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The Moroccan Example: "Coming Movements," Communities, and Lived Experience in Contemporary Protest

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"I have come to believe that those who have the good fortune to be able to devote their lives to the study of the social world cannot stand aside, neutral and indifferent, from the struggles in which the future of that world is at stake."
-Pierre Bourdieu

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ABSTRACT

What is the legacy of the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and associated protests? This is the question at the heart of this paper. To answer it, I will argue that these protests are indicative of an international mobilization that together shared both a horizontal structure and pseudo-utopian philosophy, which, in turn, affected how activists understood their own movements. To begin, this paper traces the precursors of these horizontal protests within the literature, analyzing their origins in events such as the World Trade Organization protests in Seattle (1999) and the World Social Forums since then. Next, I use Giorgio Agamben's theorization of the "Coming Community" and Richard Day's critique of this same concept to interpret these as "coming movements," which afford new potentialities without fully realizing Agamben's pseudo-Utopian vision. Lastly, through analysis of interviews with Moroccan activists who participated in the February 20th Movement—an offshoot of the Arab Spring—I will demonstrate that the lived experience of activists within this movement fits the structure and philosophy analyzed above.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

If one moment is to define the origin of the international wave of mobilization—termed the Arab Spring—that touched nearly every continent it is this: on December 17, 2010 a fruit seller in a Tunisian town, frustrated by police harassment and their bureaucratic impositions on him, lit himself on fire in front of the provincial capital. This man was Mohamed Bouazizi and his self-immolation led to the ouster of two leaders as well as a multitude of demonstrations and protests around the world. Yet, in the stories that followed this act some accounts of protest are heralded while others are silenced or misrepresented.

Such is the case in Morocco. Amidst a region often troubled by political uncertainty, social unrest, and international attention lays Morocco. Still, despite its proximity to regions considered unstable and dangerous Morocco has a reputation for being a stable and fair-minded monarchy. However, Morocco, like other countries in North Africa and the Middle East, was home to massive mobilizations during the Arab Spring. But where other mobilizations often follow the structures they critique, these movements and others like them reconfigured themselves in ways that challenge such structures with community-based ideologies.

In part, my focus is on this ideology. I address how this movement might be evidence of a future for non-identitarian, and therefore non-exclusionary, identities, communities, or movements. My work aims to engage with theories of community, especially those of Giorgio Agamben and Richard Day, that have come to challenge the

notion that communities are based purely on gaining something from the connection, viewing them instead in their contingency and in relation to the tenuousness of identity, clear leadership, and enumerated aims that exists within them.

In what follows, I trace the 20 February Movement for Change, herein simply called the February 20th movement, and its precursors and theoretical foundation within the literature, starting with the Battle of Seattle in 1999 and ending with the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street. Next, I will come to term the February 20th movement and movements like it coming movements, a term I develop fully later in my theory chapter based on Agamben and Day's work on the subject. After this construction, I will test my theory that coming movements might offer a frame of reference for these movements by applying it to the specific case of Morocco's February 20th movement, using my own research conducted through interviews with ten Moroccan activists.

In sum, this research will address whether community-based ideology can explain certain recent protests while also challenging the idea of what identity, leadership, and aims ought look like in a social movement. I will also examine the outcomes of such a movement on the people, country, and protest culture, looking particularly at the Moroccan example.

Why Study This?

There is already substantial literature tracing the novelty of various aspects of the Arab Spring, yet my work aims do something different. To begin, Morocco is rarely, if ever, seriously considered within literature on the Arab Spring. There is little research, especially in English, on Morocco's role in the Arab Spring or on specifics of its Arab Spring mobilization, the February 20th movement. Next, my work is engaging primarily with theories of community in order to find whether an inclusive community that does

not lend itself to intentional or unintentional repression of its members is possible. I consider my work to deal with the question of how we might live together best; one way to get at this question is to engage the social instantiations of these communities, in this case social movements. Last, I consider this work a continuation of my research while abroad in Morocco in the spring of 2013, wherein I looked at how transgressive movements after the Arab Spring used technology to negotiate public space. My research during that time led me to the February 20th movement, which seemingly altered Morocco's protest culture.

In another sense, this issue is worth considering because it challenges some of the assumptions that underlie the study of social movements. Most research on the topic will examine the identity, leadership, and aims—mine will as well—but I do so differently. I argue that there is a hegemonic understanding of these three traits within theorizations of social movements and common parlance which has in fact been subverted in the February 20th movement.

CHAPTER 2:

THE MOROCCAN CONTEXT

Studying Morocco's February 20th movement is both difficult and beneficial for the very same reason: the dearth of scholarly research on the subject. Where the Arab Spring generally led to expanded scholarship on the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco's place in the Arab Spring has not been widely considered in scholarly publications, and certainly not in English. Yet, some sources, primarily from the media do consider Morocco's specific case.

Before beginning here is some context: Morocco, which gained its independence from France and Spain in 1956, is a constitutional monarchy whose current king is Mohammed VI. In 2011, Morocco was part of the democratization mobilization called the Arab Spring wherein a movement called the 20 February Movement for Change agitated for major reform. But unlike other countries the regime was not overthrown, rather the king supported a new constitution passed in July by a popular referendum. As a result of his program of reform a moderate Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), was elected to power as the first Islamist party to lead Moroccan Government (Anon 2014).

In the same year, 2011, when most of the sources considered here were written, the literacy rate hovered barely above 50 percent, 15 percent of Moroccans lived on under 2 U.S. dollars a day, and that, according to United Nations Human Development Index, Morocco ranked 130 behind the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, and Gabon. Also, consider that between 1999 and 2009 nearly 30 journalists were "arrested, charged,

prosecuted, and sentenced" (Lalami 2011a:3). Given these conditions Morocco did not spontaneously turn to protest, but rather had experienced frequent bouts of unrest and resulting protest for years leading up to the Arab Spring.

In 2011 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace collected a policy outlook on "Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World." Written by Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, the paper primarily analyzes the state of the "Arab World" before the Arab Spring. They summarize Morocco saying:

> Morocco…experienced successive waves of protest, particularly in the last decade. Noticeable in some incidents was the presence of labor unions, which at times even included government-aligned ones. The high point of protest in Morocco was in 2007, when 945 protest episodes took place between January and October as labor unions, professional associations, and young activists took to the streets to voice frustration at unemployment, high prices, and poor labor standards. Protest, however, subsided in subsequent years (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011:4).

The paper continues by examining the composition of movements in the region and a means for assessing them.

In terms of the composition of movements in the region, Ottaway and Hamzawy claim that "the formation of broader alliances around episodes of protest is also hindered by the different organizational styles of labor groups, political parties and movements, political bloggers, and the youth movements" (2011:9). Though this was written before the Arab Spring had begun fully, several articles on the February 20th movement in Morocco—a parallel of other Arab Spring movements—negate this claim. Writing for "the Middle East Channel" on *Foreign Policy* online, Zahir Rahman talks about the inclusivity of the movement, saying "the movement has brought three previously disengaged demographics to the forefront of Moroccan political participation: namely, youth, women, and the lower socio-economic classes, who have all become heavily

involved in the February 20th movement" (Rahman 2011:2). Likewise, Laila Lalami, blogging for *The Nation* explained that the group called Democracy and Freedom Now, which officially began the February 20th Movement, was joined "by a loose coalition of cyber-activists, traditional lefties, Islamists and twenty human rights organizations, including the Moroccan Association of Human Rights and Amnesty Morocco" (2011a:1). This is to say that in contrast to what the Carnegie report indicates February 20th seems to have been based on a coalition of various groups. Yet, the authors of the Carnegie report would claim that such a coalition, were it to exist, is likely inefficient.

Explaining the potential for inefficiency, then, the Carnegie report claims that protests in this region have two serious limitations. First, individual organizations lack the structure to be successful. Second, there is not an organized, cohesive movement nationally or regionally.

The first claim that individual organizations are themselves too weak to create true progress hinges on an argument about size and power, which does not hold true in the Moroccan context. That is, the Carnegie authors claim no labor unions—their particular example—exist with enough power to single handedly unite others or effect change though they acknowledge that certain countries, Morocco among them, are nearer to this than others. Yet, various accounts of the February 20th movement look particularly at the presence of large organizations if not unions. For instance, several large human rights organizations and feminist organizations, each with their own power, were present. It is important to note that organizations such as those involved in the February 20th movement are actually quite powerful, having effected important structural change in Morocco regarding the family code, or *Mudawana,* in 2004. Sarra El Idrissi reflecting on

her own experience for *openDemocracy*, specifically identifies two major organizations which regularly participated in protests: The Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) and The Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM) (2012:3). These large national organizations seem as though they would fit the characteristics of a strong organization, as described in the Carnegie report, such that perhaps the report does not represent the reality of the February 20th movement.

Moreover, the report's second claim that "in each country studied, the discontent that drives the protest is manifested in a large number of distinct episodes…that do not build on each other" (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011:12). Likewise, they acknowledge that were such a large-scale movement to exist it would most likely fail due to the difference among groups within such a broad coalition. Depending on the operationalization of success, this necessity of failure in a broad coalition was not so clear given the outcomes of protest in Tunisia and Egypt, where broad movements overthrew their respective dictators. In the specific case of Morocco, however, the outcome is more ambivalent. Certainly changes occurred, but even protesters—indeed, especially protesters—find these changes to be cursory.

The changes referred to here are the constitutional reforms, which occurred as a result of the February 20th movement and general unrest. What follows is a brief outline of the movement which, unlike the Arab Spring as a whole or the Occupy Wall Street movement, did not garner much international attention. The February 20th movement began "by a group calling itself Democracy and Freedom Now" which called for a variety of aims dealing chiefly with increased democratization and decreased income inequality (Lalami 2011a:1). Yet, the full list covered many more topics than that

including: constitutional reform, dissolution of the present parliament, an independent judiciary, more accountability for elected officials, language rights for Berber speakers, and the release of political prisoners (Lalami 2011a:1). Indeed, like many movements elsewhere, a YouTube video featuring Moroccan young people explaining their reasons for protesting went viral. This led to massive protests first in major Moroccan cities—the capital city Rabat, Casablanca, Fes—and then protests in villages, towns, and cities across Morocco. A few weeks later the King, Mohammed VI, announced he was creating a committee to write a new constitution which was approved by referendum three months later and by November the king held new parliamentary elections (Ottaway 2012:1). The resulting election put the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), an Islamist party that had been an unofficial part of the movement, in power, wherein the king named PJD secretary general Abdelilah Benkirane as prime minster per new constitutional requirements (Ottaway 2012:1). Yet, behind this official story of the reforms are unofficial accounts of political cronyism and empty promises.

In every telling of the February 20th movement and the government response to it a central fact will be the speed with which the King acted. This is especially emphasized in certain western sources. For instance, the *New York Times* wrote that when the Arab Spring reached Morocco the king "responded quickly", changing the constitution (Alami 2012:1). Similarly, another Carnegie endowment article examines how the king "quickly plunged into a process of political reform" (Ottaway 2012:1). Likewise, a *Foreign Policy* correspondent writes that the movement was "alarming enough for the Moroccan government to react" and emphasizes that the response came only three weeks later (El Danshan 2013:2). This narrative is, in part at least, a result of the established

governmental account of the "Moroccan Exception", or rather the idea that Morocco would not succumb to violent revolution because it is different than the rest of North Africa and the Middle East. Put another way: "Morocco is not Tunisia"—a claim made by Minister Khalid Naciri (Lalami 2011b:2).

However widely touted the claim of moderate reform, the "Moroccan Exception" is primarily a PR tool as evidenced by the actual lived violence that resulted from government crackdowns on February 20th protesters. While from abroad Joe Lieberman, John McCain, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy praised the King for his visionary reforms, at home in Morocco the King continued to undermine the February 20th movement using "a variety of strategies: physical threats against activists, accusations that they were drug addicts and alcoholics, hacking of social media accounts, press censorship, and salary raises for public sector employees and riot police" (Lalami 2011b:3). Moreover, the continued demonstrations were marked by increased violence and repression by the government. From mid-March to late May seven people were killed with the majority of the violence occurring in the North away from major cities (Anon 2011; Lalami 2011b:3). This was not all: the government issued a ban on demonstrations in May, activists were continuously and frequently arrested, prisoners revolted over detention conditions and Morocco's antiterrorism law, the editor-in-chief of the best-selling Moroccan newspaper was arrested, and extreme violence was used on peaceful protesters (El Idrissi 2012:1). This is all to say that the "Moroccan Exception" may represent some truth in that Morocco did not, in fact, become Tunisia or Egypt; but the further claim that this was the result of a moderate, democracy-minded government is blatantly incoherent in light of these facts.

Similarly, there is another narrative used to explain Morocco's special ability to maintain control and satisfy protesters—the "third way". The "third way" narrative indicates that governmental reforms are a "third way" to democratization, meaning that they are neither top-driven and controlled by the king nor a result of revolution, but rather an alternate path of cooperation between the parliamentary government, namely the PJD, and the king (Ottaway 2012:1). To begin with some doubt that the constitutional reforms that form the basis of this movement are themselves democratic with several authors questioning the supposed 72% turn out rate (El Idrissi 2012:2; Lalami 2011b:4). More simply, however, most of those writing on this topic acknowledge that the very nature of the "third way" inherently takes some of its power away. Since the king, Mohammed VI, still holds executive power, in order for reform to happen he himself must enact it. Therefore, without real democratic reforms, the "third way" is really just another top-driven scheme. A Carnegie Report on the "third way" finds that "the present balance between a party [the PJD] that wants to avoid confrontation and the palace that still appears considerably more powerful than the elected government does not augur well for the depth of reforms" (Ottaway 2012:4). As such, most authors admit that to some degree both the "Moroccan Exception" and the "third way" are fictions created by the Moroccan government for the benefit of international audiences though they remain important considerations in a study of the current Moroccan context.

As will become evident in the literature review to follow, this Moroccan movement seems to fit the themes that are dominant throughout the analysis of coming or "newest movements". New media, cooperation among contrasting identities, and new relations between movements and protesters exist at the very least at a cursory level, as in

the movements to be considered later. However, these trends deserve more consideration than exists in current scholarship on the February 20th Movement. Therefore, my research will aim to address these three issues, while also examining this movement in light of its relatedness to other movements.

CHAPTER 3:

THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE AND BEYOND

The sociological phenomenon I explore in this project deals with those movements deemed by Richard Day to be the "newest social movements," that is, those movements which do not follow the pattern of "modern" protests, a distinction that will be made clearer shortly (Day 2004; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Here, then, I will trace the literature concerning this change beginning with the Seattle WTO protests and then consider Occupy Wall Street and the implications for Morocco's February 20th movement. Thus, I will examine the literature surrounding these "newest" protest movements drawing out what new trends are evident across these seemingly disparate movements and how they relate to the broad concept of protest as well as the particular movement considered in this project. In the next chapter, I will explore how the similarities between "newest" movements fit the theoretical framework of what I, using Giorgio Agamben's theoretical framework, term coming movements.

The New and Newest Social Movements

In his article "From Hegemony to Affinity: The political logic of the newest social movements" Richard Day (2004) seeks to differentiate between new social movements (1960's-80's) and what he calls the "newest social movements". First, Day examines the differences between New Social Movements and the "Newest Social Movements," next, he considers—with an admitted anarchist bias—how a hegemonic understanding has been supplanted by an affinity-based theoretical understanding and concludes by discussing the type of action prevalent in these newest movements.

He begins by saying that the now old "New Social Movements" (NSM's) had several observed regularities. First, NSM's were new in that they addressed antagonisms irreducible to class (Day 2004:722). Steven Buechler (2000), in his book *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism,* agrees that a basic tenant of NSM's is their complex relationship with class and, more generally, Marxism, with some theorists attempting to update it while others attempt to displace it. However, he expands Day's claim saying that focusing on different issues reflects the diversity within the base of these movements. He continues, saying the analysis of this shift shows that there is no consensus among theorists of how directly NSM's have changed their composition beyond Day's claim of a movement beyond class, but that plurality does exist both ideologically and theoretically (46).

Next, Day argues NSM's lack a totalizing conception of social change, focusing instead on single issues, a claim seemingly contradicting Buechler. Day acknowledges that such a view is perhaps not entirely fair as there have always been nuances to even seemingly single-issue movements, such that, for instance, feminists in the 1970's considered links between patriarchy and capitalism, but NSM's do not seek open revolution as in older social movements (Day 2004:723). Buechler might disagree, however. He expounds upon the centrality of the politicization of everyday life as well as new value systems, both of which imply more than a single-issue system to these movements.

For Day, the "Newest Social Movements" on the other hand, are "non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments" (Day 2005:9). This he distills into an opposition of the logic

of affinity against the "hegemony of hegemony", or, "the commonsensical assumption that meaningful social change can…only be achieved through the deployment of universalizing hierarchical forms, epitomized by the nation-state, but including conceptions of the world state" (Day 2004:717). Where NSM's focused on purely anti-hegemonic acts, "the newest social movements" oppose the prevalence of discourse around hegemony as power. Buechler, citing Nancy Whittier, agrees with the idea that NSM's focused on being anti-hegemonic, but Day wants to take this idea further saying that the "newest social movements" counter the very hegemony of the notion that hegemony is central to understanding social movements (2000:48). Put another way, Day argues that the newest social movements move away from thought that emphasizes change within systems of state or corporate power and focuses instead "on the possibilities offered by the *displacement* and *replacement* of this system"(2004:719). So, for instance rather than attempting to effect change through the system, it is the system that is broken and must instead be changed.

It is in the above stated action wherein the "newest social movements" derive their character. In discussing the type of direct action which defines these movements Day offers first a complex overview of "new social movements" and next a potential distinction to clarify the complexity of the issue. To begin, Day says that the term "newest social movements" refers to:

> …Those direct-action oriented elements…which are neither revolutionary nor reformist, but seek to block, resist and render redundant both corporate *and* state power in local, national and transnational contexts. At the same time, these groups/movements/tactics do not seek any irradiation effects on any spectrum at all, except perhaps in the sense of a postmodernist performative contradiction… (2004:733)

This is to say that the goal of the "newest social movements" is quite simply not to reform or revolt. However, Day goes further in his breakdown of this topic by exploring a distinction between what he calls the *politics of the act* and a *politics of demand* (2004:733).

