

1-1-2014

# John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace

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## Recommended Citation

Bostdorff, Denise M. and Ferris, Shawna, "John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace" (2014). *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 100(4), 407-441. 10.1080/00335630.2014.989895. Retrieved from <https://openworks.wooster.edu/facpub/239>

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**John F. Kennedy at American University:**

**The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace**

**Denise M. Bostdorff and Shawna H. Ferris**

*Abstract:*

In his American University address, Kennedy employed epideictic progression, a pedagogical process drawing upon dissociation and epideictic norms to convince listeners, gradually, to embrace a new vision—in this case, a world in which a test ban treaty with the USSR was possible. To do so, Kennedy’s words: (1) united the audience behind the value of “genuine peace”; (2) humanized the Soviets as worthy partners in genuine peace; (3) established the reality of the Cold War and the credibility of US leadership; and (4) connected lessons on genuine peace to domestic civil rights.

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## **John F. Kennedy at American University:**

### **The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace**

In 1963, an ideological battle—begun in the post-war era—continued to dominate US-Soviet relations, and President John F. Kennedy was in a tough spot. After campaigning on charges of a missile gap, he had intensified his cold warrior persona by creating the most formidable military the world has ever seen and continuing his hardline anticommunist rhetoric.<sup>1</sup> In the terrifying wake of the missile crisis, however, the Kennedy administration identified the need for a more conciliatory relationship with the USSR, which could occur only through a new foreign policy strategy of *détente*.<sup>2</sup>

The first major step toward such a strategy was achievement of a limited nuclear test ban treaty, which Kennedy now was in a better position to persuade Americans to accept due to his increased political capital after the missile crisis. Although a test ban was in the nation's best interests, it would not be an easy sell, as the president's previous confrontational rhetoric had left little room for compromise and reinforced anticommunist sentiments. To convince citizens, Kennedy needed to create a new context in which the public could view US-Soviet relations. He also had to reassure allies that the United States would still uphold security agreements and the USSR that a test ban treaty was in its interests, too.<sup>3</sup>

To help shape this new reality, the president delivered a commencement address on June 10, 1963, at American University that would be judged one of the greatest American speeches of the 20th century.<sup>4</sup> The address also marked a dramatic change in US foreign policy, from one focused upon preparation for possible nuclear war to one embarked on the potential for a test ban treaty and improved US-Soviet relations.<sup>5</sup>

To initiate such a shift, Kennedy's speech demonstrated a new understanding of reality—the possibility of peace with an adversary—that the audience should embrace. More specifically, we posit that Kennedy's American University address is an exemplar of what we term “epideictic progression,” a rhetorical process distinguished by use of the teaching role assigned to epideictic speakers to alter perceptions of reality that directly influence one another, gradually moving from the most abstract concepts to the most specific. Epideictic progression draws on cultural materials already familiar to the audience and relies heavily upon dissociation and epideictic norms to modify the audience's view of reality in strategic steps, with the first perceptual shift requiring explanation for acceptance before the subsequent one can be acknowledged as legitimate. As rhetors move from one perception to the next, they interweave each altered concept with the ones preceding it, thereby creating an overall understanding that aims to foster attitudinal inducement to act in new ways.

Despite its historical significance and assessment as Kennedy's greatest speech,<sup>6</sup> relatively few scholars have examined the American University address.<sup>7</sup> The analysis of Kennedy's epideictic progression provides additional insight into how rhetors can use epideictic discourse, typically considered traditionalist or conservative in nature,<sup>8</sup> to challenge prevailing views.<sup>9</sup> In particular, our case study expands on Vivian's 2009 efforts to understand how “epideictic performances” may “contribute to or detract from the work of political transformation” needed to end intrastate conflicts, as in Yugoslavia,<sup>10</sup> by considering a study of epideictic discourse in interstate conflict. Since past research has focused on how presidents exploit epideictic rhetoric to conduct war,<sup>11</sup> Kennedy's address allows us to discern how the art of praise and blame might, alternatively, be used for the purpose of peace.

Furthermore, this analysis illuminates the president's discourse more broadly. Many of Kennedy's finest rhetorical moments came in epideictic speeches, such as his inaugural.<sup>12</sup> According to Murphy, the president was especially fond of commencement addresses because he saw his "entire administration as a ritual of transition, a movement from one generation to the next, and that fit well with graduation speeches." Commencement speeches, as a form of epideictic, were compatible with Kennedy's preference for "high style" in his oratory and allowed him "to speak as historian, teacher, and statesman."<sup>13</sup> We agree with Murphy's assessment. Through our analysis, we aim to shed further light on *how* Kennedy relied on epideictic discourse to forward his persuasive goal at American University and *why* commencement speeches may have been well suited for providing new perspectives on recalcitrant problems, whether matters of economics or war and peace.

We begin our examination by discussing how the combination of epideictic norms and dissociation offers an appealing approach for rhetors who aim to transform listeners' perceptions of reality. Next, we provide a context for Kennedy's address and then analyze the president's use of epideictic progression. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis.

### **The Partnership of Dissociation and Epideictic Norms in Epideictic Progression**

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, dissociation takes place when rhetors split a unitary concept and associate their position with the preferred term. The result is to integrate two "philosophical pairs" or opposed terms into a new definition that still bears markers of the old, thereby making its acceptance more likely, yet also facilitating the rhetors' argument.<sup>14</sup> For instance, a gun control advocate may claim that measures restricting gun ownership would provide "real security," a phrase that splits security into that which is "real" and that which is "false." In doing so, the rhetor makes her position more appealing by associating it with security,

yet differentiates it in a positive way from the policy of relatively unfettered gun ownership typically associated with security and which, through this maneuver, becomes the less preferred option since—by implication—the current policy offers only “false security.”<sup>15</sup>

When successful, dissociations alter audiences’ perceptions of reality, with the result that dissociations may function as argumentative techniques and also become the grounds from which future argument proceeds.<sup>16</sup> Listeners, however, often resist dissociations, especially if they believe the rhetor is using an explicitly persuasive “device” intended to alter their views.<sup>17</sup> How, then, to generate compelling dissociations? The answer: epideictic rhetoric.

First, epideictic rhetoric can make an audience more receptive to dissociation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that when “the hearers share the speaker’s respect or admiration for values extolled” in an epideictic speech, “such a speech will rarely be felt to be a process,” thereby allowing the rhetor to engage in dissociation without antagonizing listeners.<sup>18</sup> The rhetor, that is, begins by praising values the audience holds in high esteem and/or decrying values that the audience holds in low repute. From that basis, the rhetor then can engage in dissociation of said values to move the audience, gradually, to a new perspective.

Epideictic rhetoric, at its best, engages the audience as a participant in the promulgation of positive change, a partnership also needed for dissociation. While Aristotle has been translated as relegating the epideictic audience to *theoroi*, akin to spectators at the theatre, as opposed to *kritai* or judges of forensic and deliberative rhetoric, recent scholars have noted that *theoros* has other meanings, as well: “philosopher” or one who contemplates, and even “an ‘ambassador’ sent to consult an oracle.”<sup>19</sup> These latter two meanings, which convey a deeper sense of audience involvement, reflect how the early sophists envisioned epideictic rhetoric. Indeed, epideictic messages have the potential, Walker argues, to ask listeners “to form opinions, or even to revise

their existing beliefs and attitudes on a given topic.”<sup>20</sup> Vivian points to how leaders have used epideictic discourse in an effort to alter attitudes perpetuating domestic conflict by praising citizens for overcoming past mistakes, as with Mandela in post-Apartheid South Africa, and by attributing responsibility for conflict to all citizens, as in Lincoln’s second inaugural.<sup>21</sup> Just because a message is epideictic, however, does not mean that the audience will act as “contemplative *theoroi*; nor does it rule out that possible response.” Rhetors can encourage listeners’ thoughtful participation or their passive acceptance, and audiences also bring their own predispositions to the rhetorical situation.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, epideictic rhetoric has the capacity to engage the audience in a process of reflection and change, permitting it to work compatibly with dissociation which likewise requires the audience’s active involvement in its conceptual reconfigurations.<sup>23</sup>

Dissociation and epideictic rhetoric also share overlapping stylistic associations, for dissociations often arrive through rhetorical figures typical of high style. Antithesis, in which opposing ideas are conjoined, is especially ripe for dissociations, as in Barry Goldwater’s 1964 assertion that “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”<sup>24</sup> In polyptoton, the rhetor repeats “words from the same root but with different endings,” which likewise may provide an elegant form of dissociation. Obama, for example, suggested the new kind of presidential leadership he had to offer when he announced his candidacy in 2007 in Springfield, Illinois, and reflected on his work as a state senator: “It was here we learned to *disagree* without being *disagreeable*—that it’s possible to *compromise* so long as you know those principles that can never be *compromised*. . . .”<sup>25</sup>

Stylistic figures like these fit most comfortably within the high style of epideictic rhetoric, with its roots in ancient Greek poetry from which Gorgias and other early sophists

borrowed as they developed epideictic in the form of free verse, what Walker describes as “a mode of rhythmic discourse that relied on schemes—such as repetition, symmetry, opposition, and balance.”<sup>26</sup> Indeed, scholars have repeatedly noted epideictic oratory’s strong relationship with poetry, manifested in its use of analogy, metaphor, alliteration, antithesis, repetition of sound, and so on.<sup>27</sup> Particular figures like antithesis and polyptoton offer new perceptions of reality through dissociation, while their placement in an epideictic message seems fitting, stylistically.

By means of this *lexis* or verbal style, the epideictic orator engages the audience affectively and prepares the groundwork for contemplation and possible deliberation.<sup>28</sup> Burke explained this collaborative appeal of formal devices: “For instance, imagine a passage built about a set of oppositions (“*we do this, but they on the other hand, do that; we stay here, but they go there; we look up, but they look down,*” etc). Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation regardless of the subject matter. Formally, you will find yourself swinging along with the succession of antitheses, even though you may not agree with the proposition that is being presented in this form.” A listener’s resistance will vary depending upon the degree of her original opposition to a proposition, but the universal appeal of form may help a listener “yield” to new perceptions by engaging her in a collaborative rhetorical process that appeals through high style and facilitates dissociation, but without drawing overt attention to persuasive intent.<sup>29</sup>

Another commonality of dissociation and epideictic rhetoric is their reliance upon ethos as proof. If listeners do not trust a rhetor, they will not accept the dissociations that he offers.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, because epideictic oratory does not focus on securing a particular policy or judicial decision, the role of ethos is paramount, even more so when the speaker offers potentially challenging dissociations. The speaker performs ethos through the rhetorical choices of the



speech itself. Therefore, the audience judges performance by assessing the epideictic rhetor's selection of values to uphold and/or abhor, capacity to interpret reality in light of current or ideal cultural values, construction of her authority, provision of reasons for supporting her view of the world, ability to foster identification with listeners, skill at constructing a message by refashioning "fragments" from other cultural discourses, and adeptness of style.<sup>31</sup>

The performance of ethos is intertwined with rhetorical demonstration as proof. As Hauser explains, rhetorical demonstration in epideictic messages might seem at odds with demonstration in "mathematical, logical, or scientific arguments," but they have much in common. Both are grounded in the subject matter of their concern, attempt to gain listeners' commitment through showing or exhibiting, and make assertions based upon "purportedly irrefutable premises" since "rhetorical demonstrations possess an air of moral certainty that parallels the logical certainty" of these other types of proofs.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, epideictic rhetors deal with the subject of cultural values; use *lexis* to create affective images that display the essential "truth" of some person or matter, rather than just presenting empirical facts; and make arguments about presumably indisputable moral truths to induce particular judgments and ethical positions in the audience.<sup>33</sup> At epideictic rhetoric's most compelling, Sheard observes that it "alters the reality in which it participates by making its vision a reality for its audience and instilling a belief that the power for realizing the vision lies with them."<sup>34</sup> The epideictic speaker's rhetorical choices perform ethos that, in turn, impacts the willingness of the audience to accede to the process of reality transformation—including any dissociations offered—and the veracity of the rhetor's message. Furthermore, assessment of the speaker's eloquence serves as a judgment of the speaker's leadership capability.<sup>35</sup>

If epideictic speakers ignore ethos, they doom themselves to failure, particularly if they seek to modify audience perceptions significantly. Agnew demonstrates this point in her analysis of *New York Times* correspondent, Christopher Hedges, and his 2003 commencement speech at Rockford College in which he acknowledged neither the occasion nor the graduates, and instead began with a “trenchant critique” of the US war with Iraq; only in his conclusion did Hedges appeal to the shared value of love, by which point the audience was booing him and security personnel had to escort him to safety.<sup>36</sup> The pairing of epideictic discourse and dissociation is an enticing choice for transforming listeners’ views, but poor performance of ethos can lead to rejection of the speaker’s rhetorical demonstration of value precepts.

