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Ethnic Nationalism In Postcolonial Disputes: The Epistemic Re-Evaluation Of Interest-Driven Knowledge Claims

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ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN POSTCOLONIAL DISPUTES: THE EPISTEMIC RE-EVALUATION OF INTEREST-DRIVEN KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS

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Abstract

This thesis combines the disciplines of political science and philosophy to illuminate the conceptual links between ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and epistemology. In doing so, it proposes a novel understanding of postcolonial disputes that moves beyond the politics of national sentiments and socially constructed historical memory to one that also recognizes the epistemic stakes in the contestation. To this end, the research question is stated as, "If postcolonial disputes are intensified by ethnic nationalism, are postcolonial disputes an instance of epistemic subjectivism?" To answer the question, the thesis pursues two objectives (the empirical and the philosophical) that ultimately tie in together. The first objective is to examine the intersection of ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes. The hypothesis which finds an association between high levels of ethnic nationalism and the growing intensity of postcolonial disputes is supported in the comparative case studies of India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads. The second objective is to provide an epistemic evaluation of the nature of postcolonial disputes and interest-driven knowledge claims. This epistemological analysis is further divided into two subparts where the first part presents the tendency by colonizer states to avoid negative aspects of colonial history, as a manifestation of "active ignorance." The second part evaluates the interest-driven knowledge claims made by the colonized country that demonstrates high levels of ethnic nationalism (which is South Korea as identified in this thesis). Here, a paradoxical claim is made that despite the involvement of subjective forces in the knowledge claims made by a country identified with strong ethnic nationalism (such as the emotional attachment to one's nation and its members), the content of postcolonial disputes can maintain epistemic objectivity. The dominant assumptions about knowledge rooted in the scientific paradigm tend to deny the validity or the possibility of other types of knowledge. In response, social epistemology and virtue epistemology are discussed as alternative paradigms to their Cartesian counterpart. By deviating from the scientific model of knowledge and recognizing the distinct quality of knowledge (the intentionality of interpretation) that postcolonial disputes concern, this thesis argues that the colonized community is not merely biased in favor of itself, but rather, is better positioned to add valuable insights into the historical knowledge of colonization. The colonized groups' knowledge claims can thus trigger a shift in the epistemic discourse: from the persistence of a muted account of colonial history to the birth of a historical understanding of colonization that reflects the voices and reveals the experiences of the oppressed. Ultimately, the transition to ethical epistemology or knowledge about people and their relationships is proposed. This analytical approach will generate a more nuanced understanding of interest-driven knowledge claims in postcolonial disputes fueled by ethnic nationalism, an understanding that embodies the inherent complexities of the matter.

Dedication

To the Postcolonial States on an Epistemic Journey Towards Being Heard

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많이 부족한 나를 항상 믿고 응원해줘서 고마워. 온라인 수업하는 일년 간 집에서 먹여주고 재워준 이하준, 무뚝뚝한 똑똑이 하민이, 내 1 호팬 왕자님 하린이, 세상에서 제일 귀여운 막내 하진이, 대학생활 중 많이 의지했던 나리이모, 그리고 죄송한 게 많은 우리 엄마 아빠. 딸 키우느라 고생 많았고 앞으로는 받은 만큼 베풀며 사는 내가 될게. 표현은 잘 안 하지만 내가 많이 사랑해. 하나님 아버지도 사랑해요. 4 년간 지켜주시고 성장시켜 주셔서 감사합니다. 오직 주님께 영광 돌리는 삶을 살게요.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview of the Topic

This interdisciplinary thesis examines how ethnic nationalism affects the intensity of postcolonial disputes, and upon finding the conceptual association between the two, discusses the implications for the epistemic evaluation of knowledge claims made by parties engaged in the disputes. Thus, the following question is posed: "If postcolonial disputes are intensified by ethnic nationalism, are postcolonial disputes an instance of epistemic subjectivism?" Epistemic subjectivism refers to the situation where knowledge is anything that a person or a group wants or desires as knowledge, lacking objectivity or a standard by which truth or falsity independent of subjective desires can exist. The contradiction of values in the assumptions attached to ethnic nationalism and knowledge (ethnic nationalism as a subjective emotional force and knowledge as an objective, person-neutral, and rational entity) becomes pronounced in the above question.

Since this thesis concerns the broader epistemological question about knowledge-claims infused with strong emotions and interests, the objective of the thesis is two-fold: 1) illustrating the association between ethnic nationalism and intensification of postcolonial disputes by a comparative case study of two postcolonial dyads and 2) addressing the implications of the conclusion drawn in the empirical study. In persistent postcolonial disputes where high levels of ethnic nationalism are involved, the contestation can appear as conflicting political interests or an extension of the emotional frustration of the parties involved. The epistemic implication of this observation is that there is no possibility of knowledge in postcolonial disputes. This conclusion appears to be logical, but it overlooks the complexities of the nature of knowledge and the postcolonial dynamics in the production of knowledge. Hence, the above epistemic implication following the empirical study is tested, challenged, and argued against in this thesis.

The two postcolonial dyads that were chosen for the study demonstrate a considerable difference in bilateral relations between the colonizer and the colonized: India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan. The India-UK dyad has a strong cooperative relationship and has maintained robust ties rooted in the Commonwealth. On the other hand, the South Korea-Japan dyad is well-known for mutual hostility over unresolved postcolonial matters. Both India and South Korea share the experience of being colonized but the puzzling difference exists in the intensity of postcolonial disputes between their former colonizers, the UK and Japan respectively. The South Korean public is highly involved in the topics of postcolonial disputes that largely revolve around the events of Japanese colonization. As a result, postcolonial disputes constitute an important factor in South Korean politics and foreign policy towards Japan.

Many identify the "historical grievances" (Glosserman and Snyder 93) in South Korea as an obstruction to establishing a stable relationship with Japan. Despite the clear benefits from cooperation, South Korea and Japan have struggled to move past the unresolved postcolonial disputes. The empirical study of this thesis identifies ethnic nationalism as an important factor that accounts for this difference. Ethnic nationalism involves the high appreciation for group authenticity, history, culture, and identity. Unlike the modernist theory of nationalism where a "nation" is understood as a necessary product of modernization, and hence a recent phenomenon, "nation" in ethnic nationalism (informed by the ethnosymbolist tradition) refers to a group predating modernization whose members have a shared ancestral origin and deep ethnic history.

Ethnic nationalism consists of the strong emotional bond between national members through time and history. When such strong affective ties and attachment to the national group are found to be associated with the growing intensity of postcolonial disputes, the instinct is to label "ethnic nationalism" as a detrimental force to inter-state cooperation. Under such judgment,

it appears logical to reach a conclusion or propose a solution that reflects the following sentiment: since ethnic nationalism intensifies postcolonial disputes, ethnic nationalism should be abandoned to assuage postcolonial disputes and their unpleasant effects on politics (this idea also reflects nationalism as a wholly social construct).

This thesis addresses the above kind of conclusion that can be drawn about postcolonial disputes where ethnic nationalism is strongly involved. A conclusion that may seem logical yet also dangerously shallow in its evaluation of postcolonial disputes: an evaluation that brushes past the complexities of knowledge claims including those claims associated with social factors contained in ethnic nationalism. The possibility of knowledge and objectivity for the content of postcolonial disputes can be easily denied when all one sees is the mere involvement of strong emotions in the claim-making activity. Hence, the second part of the project is geared towards addressing the epistemological questions, concerns, and discussion on the nature of postcolonial disputes, suggesting that these disputes are not a mere contestation of irreconcilable social constructs (such as an elite-engineered nationalistic sentiment), but concern knowledge and the need to discriminate between claims to knowledge.

Arguing for objectivity and the possibility of "truth" in postcolonial disputes fueled by ethnic nationalism could lead some to believe that this thesis endorses the adverse effects of ethnic nationalism in politics. However, this thesis does not defend the destructive effects of ethnic nationalism as witnessed in cases of violent ethnic conflicts. Rather, it is concerned with pointing to how the commonly held assumptions about ethnic nationalism blur the concern for truth amidst ongoing disputes and contestations about the history of colonization. Postcolonial disputes necessarily involve debates about the truth of what happened in the past during colonization. This thesis argues for the centrality of knowledge about the past, or historical

knowledge in constituting postcolonial disputes. Thus, postcolonial disputes are understood as an instance of competing knowledge claims. This thesis goes further to note the epistemic injustice manifest in the dynamics of postcolonial disputes and argues for the need to reevaluate the status of interest-driven knowledge claims made by both parties in a postcolonial dyad.

Significance of the Study

The research question addresses several areas of analytical significance in both the study of international relations and philosophy. Firstly, it provides a better outlook on analyzing the postcolonial bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Developing a better understanding of bilateral relations within postcolonial dyads is critical to the study of international relations. States are major actors in world politics and understanding the bilateral relationship between states that share a colonial history adds special insights into the study of international relations. Furthermore, while bilateral relationship appears to exclusively concern the states involved, the interaction between states has major implications for the ecology of international relations because the interests of actors intertwine and intersect at an increasing rate with the converging world order. Therefore, the bilateral relationship between two countries is no longer limited to the states involved but also concerns other political actors such as a mutual ally, neighboring countries, and intergovernmental organizations both regional and universal. Examining ethnic nationalism in a postcolonial dyadic relationship and addressing the epistemic assumptions ensuing the perceived association between the intensity of disputes and ethnic nationalism will help provide a nuanced understanding of bilateral relations at hand and encourage policies or solutions that are sensitive to the complexities observed.

Secondly, the study of ethnic nationalism in relation to postcolonial disputes adds a historical depth to the understanding of nationalism and its development. The study of ethnic

nationalism in postcolonial interaction can further illuminate the political behavior of postcolonial dyads and the plausible trajectory of their future development. The interactive aspect of nation formation through the colonial history will add complexity to the study of nationalism and provide a better explanation for how nationalism, in particular ethnic nationalism, can affect and drive state behavior in the context of postcolonial interaction.

Lastly, this study provides important insights into the critical role knowledge plays in politics. The magnitude of the effects of knowledge or claims to knowledge in politics is paramount. Knowledge can serve as a mode of justification for policies or political decisions made by governments or officials. Knowledge also guides the decision-making process both at an individual and a collective level and this extends to politics. While the role of knowledge is recognized, the philosophical depth into the study of knowledge including its definition, debates about its formation, and the epistemic dynamics of agents, is often underappreciated by political scientists. Explicitly recognizing the place of knowledge in postcolonial disputes and addressing the evaluation of knowledge claims made by the parties involved will be an important consideration for policymakers in the sense that the perception of postcolonial disputes will include the consideration of epistemic concerns beyond politics and the power dynamics between states understood in the traditional sense.

Postcolonial disputes as conceptualized in this study can be distilled down to the contestations around knowledge to procure dominance (in perspective and interpretation) over the historical narrative of colonization. The re-evaluation of the status of interest-driven knowledge claims is therefore critical. The importance of this re-evaluation becomes greater when one notices the lack of investigation undertaken in epistemology on the highly (or exclusively) politicized issue of postcolonial disputes. Furthermore, while social epistemologists

discuss the notion of epistemic injustice that arises from various socio-economic and political settings, efforts to examine the lasting power imbalance within postcolonial dyads have been limited. The power dynamic between states as manifest in postcolonial disputes concerning knowledge production is also a compelling yet underexplored area which will be explored.

This thesis encompasses the interaction between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes both on an empirical and a conceptual level by analyzing the topic through an epistemological lens. The exploration of the topic as framed and designed in this thesis contains considerable merit in expanding the scope of traditional epistemology to complement the recent advances made by social epistemology and virtue epistemology. This will also identify new areas in epistemology for future studies to explore, adding to the body of knowledge. By bridging the political and the philosophical, or rather, by identifying the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and politics (Medina, *Resistance* 29), this thesis will provide a clearer venue of application for valuable philosophical discussions and concepts in the world and its constituents.

Clarification of Terms

Before moving forward, a few clarifications need to be made on the usage of terms as employed in this thesis to reduce confusion. Firstly, ethnic nationalism in this thesis is inspired by the ethnosymbolist tradition and thus reflects the ethnosymbolist theories of nations and nationalism distinct from its modernist or primordialist counterparts. Ethnic nationalism also refers to that which can be applied to and representative of the state as a whole unit. This means ethnic nationalism that exists among groups within state borders is not included when the term is used. Secondly, postcolonial disputes in this study refer to those disputes arising after colonization has ended, about events that occurred during colonization. The term “postcolonial” is understood in a strictly temporal sense to mean quite literally, the era after colonization has ended. Postcolonial

disputes also refer to disputes within a postcolonial dyad about a particular event that was chosen for the analysis. Lastly, the terms "colonizer", "colonizer state", and "colonial power" are used interchangeably to refer to *former* colonizers. The same goes for the terms "colonized", "colonized state", and "postcolonial state", where all three refer to the *previously* colonized unit.

At some points, the terms "groups" or "communities" replace "state" for both the colonizer and the colonized. This ambiguity in term serves to account for the postcolonial states that were not a "state" (a formal political unit) until after their independence. The interchangeable use of the terms "group" or "state" for the colonized also reflects the focus placed on the people and the affected communities of colonization when discussing knowledge claims: the people and groups are voicing out their claims about history within the context of their political reality (formal citizenship that binds them to their country of belonging). The political positionality of the colonized group or the people is externalized on a systemic level via the political behavior of the states they belong to. Likewise, the analysis of this thesis focuses on group voices encased in formal political arrangements rather than placing the analytical focus on state governments and working downwards to the people of the countries in question.

Summary of Chapters

In Chapter 2, the literature on ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and knowledge is discussed. The chapter opens with the theories of nationalism, comparing the modernist and primordialist theories of nationalism. The ethnosymbolist tradition is proposed as the theory of nationalism that best informs the concept of ethnic nationalism as used in this thesis. The chapter also discusses how ethnic nationalism intersects with postcolonial dynamics and postcolonial disputes. Postcolonial disputes are characterized by the divergence of historical knowledge within a postcolonial dyad and this divergence is explained in part by the aversion of colonizer

countries towards discussing their colonial history. The last section discusses the literature on epistemology. The absolutist notion of knowledge is compared to a relativist, or a post-structuralist account of knowledge where absolute objectivity is challenged. Alternative branches of epistemology including social and virtue epistemology are also introduced in this chapter.

In Chapter 3, the research design and methodology are discussed. This study employs a comparative case study of two postcolonial dyads: India-UK and South Korea-Japan. The two dyads were chosen as examples of cases that each demonstrate low versus high levels of ethnic nationalism (India showing low levels while South Korea showing high levels of ethnic nationalism). The independent (levels of ethnic nationalism), dependent (intensity of postcolonial disputes), and intervening (divergence in historical knowledge) variables are introduced and explained. The hypothesis is also stated which expects the intensity of postcolonial disputes to grow with higher levels of ethnic nationalism. The chapter explains the case selection process and ends with a discussion on available data sources.

In Chapter 4, findings of the empirical study are discussed and analyzed. The chapter first provides the colonial history of the two postcolonial dyads and outlines the differences. The next section compares ethnic nationalism levels in the postcolonial states of India and South Korea. This is followed by a section on the disputed events of colonization, including the general description of the events and disputed areas between the colonizer and the colonized. The next section notes the divergence in historical knowledge between the colonizer and the colonized and presents this divergence as a defining characteristic of all postcolonial disputes. The chapter ends with the discussion of public opinion polls in India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads where it is found that the public in the former exhibits less interest in postcolonial disputes while the latter demonstrates stronger engagement in the disputed history. This translated into

postcolonial disputes affecting the overall bilateral relationship in the South Korea-Japan dyad while the India-UK dyad maintained positive relations despite the unresolved nature of the dispute. Despite the common epistemic divergence with respect to historical knowledge, postcolonial disputes intensify in the case showing high levels of ethnic nationalism. Hence, a strong association is found between ethnic nationalism and the intensity of postcolonial disputes.

In Chapter 5, an epistemological analysis is provided on the phenomenon of knowledge contestation inherent in postcolonial disputes. The apparent impossibility of granting objectivity to contents of postcolonial disputes is attributed to the dominance of the scientific paradigm in epistemology. The belief in absolute objectivity independent of social factors, is undermined in this chapter by demonstrating how scientific knowledge is also influenced and shaped by social factors and human interests. Foucault's power-knowledge complex is discussed to further challenge the scientific paradigm. In this chapter, the normative foundation or orientation of epistemology is established including the need to discuss the standard by which true and false interpretations are discriminated in historical knowledge contestations, even in those situations where strong social factors are involved. Social epistemology and virtue epistemology are also discussed under which the notion of testimonial injustice is presented as characteristic of the unequal power dynamics in postcolonial disputes between the colonizer and the colonized groups. The colonizer benefits from the scientific model of knowledge which justifies its rejection of knowledge claims made by the colonized, given its highly emotional and interest-driven appeals to being heard about the colonial experience.

In Chapter 6, interest-driven knowledge claims by the colonizer and the colonized are compared and distinguished from each other while it is granted that the two parties are in mutual resistance against the other's epistemic claims. The disposition of the colonial powers to avoid

and minimize the colonial history is described as embodying the epistemic vice of active ignorance and closed-mindedness. The colonized communities are presented as engaged in an epistemic resistance against such minimizing accounts of colonization. The South Korean case is selected as an extreme example of interest involved in knowledge claims given the strong presence of ethnic nationalism in the country which is often externalized emotionally. Two reasons for rejecting the colonized community's knowledge claims are stated: the presence of strong emotions and self-interest in the act of making knowledge claims. The two reasons are then addressed and tackled. The perceived dichotomy between emotion and reason is deconstructed in response to the first charge. In response to the second charge concerning self-interest, it is argued that the mere presence of interest alone does not disqualify a belief from lacking truth value. The colonized communities are re-evaluated as groups endowed with the special insight and instincts to advocate for a fair account of colonial history given their positionality as those who can empathize with the colonized and their experiences.

Chapter 7 provides an overview and summary of the thesis. It restates the research question, hypothesis, and findings of the study. The implications for the literature are provided where major theories of nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and the concept of knowledge (including objectivity and truth) are revisited. Next, policy implications are discussed which covers suggestions for governments and policymakers moving forward. It also posits a problem that the colonized community faces: the need to negotiate between appealing to the credit-giving part of knowledge (facts and verification) versus maintaining the distinctively narrative nature of the knowledge it is concerned with (historical knowledge that has the intentionality of interpretation). This section is followed by the discussion on the strengths and limitations of the study that both arise from its interdisciplinary nature. While the interdisciplinary approach added

complexity to the analysis and identified new areas of research from the intersection of two disciplines, a combined thesis also meant lacking a detailed investigation and elaboration of topics faithful to one discipline. The chapter concludes by offering some suggestions for future research based on the strengths and limitations of the study.

Chapter 2: Knowledge at the Intersection of Postcolonial Disputes and Ethnic Nationalism

Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on the underexplored intersection between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes and the inherent quest for knowledge in the disputes. The literature suggests ethnic nationalism to have noteworthy effects on group behavior, thus having implications for the political behavior of states engaged in postcolonial disputes. If ethnic nationalism which accounts for the strong emotional attachment to a nation and its history is associated with the intensification of postcolonial disputes, then given the prevalent definition of knowledge that assumes objectivity, an important question arises: How much objectivity can one expect in the knowledge claims made by states having high levels of ethnic nationalism?

The review of the literature reflects the objective of this thesis which is two-fold: 1) investigating the association between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes and 2) evaluating the nature of postcolonial disputes and the status of knowledge claims imbued with strong national interests. This chapter begins with a section that introduces the two theories of nationalism: modernism and primordialism. The following section presents ethnosymbolism as the strongest theory to capture ethnic nationalism as used in this thesis. The next section establishes the convergence of ethnic nationalism and postcolonial studies where important gaps in the literature are noted. The main gap in the literature is identified as the lack of appreciation for the importance of ethnic nationalism in explaining postcolonial dyadic relationships and the need to understand the deeper colonial history to grasp the development of ethnic nationalism.

This section is followed by the nature of postcolonial disputes which involves the collective memory of groups in the formation of knowledge about the history of colonization that often involves violence and the resulting experience of group loss. The next section discusses the

divergence in historical knowledge (between the colonizer and the colonized) initiated by the disposition of colonial powers to avoid facing or accepting negative group history. The chapter ends with the two conceptions of knowledge, the absolutist and the post-structuralist, to establish grounds for evaluating both the nature of knowledge contestations in postcolonial disputes and the individual knowledge claims made by the colonizer and the colonized groups.

Modernist and Primordialist Theories of Nationalism

Different theories of nationalism offer different accounts of nations and nationalism. This section briefly summarizes the modernist and primordialist theories of nationalism. The weaknesses of the two paradigms are discussed to demonstrate the strengths and merits of the ethnosymbolist paradigm which successfully addresses the weaknesses of its counterparts and offers a stronger theory of ethnic nationalism.

Primordialism is defined by the belief in the "naturalness and/or antiquity of nations" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 50). According to the primordialist tradition of nationalism, ethnicity and common ancestry are central to the definition of a nation (Hearn 20) where national bonds are formed around shared recognition of common descent (Hearn 21). According to the *nationalists* within primordial tradition, "nationality is an inherent attribute of the human condition" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 51) where humanity is divided into distinct and pre-given national groups. The nation claims a "unique history and destiny [and thus constitutes the] only source of political power and legitimacy" (Özkirimli 51). Similarly, the *culturalists* argue that primordial or national identities are pre-given and natural, rather than socially constructed. Nationalism is essentially "a question of emotion and affect" which is also coercive in the sense that if a person belongs to the nation, he or she necessarily feels attached to the

national group (Özkirimli 55). In claiming the antiquity of nations, primordialism emphasizes the persistence of nations and nationalism through time (Özkirimli 60).

On the other hand, the modernist theory describes nations as a recent invention of modernity and a largely subjective phenomenon. Nations are viewed as a socially constructed entity or a "sociological necessity in the modern world" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 72). The emotional attachment or commitment of the people can be an aspect of nationalism, but such emotions are seen as sociologically constructed by the political elites. Ethnicity and nationality are understood as "convenient tools [employed] by the elites for generating mass support" (Özkirimli 88) to meet the goals of procuring power and wealth. According to modernism, nations or nationalism do not exist objectively nor are they natural (and have never existed naturally prior to modernity). Nations are understood as one form of "social construction and nationalism [is seen] as a discourse" (Özkirimli, *The Nation as* 341). In other words, nations were *created* to meet the demands of modernization and industrialization. Nationalism was engineered by the elites to achieve group solidarity and unification for the needs of a modern state. Thus, under the modernist theory, national identity and nationalism lack realism.

One example to illustrate the difference between primordialism and modernism is the contrasting account of national language. Primordialists argue for the objective existence of language unique to each nation given the fact that language is passed on from generation to generation. The unique national language is one of the defining characteristics of a nation that attests to its uniqueness and naturalness. Contrastingly, modernists argue that common language was artificially produced and solidified through the process of standardization and fixation by the elites for the modern state. Laws and social institutions such as schools actively promoted the use of a certain type and style of language which was then adopted and used by the public. The

regionalization and evolution of national language are thus invented and modified by the modern state (Hearn 81; Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 96). In this sense, language distinct to a nation is nothing more than an "invented tradition" which serves the interests of the state in different sociopolitical situations of modernity. This includes the necessity of a unifying point against the "fragmentation and disintegration" (Özkirimli 94) prompted by industrialization. While language is understood as the "objective of affect and sign of [national] authenticity" for the primordialists, modernists emphasize the "technical effects of language" (Hearn 210) and how standardized language met the demands of modern society.

Critiques of Primordialism and Modernism

Both modernism and primordialism are subject to several criticisms and fall short of explaining the durability of nations. To start with, primordialism fails to sufficiently explain the endurance of nations because appeals to nations as the natural condition of human existence is not equivalent to an explanation for the strong affective ties formed around the nation. For primordialism, the strong involvement of emotions in nationalism is natural and given: primordialism states that "emotional ties are not born in social interaction but are just there", thus effectively "desocializing [...] the phenomenon" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 66). However, the objective criteria of a nation alone prove "insufficient to determine whether or not a group constitutes a nation" (Connor 197). Defining the nation solely in terms of the objective criteria cannot explain why other social groups such as the Amish that meet the criteria of a nation do not generate the same level of emotional identification, attachment, and commitment to the group. The deep psychological bond and emotive force felt by the people of a nation is poorly explained when the subjective experience of the nation remains unaccounted for.

As a related point, while the primordial tradition recognizes the existence of cultural symbols in a nation, it fails to offer a mechanism by which those cultural symbols feed into the "emotional bonds" (Hearn 45) between members of a nation. Group socialization around cultural symbols prompts the "cultivation of identities and motives" (Hearn 60) that reinforce the nation. Primordialism lacks the necessary appreciation of the important role "social organization" (Hearn 45) plays in preserving nations through time nor can it explain the deep emotional and psychological bond and commitment evoked by "ethnonational identity" (Connor 73). By taking the nation as a given and thus "fixed or static" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 60), primordialism fails to account for the importance of socialization that occurs around it.

On the other hand, modernism is unsuccessful in explaining the historical depth of nations (Hearn 95; Smith, *Culture, Community* 447). By asserting that nations and nationalism are a modern phenomenon, modernism is unable to explain the "continuity or recurrence" (Smith, *Ideologies* 39) of the nation's ethnic past in its present form. Modernism fails to sufficiently account for the "continuing relevance of pre-modern ethnic attachments" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 127) in nations and nationalism. Modernism has also been criticized for its Euro-centric account of nationalism, overlooking and misrepresenting the cultural and historical particularities of non-Western nations (Hearn 96-98; Özkirimli 122).

