Insurgency in the Late Bronze Age Levant: A World-Systems Analysis of Three Egyptian Garrison Sites

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Insurgency in the Late Bronze Age Levant:
A World-Systems Analysis of Three Egyptian Garrison Sites

by

Eric T. Hubbard

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of the
Requirements of Independent Study
in Archaeology at
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Prof. O. Navarro-Farr

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Abstract

The wide-ranging research focused on the turbulence of the Late Bronze Age in the Mediterranean and the Levant has not yet yielded a unified narrative of how this period was experienced across the region. While some sites exhibit no sign of the infamous collapse or ‘crisis,’ many others exhibit rapid abandonment or destruction layers. The narrative surrounding these destructions tends to be viewed as relating to foreign powers such as the imperial Egyptian invasion, Israel’s rising kingdom, or all manner of so-named ‘Sea Peoples.’ This macro-causal approach leaves fewer considerations of micro-scale incidents of local resistance/agency. Recent evidence from a New Kingdom outpost in Jaffa (Tel Yafo), excavated by the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project (JCHP), sheds light on just such a possibility. Specifically, evidence suggests a local Canaanite resistance against Egyptian domination. In this thesis, I reconsider a number of Late Bronze Age, New Kingdom outposts to better gauge the intensity of Egyptian influence in the Levant and to posit the probability of local efforts to collectively resist.
Dedication

For my parents
Tom ('77) and Jean Hubbard
and Chewie...
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to give thanks to Professors Kardulias and Navarro-Farr for their generous guidance and support throughout both my time here at Wooster, and the process of developing this Independent Study. Additionally, the following research would not have been possible without Prof. Aaron Burke of UCLA who shared with me an inspiring enthusiasm for Levantine archaeology and was incredibly generous to me with his time, advice, and yet unpublished materials from recent excavations at Jaffa. Thanks must also go to Mr. Ryan Ozar and Ms. Kate Patch of APEX and Off-Campus Studies, respectively. Ryan went above and beyond the call of duty in supporting my unique application for an APEX Fellowship, which funded my first field school experience with the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project. While at the helm of OCS, Ms. Patch ensured my continued success in studying abroad in Jerusalem despite the Gaza Conflict of 2014. Finally, I would like to acknowledge all the friends, family, and past mentors from both Defiance and Wooster who have continually supported my endeavors in, and outside, academia.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The following investigation outlines a review of an argument for an archaeology of insurgency posited by Burke and Peilstöcker (Burke et al. 2015) of the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project (JCHP) compared against two cases of similar Late Bronze Age Egyptian outposts in Canaan (Beth Shan, Deir el-Balah). In the Late Bronze Age (LBA), the Assyrians, Hittites, and Egyptians began to lose their hold on the Levant, a land highly valued for its access to the Mediterranean, overland trade routes, and natural resources. For centuries these powerful civilizations had competed for their share of this region. Located inland of the Eastern Mediterranean coast, Canaan was the bottleneck of the Levant, a place of inevitable “international” contact between the major powers of the ancient world. It was also home to a number of major urban-centers, whose inhabitants come under the cultural umbrella term of Canaanite, a name academics in the region largely received from Mari, Biblical, and other non-Canaanite documents (Tubb 1998). Despite nearly two centuries of excavation, scholars are still in search for a framework to reconstruct the complex political and cultural landscape of the LBA Levant, in particular, the relationship large city centers had to one another, the degree to which Egyptian imperialism upset this dynamic and ultimately the true nature of Egypto-Canaan relations.

Key to this understanding is a series of documents known as the Amarna Letters. These documents represented at least 17-28 years in correspondence between the Egyptian administration and various entities in the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor,
and the Middle East. They indicate that the political relationships during the nearly 300-year occupation of the New Kingdom in the Levant, during the LBA, were tumultuous. Interestingly, however, they also demonstrate a period of unprecedented collaboration between these ancient near eastern powers. The numerous destruction levels found almost ubiquitously across Levantine sites seem to back the Letters’ historicity regarding the tumult of the period, especially for those sites identified as Egyptian outposts. Scholars Killebrew (2005), Falconer and Savage (2003), Cline (2000), and Finkelstein (1996), among other Levantine specialists, often cite these and related texts in support of their political and economic reconstructions that also speak to the turmoil as evidenced by the archaeological record. The Levantine material record during the LBA is eclectic to say the least and bespeaks an “international” period in which diplomatic correspondence like that of the Amarna Letters would be expected. Given the importance of this historically documented narrative, and the privilege often afforded to textual evidence accompanying archaeologically observable events, it is inevitable that most conversations surrounding Canaan have centered on its complexity as an international crossroads subject to the influence of profound foreign economic and cultural factors. The strength of this textually driven narrative tends to frame the interpretations of the destructions mentioned above as having resulted from one of several potential foreign military powers or internecine feuding, interpretations that have become commonplace.

However, recent evidence from the JCHP (Burke et al. 2015) has prompted principle investigators Dr. Aaron Burke and Dr. Martin Peilstöcker to suggest that conflicts resulting in archaeologically visible destructive events may derive from internal rather than external causes. Jaffa has served as a port on the central Mediterranean coast
of the Levant for over three thousand years. Though the first evidence of continual habitation is found in the MBA, the port does not stand out historically until after the 15th Century BCE when Pharaoh Thutmose III began a campaign to expand Egyptian rule into the Southern Levant, a plan that included the taking of Jaffa. In recent excavations, the JCHP has uncovered a series of destruction layers and rebuilding phases within Jaffa’s Egyptian gate. This alternating stratigraphy indicates to the directors a reoccurring hostility (Burke et al. 2015), perhaps suggestive of local rebellions as opposed to the persistence of foreign militaries.

This study is therefore an exploration of, as Burke calls it, an archaeology of insurgency at Jaffa. Dr. Burke and Dr. Peilstöcker’s interpretation of Jaffa’s stratigraphy of destruction offers a compelling alternative narrative to investigate and challenging theoretical questions to address. For example, how can one test for insurgency and similar types of interactions within the record? If it is detectable, are there discernable patterns that assist our present understanding of Egypto-Canaan relations and, more broadly, the relationships between Canaanite city-states? In order to answer these questions and test the viability of this alternative interpretation, the creation and application of a model based on Jaffa is necessary. Using a world-systems approach I re-evaluate the remains of Jaffa and two additional Egyptian outposts that may exhibit similarly patterned destructions.

**Review of Literature**

The following review of literature is split into five major sections, echoing the layout of the subsequent research plan. First, a broad overview of Levantine culture history, its major acts and actors, is presented in order to contextualize the material from
Jaffa. Within the overview section are two sub-groups of sources that pursue more specific questions of defining “Canaanite” culturally and geographically as well as present understandings of the Egyptian imperial model and its effects in the Levant. Following the overview is a brief introduction of Jaffa’s archaeological site, its history, and a description of the recent findings that sparked this research. Next, we diverge greatly into a variety of sources that will help to define an “archaeology of insurgency” and develop a theoretical model by which to apply to the data. Although I more fully theorize insurgency in the following chapter, I briefly review this literature here in order to more precisely define, or situate, insurgency in the record. Finally, the last two sections deal with the sites themselves. Central to identifying residues of insurgency involves looking for potential analogues. I consider two garrison sites, Beth Shan and Deir el-Balah, where similarly constituted stratigraphies indicate Egyptian occupation, with the former demonstrating evidence of destruction. I will return to these examples in the data chapter, where their material will be explained at length alongside Jaffa’s.

*The Levant in the LBA (ca. 1400-1200 BCE)*

The history of the Levant during the Late Bronze Age was shaped by the trajectories of four distinct civilizations, the Egyptian, Hittite, Assyrian, and Aegean. Two major routes, the Via Maris (coastal route) and the “King’s Highway,” made the Levant a place for intensive interregional trade, a hub for the exchange of knowledge, resources, and prestige objects (Killebrew 2005). Therefore, rather than focus on a defined group of people called the Canaanites, a history of Canaan reads as a series of both hostile and peaceful interactions resulting from the nearly constant push and pull of foreign political and economic forces. Egypt held the most direct investment in the
region, starting at the end of the Middle Bronze Age when they pushed the Hyksos out of the Delta and began, according to a number of Egyptians texts and reliefs, a series of yearly military expeditions throughout the area (Killebrew and Steiner 2014; Morris 2004). The Battle of Megiddo, ca. 1457 BCE, was a particularly decisive victory for establishing Egyptian dominance in Canaan. From there, many authors (Ben-Tor 1992; Killebrew 2005, 2014; Tubb 1998), characterize the resulting flourishing state as one in which a majority of Canaan, save for the northern Levantine coast, existed under the rule of Egypt while acknowledging the multifaceted character of the region’s culture and economy.

*The Trouble with Canaan*

One of the most glaring obstacles to this study, and most studies dealing with social interactions between strong foreign powers and indigenous groups, is that little is confidently known about the indigenous people who fall within the umbrella term of “Canaanite.” In a book devoted to Canaanite culture, Tubb (1998) explains that the term “Canaanite” is an identity attributed by recent scholarship to the assumed indigenous population of the Southern Levant. The problem then becomes geographical, for the size of Canaan and the Ancient Levant differs among scholars. Some sources align it to the modern states of Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, while others accept it only within specific temporal parameters such as the known territory of Egypt’s Asian province during 18th-20th Dynasties (Na’aman 1999). In this study, I define the borders of Canaan as roughly following the modern boundaries of Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and southern Syria.
In the same vein, many scholars have sought to define the Canaanite city-state, as well as sound ways to determine each city center’s surrounding territory or political borders. Israel Finkelstein (1996) and Na’aman (1999), among others have been at the forefront of positing several models for ascertaining the number and size of Canaanite city-states. In addition to Finkelstein, Savage and Falconer (2003) have employed the use of spatial statistics and Thiessen polygons in order to quantify and supplement arguments solely backed by historical accounts or regional settlement data. While several differences exist between these scholars’ interpretations of LBA texts and even the very definition of a city-state (Charlton and Nichols 1997), the general consensus concludes that there existed many, moderately sized polities exhibiting great variety in structure and composition (Savage and Falconer 2003; Sugarman 2009).

*Egyptian Imperialism and Destruction*

Burke and Peilstöcker are by no means the first to uncover evidence that calls for the re-evaluation of destruction layers in Bronze Age Palestine. Pertaining to the rise of the Egyptian Empire in Canaan, Redford (1979) and Weinstein (1981), among others (Seger 1975, Wright 1961, Kenyon 1979, Shea 1979), have debated the feasibility of the position/argument that the Egyptian conquest of Canaan is the singular explanation for the numerous examples of destructions exhibited in the Canaanite record of the mid-16th century BCE. Weinstein (1981) and Hasel (1998) brings together archaeological evidence and textual/iconographic sources to construct, in their mind, a more accurate picture of an Egyptian occupation whose intensity of economic exploitation and military presence was never truly uniform across the region. This idea is echoed by many others, but especially well by Ellen Morris’s (2004) in-depth work on Egyptian military architecture abroad.
She arranges the chapters of her work conveniently by dynasty in the New Kingdom and by specific regions, discussing how changes in architecture can reflect shifts in Egyptian foreign policy from administration to administration. Nevertheless, the consideration that locals might be responsible for even the early destructions of Canaanite sites is relegated to mere footnotes (Weinstein 1981). Still there are some scholars who renounce the idea that Egypt’s New Kingdom ever ruled directly in Canaan. Instead, some scholars, particularly Higginbotham (1996), argue for a model of elite emulation in order to explain the major increase of Egyptianizing artifacts and architecture throughout the Levant.

A Crossroads in Texts

The Amarna Letters have been an invaluable source of historic documentation. In some 350 letters and inventories, roughly 17-28 years of correspondence between the New Kingdom Pharaonic administration (from Amenhotep II to Tutankhamen ~1377-1334 BCE) and contemporary “world powers” are preserved. Most of the texts from the archive in Amarna represent letters received by the Pharaoh and, since Knudtzon’s (1907) milestone translation; the collection has generally been split between two subject areas. First, are the letters that were exchanged with relatively equal foreign powers and deal with diplomatic concerns such as trade and marriage negotiations. The second category of letters includes those received by the Egyptian vassals of Syro-Palestine. Fortunately for scholars of this region they are the most abundant of the collection and permit a unique look into the relationships between the vassal city-states, as well as the vassal and pharaoh. Numerous scholars and epigraphers have poured over these texts for clues to enhance our comprehensive understanding of the time period and align the texts
with archaeological findings (or vice versa). Although their conclusions differ, Ehituv (1978) and Na’aman (1981) for example, have attempted to gather the economic data contained in the letters to reconstruct the general economic atmosphere created by the Egyptian presence in terms of the origins of commodities traded, the exaction of tribute and corvée labor. Even more enlightening is how such studies reveal how the arrival of Egypt’s administration brought shifts in inter-city-state relations, territory size, and land use management (Na’aman 1981). In this study, I follow a rereading of the leading translation of these texts by William Moran (1992).

A Brief History of Jaffa

The history of archaeological investigation at Jaffa is interesting, because while several excavators conducted work there for over 40 years, they published very little. Modern excavations at Jaffa began after the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. In the mid-1950s, Jaffa’s principal excavator, Jacob Kaplan, came to work as the municipality’s archaeologist until his retirement in 1982. Unfortunately, despite a career lasting over 30 years, only a handful of site reports were published, leaving substantial records of his work at Jaffa unseen after his death in 1989. The JCHP was created in 2007 in part for the purpose of reevaluating what Kaplan had discovered at Jaffa. Even more so, the boom of development and real estate projects around Jaffa’s harbor in the late 1990s motivated the directors, Martin Peilstöcker (Israeli Antiquities Authority) and Aaron Burke (UCLA), to create a program that had a more investigative edge for the numerous salvage operations that lay ahead. This meant allying with the Old Jaffa Development Co. and defining, once again, the areas first protected by Jacob Kaplan for archaeological research.
Today there is one main area of excavation, Area A (roughly 85 m by 85 m), which is comprised of two smaller areas known as the “Lion’s Temple” and the “Ramses Gate” areas. The area is situated within an archaeological garden on a tel in the eastern edge of the city. The limited exposures comprise a small portion of the old city whose estimated size is around 5 hectares (Burke and Peilstöcker 2011). Since the project’s inception, the JCHP has re-excavated the main sections of Area A to the extent and beyond that of previous teams, in addition to spearheading a number of other research/salvage excavations around the tel. All finds are catalogued and archived in the nearby archaeology museum, the roof of which forms the project’s main laboratory space.