One figure in American history who especially seemed to appreciate epideictic rhetoric’s potential as a vehicle for change was John F. Kennedy. In the following, we explain the rhetorical context for his epideictic progression at American University.

### **Rhetorical Context for JFK’s Address at American University**

In 1963, the Kennedy administration’s primary foreign policy objective became détente with the USSR, specifically agreement on a limited test ban treaty to prohibit testing of nuclear weapons in space, the atmosphere, and under water.<sup>37</sup> Although the president believed this treaty was in US interests, his anticommunist rhetoric during his first two years as president would make it difficult to change the public’s negative perceptions of the Soviets and, in turn, to gain acceptance of the treaty. Therefore, Kennedy had to create a new context in which the public could view the USSR and a possible test ban agreement.<sup>38</sup>

The president was not, however, completely starting from scratch. A small but steady stream of Americans had been protesting both US and Soviet nuclear testing from his very first year in office. Beyond students and academics, women composed a major component of anti-

nuclear activists due to revelations that high levels of Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope, had been found in breast milk. In November 1961, for example, Women Strike for Peace organized tens of thousands of women to protest in cities all over the country, including Washington, DC. On January 15, 1962, 2000 American women picketed the White House, leading the president to meet with them briefly. More protests followed.<sup>39</sup> Altogether, the expressions of opposition raised questions about the rationality of current policies.

These impulses toward peace also provided Kennedy with an opening, but his chances of success were far from secure. The male-dominated realm of politics was less likely to pay heed to the opinions of women, and certainly anti-nuclear activists did not represent the views of even most Americans. The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis had undoubtedly shaken citizens, even more so in light of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's March 1963 revelation that the world had been on the brink of nuclear war.<sup>40</sup> For many, however, the incident simply reinforced what Wander described as prophetic dualism, a mode of argument descended from a fusion of Puritanism and World War I nationalism that became dominant during the Eisenhower-Dulles years. Prophetic dualism depicts a bipolar world in which one side "acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through total victory of one side over the other." A mere month after the crisis, for instance, columnist and conservative leader William F. Buckley, Jr., reflected on the potential for nuclear war that "if it is right that a single man is prepared to die for a just cause, it is right that an entire civilization be prepared to die for a just cause. . . . [And] it can scarcely be disputed that if ever a cause was just, this one is, for the enemy combines the ruthlessness and savagery of Genghis Khan with the fiendish scientific efficiency of an IBM machine." He concluded, "And if we die? We die." As Wander aptly observed, prophetic dualism makes

compromise with the enemy very difficult to explain. Indeed, Kennedy faced opposition within his own party to a test ban agreement. For example, in March 1963 Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut declared that any concessions in negotiating a test ban treaty would inevitably strengthen “our declared enemy,” “court war,” and “invite the destruction of our country and our civilization.”<sup>41</sup> Kennedy’s task in his American University speech was to exploit the opening that the expression of anxieties about nuclear weapons offered and to recast the context through which a critical mass of Americans still perceived U.S.-Soviet relations and a negotiated agreement on nuclear testing.

According to Wander, the foreign policy rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, particularly on Vietnam, countered prophetic dualism with technocratic realism, a mode of argument that “finds the modern world much too complex for old time religion. Not the prophet, but rather a skilled, tough expert is what is needed.” Technocratic realism emphasizes expediency and rationality, justifies negotiation, and has its origins in the Progressive Era.<sup>42</sup> In Kennedy’s American University address, we argue that the president evoked the broader strand of progressive thought, from which technocratic realism descends, to aid him in his persuasive endeavor. Progressivism may have been dormant in the Eisenhower-Dulles years, but it was not dead, and its guiding principles (education, rationality, tolerance, democratic practices, optimism about the prospect for human advancement, and faith in expert problem solving)<sup>43</sup> provided Kennedy with familiar cultural materials to help redefine the context of US-Soviet relations for his fellow Americans. Some of these ideas already resonated with citizens—even in the heyday of prophetic dualism, for instance, Americans retained great confidence in scientific expertise—but the growing voices of anti-nuclear opposition also

suggested that rhetorical efforts to reinvigorate progressive ideas like rationality and tolerance might well meet with success.

The president's address had other key audiences, as well. While European allies praised Kennedy for his management of the missile crisis, they were less than pleased he had allowed the crisis to develop in the first place. Indeed, French President Charles de Gaulle argued France was more capable of providing an effective nuclear deterrent to protect Western Europe than the United States, while West German officials were particularly leery of a test ban treaty and its implications for West German security. Only Great Britain, among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, already favored a test ban.<sup>44</sup> In sum, Kennedy needed to convince allies that any agreement with the USSR would uphold their security interests, too. Here again, though, a small opening presented itself, as revealed by public protests against nuclear weapons in allied countries. In August 1962, for example, rallies took place in Japan and all over Europe to oppose the USSR's resumption of nuclear testing, and in April 1963, 70,000 British demonstrators protested their own government's ongoing development of nuclear weapons.<sup>45</sup> While security concerns were paramount, some citizens in allied nations had begun to voice growing nuclear fears. Kennedy's task was to speak to the former and make use of the opportunity posed by the latter.

The USSR was also an important audience. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had agreed to discussions with Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on a possible test ban, but he had not yet indicated his decision to accept the limited test ban that the Americans had been offering for months, as opposed to a complete ban with other conditions related to Berlin that the premier preferred. Years later, evidence revealed that Khrushchev had already decided to accept the limited test ban when the president delivered his speech, but all

Kennedy knew at the time was that the premier faced internal political opposition—spearheaded by the Presidium’s Frol Kozlov and augmented by Soviet generals who supported tactical nuclear weapon use—due in part to what many viewed as Khrushchev’s embarrassing capitulation during the missile crisis. When a stroke incapacitated Kozlov in April 1963, pressure dissipated, but the premier still faced dissension in Moscow and among Eastern European governments for whom the missile crisis had undermined confidence in his leadership. Moreover, the Chinese, who maintained a tense alliance with the Soviets, had nuclear ambitions of their own and hence opposed a test ban. Because Khrushchev was sorting through all these problems, he had not yet revealed his decision to agree to the US proposal. Accordingly, Kennedy constructed his address with the idea of convincing Khrushchev and the Soviet political infrastructure to support a limited test ban.<sup>46</sup>

The selection of American University’s commencement as the venue was strategic. As Ted Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter and close advisor, later explained, American University was an ideal setting because it was known for “its focus on international affairs, including a program on conflict resolution.”<sup>47</sup> The ceremony also allowed the president to make use of the “teacher role” that epideictic rhetors assume. Furthermore, as Windt observed, the transition that commencements mark nicely underscored the transition in perspectives that Kennedy was asking Americans to make in regard to US-Soviet relations.<sup>48</sup>

The president also engaged in an uncharacteristic speechwriting process for strategic reasons by working solely with Sorensen to draft the address, consulting only a small group of advisors whom they swore to secrecy, and keeping the speech under wraps until two days before its delivery. Kennedy wanted to make a case for peace without bureaucratic intervention and feared, as Sorensen later explained, that Defense and State would insist on “the usual threats of

destruction, boasts of nuclear stockpiles, and lectures on Soviet treachery,” as well as conditions on any discussions.<sup>49</sup> The altered process gave Kennedy greater control over rhetorical invention.

As Kennedy took the stage at American University, then, he faced a challenging persuasive task. He not only had to help the graduates gracefully transition to a new chapter in their lives, but also he needed to transform his larger audiences’ views of the US-Soviet relationship so that they might support a limited test ban treaty and the transition to peace. While growing anti-nuclear protests and the sobering events of the Cuban missile crisis provided an opening, Kennedy confronted serious obstacles: his past anticommunist rhetoric; domestic opposition, including within his own party; the cultural strains of prophetic dualism that still dominated so many American arguments and perceptions; the insecurities of Western European allies; and the seeming ambivalence of Khrushchev who also faced political pressures. The president’s response to this situation was to employ epideictic progression—drawing on familiar cultural materials in the form of progressivism as he did so—to move his diverse audience, gradually, toward a new vision of the world.

### **Epideictic Progression in JFK’s American University Address**

From the start, Kennedy set the tone for both education and contemplation by stressing the setting. He referred to “President Woodrow Wilson,” who opened American University in 1914, and to “Professor Woodrow Wilson,” who encouraged college graduates to embrace public service. Kennedy’s words thereby linked presidential and pedagogical roles through reference to one of the nation’s most famous progressive presidents. Moreover, Kennedy quoted British poet laureate John Masefield’s observation that the university is ““a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see.””<sup>50</sup> By drawing attention to the university setting—an environment where the teacher-student

relationship prevails—the president asserted his epideictic role as the audience’s teacher, thus reinforcing his authority while placing listeners in the deferential position of attentive students.<sup>51</sup> His discussion of the setting was in keeping with progressivism’s faith in education as a solution to societal ills and also implied that Kennedy’s understanding of reality was, in fact, the “truth,” thereby bolstering his ethos, while his statement simultaneously praised listeners by suggesting their presence meant they disdained ignorant perceptions of reality and valued the imparting of knowledge. As Kennedy’s words were broadcast across the country and around the world,<sup>52</sup> he established the pedagogical nature of his address for all listeners, as few would respond to a ceremonial message by asserting that they loved ignorance and had no desire for knowledge.

In his speech, the president utilized epideictic progression by using both dissociation and epideictic norms to alter perceptions of reality that directly influenced one another. Epideictic progression begins with the rhetor engaging in praise and/or blame of some idea or entity in a manner congruent with audience perceptions and then strategically reflecting on that idea or entity and offering alternative perceptions through dissociation in conjunction with epideictic appeals, moving from the most abstract concepts to the most specific and meditating on each before reconceptualizing it. As the speaker offers each perceptual shift, she provides explanation to gain acceptance before moving to the next redefinition. The rhetor also interweaves each transformed perception with the ones that preceded it and thus provides an overall understanding that nurtures new attitudes and concomitant actions.