Like primordialism, modernism lacks an explanation for "the strong passions generated by ethnic and national identities" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 124). People show loyalty and commitment to the nation to the point of making immense sacrifices including forsaking their own lives for the nation. Such devotion cannot be attributed to the role of elites alone whose importance is exaggerated by the modernist theories of nationalism (Özkirimli 129). Modernism also provides a misleading account of nationalism where "ethnic sentiments [are defined] by

purely economic and spatial characteristics" (Özkirimli 123). The rational choice theory alone cannot explain why people do not abandon their national group when it is beneficial for them to do so. Likewise, the materialist accounts of modernism limited to "regional economic inequalities and exploitation" (Özkirimli 123) also fail to explain why and how nations and nationalism motivate individuals and the collective to such a great extent as witnessed many times in history.

Ethnosymbolism

The ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism responds to the pitfalls of modernism and primordialism by accounting for both the objective and the subjective dimensions of a nation. According to ethnosymbolism, which started as a "theoretical critique of modernism" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 143), nationalism involves the subjective experience of the nation rooted in the objective existence of ethnic communities that precede a nation. Walker Connor (1994) elaborates on the subjective socialization of the nation and its significance for the members of the nation. The claim is that the objective characteristics alone cannot truly represent the nature of nations and nationalism. The subjective experience of the people must figure into the understanding of nations and nationalism.

Anthony D. Smith (2009) further notes the dynamic between the objective and subjective components of nations and nationalism. Smith argued against "the polar extremes of the primordialist-instrumentalist debate when assessing the recurrence of ethnic ties and communities" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 150). The rediscovery of the past is informed by the history of ethnic community in interaction with the forces of modernization. According to Smith as cited by Özkirimli, "the interaction between the tidal wave of modernization and […]

local variations [accounts for] the character and scope of nationalism" (127). The conclusion is that nations are not created out of thin air as the modernists argue but have a deeper history.

Ethnosymbolism thus maintains that the definition of a nation should reflect "their ethnic forebears [and that] the rise of nations needs to be contextualized within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity which shaped them" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 143). Ethnosymbolists also appreciate "the important role of memories, values, myths, and symbols" in shaping the experience of nations and nationalism. This contrasts with the modernists who fail to "comprehend the emotive power of collective memories" (Özkirimli 144). Likewise, compared to the primordialist and modernist theories of nationalism, ethnosymbolism is able to provide a stronger explanation for the potential of nations and nationalism in generating people's deep commitment to the nation.

Ethnic Nationalism Informed by Ethnosymbolism

In this section, ethnic nationalism as informed by ethnosymbolism will be discussed. Ethnic nationalism informed by the ethnosymbolist paradigm can be understood to consist of a strong "emotional attachment to lineage, ancestry, and continuity" (Conversi 2) of the nation. The theories of nationalism as outlined in the above sections each have a different conception of nations and nationalism which also applies to ethnosymbolism. Ethnic nationalism is a political phenomenon, a factual characteristic, or a particular kind of nationalism. In that sense, it is distinct from ethnosymbolism which is a theory of nationalism. However, ethnosymbolism informs the theoretical foundations of ethnic nationalism and likewise, the political phenomenon can be elucidated in exploring the tenets of ethnosymbolism. In this section, the concept of *nations*, *ethnic consciousness*, and *national identity* are discussed informed by the

ethnosymbolist tradition. This discussion will build towards clarifying the distinct nature and characteristics of ethnic nationalism inspired by ethnosymbolism.

Ethnie, Nations, and States

Under the modernist paradigm, nations can be "invented over […] short time-spans" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 17). As briefly discussed earlier, modernist theories of nationalism tend to minimize the role of ethnicity in the formation of nations and nationalism. Ethnosymbolism criticizes this account of nations as misleading. Smith states that the problem of "ethnic phenomena" (*Ethno-symbolism* 18) is omitted from the modernist conceptualization of nations which accounts for the theory's failure to grasp the unique perception and experience of the nation in its members. In the words of Smith, "such a radical truncation of history precludes any enquiry into the long-term processes by which nations are formed and related to earlier cultural and political forms of society in the same area" (*Ethno-symbolism* 17).

For Smith, ethnicity plays a central role in the "formation and the persistence of nations" (*Ethno-symbolism* 21) where nations evolve out of or succeed the ethnic community or the *ethnie*. Smith defines the *ethnie* as "a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of solidarity" (Smith, *Culture, Community* 447). However, an *ethnie* is not equivalent to a nation. A nation has all the characteristics of an *ethnie* but it also has "a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties" (Smith, *Culture, Community* 447). Nations have a distinct desire to gain political autonomy and achieve statehood which is lacking in the level of a mere ethnic community.

Nevertheless, a close connection exists between the ethnic community (*ethnie*) and the national community (*Ethno-symbolism* 27). Both groups consist of individuals bound by shared

memories, common ancestry, common culture, and a historical connection to a certain geographic territory. The shared similarities between members are reinforced by cultural symbols and myths that enrich the notion of national identity rooted in the *ethnie* (Smith, *Culture, Community* 447; Woodwell 13). This account of nations and nationalism does more justice in terms of representing the "inner world of the participants" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 16) and provides a stronger explanation for the "symbolic and affective dimensions of nations and nationalism" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 21).

Following the distinction between an *ethnie* and a nation, a state is different from a nation in the sense that state borders do not necessarily map onto national borders. Connor defines "the state [as] the major subdivision of the globe [which can be] easily conceptualized in quantitative terms" (92). A state is different from a nation that involves the "psychological conviction of its members" (Connor 92) which is not a tangible factor as a state territory or population. The United Kingdom (UK) is an example that illustrates the difference between a state and a nation. The UK is a state, but it has multiple nations within its borders including the Irish in Northern Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales that have attempted to secede from the British state.

Both Smith and Connor have argued for the importance of making the distinction clear between a nation and a state in the study of nations and nationalism. The "indiscriminate interutilization" (Connor 40) of the two terms is evident in the names of the "League of Nations" and the "United Nations", where the term "Nations" really refers to states that have formal sovereignty. In line with the above observation, Connor notes that scholars who study nationalism in the ethnically homogenous German and Japanese states were led to conclude that nationalism is the source of people's "extreme dedication" to the state (41). However, Connor claims that such an "extreme dedication" to the state is limited to ethnic nationalism in the

context of nation-states such as Germany and Japan, where a strong emotional commitment to the nation fostered around the *ethnie* matched the boundaries of the state.

Connor thus attributes the potential of German and Japanese nationalism to foster mass mobilization to ethnic homogeneity. To confuse German or Japanese nationalism as loyalty to the state is to overlook the emotional attachment provoked in the terms *Deutsch* and *Nippon* within the respective national groups. Connor points out that Western scholars of nationalism often confuse nationalism with patriotism. This confusion is problematic because nationalism and patriotism are distinct from each other in an important sense: Nationalism directs loyalty to the national group while patriotism directs loyalty to the "state and its institutions" (Connor 196). The former involves the "aura of deeply felt, emotional commitment to the nation [rooted in] the staying power of ethnic identity" (Connor 41) while the latter lacks such affective ties. Hence, nationalism "proves the more powerful allegiance" (Connor 207) over patriotism because it concerns the instinctive national bond in blood ties and kinship that are readily recognized and internalized by the people. Likewise, Connor locates the "true nationalism" in the "problem of ethnic identity" (42) and its potential to deeply engage the people.

Ethnic Consciousness

Following Connor's argument on the importance of ethnic identity for nationalism, this section discusses the centrality of ethnic consciousness in forging national identity and ethnic nationalism. According to the ethnosymbolist tradition, ethnic consciousness "has a long history" (Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism* 145). The long history implies the persistence of ethnic consciousness through time. According to Thomas Spira (2002), ethnic consciousness is the core feature of nationalism which is a largely "cognitive or cultural" phenomenon (225). Here, a "common subjective identification" (Spira 251) plays a prominent role in fostering the common

national identity. Smith similarly claims that it is the experience of "cultural affinities" (*Ethno-symbolism* 90), the binding power of myths, shared memories, and cultural symbols that reinforce the shared traits of a nation. As the two authors stated, ethnic consciousness through time is an important socialization factor behind national solidarity.

Ethnic consciousness is the driving force behind the shared identification of in-group members with their past generation. Ethnic consciousness can hence develop into a strong commitment and attachment to one's national group "beyond time" (Connor 207). The concept of ethnic consciousness is critical to understand ethnic nationalism. Connor argued for the need to respect "the emotional and psychological depths of ethnonationalism" (76) that modernism fails to comprehend. The conceptualization of ethnic nationalism that agrees with Connor's definition of ethnonationalism counters the modernist account of nationalism as a product of elite mobilization of masses. Elites did not create the widely felt sense of national belonging in the people. Instead, elites had to appeal to the inherent emotional sentiment shared by the public, knowing that the masses would respond to the shared values rooted in ethnic consciousness.

Thus, Connor states that "nationalism is a mass phenomenon, and the degree to which the leaders are true believers does not affect its reality" (76). Nationalism and the strong emotional commitment to the nation invoked in it are treated as real properties and not merely social constructs following elite mobilization of masses for political ends. Regardless of what the elites believed in, they had to appeal to the inherent public sentiment built around the nation in order to prompt group action. While there can be an interaction between elite maneuvering and what the public thinks and believes, public sentiments of a nation should not be perceived wholly as a social construct (implying the possibility of its facile deconstruction). In the words of Connor:

> The essence of nationalism is not to be sought in the motives of elites who may manipulate nationalism for some ulterior end, but rather in the mass sentiment to which

> elites appeal. Those who would manipulate the national sentiments of the masses must hide their motive or risk losing support. (161)

Moving on, while the subjective experience of the nation is a powerful force behind ethnic nationalism, this subjective socialization must be matched with the objective characteristics of a nation. Smith agrees with Connor on the need for the definition of nations to reflect the "powerful subjective components of both ethnic groups and nations" (*Dating the Nation* 63). However, he also states that "the undoubted subjective components of the concept of nationhood need to be supplemented by more 'objective' components" (Smith, *Dating the Nation* 63). Smith calls the strict dichotomy between the subjective and the objective approach to the "symbolic realm" of the nation and nationalism as "very far from the truth" (*Ethno-symbolism* 26). He instead argues that ethnosymbolism "is always crossing the (arbitrary) line between" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 26) the subjective and the objective.

Indeed, a nuanced and accurate definition of a nation "requires the mingling of 'subjective' and 'objective' components" (Smith, *Dating the Nation* 65). The interlocking of objective traits and the subjective socialization around those traits account for the long durability of the *ethnie* and ethnic consciousness. Smith notes that the important role culture-myth symbols play in perpetuating ethnic consciousness accounts for the "durability of ethnic cultural heritages" (*Dating the Nation* 64) which in turn constitute an indispensable aspect of the modern nation. State institutions are also involved which actively prompt and guide "the reproduction of the distinctive heritage and character of ethnic communities and nations in each generation" (Smith 65). The objective aspect of the nation extends to the *ethnie* history which is not merely a group narrative crafted by the elites, but a form of "social reality" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 25) of the nation. Again, the "long history of ethnicity [is important] for the formation of nations"

(Smith, *Culture, Community* 447) where the culture, tradition, language, and experiences of the pre-modern *ethnie* inform the modern nation.

Connor states that ethnic consciousness can be a strong "barrier to the political integration of [a] multiethnic state" (56). This is because people's primary loyalty is directed to their ethnic group which takes priority over the state (Connor 90). Ethnic nationalism informed by ethnosymbolism has major implications for the majority of postcolonial states that are multiethnic given the arbitrarily drawn state borders (Wane 103). This observation points to the necessary qualification of ethnic nationalism specific to the empirical study of this thesis. The unit of analysis employed in the empirical study is the *countries* involved in postcolonial disputes. The centrality of ethnic consciousness in ethnic nationalism points to the need to clarify the scope of ethnic nationalism to examine its effects on postcolonial disputes between "states" and not other groups. Hence, ethnic nationalism informed by this section on ethnic consciousness is limited to one that maps onto state borders and not one that can exist in groups within a state.

National Identity

From ethnic consciousness shared by the members of a nation arises national identity. Put differently, ethnic consciousness and the belief in the uniqueness of one's ethnic community constitutes one's national identity (Connor 103). Smith claims that nationalism as an ideology has three core doctrines: 1) nations have autonomy, 2) unity, and 3) identity (*Ideologies* 30). Autonomy refers to the desire for self-determination over a "collective unit" and national unity refers to achieving the "social and cultural unification" (Smith 29) of members via claiming territories of historical importance. And national identity concerns the authentication and realization of the nation with a clear "historical-cultural basis" (Smith 30). Smith notes that the doctrine on unique national identity is the most elusive but the most significant one to capture the

essence of ethnosymbolism. Informed by the core doctrines, a nation is a political unit described by "its individuality, its peculiar history, and destiny" in the world where members of a nation claim its distinct and unique position in the world (*Culture, Community* 451).

The sense of unique national identity is strengthened and internalized among the members through perpetual comparison with other groups (Connor 54). Regular contacts with out-groups reinforce the similarities shared among in-group members and magnify the differences between the in-group and the out-group. In this way, a nation fosters a sense of "special [internal] unity which separates those who share in it from the rest of humanity" (Spira 258). Consistent with the close connection between ethnic nationalism and identity, Douglas Woodwell (2007) claims that "the politics of nationalism is the politics of identity" (13). Ethnic nationalism involving the idea of national identity rooted in ethnic consciousness thus has crucial implications for the analysis of colonial history (the interaction between the colonized and the colonizer), the colonial experience, and the postcolonial interaction concerning its legacies.

The above sections on the distinction between nations and states, ethnic consciousness, and national identity all inform the concept of ethnic nationalism as inspired by ethnosymbolism. Ethnic nationalism involves the psychological-emotional force that unites members of the nation to the national group and its history. The deep emotional connection to one's national group is reinforced and solidified around the *ethnie* which informs the nation of its unique history and identity. Within a nation, the shared characteristics of its members are externalized via cultural symbols that group members come to recognize and internalize as part of their identity.

Contrary to modernist theories of nationalism, ethnic nationalism informed by ethnosymbolism moves beyond the misleading notion of nations and nationalism as merely social constructs. Ethnic nationalism is also not limited to the idea of nations as a modern

invention or a collective imagination that lacks objective reality. Nor is ethnic nationalism inherently present in the nation as a fixed and static entity as the primordialists assert. Rather, ethnic nationalism consists of strong socialization and organization around an objective *ethnie* core that speaks to the people and engages them in a powerful way, accounting for the persistence and durability of a nation and its significance among its members.

Ethnic Nationalism and Postcolonialism

In the previous section, ethnic nationalism as informed by the ethnosymbolist tradition was introduced. This section will find the analytical points of convergence between ethnic nationalism and the study of postcolonial interaction (which falls under postcolonial studies understood purely in a temporal sense. Postcolonialism here refers to the political reality after colonization has ended and not to a field of study). In their comparative study of colonization in India and Korea, Vyhayanti Raghavan and R. Mahalakshmi (2015) argues that colonization "cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon" (32). They claim that colonization should be situated in the context of broader global changes in trade, society, and political reality under modernization. The insights of Raghavan and Mahalakshmi are pertinent to the postcolonial reality which requires the same level of complexity and nuance in the analysis.

Mehmet Birdal (2017) states that postcolonial theories of international relations offer an alternative approach to studying the world by addressing the epistemological questions in relation to the salience of ethnicity and nationalism in state behavior. Therefore, postcolonial theories include studies on ethnicity, nationalism, and colonialism in international relations. Studying ethnicity and nationalism is vital in understanding how national identity is constructed and how these identities are involved in group conflicts. The concern for ethnicity and ethnic identities in group conflicts resonates with the centrality of national identity and ethnic

consciousness in the ethnosymbolist interpretation of nations and nationalism. The analytical point of convergence of ethnic nationalism inspired by the ethnosymbolist tradition and the realm of postcolonial studies is thus located. As Birdal notes, if postcolonial studies cover the epistemological questions including the studies on nationalism and ethnicity on state behavior, further explanation is needed on how these variables relate to each other. The study of postcolonial dynamics would be incomplete without also taking ethnic nationalism into consideration. Similarly, the study of ethnic nationalism on the postcolonial bilateral interaction would be limited in its analysis without reflecting on the history of colonial interaction.

An important gap that exists in the literature concerns the relationship between states that have been traditionally described either in terms of the postcolonial or in terms of nationalism levels. This gap is addressed by noting how both the colonial and the postcolonial interactions have been shaped by ethnic nationalism that has behavioral implications for groups. Ethnic nationalism levels in a country are also not simply informed by the country's ethnic composition but by how the population with a certain ethnocultural characteristic (either largely homogeneous or diverse) had interacted with its colonizer. The colonial interaction produces a certain experience of colonization for the subdued population (for example, suppression of local culture) which feeds into the development of a particular national identity. Likewise, colonial history also has implications for ethnic nationalism levels in the postcolonial state. In identifying this gap in the literature on postcolonial studies and ethnic nationalism, this thesis ventures into exploring the postcolonial reality shaped by the ethnic dimension, where state behavior (in postcolonial dyadic relationship) is analyzed at the intersection of ethnic nationalism and colonialism.

Ethnic Nationalism and Postcolonial Dyadic Relationship

The current literature also lacks a discussion on how ethnic nationalism in particular affects the postcolonial dyadic relationship. Ethnic nationalism is frequently analyzed in cases of ethnic conflict, but little work is available on how ethnic nationalism affects postcolonial disputes and the overall bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized countries. This gap in the literature is illustrated in the work of Hongtong Vu (2004) who lists three main postcolonial state formation types that embody the "perspective of peripheral territories of empires" (Vu 12): *imperial breakaways, imperial breakups*, and *imperial transfers. Imperial breakaways* refer to when "peripheral territories [secede] from a functioning empire to form new states" (Vu 12). Examples include the United States and most Central and Latin American countries. *Imperial breakups* refer to a situation where an imperial collapse brings in the victors or new foreign invaders that occupy the "vanquished empire" (Vu 13). Sometimes, the victors are not interested in occupying the territory in which case the elites of the vanquished empire have the chance to build their own states. Examples include China following the fall of the Qing dynasty and Korea in 1945 after Japan's defeat in the Second World War (Vu 13).

Lastly, *imperial transfer* refers to a situation where the empire willingly grants autonomy to their colonies "on demand from indigenous elites and populations short of outright wars for independence" (Vu 13). Such a transfer of power is made possible with the presence of local elites who were "trusted to support continuing friendly relations with their old empires" (Vu 13). The elites could also guarantee that imperial interests were preserved after the colony's independence. This made "it easier for empires to give up control without a fight" (Vu 14). Thus, "the essential character of this pattern was continuity between imperial and post-imperial politics" (Vu 14). Examples include the British colonies of India and Malaysia which gained independence via *imperial transfers.*

Vu attributed the different outcomes of socio-economic transformations led by the state in the Asia Pacific to the state formation types. He also stated that his taxonomy "suggests how the different modes of imperial disintegrations may have left distinct legacies to these states [which continued to shape their] future developmental trajectories" (15). Although Vu's analysis does not explicitly address postcolonial dyadic interaction, his conclusion that postcolonial state formation types affect state behavior has implications for the dynamics of postcolonial interaction between states. Following Vu's analysis, postcolonial state formation type can seem to provide a sufficient explanation for the nature of bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized countries. For instance, a postcolonial state formed via *imperial transfer* will be more likely to maintain friendly relations with its former colonizer while a postcolonial state formed via an *imperial breakup* will likely witness a severed relationship. However, this analysis is not sufficient. While Vu's analysis notes the presence of anti-colonial nationalism in the formation of many late state formations (the postcolonial states), he does not also reflect on how ethnic nationalism in particular shapes the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized on the disputed events of colonial history and thus the character of their overall bilateral relationship (influenced by the intensity of postcolonial disputes).

Nevertheless, it must be noted that ethnic homogeneity is not a common characteristic of most postcolonial states. Many postcolonial states lacked the demographic requirements of ethnic solidarity or ethnic consciousness that would naturally unite the people. The end of colonization resulted in the artificial creation of countries comprised of diverse ethnic communities and this political reality had lasting effects on the nation-building process of many postcolonial states. The problem faced by many postcolonial states shortly after independence was the difficulty of fostering a strong common national identity across ethnic divides. Claire

Sutherland (2012) gives an example of African nation-building processes where attempts to replace 'tribalism' with a more democratic national identity often resulted in authoritarianism and brutal ethnic conflicts (108). Similarly, as postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak observed, the subaltern experience lacked a coherent, unified narrative of "authentic ethnic experience" (Berberoglu 42) that could be recognized and readily claimed by the people.

Given the wide demographic differences within most postcolonial states, it was not clear which ethnocultural identity (among many) defined the "national group" of the state. The difficulties with defining the nation in a postcolonial state reinforces the important distinction between nations and states. This political challenge is also consistent with Connor's argument about the difficulty of creating a multiethnic state in the face of the inherent and natural force of ethnic consciousness which directs people's primary loyalty to their ethnic circles (Connor 56). Given the ethnocultural diversity that characterizes most postcolonial states, few cases exist where ethnic nationalism aligns with the territorial boundaries of the postcolonial state.

However, noting the unique circumstances of cases in which ethnic nationalism aligns with state borders points to the importance of taking into account other factors that can affect the postcolonial dyadic relationship. Given the potential of ethnic nationalism to mobilize the people around national causes (such as realizing authentic history or culture), a postcolonial state whose state boundaries match the scope of ethnic nationalism is likely to direct more energy in addressing the experience of the nation under colonization. This state disposition informed by the presence of ethnic nationalism can shape the relationship with its former colonizer in a particular direction. This provides an alternative explanation for postcolonial interaction beyond the state formation type taxonomy.

Furthermore, the nature of ethnic composition and the presence of ethnic consciousness in the colonized region could have shaped the dynamics of interaction between the colonizer and the colonized population during colonization. A deeper history that identifies the internal characteristics of the colonized territory is required to better understand the postcolonial dyadic relationship. Hence, merely noting the state formation type would be inadequate to fully understand the bilateral relations of some postcolonial dyads where ethnic nationalism is involved. Basing the analysis solely on the framework of state formation type would entail overlooking the deeper history of the *ethnie* and the development of ethnic consciousness that undergirds the national character of the postcolonial state, which will carry important behavioral implications for the bilateral relationship with its former colonizer. Following this observation, the next section explores the connection between postcolonial disputes and ethnic nationalism.

Postcolonial Disputes

While postcolonial disputes can encompass a wide array of issues, the bulk of the disputes is concerned with the historical, physical, and political offenses committed against the colonized population. Postcolonial disputes often involve the colonized state calling out the injustices it suffered under the colonial rule. Daniel Bar-Tal (2003) observes that physical violence is an important explanatory factor in intractable relationships between groups. Physical "violence increases the emotional involvement of the parties engaged in intergroup conflict" (Bar-Tal 80) where an individual group member's death is equated to the group's loss at large. Experiencing such "group loss" from external violence or aggression strengthens the cultural socialization processes including rituals and ceremonies geared towards remembering the conflict and commemorating the lost ones. These cultural practices reinforce the resentment towards the aggressor which positively feeds into conflict perpetuation (Bar-Tal 89-90). The emotional

engagement of the public with instances of violence and the loss they incurred on the affected population makes societies become more receptive to "nationalistic feelings" (Bar-Tal 80).

This discussion resonates with the ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism where "ethno-cultural resources" play a central role in forging group solidarity among national members. Smith stressed the significance of "subjective and symbolic resources in motivating ideologies and collective actions" (Smith, *Introduction* 16). A sense of community is reinforced via regular contacts with "shared values, memories, rituals, and traditions" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 25) which all contribute to the fixation and solidification of "collective symbols" such as flags and anthems. These symbols "create and sustain communal bonds and a sense of national identity" (Smith 25). Commemoration, rituals, customs, and educational practices post-conflict become part of the shared values and memories of a national group that are reinforced in the commemorative practices (Smith, *Dating the Nation* 65). Likewise, with the presence of ethnic nationalism, the losses suffered by the colonized group under colonization can be amplified.

Memories about colonization develop into collective memories that constitute "an important part of society's culture" (Oppenheimer and Hakvoort 94). Roe and Cairns (2003) note the significant role social memories play in defining and "maintaining social identities" (174). The experience of colonization and group memories around it constitute the political reality of postcolonial states; memories about the colonial experience become a part of people's consciousness and identity in postcolonial states. The interconnection between collective memories about colonization and group identity can prompt postcolonial states to engage in disputes with their former colonizers when their former colonizers assert or deny a fact about the colonial history that contradicts the colonized population's experience. The role of social

memories in informing group identity that perpetuates collective memories about colonization is likewise a defining characteristic of postcolonial disputes between states.

Postcolonial disputes intersect with ethnic nationalism where the core aspects of it parallel that of ethnic nationalism. Postcolonial disputes necessitate and involve the memories about colonization where group history becomes pertinent. This connects to Smith's characterization of *ethnies* as constituted by "shared memories" (*Ethno-symbolism* 13). The notion of a nation's destiny rooted in its distinct ethnic heritage is "predetermined by histories" where the idea of a nation as "a community of history and destiny" (Smith, *Ideologies* 33) is reinforced. Inspired by the ethnosymbolist tradition, ethnic nationalism emphasizes the importance of national history and the desire of the national group to realize its authentic form.

The pertinence of collective memories about colonization in driving postcolonial disputes can be magnified with the presence of ethnic nationalism that involves commemorative practices which highlight group losses suffered under colonization (memory is perpetuated) as well as the strong desire to preserve authentic national history. This implies that the desire to preserve the history of colonization (as remembered by the national group) forms an integral part of national identity. This national identity in turn informs the political interests of the people concerning the colonial past: a strong desire to defend a particular version of colonial history that better reflects the collective memories of the nation. This points to the likely divide in historical knowledge about colonization between the colonizer and the colonized in postcolonial disputes, the divide becoming more pronounced where ethnic nationalism is involved.

