait relationship. In a January seminar, “Retrospect and Prospects for Ten Years of Cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges,” MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh urged the governments and peoples of the two sides to work for greater exchanges of information, culture, and value systems—the three cultural links—in order to end the grudges harbored by the two sides.\textsuperscript{277} While the level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was low, Chinese diplomatic disruption continued at high levels. On March 9, The Fifteenth National People’s Congress adopted the “National Defense Law,” which defined the basic principles of and operations for national defense.\textsuperscript{278} This showed that the PRC desired to dispel international worries about the “China threat.”

\textsuperscript{275}Ibid.


Minister Chi Haotian said that this law could guard against the Taiwan independence movement and other secessionist movements that called for splitting the nation.\textsuperscript{279}

Taiwanese diplomatic disruption swung from low levels, when leaders called for negotiation, to high levels when they condemned the actions of China in Hong Kong or made bids for increased international recognition and status. On March 13, 1997, ROC Premier Lien Chan said the government would not reject direct cross-Strait talks, but was concerned with how the two sides would meet, and whether the two would meet as equals.\textsuperscript{280} ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs John Chang, while delivering a speech in European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defense Policy in Brussels on May 22, indicated that Taiwan was a political entity and that the world should confront this reality. He called for international support for Taiwan to have an appropriate international status.\textsuperscript{281} The following day, the Government Information Office, under the Executive Yuan, issued a position paper on U.S.-ROC Relations and pragmatic foreign policy to explain the government's fundamental position. The paper emphasized that the ROC deserved the rights of a sovereign state, and called for international attention to the ROC's sovereign status. It also noted that the government strongly opposed “one country, two systems.”\textsuperscript{282} In early June, when interviewed by the \textit{Washington Times}, President Lee said, that the ROC government hoped Hong Kong continued to prosper after the reversion of its sovereignty and that Taiwan-Hong Kong relations and cooperation could be enhanced. The ROC, however, opposed solving the unification of China in the Hong Kong model.\textsuperscript{283}

\textsuperscript{279} “Chronology: 1997,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{282} “Chronology: 1997,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
Taiwan would unify on its own terms, or not at all. On July 18, 1997, MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh, explained the four prerequisites for unification: (1) Mainland China had to respect the reality that the ROC does exist; (2) Taiwan security would have to be guaranteed; (3) two sides could co-exist in international organizations; and (4) Mainland China had to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.\(^\text{284}\) In response, at the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on August 1, PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian said, "The PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the Taiwan independence movement, movement to split the mother land, and intervention by foreign forces."\(^\text{285}\)

Taiwan called on China’s pragmatism to set aside their differences and cooperate, insinuating that China was acting irrationally. On August 8, 1997, MAC Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian said Mainland China should face the reality of the cross-Strait relations with a pragmatic attitude. If the PRC could consider adding the words that “Taiwan and the Mainland make up China” to further define the “one China Principle,” the ROC government would be willing to accept this.\(^\text{286}\) On September 1, President Lee reiterated that, to extend the olive branch, he would be willing to take with him the consensus and will of Taiwan’s 21.3 million people to visit the Mainland. He was also willing to meet with the top leadership of Mainland China for a direct exchange of views and open up a new epoch of cross-Strait cooperation.\(^\text{287}\) That same day, new Premier Vincent Siew spoke on his view of the development of cross-Strait relations. He said the two sides should (1) shelve the disputes

\(^{284}\) Ibid.
\(^{285}\) Ibid.
\(^{286}\) Ibid.
\(^{287}\) Ibid.
over sovereignty; (2) promote pragmatic exchanges; (3) proceed with negotiations on an equal footing; (4) carry out friendly interaction; and (5) establish a normal relationship.288

The Road to Reestablishing Stable Relations

As tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued to subside, the United States chose to deepen its ties with China. On October 26, 1997, PRC President Jiang visited Washington, to forge a “constructive strategic partnership” with the United States.289 Commenting on cross-Strait relations after the first summit between President Clinton and President Jiang, the MAC urged Mainland China to face the reality that the two sides belong to separate jurisdictions, and to immediately resume the Koo-Wang talks and other institutionalized channels with no prerequisites.290 On October 31, James P. Rubin, spokesman of U.S. State Department, mentioned, for the first time publicly, that the United States would “not [support] Taiwan independence.”291

The ARATS and the SEF were off to a rocky start in November 1997. On November 6, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF, inviting Secretary General Jen-ho Chiao to lead the delegation of SEF board of directors to attend a conference on economic and trade issues, and to tour Mainland cities.292 The next day, the SEF suggested that Chairman Koo lead a delegation for a formal visit to meet with relevant persons, and that the ARATS was welcome to visit Taiwan.293 Following this redirection, on November 11, an ARATS press

288 Ibid.
289 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
290 “Chronology: 1997,” MAC.
291 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
release expressed regret that the SEF rejected the November 6 letter of invitation without responding to the ARATS’ suggestion.\textsuperscript{294} This news release said SEF Secretary-General Chiao Jen-ho was unable to attend the opening ceremony of the seminar or visit the Mainland, thus losing the opportunity for responsible persons of the two associations to meet. The ARATS later announced that the seminar was called off without giving any explanation.\textsuperscript{295} In December, Taiwan began to seek talks with China without conditions. In an interview with Sankei Shimbun of Japan, President Lee Teng-hui said that the ROC government was willing to resume the SEF-ARATS negotiations without any preconditions.\textsuperscript{296}

Relations between China and Taiwan finally began to normalize in 1998. On January 1, ROC Premier Vincent Siew reiterated that the cross-Strait discussions should resume, and advance step by step. He suggested that the SEF-ARATS functional negotiations should be resumed first, and when contacts between the two sides normalized, they would not exclude the possibility of entering into talks on other issues.\textsuperscript{297} On February 20, Taipei agreed to hold political talks with Beijing.\textsuperscript{298} ROC Premier Siew reiterated Taipei’s consistent position on resumption of cross-Strait exchanges and consultation in his report to the Legislature.\textsuperscript{299} China finally responded in kind on February 24, when the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF expressing its willingness to resume cross-Strait consultation and to arrange exchanges between the SEF and ARATS.\textsuperscript{300} On March 5, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS welcoming

\textsuperscript{295} “Chronology: 1997,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{297} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{298} Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
\textsuperscript{299} “Chronology: Cross-Strait Dialogue (May 1995-April 1998),” \textit{MAC}.
the February 24 letter of response and indicating the intention to send appropriate members of the SEF to the Mainland. Following this exchange, the SEF made plans to send members to the Mainland by mid-April.

Diplomatic disruption was low due to increased communications between the SEF and ARATS in March 1998. The ARATS and SEF exchanged letters with plans to resume formal face-to-face relations. As promised, in mid-April 1998, SEF Deputy Secretary-general Jan Jyh-horng led a delegation visiting Beijing. This meeting opened the doors for further exchanges. In May 1998, the SEF suggested that the ARATS deputy secretary-general visit Taipei during late May. On June 1, the ARATS replied that it would choose an appropriate theme for the next trip by ARATS deputy secretary-general to Taiwan at an appropriate time. The ARATS also expressed that during this trip the ARATS deputy secretary-general would take the opportunity to discuss Chairman Koo’s visiting the Mainland with the SEF. On June 25, the ARATS agreed that SEF Chairman Koo would visit the Mainland in mid-September or mid-October of that year. The ARATS also expressed that it would designate its deputy secretary-general to lead an education delegation to Taiwan in late July, but postponed the visit to the Mainland by SEF Deputy Secretary-General Jan, which was proposed in the SEF’s letter of June 19. This letter was thus an indirect refusal of SEF Vice Chairman Shi’s proposed visit.

In Late June 1998, the United States increased its involvement with the PRC, indirectly opposing the actions of the ROC. U.S. President Bill Clinton flew from Andrews

303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
Airbase in Washington for a nine-day visit to the PRC, and stopped in five Mainland cities.\(^{306}\)

On June 27, during the president’s visit, Jiang Zemin told Clinton in Beijing: “I hope the U.S. Government will clearly indicate its support for China’s reunification.”\(^{307}\) In Shanghai, Clinton participated in a round table seminar on "Constructing China for the 21st Century." He talked about the “three nos policy” on Taiwan—no support for Taiwan's independence, no support for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and no support for Taiwan to enter international organizations that require statehood.\(^{308}\) He reiterated the U.S. position in favor of a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait issues.\(^{309}\)

**Continued Sources of Instability**

Even as the SEF-ARATS exchanges fostered stability across the Strait, ROC President Lee stayed true to his principles and in the process, disrupted the fragile relations. On July 22, 1998, ROC President Lee proposed “democratic unification” at the National Unification Council meeting, urging the two sides to negotiate and reach a peace treaty under the principle that China had separate jurisdictions.\(^{310}\) Within the next few days, ARATS Deputy Secretary-general Li Ya-fei led the promised “Delegation of Beijing City Elementary and Middle Schools for Off-Campus Visit Programs” to visit Taiwan.\(^{311}\)

Tensions escalated again as the PRC refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. On July 27, 1998, the Information Office of the State Council issued a PRC Defense White Paper. In reference to cross-Strait relations, the white paper said that the PRC would


\(^{307}\)Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.

\(^{308}\)Ibid., p. xv.


\(^{310}\)Ibid.

not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. It emphasized that each sovereign state had the right to adopt any means necessary, including military force, to safeguard the integrity of its sovereignty and territory.  

In August, President Lee created a task force for “reinforcing the position of the ROC as a sovereign nation.”

Even as tensions rose among top leaders, the SEF, the ARATS, and the MAC continued to push for increased exchanges and interdependence. On August 12, 1998, MAC Chairman Chang said that cross-Strait negotiations should start with practical issues first and later move to political ones. He urged Mainland authorities to stop excessive political obstruction of cross-Strait exchanges. Chang also promoted the “new three direct links”—exchanges of information, culture, and thoughts. The SEF and ARATS continued to plan for more face-to-face talks. In September, the ARATS invited Liang Su-long, president of the Peaceful Reunification Promotion Association Across the Taiwan Strait, to lead a delegation to visit Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities in Northeast China. During Liang Su-long’s visit, Wang expressed his hope to see “a resumption of negotiations and peaceful unification.”

As the Clinton Administration sought to increase ties with the PRC, the U.S. Congress continued to push for the protection of Taiwan. On September 24, 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted the Defense Authorization Act, empowering the Department of Defense to study the establishment of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) that would cover the Asia-Pacific region to protect Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other

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312 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC.
313 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
314 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
In the following days, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Washington for a three-day visit. On September 29, Tang met U.S. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright separately. At meetings, Tang said he hoped the Taiwan issue would not affect the U.S.-PRC relationship. Tang also ruled out the possibility that ROC President Lee visit the Mainland in his capacity as president. On the first of October, the U.S. Senate adopted the joint report on Defense Authorization Act, with stipulations that the Department of Defense should complete the feasibility study of a TMD within a specific time and include U.S. allies—Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea—under the shield.