_Jaffa’s Interpretation and Meaning_

The interpretation of Jaffa by the JCHP largely relies on architectural remains found within the “Ramses Gate” area and assumptions based on textual evidence and Jaffa’s strategic locale.

_Architecture_

The main architectural features within the site are remains of the LBA Egyptian fort and gate complex. Surviving are the foundations of two monumental mudbrick towers each flanking a wide passage of beaten earth. Today, some parts of the north and south towers still stand 3m above the RG-4b gate surface. The compelling evidence for insurgency comes within the gates entrance and passage, where excavations have revealed up to five phases of construction. Three of the phases display signs of restoration and outright destruction. The destruction of Phase RG-4a (roughly dated from 1300-1175 BCE) is most conspicuous, featuring within the passage 20 courses of
collapsed mudbrick wall, nearly two-dozen scorched ceiling timbers, as well as seeds, ceramics, antlers, and other debris (Burke et al. 2015).

**Textual Evidence for Jaffa**

As I argued in my junior independent study (Hubbard 2015), the JCHP’s identification of the destroyers as local Canaanite rebels is almost entirely reliant on textual sources. First is a stele in Egypt recounting the 15th Century campaign of Thutmose III, in which Jaffa is named alongside almost 100 other cities that were conquered and among a handful of cities where Egyptian garrisons were subsequently stationed. Given Jaffa’s placement along the maritime trade route and the remains of the monumental mudbrick foundations, the record appears to affirm Jaffa’s identification as a garrison town in the text. The second piece of evidence also comes from Egypt and takes place during the reign of Thutmose III. It is a papyrus preserving a story of the Egyptian capturing, or recapturing that is, of Jaffa after the supposed Canaanite inhabitants of the city managed to expel the Egyptian garrison (Burke and Lords 2010).

**Approaching Insurgency in the Record**

In order to develop a model by which to understand insurgency in the record I look to a variety of theoretical sources. First, I want to look at insurgency from a social standpoint. Rebellion by its very definition is an inherently social act, taking place between two parties located on opposing rungs of an established (or enforced) social hierarchy. Insurgency also implies an action committed by those not in an authoritative position, presumably non-elites. Therefore I employ agency theory to consider the intersection of social class conflict, rather than an agency approach focused on discerning an ancient individual’s creativity or intentionality. Little could be more intentional than
the collective destruction of an administrative center. This study instead focuses on agency as described by Shanks and Tilley (1987) and Barret (1994, 2000) in which past action is dependent on what resources (symbolic, social, material, etc.) are present to allow certain phenomena to take place (Dobres and Robb 2000).

To this end the surrounding environment must also come into play through the use of spatial analysis on a landscape and regional scale. Do particular landscapes and geographies, such as the Jezreel Valley, encourage conflict between sites as Cline (2000) implies? Furthermore, as noted above, what constitutes a Canaanite city-state and what natural resources and boundaries influence their establishment (Charlton and Nichols 1997)? While this study will not fully dissect these big questions, a sound definition of the “Levantine city-state” and its environs would allow for the search of land use change and production concurrent with the arrival and fluctuations of Egyptian imperialism. In this way, similar to a study conducted by Barker, Daly, and Newson (2002) on the impacts of Roman imperialism in Southern Jordan, one might gauge just how intensely New Kingdom rule invested in Canaanite land and labor.

Though insurgency bespeaks a conflict of circumstances unique from interregional skirmishes or random raids, all are capable of leaving very similar archaeological residues of destruction and are therefore addressed in an already tremendous body of literature on the archaeologies of violence, conflict, and even imperialism and sovereignty (Smith 2011). Such works can help illustrate the different ways archaeologists have approached troubled social relations through material remains. Examples are widely spread spatially and temporally from recent political repression in Uruguay (Mazz 2009), to Medieval, English peasantry (S. Smith 2009), and 18th and 19th
century Northern Albania (Galaty 2013). In the following chapter, I reference a piece by Michael Dietler (2010) on the colonial archaeology of the Roman Empire in the French Mediterranean, a case that aligns well with this research.

Sites to Consider

The following is a brief overview of the two sites I wish to consider in this archaeology of insurgency. Deir el-Balah, and Beth Shan do not all necessarily contain the same pattern of data that is seen at Jaffa’s gate, however, like Jaffa, textual and archaeological evidence have led researchers to confidently identify them as the locations of significant garrison towns. In other words, they are arguably the sites of the most intensive and most direct interaction between imperial and local powers. They therefore constitute suitable contexts by which to evaluate data from Jaffa.

Deir el-Balah, located 19km southwest of Gaza, became a garrison site in the mid-fourteenth century BCE during the reign of Ramses the II. The fort there demonstrates one of six alluded to in the corresponding campaign texts found at Karnak (Brandl and Dothan 2010a). However, the most telling sign was the discovery of locally made (but Egyptian derived) terracotta, anthropoid coffins interpreted to be the burials of the garrison troops. Not to mention the presence of mortuary stelae to Osiris. A man-made reservoir adjacent to the fortifications was recently determined to be a quarry for mudbricks, another clear sign of Egyptian architectural practices (Killebrew et al. 2006).

Beth Shan is by far the more significant of the two locations. At the intersection of the Jezreel and Jordan River valleys (northeastern Israel), the site exhibits an impressive tel, presently situated behind a well-preserved Roman-era cardo and amphitheater. The tel contains the foundations of a once equally impressive collection of
Egyptian architecture (residences, a fortress, and temple) resembling very much the work of New Kingdom architects. Similar to Deir-el-Balah, burials yielded ceramic anthropoid coffins resembling the unique Egyptian mumiform style (James and McGovern 1993, Killebrew and Steiner 2014).

**Conclusion**

Before entering into a theoretical discussion on insurgency in the archaeological record, I want to clarify that this study is not meant as a commentary on the present political connotation of terror attached to insurgency or its origins, especially in the region under investigation. I merely explore insurgency as any other social interaction or behavior that an archaeologist may hope to tease out of material remains. The interpretation of Jaffa’s evidence by Burke and Peilstöcker presents an opportunity to explore insurgency in this setting. This alternative approach is important considering 1) this is a region in which one would expect such behavior and 2), the textual evidence supports such a possibility.
CHAPTER II
THEORY

The present chapter is devoted to the creation of a theoretical model by which one can interpret evidence of destruction at garrison sites. The question here is not simply whether or not the potential for destruction is exhibited, since every garrison site examined features some sort of devastation. The challenge is to create a framework by which we can interpret material evidence to substantiate or refute the possibility that a destruction was caused with intention and by local agents at odds with the Egyptian administrative and military presence.

The proposed framework is an attempt to rethink the metanarratives that have long dominated the archaeology of the LBA Levant, characterizing it as a tumultuous crossroads caught within the competition of surrounding monolithic empires and city-states. Such narratives as the rise of Israel and Judah, the arrival of the ‘Sea Peoples,’ Hittites, or Egyptians, among others, have become fixed in the conceptions of that period for several reasons. The most important being that the unusually large number of surviving period texts heavily influences archaeological reconstructions; the role of “dirt” archaeology is therefore relegated to substantiating (or not) these texts. The Amarna Letters, mentioned above, are a standard reference in the literature used to illustrate the LBA’s interconnected and almost international quality. Nevertheless, the following involves an alternative line of inquiry focused on evidence that can be read as the result of internal disputes, rather than the traditionally accepted, though largely unquestioned/unevaluated proposition that the destructions result from violence committed by the state or contemporary core powers.
In order to remedy this I have adopted a model that combines ideas about insurgency and agency with world-systems theory. While it seems counterintuitive to group agency with a macro-scale, deterministic approach such as world-systems, I feel it necessary. The model must accommodate a large-scale understanding of the “international” nature of the Levant, in particular the encroaching Egyptian imperialism, as well as the inherent independence exercised by indigenous groups who rebel. This combination is best embodied by Kardulias’s (1990) “peripheral negotiation” that will be discussed below after separate introductions to both insurgency and world-systems theory.

**Insurgency**

It is fitting to begin with a definition of insurgency. In a modern, post 9/11 world, insurgency is a word burdened with a number of poor connotations. To many nations, besides the U.S., the use of the word signals a link to indiscriminate violence, extremist behavior, and, unfortunately, religious fanaticism. In researching insurgency it was none too surprising to find that most sources dealt with insurgency in the modern sense as a modern problem, particularly of this and the previous century. In other words, it is an issue of recent, international politics mainly centered on terror organizations in the Near and Middle East, as well as violent revolutionary groups in central Africa or South America. As before, although some of my definitions do derive from such contexts, I wish to make it clear this study’s departure from modern geo-cultural associations and move towards a more objective definition of the motivations, goals, and strategies behind insurgency as a social exchange.

Insurgency usually involves a grassroots uprising with the goal of destabilizing the existing government or, as Underhill (2014: 11) adds, “a set of societal norms [the
insurgents] feel threatened by.” By this definition not all insurgent groups necessarily employ physical violence. However, more nuanced definitions make violence an integral part of the process. For example, Berntsen (2008: 64) writes that, “insurgency is a protracted struggle by one or more armed groups that employ violence with the goal of overthrowing an existing political order.” Another important facet is therefore acknowledging insurgency as also a fight for the population’s support. In the context of the revolutionary groups FARC and SPLA in Columbia and Sudan, Metelits (2010) goes to great lengths to understand the sometimes symbiotic and sometimes violent and coercive relationships shared between an insurgent troop and the host population it supposedly represents. Insurgencies can be categorized in many ways, but are primarily analyzed by their structure (militant, political, urban-cells, etc.) and goals (revolutionary, reformist, separatists, resistance, or commercialist). Today, anthropologists, military intelligence organizations, and scholars of international politics attempt to squeeze insurgent groups into boxes by these schemes when both present and past events suggest that a group’s goals are never singular and structure can change frequently with variable resources and leadership.

For the purpose of this investigation, the definition of insurgency must necessarily be kept to Berntsen’s basic formula of an armed conflict with the goal of displacing the incumbent political structure (2008). To be more specific or stringent in the definition is to restrict interpretation and allow for the problematic projection of modern insurgent behavior. While an argument could be made for universal traits and motives associated with insurgent groups who share similar goals, the manifestations and rational behind all groups is the unique product of their natural, cultural, and political landscape.
It also warrants mentioning that the attribution of destructions to Canaanites as insurgents should not color them as the sole aggressors or provocateurs. As we will see in the following pages, violence was mutual. Within the LBA context, Canaanites are represented as the insurgents by virtue of being subject to an imposed foreign government and choosing to resist.

**World-Systems Analysis**

The basic structure of world-systems analysis is composed of two to three main parts; the core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Each part is associated with a certain level of power, complexity, and often a distinct geographical area. Together they create a system in which unequal relationships, primarily in trade, consistently lead wealth and power back to the core (Wallerstein 1974). Cores act as the seat of a system’s economic and political power. As Urban and Schortman (1999) and others (Giddens 1984; Stein 1999) have acknowledged, cores characteristically exercise a centralized control of allocative, authoritative, and exotic resources. They can control not only life’s necessities such as subsistence goods or access to water, but also those cultural symbols and rituals which give meaning to life. Once incorporated into the core’s reach, a periphery can become both exploited for its raw material resources or specialized manpower and dependent on the distribution of vital resources from the core (Urban and Schortman 1999).

A bulk of the literature on world-systems theory and analysis is dedicated to creating an accurate and comprehensive description of the core-periphery relationship, while maintaining flexibility in its many dimensions. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) recognize the complicated nature of this relationship in their discussion of how systems merge or how peripheries are incorporated into a core’s system. They describe incorporation as a
process that develops over time along a continuum of connectivity. The level of connectivity is determined by the level and type of exchange between the core and periphery. Chase-Dunn and Hall denote four main types of exchange, each requiring a greater level of interdependence. The lowest level is information exchange, the point at which the two have merely made contact and ideas are shared, but no motivation towards conquest or expansion is expressed. That type of motivation moves the level of connectivity up a notch when the two engage in prestige good exchange. Prestige good exchange exhibits an attempt to forge political relations and often impress upon the periphery the core’s wealth and abundance. Full incorporation comes with political and military exchange, usually with the core’s superior military force dominating the periphery. Finally, the full incorporation of the periphery as an extension of the core’s political domain leads to the exchange of bulk goods, essentially the exploitation of peripheral resources (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

While Chase-Dunn and Hall maintain this is the most likely progression of a relationship between a core and periphery, it must be reiterated that the continuum serves to illustrate that any two parts of the system can share any level of interactivity. Furthermore, relative levels of complexity between the core and an appropriated periphery impact the type of relationship they will have. For most world-systems theories the major factor to consider in evaluating any relationship is the economy. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) determine the four most important factors are the quantity of goods, the type of goods, how centralized the exchange is, and how important the transfer of those goods are to the respective parties’ economies. As economies increase and decline, so do world-systems expand and contract. Frank (1993) and Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) speak
of regular expansion and contraction experienced by systems through time. Frank (1993), an economist like Wallerstein, uses alternating A and B phases to delineate periods throughout the Bronze Age of the rising (A) and falling (B) of empirical economic power.

One of the main critiques of world-systems theory is that it is necessarily reductionist and macro-scalar, relying too heavily on the impersonal mechanism of economics to measure cultural interaction, as opposed to more social indicators of extra cultural influence (Stein 1999). Alvin So (1984) argued that incorporation has to occur through personal relations and more than anything relies on the actions of local agents. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) accommodate for this within their continuum of incorporation, determining even the weakest of incorporations can make large waves within the receiving periphery. They recall the introduction of guns and metal utensils to Native American populations by European fur traders. For the French and English traders the exchange was not vital to their economy, but it led to major changes in hunting tactics and eventually social reorganization for native populations (Kardulias 1990).