At American University, Kennedy made use of epideictic progression to: (1) unite the audience behind the value of “genuine peace”; (2) humanize the Soviets as worthy partners in genuine peace; (3) establish the reality of the Cold War and the credibility of the US leadership needed; and (4) connect lessons on genuine peace to domestic civil rights. These moves enabled



Kennedy to appeal to his primary audience of American citizens, but also to reach out to European allies and the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, he paved the way for domestic action on civil rights by linking altered perceptions of international peace with peace at home.

### **Uniting the Audience Behind “Genuine Peace”**

Beginning with the most abstract, but pivotal, concept related to a limited test ban, Kennedy addressed his domestic audience’s perception of peace. Most Americans valued peace, but perceived it in the post-war era as possible only if aggression were not tolerated. Therefore, an announcement regarding talks with the USSR on a test ban would almost certainly meet resistance from many US citizens who instinctively believed negotiation with the USSR meant tolerating Soviet aggression and putting peace at risk.

To alter these attitudes, Kennedy dissociated peace into “genuine peace” as a value around which Americans could unite. He and Sorensen crafted such a definition with help from a memorandum composed by National Security Council staffer Charles E. Johnson that outlined “the meaning of ‘peace’ in the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century” and compared the “unreal concept of peace” with what the president would term “genuine peace.” In addition, Kennedy and his speechwriter used Johnson’s notion that peace changes, as “Each generation must define peace for itself in meaningful terms.”<sup>53</sup> Taking these ideas and running with them, the president tried to unite the audience behind a new and far more flexible understanding of peace in the 1960s that framed cooperation with the USSR as positive, rather than alarming. This peace was genuine peace.

Employing epideictic progression, Kennedy attempted to shift the audience’s perception of peace by moving from the abstract to the more concrete. He began with familiar, idealistic outcomes of peace and then slowly transitioned to a more refined definition that constructed

peace not only as ideal, but also as rational, tolerant, democratic, and attainable, values often attributed to progressivism as well. Recalling his reference to the university setting, Kennedy first described world peace as “a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth [is] too rarely perceived.”<sup>54</sup> He depicted peace as complicated and misunderstood, thereby justifying the need for clarification by an authoritative source. Given Kennedy’s celebrated heroism during World War II and successful resolution of the missile crisis, he came to American University with a reputation for knowledge on matters of war and peace. Thus, Kennedy took advantage of both his existing credibility and the epideictic nature of his address to assume responsibility for teaching his audience the true meaning of peace. According to the president, “genuine peace” was “Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war” and “Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave.”<sup>55</sup> Instead, he distinguished the true form of peace as “the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.”<sup>56</sup> Here, Kennedy employed dissociation through antithesis to create a broad, favorable definition of genuine peace that could resonate with Americans generally and also with nuclear testing opponents like Women Strike for Peace specifically. He described two abstract concepts of peace, one “genuine” and one false, such that the familiar, idealistic definition attached to genuine peace stood in stark contrast to the dark and menacing alternatives, thereby enticing listeners to investigate genuine peace further. Moreover, the contrast between the allusion to Neville Chamberlain’s infamous “peace in our time” and the president’s promise of “peace in all time” offered reassurance that the pursuit of *genuine* peace would secure international peace

indefinitely. He included the USSR and US allies, as well, by maintaining that genuine peace applied to “all.”

By initially praising a broad and idealistic definition of genuine peace, Kennedy highlighted aspects of peace already recognizable to listeners since children grow up learning that peace brings happiness and promotes better living for all. This familiarity encouraged audience members to unite behind a common, identifiable understanding of peace and to feel they could relate to “genuine peace” without radically altering how they understood peace in the first place. Additionally, the abstract focus on peace’s idealistic outcomes framed it as a highly desirable goal that the audience would want to pursue. In all, Kennedy’s abstract definition of genuine peace made it a comfortable concept for listeners to accept and a sturdy platform on which he could build.

Returning to the concept of genuine peace as a state neither enforced by weapons nor secured by acquiescence, Kennedy drew on epideictic norms by situating his audience in the present<sup>57</sup> and simultaneously dissociating the idea of war. More precisely, he established “the new face of war” to demonstrate that nuclear weapons could not effectively bring peace, explain why world peace was such an urgent issue, and increase the overall appeal of genuine peace.<sup>58</sup> Unlike war of the past, the president argued that warfare in the atomic age was a zero sum game in which nuclear weapons produced no winners, only losers. Kennedy warned that total war in the nuclear age would be irreversible, far more destructive, and hence irrational. As he made his case, the president used anaphora, which stylistically appealed to listeners to accept his redefinition of war through repetitive form and emotional climax.<sup>59</sup>

*Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It*

*makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by the wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.*<sup>60</sup>

Although many citizens perceived nuclear armaments as essential to secure peace, Kennedy portrayed an unstable world in which nuclear weapons were not a safeguard against danger, but rather a step toward the annihilation of humankind. This state of affairs led to a clear conclusion: peace was “the necessary, rational end of rational men.” As a result, Kennedy implored, “we have no more urgent task,”<sup>61</sup> his rhetoric echoing progressivism’s emphasis on rationality. Altogether, the president’s focus on the futility and horrific consequences of nuclear war attempted to adjust the audience’s perception of reality by making genuine peace more attractive and the prospect of change in how most Americans viewed peace less alarming. If genuine peace prevailed, Americans would have no need to fear nuclear destruction.

Nonetheless, Kennedy acknowledged that some citizens might understand the perils of nuclear weapons, but still see peace and disarmament as impractical until the Soviet Union assumed “a more enlightened attitude.”<sup>62</sup> He disputed this mindset by asserting that Americans could help prompt such an attitudinal shift by reconsidering their own perceptions of peace, the USSR, and the Cold War.

Again using epideictic progression, the president returned to the most abstract of those perceptions and asked his American pupils to reexamine their understanding of peace.<sup>63</sup> Kennedy once more engaged in dissociation, this time by contrasting genuine peace with “absolute” peace or what he alliteratively described as a foolish concept associated only with “fantasies and

fanatics,” thereby simultaneously separating himself from extremists on both ends of the continuum. According to the president, those who ascribed to the inflexible idea of absolute peace held a “dangerous and defeatist belief” that only discouraged hope for a better future since absolute peace characterized peace as “impossible,” war as “inevitable,” and destiny as uncontrollable.<sup>64</sup>

Genuine peace, by contrast, provided hope because it recognized that “no problem of human destiny” was “unsolvable,”<sup>65</sup> words that conjured the nation’s progressive past with its indefatigable confidence that people could improve society.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, genuine peace did not require absolute harmony to be sought or maintained between opposing parties, but instead merely required “mutual tolerance” and conflict resolution through “just and peaceful settlement.”<sup>67</sup> Because genuine peace permitted “quarrels and conflicting interests,” Kennedy encouraged listeners to view peace with those who differed as possible and even desirable.<sup>68</sup> Accepting the concept of genuine peace as legitimate also meant Americans could seek a peaceful global community that would lead to a high quality of life and a secure future without legitimizing communism or weakening democracy.

Kennedy refined his definition further when he claimed genuine peace fostered democratic principles because it relied on cooperation and negotiation. Not only was genuine peace a goal, but also a problem-solving “process” that, like congressional deliberation, produced “concrete actions” through “effective agreements” that incorporated the voices of multiple actors.<sup>69</sup> Genuine peace was therefore both desirable and practical, particularly since it did not require people or nations to abandon foundational beliefs. Overall, Kennedy ascribed specific positive characteristics to genuine peace to shift the concept from an abstract idea to a concrete, rational goal achievable through a pragmatic, democratic process. His attributions of

tolerance and democratic practices to genuine peace idealistically legitimized the concept by evoking the American progressivism of days past.<sup>70</sup> At the same time, genuine peace, unlike nuclear weaponry, was an effective way to generate global security and democracy.

Kennedy also argued that genuine peace was not unchanging, nor could it be achieved through the policies of just “one or two powers.” He explained, “Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation.”<sup>71</sup> In this passage, Kennedy nodded to Western European allies by making clear that their partnership was needed, too. The president simultaneously linked the need for genuine peace with the challenge of nuclear weapons faced by a “new generation,” a phrase that broadly encompassed his own administration, the “new generation of Americans” that he invoked in his inaugural and which he represented, citizens around the globe who faced the new dangers of the atomic age, as well as the young graduates seated before him. Additionally, Kennedy pedagogically underscored the changing nature of genuine peace—clearly reflecting Johnson’s memo—when he explained “history teaches us” that no matter how “fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors.”<sup>72</sup> Thus, tension between the United States and the USSR was neither inevitable nor permanent and, while genuine peace could not be achieved by the United States alone, Americans could take the first step to transform US-Soviet relations.

Finally, Kennedy stressed the importance of pursuing a reconceptualized goal of genuine peace when he stated, “Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly towards it.”<sup>73</sup> Here, as

elsewhere in his speech, Kennedy performed dissociation through a high style employing antithesis, assonance, and balanced structure that aesthetically carried the listener along to his conclusion, while his progressive allusions to practicality and management made the redefinition plausible.

### **Humanizing the Soviets as Worthy Partners in Genuine Peace**

Kennedy's reconceptualization of genuine peace had encouraged listeners to view peace with adversaries as possible. However, if the USSR were truly an evil nation with the aim of destroying the United States, then even genuine peace was unattainable. The president therefore used epideictic progression to alter such views in a gradual way. He explained that "genuine peace" was dependent not just upon the Soviets, but also upon Americans who must "reexamine our attitudes toward the Soviet Union."<sup>74</sup>

As with his redefinition of peace, Kennedy began with ideas familiar to the audience, slowly increasing the degree of change proposed so as to make perceptual transformations less alarming. He did not immediately revert from his cold warrior persona, but instead engaged in familiar epideictic appeals that blamed the USSR for perpetuating misguided perceptions. Unlike his rhetoric of the past, though, Kennedy and Sorensen made a clear effort to refrain from assigning blame directly to the Soviet government. The initial speech draft declared, "it is discouraging to realize that their leaders may actually believe—and I quote Chairman Khrushchev—that our foreign policy 'is determined by class interests of monopoly capital...by those bourgeoisie groups which enrich themselves on the arms race.'<sup>75</sup> Because blaming the Soviet leadership would discourage US citizens' support for cooperation on a test ban and strain the superpowers' already tense relationship, the president instead claimed, "It is discouraging to think their leaders may actually believe what their *propagandists* write."<sup>76</sup>

Kennedy then gave an illustration of outlandish claims from Soviet propagandists that maintained the United States was preparing to wage war on the USSR and that the political goals “of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries. . . and to achieve world domination.”<sup>77</sup> By attributing blame for overtly false accusations to vague “propagandists,” rather than to Khrushchev himself, the president engaged in dissociation that redefined Soviet leaders and, by implication, Soviet citizens, as ignorant, misled people rather than evil people. He further suggested that it was the propagandists who were malevolent, for after providing examples from their messages, Kennedy commented, “Truly, as it was written long ago: ‘The wicked flee when no man pursueth.’”<sup>78</sup> By using “truly” to set up this biblical allusion to Proverbs, Kennedy not only cast the propagandists as wicked and their claims as baseless, but also depicted his own stance as moral and accurate. Universities were, he had asserted, places where ignorance was revealed and truth disseminated. Thus, Kennedy, the epideictic teacher, simultaneously unveiled the true source of misguided Soviet perceptions—ignorance cultivated by “propagandists”—and gave hope that such ignorance could be remedied, an assertion once more reflecting progressivism’s faith in education.