Divergence in Historical Knowledge

Disputes about an event that involved violence against the colonized group would arise if the facts asserted by the colonized are denied or rejected by the colonizer. The divergence in

historical knowledge between the colonizer and the colonized can be explained by the universal tendency of former colonial powers to ignore the events in colonial history that involved injustice or violence inflicted upon the colonized population. The knowledge divergence between the colonizer and the colonized is illustrated in the case of the Namibian genocide committed against the Ovaherero and Nama groups from 1904-1908 (Köbler, *Postcolonial Asymmetry* 117). While many Namibians still suffer from the legacies of German colonization (such as land expropriation which displaced many indigenous people), many Germans are unaware of their country's colonial past. This ignorance about the colonial history and its legacies is an instance of "colonial amnesia" (Köbler 119) which reflects the reality of many colonizer societies where the atrocities and brutalities of colonization are forgotten and unseen. This is evident in the attitude of many Germans who live unbothered by the troubling history of a genocide undertaken in Germany's name against the Ovaherero and Nama groups (Köbler 121-122). The unfortunate part of this amnesia is that such a tendency to actively unsee and forget the sufferings caused by colonization describes the reality of many, if not all, colonizer states.

Colonial Amnesia and Postcolonial Asymmetry

In the past, when European imperialism was the norm, the subordinate position of a colony relative to its colonizer was unquestioned and considered natural. However, there has been a shift in the evaluation of the colonial relationship. A new moral judgment emerged under the concept of self-determination which inspired the idea that former colonies should gain independence and freedom from the oppressive structures of colonization. This moral shift in the political realm posed a new challenge to the colonizers: the challenge of facing moral condemnations of colonial rule and the ensuing problem of having to assume legal responsibility for the losses suffered by the colonized. A pattern of denying the morally questionable aspects of colonization emerged

among many former colonial powers. This instinctive aversion to addressing the colonial history captures the essence of "colonial amnesia" (Köbler, *Postcolonial Asymmetry* 119).

An instance of colonial amnesia is clearly demonstrated in the German government's negotiation with the Namibian tribes over the genocide of 1904-1908. The victimized groups in Namibia demanded a formal apology and compensation from the German government for the genocide committed during Germany's colonization of Namibia. However, the German government rejected their demands and refused to talk about reparations (Köbler, *Postcolonial Asymmetry* 123). For many years, the official German policy concerning this issue was defined by the principle of not referring to the event in Namibia as a genocide. German diplomats in the negotiation process also demonstrated poor knowledge about the issue which revealed their "lack of respect" (Köbler 126) for the affected communities. The German government's response to Namibian demands also reflected a problematic notion that an "apology for the genocide [...] should itself be an object of negotiation" (Köbler 124).

German policies on Namibian genocide were an intentional act to avoid the legal consequences of admitting that genocide had been committed in Germany's name (Köbler, *The Postcolonial Aftermath* 37). The political contention (or postcolonial dispute) between Germany and the affected groups in Namibia captures the notion of a "postcolonial asymmetry" (Köbler, *Postcolonial Asymmetry* 117) that reflects the "structural realities [rooted in] colonialism" (Köbler 129). The postcolonial asymmetry also results in an epistemic asymmetry as seen in the difference in historical knowledge about the colonial event (the genocide) between Germany and Namibia. While most Germans live in ignorance about Germany's colonial history, the Namibians are constantly reminded of it as they live through the daunting legacies of colonization including the socio-economic effects of land expropriation and painful memories of

the genocide. The distinct social realities of the countries shape their epistemic capacity: While the affected groups in Namibia are highly attuned to the unjust history and legacies of colonization, the German population are stuck in their ignorance about their colonial past. This ignorance is perpetuated by the lack of interest in the lives and experiences of people outside one's proximate socio-cultural sphere.

The negotiation process between Germany and the Namibian tribes also reflects an important aspect of all postcolonial disputes: the affected group's country failing to represent the victims in the negotiation process. For instance, the Namibian government has sought to frame the genocide as a collective national experience, ignoring the ethnocultural differences between tribes within Namibia. The negotiation process often neglected the actual victims of the genocide and their voices. The Nama and the Ovaherero tribes rejected the Namibian government as the legitimate representative of their concerns in the negotiation process, but their voices were turned down by both the German government and the Namibian state (Köbler, *Postcolonial Asymmetry* 126-127). This points to the fact that the postcolonial state and its people are not identical in their interests and motivation in addressing the colonial past. The inconsistency between the formal stance taken by the state and the demands coming from the victims can hinder the negotiation process. The victims are pulled further away from seeing their demands met when the state they belong to interferes as the formally recognized entity to negotiate with the colonizer.

Social Identity and Social Categorization Theories

The disposition of the colonizer states to ignore and deny their colonial history can be further explained by social identity and social categorization theories. According to social identity theory and social categorization theory, individuals are inclined to make a positive image of themselves via defending the group they belong to because individual identities are tied to group

identity (Zebel et al. 152). This implies that "group membership shapes the cognitions, emotions, and behavior of individuals" (Branscombe and Doosje 4). Group membership can evoke "group-related emotional responses when the group's negative history is confronted" (Rensmann 170). When people's identity is defined by the group they belong to, the mere identification with the group arouses feelings of guilt and shame concerning their group's past wrongdoings.

Consistent with the social identity/categorization theory, Branscombe and Doosje (2004) propose the concept of "collective guilt" where individuals strongly identify with their national group and thus feel guilty about the group's behavior that is "perceived as immoral" (Branscombe and Doosje 3). Since people's identities are closely tied to their group and its actions, they often feel shame or guilt towards the immoral act committed by their group when confronted by it, even when they were not personally involved. The authors also state that the notion of "collective guilt" in perpetrators is an inherently moral issue (Branscombe and Doosje 8): In recognizing the morally condemnable act committed by one's group, group members either feel guilty for it or avoid such negative experience of the group by denying or minimizing the act in question.

Doosje et al. (2004) further claim that the degree to which individuals identify with their national group has different implications for the group's experience of collective guilt (95). Consistently, Branscombe and Doosje conclude in their empirical study that a high level of national identification is related to a weak willingness of the people to accept negative aspects of their national history (97-98). Similar to this argument, an empirical study by Zebel et al. (2004) conclude that a higher identification with the in-group was associated with a tendency to defend the group's negative history. On the other hand, a greater willingness to accept negative group history was observed with lower identification levels (Zebel et al. 153).

Zebel et al. also state that "perspective" is a significant factor in shaping the attitude towards negative group history. Taking the perspective of the perpetrator versus the victim has "different implications for the experience of collective guilt" (Zebel et al. 149). Taking the victim's perspective has "positive implications for feelings of collective guilt" (152) because individuals are more willing to address the past and take actions to rectify it. On the other hand, individuals justified the past action in taking the perspective of the "defensive ingroup" (Zebel et al. 152), hence feeling less guilty about the group's action. As observed earlier, a high level of identification with the group translates to a strong desire "to defend one's positive image of the national group" (Zebel et al. 149). A strong identification with the group coupled with a commitment to the perspective of the in-group results in a denial of negative group history and a sense of feeling justified in denying the accusations brought by the victims (Zebel et al. 150). Downplaying negative national history or avoiding the topic is hence a defense mechanism employed against the experience of collective guilt.

Similarly, Lars Rensmann (2004) states that the lurking anti-Semitism in the German population is a form of self-protection against the moral condemnation of the Nazi Holocaust. Rensman discusses the general trend in the younger German generation of minimizing historical discussion on the Nazi history and being resentful about Jewish claims for reparations (Rensmann 177-78). This trend was attributed to the low level of knowledge about the Holocaust in the people. The aversion to the topic of the Holocaust and a heightened defensive posture against moral criticisms were much stronger in people who received little to no education about the history of the Holocaust (Rensmann 179). Those who are less educated about Holocaust were more willing to "put an end to its remembrance" (Rensmann 177). Conversely, a higher level of education on the topic was associated with a greater willingness to remember the history and

engage in active discussions about it. Rensmann notes that suppressing critical discussion about negative group history aggravates the negative experience of collective guilt lurking behind individuals and increases their efforts to delegitimize accounts of such history (186).

Connecting the above discussion to the characteristics of ethnic nationalism thus explored, higher levels of ethnic nationalism could result in a stronger intensity of postcolonial disputes. When the divergence of historical knowledge occurs in the context of a high level of ethnic nationalism, the public is more engaged in the disputed event and is likely to be more emotional about the losses incurred in the violent event. The public would also feel compelled to resist watered-down accounts of colonial history that deny the severity of violence inflicted upon the colonized population. Hence, given the characteristics of ethnic nationalism where people feel a deep emotional need to preserve the integrity of the *ethnie* history, postcolonial disputes are expected to be of stronger intensity where a high level of ethnic nationalism is involved.

Rensmann's analysis observed that a lack of knowledge is conducive to defensive postures and a strong unwillingness to accept negative aspects of group history. It thus also suggests that more education about the event can positively alter people's behavior. However, this possibility is limited to those situations where an established body of knowledge exists. This limitation points to the fact that no established body of knowledge about the disputed events of colonization exists as postcolonial dyads remain polarized in their claims about the past: If the disposition of former colonial powers is to defend themselves against the challenges brought by their former colonies, the disposition of the colonized is to challenge that amnesia and ignorance.

Given such diametrically opposed interests between the colonizer and the colonized, postcolonial disputes can develop into epistemic group polarization. Broncano-Berrocal and Carter (2021) state that group polarization is "epistemically problematic" (39) when they reflect

the desires and interests of the people and not a genuine concern for "knowledge." Mikkel Gerken (2021) further notes that such epistemically problematic polarization can both generate and result in epistemic injustices (140). Similarly, Maura Priest (2021) claims that the structural difficulties of refining group beliefs are in part due to group members' prioritization of non-epistemic interests over refining their beliefs (252). The non-epistemic interests in the context of postcolonial disputes include the desire to preserve the positive moral image of one's group and the positive experience of the group one belongs to.

The prioritization of non-epistemic interests was seen in Germany where demands from the Namibian tribes were rejected and the event of 1904-1908 was not referred to as genocide at all. The desire to avoid the negative emotional experience of the group and its history shaped the "political orientation" (Doosje et al. 97) of groups which resulted in persistent disputes about the colonial past. The refusal to revise in-group beliefs about colonization is evident in the interaction between the colonizer and the colonized, in which historical knowledge about the colonial rule became increasingly polarized between the two parties. Given the lack of shared evidence rooted in the divergence of historical knowledge, postcolonial disputes about policies to address the past can amount to irreconcilable political claims between the colonized and the colonizer. Given that both sides argue from strong self-interests built around group identities, the question becomes whether the dispute and the contesting knowledge claims have objectivity beyond the subjective interests of group members.

Epistemology and the Absolutist Paradigm of Knowledge

The previous section on the divergence of historical knowledge identified a distinctly epistemic concern where shared grounds on knowledge about the colonial event is absent between the colonizer and the colonized. This section continues the previous discussion by exploring the

possibility of knowledge and how the subjective forces evident in ethnic nationalism, interact with objectivity -- the defining quality of knowledge. This section thus turns to epistemology or the "study of knowledge" (Goldman 10).

In epistemology, "justified true belief" is the widely held definition of knowledge (Tollefsen 264). In the above definition, objectivity and truth constitute the core pillars of knowledge. The two concepts are closely interrelated, one implying the other. Objectivity implies an independence from "what individual people may think or prefer" (Rescher 408). Similarly, truth is believed to be independent of and uninfluenced by individual desires. Indeed, as Heidegger (2016) observes, truth "grasped as 'objectivity' is decisive for modern thinking" (131). Beliefs also needs to be *justified* to become knowledge. The standard of justification must also assume objectivity where only the justification made "by 'the facts' or by some impartial […] criteria" (Longino 62) produce knowledge. This excludes subjective desires or passion. In contrast to the values of objectivity, subjectivism defines a system of discourse such as morality or knowledge as "a matter of attitudes or tastes" (Rescher 394). Objectivism on the other hand holds that knowledge is "independent of personal desires and inclinations" (Cox 105).

The definition of knowledge also entails various assumptions attached to the nature of knowledge. One such assumption is that knowledge is independent of or unaffected by passions. Adopting "objectivity as an epistemic standard" (Daukas 331) results in the conceptualization of knowledge as being free from bias, prejudice, or any other social factors that can weaken its neutrality. The conclusion is that only through neutral and uninvolved eyes can one pass sound judgments about an issue or a topic (Friedmann 83). Consistent with this judgment, Ian James Kidd (2016) differentiates between *rhetorical vice charges* and *robust vice charges*. The two charges both target "epistemic vice" but they are not equal in their status (Kidd 183). Only

robust vice charges qualify as "legitimate modes of criticism" (Kidd 183) while rhetorical charges do not. Kidd's distinction or argument that reflects the distinction between rhetorical and robust vice-charges reflects the dominant conception about the status of "knowledge": Knowledge is beyond emotional convictions or individual inclinations. Neither is knowledge equivalent to one's "certainty" which must be deciphered in the words of reason. Knowledge assumes objectivity which in turn endows it with a superior status among other beliefs.

The traditional definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" raises the metaphysical problem of verifying truth in terms of an accurate reflection of reality (the correspondence theory of truth). However, human quests for power and selfish interests often distort the production and transmission of knowledge in its pure form. In this sense, only *a priori* knowledge appears to qualify as truth, and beliefs that do not fit the criteria of such knowledge are denied truth. This conception of knowledge and truth has significant implications for evaluating disputed historical knowledge claims in postcolonial disputes. This also involves the question of whether objectivity is possible in self-interested knowledge claims (a case where social factors are clearly involved).

As examined earlier, ethnic nationalism consists of a strong emotional involvement of the national group to its nation and national history. A national bond is understood to be "subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational in its inspiration" (Connor 204). Ethnic nationalism can thus be easily equated to a strong, unqualified emotional attachment to the nation. Therefore, the evaluation of postcolonial disputes charged with ethnic nationalism using the lens of the correspondence theory of truth results in the following conclusion: Postcolonial disputes fueled by ethnic nationalism is an instance of epistemic subjectivism where knowledge claims about the colonial past are a mere extension of strong national sentiments and

preferences. Hence, knowledge is unattainable in its pure form (demonstrating objective in the scientific sense) for the disputed events of colonization.

The above conclusion about knowledge reflects the tenets of logical positivism and reductive naturalism. Michael P. Lynch (2004) notes that "culturally speaking, […] natural science is our paradigm of knowledge" (*Truth, Value* 76). Under reductive naturalism, knowledge is unified in a radical way in which truth about the world is "written in the language of natural science" (Lynch 76). Similarly, according to logical positivism, "the only meaningful debates [are] scientific ones [where moral propositions] can neither be verified nor falsified empirically" (Lynch 79). When it comes to disagreements over injustices of colonization, or when the interpretation of a colonial event and its injustice is disputed, what is really happening is an expression of "an emotion or attitude toward an idea" (Lynch 79) that lacks truth value. Moral disagreements can appear as though "truth" is being disputed but logical positivists maintain that "neither side of the debate [is] speaking the truth and neither side is saying something false" (Lynch 79).

The implication of this conclusion is that appeals to knowledge is not a possibility for postcolonial disputes. This paints a troubling picture for the colonized groups who have been arguing for their case against claims that minimize the brutalities and injustices of colonization. Francis B. Nyamnjoh as cited by Njoki N. Wane (2014), expressed similar concerns over the Western definitions of "valid" knowledge as limiting other forms of knowledge (Wane 98). Nyamnjoh observed that anything that did not fit the model of objective and rational knowledge was dismissed as "irrational [and] subjective" (Wane 98). Wane proposes the consideration of African epistemology where knowledge is "constructed to validate and legitimate the pluralist way of knowing" (Wane 98). Under this framework, various forms of knowing intertwine and

interact with each other: through the rational and the irrational, subjective and objective, empirical and spiritual. However, under the Western tradition that strictly observes the clear divide between the rational and the irrational, other forms of knowing that deviate from the conventional conception of knowledge are rejected (Wane 99). Continuing the discussion on the nature of knowledge, the next section examines the literature against the scientific or the absolutist paradigm of knowledge.

Knowledge-Power Complex

Against the absolutist conception of knowledge, Michel Foucault (1995) presents a radically different view: Knowledge is inherently tied to power. Foucault claims that power is involved in the production, circulation, and functioning of knowledge (*Discipline & Punish* 93). In response to the absolutist notion of knowledge, Foucault points out and criticizes the tradition that imagines knowledge to be detached from power. Instead, power and knowledge are inextricably connected where "power and knowledge directly imply one another" (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 27). This is reflected in the power-knowledge complex formulated by Foucault which undermines the supremacy of knowledge rooted in absolute objectivity (detached from human values). Foucault's analysis likewise challenges the deification of objectivity as the ultimate goal of epistemic inquiry. His analysis also helps overcome the blind assumptions about absolute neutrality and the purity of knowledge removed from power, where power signifies the influence of human factors and social dynamics on the production of knowledge.

Foucault's analysis offers a position that regards "knowledge-seeking [as] driven by quests for power and social domination" (Goldman and O'Connor). This analysis of knowledge is pertinent in understanding how the power imbalance between the colonizer and the colonized affects the body of knowledge about colonization. Oppenheimer and Hakvoort (2003) concluded

in their empirical study that in colonial relationships where the power difference is apparent, the inferior group accepts its inferiority (91), succumbing to the superiority of their imperial master. The perceived difference in political power affects how countries interact on postcolonial matters and this interaction has definite ramifications for the production of knowledge about colonization and colonial history. Through the production of knowledge that reflects the views of the colonizer, the colonizer's superiority can be inculcated into the minds of the colonized, thus establishing and maintaining the relationship of a superior-colonizer and the inferior-colonized.

Foucault claimed that power is presupposed in truth, that "truth is already power" (*Truth and Power* 319). As a result, a battle is waged "around truth" (Foucault 318). The contestants, however, are not in pursuit of the ideal concept of truth as something that is over and beyond human passion and bias. Instead, they are after the "specific effects of power attached to the truth"; the battle is not "on behalf of truth [but is] about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays" (Foucault 318). While Foucault's analysis challenges the absolutist paradigm of knowledge, it raises yet another problem for the colonized community that aims to elevate their claims about history to gain the same level of recognition as knowledge.

If truth is closely intertwined with power, then the authority of knowledge rooted in absolute objectivity is weakened. The authority attached to knowledge is important for the colonized communities because the perceived authority would support their claims about the need for the colonizers to recognize the injustices suffered during colonization. This is only possible when what the colonized asserts becomes established as knowledge. Furthermore, without the notion of truth, the possibility to discern between better and worse claims about colonial history disappears. In other words, there is no standard to justify the efforts made by the colonized groups to elevate the status of their claims about colonization to knowledge.

Social Epistemology and Virtue Epistemology

The entanglement of power and knowledge has raised skepticism about the realization of truth and objectivity in knowledge (Goldman and O'Connor). Following Foucault's analysis, many debunkers of truth argued against truth based on the claim that what people see as truth and knowledge are mere products of "social practices" (Goldman 11). Nevertheless, social epistemologists defend the possibility of truth while also recognizing the involvement of social factors in the production and shaping of knowledge (Goldman 12). Social epistemology does not deem "social factors or practices [to] pose threat to the attainment of truth" (Goldman and O'Connor) or knowledge. Likewise, social epistemology provides a new understanding of knowledge that departs from the Cartesian model of knowledge.

According to social epistemologists, knowledge production inevitably involves social processes and human values, yet the concept of truth, rationality, and knowledge are preserved (Goldman 12). Virtue epistemology also complements the re-evaluation of knowledge by locating new sources of justification based on virtues where the justification for beliefs lies in the virtuous ways of knowing (Baehr). The absolutist orientation of epistemology is inadequate for the analysis of non-conventional sources and forms of knowledge that do not conform to the purely scientific, *a priori* knowledge. Social epistemology and virtue epistemology depart from the problematic notion of knowledge rooted in the absolutist paradigm by recognizing the convergence between knowledge and human factors. The problem raised by the debunkers of truth is also addressed where the value and the possibility of truth and knowledge are preserved.

Additionally, a novel contribution of social epistemologists to the study of knowledge is the identification of injustice in the act of knowing and knowledge production: the notion of epistemic injustice, the most common type being testimonial injustice. Epistemic injustice is

understood to arise in the context of social injustice and disparities where "differential levels of recognition [are] given to different groups" (Medina, *Resistance* 8), some getting more credibility for what they say compared to others, and therefore, being heard and taken more seriously than others in an unfair manner. Testimonial knowledge refers to knowledge attained from other epistemic agents in verbal and written communication. This type of knowledge involves social interaction between agents. Testimonial injustice occurs when unjust social relations affect the production of knowledge. The audience of the privileged group can be prejudiced against the speaker from a marginalized group. This could result in the speaker being denied epistemic credibility where the information they share are rejected as false.

Therefore, social epistemologists who raise the problem of epistemic injustice claim that epistemology cannot be addressed independently of ethics. José Medina (2013) further states that "we cannot properly address the epistemic and the ethical independently of the political" (*Resistance* 29). Medina argues for "the expansion of the notion of epistemic injustice" (32) where he noted the intersection of politics, ethics, and epistemology. In discussing another type of epistemic injustice known as hermeneutical injustice, Medina argues for the need to understand "the epistemic, the ethical, and the political [as] inextricably intertwined dimensions of normativity" (*Resistance* 29). Unless one grasps the epistemic in the ethical, the ethical in the political, and the political in the epistemic, how each area converges and mutually constitutes the terrain of the other, testimonial injustice and epistemic injustice will never be recognized or adequately addressed. Medina's insights connect the overarching themes explored in the literature pertaining to epistemology and resonate with the analytical orientation of this thesis. Medina's observation points to the final gap in literature addressed in this chapter. This gap extends from the tripartite complex between politics, ethics, and epistemology where epistemic

injustice is brought to bear in the political sphere. By noting the presence of injustice in the realm of knowledge, social epistemology points to the need to realize the unjust ways in which some agents are treated in epistemic deliberation.

However, social epistemologists have not yet explored the possible mechanism by which epistemic injustice takes place in the context of postcolonial disputes. Not much exploration has been made on how the absolutist conception of knowledge aids the justification of testimonial injustice perpetrated by the dominant social groups. The conceptual link is lacking between the prevalence of the absolutist paradigm of knowledge and the postcolonial reality where postcolonial disputes are perceived to be a clash of irreconcilable claims that lack a genuine concern for knowledge. The nature of postcolonial disputes defined as such, reflects the view that knowledge claims made by both the colonizer and the colonized lack objectivity and truth.

The implication of such judgment is the belief that there can be no truth about colonial history. This view effectively rejects knowledge claims made by the colonized and bars the colonized community from gaining recognition about their oppression under colonial rule. This is because their knowledge claims are judged to be neither objective nor verifiable as truth. As stated previously, the absolutist conception of knowledge reflects the Western tradition of epistemology that has been the dominant paradigm of knowledge, dictating the thinking of many. By appealing to the scientific model of *a priori* knowledge, the colonizers could effectively reject other forms of knowledge asserted by the colonized groups. This is important to note as the account of an "experience" of any historical event is subjective to a degree, involving people's interpretations and feelings about the event. Appeals to the scientific model of knowledge can thus be a convenient tool for the colonizer group to deny knowledge claims made by the colonized and preserve the dominance of the colonizer's perspective on the discourse of

colonial history. Likewise, establishing the conceptual connection between the scientific paradigm of knowledge and testimonial injustice is an important step to explain why postcolonial disputes charged with ethnic nationalism are often identified with epistemic subjectivism.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the literature to construct the analytical foundation for the research question which is stated as: "If postcolonial disputes are intensified by ethnic nationalism, are postcolonial disputes an instance of epistemic subjectivism?" The ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism best captured the essence of ethnic nationalism as conceptualized in this thesis. Ethnic nationalism informed by ethnosymbolism involves strong affective ties to the national group which can generate remarkable commitment and loyalty from the members to the nation. The nation succeeds the ethnic community or the *ethnie* which has a deep history, constituting the source of unique national identity. Cultural symbols undergird and reinforce ethnic consciousness that figures into the nation and ethnic nationalism. Against the modernist and primordialist paradigms, it was argued that nations and nationalism are neither static entities nor invented traditions of modernity. Instead, ethnic nationalism is rooted in a deeper history of the *ethnie* in interaction with changes brought by modernization. In this sense, ethnic nationalism inherits the strengths of ethnosymbolism which recognizes and encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimensions of a nation and nationalism.

The conceptual conflation between "nations" and "states" was also important to note because given the above characteristics of ethnic nationalism, ethnic nationalism would not match the state borders of most postcolonial states that have an ethnically diverse population. It was necessary to point out the postcolonial reality in which ethnic nationalism would rarely represent the whole state. This specified the scope of ethnic nationalism for the analysis that

examines postcolonial disputes between *states* where ethnic nationalism only refers to that which applies to the entire country and not one that exists in groups within state borders.

While the literature on nationalism is dense on different theories of nations and nationalism, it is silent on the effects of ethnic nationalism on postcolonial disputes (in the political realm, as a political phenomenon). This gap in the literature was addressed by finding the conceptual overlaps between postcolonial studies and ethnic nationalism, both raising concerns over the importance of ethnicity in forming the identities of actors in politics. Another weakness in the literature was the failure to grasp the importance of ethnic nationalism in analyzing postcolonial dyadic interactions and the significance of colonial history in the development of ethnic nationalism. The lack of appreciation for the other discipline was mutual in the study of nationalism and postcolonial studies.