Another variable to account for in the exchange between core and periphery beyond economics is the diffusion of ideology. Urban and Schortman (1999) hold that “extensive exchange networks are frequently underlain by and depend on commonly held symbolic and religious systems.” Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: 74) would have us remember that, in addition to economic domination, the core’s goal is eventually political domination by “imposing enough political centralization within the periphery to create a decision-making system similar to itself” (74). Exchange goes both way, but whereas the core receives the greatest net worth of resource capital, the periphery often receives the
greatest net worth of ideological capital. Participating in trade does not necessitate an adoption of ideological beliefs. Therefore, determining the extent to which a periphery takes on a core’s symbol system also means determining the motivation (Urban and Schortman 1999). Was the core’s system enforced or does the periphery have more autonomy to choose what it adopts or rejects? Urban and Schortman’s (1999) work at Copan and the Naco Valley leans towards the latter. While Copan was undoubtedly an elite core center of Mesoamerica, the Naco Valley was no mere periphery. It provided material resources, including the shells so prominent in Copan’s elite symbology. Yet they imported, of course to a lesser extent, Copan’s clay and obsidian reserves to be worked by their own specialized artisans. Analysis of spatial patterning in the Naco Valley shows that the periphery is capable of picking and choosing aspects of the elite’s symbol system to incorporate within their own community. This choice indicates that the periphery is making the adoption of foreign symbols a political decision. The adoption of foreign elite symbols or religion could either enhance their own status through affiliation to the esteemed Copan core, or encourage a more hierarchical system from which the leaders of peripheral communities would benefit. Unlike the flow of economic trade, which goes both ways, world-systems sees ideological exchange flow only away from the core.

*Frontiers and Contested Peripheries*

Within the world-system scheme, frontiers are the margins of systems and the membrane of exchange (Allen 1997). Naturally, these areas are largely determined by ecological and geographical landscapes. However, technological innovation and cultural tenacity also become a factor in determining a system’s relationship with groups in a
frontier, whether they are state or non-state societies (Case-Dunn and Hall 1997).

Ferguson and Whitehead (1992) think about frontiers in their various types and roles. For example, hill frontiers vs. valley frontiers, buffer vs. barrier, and internal vs. external. Such labels help us better imagine how, even with minimal incorporation, a marginal society could be both affected and used by cores and their peripheries in competition with other systems. Buffers are geo-political zones created by groups occupying places on the margins of one or more expanding systems. Barriers on the other hand, are groups that occupy space on valuable land or vital communication routes and pose a risk to the core’s efficiency or expansion. Barriers, therefore, can come under tremendous scrutiny. How these groups respond to pressure from expanding systems varies, and determining that response must acknowledge the fact that these groups are in some way already a part of another system, interacting to some extent along that continuum of exchange discussed by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997).

Additionally, “frontiers are fertile places for studying the emergence of intergroup interactions that transform the nature of participating groups and constitute intergroup systems composed of very different kinds of people” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 71). Ultimately, this study addresses issues of the interaction of groups at different levels of complexity along the margins of three early world-systems. In an attempt to better categorize particular interactions and mergers, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) theorize that mergers most often occur between systems of similar complexity, while incorporations or conquests are conducted by systems of a higher complexity than their conquered. Complexity is often characterized as a factor of statehood level and decision-making, where state level societies are seen as having a higher, centralized complexity than
diffuse and decentralized non-states. In other words, agents of state and non-state societies often do not communicate well because they do not make decisions in the same way. Groups in which decisions are made collectively are more prone to split when community leaders with separate loyalties disagree on important decisions. Exceptions can be made in those special cases where contact between two groups has persisted long enough for representatives from the state to gain ample experience with the inner workings of their non-state neighbors and vice-versa. However, divides are inevitable when incorporation threatens non-state leaders’ authority or, for instance, an agreement for vital subsistence supplements falls apart (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).

At the juncture of the ancient Assyrian, Hittite, and Egyptian world-systems, the Levant falls under a special category of interaction known as the contested periphery. The term was first introduced by Mitchell Allen (1997) and, simply put, this is a peripheral area, usually containing some valued resource or strategic position, claimed by two (or more) cores, neither of which manages to consistently lay a distinct hold. On the other hand, the periphery is also unable to rise to the status of core or semi-periphery due to its proximity to two large cores and insufficient hinterlands. A relevant discussion of such a case is Eric Cline’s (2000) paper on the status of Megiddo, a large settlement in northern Israel, as a contested periphery after the 1st millennium BCE. Megiddo is located along the Via Maris, a major trade route running north and south through the Jezreel Valley. According to Cline (2000), numerous peoples fought over Megiddo and the valley, from the Neo-Assyrian period up through Napoleonic times and after. Cline specifically considers Megiddo a contested area only after the first millennium because before that he sees the Egyptian empire, up to Ramses II holding firm political and economic control of
the southern Levant. The hallmark of a contested periphery is evidence of consistent mixing and shifting of political, ideological, and economic affiliations. These shifts can be seen in the record by varying foreign elite goods or changes in writing and weight systems (Allen 1997). However, because areas like Megiddo are located along the crossroads of major trade routes, one can expect to see this mixing anyways. What draws Megiddo out as a contested periphery is the number of battles, archaeological destruction layers and historic accounts which give a record of just how attractive Megiddo was for the those wanting to control the land route from Egypt to Syria.

Application

World-systems theory has the potential to explain the evolution of interrelated regions over great periods of time and space using relatively simple estimations of economic transactions, population density, comparative city size, among other factors. Like any useful theory, on a grand scale it can provide good bang for the archaeological buck. Depth is limited only by a lack of evidence and the imagination, since the general concept of the core and periphery can be increased or reduced to the appropriate scale and, using Chase-Dunn and Hall’s continuum of incorporation, a nearly unlimited combination of relationships can be considered with the evidence and their consequences (both regional and local) explored. Because Jaffa appears to be an important part of the extensive LBA maritime trade network, the destruction events occurring within the Egyptian fortress cannot be examined in isolation (Burke 2011). On the other hand, if this study is to answer any questions about Jaffa’s unique situation, it must take into account that the LBA is well within the bound of recorded history. Therefore, there is the added pressure to negotiate the particulars of historical texts and dates with archaeological
evidence. This requires that the model also be able to flex down to snapshots in time unusually short for world-systems theory. Since this study explores the idea of resistance, the model must also consider the work of Urban and Schortman (1999), Kardulias (1990, 1999), S. Sherratt (2010), Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997, 2010), which accept ideas of peripheral/local agency rather than complete submission and engage the downward fluidity of systems.

Therefore, a general LBA world-system model for this study includes three state cores of the Hittite, Egyptian, and Assyrian Empires (Fig. 2.1). The Southern Levant makes up a triple frontier and contested periphery, as each core vies for the chance to incorporate valuable trade routes and resources within their boundaries.

![Figure 2.1. LBA Levant core/periphery exchange model (Hubbard 2015).](image-url)
A more detailed model of the situation at Jaffa and other garrison sites examines the progressive incorporation of the cities from the perspective of the indigenous population. Looking at Chase-Dunn and Hall’s continuum of incorporation it would appear that we have skipped the previous two steps of information and prestige exchange, and jumped straight to military occupation. However, by the LBA, Egypt and the Levant had so long been in interaction with one another that the two had already engaged in information, prestige, and even bulk goods exchange for over a millennium, albeit to varying intensities (Killebrew 2005, 2014). Jaffa, therefore, displays an instance of first physical contact between the indigenous Canaanite and the New Kingdom Empire. The model in Figure 2.2 highlights generally the stages of increasing core infiltration. Each stage offers the opportunity for the peripheral agents to negotiate their stance in the relationship and decide the next move. This model does not suggest that every core-frontier relationship ultimately ends in resistance or violence. It is meant only to understand the possible conditions under which a resistance, like the ones under investigation, might occur. Once this model is applied to a cultural and geographical context and within the framework of Frank’s (1993) cycles or Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) pulsation, the options expand and detract. For instance, the geographical setting for such an encounter may not allow potential factions to easily emigrate, leading to a violent conflict.

Going step by step, the initial contact between a core and frontier must be considered the first chance for indigenous peoples to accept or decline the infiltration of a foreign group. This initial contact may not be overtly militaristic, but it can be assumed that the core is entering the arena under the belief that controlling the periphery is of economic or political value. Perhaps the land holds valuable resources, or like Jaffa, it may be located
along an important trade route, or it could act as a buffer between competing cores. If the core is successful in beginning a physical infiltration, either through intimidation or an agreement with the periphery, then we move down the chart towards the development of new institutions that represent a growing foreign ideology and foreign concept of hierarchy formation. This takes the form of a restructuring of power to the benefit of the core, either by placing one of their own in control or appointing local agents, a tactic the Egyptians often employed (Killebrew 2005; Morris 2004). The next step is centralizing the power of that new structure through controlling local or regional trade, the distribution of vital resources, the manufacture of prestige goods, etc. We can anticipate at this point in the relationship between two powers of different complexities that animosities will grow as local resource competition increases and distribution inequality becomes more apparent. The major downside to the model is that it only predicts the points at which conflict might begin and not its imminence. Determining this depends on many situational factors such as the environment or geography, not to mention the resilience of each group. However, it can be said that once a core begins exploiting, or more especially, exporting indigenous labor, that is the time incorporation has reached its ceiling. One path that could be followed is for factions of the indigenous people to splinter off once influence from the core restructures the previous hierarchy. This could potentially lead factions to encourage either physical aggression towards representatives of the core or total avoidance through emigration. If they stay within the area, however, conflict can arise again. Both the incorporated group and the newly defined and separate factions vie for the same resources now ultimately controlled by the core.
Figure 2.2. Egyptian core expansion on a non-state periphery and its negotiation (Hubbard 2015).
A Parallel in the French Mediterranean

An interesting case study and possible parallel to this research can be found in Michael Dietler’s *Archaeology of Colonialism* (2010). Using historical and archaeological evidence he addresses in great detail the impact of the Roman Empire’s arrival on the Mediterranean shores of ancient France. Valuable here is his discussions of his theoretical framework and his version of an archaeology of violence. Dietler is very direct in his skepticism of World-Systems Theory (WST), echoing a common critique of the method as being too reductionist and perpetuating the same bias hierarchical binary relied on by colonial ideology. That is, he argues basing a model on the structural dependency of periphery to core is a dangerous assumption that legitimizes the previously unfounded binary constructs, such as civilization/barbarian, modern/primitive, and dynamic/static. His preferred framework is that of colonial/postcolonial theory, which lauds the entanglement and complexity that occurs within a colonial context and attempts to situate local agencies within regional and global processes. Though he might argue that WST has no room for taking the perspective of indigenous populations, Dietler’s framework ends up overlapping in many ways with the negotiated peripherality as described above.

According to Dietler, violence, if not directly a form of conquest or resistance, can almost always be an indirect and unintended consequence of colonialism. In this statement he recognizes that, similar to the world-systems concept of the contested periphery, zones of contact and exchange can be dangerous areas for a variety of complex reasons. Therefore it is important to gauge not only the type of threat the colonizers might bring, but also how indigenous sociopolitical landscapes shift after contact and, as a
result, transform indigenous relations with each other. To do this Dietler states that there are only three types of available evidence: texts, material remains of battles or destructions, and bodies. When compared to the situation at Jaffa, Deitler’s examination of Massalia (today Marseille) on the Iron Age French coast features some striking similarities. Much like what is exhibited in the Amarna Letters, texts from Massalia record pleas to Rome for military assistance when its colony and surrounding sub colonies came under siege by indigenous groups. Archaeologically, these calls for help and the arrival of the Romans en force in the late 2nd century BCE coincide with a dramatic increase in the scale and number of destructions exhibited at colony, garrison, and indigenous sites, but heavily clustered around the main port city of Massalia. The numerous and repeated destructions in a short period of time suggest to Dietler the pattern of violence had become mutual and periodic. Furthermore, the ramparts of Massalia’s fortifications, like Jaffa’s gate, exhibited phases of rapid construction and reconstruction. Though the record appears to show that violence increased the longer the indigenous and Romans were exposed to one another, Dietler (2010) reminds us that the situation is far more nuanced. Trade goods and texts demonstrate that economic and political alliances still occurred between the Romans and competing indigenous groups, as well as between the indigenous and other encroaching core powers.

**Conclusion**

In summary, a world-systems framework is used here to look at both the large scale pressures being put on the Southern Levant and, through the concept of contested peripherality, the potential local dynamics capable of provoking violence between the Egyptian state and local insurgents. As we can infer from modern political contexts and
the nature of frontier zones, the factors influencing local aggression are intimate and complex, therefore requiring an approach from many vantages and scales. As Dietler (2010) pointed out in his work, physical evidence for resistance is often limited to indicators of destruction and stories of conflicts surviving in texts. The LBA Levant has more than enough of both, now it is time to focus on determining, from that evidence, patterns of negotiation and violence that may fit with those of insurgent motives. Explained in greater detail in the following chapter, such patterns may be physically correlated to an area’s natural boundaries, the frequencies and scales of destruction, consistency in attacked targets, and indicators of socio-cultural evolution (i.e. eclectic goods, proliferation of Egyptian and hybrid architecture, land-use shifts, etc.).
CHAPTER III
METHODS

As a broader evaluation of previously conducted excavations, this study’s method is primarily grounded in traditional academic research, pulling from three main types of resources. First, articles concerning world-systems analysis came principally from the College of Wooster’s (C.O.W.) library collection, or from author and advisor, Prof. Kardulias, at his suggestion. Second, regional studies and histories that help place Beth Shan, Deir el-Balah, and Jaffa in the context of the LBA were gathered within the College of Wooster’s library collection, the college’s interlibrary loan system, and the online database, Journal Storage (JSTOR).

The final resource type concerns the data and research conducted at Jaffa, Deir el-Balah, and Beth Shan. In the summer of 2014 I had the opportunity to volunteer with the Jaffa Cultural Heritage Project (JCHP) in their continued excavation of the “Ramses Gate” and “Lions Temple” of Area A. It is that experience which prompted the present study. Most of the source material and data I present from Jaffa comes from the JCHP’s first major publication (Burke and Peilstöcker 2011), along with a number of other published site reports by previous excavators. Data, site plans, and cross sections from the most recent excavations come from a yet unpublished article by the site’s co-director, Aaron Burke, and it is with his permission that I include its information below (Burke et al. 2015). The data primarily include details on a ceramic assemblage and several architectural phases of an Egyptian gate complex. Egyptian vs. Canaanite ceramics are distinguished by style as identified by these traits: painted decoration, everted rims, base type, and material.
The site of Deir el-Balah is located over 8.5 miles south of Gaza City within the Israeli occupied Gaza Strip. The first salvage excavations and surveys at Deir el-Balah were conducted by staff and graduate students from the Hebrew University in 1972 after locals uncovered the first remnants of a Bronze Age cemetery in the process of reclaiming agricultural lands. Excavations led by Trude Dothan continued till 1982 and expanded to include both the cemetery and part of an adjacent settlement. Due to security risks, recent research has been limited to reassessing site reports and artifacts found outside the borders of the Gaza Strip. The same will be true of this investigation primarily looking at data from the 1977-82 site reports (Brandl and Dothan 2010a/2010b).