As he continued, Kennedy persisted in blaming communist propagandists, but depicted their work as a cause for sorrow, rather than anger. The president said it made him “sad” when he realized “the extent of the gulf” between the two nations.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, a gulf is capable of being bridged, implying that US-Soviet differences could be spanned. Mending this relationship was only possible, however, if Americans took Soviet ignorance as a warning “not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more



than an exchange of threats.”<sup>80</sup> By discussing Soviet ignorance this way, Kennedy alluded to principles inherent in genuine peace—for instance, that peace does not require absolute agreement—and thereby linked genuine peace with the re-examination of American attitudes toward the USSR. The president simultaneously reaffirmed genuine peace by contrasting it with the Soviet people’s misguided understanding of peace and possible cooperation with the United States, and he made use of anaphora, alliteration, assonance, antithesis, and balanced structure to do so. Epideictic rhetoric, of course, often contrasts a group and its values with those who differ as a way of producing group unity.<sup>81</sup> While the president’s rhetoric certainly contrasted his American listeners—who, he argued, were open to the truth—with their Soviet counterparts who had been misled by propagandists, Kennedy also suggested that Americans should be wary, lest they succumb to similar deceptions. Indeed, he may have intended his words as a warning to Americans not to be misled by US propagandists, who would inevitably reject and campaign against genuine peace with the USSR.

The president’s ascription of blame to nameless, ambiguous Soviet “propagandists” also laid the groundwork for his outright praise of the Soviet people, which further refined his portrayal of them as misguided yet still virtuous.<sup>82</sup> According to Kennedy, the Soviets were not immoral, for “No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking virtue.”<sup>83</sup> His words offered hope, because if the Soviets were good people simply misled by propagandists, then the two countries could potentially reconcile their differences by expelling ignorance.

To continue inspiring attitudinal change, Kennedy focused on the USSR’s accomplishments, US-Soviet commonalities, and collective memories of World War II. He recognized the Soviet people’s “many achievements—in science and space, in economic and

industrial growth, in culture and acts of courage” as a source of justifiable pride.<sup>84</sup> By glossing over negative US memories of Soviet successes like Sputnik and by praising the USSR’s advancements as solely positive deeds, Kennedy encouraged Americans to view the Soviets not as an enemy to defeat, but as a hard-working, accomplished people.<sup>85</sup>

Next, the president claimed that the USSR and the United States had many similarities, with their “mutual abhorrence of war” constituting the strongest tie.<sup>86</sup> To make this claim easier to accept, Kennedy drew on collective memories of World War II to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s virtue. Narrating the USSR’s losses was an attempt to elicit compassion and help Americans understand why the Soviet people would desire peace. Kennedy declared, “no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the Second World War.”<sup>87</sup> To emphasize the extent of devastation, he listed Soviet losses—20 million killed, millions of homes and farms destroyed, and a third of the nation’s territory laid waste. Kennedy put the enormity of this suffering into perspective for Americans by explaining that the amount of Soviet territory “turned into a wasteland” was “equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.”<sup>88</sup> Soviet audience members also would have appreciated his acknowledgement of their sacrifice.

Taken together, Kennedy’s descriptions established the integrity of the Soviet people—and thus their nation—by admiring their accomplishments and encouraging compassion for their losses. His praise implied that Soviet achievements and sacrifices were no less significant simply because of the USSR’s vastly different ideology. Furthermore, the president’s focus on collective memories of World War II reminded both Americans and Soviets of a time when their countries were allies—he carefully omitted reference to the USSR’s initial alliance with Nazi Germany—thereby suggesting the potential for new cooperation. Like the rhetors in Vivian’s study who used epideictic performance constructively to resolve intrastate conflict,<sup>89</sup> Kennedy “re-

membered” the history of US-Soviet relations in order to make a more productive relationship in the present seem possible. The president added that the two nations “have never been at war with each other,” an accomplishment nearly “unique, among the major world powers,”<sup>90</sup> which suggested a sturdy basis for improved relations.

By blaming propagandists rather than the Soviet leadership, praising the virtue of the Soviet people, and establishing shared commonalities, Kennedy constructed a consubstantial framework in which the two countries once again were partners and, in fact, shared a common foe, a framework he had suggested earlier when discussing the new face of war.<sup>91</sup> Kennedy now returned to the idea by describing the horrific consequences of nuclear war for both nations. He proclaimed that “should total war ever break out again...the two strongest powers,” the United States and the USSR, would be the main targets and suffer the most “devastation.” He stressed the potential annihilation the two countries faced when he stated, “All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours.”<sup>92</sup> Indeed, the president acknowledged that the United States and the USSR shared the “heaviest” burdens of the Cold War since both countries had committed huge amounts of money to nuclear weapons, money that could be better spent “to combat ignorance, poverty and disease,”<sup>93</sup> a claim that again alluded to the United States’ progressive past and its emphasis on education and the application of resources and expertise to combat social ills.<sup>94</sup> Here, the president’s reference to “ignorance” also directed listeners back to genuine peace as a concept associated with dispelling ignorance.

Kennedy therefore argued that the main peril of the early 1960s was not the USSR, but rather nuclear weapons and the arms race, which had driven the superpowers together, forcing them to assume the world’s greatest responsibilities. Moreover, he assigned blame to both countries, noting that they were “caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on

one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons,”<sup>95</sup> his depiction of mutual blame again reflecting a characteristic that Vivian identified in the use of epideictic rhetoric to move constructively beyond intrastate conflict.<sup>96</sup>

Neatly intertwining the concepts of genuine peace, a newly-humanized USSR, and the shared danger of nuclear weapons, Kennedy’s epideictic progression pointed to the need for future political action by confidently asserting that it was in the interests of both nations to secure a “genuine peace.”<sup>97</sup> The president hinted that a treaty to halt the arms race would be the best course of action, as “even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.”<sup>98</sup> Kennedy then asked listeners, in light of potential nuclear devastation, to adopt the principle of genuine peace and to remember important commonalities that the United States and USSR shared. As he interwove these three ideas, the president began his entreaty with antithesis and ended it with anaphora: “So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct our attention to common interests and the means by which our differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal.”<sup>99</sup> Alluding to concerns expressed by the “extremely earnest” American women who opposed nuclear war<sup>100</sup>—as well as by other activists in both the United States and abroad—Kennedy’s words transcended animosities between East and West. With the USSR established as a worthy partner for the US mission to achieve genuine peace and with blame for world tension shifted to the dangers of nuclear weapons, Kennedy then moved to alter one final set of perceptions likely to hinder acceptance of a limited test ban treaty.

## **Establishing the Reality of the Cold War and Credibility of the US Leadership Needed**

One remaining problem was the perception of the Cold War as a competition for ultimate victory, which left little room for negotiation and permanently pitted the United States and the Soviet Union against one another, while a second was the dominant mindset that negotiating with the USSR meant endangering US safety and straying from commitments to allies. In response, Kennedy reconceptualized the reality of the Cold War to make peace seem imperative and demonstrated that the United States—and, implicitly, his administration—had the leadership skills necessary to achieve peace without threatening security needs. His rhetoric thereby reflected progressivism’s optimism that formidable problems could be solved through the application of expertise.

The president first used dissociation to urge listeners to reexamine their “attitude towards the cold war, remembering we’re not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points.”<sup>101</sup> The Cold War was not about “distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment.” Instead, Americans needed to “deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different.”<sup>102</sup> Drawing on the rhetoric of realism,<sup>103</sup> Kennedy dissociated perceptions of the Cold War into those that were true and those that were false. His positive portrayals of the Soviet people and assignment of blame to the nuclear arms race had revealed the reality of the world situation, one in which genuine peace was both attainable and necessary to avoid nuclear war’s devastating consequences.

After establishing the new reality of the Cold War, the president emphasized how it called for a new kind of leadership. He did not immediately propose a test ban treaty, but instead used epideictic progression to move his audience gradually toward it. Kennedy first talked in

broad terms about how the United States must “persevere” and “conduct our affairs in such a way” that the USSR would recognize “genuine peace” as in its interests.<sup>104</sup>

However, since many Americans—and US allies—viewed negotiating with the USSR as imprudent, Kennedy next constructed a new kind of US leadership, one already embedded in current policies, that would both achieve genuine peace and protect vital interests. The president said to secure these ends, “America’s weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility.”<sup>105</sup> In short, Kennedy depicted the United States as a virtuous exemplar that not only had the specialized tools and institutions in place for security but also for the endeavor of genuine peace. His words exemplified both technocratic realism and the progressive rhetoric from which it descended by emphasizing problem solving through “dispassionate, informed, and pragmatic expertise.”<sup>106</sup> Kennedy then performed dissociation through polyptoton to explain this necessary, new-yet-old form of US leadership by reassuring dubious listeners that “we can seek a *relaxation* of tensions without *relaxing* our guard.”<sup>107</sup>

Rather than completely break with his past rhetoric, Kennedy employed familiar praise and blame to underscore American moral superiority: “And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people—but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.”<sup>108</sup> In this passage, Kennedy indirectly indicted the USSR and/or communism in ways recognizable to his audiences, but also diminished the reproach by not naming the party with whom he was comparing the United States and by emphasizing peaceful competition.<sup>109</sup> His praise and blame here were

significant because they demonstrated, enthymematically, that the president still understood the basic differences in character that separated the United States from the USSR and the free world from the communist world, but without engaging in explicit antithetical appeals that would undermine his earlier redefinition of the Soviet Union. He similarly attributed global tensions to “the *Communist* drive to impose their political and economic system on others”—a line that he and Sorensen took pains to soften from “the *Soviet* drive” that appeared in the initial draft—but immediately downplayed this criticism by observing that “if *all* nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured.”<sup>110</sup>

Kennedy’s words bridged his old rhetoric to the new so as to provide consistency and reassurance about the wisdom of his leadership, but without completely undercutting his earlier efforts to remake the USSR into a worthy partner for peace. The president’s paen to American virtue also reflected the nationalism of progressivism that undergirds both technocratic realism and prophetic dualism,<sup>111</sup> thereby depicting his redefinition of the Cold War as a small shift, rather than a dramatic change.

Working from abstract attributes to more specific actions, Kennedy continued to demonstrate the United States’ credibility as a virtuous nation that could offer the leadership needed for both a reconceptualized peace and a reconceptualized security. He mentioned, for example, how the United States wanted to assist the United Nations with its financial problems, make the UN “a more effective instrument” for the pursuit of genuine peace, and develop it into “a *genuine* world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.”<sup>112</sup> The president’s dissociation of security here matched his earlier dissociation of peace since genuine or real security could be found not in an ever-escalating arms

race, but in an international system of democracy that could lead to disarmament, a claim that invoked the progressivism of Wilsonian internationalism and its alluring dream of the League of Nations, a dream that—in popular recollection—citizens had supported and a shortsighted US Senate had thwarted, thereby leading to World War II.<sup>113</sup> In addition, Kennedy pointed to specific exemplary US actions in the past—its “patient and persistent” attempts to make peace among nations in the “non-Communist world” in places like the Congo and US efforts to mediate differences with Mexico and Canada<sup>114</sup>—as evidence that the United States had both the competence and commitment needed to attain genuine peace.