A politics of demand is the practice of older social movements—"old social movements" and NSM's—wherein the aim was to better state, corporate, or societal practices by working within the system. However, this is, to Day at least, a limited scope. These movements can only ever "change the content" of the system of domination or oppression, but never "change their form" (Day 2004:733). Because they are only ever working within a system of domination and oppression the outcome can only ever be one of domination or oppression, though perhaps with a new name or form. Day here relies on what seems to be a Foucauldian reading of the phenomenon where a politics of demand reifies the very structures it aims to subvert. Thus, in a politics of demand the action—trying to subvert the dominant structure—insofar as it actually strengthens the structure instead, ultimately creates the system it is trying to tear down creating a loop of perpetual desire for emancipation without ever actually achieving such emancipation (Day 2004:734). The politics of the act on the other hand gives up on the illusion that the dominating structure in place will ever enact a non-dominating response and acts by precluding the necessity of the demand of the politics of demand, thus ending the loop (Day 2004:734). This politics of the act is what Day sees as the form of direct action the newest social movements take.

Yet, Day and Buechler are not the only theorists to have developed an explanation for the "newest social movements," though he does more than others to concisely explain

what the NSM's looked like and how power is played out throughout this shift. Others do much more to characterize the newest social movements than Day, however. Indeed, his piece is in dialogue with theorizations of transnational protest, here articulated by Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, which specifically outline the new transnational aspect of social movements.

In the introduction to their book *Transnational Processes and Global Activism* Della Porta and Tarrow (2005), like Day, explore what differentiates recent protest movements from previous, modern movements. They begin by acknowledging, like Day and Buechler, that what is considered a modern protest (e.g. women's rights, civil rights, etc.) "developed with the creation of the nation state" in opposition to movements, which today focus on different loci of power (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005:1). That is, movements of this type—what I will term "coming movements" and what Day termed the "newest social movements"—are in opposition to globalized or supranational instantiations of power (e.g. the IMF, WTO, NAFTA, etc.). This shift has affected more than just their point of opposition; indeed, movements themselves have changed their actions, structures and identities. Della Porta and Tarrow draw out three of the most prevalent processes in the literature concerning the "newest" or "coming" transnational protest: diffusion, domestication, and externalization. They explain:

> By *diffusion*, we mean the spread of movement ideas, practices, and frames from one country to another; by *domestication*, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally; and by *externalization*, we mean the challenge to supranational institutions to intervene in domestic problems or conflicts (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005:2).

Of these, the first two will resonate with the following analysis. Yet, they add a last, "most important" process, what they call "transnational collective action" (Della Porta

and Tarrow 2005:2). By "transnational collective action" they mean international campaigns by networks of activists against international actors, other states, or institutions (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005:2–3). Indeed, Richard Day, also identifies a similar trait and, citing Tarrow specifically, says that his own term "newest social movements" is what others, like Tarrow and Della Porta, call transnational protest movements (Day 2004:728).

Taken together these theorists offer a compelling vision of new social movements. While certainly each theorist offers specific pieces of explication, their interaction gives a fuller image of "newest" or postmodern social movements. For instance, while Days explanation of NSM's is helpful in understanding how "newest social movements" have further developed, it is augmented by Buechler's more thorough contribution.

There is perhaps something to be said about the very concept of novelty within any discussion of new or "newest" social movements. That is, a consideration of what newness means in this context is important. Buechler (2000) argues that claims of newness are a primary reason for criticism of social theories dealing with so-called new social movements, and certainly, such a critique could be applied to "newest" social movements as well. He says that "the argument that there is a defensible category of 'new' movements sufficiently like each other and demonstrably different from 'old' movements to be the foundation of a whole new theoretical approach to social movements has drawn the most criticism" (Buechler 2000:49). The criticism, he argues, stems from claims that theorists exaggerate the novelty, ignore predecessors, mistake cyclical systems of protest for new types, and misread phenomenon as total shifts (Buechler 2000:49–50).

However, this does not seem to be what Day, Della Porta, or Tarrow attempt to do. Rather, Buechler argues that claims of newness most likely relate to the relationship between movements and changes in their social context (2000:49). So, broader changes in social environment determine strategies adopted, and newness is ascribed to social structures to which movements react, rather than to movements themselves. For instance, Tarrow and Della Porta analyze how advanced capitalism and globalization result in transnational movements. Similarly, Jackie Smith, considered below, focuses on neoliberalism and globalization and the resulting opposing movements. She exemplifies this concept insofar as she talks about new movements but also identifies the 19th century roots of these actions.

Technological Considerations in the "Newest" Movements

A prominent example of a new social environment that requires a new response is advanced technology. This is both an important point of consideration and a clear example of what the above theorists claim newness means—a reaction to a change in social environment.

Discussions of the "newest social movements" are hardly complete without some consideration of new media, or, as Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave (2002) put it, information and communication technologies. Specifically Internet growth and cell phone use have changed the social environment of social movements. Indeed, Habibul Haque Khondker, writing later, acknowledges that the new media has been a point of contestation for much of the 20th century (2011:678). Though some critics claim that new media does not actively change politics, Van Aelst and Walgrave argue that participation in politics is facilitated through technology and that action is easier and faster as a result (2002:455–6). Moreover, they claim that such trends can extend to international or

transnational movements. Van Aelst and Walgrave were writing in 2002, basing their findings off of analysis of anti-globalization websites in the era just following the "battle of Seattle". Today, though, in a post-Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street discourse the effects of new media are even more exaggerated, as discussed later.

While Van Aelst and Walgrave look at how anti-globalization efforts employ new media for their movements, Khondker points out the irony of such a situation in that globalization itself has intensified the types of technology that make these protests possible. This connectivity, he claims, "is as vital for facilitating business transactions as it is for social interactions and mobilizations" (2011:675). Writing about the Arab Spring, he says that claims of the impact of technology may have been somewhat exaggerated.

Instead, he, like other authors, proposes a more balanced view where both new media and traditional media made the movements in the Middle East and North Africa possible (Greene and Kuswa 2012; Khondker 2011). Their role in the organization of protests and the visibility of them cannot be undervalued, "but conventional media played a crucial role in presenting the uprisings to the larger global community who in turn supported the transformations" (Khondker 2011:677). Outcomes of this activism, he continues, are different in different contexts, yet even so cyber activism has become increasingly prominent in the region (Khondker 2011:678). From this he draws two conclusions: first, new media is a means to an end for social movements and thus— second—the role of media relies on the movements that happen physically in the streets (Khondker 2011:678).

Taken together Van Aelst, Walgrave, and Khondker encourage a balanced view of new media, such that it is not the single defining facet of new movements but nor is it

unimportant. This is especially important to consider in light of the discourse surrounding the Arab Spring wherein it is claimed that technology alone created the revolutionary effects. As Khondker himself acknowledges, new media has been a fixture of the 20th century such that it makes sense as part of a trend of "newest movements."

The Battle of Seattle: 1999

In November of 1999, the World Trade Organization held a conference in Seattle, sparking massive protests. What happened as a result has changed the discourse surrounding social movements and has in turn informed recent movements like Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring.

However, there is nothing new about protesting globalization. As Van Aelst and Walgrave point out third world organizations had been pointing out inequity resulting from international organizations long before Seattle drew it to the fore (2002:468). Likewise, they examine the situation leading up to the Seattle WTO protests, namely the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998, which was stopped after approximately 600 organizations enacted an internet-based campaign of mobilization and education.

Van Aelst and Walgrave argue that while it may be hard to know whether the Internet alone led to the success of this movement there is evidence that it did. Namely, citing Ayres (1999), they argue that a similar campaign ten years previously "using more costly and time-consuming methods, did not have the same result…" (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2002:468; Ayres 1999). Though other methods were used, technology indicates one way in which this early protest may fit the model of "newest social movements". Optimistic after this success international networks prepared for the next symbol of globalization and the expansion of free trade: the WTO meeting in Seattle.

Jackie Smith (2002), in her article "Globalizing Resistance: The Battle of Seattle and the Future of Social Movements," identifies progress in the Seattle protests that tracks well onto the analysis above and, in turn, does more to analyze the complexity of the individual and collective protester identity. Smith acknowledges two ways in which Seattle differs from and builds off of previous movements: mass mobilization and transnational collective action—similar to those ideas which Della Porta and Tarrow developed.

The first—mass mobilization—refers to the way in which the Seattle protests, like the MAI protest above, saw a variety of people, organizations and institutions involved in protest activity in novel ways. On this Smith says, "Seattle raises questions about the prospects for and limitations on social movement mobilization across national boundaries as well as class and cultural divides" (2002:2). In both domestic and transnational regards the anti-WTO protests created mobilizing structures that mixed a variety of organizations and people, changing the formula of movements while simultaneously building upon the accepted notion of social movement formation.

To begin with, Smith identifies that most research on domestic social movements identifies formal social movements as important for forming the structure, tone, and agenda of a protest, while "extra-movement" organizations like churches and community groups lend resources and support to these formal organizations. Yet, the Seattle protests "attracted a large number of 'extra-movement' organizations and informal networks," which Smith argues may explain the anti-WTO protests' impact (2002:5). In this way Seattle followed the form of past movements but increased the amount of support from "extra-movement" sources.

Similarly, the Seattle protests built on mobilizing structures transnationally. Seattle especially benefited, Smith explains, from the rapid expansion of transnational social movement organizations in the fifty years preceding Seattle (2002:5). Smith goes on to say that the involvement of these transnational organizations had a marked effect on the message of the protesters even if the message did not ultimately cause substantive changes. That is, the involvement of transnational social movement organizations led to a more diverse message than would have existed previously but the effect of that message was unclear. For instance Smith gives the example of Western environmentalists and labor activists who were willing to work within WTO structures, but after dialogue with their international counterparts changed their position, resulting in a "common statement endorsed by 1500 citizens' organizations from 89 countries" (2002:6). Thus, this movement shows a shift from a domestic to a transnational context that shaped the makeup of the group as well as the message of the movement as a whole. However, Van Aelst and Walgrave acknowledge that both domestic and transnational contingents had distinct effects on the movement, saying that, "while groups with local ties concentrated on mobilization and direct action, more transnational-based groups provided information and frames to feed the action" (2002:469).

Yet, the mobilizing structures alone were not the only change. Indeed, both the sheer numbers and the framing of the event led to similarly important mobilization effects. Likewise, the framing of the event was itself an important form of action. Thus, mass mobilization and framing, in two different regards, came to define the successful strategies of the Seattle protests.

Smith discusses the benefits of mass protest saying, "one important function of mass rallies and protests is to create a relatively (in Western contexts) low-cost means for people to participate in a movement" (2002:11). The implication being that mass protests such as those in Seattle, as well as the movements discussed later, offer a cheap way to be a part of a movement. Smith goes on to say that participation also motivates by creating and nurturing identities through the us-them mentality of protest, generating new protestors and new levels of commitment among already established protestors, an effect only amplified by repressive responses like those in Seattle (2002:11). In this way the numbers themselves changed the perception of anti-WTO protests while drawing more participants to the protests.

Likewise, framing was central to the mobilization of Seattle and accounts for some of its uniqueness in respect to past movements. Smith identifies that Seattle protesters did not rely solely on mass media but rather organized their own "Independent Media Center" (2002:12). Van Aelst and Walgrave similarly point out the use of new media, claiming it was especially impactful for mobilization and for coverage of the event. Beyond that, Seattle protesters took pains to educate the public about their message with teach-ins, caravans, and performances. The Seattle protests brought activists from around the world together with labor unions, legislators, and the public, "reversing traditional flows of knowledge and assistance" (Smith 2002:12). What Seattle did that was irregular, then, is to use the protest as a sort of symposium. By making the protest itself a school of activism and creating and distributing their own message the Seattle protesters distanced themselves from the way the mass media, the WTO, and government official presented the protesters and their claims.

This framing, though certainly an effort to mobilize activists and the public through information is also an example of action—the second way Seattle differed from past movements. The anti-WTO movements are perhaps most well-known by the popular portrayal of their direct action against signifiers of globalism. Media portrayals of the movement showed activists destroying McDonalds while often ignoring the complexity or totality of their actions or even what began the violence initially. So though "puppet-ganda" and distribution of embargoed Roquefort cheese was less visible to the public as direct protest actions, the public saw plenty of footage of the anarchist groups who destroyed downtown shops—violent actions which occurred only "after the authorities began the cycle of violent confrontation, which escalated into what was essentially a police riot" (Smith 2002:13). This is to say that the action that occurred went well beyond what is often remembered from the event. Since then, Van Aelst and Walgrave argue, every summit of international economic organizations has been protested. Indeed, organizations like the WTO and IMF have created spaces of protest through their use of summits (2002:470).

Here it is important to note several major consistencies between this study and the theoretical underpinnings of the "newest social movements": mass mobilizations of diverse individuals, new sets of relations between protesters and movements, the use of new media in tandem with traditional protest techniques, and different means of action. As will become clearer, these threads run throughout a consideration of Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring, and the Moroccan February 20th movement.

Post-Seattle Protest: The World Social Forum

Darren Hoad (2002), writing about the post-Seattle world, explains that the WTO and other similar groups face a global opposition following the Battle of Seattle in 1999;

after Seattle, he contends, the WTO is not the same. Yet he posits that this is not because

the protests were seen as purely negative; rather, the response was mixed (Hoad 2002).

One notable outcome of the movement is more far-reaching than the state of the WTO

after 1999—The World Social Forum (WSF).

Two months after the Battle of Seattle, protesters traveled to Davos, Switzerland

in the hopes of protesting the World Economic Forum. Yet, due to greater security

protests the size of Seattle were impossible so instead "the idea emerged of organizing a

counter meeting" (Becker 2007:207). The counter meeting was to have three goals:

> (a) The meeting should be held in the global south; (b) it should be called
> the World *Social* Forum; and (c) it should maintain the symbolism of
> meeting at the same time as Davos (Becker 2007:207)

Following the tradition of other "newest" movements, it would bring together diverse

people for diverse aims and, at least nominally, have a nonhierarchical organization. It

was to be not a movement, but, perhaps more aptly, a movement of movements (Becker

2007:206). And their slogan, in contrast to Margaret Thatcher's statement that "There is

No Alternative," was "Another World is Possible" (Becker 2007; Hammond 2006). It

aimed to recognize other non-neoliberal means of realizing a better world by developing

a complex global take on the issues facing the world due to globalization. In other words,

it was designed to be "a meeting of social movement leaders and activists from around

the world that [promoted] the exchange of ideas and strategies for social justice"

(Fernandes 2006:1230). This is primarily achieved through diverse participants, open

dialogue, and a lack of hierarchy.

John Hammond explains the experience of attending the WSF, saying that it is

striking with people "managing to communicate across barriers of language, political

orientation, and issue emphasis" (2006:41). Hammond was not alone in describing this and indeed most called it an overt aim. Jackie Smith writes that the WSF "includes a wide range of organizations, and organizers explicitly seek to avoid exclusionary tendencies and to maximize space for expressions of diversity" (2004:415). Hammond, himself, expresses how central this point was:

> Diversity itself is also a point of unity among participants. They celebrate the fact that the forum brings together so many different people and groups, they proclaim their respect for the varying opinions expressed and for the many cultures visibly present, and they defend the right of all to differ with each other (2006:43).

Marc Becker offers a somewhat enthusiastic portrayal of the diversity within the WSF saying, "participants disposed of hierarchy and privilege as they worked together in a common project to transcend race, class, and gender barriers" (2007:211). However, Becker fails to acknowledge that this diversity also raises problems.

John Hammond and Jackie Smith each examine the ways in which obtaining diversity is made difficult by the very nature of the meeting. Primarily, this results from the fact that being there generally requires a certain socioeconomic status in order to afford the flight (Hammond 2006; Smith 2004). Yet, there is also a gender imbalance where the speakers are primarily men even when the audiences are not, such that talks are often given by men to passive female listeners (Hammond 2006). And, interestingly, Smith considers how being there requires attachment to organizations, such that individuals are excluded (2004). So, certainly there are problems with claims of diversity, but the movement still, just as certainly, brings together an array of activists from various backgrounds, movements, countries, and ideologies.

Next, the movement exhibits similarly diverse aims. This is in part due to the diversity of people, but the WSF also overtly aims to be a space for open dialogue. Smith explains:

> The WSF explicitly rejects a representative role, and it makes no recommendations or formal statements on behalf of participants. It does require that participants adopt a general opposition to neoliberal globalization and a commitment to non-violent struggle. These basic principles have allowed it to include many voices while avoiding major divisions and hierarchies (2004:414).

Thus, the WSF organizes itself such that it does not foreclose on any potential aims or positions, outside of pro-neoliberal or violent ones, that is. Similarly, Becker posits that despite difficulties that arise from having a diversity of participants "that diversity of views and concerns *was* what the WSF was about—the creation of space for social movements to present and debate a broad range of issues" (2007:209). Even if the range of issues was broad the WSF still posited a positive vision of itself as more than just in opposition to neoliberalism and violence (Becker 2007; Smith 2004). As Smith puts it, the WSF was "a response to critics' arguments that 'we know what you're against, but what are you *for*?'" (2004:414). What the WSF was for, in simple terms, was "Another World" like their slogan stated, but what this meant was left open.

Of course, this overarching message too is complicated. Some participants wish that the WSF would come out in favor of a specific program. The complaint, as Becker puts it, is that "the WSF has emphasized reflection, not action" (2007:216). He continues, that the idea was to allow member groups to be programmatic while the WSF remained merely a space for dialogue (Becker 2007). Hammond argues that this internal debate may stem from two different understandings of the State: first, if the State is powerful then the WSF should be proactive and therefore political and second, if the State is no

longer the most powerful institution then the forum and civil society "should steer clear of overtly political actions" (Hammond 2006:47). In either case, tension exists within the WSF about whether a more political route should be taken.