In contrast, the site of Beth Shan is located considerably more north and east, near the modern “border” between Israel and Jordan along the Jordan River. The first excavations there were carried out by the University of Pennsylvania’s Archaeological Museum from 1921-1934. The directors of the University Museum Expedition (UME) through the 1923-1928 seasons, A. Rowe (1923) and C.S. Fischer (1924-8), focused their excavations on the Late Bronze and Iron Age strata. Data from those excavations will be gathered from a later reevaluation of the records and collections gained by the museum (James and McGovern 1993). The reanalysis specifically concentrates on correcting prior errors in dating, recording and interpreting the LBA levels as belonging to a period of intense Egyptian occupation (i.e. the stationing of an Egyptian garrison). The Bronze Age levels were again revisited later in 1989 by the Institute of Archaeology of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Under the direction of R. Mazar, the excavations lasted till 1996 and yielded a four-volume report, the data from which will be addressed in the following chapter (Mazar 2006; Mazar and Mullins 2007; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).
Beth Shan and Deir el-Balah were chosen as the additional case studies based on the three major criteria. Like Jaffa, they had to exhibit evidence of habitation during the LBA and specifically habitation by an Egyptian garrison. Second, they had to be sites that have come under some archaeological investigation whose published reports were accessible and written in English primarily. Finally, the sites in combination would demonstrate a branching away from Jaffa and represent different areas of the Egyptian garrison’s network in Canaan. Both Beth Shan and Deir el-Balah fulfill this final requirement by being located on opposite sides of Jaffa and representing sites both deep in the Levantine frontier and close to Egypt’s border, respectively.

The method entailed will be to assess at each site a number of factors that may contribute to the increased potentiality of conflict between local Canaanites and the Egyptians. Such assessments will include the degree with which the area is of strategic value to both competing parties, as seen in proximity to natural resources, trade routes, and presence of fortified architecture. Markers of socio-cultural shifts will also be addressed via the changing ratio of Egyptian and Canaanite material (mostly pottery) and their spatial contexts, not to mention visible shifts in land use, perhaps to due exaction of Egyptian tribute. The level to which the center integrated “Egyptianized” architecture beyond administrative or militaristic buildings, such as temples, is also important to note.

After an assessment of the sites in general, I will scrutinize more closely the location, nature, and size of destructions, if present. In a 2009 article, Israel Finkelstein considers the nature of destruction in the Levant and specifically at his main site of Megiddo. He creates a scale of destructions and their correlates (Table 3.1) that will be employed in the following analysis.
Finally, in Burke et al. (2015) the investigators postulate that purposeful destructions, particularly those caused by local insurgents, likely occur during pharaonic transition. In other words, insurgents take advantage of a period of weakness in which the previous pharaoh’s military presence might be temporarily suspended, or all together abandoned by his/her successor. This hypothesis will be addressed when considering the interpretation of a destruction’s time period.

Table 3.1 Southern Levant destruction scale adapted from Finkelstein (2009:120-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destruction Level</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-Partial destruction of city</td>
<td>Megiddo IV A,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-No occupation gap</td>
<td>Ashdod VII-VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-Severe destruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Evidence for conflagration and/or collapse</td>
<td>Megiddo VIIA, VA-IVB Rehov V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Possibly short abandonment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-Complete annihilation of settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Heavy conflagration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Wall and roof collapse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Large assemblages of finds on the floors</td>
<td>Megiddo VIA Lachish VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Occupational gap follows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV
DATA

Levantine Dating

Dating sequences in the Levant primarily follow the European tripartite system of dividing ages of technological advances, such as the Bronze or Iron Age, into “Early,” “Middle,” and “Late” periods. William F. Albright was one of the first archaeologists to incorporate this scheme within his excavations. His work tied these periods in the Levant to the already well-known and trusted historical dates of particular Egyptian dynasties, in addition to Biblical events he and his peers thought to be historically reliable (Sharon 2014). When using the so-called ‘find the pharaoh’ technique (Leonard 1988), sequencing the strata is almost entirely based on textual evidence, whether found at the site or by attempts to corroborate previously known textual references to the site. Per Petrie’s work in Egypt and pottery’s ubiquity within archaeological sites, ceramic seriation also lent itself well to indicating chronological shifts through strata. While both techniques were extremely useful in a time before radiometric dating, they are problematic in many respects. This is especially so when concerned with defining the transitional periods and establishing sub-periods (ex. LBIIA v. LBIIB). As a result, chronologies differ not only across regions of the Levant, but across individual sites. With this in mind, Table 4.1 lays out a comparison of the relevant chronologies and levels for each site in question and their associated New Kingdom Dynasty.
Table 4.1 Comparative stratigraphy of Beth Shan, Deir el-Balah, and Jaffa. Compiled from Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2009:13), Burke et. al (2015), and Killebrew’s (2006:117) revised chronology for Deir el-Balah.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prd.</th>
<th>Date BCE</th>
<th>Egyptian New Kingdom</th>
<th>Pharaoh(s)</th>
<th>Beth Shan UME</th>
<th>Beth Shan HU</th>
<th>D. el-Balah</th>
<th>Jaffa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LB III/ Iron IA</td>
<td>1190-1140</td>
<td>20th Dynasty</td>
<td>Ramses II-IV</td>
<td>N-3a S-3b,a N-3b, S-4</td>
<td>Q-1</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>IVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB IIB</td>
<td>1300-1190</td>
<td>19th Dynasty</td>
<td>Ramses I - Tauseret</td>
<td>Late VII, Level VII N-4, S-5</td>
<td>Q-2</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>IVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB IIA</td>
<td>1375-1300</td>
<td>Late 18th Dynasty</td>
<td>Akhenaten-Tutankhamun (Amarna)</td>
<td>Level IX R-1a</td>
<td>R-1a</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB IB</td>
<td>1479-1375</td>
<td>Mid – 18th Dynasty</td>
<td>Thutmosis II- Amenophis III</td>
<td>Level IX R-1b</td>
<td>R-1b</td>
<td>VI early</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB IA</td>
<td>1550-1479</td>
<td>Early – 18th Dynasty</td>
<td>Ahmose-Hapshetsut</td>
<td>R-2</td>
<td>R-2</td>
<td>VI later</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ceramics**

*Beth Shan*

During the University Museum Expedition (UME) excavations, levels VII and VIII (Figs. 4.8, 4.9) yielded both Egyptian and Canaanite forms, with Canaanite forms far outnumbering Egyptian overall. However, in manufacture and source material, nearly all the Egyptian style ceramics are shown to be locally made and not imported. Hybrid forms are also exhibited. Excavations continued by the Hebrew University in the 1980’s and 1990’s in areas N, S, and Q obtained similar results. The Hebrew University’s updated
methods of excavation and recording provided a more nuanced look at subtle changes in the ceramic assemblage both vertically and horizontally. While both the Egyptian and Canaanite forms found by the UME and Hebrew University are characterized by an overall homogeneity of types and technology, careful record of the ratios of Egyptian to Canaanite forms was kept from strata to strata (Figure 4.3).

**Canaanite**

Canaanite-style forms found at Beth Shan include various bowls, chalices, goblets, kraters, cooking pots, pithoi, jars, jugs, juglets, flasks, lamps, and vats among others. Most of the Canaanite forms were wheel coiled, with the bases being mostly flat or having low ring. Of the forms found, the cooking pots stand out as being mostly created through a mold, though some were wheel-coiled. A substantial portion of the Canaanite assemblage featured painted decorations. Often these are motifs of geometric designs, such red accents within a metope (Panitz-Cohen 2009).

**Egyptian**

Egyptian forms were found in their greatest number in Area S and consist mostly of simple bowls with rounded or straight walls and a plain rim, a flaring or splayed rim or a flanged rim (Figs. 4.1, 4.2). Other open forms include spinning bowls and large open bowls. Carinated cooking bowls were only encountered in Area N north. Beers jars, small ovoid or drop-shaped jars, funnel-necked jars, and large neckless jars were also encountered. Of the few imported items reported there were small handled cups and two handled amphorae (Martin 2006).
Deir el-Balah

The following overview of the ceramic assemblage at Deir El-Balah will focus on the two most prominent groups represented, Canaanite and Egyptian. The greatest amount of pottery comes from the LBA II strata. In both groups, largely utilitarian forms that were manufactured locally predominate. While the few fine wares or non-utilitarian forms are imports of Cyprus, Greece, Egypt and Crete. In all, the technique of clay preparation seemed to be shared between forms and is considered to be of Egyptian inspiration (Brandl and Dothan 2010b).

Canaanite

Similar to the Egyptian-style forms found, Canaanite vessels are largely utilitarian in nature and are common to sites across the Southern Levant in the 13th and 12th centuries B.C.E. (Figs. 4.4, 4.5) The forms found include bowls, chalices, cooking pots, chalices, flasks, jugs, juglets, lamps, and storage jars (Killebrew 2010).

Egyptian

Egyptian-style pottery makes up the largest ceramic group of Deir el-Balah’s assemblage, though the ratio with Canaanite forms still hovers around fifty percent (Killebrew 2006). Generally speaking, this pottery is characterized by a majority of handless, wheel-made shapes almost entirely utilitarian in function. Neutron Activation Analysis conducted on a large sample of undecorated, Egyptian-style sherds showed them to be of local provenience. Although Egyptian pottery is known for its marked uniformity, certain stylistic and decorative motifs, such as the funnel-necked jar or the use of “Amarna blue” pigment, demonstrated at Deir-el-Balah place the Egyptian influence squarely in the New Kingdom era of 18-20th Dynasties. The types exhibited at
Deir el-Balah include, but are not limited to bowls (of which there are several varieties A-G), ovoid jars, globular jars, necked jars, funnel-necked jars, beer bottles (the most numerous Egyptian form), juglets, and storage jars (Gould 2010).

**Jaffa**

Kaplan found the single, largest ceramic collection from Area A in the late 1950s within what he identified as Jaffa’s LBI settlement from the 16th to the 15th centuries BCE, known as the “Garrison-Kitchen assemblage” (Fig. 4.6). The JCHP reassessed this Egyptian and Canaanite collection and cross-referenced the findings with similar assemblages at Beth-Shean, Aphek, Tel-Mor, Ashkelon, and Tel-Dan. Not only are most of the Egyptian forms at Jaffa, save for a few unique pieces, representative of those found in other LBA Canaanite sites, the well-established seriation of Egyptian vessels allows for a confident dating to the LBIB. The ceramics from this group (approx. 85% Egyptian forms) are primarily utilitarian in nature and suggest a context of food production. To be further discussed in the following chapter, Burke and Lords (2010) postulate that the garrison kitchen and its ceramics represent one of the earliest visible phases of Jaffa’s transformation into an Egyptian outpost (Burke et al. 2015). Like the previous sites presented, the assemblage at Jaffa consists largely of bowls, but also includes carinated jars, “flowerpots,” and storage jars.
Figure 4.1. A small sample of the Egyptian ceramic assemblage of Beth Shan (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009:436).

Figure 4.3. Relative ratios of Egyptian: Canaanite pottery forms between strata and areas of Hebrew University’s excavations (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009: 461).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UME</th>
<th>Area R</th>
<th>Area Q</th>
<th>Area S</th>
<th>Area N North</th>
<th>Area N South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late VII?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII ca. 15-20%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Q-2</td>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>N-3</td>
<td>N-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII (no Eg. Forms)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Q-3</td>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>N-4</td>
<td>N-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>R-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.4. Canaanite bowls and other vessels from Deir el-Balah (Brandl and Dothan 2010).
Figure 4.5. Canaanite storage jars found at Deir el-Balah (Brandl and Dothan 2010).
Figure 4.6. Sample of ceramics, both Egyptian and Canaanite, found within the “Kitchen Assemblage” of Jaffa’s Area A (Burke et. al. 2015).
Architecture

Beth Shan

Residential Areas(?)
Southeastern Section

The Southeastern section of the tell is characterized by a central street (Locus 1250 in VII/Locus 1311 in VIII) bisecting a number of various sized rooms and small complexes. The most significant of complexes forms a large portion of this sections Southwestern area and consists of Loci 1243 and 1245-1249. The building is proposed to be an Egyptian-style center hall building (James and McGovern 1993).

Table 4.2. UME Southeastern Section Loci.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room/Feature</th>
<th>Loci</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Street</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Center Hall” building (Egyptian)</td>
<td>1243, 1245-1249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Temple Precinct

The so-called temple precinct is located at the center of the area excavated by the University of Pennsylvania Museum and is found in both the VII and VIII strata. The precinct features several rooms making up the temple itself, as well as a surrounding outer courtyard (James and McGovern 1993).

Table 4.3. UME Temple Precinct Loci.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room/Feature</th>
<th>Loci</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Altar Room</td>
<td>1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Courtyard</td>
<td>1072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE room off Inner Courtyard</td>
<td>1085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance Hall</td>
<td>1086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Courtyard (N to S)</td>
<td>1104, 1105, 1107, 1103, 1062, 1374, 1069, 1070, 1371, 1362, 1364, 1089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Commandant House” Building 1500

In Level VII there appears a large square building just less than 15 meters west of the temple precinct (Fig. 4.7). Each side is roughly 12 meters in length and the exterior walls exhibit thicknesses from .9m - 1.8 m, the entire structure built from mudbrick on stone foundations. Within the complex four rooms are defined by thin walls about .8 m thick. Two of the rooms on the eastern edge are rectangular in shape (~3.6m x 4.8m). While the other two, to the south and west, are more elongated. Respectively their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room/Feature</th>
<th>Loci</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Commandant House,”</td>
<td>1369, 1370,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VI</td>
<td>1372, 1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level VIII walls</td>
<td>1402, 1402 A,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.7. Schematic floor plan of Building 1500 (UME), the “Commandant’s House” after HU excavation (Mazar 2006: 64).
dimensions are 8.6m x 1.4m and 7m x 3.2 m.

In Level VIII (Fig. 4.9) the area underlying the structure is devoid of architecture, save for three rooms. Foundation remains of the previous stratum, Stratum IX, suggest that the walls making up the three rooms are not a continuation or rebuilding of prior architecture. Furthermore, the circular silo contemporary with the walls of the “Commandant’s House” appear to cut through what would have been the western wall of Loci 1399 (James and McGovern 1993; Mazar 2006).