In mid-October 1998, SEF Chairman Koo traveled to the Mainland. On October 14, while meeting with Chairman Koo at the Peace Hotel, Chairman Wang said that the two sides should promptly enter into political talks and related procedural meetings for them. He repeated the substance of the “one China” principle. During the second meeting between SEF Chairman Koo and ARATS Chairman Wang at the Qinjiang Hotel in Shanghai, the two reached four agreements: (1) enhance the dialogue to resume systematic discussions; (2) promote exchanges of visits between SEF-ARATS staff at various levels; (3) actively provide mutual assistance on cases arising from exchanges; and (4) arrange a Taiwan visit for Mr. Wang at an appropriate time. On October 18, several SEF delegates met with Jiang Zemin. During the meeting, Chairman Koo mentioned Taiwan's achievements in political democratization and economic development and added that Taiwan would be willing to share

318 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC.
319 Ibid.
320 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
322 Ibid.
its experiences with Mainland China. Chairman Koo emphasized that Mainland China's
democratization was the key to reunification. Having a meeting between top leaders of the	two sides could help find a mutually acceptable way to approach the topic of eventual
unification.323

The PRC and ROC continued to argue over the ROC’s bids for international
diplomatic status, the “one China” issue, and democratization of the PRC as a precondition
for unification. On October 30, 1998, regarding Mainland China’s continuing pressure on the
ROC’s diplomatic space, Premier Vincent Siew said that depriving Taiwan of its
international space and diplomatic status was an attempt to suffocate the ROC, which was by
no means acceptable.324 On November 6, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen said that after
Macau reverts to Chinese rule, the Taiwan side may continue its presence in Macau, but
would be required to strictly observe the “one China” principle.325 In the following days, in an
interview with Asahi Shimbun of Japan, PRC President Jiang Zemin mentioned that only
under the principle of “one China,” the two sides could touch on the post-unification issues
such as the nation’s name, national flag and anthem.326

Even as these divisive issues arose, on November 2, the Executive Yuan held the
1998 Mainland Affairs Working Meeting in Taipei to conduct extensive discussions under
the theme of “Unfolding a New Era and Promoting Friendly Interaction” between the two
sides.327

323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
326 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC.
327 Ibid.
New Deadlock

The deadlock of steady tension seemed to settle into place in December 1998. On December 11, at the National Assembly general session on national affairs, President Lee criticized Mainland China’s bullying of the ROC in the international community as “hegemony.” Such a move demonstrated the PRC’s lack of ethnic compassion and its violation of the prevalent principles of peaceful co-existence and equal treatment in the global village. He vowed to promote pragmatic diplomacy and urged Taiwanese people to join together to support the government’s reforms to greet the advent of the new century and create a second Taiwan miracle.328 On December 16, MAC Vice Chairman Lin Chong-pin emphasized that the ROC government's insistence that the Mainland's democratization must take place prior to unification was out of four considerations: regional stability, humanitarian considerations, legal considerations, and domestic reality.329 The following day, the Xinhua News Agency and China News Service carried the same article, titled “The German Model is not suitable for Chinese Unification.”330 President Lee continued to advocate that the ROC should not give up fighting for a role in the international community.

The ARATS-SEF talks were slow to start. On December 25, 1998, ARATS Vice Chairman Tang Shubei said that Chairman Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan should be arranged at a time when cross-Strait political and economic dialogue could make progress. In the following week, the ARATS held a seminar on cross-Strait relations in Beijing to fully understand the ROC’s political developments and to solicit opinions of Taiwanese representatives on the development of cross-Strait relations.331

328 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
329 Ibid., p. xv.
330 “Chronology: 1998,” MAC.
331 Ibid.
Unification began to look increasingly unlikely. On December 31, MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh reiterated that Mainland authorities should seriously consider cooperation proposals from the ROC government, including the establishment of a military confidence-building mechanism, joint efforts in the East-Asian financial crisis, assistance in the reform of Mainland state enterprises, and exchange of democratic experiences at the grassroots level. These programs could have helped the two sides to create a constructive cross-Strait relationship of prosperity and reciprocity.\textsuperscript{332} The PRC was also not willing to compromise. That same day, PRC President Jiang Zemin, in a New Year message, repeated calls for “peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems” to resolve the Taiwan issue. He hoped Taiwan could enter into dialogues and negotiations with the PRC as early as possible.\textsuperscript{333}

**Rise of Military Tension**

In January 1999, China-Taiwan relations progressed from deadlock to high tensions once more. On January 11, Wen Hui Bao of Hong Kong, quoting a Beijing authoritative source, said that if the United States included Taiwan in their Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, the PRC would be “forced to make proper military adjustments to safeguard the integrity of national sovereignty and territory.”\textsuperscript{334} In early February, Mainland China had deployed approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan along the southeastern coast. MAC Chairman Su Chi responded, stating that for defense purposes, the ROC government was considering joining the TMD of the United States.\textsuperscript{335}

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid.
While relations worsened between the PRC and ROC, the United States strengthened ties with the Mainland. In April 1999, PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paid an official visit to the United States at the request of President Clinton.\(^{336}\) At the joint press conference after the Clinton-Zhu meeting, Zhu stated that post-1997 Hong Kong development exemplified the PRC’s strict adherence to “one country, two systems.” Conditions for unification with Taiwan could be more relaxed, meaning that Taiwan could keep its own military forces and the Taiwan leader could serve as deputy leader at the central government level. As for cross-Strait unification, the PRC repeated its position that it would reach unification through peaceful means, but would never renounce the use of force against Taiwan.\(^{337}\)

From the end of April and into June 1999 diplomatic disruption grew from low to high levels. On April 20, Chen Shui-bian argued that Taiwan and China should develop “international special relations,”\(^{338}\) evidence of low-level disruption in the form of opening negotiations. In early May the PRC tried to block the ROC from entering the World Health Organization (WHO) since membership is only for sovereign states.\(^{339}\) From this medium level disruptive action, diplomatic tension continued to rise. On May 25, the U.S. House of Representatives released the “Cox Report,” which disclosed that the PRC had stolen U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets.\(^{340}\) In the following days, the PRC ambassador to the United States refused to give a direct reply to the question whether the PRC would use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. He claimed that it was a domestic affair to deploy nuclear


\(^{337}\) “Chronology 1999,” \textit{MAC}.


\(^{339}\) “Chronology 1999,” \textit{MAC}.

weapons on the Mainland, in which no foreigner had a say. During the month of May, the Two-State Theory, which defined “one China” as two equal countries, was finalized and submitted to President Lee.

The PRC called for a change in U.S. involvement in the situation. The spokesperson of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the PRC strongly opposed the “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,” which was pending in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. The Clinton administration publicly expressed its objection to the bill and took effective measures to prevent it from being adopted as per PRC demands. The next day, the vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission stated that selling a TMD system to Taiwan, including it in the program in any form, or directly or indirectly bringing Taiwan under the umbrella of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation would constitute a serious intrusion into the PRC’s sovereignty and territory.

Conclusion

In this period of time between the two peaks of positive feedback, the level of disruption decreases as I expected. U.S. diplomatic and military opposition also increased in a predictable fashion. As Taiwan sought more power in the international system, the United States undermined their claim of sovereignty by backing the PRC. The next section details the events of the Taiwan Confrontation.

341 “Chronology 1999,” MAC.
343 “Chronology 1999,” MAC.
344 Ibid.
The time from July 9, 1999 to May 29, 2000 includes the Taiwan Confrontation. ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s insistence on his Two-State Theory incited Chinese aggression. Chinese military disruption during this incident only reached medium levels; no shots were fired at Taiwan. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption remained high until President Chen Shui-bian was elected in May of 2000 and reversed Lee Teng-hui’s incendiary rhetoric.

**Figure 5.4: IVD3 and IntVD3**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAIWANESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>CHINESE DISRUPTION</th>
<th>OPPOSING TAIWAN</th>
<th>OPPOSING CHINA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>LOW</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Diplomatic</td>
<td>LOW/HIGH</td>
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**Two-State Theory**

July 1999 began with President Lee’s highly disruptive proposal of a “special state-to-state relationship”\textsuperscript{345} between China and Taiwan. On July 9, 1999, President Lee said in an interview:

The Republic of China has been a sovereign state since it was founded in 1912. Moreover, in 1991, amendments to the Constitution designated cross-strait relations as a special state-to-state relationship. Consequently, there is no need to declare independence. The resolution of cross-strait issues hinges on the issue of different systems. We cannot look at issues related to the two sides simply from the perspective of unification or independence. The Chinese Mainland’s promise of a “one country, two systems” formula for Hong Kong and Macau is irrelevant to Taiwan ... the ROC is a sovereign, independent state.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{345} Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.

On July 12, ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan said he was surprised at hearing Lee's statement of “special state-to-state relationship.” Wang said that the statement would destroy the foundation for cross-Strait talks under the “one China” principle. Chinese military disruption escalated in an attempt to coerce President Lee to back down. On July 16, Chinese jet fighters began to fly across the centerline in the Taiwan Strait.

The United States got involved on the side of China using the tool of diplomacy. On July 18, 1999, President Clinton had a hotline telephone conversation with the PRC President Jiang Zemin, in which Jiang criticizes Lee's statement of the “special state-to-state relationship.” He said that the statement was a dangerous step and a serious provocation to the “one China” principle that has been recognized by international society. Clinton reiterated that Washington's “one China” policy remained unchanged. In the following days, President Clinton outlined his “three pillars,” which includes “one China” to pacify the PRC, “peaceful resolution” to set Taiwan at ease, and “cross-Strait dialogue” to enhance trust and reduce tension.

In response to Chinese military disruption, Taiwan mimicked this response and drew up preventive strategies and built a system for “early warning, rapid reaction, and joint operations.” Their first priorities focused on developing capabilities against short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, information warfare, electronic warfare, and submarine warfare in order to ensure ROC national security. On July 30, 1999, SEF Chairman Koo emphasized that the “special state-to-state relationship” was the ROC government’s position.
made in line with the consensus in 1993 that “One China principle can be subject to the interpretation of the two sides respectively.” Koo's remarks were faxed to the ARATS right away. However, the ARATS sent it back to the SEF in two hours, claiming that Koo's remarks “seriously violate the ‘one China’ principle.” The same day, the ARATS Chairman called Chairman Koo’s remarks “unbecoming” adding, “the basis for ARATS-SEF exchanges and dialogue no longer [existed].”

Even as Taiwan tried to repair the damage to their relationship, China was not satisfied and war looked likely once more. On August 1, 1999, the MAC appealed for a return to the “one China, respective interpretations.” The next day, the PRC announced a test fire of DF-31 ICBM, capable of hitting the continental United States. The Ministry of National Defense Spokesman stated that Mainland China had test-fired its newly developed long-range ballistic missiles on the Mainland, which is aimed at deterring superpowers, and not Taiwan. That same day, the Xinhua News Agency carried a commentary titled “To stick to the Two-State Theory is a betrayal of the Taiwanese people—a follow-up comment on Koo Chen-fu’s statements on July 30.”