Last, the movement aims to have a nonhierarchical structure stemming from its diversity of participants and diversity of aims, which—as in the other two areas—is only sometimes successful. In a quote from Jackie Smith given above, she explains that diversity of participants has made it possible to avoid hierarchy and division, but she continues that "recent experiences suggest that the WSF might be outgrowing this organizing formula" (2004:416). Indeed, both Hammond (2006) and Becker (2007) point out that some activists call the meeting's organization "top-down", as it lacks transparency and, sometimes at least, an open decision making process. This, Hammond explains, is changing. But both explain that trying to model direct democracy on this scale is difficult; thus to some degree the problem is not ideological—most want a more democratic organization—but logistical—"the forum bursts at the seams" (Hammond 2006:44). Yet, for a movement to be global it must be large, therefore, this challenge will likely remain. Smith explains that some steps have made this problem less apparent, however. The emergence of more regional social forums makes organization more possible and, as Hammond explained, the forum has reformed and decentralized its structure (Hammond 2006; Smith 2004).

This meeting, which took up the themes prevalent in the Battle of Seattle, continues today. Yet, these themes are evident elsewhere in globalized mobilizations and individual movements. Among these global mobilizations related to "newest" movements are the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street.

Occupy Wall Street

Though this does not strictly follow the chronology of events, next I will consider Occupy Wall Street (OWS) due to its clear connection to the Seattle tradition *vis a vis* its anti-neoliberal rhetoric and Western, urban setting. Yet, its connectivity to the Arab Spring is worth independent consideration, which it will be afforded. Thus, OWS will be examined in light of its continuity with Seattle as well as with the Arab Spring.

What began in the minds of several magazine editors quickly became a protest movement, which swept through first the US and then a multitude of foreign countries. This international occupation follows in the ideological footsteps of Seattle in that it is anti-neoliberal and uses new media but somewhat unlike those found in Seattle, its participants and their ideologies occupy contradictory and contingent spaces.

To begin, new media is a clear line of connection between Seattle and OWS with much of the mobilization occurring through formal and informal means. In regard to OWS's use of the media Craig Calhoun (2013) writes "it was always at least in part a dramatic performance before audiences and cameras" (32). Calhoun agrees with Gitlin that much of OWS's sustenance as a movement was drawn from the presence of media (Calhoun 2013:32; Gitlin 2013). Social media in this case served mostly to inform mainstream media, which in turn informed the general public though certainly social media also reached an audience of its own (Calhoun 2013). Gitlin also identifies that social media and independent OWS media was helpful in terms of showing the violent techniques used by the police, including, perhaps most famously at University of California at Davis where police in riot gear pepper sprayed students peacefully protesting on the ground (2013:13). That picture and those like it circulated widely, moving from new media to established media, thus garnering increased mainstream

support for OWS. As Gitlin puts it, OWS captured the "indispensable commodity of contemporary culture: attention" (2013:13). Here then is one thread that runs consistently between Seattle and OWS, though the actual ideological foundation is also intimately connected to that tradition.

Occupy Wall Street in its simplest instantiation is a movement fundamentally opposed to the economic and social inequality bred by neoliberalism. Yet within this ideological foundation is a unique space for identity formation. Put another way, though OWS focuses on socioeconomic issues it encompasses more than the typically anti-globalization or anti-neoliberal movements by becoming a definitive identity. Most of the initial members of OCS "were anarchists and democratic radicals, desirous of reorganizing social decisions around directly democratic, 'horizontal' assemblies," but this movement caught on as this core put itself in opposition to American capital, which had simultaneously safeguarded itself while causing massive economic inequality (Gitlin 2013:6). Todd Gitlin (2013) in his article "Occupy's Predicament: the Moment and the Prospects for the Movement" makes the simple claim that Occupy Wall Street is, at its very root, about identity. Gitlin continues that the core of anarchists and left-wingers whose own roots harkened to the Seattle anti-WTO tradition create a single-minded thrust—"stop plutocracy"—while also creating and affirming a "communal self" (Gitlin 2013:9). More simply, the political edge was clearly anti-neoliberal but the movement was also a community and an identity unto itself.

Yet, interestingly, within this movement-as-identity there are also contingencies and contestations of identity. This does not indicate a demographic diversity necessarily since, as Gitlin (2013) points out, the movement struggled with its majority whiteness

and the place of women and transgendered people, though it does seem to indicate an ideological diversity. Gitlin explains:

> It brought hard-core activists—anarchists, revolutionaries, drifters, homeless people, foreclosed and indebted people, desperate people, reformers of many stripes—together with a myriad of allies. These were people who wanted a community, a new start, a society in secession or a society somehow of their own (Gitlin 2013:14).

This played out clearly in the signs of those present which represented their own personal reason to occupy which Gitlin includes prominently in his article. Yet, this diversity is also noticeable in literature that seeks to explain occupy. For instance, the book *The Occupy Movement* (2013) includes articles by various authors with titles like: "the Occupy Movement is a Patriotic Protest Against Greed and Corruption" or OWS is "Being Fueled by Government Demagoguery" and OWS is "Based on Anarchist Principles"(Anon 2013). While more can probably be said about the diversity of people and ideas that all found fertile ground in the OWS movement, there is similarly something to be said for the connectedness of this movement—including this identitarian phenomenon—with another international mobilization: the Arab Spring. Thus, in the analysis to follow of Morocco's February 20th movement it is important to keep in mind these ideological forbearers.

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring follows in the tradition of post-Seattle protest with many of the same characteristics. However, to begin, I will briefly consider the major explanations offered for the Arab Spring. Jack Kalpakian, in his article "Between Reform and Reaction: The Syrian and Moroccan responses to Arab Spring," outlines the four main strains of literature concerning the Arab Spring: analysis of economic and technological causes, the role of external actors, country-specific analyses, and normative analyses (e.g.

arguments for anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist, liberal, Islamist, etc. views of the phenomenon). Of the first type of analysis, that of causes, most look at "economic failure, the rise of the internet and the level of repression by the government" (Kalpakian 2013:5). I will consider this issue primarily in terms of how new media is discussed in relation to the Arab Spring. As for the following three strains of thought I will examine the Morocco-specific literature on the topic and will look at various ideological takes on the subject. Indeed, my own work reads the movement as a model for community-based protest, falling, perhaps, into a normative analysis. Yet, I will not delve too deeply into the conversation around external forces as it is not within the scope of my project. Moreover, I will look at the continuation of trends through the post-Seattle tradition.

Like Occupy Wall Street, the Arab Spring was indicative of a broad reaching mobilization. As such, the first consideration here is the Arab Spring's far reach. Yet, it shares a second similarity with OWS: its relation to the Seattle WTO tradition. The diverse population of protesters, the complex relationship between protester, movement and government, and the use of new technology all seemingly indicate some continuity from Seattle to the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street today.

The Reach of the Arab Spring

Nothing quite captures how widespread protest was throughout the world more than the *Time* magazine person of the year in 2011: the Protester. Kurt Andersen, author of the *Time* article, writes that protest was everywhere: in Tunis and Cairo, Madrid and Athens, Tel Aviv and Moscow. And in each of these places it is "remarkable how much the protest vanguards share," making similar claims about government corruption, economic inequality and dysfunction. Another piece by Ronald Greene and Kevin Kuswa gives the concrete example of an Arab Spring protester, Asmaa Mahfouz, who made a

video plea for a protest in Tahrir Square which soon became emblematic of the Arab Spring in Egypt and who later found herself giving a teach-in at OWS. The point being that these protests did not remain firmly in place just as "the rhetoric of the Arab Spring did not remain exclusively Arab, nor did the rhetoric of Occupy Wall Street stay on Wall Street" (Greene and Kuswa 2012:272). Beyond the language, even the idea of massing in one location spread from the Arab Spring to OWS (Kriesberg 2012:89). Rather than remaining a regional phenomenon, the Arab Spring and its ideology, its location, and its language spread.

It is interesting to note that this notion of a movement's "diffusion" from one country to another fits Della Porta and Tarrow's framework explicitly (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Frédérick Volpi contends that the dispersion evidenced by the Arab Spring indicates a sort of "contagion effect" that primarily appears regionally (2013:969). Jacqueline and Shereen Ismael agree, expressing the existence of "true 'regional' solidarity" within the Arab Spring (2013:235). This effect is "linked to shared socio-economic and political plights in the region" such that circumstances regionally determine whether a protest spreads (Volpi 2013:969). From there though, if the instance of social protest increase, there is a domino effect or multiplication of protests that increase awareness of the movement as well as foster a sense of normalcy "of political contestation" (Volpi 2013:980). Louis Kriesberg explains this dynamic in his article, "Reverberation of the Arab Spring", explaining that the reverberations or the diffusion of a movement often happens historically from student occupations at Columbia University to the Prague Spring's conflict with Soviet forces. Kriesberg explains "a powerful expression of outrage and a cry for change, particularly if it is effective, gives hope to

other people who feel some of the same grievances" (2012:88). This diffusion is constitutive of the Arab Spring mobilizations but it does not mean that the Arab Spring can be easily understood as one absolute phenomenon throughout the region; rather each country was unique (Kriesberg 2012; Volpi 2013). Thus, while certainly there was a regional character, this character did not hamper the Arab Spring's diffusion.

Diversity Within the Arab Spring

While diffusion in one sense certainly refers to the Arab Spring's spread and influence throughout the world, the Arab Spring is also notable for its diffuse population within the movement. Just as the Battle of Seattle brought a diversity of people together, so too do movements like Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring movements were composed and defined by their complex assortments of protesters, just like other "newest" movements. Contrasting ideological, political, and religious categories exist within movements and thus among protesters, maintaining the diverse populations that are one hallmark of this phenomenon (Calhoun 2013; Gitlin 2013). From Islamists to feminists (Salime 2012) to rowdy soccer players (Dorsey 2012) the protesters of the Arab Spring brought different backgrounds, skills, and opinions to the movement. In order to redefine the region's political future the country specific protest movements brought together "participants representing liberals and leftists, Islamists, nationalists, and elements of contested regimes" (Ismael and Ismael 2013:230). These modern Arab movements are dynamic and represent those things the autocratic regimes of the region and other attempts for reform lack—the protesters' youth, populism, and democratic tendencies (Ismael and Ismael 2013). This, Volpi argues, represents a challenge to common assumptions about the need for a political vanguard in revolutions. Within the Middle East this quite notably indicates a

turn away from the assumption of Islamist-only revolution (Volpi 2013:990). However,

even if there was not the expected political vanguard there was an obvious core in most

movements:

> The first days of protest in each country were organized by a core group of literate, middle-class young people who had no particular affinities with any existing political parties or any ideologies stressing class struggle, religious fundamentalism, or pan-Arab nationalism (Howard and Hussain 2011:48).

Yet, another oft-studied trait adds a minor consideration to this diversity: the use of new

technology implies literacy and wealth which make it merely a "niche tool" (Ismael and

Ismael 2013:234). Thus, the issue of a diversity among protesters reaches many identity

categories elsewhere excluded while potentially also foreclosing on access to others.

New Technology in the Arab Spring

Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain consider the role of digital media in the

Arab Spring succinctly, saying:

> There are many ways to tell the story of political change. But one of the most consistent narratives from civil society leaders in Arab countries has been that the Internet, mobile phones, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter made the difference this time (2011:35).

Indeed, they are right that the extent to which technology shaped the Arab Spring is often

considered in the literature on the topic and, just as often, it is touted as the single factor

that led the Arab Spring to be so widespread.

Yet, Jacqueline and Shereen Ismael urge a more measured understanding of its

usefulness. The protests use of technology "should not be overstated," they argue (Ismael

and Ismael 2013:233). Kalpakian agrees that the literature does not support a causal

relationship between technology and the protests; rather, "they argue that the new internet

social media made it possible for the revolutionaries to mobilize public opinion and

spread their dissident ideas and messages" (Kalpakian 2013:5). Khondker argues something similar, saying technology's importance has been exaggerated. He uses the example of an Egyptian cyber activist, Wael Ghonim, who told CNN that "If you want a free society just give them internet access," as well as the parent who named his daughter Facebook in light of how that social network affected the Arab Spring, yet, both are, to him at least, overstatements of the effects of new media (CNN Wire Staff 2011; Khondker 2011:676).

That being said though, social media and technology more generally filled a gap left by passive traditional media sources (Howard and Hussain 2011). As was the case in past protests, the Arab Spring used new media to report on things that the media would not or could not report on. And, further, this new media enabled mobilization and communication as would typically be expected in a social movement. So, it was not just filling a gap left behind but also filling a typical, necessary requirement for organizing and mobilizing. It is important to note that "they were a tool" through which the movement disseminated its grievances, organized, mobilized, and informed, but it was not, in fact, the cause of protest (Ismael and Ismael 2013:233).

New technology is likewise not only a tool for good, rather it is also used by repressive government forces (Ismael and Ismael 2013:234). Relatedly, some sites, like Facebook, do not make allowances to protect users in authoritarian States, such that these states can use new media as yet another new form of repression and co-option (Howard and Hussain 2011). This may be due to government's overestimation of the importance of new media in the Arab Spring. Amy Austin Holmes, in her article "There Are Weeks When Decades Happen," explains that according to the Arab Social Media Report only

5.5% of the Egyptian population used Facebook and only .15% used Twitter, yet the regime shutdown the internet and cell phones. This, she argues, suggests that "the Mubarak regime credited social media with as much influence as outside observers did" (Austin Holmes 2012:402). Similarly, in Tunisia the government attempted to "ban Facebook, Twitter, and video sites such as DailyMotion and YouTube," but in a few days people found a way around this ban as texting and cell phones generally became the tool of choice (Howard and Hussain 2011:37). This was, in fact, a better course as "less than 20 percent of the population actively used social media," as in Egypt, "but almost everyone had access to a mobile phone" (Howard and Hussain 2011:37). So, regimes seemingly associated social media and new technology more broadly with the instigation of the movements.

Technology and Social Media companies have also touted themselves as partially responsible for the protests, leading some companies to release new tools that this population eagerly used (Howard and Hussain 2011). Likewise, media sources like *Newsweek* and *Time Magazine* published articles specifically considering how social media, especially Facebook, had influenced the Egyptian protests. Even scholars have similarly, and as enthusiastically, explored this link in popular literary accounts. [1]

However, it is important to note that technological use in movements is hardly new. Cassette tapes played a role in the Iranian revolution, fax machines were used in anti-Soviet protests, and more recently the internet has been used by the Zapatista movement in Mexico (Ismael and Ismael 2013; Kahn and Kellner 2004). And, as Khondker explains, new media has been widely used since the beginnings of the 20th

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[1] See (Nunns, Idle, and Soueif 2011)

century (Khondker 2011). Technology is a tool and indeed this tool was well used within the Arab Spring, but it is neither the single defining factor of the movement nor an indication of its novelty.

Organization of the Arab Spring

Another trend within post-Seattle protests is their nonhierarchical organization, which several scholars identified within the Arab Spring. Explaining the difference between the Arab Spring and more "'traditional' democratic transitions and revolutions" is the Arab Spring's "unplanned, spontaneous political transitions" as well as the fact that "they are not ideologically and politically organized" (Volpi 2013:971). Volpi continues that this shows a change in the reliance on ideological vanguards as well as a shift in the way dialogue occurs between regimes and movements. For some scholars, this might have led directly to the movement's success (Ismael and Ismael 2013). What made the ouster of political leaders and democratic reform possible, it seems, "was [the movement's] clear lack of formal organization and its character as a highly decentralized mass opposition, united only by its zeal and desire to see political change" (Ismael and Ismael 2013:234). In both cases what is identified is at once a shift from other revolutions in these countries and the use and usefulness of this decentralized organization.

Morocco's Arab Spring

Ultimately, the particular context I mean to extend this analysis to is Morocco's February 20th Movement. Though Morocco is not often mentioned in analyses of the Arab Spring, the Moroccan protests, like these parallel movements, saw an extension of the trends identified among the "newest movements". Despite the little English-language scholarship on this topic there are a few sources worth consideration.

For instance, Jack Kalpakian uses Morocco as a foil in his analysis of different understandings of the Arab Spring. To begin, he lays out the circumstances in Morocco. He outlines a series of contextual problems for Morocco: human rights abuses, corruption, unemployment, and low literacy. For instance, though the Moroccan economy has steadily improved, unemployment remains a major problem especially for the young and the well-educated. In fact, Morocco's unemployment problem "increases with the level of education" (Kalpakian 2013:10). He continues: "in specific terms, one in eight university graduates is unemployed which is difficult for a country where the number of illiterate people exceeds forty percent of the population" (Kalpakian 2013:10). And, as in the Arab Spring movements generally, the core of these movements are often young, educated people, who are, in Morocco, likely unemployed.

Yet, new media is also a factor in Morocco's movement. Kalpakian explains that Morocco's relative freedom to use the internet opened a space for the oppositionist movement, the February 20th movement, to call for democratic changes (Kalpakian 2013). Frédérick Volpi, who writes about the Maghreb—Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—also acknowledges Moroccan's abilities to use the Internet, social media, and new technology widely. They used these technological sites to organize themselves as well as to enter into dialogue about their aims for Morocco: dialogues that continue on their Facebook and YouTube accounts (Kalpakian 2013). Yet, while the message on these sites is clearly for greater freedom and a more democratic government "they differ in terms of how to proceed, with some favoring a constitutional monarchy, others favoring a more radical change, and still others favoring a number of forms of Islamism"

(Kalpakian 2013). New media enabled dialogue and organization but the movement still did not have an established political program, as Kalpakian indicates.

Another factor Kalpakian analyzes is the presence of a large Moroccan community abroad. He explains that there are two or three million Moroccans living outside of Morocco who send upwards of three billion Euros worth of remittances back to Morocco each year (Kalpakian 2013). Citing De Haas (2005), Kalpakian explains this money is crucial to the functioning of the Moroccan economy (2013). Yet, he goes onto say that beyond economics, this community is important because Moroccans in Morocco believe countries abroad to "have ideas and models that can help improve circumstances in Morocco itself" (Kalpakian 2013:12). This attachment to non-Moroccan ideology, he continues, may explain a piece of why the movement came about.