“Migdol”

South of the “Commandant’s House” is the “Migdol,” or tower. The main doorway to the building was between Loci 1883 and 1382 where buttresses delineate a 1.9m-wide doorway. Dimensions of the structure’s outer walls are roughly 17m east-west by 15.1m north-south. All of the exterior walls are constructed of large mudbricks measuring 1.1 x 0.5 x 0.2 meters underlain by stone foundations. Of the exterior walls that survived they were found standing up to a meter above the interior floors and exhibit a thickness of 2.3m. Both the surviving northern and eastern walls feature long cavities containing either boulders or wood. From the southeastern corner, a large cavity measuring about 4.9m by 1.0m extends northward to the middle of wall and is filled with boulders. Where the boulders end a narrower slot containing wood begins and continues for another 3.5m. On the northern wall a similar slot (though containing no wood) extends the length of 14.3m and then opens into a square, 1.9 x 2.1m cavity filled with boulders. The southern wall, aligned with interior room, Loci 1380 was partially preserved and also contained boulders.
The building’s interior is divided into four rectangular rooms. The two on the west (Loci 1382, 1380) are orientated east-west and have about the same length (5.8m) and somewhat different widths of 3.5m and 2.5m, respectively. A segment of a wall that projects about 2m into the northeastern room (Loci 1363) could be the lower remains of a stairway to a second story, however no steps were observed (James and McGovern 1993; Mazar 2006).

Table 4.5. UME “Migdol” Loci.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms/Feature</th>
<th>Loci</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Doorway</td>
<td>Between 1383, 1382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern corner bastion (boulder filled)</td>
<td>1368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern to mid-wall cavity (boulders and wood)</td>
<td>1354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern wall cavity (partially preserved, with boulders)</td>
<td>Aligned south of 1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior rooms (clockwise from N room)</td>
<td>1382, 1363, 1353, 1380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.8. UME’s Beth Shan Level VII (James and McGovern 1993:2).
Figure 4.9. UME’s Beth Shan Level VIII (James and McGovern 1993:3).

Figure 4.10. Topographic map of Tel Beth Shan showing Hebrew University’s excavation areas 1989-1996 (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009:4).
Figure 4.11. Top plan of Hebrew University’s Beth Shan, Area S (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009:62).

Figure 4.12. Top plan of Hebrew University’s Beth Shan, Area N (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009:172).
Figure 4.13. Beth Shan Area R-1a/b (Mazar and Mullins 2007:141).

Deir el-Balah

The “Fortress” (Building 350)
Strata VII

The largest preserved structure of the LBA settlement at Deir el Balah is known as the “Fortress” (Figs. 4.14, 4.15). The square building measures 19.5m north to south and 18.75m east to west. The buttresses extend one-half meter beyond the exterior walls and are ~4.5m wide. The walls themselves are about 2.40m thick constructed entirely of mudbricks (55 x 25 x 15cm) of various clays. Ten walls, each approximately 1.2m wide, divide the interior into 14 rooms. Although no floors were discovered, the excavation of
foundation trenches allowed for the viewing of prior stratigraphy and foundation deposits of pure sand (Brandl and Dothan 2010a).

**The “Commander’s House” (Building 1131) Strata VII**

The “Commander’s House” is located to the west of the fortress and shares with it a common orientation. The structure is divided into four rooms (426–451-470, 1135–1141, 1131, and north of Wall 1524) by walls .50m thick. The mudbricks used recall the same size of those making up the fortress. Under Floor 426, a foundational deposit was discovered, consisting of two bowls and a lamp (Brandl and Dothan 2010a).

**The Crater/“Pond”/ Quarry Strata IX**

The northwestern area of the settlement excavation revealed a large, square crater containing layers of ash and other debris, such as parts of walls and kilns (Fig. 4.14). The dimensions of the crater measure 19.5m (north-south) by 17.0m. After further investigation Dothan determined the crater to be initially a sand and clay quarry for the production of mudbricks and then later a standing pool (of the 14th century Amarna type), functioning through to the VII strata (Brandl and Dothan 2010a). Killebrew (2006) challenged this interpretation in her geological reassessment of the sand and yellow/brown marl making up the crater. Observing the absence of any sign that the bottom of the crater was plastered, Killebrew argued that the hydraulic conductivity of the sandy matrix was such that even after receiving unrealistically large amounts of rain, the “pool” would not hold water for more than 12.5 days (at smallest $K$-value of 20cm/day). Instead, she purposes that after the crater’s initial use as a quarry, the pit slowly filled with refuse and sedimentation via run-off. The ash and pottery fill was therefore a result of
production activities from an adjacent pottery workshop (bordered west by Wall 1671 and south by Wall 1670) ceramics from which largely date to the 13th century (Killebrew 2006).

Figure 4.14. Schematic map of Deir el-Balah (Brandl and Dothan 2010:XXIX).
Before continuing on to Jaffa’s architecture and the rest of the data, I want to briefly acknowledge additional architecture shared by both Deir el-Balah and Beth Shan. Each site features a notable cemetery adjacent to its settlement, to the west and north, respectively. Their discovery are particularly well known in the field because they are two of only a handful of sites in the Levant that feature remains and rich grave goods buried in anthropoid clay coffins. In the excavations that ensued after their initial discovery, each cemetery revealed nearly fifty coffins. Scholarly consensus makes it clear that these burials are of Egyptian influence. Though primarily of the 19th Dynasty Ramesside tradition, the variety of coffins exhibited can be dated from Egypt’s earliest arrival in the 18th Dynasty to their adoption by the Philistine successors of Beth Shan.

Figure 4.15. Superimposed plans of Strata IX and VII at Deir el-Balah showing the “fortress” and “pond” (Brandl and Dothan 2010:78).

**Garrison Cemeteries**

Before continuing on to Jaffa’s architecture and the rest of the data, I want to briefly acknowledge additional architecture shared by both Deir el-Balah and Beth Shan. Each site features a notable cemetery adjacent to its settlement, to the west and north, respectively. Their discovery are particularly well known in the field because they are two of only a handful of sites in the Levant that feature remains and rich grave goods buried in anthropoid clay coffins. In the excavations that ensued after their initial discovery, each cemetery revealed nearly fifty coffins. Scholarly consensus makes it clear that these burials are of Egyptian influence. Though primarily of the 19th Dynasty Ramesside tradition, the variety of coffins exhibited can be dated from Egypt’s earliest arrival in the 18th Dynasty to their adoption by the Philistine successors of Beth Shan.
The interred are thought to be ranking Egyptian officials or members of the garrison. While the burial of foreign militaries certainly has bearing within this discussion on Egypto-Canaan relations, I have opted to omit a full explanation and analysis for the sake of space. For a detailed summary on the finds see Brandl and Dothan (2010a), Dothan (1973), and Dothan and Perlman (1973) for Deir el-Balah, and Oren (1973) for Beth Shan.

_Jaffa_

The main architectural features within the site are remains of the LBA Egyptian fort and gate complex in Area A (Figure 4.16). Surviving are the foundations of two monumental mudbrick towers (22.35m long by 6.2m wide) each flanking a 4m wide passage of beaten earth roughly oriented NW/SE. Today, some parts of the north and south towers still stand 3m (of the original 4.5m) above the Rg-4b gate surface. At the threshold of the passage and leading down the tel’s slope for 8 m is a cobblestone road bedding. Mudbrick fortification walls extending north and south of the gate up to 2 m, but Burke estimates the walls could have stood nearly 10m (33ft) in height based on comparison with contemporary Egyptian forts (Burke et al. 2015).
Textual Evidence

On Site

Beth Shan

Of the textual evidence found at Beth Shan there are three royal Egyptian stelae of note. The basalt medium of the stelae lends itself to a local source and they are carved in the Egyptian style. Though all were found repurposed in architecture of later contexts, they are often attributed to UME’s VIII and VII strata. The stelae represent two different pharaohs. One recounts the exploits of Ramses II, while the other two reference Seti I. The one from Ramses II’s reign embodies a typical royal inscription complete with king names and titles. It describes the king’s bravery and valor in defending the less
fortunate, though no specific event is recalled. The Seti stelae are made distinct by size and content (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

The larger of the two recounts the dispatch of Egyptian forces to counter the forces the chief of Hammath (Tell el-Hammath) and Pahil (Pella) who sought to remove Egypt’s control of Beth Shan. Upon hearing of Beth Shan’s capture, Seti sends three “units,” one to recapture Beth Shan, a second to Hammath to take the opposing city while it is less defended, and a third to Yenoam. Yenoam has yet to be archeologically identified, though it is presumed to be located close enough to Beth Shan that it is worth protecting from Hammath’s chief or strategically placed to intercept his men upon retreat. Depending on whether Seti reigned for 15 or 11 years, the stele is generally dated to very late in his first year as pharaoh, 1294 or 1290 BCE (Kitchen 1993).

The smaller of the two Seti stelae has to do with an encounter with a people or group known as the apiiru. According to the text, the “Apiru of Mt. Yarmutu” joined another group called the Tayaru in an attack on Ruhma. Seti supposedly heard of the issue after his departure from the region and ordered some forces “turn back” to quell the disturbance, a matter that took only two days. Neither the Tayaru nor the location of Ruhma are understood well, however Mt. Yamutu is generally considered to be a strategic peak positioned ~10 miles north of Beth Shan (Kitchen 1993).

Deir el-Balah

Textual evidence on site at Deir el-Balah is much less substantial when compared to Beth Shan. The most significant of the finds are limited to four funerary stelae and a small hieratic inscription on the side of a ceramic bowl. The four stelae are Egyptian in style and, although they came to researchers via illicit lootings, they can be
confidently associated with Deir el-Balah’s adjacent cemetery dated to the LBA. From their decorations, shape, and inscription the stelae they were manufactured by and for Egyptians of the Osirion tradition. The stelae, like the example in Figure 4.17, were likely small, freestanding personal monuments that marked the graves of Egyptian individuals. Three of the four contain the individuals’ names, while all contain some invocation of the god, Osiris (Ventura 1987).

Figure 4.17. Osirion Funerary Stele 2 and inscription from Deir el-Balah. The stele is carved from kurkar and measures 67.5cm x 30cm x 7cm (Ventura 1987: 116).

The hieratic inscription (Fig. 4.18) was found on the inside of a ceramic bowl located in Locus 1068 near the silo. A tentative translation of the inscription reads ‘bringing (the) harvest tax of/to’ (jnj smw n). Though there is little evidence that a temple stood at Deir el-Balah, the small inscriptions hints towards the recording of harvest taxes on votive bowls that would have been received by the local temple per Egyptian tradition (Wimmer 2010).
Besides a small number of commemorative scarabs, the main textual inscription of note at Jaffa consists of the fortress’s monumental gateway bearing the name of Ramses II (Fig. 4.19). Only fragments of the doorjambs survive, however the attribution to Ramses is formulaic enough to reconstruct most of the inscription (Burke et al. 2015).

[right jamb] Horus-Falcon, String Bull, beloved of Maat; Son of Re, Lord of Crowns, Ramses II

[left jamb] [Horus-Falcon], String [Bull], beloved of Maat; [King of S &N Egypt, Lord of Both Lands, Usimare Setepenre]”

(translation by Kitchen 1993: II, pg. 229)
Textual Evidence
Off Site

Beth Shan

Beth Shan receives a number of references throughout ancient texts. During the period in question it is mentioned among the topographical lists of Tuthmose II, Seti I, and Ramses II at the Temple of Karnak. During the reign of Seti it also appears in three other topographical lists, two in Qurneh and one in Abydos. During the reign of Ramses II, Beth Shan is featured as well in the Papyrus of Anastasi I. Later on, Beth Shan was also featured prominently in the Old Testament as a city that the Israelites failed to conquer and the place where the Philistines hung the body of Saul and his sons on the city walls (Mazar 2006)

Deir el-Balah

Being that Deir el-Balah is located at the outskirts of the better-known garrison, coastal city of Gaza, there are virtually no outside texts that reference the city during the LBAII.

Jaffa

Jaffa is first mentioned in the LBA as one of several sites that were conquered or sacked by Thutmos III during his conquest of the Southern Levant. Though the dates are never explicitly mentioned, it is often said to have taken place between the end of the 15th and early 16th centuries.

Another interesting Egyptian source dated to roughly 1300 BCE recounts the story of the strategic recapturing of Jaffa by an Egyptian garrison. The story is found within Papyrus Harris 500 and is also set during the reign of Thutmos III. According to the text the garrison is forced outside of the city by a local insurrection. In an odd turn of
events the Egyptian commander, Djehuty, was able to subdue the rebel leader and retake the city with a deception similar to that of the Trojan horse. Two hundred Egyptian soldiers were put into baskets and delivered to the gates of Jaffa by an additional 500 soldiers. Once the baskets were inside the gate, the soldiers leapt out and returned the city to Egyptian control, seemingly without a fight. The rebels were bound and Djhuty’s final remarks include requesting that the rebels be sent to Egypt as slaves. The text also mentions the presence, or threat rather, of the apiro and the maryannu.

Within the Amarna Letters, Jaffa is referenced only a handful of times, none of which comes directly from the city. Table 4.2 outlines the main letters that include a mention of Jaffa, as well as the basic subject of their content and sender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Sender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EA 138</td>
<td>Plea to Pharaoh for military assistance and strength, Jaffa referenced as a place of safety</td>
<td>Rib-Hadda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA 294</td>
<td>Jaffa as šu-nu-ti (granary) of the king</td>
<td>Ad[d]a-[d]anu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA 296</td>
<td>An assurance of loyalty to the pharaoh and mentions the guarding of Jaffa’s city gate</td>
<td>Ḫa[h]tiru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA 365</td>
<td>An assurance of loyalty through supplying corvée workers, some of which come from Jaffa</td>
<td>Biridiya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional textual references worthy of note are a letter from Tel-Aphek and a satirical letter from Egypt. The text from Tel-Aphek includes a report to an Egyptian, regional governor of Canaan regarding the delivery of a substantial amount of wheat to Jaffa. While the satirical letter, *Satire of the Trades* (Papyrus Anastasi I), gives Jaffa a place of prominence in its narrative compared to a list of other Egypto-Canaanite outposts mentioned (Burke and Peilstöcker 2012; Pritchard 1969).
Destructions

Beth Shan

R-1a

At Beth Shan there are three destructions of note. The earliest stratigraphically is found at the end of UME’s strata IX. Mazar, working in Hebrew University’s Stratum R-1a (Fig. 4.13) found substantial evidence for this heavy destruction by fire. In some loci of R-1a this consists of up to a meter of collapsed, burnt, and hardened yellow, red, and brown bricks. The fallen bricks in turn covered a .2m thick layer of black ash that lay upon the beaten earth floors. The brick debris also included large amounts of charred wood, the remnants of roofing beams. After the destruction the following levels VIII and VII demonstrate major changes in the street system, the construction of a new temple, residential quarters, and public buildings. (Mazar and Mullins 2007).