Kennedy then spoke directly to US allies, insisting that the United States remained committed to them out of a sense of both virtue and pragmatism. As he proclaimed, “The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge.”<sup>115</sup> Notably, a comparison of the first and final versions of the speech indicates that Kennedy added explicit reassurances for Western Europe and West Berlin,<sup>116</sup> as he likely assumed they would worry most about negotiation with the USSR and any sign of wavering US strength.

Although the president stressed that both the United States and its allies were determined to protect the “frontiers of freedom,” he also underlined their common interest in “pursuing the paths of peace”<sup>117</sup> and thereby set up his announcement of particular deliberative actions. Kennedy began by referencing acts already familiar to his audiences, such as the recent proposal to add a direct communication line between Moscow and Washington, DC. Additionally, he reaffirmed support for the ongoing Geneva arms talks as consistent with the “pursuit of disarmament [that] has been an effort of this Government since the 1920s,” as “urgently sought



by the past three administrations,”<sup>118</sup> and hence, as faithful with longstanding bipartisan endeavors.

Next, Kennedy raised the possibility of a limited test ban treaty, for such a treaty “would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit. . . .”<sup>119</sup> He then made two major, but brief announcements: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom had agreed to begin talks on a test ban, and the United States would halt nuclear testing in the atmosphere, so long as other nations did the same.<sup>120</sup> Each announcement prompted applause. Within the context that Kennedy had established, his declarations seemed to be reasonable responses to Cold War reality where nuclear weapons threatened the entire world and where the United States—and its president—were well equipped to provide the leadership needed to attain peace without losing security or abandoning allies. Indeed, Kennedy treated these announcements as almost routine by elaborating very little and instead turning to a domestic issue that might, at first blush, seem far removed from foreign affairs.

### **Connecting Lessons on Genuine Peace to Domestic Civil Rights**

In the days prior to his address, Kennedy was also grappling with the issue of civil rights, as Alabama Governor George Wallace had pledged to prevent the enrollment of two African American students at the University of Alabama. When Kennedy and Sorensen drafted his commencement speech, they likely were unsure of exactly when James Hood and Vivian Malone would attempt to register, but knew it would be after June 10, as the university did not want them registering the same day as white summer registrants. The president had, up to that point, maintained a primarily legalistic stance toward civil rights, even in the face of Bull Connor’s brutality in April 1963.<sup>121</sup> In a nationwide address on June 11, the day after American

University's commencement, Kennedy would move the case for racial equality to moral grounds and call for legislative action to desegregate public facilities.<sup>122</sup> On June 10, however, he used his epideictic speech to link peace abroad with peace at home, thereby adumbrating value premises on which he would later draw.

While not explicitly mentioning civil rights until the end of his address, Kennedy foreshadowed their appearance. His introduction praised American University as an “institution of higher learning for all who wish to learn, whatever their color or their creed,” and extolled the school’s “enlightened” mission, immediately adding “and I commend all those who are today graduating,”<sup>123</sup> which extended his praise of tolerance—a value idealistically associated with progressivism—to the students before him, while also fulfilling epideictic expectations of congratulations.

Kennedy's speech clearly focused on international peace, but often his phrasing was multivocal, for his words also were meaningful in the context of civil rights.<sup>124</sup> For instance, his definition of genuine peace—“the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living—the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children”—could be applied to US race relations, too.<sup>125</sup> Although many Americans viewed peace between black and white citizens as “impossible,” just as the president had described common perceptions of peace with the Soviets, Kennedy's definition of genuine peace insisted that cooperation *was* possible. He maintained that genuine peace was a “dynamic” form of peace that transformed “to meet the challenge of each new generation.”<sup>126</sup> Likewise, he insisted that genuine peace “does not require that each man love his neighbor—it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement,”<sup>127</sup> a claim also relevant to race and illustrative of the democratic principles and progressive methods that Kennedy

associated with genuine peace. The president spoke multivocally, too, when he claimed that no matter how “fixed our likes and dislikes may seem,” history had shown that “surprising changes” in relationships may occur, for “enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever.”<sup>128</sup> In all, Kennedy depicted genuine peace—a flexible concept that changed with the times, stressed tolerance, and provided hope without expectations of complete harmony—such that its attributes related to conflict resolution both abroad and at home.

After announcing talks on a test ban treaty and the US decision to stop atmospheric tests, the president built upon this earlier multivocality for a more explicit lesson on genuine peace and civil rights. He stated, “Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude towards peace and freedom here at home.”<sup>129</sup> The word “freedom,” significantly, had appeared only twice earlier in the speech: when Kennedy observed that Americans could attain genuine peace with the Soviets even if they personally found communism “repugnant as a negation of personal freedom,” and when he claimed that the United States and its allies had interests both in protecting “the frontiers of freedom” and in pursuing “the paths of peace.”<sup>130</sup> Through these phrases, Kennedy reflected how most Americans perceived freedom *and* peace as cardinal US principles deserving of protection. He may have gradually redefined peace as genuine peace, but still depicted it as closely intertwined with freedom.

In reexamining attitudes toward these values at home, Kennedy emphasized how national and individual actions must uphold both peace and freedom. The president emphasized, “The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad,” and he pointed to how some graduates would demonstrate the virtuous character of the country through Peace Corps service.<sup>131</sup> Such actions alone, however, were insufficient. Moving from the broader international context to domestic civil rights, Kennedy asserted, “But wherever we are, we must

all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace *and* freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.”<sup>132</sup> The failure to provide security for freedom abroad could endanger genuine peace, but the same disregard for freedom at home not only could lead to domestic conflict, such as the attacks on civil rights advocates, but also—the president implied—could harm efforts at peace abroad.

With this intersection of domestic and international realms, Kennedy offered a specific accounting of obligations for civil rights: “It is the responsibility of the executive branch *at all levels* of government—local, State, and National—to provide and protect that freedom for *all of our citizens* by *all means* within our authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch *at all levels*, wherever the authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of *all citizens in all sections* of this country to respect the rights of others and [to] respect the law of the land.”<sup>133</sup> Once again, the president employed anaphora—“It is the responsibility”—while his use of conduplicatio, through the repetition of “all” in successive clauses, emphasized the obligation that each and every party had to ensure freedom. Through such stylistic devices typical of epideictic, Kennedy encouraged listeners to yield to the form of his address as a way to encourage acquiescence to the image of the world he presented and to his legitimacy to direct action in response to that world. The president’s audience at American University shared its positive judgment of his appeal by interrupting him with applause, an action that functioned to endorse Kennedy’s statements. Of course, members of the campus were likely predisposed toward his views on civil rights, but that is why he had selected them as his immediate audience in the first place.

Kennedy realized, nonetheless, that many Americans might agree with his assessment of genuine peace in international affairs yet question its linkage to domestic issues of race, for he

quickly added that “all this is not unrelated to world peace.”<sup>134</sup> Turning again to Proverbs, the president intoned, “‘When a man’s way[s] please the Lord,’ the Scriptures tell us, ‘he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.’ And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation—the right to breathe air as nature provided it—the right of future generations to a healthy existence?”<sup>135</sup> Just as Kennedy had used biblical injunction to disparage the acts of Soviet “propagandists,” he drew on it here to argue that actions at home impacted US credibility abroad, including efforts to attain genuine peace. His assertion employed dissociation to redefine “rights,” a concept traditionally associated with freedom, into “human rights,” a concept more clearly relevant to the issue of race, and then equated human rights with peace. Even Kennedy’s examples of human rights were multivocal, germane to threats posed by both racial discrimination and nuclear arms.

As the president closed, he returned more overtly to genuine peace with the USSR and reiterated his new vision of the world. Kennedy admitted that no treaty could “provide absolute security,” but insisted that an agreement written with the interests of its signers in mind and accompanied by effective enforcement would provide “far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.”<sup>136</sup> He reinforced his depictions of US leadership as appropriate for such a task by emphasizing that the United States would never start a war because “This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and *hate* and *oppression*,”<sup>137</sup> a line that again spoke to both international and race relations and prompted a fourth burst of applause. At the same time, Kennedy reassured Americans and allies that the United States would always be prepared for war “if others wish it.” Nevertheless, he once more drew on progressive allusions to conclude, “we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the *weak are safe* and the *strong are just*. . . . Confident and unafraid, we

must labor on—not towards a strategy of annihilation but towards a strategy of peace.”<sup>138</sup>

Kennedy’s compelling peroration upheld a transformed image of the world in which genuine peace—a goal necessitated by nuclear weapons—could be attained with opponents through leadership that carefully protected security by being prepared for war while negotiating for peace. In regard to racial discrimination, Kennedy offered no deliberative remedies—those would come on June 11—but his multivocality and epideictic progression connected civil rights with his altered vision of genuine peace and foreshadowed the value warrants he would call upon the next day when he pointed out the hypocrisy of preaching “freedom around the world” but not providing freedom to African Americans at home, urged Congress to pass open accommodation legislation, and implored Americans to support such efforts.<sup>139</sup>

### **Epideictic Progression and the Rhetoric of the Possible**

Overall, Kennedy’s address appeared to garner favorable responses. Although some congressional Republicans called it “a dreadful mistake,” he received mostly positive domestic reactions. *The New York Times*, for example, praised Kennedy’s “eloquent” entreaty, while columnist Walter Lippmann endorsed his appeals for “coexistence” as the only sensible option and—not surprisingly—liberal religious and political leaders expressed support.<sup>140</sup> In the USSR and Eastern bloc, the state press both praised and critiqued Kennedy’s message. Nevertheless, the USSR broadcast the speech, in translation, with almost no interruption, rebroadcast it sans censorship and, soon after, stopped jamming Western broadcasts entirely for the first time in fifteen years. Khrushchev told US envoy Averell Harriman that Kennedy’s address “was the best speech delivered by any American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt.” The Council of Ministers also viewed the address favorably and permitted the Soviet press to publish it in full.<sup>141</sup> As for allies, the United States Information Agency reported that—aside from somewhat

negative responses in France and “friendly, but somewhat skeptical” reactions in Germany—Western European media coverage had been “uniformly good.”<sup>142</sup>

These positive responses notwithstanding, critics have cited two events that diffused the speech’s impact. First, Wallace’s refusal the next day to allow Hood and Malone to register prompted Kennedy to federalize the National Guard and address the nation on racial discrimination, which shifted public attention away from foreign policy and toward civil rights.<sup>143</sup> Second, the president began a tour of Western Europe on June 23 that included his “Ich Bin Ein Berliner” address in which—as Windt put it—Kennedy got “carried away” and harshly criticized communism, which seemed to undercut his earlier message.<sup>144</sup>

Nonetheless, negotiations on a limited test ban went forward. The president had undertaken his Western European trip to give allies—and anti-communists at home—additional reassurance that nuclear détente could be achieved without abandoning their interests, and his other speeches on the trip stayed consistent with that theme.<sup>145</sup> Although the “Ich Bin Ein Berliner” speech was vacant of peace appeals, Khrushchev returned a favor that Kennedy had paid him in the midst of the missile crisis: he ignored the belligerent message and responded, instead, to the conciliatory one delivered earlier. On July 2, the premier went to East Berlin, where—with most of his internal problems temporarily resolved—he announced that the USSR would accept a limited test ban treaty.<sup>146</sup> In August, Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The US Senate approved it by a margin of 80 to 19, and Kennedy signed the LTBT into law on October 7. Public opinion research found 76 percent of Americans supported the treaty, with only 16 percent opposed, while it also “boosted American prestige” in France, England, Italy, and Germany.<sup>147</sup>