Primarily, though, Kalpakian latches onto an area familiar to discourse surrounding Morocco: how reform prevented Morocco from following Egypt or Tunisia into full revolution. The protests enacted by the February 20th movement brought demonstrations to 53 cities and towns in Morocco with "significant" numbers continuing for several months (Kalpakian 2013:13). Like other protests in the tradition of the Battle of Seattle, these protests brought together a diverse collection of Moroccans, "groups of Islamists, Liberals, Leftists, and Constitutionalists," who came from many walks of life (Kalpakian 2013:13). And then the protests slowed, though they have not yet ended. Quite simply, this is, in Kalpakian's analysis, due to rapid governmental reforms. This occurred in two ways: first, the King spoke on March 9th of 2011 promising reforms and, second, a new anti-corruption law was adopted and a new constitution was drafted. And, in these areas, the movement failed, Kalpakian explains. The movement refused to

participate in the referendum for the constitution and did not take part in the dialogue surrounding it. Moreover, the movement lost its allies in the Leftist and Islamist movements as a result. Though the reforms were touted as impressive, he explains that the transition was not bloodless, with about 11 deaths and many injuries. Volpi points out that the February 20th movement did not purely bring about these reforms though. The King's control of the multiparty system allowed him to set the reforms not outside agitators (Volpi 2013). This, he thinks, is evidence of actions the kings had already begun before this wave of protestation even occurred.

These responses are somewhat different from two other scholars on this point, however. Aziza Zemrani and Cynthia Lynch argue that post-2011 "Morocco now meets the established criteria for a structural democracy" with its "free, fair elections," multiple political parties, "popular representation," separations of power, and "individual, rights, liberties and freedom" (2013:11). These scholars argue that Morocco represents evolution far more than revolution after the Arab Spring. Volpi disagrees with some of those specific claims explaining that Morocco has "complex networks of royal influence" that permeate the "fragmented multiparty system" (2013:977). This in turn, leads to the king's ability to limit the powers of other branches of government without "having to rely directly on repression" (Volpi 2013:977). As such their claim that Morocco is a full structural democracy is perhaps overly enthusiastic.

Conclusion: Trends of the "Newest" Protests

The protests analyzed in the literature reviewed here all share certain similarities, which will be borne out in the theory and research to follow. Primarily, these "newest" movements share a diversity of protesters, an atypical organization, and the use of new technologies. Of course, there are other trends that appear in this literature—for instance

the use of new direct actions and nonspecific aims—that will find consideration later, but these three traits are the most evident in the literature. And, importantly, they are examined in the sources that consider the Moroccan example.

CHAPTER 4:

WHATEVER IS TO COME: PROTEST AND COMMUNITY

I have been using the term coming movements to describe the most recent spate of social movements. The name comes from an interpretation of these movements as examples of Giorgio Agamben's "Coming Community," yet I agree with commentator Richard Day that his theory is incomplete within even the framework Agamben himself constructs. Thus, I will consider how, in Day's conception, the logic of affinity with "groundless solidarity" and a program of "infinite responsibility" can fill the gaps in Agamben's theoretical framework. Yet, I will also argue that Day and Agamben are doing slightly different work than I am, such that I will construct an interpretation of what a "coming movement" would look like based on these theories. What follows, then, is a theoretical framework for these "coming movements" with regard to their emancipatory possibilities, anti-hegemonic organization, and unspecified aims.

Movements

Before beginning, however, it is pertinent to consider a single linguistic complication in my work: the multiple potential definitions of "movement." In examining this notion, I hope to explain why I make certain argumentative and linguistic choices in the section that follows.

Following Richard Rorty's analysis in *Achieving Our Country* (1998*)*, I use the term "movement" in two different senses. Where he draws a distinction between movements and campaigns, I claim that in some instances a mobilization can be both. To begin, he analyzes what he terms campaigns. Earlier I discussed a variety of protest

movements, by which I meant individual mobilizations, or campaigns in Rorty's terminology. Rorty explains that "by campaign" he means "something finite, something that can be recognized to have succeeded or to have, so far, failed" (1998:114). To Rorty, a focus on campaigns avoids immanent teleology, turning instead to a gradual account of forward movement, but does so without relying on something as nebulous and essentialized as God or Nature (1998:123). The measure for Rorty becomes whether a campaign "did some good" rather than if it aligns with evaluative criteria such as the forward progress of history (Green 2008; 1998:123). Given this, Rorty's ideal form of action is "conscious and willed, rather than semiconsciously endured" and takes into account the fact that much progress is at least partially an effect of chance, so that to speak of inevitable progress is misleading (Rorty 1998:122–123). For Rorty, at least, campaigns escape the universalizing bent of movements.

However, movement has a grander meaning, wherein they are large and amorphous, they "neither succeed nor fail," and they assume that "things will be changed utterly, that a terrible new beauty will be born" (Rorty 1998:114–5). Similarly, though, they are related to campaigns in that members of movements can see campaigns for their immediate goals while also realizing they are a part of something much larger—a movement (Rorty 1998:114). Movements in such a sense are the overarching change within which campaigns with specific, finite goals operate.

Rorty argues for the ultimate hopelessness of movements of this latter sort, supporting instead a multiplicity of campaigns, which, I argue, does not cohere with the analysis that follows. Even so, this distinction is helpful, as my notion of "Coming

Movements" might best be understood as a blurring of this distinction, as will be explained later.

Agamben and the "Coming Community"

Here, then, I will set up the theoretical framework of what I term the "coming movements." First, I will examine Agamben's theoretical foundation, as previous theorists have influenced it. Next, I will examine Agamben's own construction of the "Coming Community," followed by Day's critique of Agamben's thought and, in turn, Day's explanation of a framework that answers such a critique. Lastly, I will consider Day's own additions to this framework.

Why Community?

Agamben's work on the "Coming Community" is first and foremost an ethical project, analyzing how people ought to live together. Yet, he is simultaneously entering into a conversation begun by George Bataille, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Maurice Blanchot, among others, all of whom argue "that communities have always had criteria for belonging and have always organized themselves around these criteria…" (De la Durantaye 2009:159). The crux of all of these theorizations, stemming at first from Bataille, is that the only community that could avoid being co-opted by totalitarian authority would be a community that had no basis for exclusion (De la Durantaye 2009:158–9). It follows, though, that with no basis for exclusion there would similarly be no basis for inclusion. Such a community "could have no set requirements and no condition for belonging" (De la Durantaye 2009:158). Yet, while Agamben is indebted to this tradition, he ultimately diverges in how he argues that such a community might come into being.

It is at this divergence that he formulates the "Coming Community" and more specifically, the means for such a community to exist. Though this will be explored in more detail later, this divergence is primarily characterized by a reconfiguration of the relationship between the particular and the universal.

Whatever Singularity and the Example

The importance of this reconfiguration is perhaps clearest in Agamben's construction of the central notion *whatever*, which forms the basis for his theory of community. *Whatever* is not, as in common parlance, an expression of indifference, but rather quite the opposite. *Whatever*-being is not being such that it does not matter how one is. Rather, *whatever*-being is an expression of "being such that it always matters," wherein being does not relate to common properties, but to "being such as it is" (Agamben 1993:1). Put another way, Agamben asserts that singularities ought to be viewed as singularities rather than the more accepted notion that singularities can only be understood by reference to universality. So, for instance, *whatever*-being understands a particular woman in her particularity rather than in reference to the universal category woman. This is not to say that the universal is replaced by an absence of belonging to a group or category; indeed, it is meant to say that belonging itself is the replacement (Agamben 1993:2). Thus, seeing the particularity in all its specificity is the aim.

Agamben further recognizes that there is a form that can evade the relationship between universal and individual much like *whatever-being*—the example. The example, Agamben explains, is "neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity" (1993:10). Agamben contends that examples show the empty space wherein it is possible to speak without taking on an identity or essential property (1993:11). To some degree, Morocco's February 20th

movement is such an example. It simultaneously typifies the sort of movements I attempt to encompass; yet, it is also a singular instantiation of such movements. Coming movements generally are fundamentally a contestation of the distinction between particular and universal, just as they contest Rorty's particular campaigns and general movements. In another, perhaps more practical sense, examples and *whatever* are played out within movements on an individual, lived level. And it is this practical usage, such as the political usage examined previously, to which Agamben next turns his attention.

Politics of the "Coming Community"

This *whatever* singularity can further be understood in a political sense. As it "is neither universal, and thus enshrined in the 'rights of man', nor particular, and thus able to claim sectional rights" Agamben perceives this *whatever*-being "as marking the possibility of a human community free of any essential condition of belonging, common destiny or work, or principle of inclusion and exclusion" (Whyte 2010:4). *Whatever*-being is, by its very nature, in opposition to identitarian politics that focus on apportioning rights to already constituted constituencies. *Whatever*-being in this political sense contests the notion that identity can be fixed and that it can ever be representative of a group (Whyte 2010:3–5). In his view, the current political schema prevents its subjects from ever being other than they already are by determining the identities that constitute their being. So, as it is, a particular woman can be said to be made up of her constituent identities (e.g. woman, white, heterosexual, etc.). Agamben wishes to problematize this. Here he argues for a self that is no longer natural or sacred, but rather "a pure singularity"—not an instance of a particular identity. And it is this pure singularity that he understands as *whatever* (Whyte 2010:3). *Whatever*-being in this applied sense, thus, means that community through being itself escapes this identity

framework, simultaneously creating a new politics as well as a new understanding of belonging and community, to which I will turn in this section.

Agamben attempts to illustrate his political vision by the use of two examples: Herman Melville's character Bartleby the scrivener and the protests in Tiananmen Square. These two examples show that the root of the "Coming Community's" politics lies in the potential of impotence and a refusal to offer explanations—what I call being unspecified—to be politically useful.

Bartleby the Scrivener

Melville's famous tale about Bartleby the scrivener who "prefers not to" is, to Agamben, an example of pure potentiality—the potentiality not to do. Or, in his words, impotence. Though Agamben only references Bartleby in the last line of the chapter "Bartleby" he explains that he "writes nothing but [his] potentiality to not write" (1993:37). Impotence, or this potentiality "not to," is a blank slate, a state of pure possibility wherein the "Coming Community" can be realized. Furthermore, one might say that *whatever*-being is conditioned on this impotentiality insofar as impotence captures the importance of being without reference to categorization. Yet, if this is the philosophical instantiation, Agamben offers a corollary political instantiation. That is, this refusal to act is mirrored by a refusal to offer a justification for action or inaction. Leland de la Durantaye perhaps best outlines this in his analysis of Agamben's use of Bartleby:

> [Bartleby] does not, in fact, denounce anything. His civil disobedience, if it can even be called that, is a dual disobedience in that he not only prefers not to do what those around him do, he also prefers not to provide what more and more around him demand: an explanation for his singular behavior (De la Durantaye 2009:165).

Agamben seems to latch onto this form of impotence not just as pure potentiality but also a politically efficacious method for change, as in his second example—Tiananmen Square.

Tiananmen Square

Where Bartleby was the literary exemplar and a philosophical account of the potential origins of the "Coming Community", the student protests in Tiananmen Square are instead the political paradigm for resistance. Yet, it is in Bartleby that Agamben sees the beginnings of a radical politics. Put differently, for Agamben "Bartleby was a one-man sit-in of the most radical sort" of which Tiananmen is a larger example (De la Durantaye 2009:171).

Thus, it is not surprising that, as with Bartleby, Agamben was most struck by "the relative absence of determinate contents" in the students' demands at the Tiananmen protests (1993:85). As, he adds, democracy and freedom, though certainly demands, are too generic to constitute a real object for conflict (Agamben 1993:85). This is frustrating to the typical identitarian schema of politics wherein protesters rely on both identity and demands for substance. Indeed, in Agamben's view what occurs is a shift in the loci of politics. He says:

> *The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization* (Agamben 1993:85, emphasis in original).

What the State cannot tolerate, Agamben argues, is a lack of recourse to identity. For the individual is unintelligible to the State without the identity they are subsumed by. Agamben posits that agents of the State do not orient themselves towards particular individuals, but rather whole classes of people (women, the poor, deviants, etc.).

However, when a particular individual or a group refuses to be categorized it frustrates the efforts of the State insofar as it does not fit within their accepted structure. Citing Alain Badiou, Agamben argues that the State is not defined most by the social bonds, of which it might be one, but rather by the unbinding or dissolution of ties, which it prohibits (1993:86). In this case, both Bartleby and Tiananmen are manifestations of this unbinding. Given this, Agamben adds a final striking statement on the State's reaction to this coming together for the "Coming politics," saying "Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear" (1993:87).

Pure impotence in both the form of the potentiality not to and the refusal to voice demands or adhere to the State's identitarian framework is thus the crux of the politics of the "Coming Community." How, then, does such a community form as in Tiananmen? *Whatever*-being. That is, they are united purely by their coming together, by their belonging-itself.

The Anarchist Critique

Agamben's theory is not without critics, yet the critiques offered do not necessarily diminish the theory, but rather build upon it in synergistic ways. Richard Day, one such theorist, offers an anarchist analysis wherein he addresses the potential problems with Agamben's theorization of the "Coming Community." Day's three major critiques of Agamben's theory are as follows: first, a problem of language; second, a problem of theoretical actor; and, third, a problem of the axis of analysis. From there, Day adds an addendum to Agamben's theory based on the logic of affinity.

Language

Day's first critique is taken from Agamben's theory itself and deals with the very notion of a "Coming Community"; that is, the notion of an ultimate, singular community is problematic. The problem that Day recognizes is that Agamben implies that despite the necessary "disparities and lacks of which it is composed, this new mode of association will be totalized at some level" (Day 2005:182). And, indeed, Day seems right to be hesitant here. Agamben's own example of the Tiananmen Square protests is meant to illustrate that the Coming Politics and the "Coming Community" are possible, but it does not seem that he is saying Tiananmen represents the "Coming Community" in its only instantiation, nor even in a fully realized form. For Agamben, Tiananmen is as an example in his sense of the term.

Day continues that Agamben similarly seems to avoid the notion that the "Coming Community" can be complete in that belonging-itself is contingent and continually renegotiated. Indeed, Day writes that "nothing *can be* completed" (2005:182). Put another way, the ability for a community to be a "Coming Community" relies in some regard on its ability to negotiate belonging such that there is always room to include others in this belonging-itself. Otherwise, such a community would be exclusionary and thus not fit Agamben's framework (Agamben 1993:1). Furthermore, rather than even seeking the totalization of the term, Day continues, "we must understand communities as multiplicities that cannot be totalized, as n-dimensional networks of networks that spread out infinitely and are infinitely interconnected" (2005:182). On these two counts, then, Day seems to make the logical linguistic choice to acknowledge this plurality, calling them instead the "Coming Communities."

Actors

On his second point Day focuses on Agamben's understanding that the "Coming Community" is deeply tied to consumer capitalism and that, indeed, those most intimately connected to it will directly bring about the "Coming Community". On this Agamben writes, "Advertising and pornography, which escort the commodity to the grave like hired mourners, are the unknowing midwives of this new body of humanity" (1993:50). Agamben argues in part that what commodity has created is the image of body from behind which the *whatever* body can develop. Though commodification was meant to create a sphere that would operate on the body, instead there is a sphere in front of the body, which has no contact with the body and serves only to free the body to be the body-itself (Agamben 1993:50). However, Day points instead to counter-cultures acknowledging that these populations are already "that which cannot be represented" in a globalizing capitalistic environment (Day 2005:183). Though Agamben maintains that commodification creates something that is not represented, a false body before the body-itself, Day believes that this possibility exists elsewhere. Day concludes that recourse to commodity for emancipation is not necessary. Indeed, his argument is that there can be a multiplicity of identity groups that come to ascribe to *whatever*-being. Put more simply, Day cites Agamben's idea that the Coming Politics will operate between the State and humanity and concludes that this is oversimplified and unnecessarily dichotomous. Surely, he argues, there will be tension within humanity as well. Therefore, for Day, these many different categories—Agamben's emancipated, commodified bodies and Day's counter-cultural identities—will conflict and force identity, even that of belonging-itself, to remain contingent.

Analysis

Similarly, Day argues that given a reconceptualization of Agamben's perceived conflict between the State and humanity it is important to focus on a more complex analysis of these interactions. Insofar as the actors are more complex, so too are the means of understanding the phenomena of the "Coming Communities". Given the global spread of neo-liberalism and its affect on domination and exploitation, "we must keep in mind that it is manifested differently for different identities, at different times and places" (Day 2005:184). In his view, neo-liberalism and its effects are conditional. Day concludes, "a multidimensional analysis of oppression is therefore crucial to any effort to oppose, subvert or offer alternatives to the neoliberal world order" (2005:184). Other theories, for instance Queer theory and feminism, have similarly had to expand their understanding of the nexus of oppression.

Yet, quoting Mohanty, Day continues that even with a complex analysis of oppression and exploitation there ought to be space for solidarity (2005:184–5). While he praises other theories for avoiding the false promise of communities that lack presuppositions altogether, he emphasizes how a community might be formed that shares presuppositions that are unlike those of global neo-liberalism and the system of State actors (Day 2005:185). Such communities would be "changeable and open to *anything* but the emergence of apparatuses of division, capture, and exploitation" (Day 2005:185). Day argues that State actors and neo-liberal doctrine rely on an understanding of community contrary to Agamben in which division is necessitated. So, for example, to be a member of a community in a neo-liberal framework of community relies on a shared property (e.g. nationality, race, religion, fandom). It is this framework, presupposed by neo-liberal doctrine, which is problematic. Arguably, was a neo-liberal actor to adopt an

alternative framework to the typical exclusionary property based concept of community, then such an actor could be included within the coming communities. This is clearly less a critique of Agamben than it is an addition to his theory, wherein Day claims Agamben's analysis does not go far enough and, indeed, that these "Coming Communities" relate to each other in similarly complex ways. As such, he lays out two notions that would develop such a complex addendum to Agamben's work.

An Anarchist Addendum

Day argues that an anarchist perspective offers two ethico-political additions to Agamben's theory: Groundless Solidarity and Infinite Responsibility. Basing these ethico-political commitments off of queer, feminist and indigenous theories, Day believes that these can offer an alternative to arguments for Hegemonic, State-based reform. This alternative he terms the "logic of affinity," as opposed to the "logic of hegemony" that takes either a (neo)liberal or (post)modern guise and hinges on the importance of identity, recognition, and State-centered actions (Day 2001:33). This "logic of affinity" is much like Agamben's "Coming Community" in that it prizes connection and togetherness regardless of identity while attempting to avoid working within or for State power (Day 2001:33). Starting from a point similar to Agamben's—the logic of affinity—Day adds considerations that do more to address the complexities of the pragmatic facet of the pseudo-utopian "Coming Community".