N-4

A destruction of some significance was also uncovered in Hebrew University’s Area N, stratum N-4 (Fig. 4.12). Specifically the destruction debris was exhibited within two of three rooms (Rooms 18418, 18411, and 18419) making up Building NB. The building is located in Squares S-Y/13-15 and is bordered on its west by a street separating from Building NC. In a few ways, the building resembles the “migdol” described above in that it was likely a multistory construction, exhibiting thick, 2.5m walls and cavities filled with boulders. The largest room, 18418, consisted of large amounts of ash, burnt mudbricks and debris, burnt wooden beams, and carbonized grain. The upper layers of the debris contained long, wooden beams that were badly burned, one of which tested positively as cedar from Lebanon. A smaller room, 18419, also featured a half-meter of
debris, mostly consisting of charred grain. According to the excavators, the mudbrick walls within the structure received a series of repairs and additions during Strata N-4-3 (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

**S-3a**

The last phase of Stratum 3 of area S also exhibits signs of destruction by heavy conflagration (Fig. 4.11). Thick layers of burnt mudbrick debris, pottery, black ash, and charcoal were again found on beaten-earth floors. According to the excavators, a number of outer walls were heated enough to turn the brick into a reddish pink hue (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

**Jaffa**

Evidence of destructions at Jaffa is found within the major construction phases of the Egyptian gate complex (Fig. 4.20). Three destructions are of note and occur with the RG-4b, RG-4a, RG-3a phases of the building.

**RG-4b (LB IIA) 1390-1300 BCE**

The RG-4b phase is the earliest phase of the Egyptian gate complex, with mudbricks resting on stone foundations. Further discussion on whether or not the stone foundations indicate a prior Canaanite fortification is pursued in the analysis. The mudbricks from RG-4b are yellow and orange in color and made from a fine, sand grain size and presumably created off-site. A possible destruction of phase RG-4b comes from evidence of restoration, rather than a distinct destruction layer. Most prevalent on the south tower is a shift in the color, and thus make, of the bricks used in the construction of the gate. At the transition into the RG-4a phase, the bricks are varied in color and make, including some reused brick from the prior phase. This suggests that the gate underwent
some necessary repairs, and due to the lack of material culture from the 4b level and the upper heights of the 4b phase, Burke argues there must have been a significant clearing of debris. Evidence to date the structure’s building and transition confidently is sparse, but the JCHP, working backward from the RG-4a, suggests the transformation took place at the opening of the 13th century BCE (Burke et al. 2015)

**RG-4a (LB IIB) 1300-1175 BCE [?]**

The destruction of the RG-4a phase, which now includes the Ramses Gate façade, is considerably more obvious than its predecessor. Excavation in the passageway revealed approximately 20 courses of mudbrick wall belonging to the southern tower’s higher elevations that had collapsed into the passage and sealed debris from the same event below. This debris included two-dozen intensely burned timbers (L.3102, Lebanon cedars, acacia, and olive), weaponry, thousands of seeds, ceramics, ivory inlays, and a few deer antlers. The wood timbers would have been used primarily to provide the passageway with a ceiling and perhaps add extra support and decoration to the walls. Therefore the extent to which the wooden components of the gate’s two towers were dismantled and burned, even getting hot enough to fire some of the surrounding brick *in situ*, lends itself, in Burke’s mind, to ascribing the event to human agency. Various seed types, from olive to grape pits, allowed for radiometric dating of the destruction to the late 13th century/ early 12th century (1214-1153BCE [?]) (Burke et al. 2015).

**RG-3a (LB III) 1120 BCE [?]**

Much like the destruction of the RG-4b gate phase, evidence for destruction of the RG-3a phase is rather conspicuous. Kaplan first discovered this destruction layer in 1956 when he encountered a significant layer of ash on the southern half of the gate’s
threshold, and within it, a bronze gate hinge (one of two weighing approx. 30 kg) (Burke and Peilstöcker 2011). The hinge contained charred remains of the wooden doors, which would have been around 20 cm thick, and bronze nails still extended from the hinge’s wings. Furthermore, mudbrick debris and traces of roof timbers were found in the passageway atop this gate phase’s occupational level. Dating the destruction has proved difficult, since there is little to no differentiation in brick color between this and the previous (RG-3b) phase. Burnt seeds have been found, but radiometric dating has yet to be conducted. Repairs during the previous phase and the consideration of the traditional dating of the end of Egyptian occupation places the destruction roughly in the late 12th century (Burke et al. 2015).
Figure 4.20. Composite cross section of the Ramses Gate Complex and its phases (Burke et al 2015).
Conclusion

The data presented in this chapter has been an overview of the major LBA archaeological features, artifacts, and textual references concerning Deir el-Balah, Beth Shan, and Jaffa. This does not represent an exhaustive report of each site, which might also include studies on metallurgy, botanical remains, small finds, etc. Of the archaeological remains, ceramics and architecture were chosen primarily because the state of their preservation might best indicate the scale and nature of destructions. Additionally, their diagnostic nature would help in dating. That being said, in regards to the ceramics at each site, the distinction between the Canaanite and Egyptian wares is not always clear. Only on occasion was a unique hybrid recorded, otherwise ambiguous forms were given Egyptian status.

It should also be stated that the goals of each excavation, whether between sites or between excavators at those sites, were always changing. Therefore, no one methodology or logic of recording and sampling is overlapping. This affects not only what materials there are to compare across sites, but it also causes discrepancies in their temporal contexts. Nonetheless, the following analytical discussion attempts to cautiously synthesize these previous works as they might inform a narrative of insurgency.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS

In the present chapter I evaluate the evidence described in the data chapter within the framework of world-systems (see Chapter 3) and through the lens of a model of insurgency. Since the JCHP is one of the few projects in the Levant to strongly propose an association of destructions with that of local, Canaanite rebellion, I will first begin by reviewing the evidence from Jaffa. Thereby setting up the model through which Beth Shan and Deir el-Balah will be evaluated respectively.

Jaffa

Following the evidence chronologically, I begin with the ceramic assemblage from the LBIB context. As the JCHP has determined, the assemblage likely forms the contents of a kitchen, and more specifically an Egyptian one. The Egyptian ceramics, which predominate, are a mix of locally produced objects and imports, all having to do with food production, consumption, and storage. Furthermore, the “flowerpot” forms and wasters found within the firing pit associated with the “kitchen” conform with Egyptian practices of keeping ceramic production near to places of food production, presumably in order to facilitate the needs of preparation (Burke and Lords 2010; Killebrew 2005). This assemblage is the first concrete evidence of Egyptian presence in Jaffa. Although we do not know if the first contact between the Egyptians and Canaanites at Jaffa was violent, on the flow chart of incorporation and resistance (Figure 2.2), the existence of such a kitchen represents Jaffa’s “acceptance” of the Egyptian presence for the time being, whether through force or diplomacy. There is little contemporaneous evidence to confirm whether or not the kitchen’s operators were actually members of the Egyptian military.
However, considering the historical accounts of Egyptian campaigns in the Levant throughout the 18th Dynasty, Jaffa’s strategic position along maritime coastal routes, and the subsequent establishment of more extensive Egyptian fortifications at the same location, it is more than likely this is the case. The fact that there are few Canaanite forms among the assemblage may or may not be significant to the interpretation of Egypto-Canaan relations. If so, then it could be said that the assemblage represents, on the continuum of incorporation, the transition after initial contact and acceptance of core influence, and towards a fuller incorporation. That the Egyptian garrison maintained their own distinct food and ceramic production within a defined space could be suggestive of ongoing negotiations with the local population. Burke argues that at this early stage in Egyptian campaigning, garrisons, especially ones located on the coast, could still remain in relatively direct contact with the home country, receiving resources and supplies when requested, or from skimming Egyptian exports that passed through the port (Burke et al. 2015). In this case the Egyptians are not quite to the point of encountering a resistance that is the result of their extensive exploitation of local resources. On the other hand it could be just the opposite, in that the Egyptians experienced immediate resistance from Jaffa, and therefore needed to remain self-sufficient within the confines of the garrison’s structure.

In RG-4b (LBIIA) we see both the first installation of monumental Egyptian architecture and the first reliable signs of resistance. The construction of such a large gate indicates the next step in the Egyptian incorporation of Jaffa, and thus another opportunity for local resistance. Dimensions and construction style lead to the conclusion that the gate is distinctly an Egyptian military feature, having parallels at other
New Kingdom era sites in Egypt, such as Amarna (Morris 2004; Burke et al. 2015).

Whereas the Egyptian gate consists of two large rectangular structures acting as piers and forming an impressive passageway, Canaanite gates usually featured three piers and two chambers on each side of a narrow passage (Killebrew 2005; Tubbs 1998). Even the use of mudbrick with a sandy consistency, akin to that of mudbrick found in Egypt and especially Amarna, can help in determining this is an Egyptian built structure (Burke et al. 2015). Especially if we consider that like many ancient militaries, the Egyptian garrison carried among their ranks soldiers well versed in their culture’s distinct style of masonry and architecture, looking to take advantage of materials closest to what they use at home (Morris 2004).

An opposing interpretation takes into account that the mudbricks of the RG-4b gate are placed atop stone foundations, a traditionally Canaanite technique, never seen under mudbrick structures in Egypt and rarely seen in any other Egyptian-occupied, Canaanite territory of the time (Burke and Lords 2010; Killebrew 2005). This can have one of several explanations, each with their own implications. Perhaps the geology of the Tel necessitated the use of a sturdier foundation; local Canaanites could have been employed (voluntarily or through force) in its construction; the Egyptians made the decision to take on local techniques (perhaps to placate local tension), or the stone foundations came from a previous Canaanite building over which the garrison built the fort. Whichever was the case, and it may well be a combination of several of these possibilities through time, the gate is eventually destroyed. In contrast with what the ceramic assemblage of the garrison kitchen could tell us, the boldness of the gate structure brings us further down the chart towards hierarchy formation and the transition
of the foreign Egyptian core into Jaffa’s central political power. The resistance that RG-4b met in turn, could well be a result of the formation of local factions that chose not to submit to the foreign pressure, or indeed, locals who felt the strain of resource competition.

The next phase, RG-4a, which coincides with the rule of Ramses II, represents the apex of Egyptian rule in Jaffa, and overall the height of the Egyptian Empire during the New Kingdom. Perhaps it is no coincidence that around the end of Ramses II’s reign this is also the gate phase in which we see the most extensive evidence for an attack on and destruction of the Egyptian fort. It was during the lifetime of this phase that the Egyptians (Ramses II) added a hieroglyphic inscribed gate façade. With this addition we move further up the scale on the continuum of incorporation. Surely if a monumental piece of foreign architecture did not send a clear enough message to local Canaanites where power laid, a large, inscribed gate praising a specific foreign ruler and his appropriation of their land would. Though the evidence within the destruction layer demonstrates a near complete destruction of the RG-4a gate (recall the collapsed southern tower and scorched beams), a new gate (RG-3b) seems to have been built on the same foundations within the year. If anything this is a testament to the resilience of Egyptian empire and suggests that, despite resistance, the Egyptians began to see their station at Jaffa as no longer a mere post or strategic position, but perhaps a more permanent extension of their homeland. However, this feeling did not last. In the destructions of the next two phases (RG-3b and RG-3a), whose dates remain ambiguous, we see the end of Egyptian rule at Jaffa. Only relative dating places these final two phases close to what is
traditionally accepted as the end of Egyptian occupation in Canaan, 1160 BCE (Burke et al. 2015; Killebrew and Steiner 2014).

In summary, Jaffa exhibits a major Egyptian presence throughout the New Kingdom’s expansion into the Levant. Within that span of some 300 years, the surviving Egyptianized fortification demonstrates a series of four destructions. Unfortunately, the dating of those destructions can only be roughly estimated, the most confident date coming from radiocarbon evidence in the RG-4a phase. The inaccuracy in dating has led Burke and the JCHP to rely rather heavily on historical accounts, such as the Amarna letters, in their interpretations. Of course the Amarna letters are the source of numerous accounts of local insurgency against Egyptian rule in Canaan. Amarna letter 116 exemplifies a typical plea from Egyptian representatives in Canaan to the pharaoh. The representative writes, “note that I am your loyal servant…may the king know that there was an attack on our garrison…[and] may the king send archers” (Moran 1992: 116-7). Effectively, other than the site’s advantageous location as a port, the events as described in the Amarna letters form a large part of the basis for Burke’s conclusions that attributes each of the gates’ destructions to Canaanites, as opposed to larger powers like the Hittites. Although one must always be wary when relying on documents of a contested historicity, it is the next logical step towards understanding the data more fully and Burke’s tentative conclusions tend to fit well with this analysis of world-systems incorporation. For example, Egyptian inscriptions about Thutmose III’s campaign in Canaan and victory at Megiddo mention Jaffa among one of many Levantine cities, such as Aphek, that submitted to Egyptian rule. This fits rather nicely with the ceramic evidence from the garrison kitchen, in which were found vessels exhibiting the “red-
“splash” decoration, thereby limiting the context to roughly the time of Thutmose III
(Burke et al. 2015; Cline 2000).

Furthermore, an evaluation of documents like the Amarna letters helps in
detailing Egyptian politics and strategies which otherwise might no longer exist in the
record or would be difficult to tease out of the record. Following the theoretical flow
chart of frontier negotiation and resistance (Figure 2.2) at Jaffa we are able to say a lot
about one ceramic assemblage and a series of destructions, but it is limited in its capacity
to provide hints of specific Egyptian actions that might provoke Canaanite resistance.
Within the letters, Jaffa is mentioned as the place of major storage depots and a location
from which Canaanite slaves may be extracted for labor. For example, the text of EA 365
(El Amarna letter 365) includes a petition by a representative in Megiddo to the pharaoh
to recognize his loyalty, proclaiming that unlike other “mayors,” he alone is successful in
providing corvée laborers from Yapu (Jaffa), Megiddo, and Nuribta (Moran 1992). A
movement towards the attainment of slave or corvée labor from the Canaanite population
in the 14th century has obvious implications within the present theoretical model and,
therefore, our understanding of Canaanite motivations for resistance and rebellion.