Despite Chinese retaliation to the ROC’s idea, the MAC, the SEF and top ROC leadership continued to press the concept of a “special state-to-state relationship.” On August 3, 1999, the MAC released the English edition of “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The ROC’s Position on the ‘special state-to-state relationship.’” The MAC stated that this English position paper would include the basic information for ROC overseas representative offices

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353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
356 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
357 Ibid., p. xv.
358 “Chronology 1999,” MAC.
359 Ibid.
to explain the government’s stance on cross-Strait relations to international society. On August 7, President Lee Teng-hui stated that the key resolution of the current tension in the Taiwan Strait lies in economic strength, not military struggle. He said that if Taiwan continued to promote economic development in a stable manner, the final victory would be on its side.

**Chinese Aggression**

Chinese military disruption continued to escalate. According to wire reports on August 9, 1999, the PRC Central Military Commission prepared for major high-tech live-fire exercise to be joined with a missile test fire at sea before the end of August, focusing on blockading the Taiwan Straits. The exercise would last for about 10 days. The next day, authoritative resources in Beijing confirmed that the PRC successfully test-fired a new long-range ground-to-ground guided missile, the DF-31, within the Mainland on August 2, the first test-fire of this type.

Understanding that his interpretation of the 1992 Consensus had backfired, President Lee ordered the speaker of National Assembly not to incorporate the Two-State Theory into the constitution. On August 14, 1999, CCP leaders decided that if Taiwan codified the Two-State Theory into its Constitution, the PRC would use force against Taiwan. ARATS

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361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
364 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
Chairman Wang said that if Lee retracted the Two-State Theory, he would still visit Taiwan.365

The United States understood the magnitude of the situation after major military deployments and maneuvers. On August 18, the PLA staged a massive maneuver with 100 military vehicles and 2,000 soldiers transported from Guangdong to Fujian Province.366 On September 15, in an unprecedented move, the United States opposed Taiwan’s reentry into the UN.367

The Jiji Earthquake

The game changed on September 21, 1999 when Jiji, in Nantou County, Taiwan was hit by a category seven earthquake. This disaster was the second deadliest quake in Taiwanese recorded history. That day, PRC President Jiang expressed his concern, and said that Beijing was ready to provide all necessary assistance to reduce the damage caused by the earthquake.368 In the following days, the ARATS stated that Mainland China was willing to make a donation to disaster relief in Taiwan following the Jiji Earthquake, and that they were also willing to send experts to Taiwan to assist in disaster relief. SEF Deputy Secretary General Jan Jyh-horng responded that the Taiwanese government was grateful for Mainland China's offer, and was willing to accept the donation, but that Mainland China would be

365 “Chronology 1999,” MAC.
366 Ibid.
367 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xv.
notified of the government’s decision regarding the offer of material assistance and expert personnel, after further evaluation had been undertaken.369

The ROC and PRC both closed the year 1999 with statements of their respective concerns and priorities. Executive Yuan Premier Vincent Siew reiterated the ROC government’s policy towards cross-Strait relations, pointing out that the four main foundations for the development of cross-Strait relations were “national security,” “Taiwan first,” “a win-win situation for both sides,” and “international relations.” Premier Siew said that Taiwan would seek peaceful unification in the long term on the basis of the “special state-to-state relationship.”370 PRC President Jiang said that important progress was made in the great task of reunification, and that the implementation of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle in Hong Kong and Macao had an important demonstration effect with regard to solving the Taiwan issue. Jiang stated that the government and people of Mainland China were confident in their ability to solve the Taiwan issue at a not too distant date, thereby bringing about the complete reunification of China.371

Renewed Tensions

On the first of January 2000, President Lee stated that a “special state-to-state” relationship would be a more realistic positioning of the present cross-Strait relations. Both sides should negotiate as equals, enhance exchanges, seek common ground and resolve differences, and strive for a win-win situation.372 In his New Year comments, President Jiang

369 "Chronology 1999," MAC.
370 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
reiterated that both sides of the Strait could discuss any problem under the principle of “one China.”  

On February 21, 2000, the PRC released a White Paper on “the One China Principle and Taiwan Problem,” which listed “three ifs” for the use of force against Taiwan, namely, if there occurred any major event wherein Taiwan was alienated from China under any name or title; if another country launched an attack and conquered Taiwan; and if the Taiwan authorities refused indefinitely to peacefully resolve the issue of cross-Strait unification through negotiations. In these cases, the Mainland would be forced to take all possible drastic measures, including the use of force to preserve the integrity of the Mainland's sovereignty and territory, and to accomplish the great task of Chinese unification.

The Taiwan Confrontation was stabilized only with a change of leadership on Taiwan. On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were elected the tenth president and vice president of the ROC, and proclaimed a desire to negotiate direct links and peace accord. In the following days, the Legislative Yuan agreed to open “mini-three links” (direct postal, transportation, and commercial links with the Mainland) as a trial run on the offshore islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.

Despite Taiwan’s efforts, on March 28, 2000, the Mainland deployed the latest Russian-made S-300 missiles near Fuzhou, and deployed more in the following weeks at Xiamen and Shantou. Even as this was going on, officials of TAO stated that although

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373 Ibid.
374 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xvi.
375 “Chronology 2000,” MAC.
376 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xvi.
377 Ibid., p. xvi.
378 “Chronology 2000,” MAC.
cross-Strait talks had been cut off, the functions of cross-Strait exchanges, the care of Taiwanese businessmen, and the reception of Taiwanese visitors were still under the responsibility of the ARATS. Therefore the ARATS would not be scrapped in the short term.\(^\text{380}\)

On May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu Hsiu-lien were officially sworn into office as the 10th president and vice-president of the ROC. The newly elected President then delivered his inaugural address entitled “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era,” and advocates the “Four No's Plus One” policy on cross-Strait relations. Provided that the PRC renounced the use of force against Taiwan, President Chen would not (1) declare independence, (2) change the national title from “the Republic of China” to “the Republic of Taiwan,” (3) include the doctrine of “special state-to-state” relations in the ROC Constitution, or (4) promote a referendum on unification or independence.\(^\text{381}\)

Neither the United States, nor the PRC trusted President Chen to keep his word and promote stability in the Strait. Under his leadership, Taiwan would be steered closer to independence than in the time of President Lee. On May 29, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen clearly expressed that “Taiwan [was] part of the Republic of China, and that the Republic of China [was] an independent and sovereign country.”\(^\text{382}\) She also emphasized that whether Taiwan would re-unite with the Mainland, declare independence, or maintain the status quo, the new administration would be open about it.\(^\text{383}\)

\(^{380}\) “Chronology 2000,” MAC.
\(^{382}\) “Chronology 2000,” MAC.
\(^{383}\) Ibid.
Conclusion

The Taiwan Confrontation of 1999 began as a result of President Lee’s highly disruptive diplomatic statements that Taiwan was a sovereign state since 1912. The Mainland responded with high-level diplomatic and medium level military disruption. The United States was not deeply involved in this incident. The actions of China and Taiwan for the most part corrected themselves through the actions of top leadership, and the voters on Taiwan.

MAY 30, 2000 – MAY 30, 2002 (IV2+ & IntV2+)

In the span of time between May 30, 2000 and May 30, 2002, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption swung from low in the aftermath of the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, to high as President Chen increased support for DPP politics, especially in his pro-independence rhetoric. Chinese military and diplomatic disruption shifted from low to high in response to the statements and actions of President Chen. The United States was only minimally involved in the Strait during this time.

Figure 5.5: IV2+ and IntV2+

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Increasing Stability

China-Taiwan relations in the period following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation were tense but stable. Despite political differences, cultural links between the Chinese and
Taiwanese people continued to deepen. In June 2000, the Mainland hosted a religious pilgrimage in Fujian Province for the Goddess Mazu. However, the PRC did not make the pilgrimage easy for the Taiwanese. Four principles were to be observed by the Taiwanese people participating in the religious pilgrimage to the goddess Matsu on the Mainland, namely, (1) under the condition of one China, the implementation of direct two-way transportation for mutual benefit and reciprocity, and no docking at a third port is allowed; (2) cross-Strait routes are special domestic routes, wherein only ships of both sides are allowed to operate. If this poses a difficulty for Taiwan, it can rent ships of Mainland companies, or even Hong Kong registered vessels, but it cannot rent foreign vessels; (3) ships entering ports can either raise flags bearing a mark or the company's logo, or not carry any flag at all; and (4) pilgrimage participants intending to visit other sightseeing spots should apply for a Taiwanese compatriot certificate before making the trip.  

384 Diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan remained low for the rest of the year. On July 13, 2000, ARATS Chairman Wang stated that “there have been adjustments in the independence stance of Taiwan’s new leadership; however, there is a need to continue observing,” and reiterated that Taiwanese authorities should revert to the consensus in 1992 wherein each side makes its own interpretation of “one China.” 385 “This is the foundation of cross-Strait dialogue.” 386 In August, the Mainland decided to end the phase wherein the statements and actions of Taiwan’s newly-elected President Chen would be closely monitored, and started the phase of waging a tit-for-tat struggle in which goodwill was met with goodwill and malice with malice. 387 In October, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen said

385 “Chronology 2000,” MAC.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
that the cross-Strait policy of the administration was centered on the “Spirit of 1992,” hoping for both sides of the Strait to strengthen exchanges and put aside differences. Although Taiwan had not accepted the Mainland’s version of “One China,” it would not deliberately challenge it.\(^{388}\) A few days later, President Chen reiterated that the ROC Government would show its utmost sincerity and patience in searching for the “goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent peace” for both sides of the Strait.\(^{389}\) He called on the leaders of both sides of the Strait to revert to the “Spirit of 1992,” put aside mutual differences, and resume dialogues and exchanges as soon as possible.\(^{390}\)

**Another Period of Increased Tension**

New differences in opinion arose between the two polities, creating renewed but less severe tensions across the Strait. On January 12, 2001, President Chen Shui-bian expressed that the integration he had in mind was patterned after that of the European Union, in which three concepts were involved: sovereignty, freedom, and self-will.\(^{391}\) Later that month, the MAC issued three statements in response to Qian Qichen's statement on the 6th anniversary of “Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal.” The MAC reiterated its desire to sit down and talk with Mainland authorities without setting any preconditions and pre-set positions, and start a dialogue on issues that concern both sides.\(^{392}\) In response to President Chen’s January 12

\(^{388}\) Ibid.

\(^{389}\) Ibid.

\(^{390}\) Ibid.