The conceptual connection between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes was made in noting such a gap in the literature. Following Bar-Tal's analysis of irreconcilable conflicts, the experience of group violence was identified as an important factor that engages the affected population. The violence factor led to another qualification for postcolonial disputes for the empirical analysis: disputes about events of colonial violence inflicted upon people. The experience of group loss due to external aggression in the context of ethnic nationalism would magnify the involvement of the people, often highly emotional in nature. This is due to the strong affective ties to the nation and a strong concern for the preservation of authentic national history (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 21) coupled with commemorative practices and rituals that reinforce collective memories about the violent event (Smith, *Ideologies* 30).

Moreover, postcolonial disputes had an important characteristic: the divergence in historical knowledge about the disputed event. This divergence was attributed to the universal

tendency of former colonizers to display colonial amnesia towards colonial history. Colonial amnesia is perpetrated at the nexus of postcolonial asymmetry and epistemic asymmetry that arises from it. This disposition was further explained by the social identity and social categorization theories. The notion of collective guilt affected by levels of group identification was discussed by referring to several empirical studies done in the field. Following the literature, colonizer states are likely to deny and minimize the colonial history when confronted by the colonized communities demanding moral actions be taken about the past.

The distinctly epistemic concern present in postcolonial disputes was not fully addressed by the literature. This was problematic because postcolonial disputes are essentially disputes about knowledge. As noted by Rensmann, the level of knowledge about the Holocaust had implications for the German people's attitudes towards it. The word "level" refers to the existence of established knowledge about the topic. However, the same kind of established knowledge about the victims does not exist in the history of colonization. The dominant discourse about postcolonial disputes focuses exclusively on its politicized nature and thus fails to account for the divergence in historical knowledge which perpetuates the lack of an established body of knowledge on colonialism. Failure to recognize the interconnection between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes, and the significance of the absence of shared knowledge about the colonial history, will result in brushing past the complexities of the matter.

Noting the importance of knowledge and the epistemic stakes involved in postcolonial disputes is the first step to grasp the complex nature of postcolonial disputes. However, this is not enough as the concept of knowledge raises the question of discerning between knowledge and non-knowledge. Social identity theory and ethnic nationalism appear to produce similar behavioral effects: both colonizer and colonized groups (especially those with strong ethnic

nationalism) demonstrate vested interests in the event rooted in group identity. It is not clear whether claims about the brutalities of colonization can attain the same level of recognition as the widely established body of knowledge about the Holocaust. To address this area, the more important task is to examine the case where ethnic nationalism as a strong subjective force engages the public to the extent that postcolonial disputes are greatly intensified, and thus made visible. The philosophical project is geared to this end where the scientific paradigm of knowledge is challenged to argue that the authority conferred to the concept of knowledge defined by absolute objectivity should extend to non-conventional forms of knowledge such as historical knowledge that involves the intentionality of interpretation.

The literature on epistemology started with unpacking the implications for the concept of knowledge rooted in the absolutist (scientific) paradigm. This posed a problem to the colonized communities whose knowledge claims did not fit the scientific model of objectivity or truth. The scientific paradigm thus perpetuates the injustice of barring marginalized voices from gaining recognition in the discourse. In the following section, absolutism in the scientific paradigm was challenged by Foucault's power-knowledge complex. Foucault's analysis located the intersection of knowledge and politics, hence the role of power dynamics in the production of knowledge.

However, this constituted another problem because the standard of justification for beliefs was lost in challenging the absolute notion of objectivity and truth which endowed knowledge its special status over other beliefs. In response, social epistemology and virtue epistemology were discussed which provided a way out of the problem raised by the debunkers of truth following Foucault's analysis. Social epistemology also identified the convergence between ethics and epistemology in discussing the notion of epistemic injustice. Grasping the intersectionality of ethics, epistemology, and politics in the analysis of knowledge claims in

postcolonial disputes uncovers the depth of the matter addressed by the research question which also embodies the intersection of politics, epistemology, and ethics.

Informed by the literature, ethnic nationalism is expected to be an important variable that can shape the dynamics of postcolonial disputes and their intensity. Moreover, a divergence in historical knowledge about the disputed event is expected to be seen between the colonizer and the colonized. The divergence in historical knowledge is also expected to have important implications for postcolonial disputes, accounting for reasons behind the difficulties of resolving them. Following the literature, this study expects to see a strong association between high levels of ethnic nationalism and the intensification of postcolonial disputes. The next chapter will discuss in further detail the research design and the expectations of the empirical study.

Chapter 3. Research Design and Methodology

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the conceptual link between ethnic nationalism and conflict was established to state that ethnic nationalism can intensify postcolonial disputes between countries by augmenting the effects of knowledge differences on the disputes. The divergence in knowledge was understood to reflect the common disposition of many colonial powers to minimize or avoid responsibility for the acts of cruelty and oppression committed against the colonized population. The research question was stated as follows: "If postcolonial disputes are intensified by ethnic nationalism, are postcolonial disputes an instance of epistemic subjectivism?" This chapter provides the methodology and research design to test the hypothesis that expects to see high levels of ethnic nationalism associated with strong intensity of postcolonial disputes and is thus limited to addressing the first half of the research question.

The chapter opens with the introduction of the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. The independent variable is the level of ethnic nationalism in a postcolonial dyad, the intervening variable is the divergence in historical knowledge, and the dependent variable is the intensity of postcolonial disputes. The hypothesis is briefly stated followed by the discussion on the methodology. The study employs a comparative case study of two postcolonial dyads. The following section discusses the case selection process and justifies why the postcolonial dyads of India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan were chosen. It also includes the explanation for why specific events of colonization were chosen for each postcolonial dyad: the Amritsar Massacre (also known as the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre) and the Comfort Women system. The chapter concludes by discussing available data sources for the study.

Measures

Independent Variable: Level of Ethnic Nationalism

The independent variable is the level of ethnic nationalism in a postcolonial dyad. Several qualifications need to be made about the term "ethnic nationalism" as will be used in the study. Firstly, ethnic nationalism in this study is limited to that which represents the whole state and does not include ethnic nationalism that can exist in groups within state boundaries. The objective of this study is to observe how ethnic nationalism affects postcolonial disputes within a postcolonial dyad that consists of countries. It is for this reason that ethnic nationalism refers to one that can be attributed to the state as a whole.

Secondly, postcolonial states (former colonies) will be the point of examination to determine the level of ethnic nationalism in a postcolonial dyad. Ethnic nationalism levels in Japan and the UK are not considered because postcolonial disputes are understood as a situation where disagreement becomes vocal or visible *when* the colonized state challenges the universal tendency of colonial powers to minimize, distort, or ignore the event in question. In simpler terms, the behavior of colonizer states is constant, and the reactionary behavior of colonized states is variable. Hence, ethnic nationalism levels in postcolonial states should be noted to observe the effects of the independent variable (ethnic nationalism levels) if postcolonial disputes are sparked by the responses from the colonized state. This is why ethnic nationalism in the postcolonial states takes focus in the study.

To determine the levels of ethnic nationalism in a country, the starting point is the ethnic composition within state borders as ethnic nationalism means one that maps on to the whole country. India and many postcolonial states embrace the colonial legacy in the arbitrarily drawn borders and the resulting ethnic diversity that can prompt inter-group conflicts within the state

(Thomas 70; Wane 103). The Indian colony was split into two states at Britain's discretion after its independence. Today, India is one of the most diverse countries in the world (Singh 494) which reflects the multi-ethnic nature of most postcolonial countries.

On the other hand, South Korea has remained ethnically homogenous prior to and after Japanese colonization. Korea has a history of being a largely "homogenous nation-state" (Seo 89). The Joseon dynasty had long maintained "the status of single nationhood" (Seo 55). The ethnic homogeneity of the Korean kingdom solidified especially during the period when Korea was known as the *Hermit Kingdom* for being closed off to the outside world (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 20). While the Korean nation was later divided into two countries along ideological lines, the notion of the Korean nation or *Han minjok* has remained largely intact (Yim 38). Based on this qualification, the simplest judgment of ethnic nationalism levels for India and South Korea is the following: India has a low level of ethnic nationalism due to its ethnocultural and religious diversity and South Korea has a high level of ethnic nationalism due to its largely homogeneous ethnic composition.

The consideration so far is limited to the objective characteristics of a nation. However, the evaluation is not complete without also accounting for the subjective experience of the nation (Smith*, Dating the Nation* 63). The question of whether people feel a strong connection to their national group including the past generation and their experiences, and whether a strong sense of national identity rooted in shared ethnicity, culture, and heritage defines "ethnic consciousness" (Smith 54) should also be addressed. This is where colonial history becomes important. Compared to the British colonial style, the Japanese imposed a much tighter cultural policy, forcing Korean people to adopt Japanese names, learn Japanese, and worship Japanese gods (Shintoism) while banning Korean culture (Kim 12). This assimilation policy greatly intensified

the Korean population's animosity towards Japan: an animosity rooted in prior experiences of Japanese invasion that was exemplified with strong ethnic consciousness.

The ethnic composition of a country matters because it affects the dynamics of interaction between the colonizer and the colonized countries. Ethnic composition is akin to a breeding ground or a starting point for the development of ethnic nationalism (or a lack of it). The interaction between ethnic composition and the colonial experience accounts for the varying levels of ethnic nationalism in India and South Korea. A greater resistance against the colonizer is expected in a political entity where there is ethnic homogeneity compared to the one that lacks a common ethnic identity and has greater internal differences between groups. This is partly because the direction of antipathy is scattered when there are internal competitors for power (for example, the provinces under the Mughal empire) compared to a situation where a prior experience of resisting foreign invasion as a unified nation strengthens the national identity of the people in comparison to the foreign invader (for example, the ethnically homogenous Joseon dynasty). The accumulating instances of collective resistance against the colonizer and the growing animosity alongside it contribute to the making and the preservation of strong ethnic consciousness in the latter case.

Intervening Variable: Difference in Knowledge About Colonization

The intervening variable is the divergence in historical knowledge about the disputed event. The difference in the knowledge base about the colonial history between countries within a postcolonial dyad is an important aspect of postcolonial disputes. When negotiating apologies and reparations, the facts about the historical event play a determinative role. For example, if one believed ("believed" to indicate one's knowledge about the event) that the Amritsar Massacre was an anomaly in the benign British imperialism in India, and that the number of deaths was

much smaller than those reported by the Indian media, then a formal apology from the British government would seem uncalled for. Similarly, if one believed (or "knew") that the Japanese state was not involved in the operation of the Comfort Women stations and that these stations were no more than a voluntary prostitution system (denying the inhumane treatment of women), then demanding apology and reparations from the Japanese government would seem absurd.

A lack of common knowledge on the event in question perpetuates the cycle of conflicting truth claims about the event and the ensuing ought-claims made in the present. Knowledge about the past is responsible for the kinds of judgments made about the event in colonial history and the political actions concerning the event. For instance, India claims that the British have never formally apologized for the Amritsar Massacre and that the number of deaths was greatly reduced in the official figures published by the UK ("Jallianwala Bagh Massacre"). If the casualties of Amritsar Massacre are greatly minimized and the event is presented as a necessary political action to have been taken by the British, disputes about whether the British should compensate for the deaths or deliver a formal apology to India may be difficult to reconcile. The intervening variable thus provides a possible reason behind the persistence of postcolonial disputes and the difficulty with resolving them especially on negotiating the policies concerning formal apologies and reparations.

Dependent Variable: Intensity of Postcolonial Disputes

The dependent variable is the intensity of postcolonial disputes. The term "postcolonial disputes" in this study refers to disputes between countries (having formally recognized statehood) sharing a colonial past, and not between ethnic groups that could have existed before and during colonization. Postcolonial disputes are disputes concerning events that occurred during colonization. This involves political demands concerning the colonial event made by the

postcolonial states such as demands for reparations and formal apologies for the harm inflicted upon the colonized population. Postcolonial disputes broadly cover any disputes between the colonizer and the colonized after the end of colonization. However, in this study, only those postcolonial disputes over a particular type of event that occurred during colonization are considered.

The type of event is one that involved an instance of violence inflicted upon the colonized population which is able to evoke strong emotional responses from the people of the colonized country. The violence involved in the event should be to such an extent that the event can be noted as an instance of "crimes against humanity" as defined by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In other words, postcolonial disputes in this study should concern an event that is serious enough to get the public involved. Only then would the dispute be of a kind that can potentially affect the overall bilateral relationship of a postcolonial dyad. This possibility of influence had to be established because the intensity of postcolonial disputes is measured in terms of whether the negative sentiments generated in the disputes constrain the trajectory of development in the bilateral relationship.

The nature of the bilateral relationship defining a postcolonial dyad is important in measuring the intensity of postcolonial disputes. If despite the existence of unresolved postcolonial disputes, the bilateral relationship is largely positive, then the intensity of postcolonial disputes is considered low. On the other hand, if the bilateral relationship is fraught with tension and hostility despite strong incentives for mutual cooperation, then the intensity of postcolonial disputes is considered high. To this end, the intensity of postcolonial disputes will be measured by observing whether they spill over to and affect the outcome of important political agreements (which will then have implications for the bilateral relationship).

Hypothesis

The second half of the research question concerns the epistemological analysis of the objectivity of knowledge statements imbued with subjective motives. For this purpose, a clear and strong association between ethnic nationalism and intensity of postcolonial disputes had to be established first. The two hypotheses tested in the empirical study are proposed as follows:

> Hypothesis 1: If a postcolonial dyad has high levels of ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes in the dyad will be of high intensity.
> Hypothesis 2: If a postcolonial dyad has low levels of ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes in the dyad will be of low intensity.

Instead of measuring and testing ethnic nationalism levels, the two postcolonial dyads selected for the study each represents a case with low ethnic nationalism and high ethnic nationalism. Again, ethnic nationalism levels are limited to what is observed in the postcolonial state. The intensity of postcolonial disputes in relation to the bilateral relationship will then be compared between the two cases. The following section elaborates on the methodology employed.

Methodology

This study adopts a comparative case study of two postcolonial dyads: India-UK and South Korea-Japan. A comparative case study has many advantages. In a general sense, it highlights the similarities and differences between the compared cases. And in highlighting the similarities and differences, a comparative case study can provide a stronger understanding of individual cases and capture their distinct characteristics. Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley provide a well-rounded definition of comparative case study as follows:

> A case study [is] a method of obtaining a 'case' or a number of 'cases' through an empirical examination of a real-world phenomenon within its naturally occurring context, without directly manipulating either the phenomenon or the context. The *comparative*

> *case study* is the systematic comparison of two or more data points ('cases') obtained through the use of the case study method. (372)

Following this definition of comparative case study, Kaarbo and Beasley note important implications. Firstly, a comparative case study does not assume a particular purpose in the study, allowing for flexibility from casual inferences to "detailing historical occurrences" (Kaarbo and Beasley 372) which is what this study is concerned about: recounting and comparing the colonial history of India and Korea to demonstrate the intersection between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial disputes. Secondly, a comparative case study does not require the use of multiple sources and various types of evidence to conduct the study. This was another advantage of using a comparative case study model which allowed for the analysis of two cases without a heavy reliance on multiple sources of evidence given the qualitative nature of this empirical study.

Consistently, the third implication of a case study is the possibility of conducting a study that is "qualitative and narrative in form" (Kaarbo and Beasley 373). This quality makes the integration of the two disciplines (political science and philosophy) easier and more plausible, compared to using a study that requires a strictly quantitative analysis, in which case, there would be an abrupt break between the two subjects. The fourth implication is the importance of observing the phenomenon "as it occurs within its context" (Kaarbo and Beasley 373) without manipulation. Since examining the colonial history is central to the empirical study of this thesis, this fourth implication of a comparative case study is consistent with the interests of this study: to explain and understand the cases as they are in the specific historical contexts of colonization.

This study is concerned with the third type of case study identified by Kaarbo and Beasley: "using cases to develop theory" (374). Here, cases are investigated to test hypotheses and build a theory. The case selection is determined by the nature of the theory rather than particular cases of interest (Kaarbo and Beasley 375). This serves the purpose of this thesis at

large where the goal is not to study the case itself but to use the case to prove or develop a theory (an area where the philosophy portion has its emphasis on). Kaarbo and Beasley effectively capture the essence of the third type of case study which also accounts for the spirit of this empirical study: “The focus shifts from being explicitly on the case to being explicitly on the theory” (375). In the following section, the case selection process will be explained and justified, consistent with the goals of a comparative case study designed to develop a theory.

Case Selection

The two cases in the study were selected to meet the goal of testing the association between ethnic nationalism levels and the intensity of postcolonial disputes to address the broader question pertaining to epistemology. This section will first start with the introduction of the postcolonial dyads of India-UK and South Korea-Japan and how they were chosen. A table that compares the two dyads is included at the end of this section which summarizes important similarities and differences. The next section will also introduce the two disputed events of colonization and explain why they were chosen. As stated in the introduction chapter, postcolonial disputes in this thesis refer to disputes over a particular event and do not cover other areas of disputes that can arise within postcolonial dyads.

Postcolonial Dyads: India-UK and South Korea-Japan

The two cases selected for the study are India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads. As explained earlier, the India-UK dyad represents a case with a low level of ethnic nationalism and the South Korea-Japan dyad represents the opposite, a case with a high level of ethnic nationalism. The two cases were chosen using the method of difference. The two dyads demonstrated considerable similarities concerning the relational factor (the nature of relationship

between the colonizer and the colonized countries): all four countries are democracies, both postcolonial dyads of India-UK and South Korea-Japan consist of strategic partners (cooperation would be mutually beneficial on economic, political, security fronts for the two countries in a dyad), both dyads are engaged in an unresolved postcolonial dispute, and both India and South Korea have comparable economic strength and independence from their former colonizer. The comparison of India-UK and South Korea-Japan dyads serves to formulate an explanation for why the former demonstrates less hostility in postcolonial disputes compared to the latter.

The relative economic independence is an important factor to note because it enables states to challenge their former colonizer on disputed events when necessary. A power imbalance between the colonizer and the colonized states can interfere with gauging the effects of ethnic nationalism levels on the intensity of postcolonial disputes. Examples from Eastern Europe during the Cold War illustrate how the political ability to "[express] national values" (Cottam and Cottam, *Nationalistic Values* 125) was curtailed under the Soviet Union's dominance. Hence, even with high levels of ethnic nationalism in a postcolonial state, economic and political inferiority to the colonizer country can alter the nature of interaction, thus affecting the effects of ethnic nationalism on the intensity of postcolonial disputes.

One such example is South Korea in the 1960s where the government put behind the issue of addressing colonial matters when cooperation with Japan (getting on its good side) was of absolute necessity for economic development (Hosaka). To gauge the effects of ethnic nationalism, the ability to challenge the former colonizer had to be constant (controlling for the effect of power differences affecting postcolonial disputes). Hence, the scope condition for the case study is the relative comparability between the economic capacity (or power) of former

colonies and colonizers. This scope condition controls for the effects of power dynamics on how countries in postcolonial dyads interact with each other.

Given that the power imbalance is controlled for in choosing India and South Korea (both have economic independence from former colonizers), one other similarity is important to note: the mutual interest of states to cooperate. One example is a need for cooperation rooted in the shared security concerns: India and UK face the problem of piracy in the Indian Ocean (Scott 177) while South Korea and Japan face common security threats coming from North Korea. Given this obvious need to cooperate, in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in (despite his largely hostile policies towards Japan) declared that given the situation in North Korea, cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States was "unshakable" (Michisita). Likewise, the shared economic, political, and security concerns between countries increase the "strategic importance" (Scott 173) of the other, which in theory, should prompt countries to enter a stable and cooperative relationship.

The India-UK postcolonial dyad shows consistency with this expectation: Trade rates increased between the two countries and a joint defense cooperation was signed in 2017 (Scott 176). On the other hand, the South Korea-Japan dyad has found itself falling into regular cycles of hostility, the bilateral relationship being wrought with persistent tension (James 2). For instance, in 2008, an important defense agreement between the two countries was abruptly canceled due to strong public opposition in Korea (Glosserman and Snyder 96). All the similarities kept constant, the two postcolonial dyads point to one major difference: the level of ethnic nationalism in the postcolonial states. The hypothesis tests whether the divergence witnessed in bilateral relations between the two postcolonial dyads is associated with the differing levels of ethnic nationalism in India and South Korea. Comparing the two cases will

illustrate the effects of ethnic nationalism on the intensity of postcolonial disputes. The table below provides a summary of the two postcolonial dyads in comparison.

Table 1. Comparison of India-UK and South Korea-Japan Postcolonial Dyads

	India-United Kingdom	**South Korea-Japan**	**Different v. Similar**
Disputed Event of Colonization	Amritsar/Jallianwala Bagh Massacre (April 1919)	"Comfort Women" (1930s-1945)	
Ethnic Composition	Ethnically diverse: multiple ethnic identities - multicultural Mughal Empire - internal division and competition between provinces - Independence movement against the British marked the birth of India's unification across diversity	Ethnically homogenous: single ethnic identity - 500 years of Joseon dynasty and 3 kingdoms before it found on single identity - this national identity reinforced in experiencing foreign invasions as a unified nation; national identity with focus on ethnicity solidified during Japanese colonization	Different
Colonial Style and its Effect on Ethnic Consciousness	Laxed cultural policies - minimum interference with local culture	Coercive cultural policies intended to assimilate Koreans to Japanese culture	Different
	Effect: Ethnic diversity preserved. The "us" versus "them distinction is made between religious groups as an effect of British Census of India	Effect: Ethnic consciousness becomes more pronounced. The "us" versus "them" distinction is between the Korean nation and Imperial Japan	Different
Postcolonial State Formation	Imperial Transfer	Imperial Breakup	Different
Independence Movement Framework	In terms of justice and injustice such as discrimination and unjust acts targeting the Indian people: Concept of justice detached from the "Indian nation"	In terms of national identity and values that defined justice and injustice. Threats to Korean national identity and culture were considered an "injustice" including the suppression of Korean language: Concept of justice intertwined with the "Korean nation"	Different
Current Bilateral Relationship	Shared interest in mutual cooperation and active cooperation observed	Shared interest in mutual cooperation but difficulty in achieving cooperation	Similar: Shared interest for cooperation between the colonizer and the colonized Different: Strong cooperation in India-UK v. weak prospects for strong cooperation in South Korea-Japan

Postcolonial Disputes: Amritsar Massacre and Comfort Women

Given that strong emotional attachments to the national group constitute the core basis of ethnic nationalism, two events that would arouse the most attention and engagement from the people were selected: the Amritsar Massacre or the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre and the Military Comfort Women issue. The selection criteria are pertinent to the epistemological analysis on evaluating the objectivity of knowledge claims imbued with subjective motives. In order to carry out this analysis, the study needed an obvious case of a strong emotional involvement of the public with the disputed event which would prompt statements made on behalf of the affected group. Ethnic nationalism involves strong emotional concerns for the nation and its history; if the goal is to test its ability to engage the public to such a great extent that postcolonial disputes are intensified, then the nature of the event had to be constant across the two cases.

It is for this reason that the Amritsar Massacre and the Comfort Women issue were chosen because both events involved an inhumane level of violence inflicted upon the people under colonial rule. Both events are considered "crimes against humanity" according to Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute published by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC defines "crimes against humanity" to be any of the eleven categories listed under Article 7 (1). Forced sexual slavery and inhumane treatment of women in the Comfort Women stations and indiscriminate murder of civilians in the Amritsar Massacre reflect the following categories that Article 7 (1) recognizes as instances of crimes against humanity: a) Murder; g) "Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; and k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health."

Operative clause 4 of the UN Security Council Resolution 1820 adopted in 2008 similarly declared that "rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes,

crimes against humanity" (United Nations Security Council). These international documents support the judgment that the Amritsar Massacre and the Comfort Women stations under the British and Japanese colonization respectively constitute crimes against humanity. The Comfort Women issue and the Amritsar Massacre also share two similarities: a common divergence in historical knowledge about the facts of the event and the unresolved status of the disputes. More than a hundred years have passed since the Massacre and India still awaits a formal apology from the UK. Likewise, South Korea has relentlessly demanded a "sincere" apology and reparation made to the Comfort Women victims from the Japanese government who denies all charges to this day. The difference between the two lies in the intensity of postcolonial disputes and this will be illustrated by examining the two postcolonial dyads in the next Chapter.

Data Sources

Glosserman and Snyder (2015) in their investigation of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan, utilized public opinion data "as a way of getting into the heads of the public on both sides and more deeply understanding the nature and parameters of identity-related issues that have inhibited development of the relationship" (95). *Getting into the heads of the public* resonates with the ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism proposed by Smith who took pride in his theory for being able to understand the "inner-world of the participants" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 16) concerning nations and nationalism. Likewise, public opinion polls will be utilized and analyzed in this study which will not only reveal what the public thinks about certain topics, but also demonstrate how their perception reflects identity concerns, the presence of ethnic nationalism as implied by their responses, and how the overall bilateral relationship surrounding postcolonial disputes aligns with the public opinion data.

However, a limitation of using public polls is for this very reason of relying on people's perspectives. People's perspective about a topic will vary depending on many factors including age group, education level, political affiliation, religion, and so on. Given such variation, public opinion data might not paint an accurate picture representing the whole population. Nevertheless, they still capture the views of an average citizen of a country which includes the overall attitude of the public towards a subject of concern. Public opinion polls will also reflect the perceived significance of postcolonial disputes in a country. For instance, public surveys in Japan and South Korea showed a mutual deterioration of the public's evaluation of each other in 2019 ("Bilateral"). This deterioration was caused by the trade disputes following a South Korean Supreme Court's ruling on the issue of Japanese Forced Labor during colonization. If a comparable survey that asks the British and the Indian people for the evaluation of each other is absent, this lack of such data can be an indication itself that a friendly relationship is the norm, or that mutual public animosity does not characterize the bilateral relationship.