Our study has implications both for rhetorical studies and for interdisciplinary scholarship on peace and conflict. While Western culture often takes ceremonial discourse for granted as superficial platitudes, some rhetorical scholars have, conversely, criticized the use of epideictic oratory to attack the vulnerable or suppress dissent, while others have praised its value as a safe means by which individuals low in societal power may challenge conventions.<sup>148</sup> Scholars in the area of peace and conflict, meanwhile, have shed light on the socio-psychological barriers that impede peace efforts and the impact of media framing on public attitudes, but have paid relatively little attention to public address generally, let alone epideictic discourse specifically.<sup>149</sup> One of the rare places where rhetorical studies and peace studies have intersected is in Vivian's examination of how four different leaders used epideictic performances in intrastate conflicts to offer group motivations for war or peace, particularly through the provision of collective memories.<sup>150</sup>

Our analysis of Kennedy's American University speech builds on past research—particularly Vivian's work—in several ways. First, our study affirms that elected leaders may employ epideictic discourse to inculcate change that can lead to peace. While any form of rhetoric may be utilized for good or ill, the president's address demonstrates how epideictic performance can challenge old prejudices and imagine new worlds, a task especially pertinent to calls for peace and social justice. Kennedy's use of his speech to prepare the way for his June 11 civil rights address also suggests how ceremonial speeches may offer refined value warrants and visions of reality on which subsequent, more deliberative messages build.<sup>151</sup> Additionally, our study affirms that “mutual blame” is an available strategy for epideictic performances on behalf of peace in interstate, as well as intrastate conflicts. References to mutual responsibility violate



bipolar worldviews, thereby pointing the way to more nuanced perceptions on the part of citizens and also on the part of allies and enemies “listening in” through media coverage.

More importantly, however, we identify yet another strategy, epideictic progression, whereby leaders may draw upon an intricate combination of dissociation and epideictic norms to instigate profound change on behalf of peace. In this respect, Kennedy’s epideictic progression reflects the sophists’ view of rhetoric, as articulated by Poulakos, where a rhetor initially addresses listeners “as they are and where they are” and then constructs a “vision of a new world” and “invites them to join him there by honoring his disclosure and by adopting his suggestion.”<sup>152</sup> Dissociation permits the epideictic rhetor to create this novel perspective by discursively building it out of familiar cultural materials. While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observed how epideictic discourse and dissociation might work hand in hand, we have demonstrated through the concept of epideictic progression how rhetors may alter not just a single perception, but a whole succession of perceptions, offering explanation for acceptance of the first perceptual shift before moving to the next and then interweaving each altered concept with the preceding ones. The potential to recast symbolic worldviews so thoroughly could be especially useful to peace efforts.

Kennedy’s rhetoric used epideictic progression at a time when prophetic dualism still heavily influenced American culture, but growing anti-nuclear protests and shocking reverberations of the missile crisis suggested an opening for the countervailing rationality of progressivism. The president sequentially used dissociation to redefine “genuine peace” into both a goal and a process that were universal, rational, achievable, realistic, and democratic. Through a series of intertwining dissociations that appealed to progressive values, Kennedy likewise humanized the Soviets as worthy partners, provided a realistic perspective on the Cold War, and

established that both he and the United States had the leadership needed to achieve “genuine peace.” The president thereby encouraged Americans to forego prophetic dualism and to assume the identity of a *demos* committed to a tolerant, pragmatic, dynamic, and achievable “genuine peace,”<sup>153</sup> an identity congruent with the cultural and symbolic past, yet adaptable to a new present and future with the USSR. As such, Kennedy’s epideictic progression engaged in what Vivian calls “public forgetting” by helping the polity to “terminate a past no longer serviceable” and to “reinvent itself, to begin anew.”<sup>154</sup> Two scholars whose work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also bridged rhetorical studies and peace studies, Rowland and Frank, have further argued that rhetors who employ pragmatic arguments to legitimize peacemaking have to “account for both identity and the need for compromise.”<sup>155</sup> Through our analysis, we illumine one way—epideictic progression—through which such legitimation may occur.

Another implication is the significant role that high style appears to play in epideictic peace performances. As noted earlier, epideictic rhetoric places the rhetor in a pedagogical position of authority, but the form of epideictic discourse—including the high style discussed here—has “an institutional character, or ethos” that lends legitimacy to rhetors and their claims.<sup>156</sup> In this sense, artfully enacted style can increase the probability that listeners will positively judge the speaker’s performance and be swayed by her appeals. Through figures like polyptoton and antithesis, the rhetor can also engage in epideictic progression by dissociating concepts while still remaining consistent with stylistic norms. The familiar cultural materials on which the rhetor draws for epideictic progression—in Kennedy’s case, progressivism—may also be reinvigorated by the engaging nature of the rhetor’s style. Other attributes of high style such as anaphora, assonance, and balanced structure play a role by encouraging collaboration with the formal aspects of the message and therefore increasing the likelihood that listeners will accept its

content. War is, Burke tells us, the “ultimate *disease* of cooperation,”<sup>157</sup> but Kennedy’s address demonstrates that listeners may likewise arrive at the cure of peace through stylistic cooperation. For the sophists, as well as for the Roman rhetoricians, invention could not be severed from style, and both Cicero and Quintilian stressed that the rhetor not only must convince listeners of the facts leading to a particular conclusion but also use a fitting style to stir the emotions.<sup>158</sup>

The merging of argument with collaborative action and emotion may be especially crucial to epideictic performances for peace. In *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry*, Cole explains that rituals can help to alter community perceptions of trauma if the rituals make use of affect—including affect “produced collectively during the rite” through community witnessing and ritual call and response—and if the rituals fuse the affect with “a strategically produced narrative.”<sup>159</sup> The value of high style in epideictic performances for peace is that it enhances legitimacy and enacts dissociative arguments while also binding the audience and rhetor together through stylistic cooperation and emotional arousal in a transformative, strategic rhetoric and ritual. Indeed, Campbell and Jamieson maintain that high style “heightens experience” and “invites contemplation,”<sup>160</sup> which leads us to conclude that a dearth of high style in a leader’s repertoire will limit her ability to construct compelling new visions for citizens to contemplate and adopt even when peace, pragmatically, makes sense. Because our analysis encompasses just one case, additional studies of how leaders use epideictic rhetoric to advance peace could shed light on the role of style in such discourse and any cultural differences in high style. Kennedy’s American University address, nevertheless, indicates the promise of stylized epideictic performances. Just as medical professionals have found that rituals like singing familiar hymns may briefly “bring back” patients with dementia by stimulating memories and emotions,<sup>161</sup> rituals of epideictic progression—with their dissociative arguments that gradually transform familiar identities and

worldviews and their collaborative high style that evokes emotion—may likewise have the potential, in a more lasting way, to pull citizens back from the dementia of war.

Finally, our study sheds light on the rhetoric of Kennedy himself. Scholars have documented the president's penchant for antithesis in his ceremonial speeches,<sup>162</sup> as well as his use of dissociation in his Houston Ministerial Association address, his public response to the steel crisis, and his Yale University commencement speech. Murphy goes so far as to call Kennedy's "New Economics" address at Yale "one large dissociation" and notes that his emphasis upon "real" economic issues constructed his rational ethos.<sup>163</sup> Based upon our analysis, we would argue that Kennedy's style and dissociations likely worked in tandem, especially in ceremonial speeches, not only to offer new visions but also to situate him as a realist who understood how the world worked and whose views could therefore be trusted. The president's stylistic reliance upon antithesis may have naturally led him toward dissociation and the performance of rationality.<sup>164</sup> Hence, the continued appeal of Kennedy's rhetoric may lie with how his stylistic artistry enhanced his legitimacy while dissociatively constructing new visions in an aesthetically pleasing and involving way.

Despite passage of the LTBT, the thaw in US-Soviet relations was only temporary. The parties involved missed the opportunity for a comprehensive ban and, all too soon, Kennedy would be dead, his successor distracted by Vietnam, and Khrushchev overthrown in a coup.<sup>165</sup> While the image offered at American University was not fully realized, Kennedy's rhetorical vision nevertheless helped lead to a treaty that slowed nuclear proliferation and showed that "selective cooperation" was possible, thereby setting the stage for later détente.<sup>166</sup> Moving away from conflict and toward peace never comes easily. However, Kennedy's American University

address demonstrates the important role that epideictic progression can play in leading audiences, gradually, toward a better way.

## Notes

1. Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *Presidents and Protesters: Political Rhetoric in the 1960s* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 19-21, 62-63; Christopher A. Preble, "Who Ever Believed in the 'Missile Gap'?": John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33 (2003): 801-826; Richard J. Walton, *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Viking Press, 1972), 60.
2. Andreas Wenger and Marcel Gerber, "John F. Kennedy and the Limited Test Ban Treaty: A Case Study of Presidential Leadership," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29 (1999): 469.
3. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 61-63; Norman Cousins, *The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, Nikita Khrushchev* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 113-114, 124-126; Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers with Joe McCarthy, "*Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye*": *Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (Boston: Little & Brown, 1970), 357.
4. Stephen E. Lucas and Martin J. Medhurst, *Words of a Century: The Top 100 American Speeches, 1900-1999* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 363.
5. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 61-63; Wenger and Gerber, "John F. Kennedy," 472-473.
6. See, e.g., Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 75; John M. Murphy, "The Language of Liberal Consensus: John F. Kennedy, Technical Reason, and the 'New Economics' at Yale University," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90 (2004): 145; Jeffrey D. Sachs, *JFK's Quest for Peace: To Move the World* (New York: Random House, 2013), 70.
7. Goldzwig and Dionsiopoulou include a brief analysis of Kennedy's "peace narratives" at American University in their larger volume on his speeches, while Silvestri devotes a few pages to the president's use of deductive reasoning and antithesis in this address. Windt

discusses how Kennedy explained the new attitudes that he wanted Americans to adopt and the consequences of both assent and rejection. Kimble uses the address as a case study of "androgynous style" in which characteristics of both "feminine" and "masculine" rhetorical style appear, whereas economist Sachs simply overviews the speech's broad themes. In sum, the American University address is significant and worthy of further examination than it has received. See: Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos, *"In a Perilous Hour": The Public Address of John F. Kennedy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995), 120-125; Vito N. Silvestri, *Becoming JFK: A Profile in Communication* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 220-222; Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 65-71; James J. Kimble, "John F. Kennedy, the Construction of Peace, and the Pitfalls of Androgynous Rhetoric," *Communication Quarterly* 57 (2009): 154-170; Sachs, *JFK's Quest*, xv, 73-88.

8. See: Jeffrey Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12; Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (1969; rpt. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 51, 55. At its worst, epideictic can stifle dissent, strengthen community by blaming "others," and uphold hegemonic political forces. See, e.g.: Celeste Michelle Condit, "The Functions of Epideictic: The Boston Massacre Orations as Exemplar," *Communication Quarterly* 33 (1985): 289; John M. Murphy, "Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Opposition to War: The Paradox of Honor and Expediency," *Communication Studies* 43 (1992): 72, 75; Bradford Vivian, "Neoliberal Epideictic: Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 11, 2002," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 91 (2006): 3-4, 8; Bradford Vivian, "Rhetorical Arts of Praise and Blame in Political Transformation," in *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to*

*Sustainable Peace*, ed. Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 81; Denise M. Bostdorff, "Epideictic Rhetoric in the Service of War: George W. Bush on Iraq and the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Victory over Japan," *Communication Monographs* 78 (2011): 301-302, 306-308, 316-317.