\(^{392}\) Ibid.
remarks, PRC President Jiang Zemin expressed on March 23, that the confederation or federal system was not applicable to cross-Strait unification.\textsuperscript{393}

Military tensions rose as China once again stockpiled offensive weaponry and conducted military exercises. On May 31, 2001, the Mainland prepared to hold large-scale military exercises of its ground, air, and naval forces, and strategic missile units at Dongshan Island in Fujian Province. Su-27 fighter planes bought from Russia were also to be used at the exercises. The large-scale landing exercises would have Taiwan as the imaginary target of the attack. The objective was to simulate air domination on the Taiwan Strait.\textsuperscript{394}

In the face of this military threat, President Chen chose to introduce the “New Five Nos Policy,” on April 27, 2001. The following are his new promises to promote stability in the Strait: (1) Weapons purchases from and stopovers in the United States were not to be considered provocative to the PRC; (2) The ROC government would not misread the cross-Strait situation; (3) Taiwan would not be a pawn of any country; (4) Taipei never abandoned its sincerity and its efforts to improve cross-Strait relations; and (5) cross-Strait ties were not zero-sum.\textsuperscript{395} In July, President Chen expressed that the “one country, two systems” framework was attempting to make Taiwan similar to the “Hong Kong” model, in which certain systems, freedom, and human rights needed the approval of Mainland authorities to take effect. This was not acceptable to the majority of the Taiwanese people.\textsuperscript{396}

\textsuperscript{394} “Chronology 2001,” MAC.
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid.
A Lack of U.S. Involvement

U.S. involvement in this period was diplomatically and militarily light. On August 28, 2001, the *Washington Times* reported that according to the latest intelligence data of the United States, the Mainland had deployed M-type short-range ballistic missiles along the coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang. The number of these missiles increased from 300 in April to more than 350. The U.S. reconnaissance satellite at the same time discovered that a new M-M missile base was spotted around the Jiangshan area in Zhejiang Province in July. While Chinese military disruption escalated, so did Taiwanese diplomatic disruption. On November 11, 2001, during a meeting with former U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, President Chen stated that the Mainland believed that the principle of “One China” was the “1992 Consensus.” He went on to say that to set the “one China principle as a pre-condition for resuming talks [was] a disguised refusal to negotiate. We [went] over every document, and there [was] no so-called ‘consensus.’ This has been unilaterally decided by the Mainland, and has not gained the approval of Taiwan.”

Taiwan continued to insist that China renounce the use of force in its dealings with Taiwan. In his New Year’s Day Message in 2002, President Chen Shui-bian reiterated that once the Mainland abandoned the threat of force and respected the people’s choice of free will, both sides of the Strait could begin cultural, trade, and economic integration, and proceed toward a new framework of permanent peace and political integration. Taiwan wanted to put the United States at ease. On January 5, in a meeting with the visiting...
delegation of the “U.S.-China Security Review Commission,” President Chen proposed a three-equilibrium scheme, which was to seek political, economic, and military equilibrium in cross-Strait relations, and to establish a constructive cooperation, not antagonistic exclusion. At the same time, he expressed the hope that the United States could play the role of stabilizer, balancer, and moderator in cross-Strait relations, in order to build a platform of peaceful contact and dialogue for both sides of the Strait.400

In early May 2000, President Chen expressed the need for permanent peace across the Strait. He said that the normalization of cross-Strait relations needed to start from the normalization of trade and economic relations. Second, both sides of the Strait should reopen talks in order to minimize misunderstandings and misjudgments. Third, the cross-Strait “Three-Links” were a road that needed to be taken, and that the “Mini-Three-Links” were the first step toward this goal.401 Later that month President Chen expressed that Taiwan was a sovereign independent country, and was not part of the PRC. The majority of the Taiwanese people rejected the “one country, two systems” and hoped for the maintenance of the status quo. Therefore, during his term, he would not declare independence, change the name of the country, or hold any public referendum. Chen believed, as long as both sides of the Strait disavowed political maneuvering and focused on economic benefits, the issues with regard to the “Three-Links” would soon be resolved.402 This uneasy truce became the status quo.

401 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
Conclusion

In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, tensions lessened then worsened as President Chen continued to be politically divisive in the fashion of his predecessor Lee Teng-hui. The level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption escalated from low to medium, reached high, then returned to low. Chinese diplomatic disruption rose from low to medium in this period. The United States did not actively participate in the de-escalation process in this period.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

MAY 31, 2002 – MAY 30, 2004 (DV2+)

Following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, China-Taiwan relations remained unstable. Diplomatic conflict was in general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility toward one another, but were open to negotiations with a third party. The United States, focused on more pressing global events such as the War on Terror, still fulfilled their obligation to Taiwan as per the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. However, economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China continued to increase.

The level of diplomatic conflict began at level two in this period: within existing channels of communication, one or the other actor complicated negotiations. On June 24, 2002, the TAO Deputy Director and the ARATS Vice Chairman stated that the Mainland would carry on the principles of “one China, direct two-way, and reciprocity and mutual benefit” in the promotion of cross-Strait “Three-Links.”

The following day, the TAO Director said that as long as the “Three-Links” were referred to as “domestic routes within a country,” they would be applicable to air transport and sea transport. The “Three-Links”

403 Ibid.
would commence just as well. Moreover, as long as Taiwan’s DPP retained the Taiwanese independence clause in its party platform, it would be impossible for the Mainland to hold party-to-party talks with the DPP. While negotiations proved difficult, the ARATS and the SEF continued to send officials to meet on both the Mainland and on Taiwan. On June 27, the Deputy Chairman of ARATS arrived in Taipei as the head of a visiting delegation.

U.S.-China relations were upset on July 12, when the U.S. Department of Defense submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China to the U.S. Congress. Two days later, in response to this report the PRC Foreign Affairs Spokesperson revealed that the Mainland was increasing its military deployment against Taiwan, and stated that the Mainland had never joined any arms competitions, and hoped that the U.S. Government would earnestly abide by the principles of the three Sino-U.S. communiqués, and would refrain from sending incorrect signals to the Taiwanese separatist forces.

Diplomatic conflict escalated and plateaued at a level three: hostility toward negotiation with one another and/or openness to negotiation with a third party. On July 25, 2002, The MAC issued a statement expressing that the ROC had always hoped that cross-Strait relations would develop toward positive interaction. However, the Mainland criticized Taiwan's president, which only worsened the cross-Strait relationship. In early August, in a live video link from the Office of the President, President Chen Shui-bian delivered the opening address:

404 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
407 “Chronology 2002,” MAC.
408 Ibid.
Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished, marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity... Taiwan is a sovereign independent country. Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and China are each one country on each side of the strait.\textsuperscript{409}

President Chen went on to complain that the Mainland had not abandoned the use of force against Taiwan, and it continued to suppress Taiwan in the international arena. This was a great offense to the feelings of the Taiwanese people.\textsuperscript{410}

China feared that Taiwan would seek independence following this and other ROC statements. On August 15, 2002, the TAO Spokesperson Li Weiyi released his reaction to “Chen Shui-bian's Advocacy of Taiwanese Independence,” which expressed that the Mainland would firmly and unchangeably oppose the Taiwanese independence groups dividing the country and would work for the realization of the unification of the country. The Mainland would never allow anybody to take Taiwan away from “China” in any way. It warned the “Taiwanese separatist forces” not to incorrectly assess the situation, and to rein in the horse in time and stop all separatist activities.\textsuperscript{411} In September, President Chen called the Mainland’s waging of a long-term “ultra-limit war” against Taiwan, basically similar to any terrorist attack in nature. The fear and threat caused by the Mainland's deployment of 400 missiles along the coastal area of the Taiwan Strait had long surpassed the limit of a terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{412}


\textsuperscript{410} “Chronology 2002,” MAC.

\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.

October and November 2002 continued the trend of level three diplomatic conflict. The TAO argued that cross-Strait relations were neither international nor state-to-state. On November 8, the Mainland’s General Secretary Jiang Zemin made his political report titled, “Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” at the 16th Communist Party Congress. The section on Taiwan policy mentioned for the first time the new three-stage theory of the principle of “one China.” While China insisted on the “one China” principle, Taiwan demanded democratization as a precondition for negotiation. On November 9, President Chen proposed “democracy and peace” as a precondition to the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations and expressed that the Mainland had waged a long-term “unrestricted war” on Taiwan, and had attempted to rapidly destroy Taiwan's political, economic, financial, and military facilities by using “Fifth Column” strategies without any warning.

The diplomatic exchange among top leaders may have been contentious, but the SEF and ARATS continued to make headway. On December 1, 2002, Dr. Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of the Fifth Board of Directors, expressed that both sides must strive to improve relations and invited ARATS Chairman Wang to Taiwan to renew talks. The PRC continued to seek stable relations with the United States by justifying their actions against Taiwan. On December 3, PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi said in a speech on “China-U.S. Relations in the new century” that the Mainland's deployment of missiles targeted against Taiwan was a

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413 “Chronology 2002,” MAC.
415 “Chronology 2002,” MAC.
416 Ibid.
matter involving national security, and should be understood and supported by the United States.\textsuperscript{417}

In response to the PRC buildup of offensive weaponry and military threats, on December 9, 2002, the Taiwan’s 2002 Defense White Paper was released. The paper includes a long list of objectives including “maintain air superiority and naval dominance,” and, “establish an excellent and modernized military force to best perform the concept of ‘effective deterrence, resolute defense.’”\textsuperscript{418} Under these guidelines, Taiwan was to rely on domestic products for national defense and supplement with foreign products.

The level of diplomatic conflict decreased as China and Taiwan shifted focus to economic issues. On December 18, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen stated that the Government’s future cross-Strait policy would build “a platform of” cross-Strait exchanges, and hoped that it would also attract Mainland capital, human resources, and tourists to Taiwan, in order to correct the present situation of uni-directional trend.\textsuperscript{419} In his year-end statement, President Chen pointed out that the policies of “richly cultivating Taiwan while reaching out to the world” and “proactive liberalization with effective management” could produce a win-win situation for both sides of the Strait, and hoped that the authorities of both sides would create collective benefits for the interests of Taiwanese businessmen and the development of cross-Strait trade and economy through negotiations and dialogue.\textsuperscript{420}

\textsuperscript{418} Denny Roy, “Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (March 2003), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{419} “Chronology 2002,” MAC.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid.
New Year, Same Problems

In early 2003, the level of diplomatic conflict in the Taiwan Strait swung between one and three. In his New Year Day Message, President Chen Shui-bian said that both sides needed to establish an “interaction framework for peace and stability,” which could serve as a major objective in the present stage to which both sides could strive for together.\(^{421}\) In the following days, the Spokesperson of the TAO agreed with President Chen and expressed that cross-Strait relations would gain a significant improvement as long as Taiwan's leaders considered the interests of the Taiwanese compatriots, sincerely approved of cross-Strait direct links and agreed to resume dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of the “1992 Consensus” reached by the SEF and ARATS.\(^{422}\)

In his New Year’s message, Mainland CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao said that in the new year, the Mainland would continue to be firm in its stance of “peaceful unification and one country, two systems,” and its goal of unification. He reiterated that the PRC supported the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of the principle of “one China,” the reinforcement of cross-Strait interactions and exchanges, the active promotion of cross-Strait direct “Three-Links,” and the firm opposition of any separatist movement of “Taiwanese independence” advocates.\(^{423}\) Following this, President Chen called for more sincere negotiations and dialogue in order to stabilize the region.\(^{424}\) The PRC finally decoupled economic talks from political posturing. On January 15, the PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen indicated that the cross-Strait “Three-Links” were an economic affair,

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\(^{423}\) Ibid.