Groundless Solidarity

Groundless Solidarity, in the simplest terms, "means seeing one's own privilege and oppression in the context of other privileges and oppressions, as so interlinked that no particular form of inequality—be it race, class, gender, sexuality, or ability—can be postulated as the central axis of struggle" (Day 2005:18). In Agamben's terms, this might

be best understood as being within neo-liberalism-itself. Or, being-itself as mediated by neo-liberalism. That is, Day asserts that individuals form what he calls a "unity in diversity" that share the experience of having to deal with the effects of neo-liberalism (2005:202). His aim, then, is for this to be the link between coming communities, wherein relationship can be created that "do not divide us into disparate, defenseless subjects begging to be integrated by the dominant order" (Day 2005:202). Where Agamben sees *whatever*-being or being itself as a means of escaping the relationship between singularity and universality, Day here sees Groundless Solidarity as a means of escaping this same relationship only within a specific neo-liberal, hegemonic structure (Agamben 1993:2; Day 2005:202). Thus, Groundless Solidarity in fact adds a level of pragmatism to Agamben's mainly abstract account of interactions between particulars and universals.

Infinite Responsibility

Day's second principle, Infinite Responsibility, "means always being open to the invitation and challenge of another Other, always being ready to hear a voice that points out how one is not adequately in solidarity, despite one's best efforts" (2005:18). He continues, that it is also a matter of acknowledging the incompleteness of your community, and of renegotiating identity to prevent exclusion and oppression (Day 2005:183, 201). Acknowledging this Other means making exist one who cannot exist in order for power to remain unchanged (Day 2005:200). For Day, power itself requires exclusion, and thus the act of including, or even acknowledging, is in fact subversive. Put another way, he might be said to practice radical inclusion. Even "though one cannot hear entirely 'correctly' or completely," this Infinite Responsibility is, like the Tiananmen protests, an example of a community which rejects the presuppositions that lead to

exclusion (Agamben 1993:85; Day 2005:200). As such, this principle fits the very openness that Agamben's "Coming Community" and Coming Politics both necessitate, but once again Day adds a politically efficacious dimension beyond Agamben's initial conceptualization.

Coming Movements

Insofar as Agamben sees the "Coming Community" so nearly realized in the Tiananmen protests, movements such as this seem a good place to begin an analysis of how the "Coming Community" will, in fact, come. Before continuing it is perhaps important to ask what, then, is the position of movements relative to community? Put simply, coming movements are transitional entities; they are the means towards community. Taken another way, coming movements can be understood as an extension of *whatever* into political realms that are not specifically addressed in Agamben's theorization. Where community is a fully realized—if still contingent and evolving— structure, movements instead ready the ground for this realization. Essentially, movements are neither fully complex nor necessarily enduring, where communities attain a modicum of stability in an identity like being-itself. This notion harkens to the earlier analysis of Rorty wherein he argues that campaigns and movements differ. Coming Communities may fit his notion of a movement, where coming movements blur this distinction. Coming movements, as I understand them, need not become communities, but nor do they need to be finite campaigns; rather they can exist as either or both of these. Like Day, I agree that the idea that the "Coming Community" will ever be complete seems ill suited to Agamben's broader philosophy. Thus, when I say that communities can have stability or consistency I mean that their identity is intelligible in a way that identities within movements are not. This will I think become clearer in what

follows. Moreover, Day seems right to emphasize that the plural best expresses Agamben's theory, thus I too use the plural: movements. My conceptualization is perhaps best understood in an analysis of the structure of the identity, leadership, and aims of these Coming Movements, wherein their specific nature becomes clearer.

Identity

Even in Agamben's understanding there is a way in which the State can be fundamentally confounded—unspecificity. By unspecificity I mean the refusal to put into words—to specify—in terms befitting the State structure. Put more simply, Agamben argues that the most powerful challenge to the State is a refusal to specify the terms of protest, and it is this notion that will be a clear tenet of Coming Movements. Within movements though this conception of identity's unspecificity becomes more nuanced. The reason for this complexity is two-fold: first, the substantive value of identity changes, and, second, identity in a Coming Movement rather than a full community is not subsumed as Agamben theorizes.

Both Agamben's understanding that characteristic or defining identity fades away in the "Coming Community" as well as his notion that unspecificity is in direct conflict with the State indicate a path for resistance. As such, Agamben's argument for an identity based on temporal togetherness and on being-itself can epitomize resistance to the State. Insofar as identity comes to lack substantive meaning beyond being-itself, it challenges the notion that identity ought relate to the individual as a characteristic relates to a particular. For example, the identity "woman" is said to relate to the particular woman (e.g. Anne) as a sum to the part, yet, in the coming movements the identity derived from protest will be merely understood as a statement on being. Taking Agamben's example, the unspecificity of Tiananmen confounded the State both because they refused to give

voice to their aims, but also because there was not much to be said about their identity beyond their contingent, temporal state of being in the place of protest (Agamben 1993:87). As Agamben explains, the State cannot tolerate that individuals come to "form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging" (1993:86). This may explain why for example these "newest" protests are often identified by place or date, rather than something more substantive. Take for example, the battle of Seattle or February 20th as opposed to the Montgomery Bus Boycott. It is this temporal characteristic that comes to be the identity of Coming Movements. Yet, it cannot be said to be constitutive of the individuals who participate in the movement, for once the contingent, temporal point has passed such identity loses its substantive meaning. Indeed, in these "newest" movements they name themselves after their finitude.

This is further indicative of a previous point, however. That a presupposition for identity exists, even if it is contingent and to do with belonging, seemingly indicates that coming movements do not fully fit the model for Agamben's "Coming Community". There is a difference between being-itself and the identity given to protests of this type in that being-itself is a primary identity, existing before and in isolation from all other potential identities. Put another way, being-itself seems to mean that identity only has to do with the shared matter of existence or finitude, but temporal togetherness comes about through a set of circumstances which bring together some people under one identity wherein other identities might be subsumed. That these other identities still affect the individual indicates that they are defined by more than just being-itself, even if their participation in coming movements gives a glimpse of the possibility of a true "Coming

Community." Thus, temporal togetherness seems less permanent and more complex than being-itself. While certainly temporal, contingent togetherness can lead to a community based just on being-itself, it still holds a level of identitarian complexity that shows its liminality.

The second, intimately connected complexity has to do with the existence of non-*whatever*-identity. Though in a "Coming Community" being-itself would be the most important and, indeed, only identity category, in a coming movement that transformation has not fully occurred. This, in turn, indicates two things. First, that coming movements are not fully realized communities with *whatever*-identity alone. Second, coming movements are capable of a second form of resistance through inclusivity.

Protesters in coming movements need not fully divorce themselves from identity in the way that Agamben theorizes would happen in a Coming Community. Instead, they take on this emancipatory *whatever*-identity in one specific area—protest. Arguably when these individuals are not protesting they are ascribed identities that they may not shirk. So, while in relation to the coming movement the identity may be unspecified, in other venues like home, school, or work, identity may fit typically within the hegemonic, State framework. Though this might seem to indicate the possibility for overbearing hegemonic identity, it instead can offer a path for resistance.

Indeed, Day seems to anticipate this complexity in his notions of Infinite Responsibility and Groundless Solidarity. The dual concepts might benefit a more inclusive vision of the coming movements insofar as they are capable of taking into account the way outside identities affect the coming movement's unspecified identity. Within coming movements both the ability to see one's position as operating within a

nexus of other oppression and exploitation as well as the ability to be open to challenges from other Others, indicates how those identities not subsumed by the unspecified identity may interact with the unspecified identity (Day 2005:18). Where in the Coming Communities Day argues these two traits mark the contingency and incompleteness of the movement, here they further indicate how those within the coming movement ought to act in regards to those not part of coming movements with typical hegemonic identities. Such identities, he would argue, must be welcome. This, like unspecified identity, can be a form of resistance. Insofar as the logic of hegemony would anticipate an exclusionary policy towards specified identity, that coming movements resist this hegemony through inclusivity is emancipatory.

Leadership

As in regard to identity, unspecificity is a hallmark of leadership in the coming movements. This is most clear in the context of the structural leadership of movements, which resists the hegemonic State structure. Though Agamben does not specifically outline the political power of a leaderless movement, his theory fits well with such a conception. If unspecified identity confounded the State at Tiananmen then the anonymity of a movement without specific leaders would be further confounding to the State. In such a scenario, who speaks for the movement? Who do you silence, arrest, or kill? This, I argue, is clearly as frustrating to the State as an unspecified identity. It is here, then, that the parallels made between the "newest" movements and coming movements become the most logical. As outlined in the previous chapter, a trademark of the "newest" social movements is a horizontal structure and by its nature this too is essential to the coming movements.

It is perhaps easiest to explain this necessary characteristic by opposing it to the vertical or top-down model prevalent in hegemonic conceptions of movement structures. Within a vertical system the movement functions like a State with a governing body. The leadership is clear and decisions are made at the top and travel downward to be acted out. Horizontal organization, on the other hand, "emphasize[s] participation and direct democracy… and privilege[s] consensual decision-making" (Della Porta 2006:141). Another way of thinking of this organization is as governed by the logic of affinity instead of the logic of hegemony. As Day explains:

> This system of networks and popular bases, organized along rhizomatic lines and actively warding off the development of arborescent structures would provide bases for social forces that neither ask for gifts from the State (as in the liberal-democratic new social movements) nor seek State power for themselves (as in classical Marxism) (Day 2001:33).

Within the framework of the coming movements an organization such as this would be important not just to prevent the exclusion and exploitation that comes about from a vertical approach, but also to challenge the logic that creates this exclusion and exploitation to begin with. In this way, leadership in the coming movements models and creates the leadership of Coming Communities.

Aims

The aims of coming movements, like identities and leadership, are primarily an extension of Agamben's claims about how unspecificity can be politically powerful. Writing about Tiananmen his claim is primarily how he was struck by "the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands" (Agamben 1993:85). He moves quickly from the unspecified aims to unspecified identity. Aims themselves seem deserving of individual consideration however. So it is important to consider what unspecificity is in this context. Yet, it is also here that the notion of the coming

movements as somehow both campaign and movement, in Rorty's terms, becomes clearer.

As in the previous forms, unspecified aims challenge the State to deal with the unnamed. But these unspecified aims are further a rejection of the type of democratic liberalism that seeks solutions from within the State. So, while unspecified aims are a form of resistance in themselves, they also indicate that the response must be different. To fit Agamben's theory and to prevent being co-opted by hegemonic regimes, a movement's aims must also be unspecified. However, the aims need not even be substantive. I understand there to be two possible types of unspecified aims. In the first, the aims are not said but still exist and the movement works towards them without naming them specifically. In the second, however, there are not aims rightly understood. There may be amorphous aims, like freedom or democracy, but, as Agamben explains, values like democracy and freedom are too vague to be a real object of a conflict (1993:85). So, while a movement may have specific aims, like greater literacy or equality in education, they need not have any. Within a coming movement what appears most important is a refusal to work within the State's confines of specificity – a "prefer not to."

This is intimately tied to how coming movements can both be movements and campaigns in Rorty's sense of the terms. Coming movements may both seek small changes, like in the first sense of aims, or seek large, structural changes as in the second sense of aims. However, they may also do both. While an unspecified but existent aim may seem to indicate that the protest is a campaign it may not necessarily be that alone. Indeed, just by its unspecificity it challenges the dominant structure that prizes specificity and recourse to the State framework. For example, if the aim of a movement is to

increase the minimum wage it could, in theory, work towards that in an unspecified way. At the same time, though, the refusal to specify the aims, leadership, or identity would challenge the logic of hegemony wherein naming is so important. As such, coming movements seemingly are both campaigns and movements.

To not say who one is, who speaks for you, or what one wants is politically powerful. It problematizes a societal organization that seeks known quantities that can be controlled. Without these, the State loses some of its power. So challenging this specificity, or this need to be named, is a powerful act of resistance. Moreover, though, it can lead to the type of community wherein seeking specified identity would be unintelligible. That is, coming movements such as this can lead to Coming Communities.

Conclusion: From Community to Movement

Giorgio Agamben's concept of the "Coming Community" offers insights into how a society ought to operate to minimize exclusion and oppression, yet its pseudo-utopian framework does not fully explain the steps necessary for this to be realized. Here, then Richard Day's more pragmatic approach is helpful. Yet, even Day does not fully explain the transition from the status quo and the logic of hegemony to a fully realized "Coming Community" or Coming Communities. The answer, I argue is a concept of coming movements, which serve as the transitional vessel between hegemony such as it is and the promise of Agamben's Coming Communities.

CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

The research for my Independent Study primarily employs semi-structured interviews with Moroccan Activists that took place in person, in Morocco. This research aimed to address two central types of questions: first, those dealing with the organization or structure of the movement, such that I could verify my hypothesis that Morocco's February 20th movement fits within the schema of the "newest" movements examined in the literature review, and, second, those which examined the motivations and the goals for the movement in order to see if its goals and organizations identify a different, communitarian thrust to movements. In both cases, I hoped to discover whether these movements fit the global trends identified in my literature view while also discovering if my notion of "coming movements" might be borne out by this research.

Following prescribed ethical standards my research was submitted to and approved by The College of Wooster's Human Subjects Research Committee (HSRC). My application to this body set certain guidelines for the research, namely, the use of pseudonyms in the resulting paper, a consent form specifying the rights of participants, and protections for the anonymity of the participants, including an avoidance of identifying characteristics and the proper storage of original notes and computer files without names or identifying features.

My research underwent a full review with the HSRC due to the politically sensitive nature of my research and the potential risk to participants. Primarily, the committee had three concerns with my research and methodology. First, the committee was concerned about the protection of my participants' identities since, by their nature,

interviews cannot be fully anonymous. Second, and relatedly, the committee was concerned about the risks posed to my participants due to the Moroccan government's history of repression of activists and journalists. There was some concern that the risks of admitting to participating in protests critical of the regime might outweigh any benefits of my study. Third, they worried that recordings of my interviews might further endanger participants for the reasons stated above. Given these criticisms I gave the following rationale for why I had chosen my method and why the risks I acknowledged were warranted. To begin, I believe that I would not have been able to reach this population without in-person contact, as culturally email and Internet communication in general is not as prevalent as in the United States. Quite basically, the Moroccans I tried to contact via email before going did not typically respond. Thus, resting my research on this would have been unwise. Moreover, my lack of language skills would have been a further impediment had it needed to be conducted online, as many Moroccans who speak English cannot write it. Similarly, I worried that using the Internet might unintentionally exclude those without regular access. As for the risk, I chose this methodology in part because there is also risk involved in online communication, a topic that came up in this and my past research in Morocco (Spring 2013). In-person interviews had the benefit of allowing activists to use their knowledge of where they were safe to speak to me to ensure their own safety.

As for the committee's main concern about the political sensitivity, in the minds of most Moroccans the February 20th movement is long over and has not been a threat since 2011. And indeed my questions were not politically sensitive in nature. My research has less to do with any critique of the King and more to do with how they chose

to organize, what their rhetoric was, and what their motivations were. Though I did hear criticism of the regime and King, I made it clear that that was not my purpose. The HSRC approved this research with one stipulation—that audio and visual recordings not be made of the interviews. This did not seem to be much of a barrier for my research so I agreed. As a result, however, in the results chapter of this paper there are very few direct quotations, as I only quoted those words that I took pains to get down exactly and then double-checked with my participants. As such, all research was conducted in accord with these agreements with the HSRC and the standards I set in my application to them.

Given this, all of my participants were informed of the ethical standards I would adhere too, as documented in the consent form found in Appendix I of this project. Moreover, they were independently informed during the interview of their right to stop participating at any point as well as their right to change or rescind anything they shared in their interviews. Due to local standards of research only verbal consent was given.

My research consists of ten semi-structured interviews that took place individually or in pairs in Morocco. All but one of these interviews occurred in the capital, Rabat. Moreover, all but one occurred in-person, while the exception occurred via Skype. Eight of these interviews occurred in English while the others occurred in French and Moroccan Arabic respectively. In instances such as these, other participants served as translators. I employed a snowball sample, wherein the research began with one activist, the "gatekeeper", who was known from my previous research in Morocco in the spring of 2013. This "gatekeeper" introduced me to other activists in informal settings, but also within the confines of the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH), or, in English, the Moroccan Association of Human Rights. From these initial meetings I made

further contacts. I also initiated two interviews with past research participants also from spring 2013.

Most interviews occurred in a single session with the exception of the "gatekeeper" whose interviews took place on three separate occasions. Interviews typically spanned lengths of 15 minutes to two hours, though the "gatekeeper's" interviews were nearly 6 hours long combined. Interviews occurred primarily in public cafes or the AMDH headquarters, however, four interviews occurred, at least partially, while walking. I have found that in Morocco a walking interview is often the best option for those who feel like they might be overheard in other interview settings. Due to this and to the stipulation that recordings not be made, my research is based off of notes taken during the interview when possible or directly after as in the case of walking interviews.

My sample consists of ten participants ranging in age from 20 years old to mid-40's with three women and seven men. All participants identify as associated with the February 20th movement and half of this sample is associated with the organization AMDH. Given this population, there are four potential concerns about my sample—their age, educational level, location, and political ideology.

First, the February 20th movement is largely identified as a youth movement, having started on social networking sites before spreading to the streets, yet my sample is on average older than those who participated. Four of my participants are approximately under the age of 30 while the movement by most accounts was peopled primarily by teens and college students (El Idrissi 2012; Lalami 2011a, 2011b). This is likely due to the link between my participants and AMDH. Indeed, three of the participants mentioned above were found elsewhere and the other participant had only a tenuous link to the

organization. This seems to indicate that the sample might not best represent the views of the young people who were the majority in the movement. However, this is due to the complexities associated with identifying participants in a largely dormant movement. Many activists were absorbed by organizations like AMDH and keep it alive in this official venue, yet, the people absorbed were primarily those old enough and with enough education to offer the organization technical skills. As such, the most easily identified block of activists is older than is typical, a point which I will keep in mind in the analysis to follow.