9. Individuals lower in status or power may employ epideictic for such purposes due to the "cover" it can provide for critique. See: James Jasinski, "Rearticulating History in Epideictic Discourse: Frederick Douglass's 'The Meaning of the Fourth of July to the Negro,'" in *Rhetoric and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century America*, ed. Thomas W. Benson (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 71-89; William D. Harpine, "African American Rhetoric of Greeting During McKinley's 1896 Front Porch Campaign," *Howard Journal of Communications* 21 (2010): 40-55. Epideictic rhetoric also may function both to reinforce and challenge hegemonic perspectives. See: Cindy Koenig Richards, "Inventing Sacagawea: Public Women and the Transformative Potential of Epideictic Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Communication* 73 (2009): 1-22.

10. Vivian, "Rhetorical Arts," 87-88, 79-87.

11. See: Denise M. Bostdorff, "George W. Bush's Post-September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 89 (2003): 293-319; John M. Murphy, "'Our Mission and Our Moment': George W. Bush and September 11<sup>th</sup>," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 6 (2003): 607-632; Vivian, "Neoliberal Epideictic," 1-26; Steven R. Goldzwig, "Commencing the Rationale for War: George W. Bush's Address at West Point, June 1, 2002," *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict* (2009-2010): 53-76; Bostdorff, "Epideictic Rhetoric," 296-323.



12. See, e.g., Sarah Ann Mehlretter, "John F. Kennedy, 'Inaugural Address' (20 January 1961)," *Voices of Democracy* 4 (2009): 41-59.
13. Murphy, "The Language of Liberal Consensus," 144-145.
14. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 413.
15. See: David Zarefsky, Carol Miller-Tutzauer, and Frank E. Tutzauer, "Reagan's Safety Net for the Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of Definition," *Central States Speech Journal* 35 (1984): 113-119; Roger Stahl, "Carving Up Free Exercise: Dissociation and 'Religion' in Supreme Court Jurisprudence," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5 (2002): 439-458; Denise M. Bostdorff, "Iraq as a Representative Anecdote for Leadership: Barack Obama's Address on the Fifth Anniversary of the Iraq War," in *Making the Case: Advocacy and Judgment in Public Argument*, ed. Kathryn M. Olson, Michael William Pfau, Benjamin Ponder, and Kirt H. Wilson (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2012), 161-189.
16. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 413; Stahl, "Carving Up Free Exercise," 453.
17. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 450-452.
18. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 451. For more on why listeners may be especially receptive to epideictic rhetoric, see: Condit, "The Functions of Epideictic," 288-290; Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven L. Vibbert, "Values Advocacy: Enhancing Organizational Images, Deflecting Public Criticism, and Grounding Future Arguments," *Public Relations Review* 20 (1994): 154; Craig R. Smith, "The Anti-War Rhetoric of Daniel Webster," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 85 (1999): 1-16; Bostdorff, "Epideictic Rhetoric," 297.
19. Edward Schiappa with David M. Timmerman, "Aristotle's Disciplining of Epideictic," in *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, ed. Edward Schiappa

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 199-200; Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics*, 9; Ned O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s *Phantasia* in the *Rhetoric*: *Lexis*, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 38 (2005): 29-30.

20. Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics*, 9; also Mark Bernard White, “The Rhetoric of Edification: African American Didactic Literature and the Ethical Function of Epideictic,” *Howard Journal of Communications* 9 (1998): 130.

21. Vivian, “Rhetorical Arts,” 83-86; Bradford Vivian, *Public Forgetting: The Rhetoric and Politics of Beginning Again* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 155-158.

22. Lawrence J. Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display: An Introduction,” in *Rhetorics of Display*, ed. Lawrence J. Prelli (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 15-16.

23. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 450-452, on how listeners carry out dissociation.

24. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 428, 444, 447-448; Richard A. Lanham, *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 16-17; Barry Goldwater, Speech Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination, July 16, 1964, <http://americanrhetoric.com>.

25. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 444; Lanham, *A Handlist*, 117; Barack Obama, Announcement Speech in Springfield, Illinois, Feb. 20, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>, our emphasis.

26. Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics*, 25.

27. See: Theodore C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature*, ed. Leonardo Taran (1902; rpt. New York and London: Garland, 1987), 102-103, 166-167; Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics*, viii, 7;

O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s *Phantasia*,” 28; George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 153.

28. O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s *Phantasia*,” 31.

29. Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950; rpt. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 58.

30. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 451-452, 453.

31. Thomas B. Farrell, *Norms of Rhetorical Culture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 80; Dale L. Sullivan, “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26 (1993): 117-126; Ekaterina V. Haskins, *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 7-8; Christine Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of Rhetoric,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 9 (1976): 167-168; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 452.

32. Gerard A. Hauser, *Prisoners of Conscience: Moral Vernaculars of Political Agency* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 166.

33. O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s *Phantasia*,” 20, 31; Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display,” 1; Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory,” 171; Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics*, ix.

34. Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard, “The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric,” *College English* 58 (1996): 781; also: Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory,” 166, 170; Haskins, *Logos and Power*, 58.

35. Oravec, “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory,” 167-168; Condit, “Functions of Epideictic,” 290-291; Sullivan, “Ethos of Epideictic Encounter,” 117; Haskins, *Logos and Power*, 7-8.

36. Lois Agnew, "'The Day Belongs to the Students': Expanding Epideictic's Civic Function," *Rhetoric Review* 27 (2008): 147-148, 156-159.
37. David Burner, *John F. Kennedy and a New Generation* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 101-102; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 347.
38. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 63, 65; Wenger and Gerber, "John F. Kennedy," 472, 473; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 346.
39. See: Foster Hailey, "White House Vigil Reflects Peace Drive on Campuses," *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1961, A1; "300 Women Protest Here Against Nuclear Testing," *New York Times*, Nov. 2, 1961, A5; Elaine Woo, "Dagmar Wilson Dies at 94; Organizer of Women's Disarmament Protesters," *Los Angeles Times*, Jan. 30, 2011, <http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-dagmar-wilson-20110130-story.html>; John F. Kennedy, "The President's News Conference," Jan. 15, 1962, *The Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>; "800 Women Protest Nuclear Tests; Some Visit Zorin," *New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1962, A3. Also see: Peter Braestrup, "Students Renew Peace Picketing at White House," *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1962, A51.
40. William MacDougall, "World Near Atom War on Oct. 22 Cuban Crisis, McNamara Reveals," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 30, 1963, A1.
41. Philip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 342-343, 345; William F. Buckley, "Where Lies the Real Horror of Nuclear War?" Editorial, *New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1962, A4; Jules Duscha, "Dodd Says U.S. Test-Ban Concessions Court War," *Washington Post*, Feb. 22, 1963, A6.
42. Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 351-353, 349-350.

43. J. Michael Hogan, "Introduction: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era," *A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. VI: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era*, ed. J. Michael Hogan (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2003), x, xiii-xiv; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 378-401. Journalists and reformers during the Progressive Era drew attention to the inequitable treatment of African Americans, immigrants, women, and laborers, but progressivism also fell far short of the ideal of tolerance, particularly in regard to race relations. See, e.g., Brian R. McGee, "Rhetoric and Race in the Progressive Era: Imperialism, Reform, and the Ku Klux Klan," in *A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. VI: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era*, ed. J. Michael Hogan (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2003), 311-338.

44. Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Détente?" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10 (2008): 7-8.

45. "Rallies Protest Soviet Atom Test," *NYT*, Aug. 7, 1962, A5; Lawrence Fellows, "70,000 Rally in London as A-Bomb Protest Ends," *NYT*, April 16, 1963, A1.

46. Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," 8, 13-17; Wenger and Gerber, "John F. Kennedy," 472.

47. Theodore C. Sorensen, "JFK's Strategy of Peace," *World Policy Journal* (2003): 2.

48. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 64-65; also Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos, "*In a Perilous Hour*," 125.

49. Theodore O. Windt, Jr., "John F. Kennedy: Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration," in *Presidential Speechwriting: From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution and Beyond*, ed. Kurt W. Ritter and Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M

University Press, 2003), 93-100, 103; Meena Bose, "Words as Signals: Drafting Cold War Rhetoric in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations," *Congress and the Presidency* 25 (1998): 8; quotation from Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 730-731; Sorensen, "JFK's Strategy of Peace," 2.

50. We constructed an authenticated transcript by taking a White House press release of the speech text and comparing it to a film of the delivered speech. See: John F. Kennedy, Remarks at American University on June 10, 1963, White House Press Release, Folder "Address at American University, Washington, D.C., 10 June, 1963," President's Office Files, Kennedy Library; and Excerpt, Commencement Address at the American University, 10 June 1963, *Special Report*, CBS News, Accession Number: TNC: 319, Kennedy Library and Museum, [www.jfk.library.org](http://www.jfk.library.org). Although the film is entitled "Excerpt," it includes the entirety of the press release text. The quotations cited here come from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the transcript.

51. Sheard, "Public Value of Epideictic," 777; Bostdorff, "Epideictic Rhetoric," 302.

52. On Kennedy's return trip from the U.S. Mayors' Conference in Honolulu that morning, White House correspondents on Air Force One were tipped off that the American University speech would be of "major importance," which assured media coverage, and both Washington and Soviet officials were briefed in advance. See: Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 731.

53. Charles E. Johnson, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, "Notes for the President's Speech on Peace," May 29, 1963, Folder "President's Speeches: Miscellaneous Drafts and Comments, 1961-1963," Papers of President Kennedy: National Security Files, Kennedy Library.

54. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 4.

55. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 5.

56. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 5.

57. Aristotle, *The Rhetoric*, I.3: 1358b.

58. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 6.

59. For more on anaphora and the other figures discussed in this essay, see Lanham, *A Handlist*.

60. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 6, our emphasis.

61. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 8.

62. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 9.

63. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 9.

64. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 12, 10.

65. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 11.

66. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 382.

67. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 14.

68. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 14.

69. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 13, 14.

70. For more on how progressive discourse encouraged deliberative practices and advocated for inclusion of marginalized members of American society, see: Robert Danisch, *Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 65-90.

71. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 13.

72. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 14.

73. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 15.

74. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 15.

75. Speech Draft, June 7, 1963, Folder “American University Commencement 6/10/63: 6/6/63-7/12/63 and Undated,” Theodore C. Sorensen Personal Papers: JFK Speech Files 1961-1963, Kennedy Library.

76. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 16, our emphasis.

77. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 16.

78. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 17.

79. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 17.

80. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 17.

81. See, e.g., Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic,” 289.

82. Kimble argues Kennedy re-humanized the Soviets via a feminine rhetorical style by emphasizing compassion, shared humanity, and identification (“John F. Kennedy,” 157-159). We agree Kennedy attempted to humanize the Soviets, but would argue that epideictic progression better explains how he also differentiated the Soviet people—and by implication, the USSR—from “propagandists” who were to blame for misunderstandings, as well as how he linked this redefinition to other redefined concepts essential to his construction of a new political context.

83. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 18.

84. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 18.

85. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 18.

86. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 19.

87. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 19.