Perhaps the most powerful piece of textual evidence in support of an insurgent
model at Jaffa is the Egyptian tale of the “Taking of Joppa (Jaffa).” Yet, as an Egyptian
source, it is problematic. The story contains major markers of satire and propaganda,
painting the Egyptians not only as stronger, but smarter than their Canaanite counterparts.
For example, the rebel leader is caught drunk outside the gates and is subsequently
clubbed with Djehuty’s ceremonial scepter, a symbol of Egyptian might. Additionally,
the Egyptians trick the “enemies” of the city into letting them in the front gate disguised
as storage baskets (Pritchard 1969). The importance of the story comes not in its historicity, but in the association of an insurgent altercation with Jaffa specifically. The existence of the story in itself lends to the possibility of a memory of local rebellion at that location. Furthermore, while the text is dated to ca. 1300 BCE, the story is set within the reign of Thutmose III (ca. 1482-1428 BCE), who first began campaigning in the Levant, and whose inscriptions at Karnak declare the initial Egyptian capture of Jaffa. In that light, the story becomes a history of Jaffa’s initial capture. However there is little archaeological evidence to suggest that any siege occurred at Jaffa around that time. Burke argues that if the tale does recount an historic event it may be related to the destruction exhibited with the garrison kitchen assemblage. This would date the destruction to the late 15th century, representing rather a short period of insurrection occurring after the Thutmose’s initial campaign (Burke et al. 2015; Killebrew and Steiner 2014).

**Beth Shan**

In comparison to both Jaffa and Deir el-Balah, the LBA remains of Beth Shan are far more robust. At the height of Egypt’s occupation, Beth Shan included a temple sector, adjacent residences, a “governor’s residence,” and a cemetery, beyond the fortification of the garrison. Considering the amount of evidence associated with the relevant strata, I will first address an analysis of the ceramics and architecture, in turn followed by the examination of the destructions in chronological order. The “migdol” and “governor’s residency/Building 1500” will be considered within the discussion on destructions.
Counter to the assemblage reported by UME, which showed an overwhelming proportion of Egyptian forms to Canaanite, the Hebrew University’s excavation demonstrated a more accurate proportion of roughly equal parts throughout their areas and even within loci (Fig. 4.3) (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). Determining the distribution of Canaanite to Egyptian spaces by ceramics is thus difficult. Yet stylistic differences remain. Martin (2009) notes that, while both forms share manufacturing methods, there seems to be little cross-over between the traditions and only a handful of possible hybrids were recorded. Martin also observed that for the large degree of variation across forms, there seems to be a relatively small amount of types per ceramic class. In other words, there appears no real standardization to the quality or quantity of the same type. According to Rice (1987) and Sinopoli (1991), this characteristic likely points to a household workshop industry. Where elementary specialization within the home turns out products of relatively the same size and shape, but feature a variety of primary and secondary formation techniques. As for the identity of craftsmen within the workshops, researchers seem confident that, due to the details of the forms and the characteristic use of a straw tempered fabric, the Egyptian forms were made by local workshops occupied by experienced Egyptian potters. As for the Canaanite forms, again it is difficult having no clear spatial differentiation between the two. Beyond that the Canaanite ceramics were made locally, it is difficult to say whether that means at Beth-Shan or if it means they were brought in from neighboring sites (Panitz-Cohen 2009).

Strictly looking at functional types, the Egyptian forms that predominate are bowls and small containers. This suggests that the Egyptian were using primarily
Canaanite cooking pots among other Canaanite forms from day to day (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). Such as suggestion raises a few possibilities about the Egypto-Canaanite relationship and each have varying consequences when interpreted through the model of negotiation. The first, and most unlikely scenario is that no Canaanite actually occupied Beth Shan during the period of Egyptian domination. The presence of Canaanite forms could therefore be explained by the practicality of the Egyptians to use what was left behind after taking the city and the continued accumulation of Canaanite goods through regional trade. Practicality, however, does not hold as a solid conclusion when considering the Egyptian and Canaanite bowls have virtually no advantage over one another functionally (shape, volume) (Killebrew 2005; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

The next scenario is that Canaanites either lived alongside the Egyptians or they commuted from neighboring sites to conduct business or work for the garrison. James and McGovern (1993) made an interesting observation related to this scenario, but focused more on gender. Working from UME’s material they noticed that the ceramic assemblages within the residential areas were not all too dissimilar from other Canaanite sites, especially with the inclusion of forms traditionally associated with the activities of cooking and textile and flour production which are typically gendered as female practices (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). In other words, some scholars, like James and McGovern, might limit the Canaanite inhabitants of Beth Shan to women. This, of course, raises an entirely new set of questions about Egyptian imperial relations (Did Canaanite women exclusively reside there? Did they commute? Did they marry into the garrison? etc.)
Architecture

Architecture through UME’s levels VIII, VII, and VI seems to become increasingly more Egyptianized. Hebrew University’s excavations corroborate this trend. Toward level VI, congruent with the 20th Dynasty, the number of inscribed architectural features increases noticeably, spreading from doorjambs like that seen in Jaffa, to lintels, doorsills, and cornices (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

The temple (level VII and VI) at the center of UME’s excavation and within Hebrew University’s Area R stands out as an architectural hybrid. Interestingly it features many similarities with temples found both at Amarna and Deir el-Medineh in Egypt, both of which were meant to include Canaanite influences (James and McGovern 1993; Mazar and Mullins 2007). The combination of traditional architecture seems to suggest the worship of both Canaanite and Egyptian deities at Beth Shan. This is further confirmed by textual and artifactual evidence. The textual evidence refers to the Mekal stele from Level VIII/VII and the Anat stele from Level V. These texts indicate that Egyptian officials worshipped local Canaanite deities from at least the 19th Dynasty era through the end of the 20th. Related small finds include clay figurines and cultic objects. Remarkably like the ceramic assemblages, of the forty some locally made, clay figurines recovered, roughly half are Egyptian and the other half Canaanite (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

Less clear is the distinction between residential architecture. In their reassessment of UME’s excavation, James and McGovern (1993) count many of the small complexes as Egyptian, saying they are reminiscent of “central-room” or “central hall” houses. However, Mazar (2009) disagrees with this interpretation, as parallels to these structures can be found both throughout Canaan and Egypt. Some residences
contain more Egyptian artifacts (jewelry or faience) or decoration than others. For example, a residence from Hebrew University’s Area S contains an Egyptian style-wall painting. Interior decoration helps in the determination of the occupant, however it is rare, and Egyptiaizing artifacts are ubiquitous throughout the time period (Killebrew and Steiner 2014).

*Destructions*

**R-1a**

Following the evidence for destruction chronologically, I first begin with strata R-1a. R-1a is one of two phases roughly correlated to UME’s Level IX, dated to the mid-late 14th century BCE or late 18th Dynasty. Originally the UME excavator, Rowe, dated R-1a to the 15th century BCE, however both ceramic evidence and radiocarbon dating point to a more accurate estimation of the Amarna period (Mazar and Mullins 2007). Architecturally, R-1 demonstrates a major shift from the previous phase, save for some continuity within the basic town plan regarding the central courtyard, the peripheral road, and some buildings on the southern edge of the mound. The two main structures of this phase are a temple, discussed above, found partly in UME’s 1230 and the “Southern Building.”

The Southern Building was originally interpreted as part of the city’s fortification system, however Hebrew University’s work determined rather that it was a large, most likely multi-story, residence or small palace. Given its location at the highest and most defensible part of the tell, there is little doubt that the Southern Building served an important purpose. Findings of painted plaster and one of the Levant’s greatest
examples of Canaanite monumental art, the “Lion and Dog” stele (Figure 5.1), appear to confirm this notion.

The main evidence of the destruction was found north of the temple area in Hebrew University’s Squares S 11/12. Since the UME did not initially distinguish two separate occupation levels within their Level IX, much of the evidence throughout the site was excavated without being observed. Nevertheless, the destruction that survived included a meter thick layer of collapsed burnt and hardened yellow, red and brown brick underlain by a layer of black ash and soot, in some areas up to 0.2 m thick. A large quantity of charred wood and seeds were also within the debris. The large deposit of seeds was made up of a majority *Triticum parvicoccum* (carbonized wheat, 35,575 grains) and *Hordeum vulgare* (carbonized barley, 360 grains) (Kislev, Melamed, and Simchoni 2007). The deposit also featured a few Egyptian storage jars (type SJ1 perhaps
for oil), one of which exhibited a hieratic inscription translated as “inspected” (Wimmer 2007). Altogether, the evidence within the destruction debris and its vicinity to the temple structure suggest that the affected area was a storage facility related to the temple.

Since our view of the destruction is limited it is difficult to understand the extent of the damage or gain a sense of targeting within the city, should the destruction have been intentional. It is telling however that the following phase features another major architectural break from R-1a, suggesting that enough was destroyed to merit reconstructing the city almost entirely. What we can say is that based on the dating of the phase to the mid-late 14th century and the increase in Egyptian ceramics, the destruction can be placed within the context of the early stages of Egyptian occupation at Beth Shan. In other words, near the beginning of Egypt’s occupation in Canaan, but after the initial conquest of Thutmose III. From the observable remains it appears that prior to the time of destruction an Egyptian administration had established itself at Beth Shan as the temple was often a center of resource distribution and tax collection in the form of offerings (Killebrew 2005; Morris 2004; Wimmer 2010), hence the hieratic sign. Therefore, Egyptian expansion into Beth Shan had by the mid-14 century centralized their political control around such centers and began the economic exploitation of the surrounding area through tax and tribute collection. Such economic pressures may have prompted aggression from local Canaanites and nearby Canaanite centers.

Another important note regarding Beth Shan considers the city’s status prior to the Egyptian occupation. While the tell is strategically located at the crux of the Jezreel and Jordan River Valleys, evidence from the MBA strata suggest that Beth Shan was neither heavily travelled nor highly populated. Surprisingly, the impressive tell was thus
not one of the major, Canaanite city-kingdoms of the MBA. In a great example of military strategy and world-systems expansion, Egyptians were able to carve a niche for themselves deep within Canaanite territory from a relatively unfortified rise along a valuable east-west trade route. From Beth-Shan they could exact a more direct control over regional trade and local taxation, all the while using peripheral Canaanite centers as buffers between themselves and other core powers to the north and east (Hasel 1998; Killebrew 2005; Mazar 2006).

N-4

The next evidence for destruction was found in stratum N-4, or UME’s Late Level VII. This places the conflict near the end of the 19th Dynasty, after the apex of Egypt’s rule in Canaan during the Ramesside period. As noted above, the city had gone through a major re-planning and reconstruction effort after the destruction seen in R-1a. The layout of the town at this stage begins to closely recall parallels in New Kingdom Egypt, featuring “center hall” residencies mixed with smaller domestic spaces and a central temple precinct along a perpendicular street grid (James and McGovern 1993; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). It is during this phase that we see the bolstering of the garrison’s presence with the ratio of Egyptian to Canaanite ceramics hovering to 50% and the erection of the so-called “migdol” or fortress in the latter half of the 13th Century. The fortress as described in the data chapter carries dimensions close to 20 x 20 meters and consists of a primarily mudbrick construction and foundation in the Egyptian style. With outer walls nearly two meters thick, it was likely multistoried and served a defensive and administrative purpose. It was also strategically constructed near the north entrance of the city, where the city is most vulnerable given the tel’s gentler slope. The remaining
foundations of the “midgol” rise only two or three courses high with no spaces to indicate entrances. What’s left of the “migdol” is thus the remains of its basement, which from the mudbrick bins found within must have served some storage capacity (Mazar 2009).

There is little evidence for destruction in the “migdol,” though there were conspicuously few to no finds on its floors. This could mean that there was an intentional evacuation of the building. However, the digging of the subsequent building phase’s foundation reached far enough to remove nearly all remaining evidence. The case was similar in Area N North at Building NC where luxury items, such as faience jewelry and a number of inscribed scarabs were left lying on the floor as if in abandonment (Killebrew and Mazar 2009).

Most of the evidence for a fiery end to the 19th Dynasty was found within another monumental structure known as Building NB. Like the “migdol,” the building features thick mudbrick walls with no entrances. The destruction debris included baked mudbrick floors overlain with ash, burnt wooden beams (Lebanese cedar), a large quantity of carbonized grains, and numerous reconstructable vessels (ex. Cypriot bowl, Egyptian imports, and Canaanite storage jars). In room 18411 of NB, there were two mudbrick bins filled with carbonized grains (mostly Triticum parvicoccum, cultivated wheat) and the floor even exhibited impressions of reeds, likely coming from collapsed ceiling or roofing material (Kislev et al. 2009) Given the similarities with the “migdol” and the evident expense of construction as indicated by the cedar woodwork, Building NB likely served as a storage facility underneath a larger administrative building or for one nearby. Oddly, for the intensity of destruction seen at NB, its adjacent building NC,
which is interpreted as an Egyptian official’s domicile, exhibits little disturbance beyond some collapsed brick (Mazar 2009).

In accordance with the increase in garrison activity, Levels VIII and VII are associated with the most Egyptian inscriptions of any stratum at Beth Shan, or of any site in the Levant for that matter (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). Most important to this research are the three monumental stelae outlined in the data chapter, however inscriptive evidence from the levels include everything from private worship stelae, to faience plaques, and hieratic ostracon. The three monumental stelae stand out for two major reasons. First, their local manufacture and placement at Beth Shan serve to demonstrate the Egyptian’s confidence in their ability to maintain foreign outposts and the notion that Beth Shan is becoming more an extension of the homeland. Secondly, the stelae (primarily Seti’s) purport to recount historical instances in which Egyptian military action had to be taken to regain Beth Shan or the surrounding area from local Canaanite factions and regional centers. While the erection of the stelae predates the evidence of N-4’s conflagration, they nevertheless demonstrate, like the story of Jaffa’s capture, a memory of local resistance (James and McGovern 1993; Kitchen 1993; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).

S-3a

Due to the density of the stratigraphy in Area S, the next destruction detected at Beth Shan takes place within an estimated 60-70 years, during the final phase of Egypt’s occupation in the 20th Dynasty (UME Level VI). It is during this phase which we see another revival of Egyptian presence primarily through the transformation of Building 1500 in Area Q. Built on the contours of the previous mudbrick “migdol,” the new
“Governor’s residency” features overwhelmingly Egyptian motifs (pillared hall) with some local Canaanite engineering (stone foundations). The building has been identified by Ward (1966: 174) as the “residency of the commander of the troops,” Ramses Weserkhepesh, a historical figure known to be the governor of Beth Shan during the reign of Ramses III (Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009). Though found out of context, his identification comes from the discovery of a lintel bearing the name of Weser-khepesh and resembling the manufacture of other doorposts in the building. Nonetheless, given parallels of Egyptian villas in Amarna and Deir el-Medineh and contemporary Levantine sites at Tel Aphek and Tell el-Far’ah there seems to be no doubt that the structure served an important ceremonial purpose (James and McGovern 1993; Mazar 2006).