Similarly, my sample is skewed in favor of the well educated. This, in turn, has two causes. First, due to my lack of language skills the majority of participants spoke English. While at least one participant was self-taught, the majority acquired their language skills through their studies. Moreover, two participants were college professors implying further education. Second, working at AMDH requires certain technical skills—languages, computer skills, etc.—that necessitate some higher education. In Morocco, as is often the case in America, higher education also indicates a certain socioeconomic status. However, it was unclear to me in all but one case what the socioeconomic status might be of my participants, as I did not obtain their self-reported socioeconomic class or income. As such, I cannot know conclusively whether my sample is similarly skewed in this regard. It is also important to acknowledge that though my sample may be skewed towards a higher level of education in comparison to the Moroccan population at large, according to my participants the movement itself is similarly skewed towards the well-educated.

Location, too, is a concern within my research. As the connections I established during my study abroad in the spring of 2013 were focused in Rabat, my research similarly was focused on this urban center. Thus, while the movement had a presence in rural areas and in urban areas elsewhere in the country my research can truly speak only to the experience of the movement in Rabat. Though I had one participant from Casablanca, his interview alone is not enough to know with certainty what the situation in Casablanca was or whether it was markedly different. Regardless, my research lacks the perspective of the many rural and regional centers beyond the small area of Casablanca and Rabat. This was the result of three practical considerations. First, as the capital, Rabat was the symbolic heart of the movement as well as the place where international attention was focused. As the seat of government, the city was often considered, sometimes unwillingly, as a model for the movement in the rest of the country. Second, my contacts were located in Rabat. Without them, I likely would have faced more barriers in accessing this population. Third, given time and monetary constraints it was more practical to examine one city's relationship to the movement in-depth than to travel throughout the country in order to witness the breadth of the movement. As will become clearer, this was ultimately a complication for drawing definitive conclusions, but did allow for a much more thorough examination of one way the movement was lived out.

Lastly, there is the question of a bias in political ideology present because of my use of AMDH and my inability to contact members of the Islamist groups present in the protest. Though I received conflicting reports, some participants expressed that AMDH is skewed towards a leftist political ideology and in the past harbored socialist and far-left activists targeted by the previous King, Hassan II. Whether or not these claims are true, I

can say with certainty that none of my participants identified as Islamists, or as members of either of the two most populous Islamist groups in the movement. So, while the degree to which my data is biased towards a leftist perspective may be hard to determine it is clear that I was not able to represent all viewpoints from the movement. Quite simply, this is the result of an inability to get in touch with members of either of the two largest Islamist groups. Even so, I tried to represent those who I could contact and interview, focusing especially on those who did not identify with any organization or political party, interviewing three such participants.

In the analysis that follows I will keep these concerns in mind while similarly considering how the make-up of my sample might effect my findings in ways outside the scope of the considerations above.

CHAPTER 6:

RESULTS: FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION

Previously I have examined the historical and ideological underpinnings of recent global mobilizations, but in this chapter, I hope to go further, examining my research's position within this discourse. Here, I will examine how the Moroccan example tracks onto my construction of coming movements. As in the theory chapter previously, I will pay special attention to identity, leadership, and aims, but I will also consider the specific outcomes and how State violence, as considered by Agamben, may fit the lived experience of those within coming movements. Morocco, then, is a sort of litmus test for my theoretical foundation. At root, this chapter is a study of whether this movement represents enough of a shift from typical conceptions of movements to warrant this new understanding. Through this analysis, I will conclude that community-based models for protest such as mine, Agamben's, and Day's explain the most recent protest movements more fully than other understandings of these movements can.[2]

Identity: Unspecified and Radically Inclusive

For most of the Moroccans I interviewed, the February 20th movement made apparent the complex identities that composed Morocco's civil structure. Furthermore, for most, the movement made visible people who are typically invisible to Moroccans with wealth, power, and connections. Though I never asked for self-reported income or

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[2] As detailed in the methodology section previously, all names have been changed for the protection of my participants.

socioeconomic class, based on how my respondents identified their jobs and their position in the protest I feel confident that all were at least middle class in Moroccan society. Soukaina, a young woman who attended one of the elite French schools in the Rabat area while the movement was occurring, explained how the movement made her realize her own privileged position. At school, she said, "people had a lot to gain from the system" and she never really heard about protests or discontent with the government. Indeed, many of her classmates' parents worked for the regime, benefiting from the status quo. Yet, the media attention centered on the movement made her "start paying attention," joining Twitter to follow the movement more closely. Online she realized that she "was separated from the real Morocco" or the socioeconomic, ethnic, and ideological complexity of her country. Having been surrounded by primarily wealthy, well-connected, and educated Moroccans, her realization amounted to acknowledging that she was in fact in the ruling minority. Yet, it is interesting that she chose to consider this complex idea of the Moroccan population "real" rather than that population she found herself a part of. Given this realization of sociopolitical distance, she, like so many young people, started reaching out to people active in the movement online via Twitter and Facebook. However, her parents were distrustful of the movement, claiming that the protests were dangerous. Thus, she hid her participation. She described how she would leave her house under the pretext of doing college applications and travel to join the February 20th protests in the heart of Rabat.

Soukaina's story, like many others, illustrates the two basic tenets of identity in a coming movement—unspecificity and inclusivity. First, unspecificity in terms of identity indicates that identity in a State-focused, nominal understanding is not the aim. Rather,

some form of being-itself, some way of avoiding ascribed value and meaning is what identity ought look like. In this sense, identity has to do with the loss of external identities and with being exposed to the Other, rather than of gaining something specific from coming together. The second tenet, inclusivity, indicates that coming movements might offer one area where other typically hegemonic identities do not exist, or at least are subsumed by other radical, unspecified identities. In this sense, people who otherwise would not relate due to ideological barriers can come together and, in doing so, challenge the barriers that typically keep them separated. Or, in another sense, inclusivity merely means that temporal identities in coming movements give people one venue where alternative, contrasting identities can be ignored. In each sense, there is evidence that Morocco's February 20th movement might fit this structure.

In Soukaina's case, as in others, the reality is that both occurred. Even in this short explanation of her experience with the movement, Soukaina describes coming together with people from other backgrounds for this one purpose. This seems to exemplify that in this one arena a new February 20th identity based on circumstance and the sublimation of other identities came about. At the same time, those people who were a part of this new identity represented very different life experiences. As much as is possible I will attempt to look at these two tenets in isolation to make clearer the dual nature of the movement, I will also examine the ways this movement does not perfectly fits such a structure.

Circumstance and Temporal Togetherness

To begin, some participants easily identified that it was circumstance more than anything that made the movement occur; that their temporal togetherness is what gave a name and a sense of unity to what would otherwise be a ragtag group of protesters. I have

given some thought before to the notion that naming based on time—dates typically—might indicate something interesting about the nature of these movements, so that is where I will begin.

Another participant, Simo, gave an account of the name or date as it related to the movement's identity. The movement already existed before there was a name, he explained. Given the circumstances in Egypt and Tunisia, Moroccans had begun discussing, primarily on Facebook, the problems with the Moroccan government and the similarities between Morocco and these other countries. Then, though, seemingly imperceptibly the movement changed from a series of grievances online to a movement, which wanted to act through physical protest. In each of my interviews, I was unable to ascertain what exactly demarcated this shift from online presence to a movement in the streets. I suspect that the explanation relies on the Facebook groups choosing a certain date, which then became a call—this time on YouTube—for protests in the streets across Morocco. Simo continued, that the date was chosen strategically. Though at first the movement had considered a date later in February, the regime used this to try and compromise the reputation of the movement, as the date they had picked was of special significance to police in Morocco. Since to pick that date was considered tantamount to allowing the regime to portray them as in league with the police and therefore the regime, collectively those present on Facebook chose February 20th. As Simo tells it, the online presence had been ignored, but once the name February 20th was decided upon and this date began growing closer the movement became just that, a movement, complete with consideration on Moroccan news stations.

It is interesting to think that the name might be so clearly linked to existence, as in the way Simo related the story. The idea that the movement should be seriously considered was rarely examined before the movement had a date around which it organized itself, but even then, there were doubts that it had the ability to become a real movement. Moroccans generally and even those who were activists in other movements initially doubted that this movement could become a force worth recognizing. Youssef, an older man who was associated with the human rights organization Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH), was an early supporter of the February 20th movement and rallied to get press coverage of the young movement mere days before February the 20th. However, his efforts faced opposition and apathy from other activists as well as press for just this reason. If it had not been for the effects of Arab Spring movements elsewhere, he believes he would not have been able to rally support, but as the date grew closer curiosity about the movement along with Morocco's comparably liberal regard towards press drew domestic and international attention to the movement. As such, the international climate is somewhat responsible for garnering support for the movement in its infancy. Moreover, it seems the time frame implied by the name gave focus and also a certain expectation that something would occur, which Youssef and others used to garner support and media coverage.

As the above story shows, however, the temporal dimension of the movement also relates to the external circumstances that made this movement and its identity possible. Here, as elsewhere in the paper, I would like to briefly consider how the Arab Spring informed the movement's construction. Likewise, it is pertinent to look at how social networking enabled this information to flow across national boundaries. Both this

international context and the use of social networking inform the circumstances that allowed the unspecified identity of the February 20th movement to come about.

As indicated in the literature examined earlier the February 20th movement came about within the scope of international mobilizations collectively termed the Arab Spring. The movement's connectedness to this spate of protests was brought up in three of my interviews. In these interviews, the external circumstances' effect on the movement's development was also alluded to. For instance, in Simo's story above, he traced the evolution of the name of the movement, yet that name is intertwined with the Arab Spring insofar as the other Arab Spring also picked names based on dates, as well as because the first February 20th protest was done in support of Egypt and Tunisia. Beyond that though, Simo enumerated the ways that the February 20th movement was connected to the Arab Spring. First, he explained, they used some of their language. To his mind, their calls for justice, dignity, and freedom were informed by the values of other Arab Spring movements. Second, they stood in solidarity with the other Arab Spring nations, primarily Egypt and Tunisia. Third, Simo explained that what Moroccans saw in other countries was the possibility of change in Morocco. This explains perhaps why Youssef was able to convince Moroccans to support the movement, in part, because of the outcomes elsewhere in the Arab world. Soukaina agreed that the Arab Spring bolstered their Moroccan movement, saying, "the Arab Spring was beneficial to us." The Arab Spring elsewhere seemingly invigorated Moroccan people, while also garnering support for the movement from those who had otherwise doubted its legitimacy. This external circumstance indicates a sort of domino effect, insofar as the circumstances passed

nation-to-nation creating a point where these non-State identities could form and where seemingly disparate causes and ideologies could find space to protest together.

This domino effect was likewise facilitated by greater technological access. I am certainly not the first to examine how technology played a role in the Arab Spring; yet, in the case of Morocco its importance, and indeed its limitations, cannot be ignored.[3] Here, then, I consider how technology, primarily social networking, played out in Morocco. Four of my ten respondents addressed how social networks affected their participation, like Soukaina above, and the movement's organization, considered later. Yet, in broader terms social networking was present throughout these four respondents interviews. This is due to social networking's presence throughout the movement. Simo explained the chronology to me: from the beginning, before the movement was even named, it existed in the form of three Facebook pages. These pages were then used to discuss slogans and a name for the movement. Later, YouTube videos were made explaining the different reasons why people would be protesting on February 20th. Last, YouTube was used to record the protests themselves in documentary style. Throughout this, Twitter was available to connect and to mobilize as well as to document what occurred. It appears that the availability of this technology was yet another circumstance that allowed February 20th's complex identity to come about.

However, social networking almost functioned like a microcosm of the movement as a whole. Indeed, it continues to be a circumstance that altered the development of the movement and its identity, leadership, and aims. In fact, it had both the open structure and the repression that were characteristic of the movement as it occurred outside of

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[3] For a consideration of technological use in the Arab Spring, see Wasserman (2011) and Khondker (2011).

cyberspace. For example, in response to a question about the organization of the movement Youssef told me that the movement started on Facebook and Facebook has no hierarchy, so the movement also lacked much of a hierarchy. What linked people, he went on, were the values they shared, namely freedom and democracy. In his understanding, social networks model and explain the movement's organizational traits. Similarly, even online there was state repression like that in the movement elsewhere. Three respondents mentioned the way police used Facebook to monitor, entrap, and harass activists, often posing as other protesters or publishing Photoshopped images of the activists doing drugs or being friendly with politicians and police officers. In this way, technology was a model for both the good and bad as it related to the February 20th movement.

Moreover, the limitations of the movement are even clearer online, since technology presupposes a certain privilege. To connect online requires literacy, income, time, and proximity to technology. As such, it is logical to wonder what this use indicates about the movement's socioeconomic diversity. Thus, its use indicates a question of whether the movement was, in fact, inclusive. This will be considered fully in regards to the movement later, but thinking about inclusivity online and what the movement's online roots indicate is worth keeping in mind for that discussion. As such, social networking can be understood as a tool, but also as a place, where the movement, its limitations, and the responses to it were acted out.

Both social networking and the Arab Spring informed the movement, but they also, notably, were enacted on the identity of the movement. In turn, this identity in its unspecificity created potential for unspecified leadership and aims. This is due to the fact

that unspecificity has to do with a refusal to substantively name as much as it has to do with circumstance and temporality. The Arab Spring and the spread of social networking were circumstances that facilitated the movement's coming about, but they too are bounded by time.

Unspecified Identity

Returning, then, to the question of unspecified identity it is central to my research that unspecificity be explained from the perspective of my respondents and in contrast to specified identity. In doing both, it is clear that the name February 20th was not substantive to those who ascribed to that identity. I consider that to claim membership in the February 20th movement is not to actually define oneself in any meaningful way, but rather to take part in a coming together during a fixed time. These activists name themselves after their finitude, thus reinforcing that they are mere beings together for a time.

For the activists in Morocco, most explained that the name and the date were primarily unifying since the movement was otherwise unplanned. Hadija, a young woman casually connected to the movement, agreed with this sentiment, saying, "the name was what made us one together." Before the name made them one group she reasoned that they "were just people" and even though they might have had similar thoughts, primarily they were disorganized. But at the same time the idea that the movement was just people seemed to appeal to her. She said, "it was all peoples even peoples like me who made the movement a movement." Or as Simo put it, "it was a democratic movement of the people." When I asked her what it meant for a movement to be just made up of people, she said she meant it was not planned; rather it was people who came together from a need and a want. Or, as I might put it, out of a set of

circumstances bounded by a specific time period. Amine, a young man who held a key position in the information structure, such as it was, in Rabat, put this sentiment more simply, "the movement was formed spontaneously."

This, I think, gets at the idea that half of identity in coming movements has to do with their spontaneity and unspecificity. To make it clearer it might help to oppose the view expressed above to another movement where the group, be it a labor union, political party, or other organization, exists first and protest comes to represent something out of their identity. Here instead, the potentiality or the circumstances existed first, then, an identity formed. In Morocco this means that waves of protest were washing over other Arab nations showing an alternative to a government that was seen by many to be despotic and tyrannical where the king controls each branch of government as well as the country's civil and religious life. Even then though, the identity was not clearly value-laden, it does not carry certain prescriptive presuppositions. So, where saying you are a union member in the US might presuppose actions of a specific kind (e.g. protests for high wages or better benefits), I argue that saying you are a member of the February 20th movement is not clearly indicative of much. Or at least it is only indicative of those things that Agamben calls too general to be real aims for a movement.

To better understand how this form of identity remains so indeterminate, it is important to consider the second half of identity—inclusivity—and, later, the aims of the movement, which allow it to be so unspecified.

Inclusivity as Radical Protest

The second tenet of coming movements is perhaps more straightforward. It rests on the idea, posited by Day, that Groundless Solidarity and Infinite Responsibility indicate that a plurality of identities can be a form of resistance since the logic of

hegemony typically anticipates exclusion rather than inclusion. Where on the one hand it is central to coming movements that individuals come together due to a set of circumstances that arise out of pure potentiality, on the other, it is still important that these individuals recognize the nexus of identity and oppression that exists outside of unspecified identity. Groundless Solidarity and Infinite Responsibility imply that this awareness coupled with an openness to challenges from Others may help resist the societal models that exist contrary to Coming Communities. In what follows, I think it will become clear that the February 20th movement quite obviously undertook a radical program of inclusivity.

Of the interviews I conducted six of ten made reference to the plurality of ideologies and identities that made up the February 20th movement. Most explanations of the movement broke down the movement into groups based on an analysis of the different aims they had for the movement. For most, the major groups were Islamists, Leftists, and independents—meaning those without an affiliation. However, these people also had other affiliations as artists, members of organizations or labor unions, students, Amazigh (Berber), or religious minorities. To protesters this plurality was a strength. Simo agreed with this sentiment saying, "having Islamists, homosexuals, and all people in one movement is great democracy." Hadija said something similar, expressing the power of having so many different people in one place. She noted, "it was a place where people of many different ideologies came together." In both of these quotations, the participants use a language of coming together, a recurring theme in all of the six interviews that addressed this issue.

Just as often, participants noted how the movement could make odd bedfellows. Primarily this had to do with pointing out the oddity of feminists or homosexuals and Islamists working together, as Simo did above. Simo recounted further, that the movement made people friendly and so you would see Islamists talking to girls in short skirts, which, he said, "was not uncommon." Hadija said something similar, focusing on how during protests you would sometimes see Islamists and feminists "together close." For members of the movement I think these groups seem diametrically opposed and so that they came together and included each other at all was seen as indicative of how unusually inclusive the movement really was.

One participant particularly identified the potential for this inclusivity to be used as resistance. Ahmed, a youngish anthropologist, explained that it fits a revolutionary view to be an "including movement," but he also felt that it was a practical choice too. He began discussing that the movement was "including" instead of standing against the real enemy, the state. On the practical considerations though, he expounded, "somehow it's a pragmatical view to unify completely different visions and ideologies rather than to shake the dominant power." What I believe he meant by this was that it makes more sense to indirectly challenge power through inclusivity than to do so directly. This inclusivity he continuously termed "pragmatic" and "strategic." He too, mentioned how two groups were strangely brought together through this protest, but rather than a story, he offered a piece of terminology that was primarily used in Casablanca—*Comrakh*, a mixture of the word comrade, representative of the Leftists in the movement, and *akh* meaning brother in Arabic, a term used primarily by Islamists. This term was used to talk about any

member of the movement as your fellow, both a comrade and a brother, and just as easily of any ideology.