An important caveat should be noted on the availability of comparable materials between postcolonial dyads. Since survey questions reflect public interests and issues that are deemed as important in the bilateral relationship, the content of public opinion polls between India and South Korea may not be sufficiently similar to be comparable. The difference in survey content and questions will indicate the difference in the national interest between the two countries; this difference is expected to parallel the divergence in the bilateral relationship with the former colonizer (if such divergence is observed). Available data sources for public opinion polls include joint surveys conducted and published by Genron NPO and East Asia Institute in Japan and South Korea from 2013 to 2019, ASAN Polls on the South Korean public's attitude towards

domestic and international political matters in 2010, and Pew Research polls taken in India that measure the public's attitude on various topics (Devlin).

Since textbooks are an important source of knowledge which has authority unlike other types of books and are part of the school curriculum, it impacts a much wider population in greater magnitude. Furthermore, if a country has a high literacy and education level like Japan and South Korea, the impact and significance of textbooks in public knowledge is greater. However, since not all educational institutions use the same material nor is the material homogenous across time, comparing textbooks within countries in a postcolonial dyad would be too massive a project for the scope of this study. Language barrier is another problem: although most Indian schools use English, some government-run schools use the local language and schools in both South Korea and Japan are use the local language and not English. For these reasons, this study instead turns to any state approval of history textbooks that are accused of historical fabrication on the topics of Comfort Women and the Amritsar massacre. Although published books or textbooks do not define the status of the public's knowledge on an absolute sense, it does indicate the government's stance on the topic by the approval it gives.

Conclusion

This section discussed the methodology, introduced the variables, justified the case selection process, and provided available data sources. The three variables were the following: Independent variable is the level of ethnic nationalism that matches state borders, dependent variable is the intensity of postcolonial disputes over a chosen event, and intervening variable is the divergence in historical knowledge between the colonizer and the colonized. It was re-established that the empirical study is geared towards answering the overall, broader research

question posed in the thesis. To this end, a comparative case study was chosen to test the association between levels of ethnic nationalism and the intensity of postcolonial disputes.

The two selected postcolonial dyads of India-UK and South Korea-Japan shared important similarities: both the colonizer and the colonized countries were democratic regimes, shared in the strategic interest of mutual cooperation, and were engaged in an unresolved postcolonial dispute. Despite the similarities, the two postcolonial dyads differed in the intensity of postcolonial disputes and the ethnic composition of the country (India and South Korea) which has implications for the evaluation of ethnic nationalism levels in the country. A high level of ethnic nationalism is expected to correspond to a strong intensity of postcolonial disputes over the chosen events: the Amritsar Massacre and the Comfort Women controversy for the India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads respectively. In the next chapter, the two postcolonial dyads will be compared to test the hypothesis of whether ethnic nationalism is associated with the intensification of postcolonial disputes.

Chapter 4: Comparison of India-UK and South Korea-Japan Postcolonial Dyads

Introduction

This chapter compares the postcolonial dyads of India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan. The comparison of the two dyads indicates that a high level of ethnic nationalism is associated with high intensity of postcolonial disputes. As discussed in the previous chapter, India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads demonstrate many similarities. However, an important difference is seen in the ethnic composition of India and South Korea. India's ethnocultural diversity and Korea's ethnic homogeneity had sizable effects on the development of national identity and the resulting levels of ethnic nationalism in the two countries. Ethnic identity and national consciousness solidified through centuries of foreign invasions in the context of an ethnically homogenous Korea. This historical experience of the Korean nation rigidified ethnic consciousness in the people that became most pronounced during Japanese colonization (Kim 262).

On the other hand, the Indian nation lacked ethnic homogeneity and the same level of national consciousness rooted in ethnic ties as seen in Korea. Indian national identity was fostered after its independence which had its basis on secularism, a mechanism to foster solidarity across India's vast ethnocultural diversity (Roy 19). Given the lack of ethnic homogeneity, the founders of the Indian state faced "the difficulties of imagining a national community along familiar axes of ethnicity, religion, language, race, or even territory [and] the substance of national identity [had] to be proclaimed in and through other registers of belonging" (Roy 114). This points to a fundamental difference between India and South Korea: India is a case that demonstrates secular nationalism but lacks ethnic nationalism. India's secular

nationalism does not affect the analysis of the study that is only concerned with ethnic nationalism as India still demonstrates low ethnic nationalism levels.

This chapter first provides the colonial history of the two postcolonial dyads followed by a section on the postcolonial state formation of India and South Korea. Colonial history adds important insights into postcolonial state formation and how national identity developed in these states. Colonial history coupled with the pre-existing ethnic composition of the colony has different implications for the levels of ethnic nationalism in countries. This leads to the following section which compares the levels of ethnic nationalism in India and South Korea. The following section introduces key examples from the disputed events of colonization within postcolonial dyads: the Amritsar Massacre (or the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre) for the India-UK dyad and the Comfort Women issue for the South Korea-Japan dyad. Both examples are instances of crimes against humanity according to Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute as discussed in Chapter 3. This section will cover the summary of the two events: what is disputed about the events and the responses from the UK and Japan to Indian and South Korean charges.

The next section identifies a common characteristic of postcolonial disputes: the divergence in historical knowledge between the colonizer and the colonized. Divergence is observed on two fronts: factual descriptions (statistics on the numbers of victims) and the interpretation of the event (whether the colonizer is responsible for it). A common characteristic of this divergence is along the lines of minimization versus remembrance of the event between the colonizer and the colonized respectively. The final section discusses the effects of varying levels of ethnic nationalism on the intensity of postcolonial disputes given the common divergence of historical knowledge in both postcolonial dyads. Lastly, public opinion polls on bilateral relationships are discussed and analyzed for the two postcolonial dyads which provide

further explanation and support for the association between levels of ethnic nationalism and the intensification of postcolonial disputes.

British Occupation of India: Multicultural Colony

The British colonization of India had its initial start with the creation of the British East India Company in the early 17th century. India was ruled by Akbar, the Mughal emperor who established centralized control over many provinces. The East India Company obtained trading privileges from Akbar's successor Jahangir, and expanded between the 17th century and the 18th century. As the central authority of the Mughals declined in the face of regional uprisings against the empire, the East India Company interfered with subcontinental politics to maintain its trading privileges (Major). Unfair tax treaties and mistreatment of the Bengali population by the Company soon resulted in widespread frustration and resentment towards the British in India. This eventually developed into the *Sepoy Mutiny of 1857*. The mutiny ended with a British victory and the official start of the British rule of India, known as the *British Raj* (Wolpert).

Under the *Government of India Act* of 1858, the British colonial control over India was transferred from the East India Company to the British Crown (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 19). The geographic distance between India and Britain made it difficult for Britain to oversee its colony by direct rule. It was impractical to send a large number of officials from Britain to administer India. Instead, the British relied largely on the local elites, a form of indirect rule of the colony. The administration of Indian provinces relied on the viceroys and local princes who swore allegiance to the British Royal Crown (Wolpert). Western education was introduced in India to ensure the making of loyal and friendly local leaders who could assist the British empire. Education projects in India produced some positive results like increased literacy rates. However,

the positive social effects were not reflective of British benevolence as the education program was intended to meet the needs of colonial rule at a distance (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 19).

The British were also aware of Hindu and Muslim wariness towards Christian converts under British influence in India. In fearing another mutiny, the British adopted a "policy of religious nonintervention" (Wolpert) where the realm of religion was left untouched, allowing for local culture to thrive. This is not to say that the British did not seek influence over Indian culture when they deemed it unethical. For example, British colonial officers abolished *sati,* a practice where young widows were burned alive with their deceased husbands (Mani 144). In fact, most British officials saw themselves bearing the "white man's burden" in the words of Rudyard Kipling. Many considered themselves to be on a commendable mission to civilize and enlighten the backward populations of India (Wolpert). But overall, a loose control over local culture defined the British colonial rule in India.

The British also adopted a *laissez-faire* doctrine in managing the Indian economy which witnessed industrial development and growth in agricultural production and trade. The British laid the railroad network which contributed to economic development as the efficiency in the transportation of materials increased. However, the benefits from economic development were barely reaped by the Indians but exclusively enjoyed by British settlers. Furthermore, local craftsmen and handicraft industries were outplayed by their British counterparts when cheaper goods manufactured from Britain were distributed to Indian villages (Wolpert), leaving the local population impoverished.

In fact, the British Raj was "a cruel and oppressive regime" (Chew) responsible for countless deaths of Indians. British taxation impoverished India, agricultural policies contributed to the famine that killed thousands, and railroad transportation and other public goods were often

unavailable to Indians or operated upon discriminatory policies against them (Chew). Years of mistreatment under the British Raj soon sparked a widespread anti-colonial protest against the British led by Gandhi who organized the civil disobedience movement from 1930 to 1931. Examples include the Salt March involving illegal salt production and the boycott of British products (Chew; Wolpert).

Gandhi's independence movement forged unity between the Hindu and Muslim populations and invited participation from the "untouchables" or the Dalit caste (Kurtz 2) as well. The British had magnified internal differences in India along the lines of religious identity via its census production (Jones 85), but Gandhi's independence movement challenged such social divisions by uniting Indians against the British colonial rule. When India gained independence from Britain, such orientation towards unity across diversity laid the foundation for the new Indian state and inspired ideas about the multicultural Indian national identity (Roy 22). The next section details the postcolonial state formation of India and how the leaders approached the problem of ethnic diversity in the subcontinent.

Postcolonial State Formation: India

According to Tuong Huu Vu (2004), the postcolonial state formation of India is an example of "Imperial transfer" (14). This is when imminent to a local uprising, the empire grants independence to its colony and maintains friendly relations with it to preserve imperial interests. When empires have local elites willing to maintain ties with their former empire, they can "give up control without a fight" (Vu 14) more easily, contributing to a more peaceful transition of power from the empire to the colony. The defining characteristic of this type of state formation is the "continuity between imperial and post-imperial politics" (Vu 14). The knowledge about state formation type provides a basic intuition about the postcolonial bilateral relationship between the

colonial power and its subject. Given the type of state formation, India was set for a friendly and close relationship with Britain after its independence. However, the state formation type analysis needs further explanation, namely how the lack of ethnic homogeneity and low ethnic nationalism levels defined the Indian state which has implications for the dynamics of interaction in the postcolonial era.

After gaining independence from Britain, the former British colony was divided into the Islamic state of Pakistan and the largely Hindu India. India lacked a single ethnic identity that defines the whole state given its linguistic, cultural, and ethnic diversity (Solomon). The Indian leaders were well aware of the diversity characterizing India and the need to control it to avoid violent ethnic conflicts and social unrest (Roy 20). The inter-group differences within the country meant the "absence of a common colonial enemy" (Roy 112) and a high likelihood of inter-group conflicts within the Indian state. For example, many lower-caste Hindu Dalits who did not identify with India's postcolonial nationalism hindered the Indian state's efforts to build national solidarity (Berberoglu 42). Hence, a national scheme was required to prioritize group solidarity around the state over the instinctive emotional affects formed around ethnic groups. Hence, efforts to detach particular ethnic, cultural, and religious identities from defining the state laid the basis for the postcolonial state formation of India (Roy 21).

Indian leaders worked to create the discourse of Indian national unity "against ethnic and religious diversity" (Roy 19), emphasizing the secular character of Indian statehood and locating Indian citizenship in the secular state. Since the dawn of its independence, India's "national identity" had been framed in secular terms (India has many ethnic groups within its borders and is technically not a nation just like how there is no national language known as "Indian"). Although Hindu nationalist groups had strong interests in claiming the Indian state (Bajpai 133),

the founding leaders of India including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi envisioned a united, multicultural India. The idea of Indian national identity was not limited to particular ethnic or religious groups but was instead imagined to be one that simultaneously embraces and transcends the ethnic and cultural boundaries.

The image of India "as a national collectivity, as distinct from diverse regional identities" (Singh 363) was forged out of political necessity given the difficulties facing a multicultural state (Connor 56). Nehru also produced the image of the Indian state as a "lacking and needy nation" (Roy 106). This scheme directed the focus of individuals to partake in the mission of increasing the country's economic and political capacity rather than pursuing national desires around their ethnic circles. Likewise, the Indian state was understood as a "community united by its commitment to common political ideals" (Bajpai 132) such as secularism and democracy.

India's Constitution also affirms that the Indian state is built on secular ideals. An important distinction was made in Indian political discourse between the term "liberation" and "independence" (Roy 70). On January 26, 1930, the independence pledge was made which represented the commitment of Indian nationalists to Indian independence. On January 26, 1950, the Constitution was accepted which was believed to mark the true and complete attainment of Indian independence that was only partially achieved in 1930. January 26th, known as the *Republican Day* in India, "celebrates the [Indian] state" (Roy 71) and its diversity, a state that is not defined by a single ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. The institutional framework of India likewise represents a "multinational federation" (Bajpai 127), one that accommodates the cultural and ethnic diversity of its people without being limited to a single ethnic identity.

Japanese Colonization of Korea: Direct Rule Reinforces Animosity

The colonial experience of Korea differed quite significantly from that of India. While there can be many reasons for the difference, one important factor is the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation. This requires further explanation because one needs to understand how ethnic homogeneity shaped Korea's historical experience of countless foreign invasions. Firstly, ethnic homogeneity makes it easier for the *us versus them* discrimination to be externalized. For the Korean nation defined by remarkable ethnic homogeneity, foreign invasions exemplified differences between the "Koreans" and others such as the Chinese and the Japanese. Furthermore, this historical experience greatly increased the wariness about foreign interference with Korean politics to the point that Korea was closed off to the outside world in the 19th century, being referred to as the *Hermit Kingdom* (Cumings 91).

The earliest attempts by Japan to control the Korean Peninsula was in the *Treaty of Kanghwa* in 1876 which established unequal treaties and forcefully opened three ports in Korea (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 20). The context of Japanese imperialism in Korea was a Japanese national desire to recover from its humiliating interactions with the Western powers (Duus 30). The goal was to "establish Japanese influence in Korea" (Duus 33) and expel Western influence. However, the Japanese were "met with fierce Korean resistance" (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 18). This hostility can be traced back as early as the 16th century when Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a Japanese Daimyo or military leader "launched a massive invasion of Korea" (Seo 90), destroying important Korean palaces and cultural sites which greatly angered the Korean people.

Moreover, the relationship between Ito Hirobumi, a Resident-General in Korea under Meiji Japan, and Korea's emperor Kojong was characterized by "mutual animosity" (Duus 205) and extending Japan's influence in Korea via self-rule was not a viable option. Hence, the

Japanese government decided on a full annexation and direct rule of Korea in 1910. This was met with fierce local uprisings. Threatened by such movements, the Japanese government adopted violence to suppress the uprising, killing thousands of people (Duus 235). Japan's geographic proximity to Korea also meant that colonial migration was possible where Japanese officials could easily "settle in Korea and administer it" (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 19) directly. Common citizens of Japan were also sent to settle in Korea who enjoyed preferential economic treatment (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 19). The colonial migration intensified the Korean animosity towards Japan which was already strong prior to colonization. New tax laws were resented by the Koreans as it was viewed as enriching the Japanese settlers at the cost of impoverishing the Koreans.

Anti-Japanese sentiments intensified when Emperor Kojong was forced to step down and was allegedly poisoned to death in 1919. Kojong's death and Japanese annexation of Korea led to countless guerillas launched by the righteous army led by the Korean elites who resisted Japanese control of Korean society, culture, and language (Seo 30). Countless independence movements persisted during the Japanese colonization of Korea. Even in the softer phases of colonization, many Koreans were devoted to driving the Japanese out of the peninsula. An interesting difference is worth noting between the independence movements in India and Korea.

Unlike the Indian independence movement that was after the injustices of British colonial rule, many Korean independence movements contained appeals to national authenticity and loyalty to the Korean nation (Baik 13). Notions of justice and injustice were defined in terms of the nation: what is important to the Korean nation and the losses suffered under the Japanese colonial rule. A strong national orientation in the independence movement could have accounted for the fact that a large bulk of the colonial interaction revolved around Korean culture. This is

evident in Japanese cultural policies that sought to suppress and eradicate Korean culture which contrasts with the British rule of India.

From the Japanese perspective of history, at the core of Japanese imperialism was the desire to "civilize" the uncivilized Korean population, to assimilate rather than conquer, ultimately for the Koreans' benefit (Duus 415). The cultural assimilation policy was geared towards the goal of politico-cultural unification between the Koreans and the Japanese. Japan also had its benign phases in its colonial rule where it sought to replaced physical violence with cultural control. Japanese culture and language were presented as superior and desirable over Korean culture and the use of the Korean language was effectively banned (Duus 175). However, the cultural assimilation scheme was a serious injustice and a "cultural genocide" for the Koreans (Blakemore). The assimilation policy was counterproductive as it worsened the people's anti-Japanese sentiments when the Korean language and culture were suppressed and destroyed (Blakemore; Han et al.; Kim 12).

Indeed, the cultural assimilation policies aimed to "eradicate and distort Korean cultural identity" (Yim 39). A symbol of Korean sovereignty, the royal palace of *Gyeongbokgung* was torn down and turned into a tourist site for Japanese settlers and visitors (Blakemore); an architecture work done by the Japanese (the capitol building placed at the front of *Kunjongjon Hall*) served to "deemphasize the importance of Korean power and culture" (Cooney and Scarbrough 175). This architecture communicated a strong symbolic message to the Korean nation whose culture was being brutally suppressed under Japanese rule. The Japanese architecture was a "visible expression of the near-destruction of Korean identity" (Cooney and Scarbrough 175).

Naturally, Japan's cultural assimilation policies generated massive resistance from the Korean people. Many protested by refusing to adopt Japanese names or speak in the Japanese language (Blakemore). Widespread independence movements throughout the Peninsula also continued to plague the Japanese leaders. Faced by such sheer resistance and uprisings, Japan pursued a "highly aggressive policy of annihilation of national consciousness" (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 29). The revised policy in the cultural control took a turn in an outright expression of the intention to destroy Korean culture as opposed to a more subtle policy adopted during the benign phase of cultural rule.

Towards the 1930s, the idea of *kominka* or making imperial subjects out of the colonized people defined Japan's colonial rule where more intrusive and aggressive cultural policies were adopted, especially in education (Seo 23). In pursuing the idea of *kominka,* Japan was intent on making pro-Japanese Korean elites who could serve as "cultural leaders" to influence Korean people's consciousness. The Korean language was banned in schools and people were forced to adopt Japanese names (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 28). The schools that Koreans attended were also inferior in the curriculum compared to those attended by the Japanese settlers. Like the British colony of India, the Japanese educational scheme in Korea was not a benign effort to enlighten the people. Instead, the education programs served to meet the interests of the Japanese empire. This involved the extermination of Korean people's strong sense of ethnic consciousness, the expectation being that combating it would expunge the resistance against Japan rooted in Korean national identity (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 29).

Japan's cultural assimilation policies aimed at outrooting Korean culture which involved the "suppression and denial of Korean history, Korean language, Korean tradition and the consciousness of the Korean people" (Seo 30). These policies constituted a strong instance of

injustice for the Koreans whose culture and language formed an integral part of their national identity. Japanese colonization was thus remembered as a painful and humiliating period for the Koreans not to mention other aspects of colonization that involved physical violence and oppression. Therefore, during the latter half of Japanese colonization where cultural genocide was the most pronounced, Korean people's resentment against Japan greatly intensified, reaching its peak until Korea's liberation in 1945 (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 22).

Postcolonial State Formation: Korea

Contrary to the Indian state which lacked a common ethnic identity, natural unity based on shared language, culture, and ethnicity characterized the Korean society before and after liberation. The Korean nation has a history of maintaining its "long and continuous existence as a unified [political entity]" (Yim 38) and ethnocultural homogeneity. Korean ethnic consciousness was also informed by the history of struggles for independence against the Japanese (a clear external enemy) which solidified anti-Japanese sentiments (Seo 30). Unlike India, a strong sense of national unity based on common ethnic roots defined Korea. Although the Korean nation was divided into the Communist North and the Democratic South after the Korean War, the notion of ethnic kinship has remained largely intact (Yim 38). This is expressed in the term *Han minjok* (or the Korean nation) used to describe Korean nationhood. Hence, unlike in India, where rich diversity characterized the postcolonial state or national identity, the South Korean state inherited and was founded upon the ethnically homogenous Korean nation.

Returning to the different types of postcolonial state formation proposed by Vu, the Korean postcolonial state is a case of an "Imperial breakup" (Vu 12). Unlike *imperial transfer,* where the relationship between the imperial power and the colony is guaranteed and preserved, *imperial breakups* are likely to result in a disconnect between the colonizer and the colonized. A

hostile relationship between the colonized and the colonizer commonly takes place as the colonizer is overthrown by other foreign powers, which in the case of Korea were the United States in the South and the USSR in the North (Vu 12). Similar to the analysis of India, while the state formation type provides an easy outlook into the likely postcolonial bilateral relationship, the analysis is limited without the reflection on ethnic composition and its effects on the experience of colonization to provide a deeper historical understanding behind the type of state formation. Although there could be other external factors contributing to an *imperial breakup* (such as the intrusion of other foreign powers in the former colony), ethnic composition and ethnic nationalism directly account for the emotional aspect of hostility in the relationship.

Unlike the Indian case where connections with the old empire were maintained, years of accumulated grudge against the Japanese suppression of Korean culture prompted a fracture in the bilateral relationship. Japanese cultural products were effectively banned through the early 1980s in South Korea. Even under the Park Jung-Hee administration that pushed for economic cooperation with Japan, restrictions on Japanese cultural goods were strictly observed (Lee 134). However, two decades after its liberation in 1945, the South Korean government signed a treaty with Japan to normalize bilateral relations and to recover the country economically.

Under the *Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea,* also known as the 1965 Treaty, Japan was assured that colonial issues would be put behind and the two governments would enter a future-oriented path. In return, South Korea received financial support from Japan under the Park administration which was in desperate need of aid to start the process of economic development. While the events appeared to indicate a positive turn in South Korea and Japan's bilateral relationship, tension was lurking behind it concerning the historical issues and the legacies of colonization viewed as "unresolved" by the Korean public (Hosaka).

Indeed, despite increased trade interactions between Japan and South Korea, bilateral relations have remained "tense and contentious" on both the economic and political fronts (James 2). In 2013, there was a pause in the leadership-level dialogue between South Korea and Japan when President Park Geun-Hye made a statement insisting that Japan address its imperial history (Glosserman and Snyder 107). Similarly, in 2019, when the Seoul High Court sided with the victims of forced labor during Japanese colonization, ruling that Japanese corporations compensate the victims, Japan retaliated by removing South Korea from its whitelist and imposing trade restrictions on important electronic materials. The Japanese government strongly claimed that the issue of forced labor was settled permanently in the 1965 treaty and that the companies involved had no obligation to compensate the victims (Kim and Kang). South Korea responded by also removing Japan from its whitelist and declared that it would not renew the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. Likewise, the full potential of the bilateral relationship between the two countries has not been realized where disputes about the colonial history regularly interfere in areas of cooperation.

Comparing Ethnic Nationalism Levels in India and South Korea

The above sections discussed the colonial history and postcolonial state formations of India and South Korea to illustrate how ethnic composition in the two countries influenced the colonial experiences. Ethnic composition of the colony was a relevant factor that determined the unfolding of other events including the colonial experience and postcolonial state formation. The state formation type was a product of the two factors in interaction: ethnic composition and colonial experience. Given the lack of ethnic homogeneity, the Indian state tried to overcome regional ethnocultural differences to foster a new discourse around Indian national identity. On the other hand, the South Korean state succeeded the strong ethnic consciousness of the Korean

nation defined by its ethnic homogeneity. In the context of such national identity, it was much easier for colonial memories to define the socio-cultural and political landscape of the public. This contrasts with the Indian case where "national" consciousness was forged around the state to surpass ethnocultural diversity, directing people's attention to the need for India to achieve economic and political growth in the larger international sphere. This section will compare the levels of ethnic nationalism between India and South Korea informed by the above discussion.

While India under the British rule was a multiethnic and multicultural entity, Korea already had a strong sense of national identity based on ethnic homogeneity (as implied in the term *Han minjok,* which literally means one-nation). Korean national identity was informed by the shared experiences of being invaded by foreigners long before Japanese colonization. While India as a subcontinent also experienced countless European invasions, it had never experienced foreign invasion as a homogenous nation with a highly developed ethnic consciousness rooted in shared culture, history, and heritage. Compared to the British rule of India, the Japanese colonization of Korea also involved policies to replace or extinguish Korean culture with Japanese culture. These policies in interaction with a strong ethnic consciousness in the Korean people sparked violent uprisings against Japan and intensified anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea. Likewise, ethnic composition combined with the distinct experiences of colonization paints a different picture for the levels of ethnic nationalism in India and South Korea.

Korea's nationalism should also be noted of its deeper historical roots. The deeper history and the magnitude of the Korean *ethnie* as reflected in the kindled anger against Japanese colonizers should not be underestimated. The origins of Korean nationalism can be traced back to the shared ethnic identity prior to modernity (Shin 232). Korean nationalism is not a wholly "modern phenomenon" (Seo 90) but is informed by the country's "rich and complex historical

experience" (Shin 232) beyond Japanese colonization. Korea's self-awareness and hostility towards Japan can be traced back to 1592 when the royal palaces were destroyed during Hideyoshi's invasion, causing great emotional distress in the people (Cooney and Scarbrough 175). Korean national identity defined along ethnic lines was strong prior to Japanese colonization and this accounted for the violent resistance against Japan at the onset of colonization. Hence, it would be misleading and inadequate to view the strong ethnic consciousness of Koreans as a modern product, a recently developed social character in response to Japanese colonization alone. Prior interaction with foreign invaders coupled with the well-established national identity rooted in ethnic consciousness constituted robust materials that figured into modern Korean nationalism (Cumings 87-89; Shin 223).