\(^{424}\) Ibid.
and that negotiations did not need to involve the political significance of “one China,” but should be actively promoted based on the principle that “political divergence should not affect or interfere with the spirit of cross-Strait economic cooperation.”

Despite this progress in the economic sphere, the PRC and ROC continued to set unrealistic preconditions for diplomatic talks. In early March, CPP General Secretary Hu Jintao emphasized that so long as Taiwan accepted the principle of “one China” and the “1992 Consensus,” negotiations could resume. The problem with this statement is that when President Lee tried to define what “one China” meant to Taiwan, it led to the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. The SEF-ARATS talks continued to be on hold due to the recent political conflicts between both sides of the Strait.

**SARS Outbreak**

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak began as early as November 2002 in Guangdong Province on the Mainland. It spread to Taiwan in March 2003. Mainland officials offered to assist Taiwan in SARS prevention, but repeatedly took advantage of the issue to refer to Taiwan as a province of China. On April 14, the MAC issued a statement that Taiwan was not a province of the PRC, and that it did not welcome Mainland officials taking advantage of the SARS epidemic to take politically-motivated actions.  

425 Ibid.  
426 Ibid.  
427 Ibid.  
China continued to oppose Taiwan in the international arena. In response to Taiwan’s bid to enter the World Health Organization (WHO), Zhang Qiyue, the Spokesperson for the Mainland's PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry, stated at a press conference on May 15, 2003, that as a province of China, Taiwan was neither qualified to join the World Health Organization (WHO) nor to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) in an observer capacity.\textsuperscript{429}

As the SARS epidemic continued, Taiwan responded to China’s offer of aid. On May 25, the SEF politely refused in a formal letter the Mainland’s offer of medical resources, explaining that the resources in Taiwan were “sufficient.” The SEF also requested that the ARATS positively regard Taiwan’s need to participate in the WHO.\textsuperscript{430}

The third party intervention from the United States remained at a level three. The United States deepened relations with the PRC through economic and diplomatic means. On June 1, 2003, in a meeting at the G8 Summit in France, PRC President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George H. W. Bush stated that the Taiwan Issue had all along been the most important issue in Sino-U.S. relations. Remaining firm in its guiding principles of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems,” the Chinese Government was willing to exert its best effort to fight for the materialization of cross-Strait reunification through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{431}

Economic and diplomatic relations across the Taiwan Strait began to improve with the gradual easing of the SARS epidemic. On June 19, 2003, Zhang Mingqing, the Spokesperson for the TAO, said that it hoped that cross-Strait exchanges would return to normal as soon as possible following the reduction of the SARS epidemic. The Mainland


\textsuperscript{430} “Chronology 2003,” MAC.

\textsuperscript{431} Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 250.
side would take corresponding measures depending on the actions to be taken by the Taiwan side.\footnote{432}{“Chronology 2003,” MAC.} While the PRC used economic incentives as a carrot to entice the ROC toward unification, it also continued work on a rather large stick. On June 20, 2003, the Mainland’s Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs met for the first time. In that meeting, Hu Jintao mentioned the three priority-works concerning Taiwan: stopping U.S. intervention in cross-Strait affairs, enhancing cross-Strait exchanges, and strengthening the military to counteract unexpected incidents.\footnote{433}{Ibid.}

**The Road to Referendum**

Taiwan continued to press the PRC to renounce the use of force. On July 4, 2003, President Chen said that if there were to be changes in the status quo, then the decisions would be made by the people through a popular vote public referendum. Otherwise, no country, government, political party, or individual could change Taiwan's destiny, its future, or its present status as an independent entity independent status quo. The President also reiterated that as long as the Mainland was willing to abandon the use of force against Taiwan during his term, he guaranteed that the “Four Nos Plus One” policy would remain unchanged.\footnote{434}{Cecilia Fanchiang, “Chen Announces Intention to Hold Referendum,” Taiwan Journal, 4 July 2003, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=20104&ctNode=451 (accessed March 16, 2016).} Essentially, President Chen threatened to disrupt the status quo via public referendum if the PRC did abandon the threat of conquering Taiwan by military means. In October, the President Hu Jintao met with President George W. Bush and said that China would never tolerate Taiwan independence.\footnote{435}{Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Hu Jintao Meets U.S. President George W. Bush,” PRC, 20 October 2003, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/hchf_665914/t30012.shtml (accessed March 16, 2016).}
In response to Chen’s proposed referendum and new constitution, the Mainland Xinhua News Agency released a commentary “exposing Chen Shui-bian's political fraud” in November severely attacking President Chen’s real intention of carrying out Taiwanese independence under the guise of a public referendum.\textsuperscript{436} Later that month, the TAO issued the first direct threat of force against Taiwan if independence was declared.\textsuperscript{437} In the following days, the Legislative Yuan passed the “Referendum Law,”\textsuperscript{438} which could potentially be used to declare independence from the Mainland. In response, the PRC deployed 496 ballistic missiles within a radius of 600 kilometers and carried out military exercises for the purpose of attacking Taiwan at any time. President Chen then stated that in order to ensure Taiwan's sovereignty and public security, a “defensive referendum” would be held on March 21, 2004.\textsuperscript{439}

On December 5, 2003, President Chen offered China an ultimatum. In a special interview with the New York Times, President Chen announced that the topic of the defensive referendum was that “the 23 million people of Taiwan [would] firmly demand that the PRC immediately withdraw all the ballistic missiles aiming at Taiwan and also openly and publicly announce and promise that they [would] not use force against Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{440} He also said that if the leadership in China responded with goodwill and agreed to immediately withdraw all the ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and openly announced that they would

\textsuperscript{436} “Chronology 2003,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{438} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid.

In order to reframe the situation, China targeted Taiwan’s democratic process. On December 7, in a meeting with UN Secretary General Kofī Annan in New York, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao expressed that Beijing understood the demands of the Taiwanese people for democracy. He added that, “however, the separatist forces of the Taiwan administration are attempting to split Taiwan away from China under the guise of democracy, which we shall not tolerate.” He further emphasized that as long as there was a ray of hope, the Chinese government would never abandon using peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue.\footnote{“Chronology 2003,” MAC.} This last was supposed to reassure Taiwan that although the PLA had weapons trained on the Island, that as long as independence was not declared, force would not be used.

In year of 2004, tensions maintained their steady pace. President Chen called for peace and pledged his commitment to the “Four Nos Plus One” promise as long as China was willing to accept the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.\footnote{“Chronology 2004,” \textit{Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Republic of China (Taiwan)}, updated 16 February 2016, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67764&ctNode=6605&mp=3 (accessed February 16, 2016).} Chinese Premier Hu Jintao reiterated the Mainland position that Taiwanese independence would be met with severe consequences.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Taiwanese Espionage Case**

On January 14, 2004, the PRC caught seven Taiwanese as they collected intelligence at the Guangzhou Huangpu shipyard. Following President Chen’s public disclosure that he
was aware of the position of Chinese military bases, and missiles aimed at the island, the intelligence network on the Mainland was crushed.\textsuperscript{445} The ARATS informed the SEF of the case against the seven spies. They had confessed everything about their identities and espionage activities. Their case was being processed.\textsuperscript{446} Following this letter on January 16, the MAC released a statement on the alleged “Taiwanese Espionage Case” pointing out that they had “reasons to suspect that this [was] the Mainland’s intention to influence the development of Taiwan's domestic political situation and to manipulate Taiwan’s elections.”\textsuperscript{447}

President Chen explained the “One Principle and the Four Major Issue Areas” on February 2, 2004. The “One Principle” was “Establishing the Principle of Peace.” The “Four Major Issue Areas” were, the establishment of a negotiation mechanism, exchanges based on equality and reciprocity, the establishment of a political relationship, and the prevention of military conflicts. President Chen stressed that after the March 20 presidential election, he would invite Mainland China to work towards the initiation of cross-Strait negotiation.\textsuperscript{448}

During this time, the United States during tried to be as detached as possible while still fulfilling its obligations according to treaties. On March 1, 2004, President Chen approved the long-delayed procurement of advanced weaponry from the United States.\textsuperscript{449} In an exclusive interview with the \textit{LA Times} on March 6, President Chen Shui-bian guaranteed that the Taiwan issue would not become a burden on the United States. In the next four years, Taiwan would maintain the status quo, and Chen would continue efforts to prevent the status

\textsuperscript{446} “Chronology 2004,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{447} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{449} Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xviii.
quo from being unilaterally changed.\textsuperscript{450} On March 20, Chen narrowly won reelection. On March 31, in an interview with the BBC, President Chen stated that it was his top priority to improve and stabilize cross-Strait relations in the next four years.\textsuperscript{451}

The PRC attempted to pit the United States against Taiwan. On April 14, 2004, PRC President Hu Jintao during his meeting with U.S. Vice President Cheney stated that the greatest threat to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was the Taiwanese separatist movement. He also demanded that the United States honor its commitments and oppose Taiwan independence and any words or deeds by Taiwan leaders to unilaterally change the status quo of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{452}

\textbf{The Inauguration of President Chen}

On May 20, 2004 President Chen delivered his inaugural address, “Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan.” Regarding Cross-Strait relations, the President emphasized goodwill, peace, and development, and reiterated that the principles and his promise made during his inaugural address on May 20 in 2000 had not changed over the past four years, nor would they change in the next four years.\textsuperscript{453} Later that month, Hong Kong newspaper \textit{Takungpao} reported that the Mainland’s armed forces would hold joint military exercises at Dongshan Island in Fujian in June. It is the first time that the objective of the exercises was “to vie for air domination over the Taiwan Strait.”\textsuperscript{454} On June 7, \textit{The Hong Kong Wenweipo} reported that Mainland authorities have stated that if the United States did not sell advanced

\textsuperscript{450} “Chronology 2004,” \textit{MAC}.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{454} “Chronology 2004,” \textit{MAC}.
weapons to Taiwan, the Mainland would consider withdrawing the ballistic missiles deployed along its southeastern coast.\textsuperscript{455} In reaction to this, on June 16, President Chen stated that in facing the growing threats of the Mainland, only by transcending political parties and strengthening self-defense capabilities could Taiwan’s military forces be able to effectively deter, a possible PRC military venture.\textsuperscript{456}

**Conclusion**

In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, diplomatic conflict was in general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility toward one another, but were open to negotiations with a third party. The United States was focused on other parts of the world, namely the Middle East in President Bush’s War on Terror. Bound by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the United States continued to sell defensive systems to Taiwan. However, economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China were only deepening. Cross-Strait Relations did not stabilize into the “1992 Consensus” until KMT Ma Ying-jeou was elected President in March 2008.