Ahmed likewise identified how such inclusivity might create conflict. He stated that the movement created an atmosphere where divergent and even opposing views could share space, but that doing so also created tension. This tension, I posit, existed in two ways. First, there was a tension of aims. Though Islamists, Leftists, and independents came together in the movement, their aims for Morocco still differed. However, this will be considered later in this chapter. The second, identitarian, tension had to do with representation. Though in theory the movement was radically inclusive, some people did not participate in large numbers. Those who did not participate were typically the poor or those located more rurally.[4] Soukaina mentioned this disparity, saying that at first the movement was mainly urban, wealthy and well-informed young people who were "already educated and easy to mobilize." Simo explained it simply: "poor people weren't present." He went on to say that even though the movement claimed to be speaking for the poor, it was mostly the wealthy that attended the initial protests. The poor, he said, were rightly afraid. But to some degree, I imagine, that this deserves its own consideration. The people protesting often were those who benefitted from the structures they protested and yet they were the ones who showed up, often facing violence. Simo described many participants as having it all, when pressed he detailed that meant they "had a job, a car, sons, life, and still came." As I have indicated, most explained that later in the movement, all types of people protested, including the poor and those from rural areas, but to begin the diversity was primarily ideological.

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[4] This is not universally true. Indeed, several rural cities and villages were active in the February 20th movement.

Another important consideration in terms of inclusivity is the notion that its point is to be in opposition to the exclusivity of hegemonic structures elsewhere. If this is the threshold for whether or not inclusion is radical, this might be of more importance than the issue of true representation, as examined above. So, rather than just looking to see if the poor are included one must look to see if any are excluded. Yet, this was surprisingly hard to ascertain. All I can offer is one anecdote about the movement and its policy towards inclusion. Simo told me the story of one of the founders of the movement, by which he meant a young man who had been in the initial YouTube campaign, who after being harassed by the police, friends, and neighbors stopped participating in the movement and joined a political party friendly to the king. Some time later, though, he wanted to rejoin the movement, sparking a heated debate. They wondered if he could be trusted in the movement after he had left and stood with the king. Simo said that the movement ultimately made their decision based on whether or not he was in line with the values of the movement. While I am not sure if he was ultimately allowed to call himself a member of the movement this brings up two important questions.

First, if he was not in line with the values should he have been included and does radical inclusivity mean that those who act in line with the logic of hegemony still ought to be included? And, second, who was making the decision? The first question is complex, but I imagine the answer is simply yes—to be radically inclusive means to be inclusive no matter what. And from what Simo said I got the impression that he felt that the values alone were the most important consideration. If so, then nothing else, even perhaps allegiance to the king, matters. The second question is seemingly simple, but the answer is not. Who was making the decision? No one. And everyone. As will be explored

next, the organization and leadership of the movement is complicated, but put most simply no one person is in charge. The man discussed here could have called himself a member of the movement, without recourse to a governing body, because there is no governing body, rightly understood. This is, of course, simply one anecdote, but it makes the argument that the February 20th movement is radically inclusive compelling.

If identity in coming movements is determined through meeting the dual requirements of coming about from circumstances alone and through practicing inclusivity, then it seems the February 20th movement does so.

Leadership, Organization, and Structure

The second facet of coming movements to be considered here is that of leadership; however, it is perhaps pertinent to flesh out the idea of leadership fully. Within coming movements, leadership means not just leadership in the sense of who, if anyone, is in charge, but also in terms of the structure and organization, if any, of the movement. This question was broached in eight of my ten interviews, and in each, the complexity of finding the language to express the reality of their movement's structure and organization was made clear. Thus, I received two types of responses. The first type of response was highly technical and addressed the specific mechanisms of organization that did exist. The second type of response dealt with a more nuanced account of leadership, as even the mechanisms they detailed are not precisely structures as they might be typically thought of.

Concerning this first type of response, I often had the basic layout of their organization explained. This usually entailed an explanation of the general assembly—the main structural entity—and how this was a venue for decision-making and planning. The general assembly was, quite basically, a meeting that included anyone who showed

up wherein any person or group could raise issues to be decided by vote. In one participant's words, the general assembly "was the only structure." However, as will be touched on later, the actual influence this body had is debatable. Next, came a discussion of committees—certain subgroups that focused on specific aspects of the movement, for instance, logistics, art, or communication. As far as I could tell these were peopled by volunteers who had a background or interest in the subject. As Simo explained it, you "do what you know" in committees, as in the wider movement. This is the structure, as much as there is one, of the February 20th movement, but in what follows, it becomes evident that even the claim that there is a structure was complicated in the interviews I gathered.

In the second type of response, interestingly I was given conflicting, but at the same time complimentary accounts of the structure. Potential accounts of any organization can likely be broken into two parts: There is an organization or there is not. Except in my research each interview held both to be true. If my respondents were to be believed then the movement had and did not have a structure. And as became clearer, they were to be believed; there was logic behind the accounts of both its existence and nonexistence.

Though it might seem contradictory to hold the opinion that there is no leadership and that there is leadership simultaneously, this is in fact the opinion that I heard again and again. So, I wondered, what did it mean? In what ways could a movement hold both to be true? One participant, Said, perhaps put his opinion most simply when he said, "what organization? It is so complicated." He continued by explaining that the organization was different than that of a government or political party. This was a statement echoed by Hadija who at first said simply "no" when asked if there was an

organization to the movement before going on to explain that she meant there were not people who "ran" the movement like people run a government. Yet another participant, Salma, compared the organization to a political party, saying that by its nature the movement was "not organized like a political party" as it was "not a hierarchy."

So, while the claim is that there is no structure, how they continue to talk about the movement indicates that these respondents likely mean there is not a typical structure. When people use the words organization or structure in terms of movements it appears that the meaning they ascribe those words relates to a State-based, or, in Day's language, "arborescent" model (2001:33). Such a model is hegemonic insofar as it is understood to be the natural or normal form of organization, when in fact it is merely the most typical form of organization. Moreover, it is this form of organization through which the status quo is upheld.

This alternative form of organization appears to have several consistencies: no clear leader, variation by location, a horizontal structure, and emotive or affinity-based leadership in the street.

A Leaderless Movement

Though much of the language surrounding leaders in the movement was indirect, the decision to not have a leader was, by one account, intentional and long thought out. Amine related how in March of 2011 the general assembly, the collection of people who made decisions consensually, considered the issue of the movement's leadership. After a discussion of whether there should be one leader or speaker of the movement, the assembly agreed that there should not be. As Ahmed explains it, having no chief or leader was "the explicit idea."

Simo posited that the reasoning behind having no central leadership was two-fold. First, he explained, a single leader or a central group of leaders could become as bad as the regime. By which I suppose he meant they could become as despotic or totalitarian as the monarchy, when in fact this ran counter to the movement's ideals, as a movement that pursued democracy. Second, such a centralization of leadership meant they might be controlled or co-opted. This control worked two ways. The government could potentially control or co-opt these leaders or these leaders could control or co-opt the movement, favoring their ideological leanings over others.

Amine also brought up these worries, specifically referencing a committee whose name in English is something like the Master or Control committee, which took a very complex position on leadership. This committee, one of several that came out of the general assemblies, was responsible for problem solving and planning in Rabat. The committee was known for their impact on the movement, as they were responsible for deciding what to do in case of police intervention, if the protest was stopped, or if violent anti-protesters, the *Baltijaya*, were present. They were responsible for practical, not ideological planning. The 15 main members allowed themselves to be known publically, but had extra members whose identities were guarded to prevent police harassment, manipulation, or retaliation. The harassment faced by these committee members led them to adopt a new leadership strategy, which shows on a small scale why this model was not adopted for the movement as a whole. Because of this, Simo related, those who participated in committees and the assemblies were always individuals rather than organizations or political parties in order to prevent manipulation by ideological groups. The general feeling, he went on, was that activists "wanted them to give money and shut

up." He continued that the movement intentionally attempted to not let money control the movement, such that when organizations donated money through a committee created to assist the movement it had to be given with no strings attached. The movement kept these possibilities in mind, taking a directly democratic position wherein a variety of general assemblies, with a subset of committees, allowed all people to participate in the movement's decision-making and action.

Variation by Location

As I noted earlier in this paper, the scope of my research deals only with Rabat, the capital. Nine of my interviews were with residents of Rabat who participated in the movement as it was instantiated in Rabat, while a lone participant came from Casablanca. This has a specific effect on my research insofar as the movements looked varied by town and region. This variation by location was also clearly on the minds of my participants. Three of my respondents said, almost word for word, that their insights into the movement had to be considered only in terms of Rabat because the movement was different in every city, village, and region. Ahmed in particular added two additional considerations: first, the movement also varied by dominant party of the village, city, or region being discussed, and, second, the movement varied by individual. Given this, he explained, there was "no one organization"; rather there were "many organizations" that were completely different region to region, and even Rabat and Casablanca, located only an hour's train ride from each other were "hugely different." To take his logic a step further it is also possible to conclude that the way he experienced the movement might have been different than how any of my other participants experienced it, even if not in major ways. However, to do that, to take his logic one step further, seems wholly atomistic when it is possible to see the consistencies of experience throughout the paper.

This is not to discount this difference, but to instead count the consistencies along with the differences.

Indeed, because my research cannot speak for those in places I did not visit, I do think it is worth considering what parts of this analysis are generalizable. For instance, the structures considered earlier, namely the general assembly and committees, were replicated elsewhere and even communicated with each other. Though, Rabat sent many of these communiqués it is incorrect to hold that Rabat somehow led the movement. While I cannot certainly say whether Rabat's model is true of other cities, according to Simo, Rabat was a guide for other cities, but "not *the* guide." To his knowledge, though, all other cities and villages had some semblance of this structure. Even so, I acknowledge that I can only speak directly to how Rabat was organized; yet, beyond methodological concerns it is interesting in itself that a so-called national movement was made up of discrete local movements. As Simo explained, "February 20th was both a national and local movement," but there was not a national organization, rather many local organizations relating to each other. Thus, the movement seemed to represent a web of local movements that in name belonged to a national entity. On a large scale, then, this represents the horizontal structure, which was present throughout the movement.

Horizontal Structure

There were often times during interviews that made me realize what a barrier my language deficit really was, and in two interviews, this was especially apparent. In the midst of discussing the movement's organization two respondents seemed lost for words and as they tried to explain what it was that the movement was not they made what was, to me, a telling hand gesture. As they grappled for words, these two participants moved

one hand down towards the other, vertically. That, they explained, was the opposite of the February 20th movement.

However, this image, of a movement contrary to a vertical structure, also came out in more direct ways. One participant in particular, Salma, put forth her idea that the movement does not have an organization, at least not in the sense of a hierarchy. Her explanation that the movement was organized outwards, or horizontally, not "down" left those around her nodding their heads. In three later interviews, I asked if Salma's understanding of the movement seemed to fit their experience and all three participants agreed her explanation made sense for the movement as they had understood it. Simo particularly agreed, offering that the movement's organization was like water in that the power flowed everywhere and was not easily shaped or contained. I think such a metaphor is apt. Indeed, it brings to mind Day's conception of the rhizomatic organization of movements, wherein there are a multiplicity of networks and bases wherein power can instantiate. However, I will consider later the broader implications of this idea for the lived protest experience. Salma went further into her analysis of the movement acknowledging that the structure was a strength of the movement and fit its ideals, something Ahmed echoed. To her, the focus in the movement was on democracy; it was on people. While many of my participants seemed to agree with this horizontal framework for the movement, they also specifically considered how one might understand the way the movement functioned publically on the street

Leadership in the Street

In what preceded this I have considered how the movement's leadership was thought to be structured. Yet, one of the major takeaways from my interviews was that regardless of how the movement was said to be organized at heart it was centered on

people and on the street. In truth, all the planning, committees, and theorizing meant little when those on the street performed protest differently than this plan. Through my interviews, I began to suspect that I was primarily speaking to those who engaged with the movement in a mainly structural and intellectual way, but not everyone did. So I asked. Ahmed explained that approximately 40 people, though at times more, participated in the general assembly and committee structure. One percent of protesters he guessed were likely engaged with this logistical side of the movement. So where was that other 99% and what role did they play?

Of my ten respondents 3 or 4 would likely fall into the category of casual protester, and while those respondents also spoke about the organization in much the same way as my other participants I also got some interesting insights into how the larger structure played out on the street. For instance, talking about her own position, Hadija recounted: "I'm not sure I would say I was a part of the movement. I was there, but I was not a speaker of it. Not an organizer. Not someone who helped run it." Yet, it was not that she was not in the movement, but rather that she was not inside it. She did not work inside the structure of it. However, she was able to explain that on the street action just happened. Or, in Simo's terms, there was improvisation. That is, the movement in protest form, as it was on the street, reacted as things happened. "We had to sort of improvise," he explained. Here, again it is worth thinking of Simo's understanding that the movement is like water. As with water, those in the movement let the power flow, such that everyone and anyone could presumably use it. This was most evident within the decisions made on the street.

Before going on, I want to note my own difficulties in writing about this. Simply, I, like some of my participants, lack the language to explain what it was to be on the ground in the movement. This is not something I experienced of the movement first hand, as while I was there the February 20th movement was relatively dormant, but I was around many of the almost daily protests in Rabat and can speak to that. The thing that made the movement decide to act one way rather than another, in unison, is hard to put into words. Yet, I think it is best described as a vibe, inclination, or affinity. And I would characterize it as primarily emotive rather than intellectual. What I am speaking of is that which led people of various affiliations, ideologies, and participation levels to make cohesive decisions. It is the unspoken circumstances, which led the potentially disparate movement to act as one unit. It is the ability of all to follow the flow of power as if it were water. I can only conceive of it in much the same way as I theorized the movement itself. Like the movement arose from circumstances within a fixed temporal space, so too did actions within the protest. Such that, with certain circumstances, in a certain time the various people and groups protesting together as the February 20th movement decided to act as one. That each protester came to the same decision, and that there was, as far as I could ascertain, a seamless, united front on the street stems from this vibe, affinity, or intuition.

To continue though, this is one explanation of how those on the street with no affiliation and with no awareness of the structure were able to join, to feel part of the movement, and to act effortlessly within it. As Ahmed reasoned, there were many individuals without contact with any activists who still participated spontaneously. It was hard to say, he continued, whether or not the assembly and committee structure

represented them, but regardless they became a part of the movement. Similarly, Simo told me that just by being in the street you were made a representative of the movement; your mere presence implied participation. These people, it would seem, could call themselves part of the movement and act within it seamlessly. Hadija spoke of her own experience saying, she did not know any activists—"I knew none of them"—though she still showed up and participated. When unforeseen circumstances arrived, she went on, "you just knew" what to do, "everyone did." By being on the street, a protester became a member of the movement regardless of their history of participation and perhaps even their ideology, and whether through intuition, affinity, or vibes such a protester could make decisions and act in concert with those around them.

Unspecified Aims

In this last tenet of coming movements, the emphasis is once again on unspecificity, but, as described in the theory chapter of this paper, aims can be unspecified in two ways. In the first, there are specific aims, but they are not acknowledged actively. Alternatively, such aims may be incidental, such that a movement that may seemingly be all about some issue, for instance literacy, may also have other issues they address which are not within the scope of the movement. The second way for an aim to be unspecified is for there to be no aims. Or at least no aims understood in Agamben's sense of the word, wherein some things, like democracy or freedom, are too vague to be the object of conflict (1993:85). Seemingly, the February 20th movement has aims that are unspecified in both senses of that term.

When asked about the aims of the movement, most respondents talked about the general, second form, aims of the movement. Three particularly spoke of the values of the movement—freedom, justice, equality, and dignity. Others—six total—added that the

movement was primarily anti-totalitarian and anti-despotic. Yet, these responses speak specifically, and only, to the second form of unspecified aims. Only two respondents discussed first form aims for the movement.

Hamza, an older man associated with AMDH, explained that in the sense of social and political aims the movement attempted to have some tangible things to work towards. So for instance, some slogans spoke of high inequality and when pressed some protesters talked about equality in jobs, education, and housing. However, these do not seem specified insofar as they are offered as expansions upon the amorphous, second form values the movement held. Put another way, the movement was not defined by its position on education, housing, or jobs; instead, these were incidental to the values they held.

The one instance that proves this clearly is the issue of Amazigh (Berber) people in Morocco. One of the most widely acknowledged successes of the February 20th movement was their inclusion and support of Amazigh activists trying to make Tamazight, or Berber language, officially recognized as a national language in Morocco. Hadija explained that while the February 20th movement was not an Amazigh movement they did help Amazigh activists bring attention to the issue, and "they succeeded." As Hadija explains, this activism was not constitutive of the movement, but rather incidental to it. Supporting this minority group fit the broader aims for the movement, making it possible to support them without it becoming a defining feature of the movement.

For the most part though, respondents spoke of the second form of unspecified aims. Respondents identified that the movement had three values or aims, though these three aims differed from person to person. As indicated above, the values included,

justice, equality, social justice, freedom, and dignity. The majority of respondents, though, claimed that the movement was pro-democracy and, thus, anti-status quo. Soukaina explained that her parents saw the February 20th movement as a human rights protest and that many others, the regime included, saw it as "against the king." Simo described the movement, saying that its major aim was to advocate for "an end to corruption and despotism." Similarly, Hamza pointed out that the movement was "against despotism" and claimed "goals of social justice." What comes through in these responses, as in other more general comments, is that the movement aligned itself with certain general values and contrasted itself with the status quo, wherein the king's government was characterized as "corrupt", "totalitarian", "despotic", and "repressive."

Both the movement's social and political values are general in exactly the sense Agamben thinks is powerful. This, he thinks, challenges the State, as they do not know how to respond to protests without clear, prescriptive aims. Instead, he argues, the State often responds with violence towards those who challenge the model of hegemonic politics the State embodies wherein naming is central. In the case of Morocco, the king mostly attempted to give prescriptive changes before turning to violence, though, as will be discussed, there was violence present in some of the movement's early protests.

Outcomes and Responses

Coming movements are by their nature to come, which means they are never fully realized. Part of such an understanding, then, means that for a movement to be understood as a coming movement its worth considering how the movement seemingly ends, or, more precisely, how it reaches the end of its fixed temporal space, such that it becomes a mere potentiality. At root, I am interested in whether the movement developed affinities or attachments, which will make a coming movement possible, or even more

likely in the future. Thus, I will consider these ideological or theoretical outcomes, as well as the physical outcomes, including state violence, which Agamben also links to unspecified movements.