An example of history museums in South Korea also exemplifies the strong grip of collective memory in Korean ethnic consciousness. This discussion further demonstrates the strong presence of ethnic nationalism in South Korea. The Korean war memorial museums commemorate the death of countless people during the war. These museums commemorate the losses suffered by the nation in Korean history and embody the "ethnic continuity" (Hong 67) of the Korean nation. They communicate the *ethnie* history, its persistence, and significance in modern Korean national identity. Here, the people are reminded of the deep history, heritage, and sacrifices made for the preservation of the Korean nation. The memories and symbols presented in the museums become engraved in people's ethnic consciousness, informing their distinct national identity. Kal Hong (2017) provides an important description about the museum worth noting to illustrate the sense of ethnic continuity perpetuated among the Korean people:

> The 200-meter-long gallery appears more like the space for the tomb of the unknown soldiers. Anyone can be there for the same reason. There seems no need to personalize any of them. Their presence and their death for the survival of the nation are all that matter. (68)

In the museum display, the military men are "immediately linked to another group from the Joseon Dynasty, which is again linked to others from ancient times" (Hong 67). The display of the Korean military reinforces the sense of historical continuity of Korean nationhood. The war museums are a manifestation of collective memories that perpetuate ethnic consciousness and inform the Korean national identity. The sacrifice made by countless Koreans during the war "transcends individual physical annihilation" (Hong 81) in an important sense where the museums and their effects on the people portray the continuity of the *ethnie* and a strong sense of belonging to the national group "beyond time" (Connor 207).

There are other indications of a high level of ethnic nationalism in Korea. Topics of nationalistic interests have always attracted strong public involvement in South Korea. The Korean public tends to show stronger sensitivity towards "issues related to nationalism such as Dokdo or comfort women" (Yang 77). For example, the Japanese claims over the islands (*Dokdo* in Korean and *Takeshima* in Japanese) have sparked immediate and intense reactions from the Korean public. Japan's criminalization of Ahn Jung-Geun (who assassinated Ito Hirobumi) also triggered anger among South Koreans (as Ahn is a national hero to the Koreans but an enemy to the Japanese). Japan's denial about comfort women being coerced and mistreated by the military led to countless civil society movements in South Korea that condemned the Japanese government. Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni shrines (a commemoration site of war participants convicted in the Tokyo trials) increased Korean animosity towards Japan (Yang 67, 71). Strong emotional reactions from Koreans towards the political statements made by Japanese politicians glorifying Japanese imperialism (Yang 61) also indicate a strong concern for preserving the authenticity of national history.

On the other hand, India is a case of secular nationalism but not ethnic nationalism. As explored in the earlier section on the postcolonial state formation of Indian, India's state building process involved the production of a new definition of "Indian national identity". The necessity of a new discourse about "the Indian nation" to minimize ethnocultural differences between groups, reflected the lack of a single ethnic consciousness that matched the geographic boundaries of the state. Indeed, India is well-known for its remarkable diversity on ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural fronts (Solomon). The Indian state takes pride in its diversity today, but such diversity came with clear political difficulties of forging group solidarity shortly after its independence (Roy 20). India's lack of ethnic homogeneity coupled with a divided society along the caste system meant a strong likelihood of social unrest and inter-group conflicts charged with emotional allegiance to individual ethnocultural circles (Berberoglu).

The Indian state was built against the discrimination between particular ethnic identities (Bajpai 127; Roy 19; Singh 363). In India, the image of external "colonial enemy" (Roy 112) was lacking. Internal differences that developed into violent conflicts between the Hindu and the Muslim populations were more pronounced and of immediate concern to the people than the British rulers. As explored earlier, at this socio-political reality, the Indian leaders including Nehru pushed to identify a common political project for all Indians to partake in, regardless of their ethnocultural identities. This was found in the image of India as a needy nation (Roy 106) requiring the crucial contribution from its citizens to change that reality. This "common political ideal" (Bajpai 132) served as the new source of group solidarity to replace particular ethnic and cultural identities. The institutionalization of the Indian state built on secular ideals accounted for the opposite direction in which Indian nationalism developed compared to its South Korean counterpart.

The direction of interest influenced by the levels of ethnic nationalism has particular implications for the intensity of postcolonial disputes. India's lack of ethnic nationalism despite the presence of secular nationalism results in a distinct set of political interests and areas of public engagement compared to South Korea. One clear indication of this is how "national welfare" is understood by the Indians. For instance, a strong secular nationalism in India can translate into a shared interest in strengthening the economic and political capacity of India. This interest takes priority over resolving postcolonial disputes concerning the painful experiences of "Indians" (a category lacking ethnic homogeneity) under British colonial rule.

South Koreans may also recognize the apparent benefits from maintaining smooth relations with Japan or even the need for cooperation. However, given the strong level of ethnic nationalism, the people would be willing to prioritize resolving the historical issues (in the direction they desire, such as revising history textbooks in Japan). In other words, what is considered "good" for the state (the material good) comes after achieving what is "good" for the Korean nation: correcting distorted accounts about the colonial past which forms an integral part of Korean national identity and the realization of authentic national history. Given the public's strong involvement with the history of Japanese colonization, the unresolved postcolonial disputes can constrain the trajectory of bilateral relations for the South Korea-Japan dyad.

Disputed Events of Colonization

As discussed in the previous chapter, two events during colonization considered as a crime against humanity were chosen for each postcolonial dyad: The Amritsar or the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre for India-UK and the Comfort Women stations for South Korea-Japan dyads. The two cases illustrate the unwillingness of the colonial power to accept full responsibility or apologize sincerely and its tendency to minimize or fabricate accounts of the event. In both cases, the

postcolonial state (India and South Korea) challenges its former colonizer in evading legal responsibility and not delivering a formal apology or a sincere one in the case of South Korea as the Japanese government has shown a pattern of stating an apology and revoking it (Hosaka). The explanation for postcolonial disputes in the simplistic sense is due to the divergence in historical knowledge between the colonial power and the colonized. This phenomenon is common to both postcolonial dyads which will be further discussed following the brief discussion of each event in dispute.

India-United Kingdom: Amritsar Massacre/ Jallianwala Bagh Massacre

In 1857, the British in India were threatened by mass uprisings throughout the subcontinent against the unjust British rule in India known by the names of the "Indian Mutiny," "Sepoy Mutiny," or the "First War of Independence" (Britannica). Wary of future uprisings, the British refused to grant more autonomy to Indians in politics. This was contrary to the promise they had made in return for India's participation in World War I on behalf of the British. The British passed the *Rowlatt Act* which strengthened British control of Indian society by suspending civil liberties, public gatherings, and allowing for political prisoners to be tried without a jury (Schultz). Angered by the *Rowlatt Act*, many Indian political leaders gathered to mobilize the public against the British authorities, especially in the northern region of Punjab.

This soon developed into violent protests in the city of Amritsar which resulted in the deaths of three British residents. Alarmed at such a level of political resistance, the British dispatched General Dyer to Amritsar to "discipline the Indians". General Dyer prohibited public gatherings of more than 4 people declaring that such gatherings would be dismissed by force. However, during the Sikh festival week, thousands of civilians gathered at the Jallianwala Bagh square for celebration and General Dyer fired arms on unarmed people on April 13, 1919, killing

and wounding many (Prakash). While the official figure released in the UK records the number of deaths in the Amritsar Massacre to be around 379, the Indian Congress party claimed that numbers were closer to a thousand ("Jallianwala Bagh Massacre"). There are also regular debates about whether the UK should make formal apologies. The Indian public has demanded a formal apology from the British government and London Mayor Sadiq Khan also made similar statements asking for a formal apology from the British government in 2017 ("London").

However, the British never delivered an apology that acknowledged British responsibility for the massacre, ignoring Indian demands for a formal apology. In 1997, Queen Elizabeth II visited the memorial for the massacre and showed respect for the lost lives but "carefully avoided making an actual apology" ("Viewpoint"). She called the Amritsar Massacre one of the "difficult episodes" in the shared past between India and Britain, but no apologies were said. In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameroon earned the hope of many Indians to hear a formal apology during his visit to Amritsar. Unfortunately, Cameroon also stopped short of giving an apology, only stating that he is "deeply shameful" (Schultz) of the Massacre. Similarly in 2019, marking the 100th anniversary of the Massacre, Prime Minister Theresa May expressed her "deepest regret" but that was it again (Schultz). Likewise, the British government has consistently replaced words of apology with expressions of "deep regret" or "shame" and this was not enough for the Indian public who felt deeply wronged by the event ("Jallianwala").

The main point of dispute concerning the Amritsar Massacre today, is whether the British government was responsible for the firing in Jallianwala Bagh regardless of whether the event was an unfortunate anomaly in British imperialism. British leaders including Winston Churchill have been quick to dismiss the massacre as unrelated with the British government while recognizing the cruelty of the event. Such an explanation was hard to accept for the Indian public

who saw how General Dyer was never imprisoned or punished but instead hailed as a hero for disciplining the Indian people in Britain (Schultz). Indeed, the House of Lords was extremely lenient with Dyer when he returned to England and many welcomed him, praising his success in "disciplining the Indian people." *The Morning Post* also hailed Dyer as "the man who saved India" and raised funds to support his family after his retirement, the amount totaling £28,000, out of which a solid £9,000 came from the British residents in India (Venkatesh).

South Korea-Japan: Military Comfort Women

In South Korea, one of the issues that attracted the strongest public engagement in recent years is the issue of Comfort Women. During the war, countless women were recruited to serve the Japanese military during war operations. 'Comfort Women' is a euphemism for sex slaves recruited by the Japanese military via coercion or means of deceit, promising better employment and education opportunities to the women, who were mostly young girls (Tanaka 52; Ahn 6). Words cannot describe the inhumane torture and violence inflicted upon these women (Tanaka 51-57). There was initially a heavy silence around this issue due to several reasons: a socially stigmatized topic, personal shame felt by the victims, and the cover-up attempts made by those involved. However, this silence was broken in South Korea when a former Comfort Women Kim Haksun revealed her name as one of the Comfort women survivors in 1991 (Schieder). Since then, the Comfort Women dispute has always laid its grip on South Korea and Japan's bilateral relationship, mainly concerning Japan's history textbooks that minimize the brutalities of the system and the unapologetic statements made by Japanese politicians.

According to Amnesty International, the survivors of Comfort Women system filed a total of 10 lawsuits against the Japanese government in Japanese courts over the past 30 years but lost in all of them ("South Korea: Lawsuits"). A recent South Korean High Court decision in

2021 dealt with the Comfort Women issue again. In January, a South Korean judge at the Seoul Central District Court ruled in favor of Comfort Women victims, ordering the Japanese government to compensate them. This prompted an immediate criticism from Japan: The Japanese government demanded South Korea to uphold the terms of the 1965 treaty and the 2015 deal and stop making claims against Japan on the Comfort Women issue (Shin). This 2015 deal also affected a recent Court decision made in Seoul about Comfort Women in April 2021 which contradicted its earlier ruling that Japan compensate for the victims (Shin). The Court reasoned that the issue had already been settled by the 2015 agreement in which Japan had delivered a formal apology and offered 1 billion yen to the victims (Hosaka). The Court also confirmed Japan's sovereign immunity from an overseas ruling. This decision generated widespread public criticism in South Korea of the Court for failing to support the Comfort Women victims.

Dr. Hosaka Yuji notes two problematic characteristics of the 2015 deal on Comfort Women signed under the Park administration. Firstly, the deal stated that it covered *all* Comfort Women, but many victims rejected the deal at its onset which undermined its legitimacy. Secondly, the terms of the agreement were never made public, and the deal was not representative of Comfort Women victims (Hosaka). Lastly, the financial offer from Japan was also not explicitly stated as "compensation" but more akin to a form of economic aid or donation (Hosaka). These aspects of the 2015 deal provide some explanation for why the issue remains unresolved. In 2017, the Moon administration called the deal "flawed", claiming that the deal did not address "personal damages" (Echols) and that the compensation given by Japan was more of aid rather than a formal compensation. Many South Koreans continue to claim that the 2015 deal lacks transparency and that it failed to involve the victims in the negotiation process.

The Japanese government has remained unsympathetic towards South Korean charges over the Comfort Women issue, dismissing the South Korean claims and demands as settled completely under the 1965 treaty and the 2015 deal. The Japanese government defended its immunity from South Korean court decisions, while also maintaining the position that the documentation and evidence to prove the Japanese government's involvement in the operation of Comfort Women stations did not exist (Echols; Yang 75). Shortly after the deal was signed, *Sankei Shimbun* published an article citing people close to the Prime Minister, reporting that "the comfort women agreement was a gamble that Prime Minister Abe makes to keep South Korea silent" (Hosaka). Such a statement reflected closely on the political intention of Prime Minister Abe and undermined the sincere nature of Japan's apology in the 2015 deal. Indeed, many South Koreans interpret the 2015 deal as a strategy of the Japanese government to shut down further discussions on the topic and many have demanded that the deal be overturned.

Divergence in Historical Knowledge

The divergence of knowledge in the two disputed events discussed in the earlier section points to the distinctly epistemic nature of the dispute: The disagreement is not simply about policies (apologies and reparation) but more importantly about the facts of the historical event. The political disagreement in postcolonial disputes comes down to a friction over the facts (Yang 62) or the difference in knowledge about the event. Given the natural disposition of colonial powers to avoid and minimize their history of aggression and violence against the colonized population, divergence in historical knowledge between the former colonizer and the colonized is a natural phenomenon observed in the majority of (if not all) postcolonial dyads.

Not surprisingly, both India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads demonstrate the divergence in historical knowledge. To begin with, in the India-UK dyad, the British

government suggests a much smaller number of deaths and casualties associated with the Amritsar Massacre compared to the Indian claims: Official numbers released by the British government estimate around 300 deaths while India asserts a 1000 (Kidangoor; Prakash). Even a news article published by the BBC reports the deaths as being in the "hundreds" which contrasts with the Indian media that suggests the numbers creeping closer to a "thousands" ("Jallianwala"). Furthermore, while India claims that General Dyer's firing of arms on civilians was representative of the true nature of British imperialism in India, the British have made it clear that General Dyer's action was an "anomaly" in the largely benevolent British imperialism (Schultz). This has resulted in unresolved disputes over whether the British should formally apologize to India or not. Gyan Prakash (2019) notes how the massacre symbolizes the "colonial injustice and violence" of Britain in India. However, by separating General Dyer's actions from the British government, the UK has evaded responsibility to apologize for the massacre. India has repeatedly criticized Britain for its reluctance in making an apology, the strongest criticism coming from the direct victims of the massacre (Kidangoor).

In the South Korea-Japan dyad, former Comfort Women victims have communicated their painful experiences of sexual exploitation, pleading justice in the South Korean and Japanese Courts (Ahn 4; Hicks 210; Tanaka 52-87). The victims' accounts agree that deception and coercion were involved in recruiting the girls to make them into Comfort Women and that they were treated cruelly (Ahn 11). The two main routes of recruitment – via military authorities and trafficking – were both monitored by the Japanese state and the women were moved using military transportation which required state sanctions. These two main characteristics of the comfort women system attest to the Japanese government's involvement with the system (Ahn 14). However, both the forced element in recruitment as well as the direct involvement of the

Japanese state in the operation of Comfort Women stations are denied by Japan. Moreover, while the South Korean side claims that the number of Comfort Women is estimated at around 200,000 women, the official Japanese records greatly reduced the estimates down to 20,000. Like the India-UK case, both the facts and the interpretation about the event are contested between South Korea and Japan.

History textbooks have enormous potential to "misrepresent the reality of history" (Hashiba 150) and the publication of revisionist history textbooks in Japan has been a great point of contention between South Korea and Japan. The contents of history textbooks are censored and approved by the National Ministry of Education in both Japan and South Korea. Hence, it is easy and natural for the decisions over contents of history textbooks to develop into a political dispute between countries. Indeed, South Korea regularly criticized Japan for how its imperial history is recorded and taught in schools.

Until the early 1990s, the Japanese Ministry of Education censored any reference to the Comfort Women in history textbooks (Hicks 8). In 2001, Japan's Ministry of Education also approved the use of a revisionist textbook in classrooms (Glosserman and Snyder 101). The approved history textbook minimized and omitted many sensitive aspects of Japanese colonization and its imperial history including the issue of Comfort Women. The publication of these history textbooks infuriated the South Koreans (Conney and Scarbrough 182) who pressured the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to "take stern measures to protest the approval" (Glosserman and Snyder 101). State approval of textbooks did not ensure that they would be used in all Japanese schools. However, the approval by the Japanese state alone clearly communicated the unapologetic stance of Japan towards its imperial past.

Apart from history textbooks, state-sponsored academic articles and books in Japan also tend to whitewash Japan's imperial history. The Comfort Women are described as voluntary prostitutes who benefitted from the system. The involvement of the Japanese military and the government is also strongly denied (Glosserman and Snyder 108; Lai 44). South Korean media have been vocal about the atrocities of Comfort Women stations where the Japanese government's denial of history takes center stage for public condemnation (Yang 65).

However, knowledge claims are not polarized purely along national lines because there are South Korean authors who make claims that support the Japanese government's account of Comfort Women. Authors that deviate from the South Korean understanding of Comfort Women are labeled as *siding with Japan* on the topic. Similarly, Japanese scholars that criticize the white washing of the Comfort Women issue are labeled as representing the *South Korean side*. This labeling of positions points to the or polarization of knowledge between South Korea and Japan to the extent that a particular claim is identified as representative of a country.

The divergence in knowledge is defined in terms of the two countries in dispute. The conflicting accounts of Comfort Women are labeled as either the "South Korean" or the "Japanese side", not in terms of truth or falsity: the former being vocal about revealing the atrocities of the issue and the latter being dismissive about it. Under such observation, the standard South Korean position on the issue of Comfort women is that the Japanese military and government organized the Comfort Women stations and is thus responsible for its injustice and any South Korean scholar who argues otherwise is considered an anomaly in the discourse.

The political colorization of the disagreement on the facts about Comfort Women (leaving aside the disagreement over policies) indicates the persistence of a deep divide in historical knowledge between South Korea and Japan. The knowledge divide informs the

absence of a converging terrain for agreement between the two countries. In other words, postcolonial disputes about reparations and apologies are a natural consequence of the lack of agreement in historical knowledge. This applies to the India-UK postcolonial dyad as well where India is still awaiting an official apology from the British government while the British government has long refused to do so based on the argument that the Amritsar Massacre was a separate incident, having nothing to do with the benevolent British crown.

A clear "asymmetry [exists] between South Korean and Japanese views" with respect to understanding the colonial history (Glosserman and Snyder 115) and the same can be said about the India-UK postcolonial dyad. The divergence in knowledge about the colonial past has obvious implications for policies proposed to address past wrongdoings committed during colonization. However, the magnitude of knowledge divergence gauged in terms of the intensity of postcolonial disputes differs between the two postcolonial dyads. This difference is attributed to the levels of ethnic nationalism in the postcolonial states. Ethnic nationalism levels affect how determinative postcolonial disputes (rooted in the divergence of historical knowledge) are in shaping the bilateral relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. The intensity of postcolonial disputes is measured in terms of when they obstruct important political agreements that would have otherwise been achieved without much contention or difficulty.

The unresolved disputes about the past have persistently defined the bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan where one side desires to forget the past while the other is unwilling "to let it go" (Cooney and Scarbrough 182). This divide explains why many South Koreans believe that Japan has "not sufficiently apologized" (Glosserman and Snyder 114) for the past wrongdoings while the majority of the Japanese people think that they have apologized and compensated enough. Contrastingly, for the India-UK dyad, the bilateral relationship is

predominantly driven by the material interests of the two countries that intersect and are realized in mutual cooperation. The same discontent about the unresolved postcolonial disputes may exist among the Indian public, especially for those who identify with the direct victims of the Amritsar Massacre. However, an important difference in the India-UK dyad is that the postcolonial dispute does not involve the majority of the public to the same extent and intensity as seen in the South Korean case, where the Korean public could effectively force its government and leaders to confront the Japanese government on the disputed topics (Glosserman and Snyder 99-103).

Public Opinion Polls: Intensity of Postcolonial Disputes and Bilateral Relationship

In this section, public opinion polls will be discussed to further illustrate the divergent trajectory of postcolonial disputes between the India-UK dyad and the South Korea-Japan dyad. Public opinion polls are important to gauge the public's general attitude towards other countries and important political issues. These polls can matter less in autocratic states because important political decisions are made almost exclusively by the leaders. However, public opinion polls carry a greater significance in democracies where the public's influence over politics is strong given that the leaders are accountable the people. As a result, the government's policy options are more constrained by public sentiments and interests. Public opinion polls reflect the public's interests and expectations for its government and can offer meaningful insights into state behavior in postcolonial disputes.

According to the ASAN Institute's public opinion poll about the perception of bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan conducted in August 2019 (during the height of the Japan-South Korea trade war), the favorability of Japan in the South Korean public was at its lowest since 2017: the score was 2.3 with 0 being the least favorable and 10 being most favorable. In 2018, the score increased to 3.52 (ASAN Poll 11) which was still low compared to

the U.S. which received a score of 5.64. Japan also scored the lowest in the favorability of neighboring states which was below China and North Korea. The favorability of Prime minister Abe Shinzo was also remarkably low, with a score of 1.1 (Kim and Kang 3). This reflected the deteriorating relationship between the two countries and the animosity that intensified around this period when public attention was drawn to the issue of forced labor under Japanese colonization. To move further back in history, according to the NHK polls taken in 1991, 1999, 2000, a positive shift was observed in the Japanese public towards South Koreans, but South Koreans showed an increase in their negative attitudes towards Japan. The negative impression of Japan in South Korea increased from 60 percent in 1991 to 80 percent in 2010. In the early 2010s, the Japanese public also showed an increase in the negative evaluations of South Korea.

The importance of history is a major characteristic of ethnic nationalism which is expressed strongly in the South Korea-Japan dyad. For instance, according to the joint public opinion poll published by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute in 2014, 54.4 percent of Japanese respondents had an unfavorable view of South Korea and 55.8 percent of the respondents blamed South Korea's relentless criticisms against Japan on historical issues as the main reason for their negative impression of South Korea (Glosserman and Snyder 112). The South Korean public remained hostile towards Japan and the Japanese government during this period: 87 percent of the Korean respondents believed that the Japanese Government had to apologize again with greater sincerity to the Comfort Women victims. Only 11 percent of the Japanese respondents agreed with that sentiment (Kim and Kang 11). Five years later in 2019, the Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll published by Genron NPO noted that 52 percent of the Japanese public identified history problems as the biggest reason for having bad impressions about South Korea (to be precise, "history problems" referring to the South Korean

criticisms against Japan on historical issues). Similarly, more than half of the Korean respondents stated that Japan's lack of remorse over its wartime aggression was the main reason for having bad impressions about Japan ("The Japan-South Korea").

Collecting public opinion polls in India was a lot more challenging compared to the polls in South Korea, Japan, and the UK for several reasons: the lack of a common national language, a divided society based on the caste system, and a wide disparity in education and literacy levels, all contributed to the difficulty of collecting public opinion data representative of the whole country (Solomon). The cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and economic diversity presents a fractured outlook into the Indian public's opinion about the UK-India bilateral relations and the debates about the Amritsar Massacre.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the public opinion polls taken in India did not cover many questions about the UK and India's relationship with it. Instead, India-Pakistan relations took more importance apart from economic issues and domestic politics (Devlin). Main domestic concerns in India revolved around terrorism and security issues concerning Pakistan in the Kashmir region where 76 percent of the population considered Pakistan as a serious national threat (Devlin). While this security issue stems from the legacies of the British rule, those presently involved in the dispute are not the British, and the direction of animosity and rivalry is not directed towards the UK but the Pakistani state.

Additionally, a lack of survey questions on the bilateral relationship or the perception of the other country in both British and Indian public polls suggest something worth noting: Since survey questions aim to gauge topics that are important in a society, the lack of questions on the Indian-British relationship indicates that the status of the bilateral relationship is not a major domestic concern or public interest. The Indian public was more concerned about its relationship

with Pakistan where many survey questions were about Pakistan: questions included measuring the favorability of Pakistan in India, the public's opinion on India's relationship with Pakistan, and the direction of future development.

Similarly, immediate security threats (including terrorist activities) and territorial concerns were mainly concerning Pakistan and China (Stokes et al. 1-23). Only 19 percent of the Indian respondents expressed a positive view of Pakistan and 47 percent chose Pakistan as the biggest national threat (Stokes et al. 6). Contrast the above scenario with public opinion polls taken in South Korea that frequently include detailed questions about the nature of the bilateral relationship and causes of hostility concerning Japan. This is especially so because there is an internal tension between strong economic and security reasons for South Korea to cooperate with Japan and the unresolved historical problems that hinder possibilities or maintenance of such cooperation (Cooney and Scarbrough 174; Glosserman and Snyder 100).

Given that postcolonial disputes remain unresolved for both postcolonial dyads, the above sections illustrate a notable difference in the level of public involvement with the disputes (or rather, the significance of disputed events in the public discourse). The level of public involvement can be indicative of the intensity of postcolonial disputes. However, a surer way to measure the intensity of postcolonial disputes is to observe whether they spill over to the bilateral relationship. Despite strong reasons for mutual cooperation, if the negative interaction in postcolonial disputes defines the bilateral relationship, then postcolonial disputes can be viewed as being highly intense. The following paragraphs will compare the interaction between postcolonial disputes and the bilateral relationship in India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads.