**Introduction**

In general, China-Taiwan relations in the early 1990s looked promising. Diplomatic relations between the two governments improved with the creation of the SEF on Taiwan and the ARATS on the Mainland. The United States continued to improve economic relations

\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{456} Ibid.
with the PRC and fulfill its obligations to Taiwan according to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

**Context of Improved Relations**

Cross-Straits relations were on a track to improve in 1991. The Executive Yuan established the MAC in January, the SEF in February, and drew up the “Guidelines for National Reunification in March.457 The guideline stipulated that: (1) The existence of the Republic of China was a simple reality that could not be denied; (2) “One China” referred to China as a historical, geographical, cultural, and racial entity; and (3) Unification was inevitable, but mutual hostilities had to be eradicated. Each had to include one another in the international arena and renounce the use of force for unification.458

In April 1991, President Lee announced that the Beijing regime would no longer be regarded by Taiwan as a rebel organization.459 This demonstrated that the ROC had formally renounced military force as a means of national unification. Therefore, military disruption was not a very important measure of the independent variable of study during this time. This diplomatic gesture also showed that the ROC government would no longer compete for the “right to represent China” in the international arena.

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457 “3. The Development of Cross-Strait Relations,” MAC.
459 “3. The Development of Cross-Strait Relations,” MAC.
Relative Peace in the Strait

Even in June 1991, China had formulated its position on “peaceful unification; one country, two systems.” This had not yet become a contentious issue. In 1991, the TAO made its first “June 7 Statement,” of which the major element was to suggest to Taiwan: “Relevant agencies, delegated bodies, and individuals from both sides of the Strait should, as soon as possible, bring discussions to solve the issues of the ‘three links’ and bilateral exchanges.” Additionally, it suggested “the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China should send representatives to engage in contacts, so as to create conditions for the progress of negotiations for a formal end to hostilities and gradual peaceful unification.”

Diplomatic relations were improved on both sides through the expansion of economic ties. On July 2, 1991, the spokesman of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade introduced the following five principles to promote cross-strait economic and trade relations: (1) direct and two-way trade, (2) mutually beneficial relations, (3) many trading areas, (4) stable and long-term relations, (5) abiding by agreements.

During this period, the seeds of future problems were sown. In October 1991, the DPP introduced the “Independence Clause” into its party charter. It aimed to establish the “Republic of Taiwan” with independent sovereignty, drafting a new constitution, and holding referendums. This was met with considerable KMT backlash. In November, Taiwan joined

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460 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.
462 Ibid., p. 258.
464 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the name “Chinese Taipei.”

China only allowed Taiwan to participate in international organizations and activities as “Chinese Taipei,” or a similar title. This generated a high tide of separatist feeling in Taiwan. In December 1991, China-Taiwan relations continued to improve. On December 16, the TAO created the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) to promote contacts with Taiwan and eventual reunification.

A New Year of Cooperation

January 1992 began an era of communications across the Taiwan Strait through the SEF and ARATS. On January 8, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF to invite their chairman, the vice chairman, or the secretary-general to lead a delegation to visit Beijing and exchange views on enhancing communications and cooperation. On June 16, secret envoys agreed to hold the first “Koo-Wang talks” in Singapore. ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan sent a letter on August 4, to invite SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu for a meeting to exchange views on economic development and SEF-ARATS affairs and discuss related programs.

On August 8, the National Unification Council (NUC) of the ROC approved the resolution on the “Definition of One China,” which states, “both sides of the Taiwan Straits

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465 Ibid., p. xii.
466 “3. The Development of Cross-Strait Relations,” MAC.
469 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.
470 “Chronology 1992,” MAC.
471 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.
agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Straits have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China.’”\(^{472}\) This became the basis for the 1992 Consensus.

U.S. involvement in Taiwan at this point in time was largely arms sales to promote the defense of Taiwan. On September 2, 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced his decision to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.\(^{473}\) These sales did not yet hamper China-Taiwan Relations. Later that month, the “Statutes Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” and its by-laws were enacted. These laws were made for the purpose of handling legal matters that could arise before national unification.\(^{474}\)

On September 30, the ARATS suggested to the SEF that they hold a preparatory meeting on the Mainland to settle the time, place, and agenda of the planned “Koo-Wang Talks.”\(^{475}\) This practical meeting took place in Hong Kong in late October. In November, the SEF proposed that each side express its interpretation of “one China” verbally and based its own interpretation on the August 8 resolution of the NUC.\(^{476}\) In response, the ARATS “fully respected and accepted” SEF’s suggestion to verbally interpret “one China” respectively.\(^{477}\)

Even as Taiwan improved diplomatic relations with China, it was still negotiating arms deals to arm itself against a possible attack. On November 18, Taiwan signed a deal to procure 60 Mirage-2000 jet fighters from France.\(^{478}\) In December, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS that emphasized that the top priority of the practical meeting was to solve substantive issues. As to the substance of “one China,” the ROC had been consistent in

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\(^{473}\) Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.


\(^{475}\) “Chronology 1992,” MAC.

\(^{476}\) Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.

\(^{477}\) Ibid., p. xiii.

\(^{478}\) Ibid., p. xiii.
following the Guidelines for National Unification and decisions of the NUC. The ROC stance was that each side of the Strait was governed by a separate political entity. When China was asked to comment on the ROC position in December, ARATS Vice Chairman Tang Shupei said that the PRC’s stance on that issue had been consistent and against the statement of “two political entities.” Tang said such a statement was not helpful for improving cross-Strait relations.

Complications and Collaboration

In the year 1993, U.S.-China relations became complicated, while China-Taiwan relations benefited from the collaborative efforts of the SEF and ARATS. On January 21, William Jefferson Clinton was inaugurated as the President of the United States. The focus of his China policy was the renewal of the most favored nation (MFN) treatment. There was initial pressure from human rights groups to use trade as leverage to pressure the PRC to improve its human rights record moving forward. The Clinton Administration eventually decided to delink human rights improvement and trade relations, a major change in U.S. policy.

That same day on January 21, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the White Paper on ROC Foreign Policy. It stipulated that the ROC’s foreign policy is one-China, two entities, and equality at the interim. The policy paper said that the government

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479 “Chronology 1992,” MAC.
480 Ibid.
481 Ibid.
482 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
would pursue an international space, with a long-term goal of returning to the UN and the eventual goal of China’s unification.\textsuperscript{484}

In March 1993, the SEF-ARATS talks continued to move forward. On March 2, the SEF suggested to the ARATS that they hold the next round of “Koo-Wang Talks” in late March or early April. At the preparatory meeting for the upcoming “Koo-Wang Talks,” MAC Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian said that the talks would cover four issues—SEF-ARATS affairs, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, cultural exchanges, and a joint combat against crime. The protection of Taiwanese investment might be added to the agenda.\textsuperscript{485} The talks were held in Singapore from April 27-29. SEF Chairman Koo and ARATS Chairman Wang signed four agreements: (1) the Agreement of Document Authentication, (2) the Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail, (3) the Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and Communication Channels between the SEF and ARATS, and (4) the Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.\textsuperscript{486}

\textbf{Conclusion}

From 1991 to June 1993 the level of diplomatic conflict was generally low. China and Taiwan benefited from economic and legal cooperation of the SEF and ARATS organizations. Third party intervention was observed at level four due to U.S arms deals with Taiwan, but a level three when the United States deepened economic relations with China. I observed military conflict in the Taiwan Strait at level two, when Taiwan continued to

\textsuperscript{485} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{486} “3. The Development of Cross-Strait Relations,” \textit{MAC}.
stockpile weapons in preparation for a potential Chinese attack. Overall, the level of conflict during this period was low.

**SUMMARY**

In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables during five periods in order to capture the formation and decline of a positive feedback cycle. I then examined the resultant level of conflict in the Taiwan Strait before and after the time designated as the positive feedback cycle. I found that the level of conflict was still medium to high in the aftermath of the 1999 Confrontation. China-Taiwan relations did not stabilize until a pro-unification leader was elected president in Taiwan in 2008.487

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487 Due to the constraints of my methodology, this event was not included in my case study, though it would have strengthened my argument and application of the PE Model.
CHAPTER SIX:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for decades persist despite periods of extreme tension and change? How have the foreign policy decisions of each state in the system helped to manage the persistent deadlock? To answer these questions, I used the punctuated equilibrium (PE) model to explore the positive feedback cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and the process by which the negative feedback cycle was reinstituted. According to Baumgartner and Jones, a positive feedback mechanism, or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs, often as a result of attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan were to increase, then the level of negative feedback from the United States would increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my hypothesis, I used a theory-guided case study approach. Case 1 discussed the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s. Case 2 examined the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. My independent variable examined Chinese diplomatic disruption, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption, Chinese military disruption, and Taiwanese military disruption. The intervening variable of this study included four components: U.S. diplomatic opposition to China and to Taiwan, as well as U.S. military opposition to China and to Taiwan. Each case study encompassed two crises and formed one positive feedback cycle.
In this chapter I analyze my findings and present conclusions. In the first sections, I analyze the independent, intervening, and dependent variables to make lateral comparisons across both cases. (Continue when chapter is finished)

ANALYSIS

This section draws comparisons between the two case studies. I first analyze the independent and intervening variable measures, then compare the results of the dependent variable for both cases. I intend to show how the PE Model can help explain deadlock in the Taiwan Strait.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The independent variable for study is the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption is the first component of the independent variable. Based on the PE Model, I expected the level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption for both cases to increase in the two years prior to the first crisis, peak during the first crisis, dip in the interim, peak again during the second crisis, and decrease in the two years following.

The independent variable measures in Case 1 began September 3, 1952, in the two years prior to the first crisis. This case followed a shallow decline in the intensity of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption. The level of disruption was highest in the two years leading up to the first crisis. As a result of the high tensions across the Taiwan Strait in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, ROC leader Chiang continued to use highly disruptive rhetoric up until the first crisis. For example, once he learned that U.S. President Eisenhower sent the
Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait due to the Korean War, Chiang declared that he believed Nationalist forces could attack communists on the Mainland at any time without UN sanction or fear of Soviet intervention. In the following periods, Chiang was already exchanging fire with the Mainland and did not need to threaten to use force. His diplomatic focus shifted from threatening to use force against the communists to pressing the United States for a mutual defense treaty, resulting in a shift from high to medium diplomatic disruption.