88. Kennedy, “Remarks at American University,” paragraph 19.

89. Vivian, “Rhetorical Arts,” 83-87.



90. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 19.
91. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 6, 7.
92. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 20.
93. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 20.
94. For more on Progressive Era principles and activities, see Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 378-401; Hogan, "Introduction," ix-xxiv.
95. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 20.
96. Vivian, "Rhetorical Arts," 86-87.
97. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 21.
98. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 21.
99. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 22.
100. Kennedy, "The President's News Conference," Jan. 15, 1962.
101. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 23.
102. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 23.
103. See: Robert Hariman and Francis A. Beer, "What Would Be Prudent?: Forms of Reasoning in World Politics," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 1 (1998): 209-301.
104. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 24.
105. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 26.
106. Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 350.
107. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 26.
108. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 26.
109. Kimble ("John F. Kennedy," 162) notes this portion of the speech relied on incrimination of the Soviets. We agree, but it is important to realize that Kennedy also softened

his indictments, as we describe here, and that he had to perform ethos for Americans and Western European allies. Had he abandoned his cold warrior persona completely, Kennedy would have raised the anxieties of many listeners in the West, rather than calming them. Windt (*Presidents and Protesters*, 69) similarly notes that Kennedy's hardline appeals demonstrated his lack of naivety.

110. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 30, our emphasis; also see Speech Draft, June 7, 1963, Folder "American University Commencement 6/10/63: 6/6/63-7/12/63 and Undated," Sorensen Papers.

111. J. Michael Hogan, "Conclusion: Memories and Legacies of the Progressive Era," *A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. VI: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era*, ed. J. Michael Hogan (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2003), 474-475; Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 353. Also see: Leroy Dorsey, "Preaching Morality in Modern America: Theodore Roosevelt's Rhetorical Progressivism," in *A Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. VI: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era*, ed. J. Michael Hogan (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2003), 66-68.

112. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 27, our emphasis.

113. Hogan argues that, contrary to the assessment of many historians, Wilson never had a public mandate for the League of Nations. See: Michael Hogan, *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour: Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and the League of Nations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 168-171.

114. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 28.

115. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 29.

116. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 29; Speech Draft, June 7, 1963, Folder "American University Commencement 6/10/63: 6/6/63-7/12/63 and Undated," Sorensen Papers.

117. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 30.

118. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 31, 32.

119. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 33.

120. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 34-36.

121. Culpepper E. Clark, "JFK and Civil Rights: Sooner or Later," in *Civil Rights Rhetoric and the American Presidency*, ed. James Arnt Aune and Enrique D. Rigsby (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 123; Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 80-81; Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos, "John F. Kennedy's Civil Rights Discourse: The Evolution from 'Principled Bystander' to Public Advocate," *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 180, 191.

122. John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights," June 11, 1963, The Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>.

123. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 2.

124. Zarefsky discusses multivocality in Lincoln's annual message of 1862. See: David Zarefsky, "Lincoln's 1862 Annual Message: A Paradigm of Rhetorical Leadership," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 3 (2000): 12-13.

125. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 5.

126. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 10, 13.

127. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 14.

128. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 14.

129. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 37.
130. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraphs 18, 30.
131. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 37.
132. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 38, our emphasis.
133. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 39, our emphasis.
134. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 40.
135. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 40.
136. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 41.
137. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 42, our emphasis.
138. Kennedy, "Remarks at American University," paragraph 42, our emphasis.
139. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights,"  
June 11, 1963.
140. Quoted in Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 733; quoted in Sachs, *JFK's Quest*, 92-93; and, e.g.,  
Jerry Voorhis to John F. Kennedy, Letter, June 12, 1963, and Reverend John Wesley Lord to  
John F. Kennedy, Note, June 17, 1963, with both found in Folder "SP 3-85 American University  
in Washington, D.C.—June 10, 1963," White House Central Files: Subject Files, Kennedy  
Library.
141. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 733; O'Donnell and Powers, "*Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye*,"  
358; Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*  
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), 218; Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban  
Treaty," 17; Wenger and Gerber, "John F. Kennedy," 473.
142. Thomas C. Sorensen, Deputy Director of United States Information Agency, to  
McGeorge Bundy, "West European Reaction to Peace Speech," June 12, 1963, Folder

“American University Commencement 6/10/63: 6/6/63-7/12/63 and Undated,” Sorensen Papers, Kennedy Library.

143. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 71-72; Clark, “JFK and Civil Rights,” 123-126.

144. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 72; Robert G. Waite, “‘Ish Bin Ein Bearleener’—JFK’s 26 June 1963 Visit to Berlin: The Views from East Germany,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 45 (2010): 844-845.

145. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 73. Windt argues that the American University and Berlin speeches were not really opposed, but rather represented the “two-track foreign policy” that Kennedy had in mind: a “policy of nuclear deterrence and . . . détente to assure that those weapons would never be used,” coupled with “a policy of containing communist expansion into smaller nations by fighting limited wars with conventional weapons” (73).

146. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times, Vol. 1* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 541-543; Wenger and Gerber, “John F. Kennedy,” 473. On how Khrushchev may have used the speech with the Chinese, see: Mastny, “The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” 17-19.

147. “Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” Kennedy Library and Museum, [www.jfk.library.org](http://www.jfk.library.org); Charles E. Johnson to Malcolm Kilduff, Memorandum, October 22, 1963, Folder “PC1 Disarmament,” White House Central Files: Subject Files, Kennedy Library; Sam Lubell to McGeorge Bundy, “The People Speak: De Gaulle Failing to Stir People to Anti-U.S. Feeling,” October 16, 1963, Folder “Opinion Polls 1961-1963,” Presidential Papers, National Security Files: Subject Files, Kennedy Library.

148. See, e.g., Jasinski, “Rearticulating History,” 71-89; Harpine, “African American Rhetoric of Greeting,” 40-55.

149. See, e.g., Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tel, "Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peace Making: An Empirical Examination within the Israeli Jewish Society," *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2011): 637-651, and Tamir Sheafer and Shira Dvir-Gvirsman, "The Spoiler Effect: Framing Attitudes and Expectations toward Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2010): 205-215. Two studies have examined the framing provided by the rhetoric of leaders during war, a third has examined how Bush offered rationales for war with Iraq in his commencement speech at West Point, while a fourth has provided an overview of protagonist strategies that can help to end violence, such as the affirmation of similarities with one's opponents. See: Michael D. Wallace, Peter Suedfeld, and Kimberley Thachuk, "Political Rhetoric of Leaders Under Stress in the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993): 94-107; Riikka Kuusisto, "Framing the Wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Definitions of the Western Power Leaders in Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 35 (1998): 603-620; Goldzwig, "Commencing the Rationale for War," 53-76; Louis Kriesberg and Gearoid Millar, "Protagonist Strategies That Help End Violence," in *Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to Sustainable Peace*, ed. Bruce W. Dayton and Louis Kriesberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 13-29.

150. Vivian notes that collective memories gain their influence to a large degree through their appearance in the speeches of "a community's most widely accepted spokespersons," including government officials. See: Vivian, "Rhetorical Arts," 78.

151. Past research has shown how epideictic rhetors may reinforce particular values such that listeners will be more likely to supply those values in later warrant-using arguments. We argue that Kennedy took particular values in his epideictic rhetoric and redefined them for subsequent use. For past research, see: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric*, 49-50;

Richard E. Crable and Steven L. Vibbert, "Mobil's Epideictic Advocacy: 'Observations' of Prometheus-Bound," *Communication Monographs* 50 (1983): 384, 394; Bostdorff and Vibbert, "Values Advocacy," 150-151.

152. John Poulakos, "Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric," in *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader*, ed. John Louis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill (New York and London: Guilford Press, 1999), 30-31.

153. Wander briefly points to Kennedy's American University address as transcending old dualities, but then critiques how the Vietnam rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations relied on technocratic realism, which has its roots in progressivism. Technocratic realism tended to dismiss the opinions of nonexperts or, that is, individuals outside the administration (Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 350). During the Progressive Era, reformers likewise touted democratic practices yet often sacrificed them to professionalism and expertise (see Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 378, and Hogan, *Woodrow Wilson's Western Tour*, 41-46, 58-60), while the tensions between expertise and democratic values continue to pose problems for those interested in liberal democracy (see Zoltan P. Majdik and William M. Keith, "Expertise as Argument: Authority, Democracy, and Problem Solving," *Argumentation* 25 (2011): 371-373. As for Kennedy, Bostdorff and Goldzwig found that Kennedy himself veered back and forth in his Vietnam rhetoric between idealism that depicted the conflict as a moral challenge of freedom versus communism and pragmatism that focused on practicality, expertise, and—to deflect criticism—complexity. See Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven R. Goldzwig, "Idealism and Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (1994): 515-530.

154. Vivian, *Public Forgetting*, 59.

155. Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, "Mythic Rhetoric and Rectification in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Communication Studies* 62 (2011), 53. Also see: Robert C. Rowland and David A. Frank, *Shared Land/Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 295-302.

156. Vivian, "Neoliberal Epideictic," 7.

157. Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 22, his emphasis.

158. For more on Roman rhetoricians' treatment of style, see: Craig R. Smith, *Rhetoric and Human Consciousness: A History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland, 2009), 120; Cicero, *De Partitione Oratoria*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and London, UK: William Heinemann, 1968), XV.53-54; Cicero, *Brutus*, in *Cicero on Oratory and Orators*, trans. J.S. Watson (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), XXIII: 286; Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 2001), 6.2.24.

159. Jennifer Cole, "Painful Memories: Ritual and the Transformation of Community Trauma," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 28 (2004): 99-100. Ivie, too, discusses the possibility that ritual might be used to harness affect as a way to humanize an enemy. See Robert L. Ivie, "Fighting Terror by Rite of Redemption and Reconciliation," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10 (2007): 238.

160. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 47.

161. See, e.g., Richard Gunderman, "Bringing Dementia Patients to Life," *The Atlantic*, Jan. 2014, <http://www.theatlantic.com/health/print/2014/01/bringing-dementia-patients-to-life/282802/>.



162. Windt, *Presidents and Protesters*, 66; Silvestri, *Becoming JFK*, 221-222; Mehlretter, "John F. Kennedy, 'Inaugural Address,'" 47, 49; Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos, "*In a Perilous Hour*," 45.

163. Barbara Warnick, "Argument Schemes and the Construction of Social Reality: John F. Kennedy's Address to the Houston Ministerial Association," *Communication Quarterly* 44 (1996): 187; Denise M. Bostdorff and Daniel J. O'Rourke, "The Presidency and the Promotion of Domestic Crisis: John Kennedy's Management of the 1962 Steel Crisis," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27 (1997): 352-353; Murphy, "The Language of Liberal Consensus," 148-149, 156.

164. As we were completing this essay, we came across an endnote in Warnick's study in which she, too, suggests such a connection: "To some extent, one could argue that Kennedy's reliance upon reciprocity and dissociation was an artifact of his stylistic preferences." See: Warnick, "Argument Schemes," 195. Carpenter presents evidence that Kennedy's writing and speaking from a very early age was typified by high style, including the use of antithesis, asyndeton, and so on. See: Ronald H. Carpenter, "On Allan Nevins, Grand Style in Discourse, and John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address: The Trajectory of Stylistic Confluence," *Style* 46 (2012): 4-9, 9-19.

165. Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," 24-25.

166. Mastny, "The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," 24-25; Wenger and Gerber, "John F. Kennedy," 481.