Over the years, the UK recognized the growing importance of India in British politics as well as international politics. According to the 2019 Pew Research on public opinion in India, 46 percent of the British respondents have stated that India plays a more important role in the world than years ago (Devlin). While India still awaits a formal apology from Britain on the Amritsar Massacre (Sidhu et al.), bilateral relations between the UK and India were not marred by disputes over the colonial event. India and the UK have engaged in active cooperation on various fronts including socio-cultural, political, and economic exchanges. India and the UK entered "capability partnerships in strategic areas" (High Commission of India 4) and strengthened their Defense relationship since 2015. India and the UK have also pursued active cooperation in education. Numerous bilateral mechanisms were adopted such as the India-UK Education Forum, UK-India Education and Research Initiative, Newton-Bhabha Fund and Scholarships, and Joint Working Group on Education (High Commission of India 4).

The two countries also agreed on launching a Tech Alliance and pursued greater cooperation in the humanities and social sciences through the Newton-Bhabha programme (High Commission of India 2). With the UK's departure from the EU, India's importance to the UK grew. In May 2021, India and the UK agreed on a "2030 Roadmap", strengthening and expanding areas of cooperation between the two countries. Prime Minister Boris Johnson also emphasized the similarities between India and the UK, stating that both countries were democracies and members of the Commonwealth (British High Commission New Delhi).

India's basis on secular nationalism also translates to the public's shared interest in expanding the economic and political capacity of India. The public opinion polls indicate that the Indian people value India's economic development and political influence on the global stage. Formal power is important including India's jurisdiction over certain territories (such as

Kashmir), India's growing economic power, and its role in world politics on important topics such as climate change and nuclear arms (Stokes et al.). This interest takes priority over the matters of postcolonial disputes. As illustrated by the various cooperative deals signed with the UK, India makes every opportunity to benefit from a profitable exchange with another country, of which the public is largely supportive. What is expected then, is the dispute over the Amritsar Massacre being kept separate from important trade or security deals with the UK. Disputes about the number of deaths or British responsibility for the event may persist but they will not likely spill over to other political negotiations or undermine the largely positive bilateral relationship.

In fact, the UK-India bilateral relations were described as strong and growing in its importance in a report released in 2019. This is ironic because 2019 was the year when Indians were the most vocal about the lack of British apology for the Amritsar Massacre in commemorating its 100th anniversary (High Commission of India, 5). This observation reveals that the "national good" is evaluated and understood in a different light depending on the type of nationalism present in a country. The public opinion polls and the evaluation of the bilateral relationship demonstrate that the focus of Indian secular nationalism is on the material growth of the state rather than on the emotional concern for one's past generation. As a result, the intensity of postcolonial disputes is milder as proven by the UK-India bilateral relations that remain largely unaffected by the unresolved disputes over the Amritsar Massacre.

The postcolonial dyad of South Korea-Japan is a puzzling case because the two countries also share in strong strategic interests to cooperate just like India and the UK, yet they remain divided in the hostile bilateral relationship. One of the strong rationales for cooperation is having the United States (US) as the common ally. This is because the US has a vested interest in maintaining a strong alliance between Japan and South Korea for regional security in East Asia.

For this reason, the US prefers to see its two allies cooperate (Cooney and Scarbrough 181) and has encouraged the two governments to stabilize their relations. Indeed, South Korea and Japan share a common security threat coming from North Korea. The two countries are also democratic market economies that share economic and socio-political values rooted in defending democracy and the liberal regime (Glosserman and Snyder 94).

Likewise, South Korea and Japan's "identities and world views align" (Glosserman and Snyder 117) closely which should theoretically bolster the momentum for cooperation based on mutual interests (Cooney and Scarbrough 174). In fact, the vast majority in both South Korea and Japan "recognize the importance of the bilateral relationship" (Glosserman and Snyder 118) between their countries. The South Korean public was well-informed about the clear need for establishing security deals with Japan, especially concerning North Korea and China (Kim and Kang 11). Similarly, on the Japanese side, South Korea was evaluated as an inevitable partner-to-be given the mutual alliance with the United States (Glosserman and Snyder 92).

However, the chance of entering a cooperative relationship fell away at the "psychological and emotional gaps in perspective" (Glosserman and Snyder 95) between the two countries that have struggled to cooperate (Cooney and Scarbrough 174). The South Korea-Japan bilateral relations have been unstable and peppered with unresolved colonial disputes shaping the outcome of important political negotiations, often in a negative direction. At the heart of a negative downturn in the relationship was the "inflamed South Korean public reaction" (Glosserman and Snyder 100) to the Japanese government on contentious historical issues.

Unlike the India-UK dyad, public sentiments about the highly disputed historical issues directly affected South Korea's interaction with Japan. For example, in 2011, a defense agreement between President Lee Myung-Bak and Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko was retracted

by the South Korean side hours before the signing ceremony due to the Korean "[public's] outcry" over historical issues (Glosserman and Snyder 97). While the India-UK bilateral relationship took on a positive trajectory, the situation in Japan and South Korea deteriorated over the years despite strong reasons to cooperate, not to mention the active efforts made by the US to stabilize their relationship (Glosserman and Snyder 102).

Many would expect the South Korean government to be the central actor behind the hostile interaction with Japan, getting the public involved with the use of anti-Japanese rhetoric and propaganda. However, it is really the public, not the government who has shaped the development of the bilateral relationship. In fact, the South Korean government has attempted on several occasions to enter a future-oriented relationship with Japan. Since the late 1990s, many South Korean presidents attempted to normalize and improve bilateral relations. They recognized the benefits of robust economic and political cooperation with Japan.

For instance, Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun tried to "restabilize" South Korea's relations with Japan. In the early 2000s, President Kim and Prime Minister Obuchi attempted to towards a future-oriented relationship, this cordial effort seen in the cohosting of the 2002 World Cup. However, the prospects of a newly defined relationship were lost by the emergence of sheer hostilities generated around controversial history textbooks in Japan and persistent territorial disputes (Glosserman and Snyder 100). Similarly, President Roh's efforts to improve the relationship with Japan during the high tide of the Comfort Women controversy were met with bitter criticism from the South Korean public (Glosserman and Snyder 102). In the end, Roh was "compelled" to demand Japan to address the problem of its imperial history (Glosserman and Snyder 103).

The domestic challenge against the government in South Korea over historical issues is also seen in the example of the 2015 deal made between the Park Geun-Hye administration and the Japanese government on Comfort Women. Under this deal, the Japanese government gave 9 billion yen to support Comfort women victims and received assurance from the South Korean government that the settlement on the issue including the Japanese apology was irreversible and complete. However, this resulted in strong public opposition as the Korean people denied the legitimacy of this deal (Tait and Macfie; Hosaka). Likewise, with high ethnic nationalism levels in South Korea where maintaining a certain position in postcolonial disputes takes priority over forging political agreements, postcolonial disputes are greater in intensity and can easily spill over to other important deals and agreements with Japan, hurting the overall bilateral relations.

The intensity of postcolonial disputes can be gauged not only by how frequently they are brought up but by observing whether they spill over to other areas of politics such as important trade agreements and security cooperation, affecting the overall bilateral relationship. Analyzing public opinion polls in the India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads supported the strong association between ethnic nationalism levels and the intensity of postcolonial disputes. The India-UK bilateral relationship was stable and growing stronger despite the unsettled disputes about the Amritsar Massacre. On the other hand, despite strong reasons for cooperation, the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship was strained by unresolved postcolonial disputes and bitter public sentiments generated around historical issues. The bilateral relationship was also constrained as many South Korean Presidents had to give up efforts to stabilize relations with Japan due to strong public demands to confront the Japanese government on historical issues.

Conclusion

While the divergence in historical knowledge about the events in dispute (Comfort women and Amritsar Massacre) are common in both postcolonial dyads, the intensity of postcolonial disputes differed. The explanation for this phenomenon was found in the varying levels of ethnic nationalism. By comparing the postcolonial dyads of India-UK and South Korea-Japan, this chapter examined whether a high level of ethnic nationalism is associated with a stronger intensity of postcolonial disputes concerning the Comfort Women issue and the Amritsar Massacre. The South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyad displayed a high level of ethnic nationalism for its relative ethnic, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity which became increasingly defined through the years of foreign invasions and solidified during Japanese colonization. The postcolonial bilateral relationship was frequently interrupted by unresolved historical issues about colonization and arguments about making compensation and apologies.

The South Korean case demonstrates a close association between levels of ethnic nationalism and the intensity of postcolonial disputes: as the public opinion polls suggest, despite the public's solid understanding of the need for cooperation, it felt strongly that historical issues should take priority over obvious political and economic benefits from cooperating with Japan. Historical issues can also be politicized in India, but they do not obstruct or end beneficial and important political negotiations with the UK. In fact, quite consistent with the observation, an Indian author has voiced the following sentiments: the condition of knowledge about the Amritsar Massacre in the UK is none of India's business and that India should focus instead on developing positive relationships with the UK, moving beyond the past (Komireddi).

Clearly, the South Koreans would not agree with the sentiments expressed by Komireddi; many Koreans feel the need to address the problem of historical fabrication in Japan. Indeed, the

majority of the South Korean public wants to see the disputed colonial history including the Comfort Women issue be properly acknowledged and taught in Japan, which takes priority over getting on Japan's favorable side or achieving important security deals. If Komireddi is right, then surely, the efforts to "correct" knowledge in Japan should come to an end as it only sparks unnecessary conflict between Japan and Korea. However, this thesis rejects such simplistic framing of the complex issue of postcolonial disputes, as doing so overlooks the epistemic and ethical implications of historical distortion in the colonizer states.

The next chapter will address this topic of being concerned with the epistemic condition of the countries that were former colonizers on disputed events of colonization, and whether the colonized should demand such correction in historical understanding of colonial history in former colonizers. The sentiments voiced by Komireddi reflect the belief that there is no real concern for knowledge in postcolonial disputes: demanding that the other recognize a particular version of colonial history. It is rather a clash of irrational emotional claims and irreconcilable political interests of the states involved in the dispute. In response to the judgment voiced by Komireddi, the next chapter provides an epistemological analysis of postcolonial disputes.

In the next chapter, the broader question posed in the thesis will be addressed in detail, informed by the findings of the empirical study discussed in this chapter. Given the strong association between ethnic nationalism and the intensification of postcolonial disputes, should postcolonial disputes be understood as an instance of epistemic subjectivism? The next chapter will respond to this question and demonstrate the untested assumptions about the concept of "knowledge". The argument is that knowledge is possible even in postcolonial disputes where it seems as though no concern for knowledge exists amidst the highly politicized claims about history, rooted in the divergence of knowledge about the events between the two countries. As

part of the discussion, postcolonial disputes are presented as an instance of testimonial injustice, perpetrated and justified by the scientific paradigm of knowledge.

Chapter 5: The Epistemological Analysis of Postcolonial Disputes

Introduction

This chapter addresses the epistemological question upon analyzing the two cases of postcolonial disputes. In the previous chapter, it was observed that while the divergence in historical knowledge was common for both the India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads, the intensity of postcolonial disputes rooted in the divergence of knowledge varied widely. In taking the disposition of colonial powers to avoid a negative history of colonization as a constant, the variation in the intensity of postcolonial disputes was attributed to the difference in ethnic nationalism levels between the postcolonial states: India (low) and South Korea (high). Postcolonial disputes on the two events discussed in this thesis are still locked in a stalemate with neither side willing to yield positions. Should postcolonial disputes be understood as a clash of political interests in which knowledge claims made about the colonial past are expressions of group sentiments lacking truth value? Or can postcolonial disputes maintain objectivity in the sense that knowledge claims about history can be true or false?

This chapter first examines the expectations attached to knowledge following Chapter 4, where it was demonstrated that historical knowledge about a colonial event remains disputed within postcolonial dyads. By discussing the criteria of scientific knowledge in terms of objectivity, Foucault's knowledge-power complex is revisited. This chapter notes that although Foucault rightfully attacks knowledge justified by the absolutist notion of objectivity, his analysis falls short of providing a standard by which one can discriminate between better ways of knowing. This is followed by the discussion on how historical knowledge that embodies the intentionality of interpretation, does not strictly conform to the scientific model of knowledge and can retain objectivity without meeting the standards of objectivity in an absolute sense.

Here, the epistemological problem is distinguished from the metaphysical problem of whether knowledge claims about history correspond to historical truth or reality in an extensional sense. The section leads to the epistemological problem of a standard of justification for historical knowledge. The verifiability condition of truth is rejected in response to the metaphysical problem. With respect to the epistemological problem, the concept of truth as a normative value is discussed to formulate a distinct standard of justification not rooted in the scientific model of knowledge. The chapter concludes by discussing social epistemology and virtue epistemology and how new forms and standards of knowledge can become visible under the novel field of "ethical epistemology" which is further elaborated in Chapter 6.

Knowledge and Objectivity in the Scientific Sense

Helen Longino (1990) observes that scientific knowledge attracts a particular reverence because of the belief that scientific inquiry is objective (62). Similar expectations are attached to knowledge as scientific inquiry: the belief that knowledge should also meet the standards of objectivity. Objectivity can be conceptualized in the following four ways:

1. Objectivity means having truth value (being either true or false).
2. Objectivity is to accurately reflect the natural world or reality as it is (Longino 63).
3. Objectivity means being extensionally true or person-neutral (Thomson).
4. Objectivity as a methodology is impersonal and repeatable (Longino 63; Thomson).

Objectivity in the first sense reflects the possibility of discriminating between true and false beliefs. This sense of objectivity does not apply to personal tastes for example. If person A likes vanilla ice cream and person B likes chocolate ice cream, their tastes or preferences cannot be judged as true or false. The content of the proposition is not separate or detachable from the person in question; it reflects the person's subjective tastes and not something that exists

independently of the person expressing the judgment about ice cream flavors. Objectivity in the second sense reflects the correspondence theory of truth. What is objective is what accurately reflects reality or the outside world. Objectivity in this sense thus necessitates and reaffirms the "independent character of reality" (Machan 141). Consistent with this notion of objectivity is the judgment that one's "successful navigation of reality demands objectivity" (Machan 142). In short, objectivity is the standard by which one can distinguish between different "ways of thinking about reality" (Machan 141) and the truth or falsity between different beliefs.

The third sense of objectivity is related to the second sense. Objectivity means to be detached from a person's interests and motives which concerns the reality removed from the person. Extensionally true sentences are referentially transparent (such as 2+2=4) and objectivity in the third sense is limited to extensionally true propositions. Objectivity in the fourth sense concerns the methodology. This fourth sense of objectivity reinforces the person-neutral aspect of objectivity addressed in the third sense. An objective methodology is one that can be repeated by multiple people and produce the same results. Individual passions and drives do not meddle with the outcome of following through the methodology. This is what the scientific method requires from its participants. And based on the above characteristics, objectivity serves as (or is perceived to be) the necessary condition to attain truth in scientific knowledge.

Scientific knowledge in truth requires all four aspects of objectivity to be met. As Longino observed, scientific knowledge or science is respected for its strict adherence to the model of objectivity in the above 4 senses (Longino 62). Therefore, a purely scientific notion of knowledge would be one that satisfies all four conditions of objectivity. The implication of this paradigm is that propositions that contain intentionality (or the intentionality of interpretation) will fall short of being "objective", and thus disqualify as a candidate for knowledge.

However, knowledge ultimately exists for humans and is indeed shaped and produced by humans as well. There are two important areas that will be addressed in the following sections. Human involvement in shaping the possibilities and forms of knowledge is one and the other is the need to recognize other forms of knowledge which do not neatly fit in the scientific model of objectivity and knowledge. The following section will elaborate on how social factors actively shape even the natural sciences (scientific knowledge) that boasts of its person-neutral nature.

Scientific Knowledge as Social Knowledge

Social knowledge points to the fact that knowledge is actively shaped by social processes and imbued with social values. Longino argues that scientific knowledge is social knowledge by pointing to the processes behind the knowledge production in the natural sciences "that are intrinsically social" (75). Longino's analysis offers both how social knowledge is formed and how even science that is revered for its detachment from social forces is shaped by social interaction and social factors. She points to "two shifts of perspective" (Longino 66) that demonstrate how the objectivity of scientific knowledge is preserved in the contextualist account. First is "the idea of science as practice" (Longino 66) and the second is to view the scientific method practiced not solely by individuals but by "social groups" (Longino 67). Another social character of scientific knowledge is the practice of peer review which refines "ideas and techniques" (Longino 69).

Thus, scientific knowledge is tested, revised, and "produced by a community" (Longino 69) for the benefit of the community that is, in turn, the benefactor of the knowledge produced. Longino proposes a revised version of objectivity be "a characteristic of a community's practice of science [...] and the practice of science [as] understood in a much broader sense than most discussions of the logic of scientific method suggest" (74). While scientific knowledge is distinct

from historical knowledge in many ways, Longino's analysis proves that scientific knowledge does not fit its own model of knowledge rooted in absolute objectivity by pointing to the clear involvement of human values in the knowledge production process.

In relation to Longino's re-evaluation of scientific knowledge, Kuhn's work on the nature of scientific knowledge reveals how human values are not separable from the notion of truth assumed in knowledge. The paradigm in natural science sets the limits on areas of inquiry and the "selection, evaluation, and criticism" (Kuhn 17) of knowledge. Scientific revolutions are compared to political revolutions where the old paradigm becomes incompatible with the new paradigm that replaces it (Kuhn 92). The incompatibility of the new paradigm with the previous one demonstrates how the conception of scientific progress as the accumulation of knowledge is misleading. Scientific revolution represents a value shift, a shift in paradigm that determines the structure and interests of scientific knowledge. Contrary to the dominant conception of science, knowledge is produced not by the accumulation of information but by the shift in paradigm which is determined by human values and interests. In this sense, scientific progress is "simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new paradigm" (Kuhn 109) and not the accumulation of knowledge that draws the scientific community closer to absolute truth.

Foucault's Power-Knowledge Revisited

Against Absolutism

Resonating with Kuhn's work, Foucault argues against the absolutist paradigm of knowledge to claim that power is integral to knowledge production and circulation. Foucault challenges the epistemology informed by absolutism and the belief in a value-free truth. A change in the body of knowledge is conventionally understood as "progress" achieved via the accumulation of knowledge. However, Foucault argues that the evolution of knowledge is not the result of

information accumulation but a shift in paradigm or values. For Foucault, the Proletariat Revolution did not represent the victory of justice for the oppressed against the evil bourgeoisie but a value shift: the Proletariat values prevailing over the Bourgeoisie values. The social norm following the revolution was now produced and dictated by Proletariat values. This shift in the value system triggered social transformation but the change did not also imply moral progress in the absolute sense. In other words, it is misleading to think that with the Revolution, truth or good (Proletariat) had prevailed over falsity or evil (Bourgeoisie) ("Debate Noam Chomsky").

The change in knowledge reflects the change in values and this is one way to understand the power-knowledge complex. Foucault does not limit the concept of power to a violent exercise of state authority or something that can be held by individuals or institutions. Power is rather a system of values including truth and knowledge that "functions in the form of a chain" (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 98) in constant motion. As explored in the literature, Foucault claimed that truth and power directly imply one another (*Discipline and Punish* 27). The implication of this is that power is exercised "through the production of truth" (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* 93). In recognizing the value of truth, individuals submit to it; their submission to what is recognized as truth is the direct indication that true discourses "are bearers of the specific effects of power" (Foucault 94).

This conclusion contradicts the notion of truth detached from power. Foucault's concept of power has greater complexities than what has been stated. However, for the purposes of this discussion, power can be understood as the force that underlies social change and the mechanism by which values are internalized by individuals, hence determining their behavior. The power-knowledge complex points to how knowledge and power are intertangled, power made sense as

the force behind social and political interaction. The belief in absolute knowledge to be beyond and above human values is thus undermined in Foucault's analysis.

Foucault's power-knowledge complex likewise challenges the common tendency to elevate objectivity (in the absolute sense) as the ultimate goal or the defining characteristic of knowledge. By refuting the view of knowledge as an accumulation of information and instead conceptualizing knowledge evolution as a value shift, Foucault offers a novel outlook on knowledge that is detached from the absolutist notions of truth and objectivity. Furthermore, unlike the expectation of truth to be removed from power, Foucault claims that "truth is already power" (*Truth and Power* 319) and that "power is presupposed in truth" (318). The expectation of truth to be free from power paradoxically attaches authority and power to things identified as "truth" and this notion of truth is constitutive of the dominant beliefs about knowledge, that is, knowledge as detached from power.

Power in Postcolonial Knowledge Production

Foucault's analysis of the power-knowledge complex also provides the conceptual tools to capture the dynamics of postcolonial knowledge production. George Hicks (1994) notes that in many former Japanese colonies in Southeast Asia, the Comfort Women issue is a "non-issue" (237). While there can be other socio-cultural issues for this silence, Hicks states that the main reason for this is the huge economic and political dependency of many Southeast Asian countries on Japan where potential repercussions from uncovering the Comfort Women issues are greatly feared (Hicks 237-247). Similarly, during the Japanese colonization from 1910 to 1921, over 200,000 Korean historical documents which had important information about the history of China, Japan, and Korea were burned and replaced by the Japanese government (Blakemore).

Evident in the above examples is the "power-knowledge [complex that] determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge" (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 28). The power imbalance between Japan and Southeast Asian countries muted the voices of many activists seeking justice for Comfort Women victims (their voices and efforts suppressed by their own government). However, power in knowledge production is also concerned with the ability to exert control over the discourse more directly. The destruction of historical evidence deprived the colonized communities of the easiest and the surest way to appeal their case which is to refer to factual evidence about the historical event. This was no longer a possibility with the massive destruction of historical records by Japan nearing the end of World War II.

In the past, given the clear subordinate position of the colonized relative to the colonizer, power was directly and materially exercised by the colonial powers as seen in the destruction of historical documents. Today, when many former colonies have attained statehood, the previous relations based on oppression and subordination no longer exist. Theoretically, all states are equal in their sovereignty. In this context, power in knowledge production is more discreet and its effects are not so direct or obvious. This is seen in many Southeast Asian governments that actively silenced Comfort Women victims and activists in their countries fearing the repercussions from Japan. Being sensitive to the massive economic and political superiority of Japan, the Southeast Asian governments were careful not to offend their former imperial master, thus partaking in the scheme of erasing the brutal history and memories of Comfort Women.

Implicit in the above discussion is the judgment that what ought to be heard and known is being hidden and concealed with the meddling of power. The involvement of power in knowledge production suggests that what becomes established as knowledge is not necessarily true, a property of fundamental value to the concept of knowledge. The preceding paragraphs can

be regarded as an attempt to reclaim truth in historical knowledge against the falsifying maneuverings of power. However, Foucault's power-knowledge analysis falls short of supporting such an attempt. Identifying the involvement of power in the postcolonial disputes concerning knowledge is not sufficient. Following Foucault's analysis of power-knowledge complex, the need for a possibility of discriminating between beliefs should be discussed.

Beyond Foucault's Power-Knowledge

While Foucault insightfully notes that power is involved in the production of knowledge and that knowledge evolution reflects a value shift rather than an absolute transition from error to truth, his analysis lacks the necessary normative grounds. Foucault shies away from providing normative guidance on epistemic behavior. As a result, he is silent on the kinds of questions that naturally arise from encountering his analysis of power and knowledge: How should individuals or groups decide on believing one proposition over the other? What is the standard by which one can differentiate between better or worse knowledge claims? If knowledge is shaped and produced by arbitrary power struggles, lacking the notion of objectivity in the first sense (the possibility of truth and falsity), the value of knowledge is severely undermined. Knowledge could easily end up in the realm of subjectivism because knowledge according to Foucault's analysis is a product of power struggles, where whatever gets established as knowledge merely reflects the dominance of one value over the other.

Unfortunately, Foucault's analysis does not provide ideas or suggestions for ways to discriminate better claims to truth from others, a practice much needed in epistemology. Indeed, a standard to discriminate between better and worse beliefs should exist for the endurance of knowledge. A possibility of such a standard is found in objectivity. The conventional definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" implies the conceptual interlinkages between truth,

objectivity, and justification. Therefore, the re-evaluation of knowledge claims made in postcolonial disputes also involves the re-evaluation of truth and objectivity, terms that lack critical reflection relative to the frequency of their use in political discussion.

While the notion of objectivity is not equivalent to truth (Feldman 410), truth contains a degree of objectivity in the sense that it exists independently of what one desires (Lynch, *Truisms* 10-11). Truth is objective in the sense that what is true is independent of what people want or desire; this explains the conceptual divide between people's beliefs (opinions) and true beliefs. Just because people believe something does not mean it is true nor do people believe something just because it is true (Lynch, *Truth* 95; *Truisms* 10-11). In turn, objectivity is what makes the notion of truth and falsity possible where truth is the standard by which beliefs are "apprais[ed] and evaluat[ed]" (Lynch, *Truisms* 13). Nonetheless, the need for objectivity does not mean going back to the scientific standard of objectivity. Instead, consistent with the theme of exploring the non-absolutist paradigm of epistemology and identifying new possibilities of knowledge, the concept of objectivity should be carefully tailored to match the type of knowledge in question, which in the context of this thesis is historical knowledge.

From the Metaphysical to the Epistemological: The Standard of Justification

According to the correspondence theory of truth, true statements are those that "correctly portray the world as it is" (Lynch, *Truth* 99). However, it would be misleading to judge the truth and falsity of historical knowledge using the standard of scientific knowledge where objectivity and truth are judged in an extensional sense as seen in the mathematic equation 2+2=4. From the metaphysical problem concerning the truth about historical knowledge arises the epistemological problem of interpretations and meaning of the historical event. When justification is a critical part of knowledge, it is also crucial that appropriate standards are employed to judge different

kinds of knowledge. Epistemic objectivity for historical knowledge does not have to fit the objectivity model for scientific knowledge. Historical knowledge can be objective in the first sense (in that they are true or false) without also having to be objective in the other three senses. Knowledge about the colonial past is knowledge about the people and their experiences of colonization and the above reflection on objectivity and truth allows for the possibility of knowledge without completely removing social factors like personal experience and feelings.