Figure 6.1: Case 2 Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption

Case 2 measures began June 9, 1993 spanning the two years prior to the first 1990s crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was the major component of the independent variable for Case 2. The measure began at a low level and oscillated between low and high, ending the cycle at a low level. Relations had begun to improve in the early 1990s when China established the ARATS and Taiwan launched the SEF. These two semi-governmental organizations opened negotiations, establishing a low level of disruption. Meanwhile, top leadership in Taiwan pushed for a greater voice in the international arena,

\footnote{WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”}
and later threatened independence, creating a high level of disruption. President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in the United States was the action that aggravated the PRC and incited their use of force. The cycle ended with hopes from both ROC and PRC leaders that the two sides could return to the status quo ante.

Chinese diplomatic disruption is the second component of the independent variable. Based on the PE Model, I expected this measure to create a bimodal curve. Figure 6.2 and 6.3 show the trends in the Chinese diplomatic disruption data for the two cases.

**Figure 6.2: Case 1 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption**

![Graph showing high level of diplomatic disruption leading up to the first crisis and oscillations during the crises, ending on a high level in the two years following the second crisis.]

In Case 1, Chinese diplomatic disruption begins at a high level in the two years prior to the first crisis, oscillates during the crises, and ends on a high level in the two years following the second crisis. The high-level disruption leading up to the first crisis is a product of tensions from the Chinese Civil War. During the two years prior and throughout the period of study, PRC leadership called for the “liberation” of Taiwan and threatened to use force against intervening states. However, once the PRC discovered that the United States was...
seriously considering using nuclear weapons in the region, it sought to negotiate with the United States and Taiwan. Due to its alliance with the ROC and its aversion to communism, the United States did not want to deepen ties with the PRC. As a result of this spurn, the Communist propaganda espoused that the PRC had never been interested in only capturing the Offshore Islands, but were determined instead to take the Offshore Islands and Taiwan at the same time. Nothing came of this news due to the ceasefire.

**Figure 6.3: Case 2 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption**

![Graph showing levels of Chinese diplomatic disruption over time](image)

Chinese diplomatic disruption in Case 2 appears to have a more bimodal structure. In the two years prior to the first 1990s crisis, this measure increased from a low to a high level. Disruption remained high during the first crisis, dipped to low levels in the brief interim, and then reached high levels during the second crisis. While tensions initially deescalated in the two years following the crises, the status quo would not be reinstituted until 2008 when President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) was elected. Levels started at a low intensity due to the SEF-ARATS talks. However, due to President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in the United States, the SEF-ARATS talks were suspended and PRC leadership stated that they would
only negotiate under the “one China” principle. In the interim between crises, Chinese diplomatic disruption continued at high levels due to their threats of force against Taiwan. The one instance of low diplomatic disruption during this period was the ARATS invitation to the SEF to resume talks, yet tensions increased once more to high levels due to the refusal of the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. The level of diplomatic disruption during the second crisis was high, then decreased to low levels during the de-escalation of the 1999 Confrontation.

Taiwanese military disruption is the third component of the independent variable. This measure was more important in Case 1 than in Case 2. According to the PE Model, I expected another bimodal curve for this measure. This was loosely accurate in Case 1.

**Figure 6.4: Case 1 Taiwanese Military Disruption**

Taiwanese military disruption in Case 1 began at a high level in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War. It decreased to low levels at the end of the first crisis, was high again at the start of the second crisis, and decreased to a medium level by the end of the second crisis. In the two years prior to the first crisis, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 15,000
to Matsu.  

This movement of troops to mount an assault on the Mainland was a clear indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. Low-level disruption occurred in the interim when Taiwan was not firing on the Mainland, but was stockpiling weapons. The level of military disruption did not decrease significantly due to the militaristic leadership of Chiang.

By contrast in Case 2, Taiwanese military disruption was rather insignificant. Due to the fact that the ROC was no longer considered an independent state, they did not have the capability nor desire to be highly militarized. They only maintained low-level arms deals with the United States during this period, the purpose of which was to ensure Taiwan could defend itself under attack. For example, while facing the PRC threat of high-tech weapons and forces, the ROC Minister of National Defense expressed that the ROC armed forces would draw up preventative strategies and expedite the building of a modern capability for “early warning, rapid reaction, and joint operations.”

This amounted to a low level of Taiwanese military disruption for the entire period.

Chinese military disruption is the fourth component of the independent variable. According to the PE Model, I expected to see another bimodal curve in the data. Case 1 and 2 loosely follow this trend.

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489 Pike, “First Taiwan Strait Crisis.”
490 “Chronology: 1999,” MAC.
As shown in figure 6.5, Chinese military disruption began at a high level during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. After Chiang Kai-shek ordered thousands of troops to Quemoy and Matsu, the Chinese Communists began artillery bombardment of the islands. When the first ceasefire was declared, disruption fell to a low level. In the time between the two crises, the PRC—in response to U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons—signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union to develop nuclear capability. During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Chinese diplomatic disruption rose to a high level and fell to a low level again when the PRC declared the second ceasefire. A brief confrontation between a U.S. ship in PRC waters and the PLA resulted in a brief high level of disruption in the Taiwan Strait, but once the ceasefire was reinstated, tensions dropped down to low levels.

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Chinese military disruption in Case 2 more closely resembled a bimodal curve than in Case 1. In the two years before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC staged military exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province resulting in a medium level of disruption. During the crisis, China launched missiles into Taiwanese waters creating a high level of disruption, while also conducting threatening joint military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In the time between incidents, China has approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan in response to ROC consideration of joining the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system of the United States. The level of military disruption peaked again during the 1999 Confrontation when Chinese jet fighters pressed the centerline in the Taiwan Strait. Disruption fell to medium levels when the PRC was only pointing missiles at Taiwan toward the end of the confrontation. In the two years following the Taiwan Confrontation, military disruption fell to low levels as the PRC stopped aiming missiles at Taiwan but continued to stockpile weapons in the area.
Conclusion

The independent variable is divided into four parts because each case began and continued for different reasons. Some measures are more important than others. In Case 1, both Chinese and Taiwanese military disruption were important measures, while in Case 2, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was most significant. Case 1 did not seem to follow my predictions based on the PE Model due to the close chronological proximity to the Chinese Civil War.

INTERVENING VARIABLE

The intervening variable of study is the level of negative feedback from the United States in response to the disruptive actions of the PRC and ROC. According to the PE Model, I expect to see varying degrees of response to Chinese and Taiwanese disruption. This will depend on the relationship of the United States with each political entity in two very different time periods.

U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan is the first element of the intervening variable. In Case 1 the United States and the ROC on Taiwan are formal allies. The United States considered the ROC to be the legitimate government of Greater China. This was in large part due to the fear of Communism in the United States, and a result of political realities at the conclusion of the Second World War. Due to their relationship as allies, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan only reached medium levels. For example during the first crisis, the United States was reluctant to sign a mutual defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. In the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States tried to improve relations with the PRC in the
Warsaw Talks, resulting in a medium level of opposition to Taiwan. This trend of improving Sino-American relations would continue.

U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1990s had changed from the 1950s. The ROC was no longer considered the legitimate government of China. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan in Case 2 was generally observed at medium levels as a result of the improvement of the U.S.-PRC relationship through diplomacy and growing economic interdependency. Additionally, the reluctance of the United States to support Taiwan, illustrated by President Clinton’s “Three Nos Policy,” also shows medium level opposition.

The second element of the intervening variable is U.S. diplomatic opposition to China. In Case 1, during the two years prior to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan fluctuated between low and medium levels: low when the United States publicly condemned China’s actions or supported Taiwan’s and medium when the United States threatened to declare war against the Mainland and send forces in to stabilize the region. Opposition to China peaked during the first crisis with the creation of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The high level opposition fell to medium levels for the rest of the period due to U.S. threats to go to war against China.

In Case 2, the United States and China are much more economically interdependent, which changes the type and magnitude of U.S. opposition. U.S. criticism of China’s oppressive government and human rights record resulted in a low level of opposition. Diplomatic opposition rose to medium levels due to U.S. arms deals with Taiwan and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. opposition to China increased to high levels when the U.S. Congress agreed to issue Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University in the United States. This was against the wishes of the Clinton Administration.
The third element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to Taiwan. In Case 1, the Nationalist Government on Taiwan was an ally of the United States against communism. During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan resulting in a high level of military opposition. This measure was not only designed to censure China, but also constrain Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of the nature of the U.S.-ROC relationship, the United States did not militarily oppose any actions taken by the Nationalists. In the 1990s this measure was similarly insignificant, but for separate reasons.

The political landscape had changed in the period of détente between the first two crises in the 1950s and the third crisis in the 1990s. Taiwan, officially considered by the United States to be a province of China, was not subject to direct military opposition. The PRC would consider any attack on Taiwan to be an attack on the “Motherland.” The United States would not jeopardize its relationship with either of the two political entities in such a way.

The fourth element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to China. In Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was constantly at a high level due to the naval forces, equipment, intelligence, and air support given to the ROC. U.S. military opposition to China in Case 2 was high due to U.S. naval and air support, equipment, and intelligence given to the ROC through arms deals.

The intervening variable of study is the negative feedback, or equilibrium forces provided by the United States. Each of the four elements that create this variable measure is important in the context of various events. For example, due to the amicable relationship with the ROC on Taiwan, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was the only logical option.
Military opposition would have destroyed their relationship. The next section analyzes the dependent variable.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict in the region. I hypothesized that if China or Taiwan were to increase their disruptive forces, then the United States would increase its influence, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Conversely, if China and Taiwan increased their disruptive actions, then the United States did not intervene, the resultant level of conflict would still be high.

The first part of the dependent variable is the level of diplomatic conflict. From two years to four years after Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, diplomatic conflict was at a level three. The PRC would not directly communicate with the ROC and vice versa. However, the PRC was willing to negotiate with the United States. In order to set a base line to compare the status quo ante and the current level of conflict, I measured the dependent variable in the four years to two years prior to the first crises in each case. The aftermath of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis was very similar to the status quo ante. In the years before the independent and intervening variables, the PRC would not communicate or negotiate with the ROC on Taiwan resulting in a level three.

From two years to four years after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, the level of diplomatic conflict was mostly observed at a level two, with a few level one incidents. For instance, during the “Taiwanese Espionage Case,” the MAC complicated preexisting communication networks, first by sending in spies in the first place, and second by being uncooperative to negotiations with China. This element of the variable fell to low levels only
when Taiwanese leaders espoused their desire to meet for talks. Diplomatic conflict was observed at level one in the Taiwan Strait during the time before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. During this period Taiwan had just established SEF and China created ARATS. These two semi-nongovernmental organizations helped get the ball rolling towards unification and greater cooperation.

The level of military conflict is the second piece of the dependent variable. In the aftermath of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level three. This was largely due to the militarism of Chiang Kai-shek. For example in the spring of 1961, Chang sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. However, U.S. refusal to supply the shells shut down this plan. In the years before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of military conflict in the region was observed at a level two. PRC Premier Zhou En-lai threatened to use force against the United States in Korea.