The King's Response: A Specified Solution to an Unspecified Problem

The king's main response to the February 20th movement was to appoint a committee to make changes to the constitution, which would be voted on by the Moroccan public later, and to agree to hold new elections where the majority party would dictate the party of the prime minister. While in most international news outlets this was touted as an impressive, moderate response to the movement, my respondents indicated that these reforms were stopgaps that did not fix the problems at the root of their frustrations. As one respondent, Hassan, a radical activist who participated in the February 20th movement as well as atheist and gay rights activism, put it the constitution "is like a shitty pop song…trying to please everyone…it may sound okay at first, but then you realize it makes no sense." He went on to explain this, saying that because the movement had not said what precisely the government should look like the king tried to appease everyone, but because that was impossible to do with so many different, often conflicting visions for Morocco, he failed. This indicates, to me at least, that a specified response to unspecificity cannot succeed. And in the case of the February 20th movement there was little ground for a specified response.

Perhaps capturing the difficulty the king faces, Ahmed described the movement as having only "a vague idea" of the Morocco they wanted. As touched on before, the movement included various groups that came together under the name February 20th, but each group had a different vision for the Morocco that might come from their activism. Indeed, this was a particular point of contention, which as Ahmed and Amine recounted,

was in their understandings a weak point of the movement. Specifically Amine admitted, "there was no agreement about the future politically," some wanted a parliamentary monarchy, others a caliphate, still others a republic. "All they agreed on," he continued, was the "importance of public freedoms and democracy." Ultimately, he concluded the movement was characterized by how "they agreed on freedom, democracy, justice, and dignity, but not on the form." The point Amine makes is that the movement functioned by putting aside their differences and focusing on those things that were common to all groups, which helped "to not weaken the movement" as they formed the common basis for the movement as a whole, but in doing so the movement made any institutional or legislative progress immensely difficult. Yet, Simo too saw this as necessary, saying a "national movement cannot be specific." Like Amine, Ahmed found it "strategic" to ignore the differences and instead "vocalize and emphasize the common views." That the movement itself had no clear program for Morocco's future meant that the State could not respond as it might to a typical, specified protest. While on the one hand this is a strength of the movement, opening up the possibility of new, nongovernmental structures, on the other hand it left the participants with no clear endpoint and with a government that was forced to negotiate their position in this nonhierarchical worldview. And just as Agamben predicted, this led to violence.

State Violence: When the Tanks Appear

In Agamben's description of Tiananmen Square, violence is inevitable. "Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common," Agamben writes, "there will be Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear"(1993:23). Morocco is no different.

When asked about violence, Hassan, a young man involved with the movement, retold his personal experiences with State violence and coercion. It is important to note that he was also involved in otherwise radical activism, primarily dealing with the rights of atheists, and he was the only respondent to openly admit his preference for Morocco to become a republic, so his responses reflect what may not be a representative viewpoint towards State violence. State violence is not always administered by tanks and force, and indeed my interview with Hassan was evidence of this. Quite simply, he was very, very late to meet me for our interview, due to the small-scale state measures he often experiences. He was late, he explained, as he had just been stopped by the police for a "routine check", which, he continued, happened frequently to him. At the time I interviewed him, he had already had his national ID card taken, which due to "paperwork problems" had not been replaced for nearly a year and he was also worried that in 3 or 4 months when his passport expired that he would not receive a new one, making it hard to travel. This sort of indirect repression is some of the least clearly objectionable that I heard about, but repression is, in fact, what it is.

By all respondents' accounts, the official number of deaths from the movement is six. But most of my respondents agree that there was more violence than this would imply. Like the example above, much of the violence and repression that occurred is not the type that is often reported on. It was hidden because the government was, in Hassan's words, "smart." The government did not typically arrest people for their activism, but rather on fake charges relating to rape or drugs. In Hassan's case the government offered him a position on a youth panel where he would receive money for the rest of his life given he stopped his activism. He refused. Others he knew did not. In each of these cases

the government makes a point of avoiding clearly repressive programs, yet, despite the "smart" methods, the pervasiveness of governmental repression was widely acknowledged.

Take, for instance, five of the sixth deaths in the movement, which occurred in Al-Hoceima. Most people believe these deaths represent government repression, as most believe they were killed intentionally by the government, but there is no categorical way to prove that. The official story is that they died in a fire inside a bank on a Sunday. In fact, in the government's story, I was told, the blame is placed on the movement itself. As the regime tells it, those who died were protesters looting the bank when other protesters lit it on fire, killing them. Moreover, according to Hassan and Simo, the regime claimed that their bodies were found in the vault, as they were in the process of robbing it. And as a note, banks, even in Morocco, are closed on Sundays and, according to Hassan and Simo, on this day often hold little or no currency. For several reasons this story seems fishy. Yet, it is practically impossible, and certainly dangerous, to prove otherwise. My respondents explained that Al-Hoceima, Safi, and other smaller cities shared the brunt of the regime's repression since they lacked the international media presence to protect them.

Most accounts explain how in Rabat, Casablanca, and other major cities the police were peaceful, but this is often attributed to how it would look to other nations if this violence were widely seen. Indeed, as Simo tells it, in most places any violence or destruction was attributed to protesters, even in cases where the protesters reported seeing other people loot or light fires while the police looked on. He explained that in Kenitra the protesters saw people with police going around looting, so, knowing the protest

would be blamed, decided not to protest at all to prove they had not been responsible. While the police, and therefore the regime, did not always loot or act violently themselves, they were typically present as this occurred. In fact, what became clear in my interviews is that often the police tried to distance themselves from the violence by allowing, or even encouraging, other Moroccans to attack the protesters. For instance, there was a group called the *Baltijaya* who were nationalists who attacked protesters with homemade weapons. Yet, Hadija informed me, by May the police would also violently attack protesters, which gave the month the name "bloody May." As Hamza explains it, there was "a program of repression" where people died, were jailed or kidnapped or even tortured. It was, he explained, systematic.

The February 20th movement's identity, leadership, and aims challenged the ideological side of the State, confounding the State through a successful community-based movement that gave space for people to address qualms and exercise power in nonhierarchical forms. This unspecificity, as Agamben predicted, led to violence against protesters, leading to at least six deaths and many other injuries, kidnappings, and arrests. However, on a practical level this unspecificity hurt the movement, and not just in terms of violent repression. For most participants it seemed the movement could not end in change without a prescriptive system, so instead, the circumstances changed and the finite, temporal space for the movement ended without any concrete political victories.

Outcomes: Real Failure or Realized Success

In what follows, I will address the complexity of outcomes associated with the movement, not least that claim, stated above, that the lack of prescriptive program was indicative of the movement's failure. Yet, what I see in these outcomes is not necessarily a failure in the theory of coming movements, but rather a complication. The changes that

come about from coming movements are unlike those in specified, typical movements and must be considered as such. By their very nature, the outcomes are different, such that for many they seem failed, but rather than actual failure what is represented seems to be an ideological and social change of a new category. One respondent, Simo, spoke specifically to this, arguing that the movement did not fail; it would not have become a new government, "the movement was just there to say something was unjust not to program an answer." What Simo is saying is that the movement had outcomes outside of those in an ordinary political sense. Answers of the type that some said the movement failed to provide were, to his mind, intentionally bypassed. Here, then, I will consider both the outcomes in a typical sense and in a social and ideological sense.

In terms of typical political outcomes most found the movement lacking. Indeed, Ahmed found the unspecificity to ultimately be "politically naïve." It explained, he continued, why the movement broke apart somewhat at the end, after the king's changes, with several groups withdrawing support from the movement. The Justice and Charity, *Al Adl Wal Ihsan,* Party, a banned Islamist movement, left after the elections, citing a discrepancy of viewpoints. And the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) a moderate Islamist group also left—though their participation at all is debated—after they gained a majority in the election, giving them access to the government, including the prime minister's position. In Simo's opinion, this development hurt the movement as a whole because when these groups left it felt like "losing party of a family." And since the elections, the movement has continuously lost people and momentum, such that at the time of writing this most participants were unsure whether to use the past or presence tense while discussing it.

Yet, I think to see this movement as a failure is overly simplistic. The king's reforms did not pacify the movement. The after-effects offered few concrete changes. And yet, Morocco is changed for the movement's existence. This has to do, I think, with what a coming movement is, which is to say still coming and never actually realized. What is left, in such a view, is some valuable knowledge—primarily on mobilization and protest—but also the intangible value associated with having had a community of this type.

The social and ideological outcomes were seemingly more positive. What is clearest among those who spoke about the ideological and social outcome of the movement is the sense that the movement is not gone. All will acknowledge that they lack the public presence they once had, but the three respondents who spoke at length about this change explained that the movement had merely shifted somehow. For, as Simo and Hadija put it, the "spirit" of the movement continues. Simo explains this type of outcome through pointing out how now things are done in "the spirit of the movement" where people still use the movement's language and talk about the fundamental values. All that is required for this spirit to live on, he explains, is to still have the values and to want something badly enough. Hadija echoed this sentiment saying, "People still want freedom and dignity. That want is there still." Ahmed, too, shared this belief, explaining, "the idea is here even if the movement is not." By which I think they mean that the values of the movement have become pervasive in Moroccan society and that the need and desire for change has not gone away.

Moreover, both Simo and Hamza acknowledged that even those who were not in the February 20th movement sometimes use the language of the movement or appeal to

the values that the movement praised. As Ahmed describes, the ideas from the movement spread and diffused among "a large part of the educated population," such that even those who opposed the movement or are part of the government (e.g. new prime minister) now use the language to balance the government's corrupted tendencies. Simo compared the movement to an earthquake, saying that nothing is the same afterwards. And to him, the changes that came about from this movement have stayed with Moroccans; they have developed "a new consciousness." Or, as he explained, a new way of thinking about themselves and their government, as well as a new interaction with public space. For my respondents, there are certain lasting effects of the movement: "new citizens", a new understanding of public space, openness, and a revitalized protest culture.

For Simo the first of these lasting changes have to do with his understanding of the "new citizen" and new "public space," while for Hadija and Ahmed the main change is in the way protests occur. All three accounts outline the ways that this community has opened up possibilities for this type of association in the future. In this, they show how the movement has modeled the temporary connection of coming movements, such that finitude or affinity-based communities in the future will not be unprecedented.

"New Citizens" and Public Space

In the aftermath of the February 20th movement, Simo points out, people are different. They are what he terms "new citizens," or those who read, discuss, and participate actively. The "new citizen" understands that even if the movement has disappeared "you can act, you can do something." What the movement indicated to all people is that "you don't need an official organization" to act on the issues fundamental to life in Morocco. These "new citizens" take part in "philosophy in the street"; they organize activities and hold discussions all in the spirit of the movement, but without an

active movement or any organization. The ability to do so relies implicitly on Simo's belief that public space too has changed.

Even during the movement, he told me, there was a new concept—"the popular street"—where it was understood that space had been given over to protest, which, in turn, affected other, nonpolitical spaces. In the course of the protests, real neighborhoods came together on the street to protest the issues specific to where they lived and to form communities within the movement itself. But this is true everywhere now, he claims. There is street theatre and read-ins in parks and members of the movement still meet in February 20th-affiliated cafes and restaurants to discuss their thoughts. The movement, he said, "changed the individual" and "made new citizens with new concerns", but it also "changed how streets, villages, cities, the nation, and its people relate." All of which, he tells me, would not have happened before the February 20th movement.

Openness and the New Protest Culture

Today these new public spaces are not purely places of protest as they were at the height of the movement; rather they are open for discourse, criticism, and even art. Indeed, this new openness of space mirrors the new openness in dialogue. Ahmed believes that due to the movement there is an increased openness, which comes, in Simo's explanation, from the line of what is acceptable being pushed back. As Ahmed puts it, "some things which have been taboo are not anymore." During the movement, Soukaina told me, the protests were seen as especially transgressive because they criticized the king, one of several lines Moroccans do not cross. "Being against the king," she went on, "is like being against God…the king is almost God on earth." But now by some accounts this has changed. Offering criticism of the king is not as dangerous as it once was, though it is still far from safe.

With this change in Moroccan taboos is a parallel rebirth of protest. As acknowledged earlier, Morocco has long had a vibrant protest culture, but after the movement new, young activists make up these protests. For instance, Hassan and Soukaina are known more for their current activism than for their participation in the February 20th movement. Yet, the new activism is, according to Hassan at least, informed by this experience. He explained to me how the February 20th movement put him in touch with like-minded young people and gave him experience organizing massive protests and dealing with repression. Hadija too saw this change, saying, "now these people have changed the culture of protestation. They are why we have so many young people in protests." She went on to say that the movement fundamentally changed how protest occurs in Morocco, such that now people are willing to work with people who they would have otherwise seen as enemies. Ahmed agrees that the movement does, and will always have some bearing on future protest. He concluded his interview with this prediction: "It will be the spark of any protestation in the future." I, like Ahmed, believe that the February 20th movement has become a valuable model for coming movements, indicating to new protesters the possibility of nonhierarchical, inclusive, and unspecified protests. Soukaina and Hassan's activism indicates that the movement gave them concrete skills in protest mobilization, but the other respondents also indicate that there is a social and ideological legacy left by the movement.

Conclusion

For all intents and purposes, the February 20th movement is a coming movement. Though imperfect, it is in the nature of coming movements to be yet to come, or not yet perfected, so this fits the theoretical framework for these movements. In terms of the three markers of a coming movement—identity, leadership, and aims—the February 20th

movement seems to meet them all though with some added nuances. Accordingly, the outcomes fit the theoretical foundation in both the violent end Agamben expects, as well as the expectation that a coming movement form the basis of other coming movements or, potentially, even true coming communities.

In any case, the February 20th movement exhibited an atypical and, indeed, anti-hegemonic structure, which tracks onto the community-based concept of protest taken from Agamben, Day, and my own work, which indicates its relatedness to a global wave of mobilizations, traced in the literature review, that all turn away from potentially dangerous and oppressive structures. Regardless of its theoretical considerations, though, the February 20th movement is worth its own consideration for its complex organization, its aims—or really lack thereof—and its amorphous and inclusive identity that often go unconsidered in accounts of the Arab Spring.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The research I have considered previously has, to my mind, two significant implications: first, it signifies the necessity of rethinking typical portrayals of identity, organization, and aims in movements and, second, it signifies that community-based models for movements can be a potential explanatory tool.

In the first case, as even my respondents indicated, there is an inclination to define the characteristics of a movement in their typical, hegemonic instantiations. So, for instance, where my respondents spoke of the movement having "no organization", what they meant was that the movement lacked a hierarchical organization, yet, as was outlined there is still an organization even if it is nonhierarchical. As such, it is worthwhile to analyze the multiplicity of ways these traits are borne out in movements.

Yet, what this further indicates is this second fact—that community-based models for movements may offer an important explanatory framework for movements. In the case of the February 20th movement, the community-based framework of coming movements did well to explain the contingent nature of the movement and its traits.

The February 20th movement, along with its fellows in the post-Seattle tradition, poses challenges to the dominant understanding of identity, organization, and aims, proving that there is more at work than might be evident in a traditional examination. Therefore, new tools are needed to better capture the contingency and complexity of post-Seattle movements. Coming movements, and perhaps other community-based ideologies, may be those tools.

As such, future research might look at whether other theories of community may be used to explain social movements. Indeed, as theories of community also touch on the political implication of their theories, a parallel consideration of community within the study of social movements will likely be fruitful and worthwhile. My considerations lent themselves to certain transnational and horizontal frameworks and analyzing the intersections of coming movements with these theories would likely add nuance to both theorizations. Moreover, my specific example of the February 20th movement is one case study against which I have tested my theory of coming movements. To be more assured in my findings it would be necessary to compare the Moroccan example with that of other post-Seattle movements.

My work indicated two clear considerations, but to expand this work, as noted, would be a fruitful addition to these considerations and the work conducted here. While I think coming movements were a useful tool for my analysis, more can be done with this framework in regards to post-Seattle movements and their complexity.

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APPENDIX I: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

Brief description of the purpose of this study
This paper will examine the February 20th movement in Morocco in light of its relationship to the international mobilization that took place at the same time (the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, etc.). It seeks to examine how individual protesters related to each other and to their movement, as well as develop an understanding of both the organization and the aims of the movement as a whole.

Procedures- You will be asked to talk about your experience in the February 20th movement. The interview should not take more than an hour and a half. Must be 18 years of age or older.

Risks- Participants will be asked to recount their participation in a protest movement that was, at times, critical of the government. As such, it is important to be aware of the risks and discomfort that may result.

Benefits- This project does not offer any specific compensation, but the participants may enjoy the experience of speaking of their protest and activist work.

*Privacy-*all information you present in this interview may be written down. The notes will be kept locked away and will be later typed. These files will be password protected. By signing below you give the interviewer full consent to safeguard this information in its storage, access and publishing.

Anonymity and Confidentiality -all names in this report will be kept anonymous. The interviewer will create a pseudonym for you as a supplement. These will not only protect your real identity from becoming known, but will also keep any information containing a real identity separate from your stored information. By signing below, you give the interviewer full responsibility to uphold this contract and its contents, as well as to publish any or all portions of this interview.

Questions- Any further questions may be addressed to the interviewer in person or by email at paige.ambord@gmail.com.

Right to Refuse or Withdraw-You may refuse to participate in this research. If at any time you wish to end your participation, you may do so without consequence. This may be done in-person or via email.

_____   _____
(Participant's name printed)   (Participant's signature and date)

_____   _____
(Interviewer's name printed)   (Interviewer's signature and date)

APPENDIX II: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

Paige Ambord
pambord14@wooster.edu

IS Questionnaire

1. How old are you?

2. How did you come to be involved in the February 20th movement (F20M)?

3. What led you to identify with the movement?

4. What would you say the aims of F20M were, if any?

5. How was the movement structured? Who, if anyone was in charge?

6. Tell me about the type of people who participated in the F20M? For instance, can you describe a typical participant?

7. How did the various groups come together to form F20M? How would you describe interactions between members of different groups?

8. What was F20M like in relation to other movements (unemployed graduates, unions, etc)?

9. In what ways do you see F20M as related to the Arab Spring? In what ways isn't it?

10. Anything further you'd like to add?