Unlike the previous two destructions, evidence for the demise of S-3a comes from a number of structures. The floors of six buildings in Area S exhibit up to 1.2m of debris. The debris includes the usual combination of burnt or collapsed bricks, timbers, grains, reconstructable vessels, and ash. From the high number of mudbrick storage bins and ovens, Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2009) deemed Area S a residential sector. The buildings’ nonmonumental construction and lack of interior decoration are also clues to the domesticity of the area. Mazar goes one step further in his interpretation to argue that the inhabitants of Area S are the garrison members themselves due to the area’s proximity to both Building NB and Building 1500. Again, the ceramic assemblage from building to building during this time period remains rather ambiguously split between styles. The identity of the architectural tradition itself also remains unknown, if it is not a mix of both Canaanite and Egyptian as in the case of the “Governor’s ceremonial palace” (Killebrew 2005; Mazar and Panitz-Cohen 2009).
While Level VI contained many inscribed architectural features and objects, none make allusions to conflict or insurgent behavior on the part of the indigenous. Rather it must be inferred that as Egyptian hegemony waned in the Levant during the first half of the 12th Century BCE, there were a number of interested parties waiting to fill the economic and political vacuum they would leave behind. In an attempt to corroborate such an idea Mazar cites Judges 6-7 and the story of the Israelites’ humble beginnings. Though 1160 BCE is the traditionally accepted year in which Egyptian rule fails in Canaan, this does not hold for all sites (Hasel 1998; Killebrew 2005; Killebrew and Steiner 2014). Instead, from ceramic evidence across Egypto-Canaan sites the withdrawal of Egyptian rule appears to be a gradual process with some centers returning mainly to Canaanite traditions or perhaps becoming mainly Philistine in make-up before others. Based on the stratigraphy of Area S, Beth Shan appears to be one of the few Egyptian centers that lasted into the latter half of the 12 Century BCE, roughly 1140 or 1130 BCE. The phase following S-3a’s destruction shows a commensurably lower ratio of Egyptian to Canaanite ceramics, and thus suggests there was no attempt to reconstruct an Egyptian Beth Shan (Martin 2009; Mazar and Panitz Cohen 2009).

**Deir el-Balah**

Though this study focuses on postulating a model of insurgency, it is equally important to infer what factors or measures might have led to a less violent coexistence between the Canaanite and Egyptian populations during the LBA. Deir el-Balah affords that opportunity, being a garrison site that exhibits no major destructions, yet shares many similarities with Beth Shan. In fact, of the Levantine sites they are perhaps the most comparable.
Regarding architecture, both include monumental fortresses adjacent to large residences of high officials. The similarities of the fortresses merits discussion primarily because it speaks to the possibility that the Egyptian military abroad had a *modus operandi* when settling a city, much like the standardization of Roman Legion forts. Their monumental walls are of comparable thickness, both for protection and to support 2-3 stories. The projected dimensions of the citadels are both ~20 x 20 m. and the interior of each recalls a matrix of narrow rooms (Killebrew 2006; Morris 2004)(See Fig. 5.2).

![Fig. 5.2 Comparison of contemporary fortress architecture from Beth Shan (left) and Deir el-Balah (right) (Killebrew 2006:).](image)

Like Beth Shan, the ceramic assemblage at Deir el-Balah is equally ambiguous in what it can tell us about the Egyptian occupants’ relationship with Canaan and vice-versa. This difficulty is made worse at Deir el-Balah where there is little left of residential areas to see the distribution spatially and most of the pottery comes out of the mixed contexts of the crater or “pond” (Killebrew 2010).

Dating Deir el-Balah, and thus placing its story within the context of Egypt’s occupation, has been a contested issue. While the original excavator, Trude Dothan
Brandl and Dothan (2010a) would argue for placing Deir el-Balah’s earliest strata within the 14th century Amarna period. Killebrew (2006) argues for a lower chronology. As described in the data chapter, the crux of the issue stems from the difficulty of determining whether or not the crater served as a pond. If so, Dothan asserts that the layout of the fortress next to the pond recalls a similar motif on 14th century depictions of outposts in the Temple of Karnak. However, I would side with both Killebrew and Mazar and Panitz-Cohen (2009) in stating that such an assertion is unfounded based on the available evidence. Deir el-Balah is not mentioned in the list of garrison cities at Karnak, in fact it is located between two, Rafia and Gaza. Furthermore, geological analyses conducted by Killebrew (2006) have shown that the crater could not have sustained standing water. Judging from ceramics, the Egyptian assemblage, Cypriot imports, and one particular Canaanite jar (CA 21b) suggests that the earliest stratum (IX) coincides with the 19th Dynasty, or 13th century (Killebrew 2006). This dating would further back the paralleling of Deir el-Balah’s and Beth Shan’s fortress structures existing contemporaneously.

Regarding Deir el-Balah’s place along the continuum of incorporation and negotiation, one reason for not exhibiting conflict may be that the competition for resources in the immediate area was completely dominated by larger Egyptian sites and military units located on the same trade route. If one considers Deir el-Balah’s proximity to the Egyptian homeland and its nesting within a larger network of Egyptian centers, one may infer that the site was protected by a military and cultural buffer zone. Gaza, being within 10 km, was the closest in proximity, but Deir el-Balah would have also been
bordered by Tel-Sera to its east, Tel el-Farah (S) to its southeast, and Rafia to its southwest (Brandl and Dothan 2010a; Killebrew 2005).

Yet, resource competition is still a concern at Deir el-Balah given the inscribed ceramic bowl located in Locus 1068 near the silo. The translation of the inscription reads “bringing (the) harvest tax of/to’ (*unj smw n)” and thereby suggests the exaction of taxes in the surrounding area by the local Egyptian forces, likely housed within the “fortress” structure and silo (Wimmer 2010).

Being a site that is closer to the Egyptian core’s border may also suggest that the Canaanite populations at southern sites are lower than sites further north. One could hypothesize that after a series of Egyptian conquests in the southern Levant, more and more Canaanite groups or factions felt the pressure to move further west or north. The four funerary stelae found in association with Deir el-Balah’s adjacent cemetery might add some credence to this hypothesis. Such stelae were likely used as freestanding personal monuments marking the graves of Egyptian individuals. Three of the four contain the individuals’ name, while all contain some invocation of the god Osiris. Within contemporary Egyptian sites, similar stelae were used as votive decorations on temples highlighting the name and office of the usually elite individual who made the offering or donation (Ventura 1987). The lack of official titles on these stelae suggests that there was no need to show off their occupation or status and that the deceased was survived by people who knew this information.

**Discussion**

In summary, this analysis demonstrates a significant correlation between the life histories of the Jaffa and Beth Shan garrison sites. Both exhibit strata that appear to
extend throughout the entirety of the New Kingdom’s occupation and both demonstrate at least three discernable Class 2-3 destructions within that period (Finkelstein 2009). Furthermore, these destructions seem to cluster near the transition of Pharaonic dynasties.

Recall Burke’s postulation that the destructions of Jaffa took place during times of Pharaonic transition (Burke et al. 2015). While the evidence at Beth Shan does not discount this idea, the correlating estimates lean more towards destructions occurring at a longer interval of dynastic transition. It is difficult to characterize the impact such a transition may have had in reality. However, it is not difficult to imagine that administrative duties and the enforcement of foreign policies were temporarily suspended to some capacity before the ascension of a new ruling family. This may in turn have led to a period of relaxed Egyptian presence in the frontier zone, making even garrison sites vulnerable to opportunistic locals and neighboring Canaanite centers.

Alternatively, signs of destruction are sparse at Deir el-Balah. Given evidence from only a small portion of the settlement, this fact may be more the result of geography and a small Canaanite population, as opposed to a sign of peaceful coexistence. Little more can be said about the data from Deir el-Balah beyond these speculations. The Gaza Strip, in which both Deir el-Balah and Gaza are located, continues to be contested land and present geopolitical circumstances prevent further investigation.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This study has been an attempt to revisit, or rather reevaluate, the question of relations between Egyptians and Canaanites in the LBA through the lens of a model of insurgency. Evidence from recent excavations in Jaffa, Israel, an Ancient Egyptian garrison site located on the Mediterranean coast of the Southern Levant, provided the groundwork for this research as the directors, Burke and Peilstöcker, see in Jaffa an excellent record of Canaanite resistance to Egyptian rule. Focusing on a particular aspect of the core/periphery relationship, this study asked questions about the nature of peripheral resistance and negotiation along a core’s boundary/frontier by expanding the inference made by Burke and Peilstöcker to two additional garrison sites. Theoretically, I largely took my cue from Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) understanding of core/periphery hierarchy, differentiation, and the continuum of incorporation. Works concerned with modern insurgent behavior and motivation (Underhill 2014, Berntsen 2008, Metelits 2010) also played a vital role in illuminating both the complex relationships formed between insurgents and their host populations, as well as the basic needs that fuel their movements. Other important theoretical works include Urban and Schortman’s (1999) thoughts on ideological domination and Kardulias’s (1990) peripheral negotiation. Together they helped me develop a model (Figure 2.2) by which the evidence, particularly of violent conflicts, at Jaffa, Beth Shan, and Deir el-Balah might be better explained as the result of local Canaanite populations negotiating their stance in the wake of Egypt’s 15th century military expansion.
These arguments are not without their weaknesses, some inherent and some designed. As discussed in the Literature Review, the sources on understanding Canaanite culture from an emic perspective are severally lacking, an issue that is compounded by their extremely eclectic material culture. The analysis of ceramics was most affected by this situation in the attempt to understand how the distribution of the two traditions may reflect social cohesion or discord. Furthermore, of the assemblages that could be differentiated, the ratio of Egyptian to Canaanite ceramics at the height of the Egyptian occupation in each case study tended to hover around fifty percent. Such an outcome severely limited the ability to determine if one could make a case for the Canaanite population becoming increasingly marginalized. While the record does show a marked increase in Egyptian ceramics after the establishment of the garrison sites and the initial campaigns of Thutmose III, a fifty percent ratio between the styles most likely does not correspond to population demographics.

Another inherent weakness lays in the ambiguity of the destruction deposits themselves. In my initial study (Hubbard 2015), which focused on Jaffa exclusively, I determined that the physical archaeological remains of the destruction did not contain within themselves the evidence to establish intentionality. However, that a single type of deposit can have numerous explanations is an issue that extends to all matters of archaeological inquiry. For example, the Levant is located along the Dead Sea Transform fault system at the boundary of the Arabian and African plates. This means that the Land of Canaan has been and continues to be a place prone to earthquakes. There are many cases in which collapsed or warped architecture and even evidence of fire has been interpreted as the result of tectonic activity (Brandl and Dothan 2010a; Drews 1993). A
question of rebellion though requires an indication of identity even when the evidence is not forthcoming. Textual evidence, such as the El-Amarna Letters or Seti’s stelae, thus becomes invaluable despite their historicity and bias being questionable. To state it plainly, it can be problematic to make a group of people we know only second-hand, responsible for damages possibly incurred naturally or accidently.

By design this study focused almost exclusively on ceramic, architectural, and textual evidence. This was done primarily in hopes of being able to track how each of the cities changed over the period of the Egyptian occupation and obtain clues as to the events and concerns worth noting in writing. This necessarily meant the exclusion of other lines of data that might help to delineate further between Canaanite and Egyptian spaces or illuminate the nature of their interactions. Although briefly mentioned in regards to Beth Shan’s wheat and flax seed production, future studies might pay particular attention to archaeobotanical remains. Such data might prove useful in identifying each city’s major agricultural resources and thus a source of competition and conflict after the exaction of Egyptian tribute and taxes. Future research may also include a more in-depth reading of the Amarna texts in order tease out a fuller understanding of the various city centers’ rulers, their loyalties and the extent of their power. Although the Amarna letters account for only a matter of decades, they might at least provide a spatial sense of the sphere of Egypt’s influence in Canaan from garrison cities run by Egyptian officials, to centers overseen by Canaanite lords allied to Egypt, to centers that retain Canaanite independence.

Nevertheless, this study has shown promise in establishing a hypothetical model whereby both textual evidence and archaeological findings come together to paint a more
holistic picture of the tension between the Egyptian and Canaanite cultures in the LBA Levant, the resistance and revival. Though the Amarna letters and other period texts speak to the tumult of the occupation, not every site within Egyptian influence can be expected to exhibit destructions. Therefore, that Beth-Shan, in addition to Jaffa, should each experience three site-wide destructions coalescing with the end of the 18th, 19th, and 20th dynasties underscores a possible phenomenon worth investigating further.

More than offering a theoretical model, this investigation posits evidence for an altogether alternative narrative. In a region where archaeological inquiry often finds itself entrenched in texts of a biblical and imperialistic nature or in nationalistic enterprise, the insurgent narrative allows for a more balanced story, progressing past the days of relegating groups like the indigenous Canaanites to passive characters. The meaningful correlation between destruction deposits found at both Beth Shan and Jaffa demonstrate the potential for a culture of Canaanite resistance and a people capable of controlling their own fate. This potential lends itself to future studies of Egypto-Canaan contact on a more nuanced level and colors the already rich, multi-cultural tapestry of the LBA Levant with another vibrant shade.

Finally, it is not lost on me as to the relevance of this research to the present political and cultural atmosphere of the modern Levant. Though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a conflict unique and wholly removed from that of the LBA Egyptian occupation, tensions for the same valuable land and its resources separate them by only three thousand years. Sites such as Jaffa (Tel-Aviv), Gaza, and Deir el-Balah continue to be city-centers from which acts of domination and resistance similar to those addressed herein are played out. In the summer of 2014, the initial research for this project in Jaffa
was suddenly halted by the sounds of sirens indicating the near arrival of rockets from the Gaza Strip. Continuing archaeological work in the region thus often leads to the collapse of those three thousand years of separation. While this undoubtedly imposes research limitations, modern conflict adds to the urgency of understanding its ancient counterpart both for the purposes of conservation and appreciating the complexity of life at the crossroads of the Southern Levantine frontier.
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