In the years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, military conflict in the region was at a level three. The PRC was increasing its military deployment against Taiwan in 2002. By November 30, 2003, the PRC had deployed 496 ballistic missiles within a radius of 600 kilometers. Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level two. The ROC continued to sign arms deals with not only the United States, but also with other countries in the international arena, such as France.

The third piece of the dependent variable is the level of third party involvement (TPI). In Case 1 after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of TPI escalated from level two to level four. One example of a level four conflict was President Kennedy’s press conference in which he said that the United States would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. Before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI swung between level one and level three. Level one

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492 “Chronology: 2003,” MAC.
occurred when the United States extricated itself from the cross-Strait relationship in order not to damage its relationship with China.

In Case 2 after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, TPI reached level three when the Department of Defense submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC to the U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{493} Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, President H. W. Bush decided to sell 150 jet fighters to Taiwan;\textsuperscript{494} as a result, TPI was observed at level four.

The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict before and after the crises in each case. The three parts that make up this variable measure are the level of diplomatic conflict, the level of military conflict, and the level of third party involvement. In Case 1, the level of diplomatic conflict was the same before and after at a level three. Military conflict was observed at a level two before the conflict, and at a level three after. Third party involvement before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis escalated from a level one to three. After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI increased from a level two to a level four.

In Case 2, the level of diplomatic conflict before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was measured at a level one. The ROC and the PRC began to communicate with each other through the creation of the SEF and ARATS. After the 1999 Confrontation, the level of diplomatic conflict decreased from level two to level one. Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis the level of military conflict was measured at level two, while in the aftermath of second incident it was observed at level three. This was in part due to the provocative rhetoric and actions of DPP President Chen. He helped to end the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, but increasingly expressed his pro-independence views. This provoked further military exercises by the PLA. Before the first incident in the 1990s, TPI reached level four.

\textsuperscript{494} Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xii.
According to the PE Model, I expected the levels of diplomatic and military conflict to be the tails on either side of the two conflicts in each case. I expected the level of TPI to react to the levels of diplomatic and military conflict within the confines of the existing relationships and obligations to one another. Since the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises occurred in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, the levels of military and diplomatic conflict before and after Case 1 were higher than in Case 2. The level of TPI in Case one increased in reaction to the rising level of military and diplomatic conflict, but after the crises, continued to increase. This was due to the dependence of Taiwan on the United States and the militaristic leadership of Chian Kai-shek.

CONCLUSION

Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. According to this model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Political scientist, Weixing Hu discussed the PE Model in relation to the Taiwan Strait, but did not execute a rigorous methodology that reflected the theory. This study illustrates how the
Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium could be applied to the case of China and Taiwan in a more methodical way than in Weixing Hu’s study.

**METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

Originally a model of evolutionary biology, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones conceptualized the model of punctuated equilibrium in the context of political science. Their model was broad enough to use as a framework into which other theories could fit. The goal of their study was to examine the dramatic policy changes that “regularly occur in American politics, even if most issues most of the time are characterized by more routine developments.”\(^{495}\) The reason this model interested me in relation to the Taiwan Strait, was that it offered a multifaceted framework to explain both long periods of stasis amid short cycles of rapid disruption. Other theories that have been used to describe the political deadlock across the Taiwan Strait, such as balance of power politics and complex interdependence theory only explain part of the longitudinal phenomenon of political stalemate. One large drawback of Baumgartner and Jones’ PE model was the lack of a coherent methodological framework. Depending on the specific area of research, the measures and methodological approach changed. Their anthology of works included statistical studies of American policy change. I sought to apply this model to international relations in the form of case study research.

Political scientist Weixing Hu attempted to use the PE Model to explain cycles of change and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He defined the negative feedback cycle as the “growing economic interdependence, domestic constraints in Taiwan, economic development

\(^{495}\) Baumgartner and Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” p. 3.
and peaceful unification strategy of Beijing, and Washington’s concerns about peace and stability in East Asia and its leverage over Taipei and Beijing.\footnote{Hu, “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations,” p. 934.} The elements of positive feedback included in his study are: the role of issue cycles and impulsive drivers for change.\footnote{Ibid., p. 953.} Weixing Hu sections off the history of the Taiwan Strait into three broad time periods which each included a period of change and détente. His three case studies do not follow a set format, but are short summaries of only the events that support his claims.

In this study I endeavored to correct the loose method of Weixing Hu and establish a systematic approach for applying the PE Model to case study research. I illustrated how the PE Model could be used to develop a codebook to examine historical cases. My process is highly replicable, unlike that of Weixing Hu. If another scholar were to repeat my study, they would find similar results. I believe future studies that implement the PE Model should be similarly systematized. In the process of combing through historical documents and coding specific events, this method safeguards against cherry-picking history to support a hypothesis.

I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan increased, then the level of negative feedback from the United States would increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. I operationalized the independent variable as Chinese and Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruption on three-point nominal scales. The intervening variable was also made up of four parts: U.S. diplomatic and military opposition to both China and Taiwan. I operationalized the dependent variable as the level of military conflict, the level of diplomatic conflict, and the level of third party involvement, each on a four-point nominal scale.
I implemented two theory-guided case studies. My first case encompassed the positive feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second case discussed the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. I measured the independent and intervening variables over five time periods in each case: in the two years before the first crisis, during the first crisis, the time in between, during the second crisis, and in the two years following the second crisis. I measured the dependent variable within the two years before and in the two years following the independent and intervening variable measures.

FINDINGS

Through this research, I found evidence to support my hypothesis according to the PE Model. As the level of disruption from both China and Taiwan increased, the United States increased their opposing influence and/or forces in order to achieve a lower level of conflict than during the crisis situations. The variable measures for both cases were different due to changing circumstances and relationships. China became a superpower and Taiwan democratized in the span of time between my two cases.

As the level of disruption increased, the level of U.S. involvement increased. As was discussed in the Analysis section of this chapter, Case 1 encompassed the First (1954-55) and the Second (1958) Taiwan Strait Crises and Case 2 included the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. In Case 1, Chinese and Taiwanese military disruption were the most important components of the independent variable while in Case 2, the diplomatic disruption of Taiwan and the military disruption of China were the most important factors. In Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was the most important
element of the intervening variable, while in Case 2, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan
was most significant. Despite these differences, I found evidence to support my hypothesis:
as Taiwanese and Chinese disruption to the system increased, so did U.S. opposition to this
disruption.

The point of deviation for my hypothesis has to do with the dependent variable: the
resultant level of conflict. I will discuss the particulars of this limitation later in this chapter.
The resultant level of conflict in both cases did not match the level of conflict before the two
instances of positive feedback. This had to do with the way my methodology was written.
Despite this setback, my study is still significant. In establishing a more systematized
methodology for the application of the PE Model, I unintentionally limited the scope of
possible observations. My framework is limiting, but no one has attempted to do this before.

LIMITATIONS

There are several limitations to my study that I must acknowledge and discuss. Many
of these limitations are inherent in case study research. Some of the components of my
independent and intervening variables have many data points, while others only have a few.
However, the written records available to me restricted my research.

A second limitation of my study was the oversimplification of the United States as the
only actor invested in the negative feedback cycle of incremental policy change. In reality,
every actor in the system acted in some instances as a balancer and as a destabilizer. For
instance, in Case 2, the actions and rhetoric of Presidents Lee and Chen were destabilizing,
while the line of negotiation between ARATS and SEF was a force of stability.
Another inherent drawback of case study research is the inability to control for historical events external to the study. I was not able to control for the increased tensions that occurred due to the Chinese Civil War or the additional pressures of the Cold War in Case 1. I did, however, repeatedly acknowledge these events as influential to my findings.

A fourth limitation of my study was the chosen bounds of my variables. History and conflicts in particular are not guided by averages. Each is unique in the time it takes a crisis to erupt and dissipate. Instead of using dates to define when I measure my variables, it would have been more beneficial to use events common to both cases to define the time periods of each of my variables. For instance, the dependent variable of the level of conflict in Case 2 was still rising in the specified time frame due to the provocative leadership of DPP President Chen. Not until pro-status quo President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008, was a period of détente reestablished in cross-Strait relations.

Despite these limitations, such a systematized application of the PE Model has not been tried before in case study research. These limitations could be improved upon in future research.

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future researchers who use the PE Model in case study research should strive to implement a systematized approach. Designing a codebook using nominal scales, defining timeframes of variables based on common events, and implementing a precise lateral comparison of the cases are lessons future scholars might glean from this work.

In the process of conducting research I discovered several avenues of thought which could be interesting to further research, but which did not fit into the scope of this study.
First, the role of public opinion in Taiwan and domestic divisions, which influenced Taiwan’s foreign policy would be an interesting area of study. There exist divisions between Taiwan natives and Chinese immigrants to the island that found expression in political parties in the 1990s. These divisions become especially important in election years.

Another possible area of research is the applicability of the PE Model to the growing economic interdependence of Taiwan and China. Economic measures are slower acting than diplomatic or military actions that can seem rash and fast. Baumgartner and Jones combined the concepts of negative feedback and deep structure in the PE Model. Connie Gersick on the other hand tries to separate these concepts while comparing the PE Model across several different disciplines.

The issue of deep structure is an interesting one. Gersick defines deep structure as, “a network of fundamental, interdependent ‘choices,’ of the basic configuration into which a system’s units are organized, and the activities that maintain both this configuration and the system’s resource exchange with the environment. Deep structure in human systems is largely implicit.”498 I had an idea that deep structure in relation to the Taiwan Strait or more broadly to international relations could be related to identity politics and the study of nationalism and national identity. That state is also defined by the relationships it chooses to enter into and how it maintains them. These identities and relationships change only incrementally over time due to multiple layers of constructed limitations. When these definitions do change, it is a rapid process largely due to attention shift and mimicking.

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CONCLUSION

This study illustrates how the model of punctuated equilibrium can be used in case study research. The Taiwan Strait deadlock can be explained using this model. As the level of Chinese and Taiwanese disruption to the system increases, the level of U.S. opposition to this disruption increases, to eventually reinstitute stability. In recent news, voters in Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen, their first woman president and Democratic Progressive Party member. Her leadership of the independence-minded DPP and her refusal to accept the “One China principle” will make it difficult for Tsai to manage Taipei’s relationship with Beijing. She has made it clear that she wants to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and is unlikely to reverse the policies of the Ma Administration. Following Tsai’s election, Xinhua News released a commentary in which it warned that “if the DPP and Tsai promote ‘peaceful Taiwan independence’ or ‘de jure Taiwan independence,’ they will become ‘troublemakers’ in cross-Strait relations, jeopardizing Taiwan’s stability and development.” Xinhua went on to warn the Tsai Administration to learn from the mistakes of Chen Shui-bian, the last DPP president who stirred up trouble across the Taiwan Strait. Will these new developments lead to greater stability or further disruption? Who knows, but the deadlock continues nonetheless.

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