Metaphysics: Truth and Verifiability

The second conception of objectivity to reflect reality in absoluteness raises the metaphysical problem of whether historical arguments capture reality exactly as it was back in time. This raises the question of the possibility of verifying historical knowledge. How would one verify that what is asserted in the present accurately corresponds to what happened in the past? Is it possible for historical "facts" to exist when verification is impossible with past events? These questions are motivated by the idea of truth as "ideal verifiability" which reflects the views of reductive naturalism: truth is reduced to things that are "ideally verifiable" (Lynch, *Truth* 80), that is, verifiable according to the scientific method. As a related argument, logical positivists have argued that moral judgments cannot be verified nor falsified (Lynch 79). What this means for postcolonial disputes which inherently involve the moral discussion is that the content of postcolonial disputes will be judged to lack truth for two reasons: first, the impossibility of verifying historical facts and, second, the presence of moral disagreements constituting the vast majority of the arguments sparked in postcolonial disputes.

The necessity of verifiability for truth presupposed in the first problem can be challenged by rejecting the argument that verifiability is a necessary condition for truth. Verifiability already "presupposes the idea of truth" (Lynch, *Truth* 81). Verification needs to be explained in terms of

truth: verifying is to justify, and to justify is to give evidence for. Evidence in justification is limited to those that are *true*. In this conceptual circularity, verifiability can neither be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.

The second problem is also solved when one rejects the tenets of logical positivism that morality is a matter of subjective tastes and passions. As discussed earlier, scientific knowledge is imbued with a myriad of social factors "even the most 'scientific' of claims is *informed* by value judgments" (Lynch, *Neither Slave* 38). In fact, science presupposes the supremacy of values in discriminating what qualifies as knowledge. Under this supremacy of values claimed by the scientific paradigm, any belief that "falls short of knowledge [in the scientific sense] is [considered] inferior" (Sosa 108). These values include truth and objectivity as understood in the scientific sense (Lynch, *Neither Slave* 38).

Epistemology: The Standard of Justification

The history of colonization involves the colonized people and their experiences under colonization. Therefore, knowledge about colonization necessarily involves the colonized people and their experiences, embodying the intentionality of interpretation inherent in historical knowledge. However, intentionality does not dismiss the fact that knowledge needs justification and qualification. The shift from the scientific paradigm of knowledge is that the standard of justification is not exclusively claimed by absolute objectivity and the correspondence theory of truth. This section responds to the epistemological problem of making a judgment between justified belief and a mere opinion, hence the need for a standard of justification.

Normativity is a property that indicates something is intrinsically worth "caring about" (Lynch, *Truisms* 16). In this sense, truth is a normative value: truth can serve as a standard of justification, a standard to determine between good and bad beliefs. For instance, truth is what

makes beliefs good to believe, a property that is "good for beliefs to have" (Lynch, *Truth* 100). In fact, "the aim of belief is said to be truth" (Sosa 108). In this sense, truth is a functional property that plays a role in the justification of beliefs or knowledge production.

Truth can have different functions for different types of beliefs. Historical knowledge involves one's interpretation of the event and concerns the intentionality of interpretation. Truth's role in propositions concerning history can thus "come in a different form [where making true] gets realized differently" (Lynch, *Truth* 99). Truth itself comes in different forms and epistemology should serve the role of finding new spaces to discuss and track the various forms of truth that are yet to be realized. Consistently, truth is possible even in the highly politicized realm of postcolonial disputes imbued with ethnic nationalism. Furthermore, this realization articulates a form of truth in the knowledge claims made by the colonized. This can be a form of truth that comes shrouded in strong emotions and self-interests, whose legitimacy is denied under the scientific paradigm of knowledge for its clear lack of objectivity in the absolute sense.

The idea of truth and objectivity as normative values are not readily available in today's epistemic discourse dominated by the scientific paradigm of knowledge rooted in the tenets of absolutism. The re-evaluation of the scientific standard of knowledge as a branch in epistemology that does not have absolute authority in the discipline (not to mention the fact that scientific knowledge is also shaped by social values), opens new possibilities for knowledge. This new understanding challenges the divinity of the scientific paradigm and consequently loosens the grip of the scientific model of objectivity on knowledge evaluation. In fact, historical knowledge does not have to answer to the correspondence theory of truth. Historical knowledge can have objectivity in the first sense (having truth value) without also having to meet the other criteria of objectivity including the correspondence to reality as is (Thomson).

Social Epistemology

In identifying a type of knowledge that does not neatly fit the criteria of scientific objectivity, social epistemology offers helpful insights. Social epistemology departs from traditional epistemology which is individualistic, focusing on the individual behavior in acquiring knowledge rather than the interaction between persons and groups concerning the production and transmission of knowledge. Social epistemology considers epistemic agents and their behavior in the collective: how epistemic groups or communities develop beliefs and how those group beliefs "are justified, rational or constitutive of knowledge" (Goldman 11). Social epistemology likewise involves coming "to terms with the epistemic significance of other minds" (Goldberg 423). Furthermore, unlike the debunkers who challenged the notion of truth and knowledge pointing to the involvement of social factors in shaping knowledge, social epistemologists claim that despite the fact that the statements considered true or objective are largely shaped and produced by social practices, the concept of truth and knowledge are preserved (Goldman 12).

Testimonial Knowledge

Knowledge about other people's experiences and memories can be communicated by those directly involved to those who are more distant, in the outer circles of the event or experience in question. Historical knowledge involves this act of learning about groups and individuals outside one's direct national or political sphere, learning about their stories and experiences. For instance, a nation is informed by unique memories of the group which includes a perspective as distinct players in the political scene. Specific to historical knowledge, an important type of knowledge is identified in social epistemology: testimonial knowledge.

Testimonial knowledge is one example of the "social sources of knowledge" (Goldberg 418). Joseph Shieber (2020) defines all information acquired not from personal experience but

from other people as testimonial knowledge (87). This points to the fact that knowledge can be acquired from "the experience of others" (Shieber 87) and their testimonies (Goldberg 419). This kind of knowledge is attained in interaction with other epistemic agents. However, the formation of testimonial knowledge which involves social interaction depends largely on the admission of information by the audience and how it evaluates the speaker in terms of credibility.

Testimonial Injustice

The audience can make a judgment about the speaker and their statements (knowledge claims) and decide whether to agree with the speaker and accept their claim as knowledge or reject it by denying its epistemic authority (Faulkner 190). The audience uses the epistemic agent or the speaker as a standard by which it discriminates between good and bad beliefs in the testimony communicated. In this way, the audience's judgment has direct implications for the status of knowledge claims stated by the epistemic agent: it can be accepted as knowledge or dismissed as untrustworthy (Daukas 327-328).

Testimonial injustice is a situation where a knower is denied their capacity as a giver of knowledge due to the audience's prejudice (Medina 203). Testimonial injustice occurs when the audience's prejudice against the speaker "causes [the] withholding of recognition" (Daukas 328) from the speaker as a credible epistemic agent or source of information. The audience also responds differently to speakers based on their social identities (Daukas 328): a person belonging to the marginalized group is unfairly disadvantaged due to the prejudice attached to the marginalized group by the dominant group whose culture defines the norms of epistemic deliberation.

Testimonial injustice has two major implications for power both on an interpersonal level and on an epistemic level. Firstly, testimonial injustice involves the interaction between the

audience and the speaker and the systematic denial of speakers as knowers based on their social identity. This "reinforces the grip of prejudicial stereotypes over social perceptions and so contributes to reinforcing existing power relations that disadvantage some groups while benefiting others" (Daukas 329). The power imbalance between the audience and the speaker limits the possibility of realizing other forms of knowledge. Testimonial injustice likewise reveals the underappreciated aspect of knowledge in traditional epistemology: that knowledge production is affected by social interactions between epistemic agents which can breed epistemic injustice in the context of unjust social relations.

In testimonial injustice, a speaker can be "undermined in her capacity as a producer of knowledge [or] as an inquirer" (Medina, *Hermeneutical Injustice* 203-204). A related injustice within this discussion is hermeneutical injustice where a person lacks the conceptual tools to truly describe or grasp an oppressive situation or circumstance that they are in. Hermeneutical and testimonial injustices are closely "interrelated" (Medina 206) and without understanding the other, neither hermeneutical nor testimonial injustice can be properly understood. The act of ignoring or undermining the qualification of the speaker based on the speaker's social identity or linguistic abilities reflects the lack of interest in another person's life and experiences to the point that no words, phrases, or concepts exist in the discourse to adequately capture the person's experience.

Hermeneutical injustices are suffered by the oppressed groups because they lack the concepts to effectively describe their experience. Within the discourse dominated by the privileged group and its culture, the marginalized groups lack the means by which they can have their voices heard. This reality is against the backdrop of the prevalence of neutrality and rationality in the epistemic appraisal of testimonies. Within such a discourse, the experiences of

the oppressed are "hidden, silenced, [and] systemically ill-understood" (Medina, *Resistance* 18). Hermeneutical injustices also reflect a "meta-blindness" where people are blind about their blindness in failing to see other people's suffering and listening to them when they try to communicate their cause (Medina, *Resistance* 26). In this sense, hermeneutical injustice feeds into testimonial injustice by inhibiting the development of concepts and terms for the marginalized groups to describe the oppressive circumstances they find themselves in (the testimonial injustice reflects the privileged group's denial of opppressive circumstances).

Hermeneutical injustices cannot be resolved unless the interlinkage between the epistemic, the ethical, and the political is realized (Medina, *Resistance* 26). If the affected communities as epistemic agents share their experience or defend the voices of victimized population and their claims are denied credibility, the existing knowledge about the event or topic excludes the perspective of the affected groups altogether. Epistemic injustice reflects the unjust power relations between groups and the socio-political institutions that effectively maintain such social order (Daukas 333). Likewise, epistemic injustice is situated in the context of unjust social relations, and this highlights the intersection of the epistemic (in knowing), the ethical (in the word injustice), and the political (social relations). The intersection of the ethical and the epistemic noted here also points to the crossing roads of social and virtue epistemology.

Virtue Epistemology

The discussion of testimonial knowledge under social epistemology uncovered the possibility of "injustice" in the act of knowing. This reflection leads to another tradition in epistemology that deals with the vices and virtues in knowing. In virtue epistemology, knowledge is defined as justified true belief informed by the virtues (Baehr). Knowledge can be approached as a cognitive performance that demonstrates the virtues of "accuracy, adroitness, and aptness" (Sosa

112). Under virtue epistemology, knowledge refers to justified true beliefs qualified by the presence of epistemic virtues that guarantee truth and justification. But to make sense of the place of injustice in knowledge, particularly testimonial injustice, this thesis detracts from the individualistic account of virtue epistemology or virtuous ways of knowing. Rather, it examines how epistemic vice manifest on the collective level of the dominant or privileged group translates into epistemic injustice (both testimonial and hermeneutical). For the purposes of this thesis, this section will focus on epistemic vice alone (not epistemic virtue), and how it obstructs the attainment of knowledge with respect to testimonial knowledge.

Epistemic Vice

Two traditions of epistemology offer different accounts of epistemic vice: the reliabilist and the responsibilist. Reliabilists argue that epistemic vices are "dispositions to form beliefs unreliably" (Carter and Broncano-Berrocal 48) such as bad eyesight for failing to read the directions closely (thus erring) or poor memory. Under reliabilism, epistemic vice is understood as a "stable quality of an epistemic agent that reliably produces bad effects of a broadly epistemic kind" (Kidd 187). Responsibilism on the other hand defines epistemic vice as character traits (Carter and Broncano-Berrocal 49) that involve one's motivations or "epistemically unworthy aims [...] aims that involve subverting or suppressing the truth" (49). Responsibilism views vice as "a stable quality [character trait] of an agent that reflects a blameworthy psychology or bad epistemic character" (Kidd 187). Examples include a lack of courage to challenge misleading political claims or the unwillingness to correct prejudice against others (Kidd 187).

Under the responsibilist tradition in virtue epistemology, epistemic vice refers to character traits that interfere with obtaining knowledge (Cassam 11; Kidd 187). While all epistemic vices are problematic obstacles for knowledge attainment, the more concerning ones

are of ignorance, especially when one is ignorant about one's ignorance. This is referred to as "stealthy vices" (Cassam 144) where a person lacks self-knowledge or self-awareness of his or her epistemic character traits or practices. This is related to the notion of active ignorance, where an active effort is made not to see certain things and to ignore certain events out of a "needing not to know" (Medina, *Active Ignorance* 8).

It is important to note that active ignorance does not refer to a mere lack of knowledge. Instead, it refers to a willful unseeing of certain historical facts and events such as genocide. It also implies a determined insensitivity towards other people's experiences, lives, and worlds. This epistemic condition makes the individuals "hermeneutically numbed to certain meanings and voices" (Medina, *Imposed Silences* 17) which accounts for their inability to grasp the notion of epistemic injustice in the first place. This results in the lack of knowledge about others which contributes to the perpetuation of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.

The discussion of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice is relevant for the conceptualization of postcolonial disputes as an instance of persistent testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Firstly, the fact that the colonized population lacks the conceptual tools to communicate their experience points to their hermeneutically disadvantaged position. Secondly, the ease at which knowledge claims coming from the colonized can be turned down due to their politicized nature is an instance of testimonial injustice rooted in the prejudice against non-conventional forms of knowledge. While the mainstream account of testimonial injustice states that prejudice reflects the cultural stereotypes against the speaker, in testimonial injustice concerning postcolonial disputes, the colonizer group justifies its rejection of the colonized group's knowledge claims by appealing to the scientific paradigm of knowledge. Testimonies about the colonial past do not match the absolutist notions of truth, knowledge, and

objectivity. Given their highly politicized nature, under the scientific paradigm of knowledge, testimonies (knowledge claims) from the colonized groups in postcolonial disputes are effectively denied as invalid.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an epistemological analysis of the nature of postcolonial disputes. The chapter outlined the problems facing the colonized groups in making knowledge claims with the ultimate goal of being heard about their past sufferings under colonization. The main problem was in the challenge posed by the absolutist paradigm of knowledge where knowledge defined by absolute objectivity required the removal of human values and social factors. This constitutes an obvious problem for the colonized whose claims about the colonial experience are heavily imbued with strong emotions and national interests. However, the scientific notion of absolute objectivity, truth, or knowledge are unattainable because social factors are inherently involved in the process of framing, selecting, and producing knowledge even in the natural sciences.

The scientific model of knowledge also fails to serve as an adequate standard to judge the truth in historical knowledge. Postcolonial disputes concern historical knowledge; the normative value of truth means that a standard of justification can exist for knowledge claims made in postcolonial disputes. Truth can play a different role for different forms of knowledge without being confined to the tenets of the correspondence theory of truth. Moreover, given the distinct nature of historical knowledge involving the intentionality of interpretations, knowledge claims about history can satisfy objectivity in the first sense (having truth value) without also meeting the other three senses of objectivity as the scientific model demands.

Acknowledging the possibility and thus the need to discern better historical interpretations over others enables one to see beyond the emotional factors and interests in

postcolonial disputes and grasp the epistemic stakes involved in the political phenomenon. However, establishing that objectivity is possible in postcolonial disputes is not enough. The epistemological analysis of postcolonial disputes moves further to frame the phenomenon as an instance of testimonial injustice perpetrated by active ignorance and hermeneutical injustice. The two branches in epistemology, social epistemology and virtue epistemology, together point to the intersectionality of ethics and epistemology (the complex made complete by its application to the political, which in this case is postcolonial disputes). Following this chapter that established the possibility of knowledge in postcolonial disputes, the next chapter will provide an epistemic evaluation of self-interested knowledge claims made by the colonizer and the colonized countries.

Chapter 6: Evaluating the Epistemic Status of Interest-Driven Knowledge Claims

Until the lions have their historians, tales of the hunt shall always glorify the hunter.
- Chinua Achebe, "The Art of Fiction" 1994

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated how historical knowledge which has the intentionality of interpretation can be objective in the first sense (be true or false) without also meeting the three standards of objectivity in the scientific sense. Postcolonial disputes concerning historical knowledge claims can preserve epistemic objectivity despite the involvement of ethnic nationalism or strong emotional forces motivating the knowledge claims. This chapter is an extension of Chapter 5 in developing the argument that there needs a standard by which one can judge and discriminate better interpretations of history that are closer to the truth or the fair picture of colonization. To this end, this chapter analyzes the epistemic status of knowledge claims made in postcolonial disputes by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer is treated more generally, the colonized in this chapter will refer to the group with high ethnic nationalism levels (the postcolonial state of South Korea) which indicates a strong emotional commitment of the members to the national group coupled with the equally strong interest in preserving the well-being of the nation.

The chapter opens with a general discussion of postcolonial disputes with respect to the divergence in historical knowledge. Knowledge concerning the severity of violence, oppression, and other acts of injustice committed against the colonized population during colonization is contested in all postcolonial dyads unless the colonial power has successfully overpowered the discourse of the colonized population. The common behavior of colonial powers in the

postcolonial dialogue (denial and minimization of the colonial event) reflects their active ignorance towards the sufferings of the colonized. The privileged group becomes actively ignorant about their group's disturbing history as a form of self-protection against things that are preferred to stay unknown. The first part of this chapter discusses such behavior of former colonial powers and how their disposition to deny events of the colonization is a manifestation of active ignorance which resists knowledge about the experiences of colonized communities.

The second part of this chapter transitions to the analysis of knowledge claims made by the colonized communities where strong subjective involvement and interest drives the contestation (resulting in the intensification of postcolonial disputes against colonial ignorance). This section analyzes the knowledge claims made by colonized communities, in particular, those charged with a strong emotional connection to the national group. This second part addresses the question of whether self-interested knowledge claims of the colonized (where ethnic nationalism is strong) can be distinguished from the self-interested knowledge claims made by the colonizers. This section takes the example of South Korean claims on the Comfort Women issue to explore whether knowledge claims that are imbued with strong emotions and interest for the well-being of one's group lack epistemic objectivity or the possibility of truth.

Two challenges are raised against the nature of knowledge claims made by the colonized community: strong involvement of emotions and the obvious presence of self-interest. This chapter responds to those challenges and argues against the conclusion that knowledge claims made by the colonizer and the colonized are irreconcilable (or essentially equal given the involvement of self-interest on both sides). It is argued that although self-interest is involved in the claims made by both the colonizer and the colonized states, the epistemic status of the two can be distinguished. Despite the strong influence of emotional attachment to one's own group,

such interests can better situate the colonized groups. In short, their claims can provide a better account of colonial history that reflects the experience of the colonized population than detached parties with more neutrality on the issue. In fact, there is a greater chance that the supposed *neutrality* of uninvolved parties is often their "indifference" to the matter in disguise. Interest drives inquiry and the mere involvement of interest in knowledge claims (even if it is "self-interest") is not a sufficient reason to dismiss a knowledge claim as illegitimate. Rather, the question of how interests are involved and what ends they aim for should be reflected upon.

By breaking the chapter into the two parts as outlined above, this chapter makes a distinction between the epistemic status of claims made by the colonizers and the colonized. It is argued that while self-interest is equally involved in the colonized group's knowledge claims, the positionality of the group better enables its members to engage in an inquiry geared towards uncovering certain truths about the colonial history, namely, the (often) silenced accounts about colonization that reflect the perspectives of the colonized people. This chapter argues that the colonized group is better situated to advocate for uncovering the colonial injustices and to resist the fabrication or forgetting of the ugly aspects of colonial history.

Active Ignorance of Colonial Powers

Following the previous section's discussion on the role of interest in knowledge production, this section presents the concept of active ignorance, a type of epistemic vice. Simply put, epistemic vice refers to character traits and intellectual defects that obstruct the acquisition of knowledge (Cassam 94); Epistemic vice is "a set of corrupted attitudes and dispositions that get in the way of knowledge" (Medina, *Active Ignorance* 30). Active ignorance involves voluntary blindness to social injustice or violence due to a vested interest in not knowing about it. This is "an unconscious defense mechanism" (Medina 7) that groups employ to protect themselves against

external criticism. As a related vice to active ignorance, the epistemic vice of closed-mindedness is "an explicit part of the social and political strategies to deal with oppression" (Medina 9). Such closed-mindedness is seen in the colonizer's attempts to whitewash the cruelties of colonial history. The epistemic vice of closed-mindedness and active ignorance in the privileged group also constitute an epistemic resistance towards the voices raised by the oppressed. The moral implications of acknowledging a particular event of colonization such as genocide and accepting the responsibility for the event are strong reasons behind the denial of the event.

One such example is the German government's responses to the victims of the Namibian genocide from 1904-08 (Köbler, *The Postcolonial* 26). Namibian groups' demand for a sincere apology and reparations had been turned down by the German government whose denial of the event and the refusal to take legal responsibility defined the negotiation process (Köbler 27). Furthermore, until 2015, the official German policy on the issue was guided by the principle of not calling the event in Namibia from 1904-1908 a genocide in order to avoid the legal consequences of assuming responsibility (Köbler 36). While Nazi Germany's atrocities in the Holocaust are widely known and commemorated, many are unaware of Germany's imperial past. As introduced in the literature, "colonial amnesia" (Köbler*, Postcolonial Asymmetry* 119) describes the German people's ignorance about the genocide committed under Germany's name which was also widely celebrated by the German media back then (Köbler 120).

This behavior of colonial powers is not exclusive to Germany but is also apparent in other colonial powers. The British minimization of death tolls in the Amritsar Massacre and the Japanese government's claims about the Comfort Women system being a benign and voluntary prostitution system are examples from Chapter 4. Active ignorance justifies the act of remaining closed-minded towards the stories and experiences of the colonized groups, thus perpetuating

testimonial injustice. This involves being closed-off to the world or the experience of others by denying their knowledge claims as invalid. The ignorance here is not only limited to dismissing that a particular event had happened or that the event in question was not as criminal as the affected community may assert to have been. The ignorance also applies to the experiences of the victims and thus, the ignorance towards the voices of victimized populations.

Resistance as Vice

What is problematic about the active ignorance of colonizers is the privileged status they occupy in assuming dominance over the discourse. The dominance is evident in the prevalence of the absolutist paradigm of knowledge, the Cartesian epistemology that focuses on the individual and the rational ways of knowing. Consistent with this judgment, non-Western forms of knowledge were "systematically usurped and negated as being ignorant, primitive, and inferior, [...] their knowledge systems [being] viewed as less valuable and/or irrelevant" (Wane 100). The epistemic resistance of the privileged group can be characterized by the inability to "acknowledge and engage alternative viewpoints" (Medina, *Resistance* 15). Given the privilege of the dominant group, the colonizer's resistance has wide and sure implications for the possible forms of knowledge. Epistemic resistance from the dominant group also perpetuates the subordinate place of alternative voices in the discourse.

The resistance of the privileged group shapes the dynamics of knowledge transmission and production. The body of knowledge in the Western world has privileged the perspective of the Empire without also engaging the "perspective of the colony" (Mahalakshmi 38). These bodies of knowledge on colonization emphasize the positive effects of colonization including industrialization, modernization, and education but are silent on the history of colonization as

experienced by the colonized people (Raghavan and Mahalakshmi 30). As Mahalakshmi acutely observes,

> The hegemonic hold of imperialist histories has often diverted attention from the structures of colonialism and has presented narratives of the triumph of European colonisers, the inferior political and economic development of the colonies at the time of colonisation, the presence of the collaborators or compradors, etc. The emphasis in the last half century in both perspectives has been on the economic roots of colonialism, its political dimensions, the social transformations. (38)

Epistemic resistance from the privileged group also imposes limitations on the possible forms of knowledge via dictating who is viewed as credible speakers (testimonial knowledge) and what kinds of claims are accepted as worthy of respect. The dominance of discourse in epistemology reflects the "tyranny of Western epistemology" (Wane 99) where truth and objectivity that constitute the heart of knowledge are limited to "the [version] sanctioned by Cartesian science" (Wane 99). The problem of this epistemic hegemony is that it bars other forms of knowledge from gaining recognition in the discourse. The Western dominance over the conceptualization of knowledge reflects in the situation where the legitimate forms of knowledge are exclusively found within "Eurocentric […] power blocs" (Wane 99).

To strengthen alternative voices so that they gain recognition, it is necessary to challenge the discourse defined by the "colonial domination of thought, belief, [and norms]" (Wane 99). Challenging the current discourse dominated by the ideals of the colonizer will create cracks through which the previously silenced voices of the colonized are let out; voices that are indispensable to the understanding of the history of colonization, the knowledge about the colonized people's experience of colonization. Knowledge claims made by the colonized community should not be dismissed as biased, emotional, or irrational because they represent people's sufferings during colonization and the lasting memories of mistreatment under the colonizer's oppressive rule which is an undeniable part of colonial history beyond what some

might call a socio-cultural imagination geared towards a political end such as receiving reparations.

Epistemic Resistance From Postcolonial States

Ethnic nationalism is often understood as involving an indiscriminate loyalty paid to the nation and its members. Under the related framework of ethnocentrism where in-group members are favored over out-group members (Levine 12), in-group members are likely to engage in testimonial injustice against out-group members concerning historical information about colonization. The simple conclusion would be that the status of knowledge claims made by postcolonial states with high levels of ethnic nationalism is no different from those made by colonial powers. If knowledge claims imbued by non-epistemic self-interests of colonizer states constitute epistemically vicious behavior, then how should one evaluate knowledge claims coming from postcolonial states, especially those having a strong emotional attachment to the national group? Indeed, the colonized communities are also engaged in an epistemic resistance against the bland, distorted narrative of the colonial period purported by the colonizers. What the colonized group resists is the minimization of the experience, perspective, and voices of the colonized in the historical account of colonization.

However, given the strong involvement of ethnic nationalism, knowledge claims made by the colonized face several challenges. The two main problems raised on the credibility of knowledge claims made by the colonized state identified with strong ethnic nationalism are 1) the presence of strong emotions, and 2) the clear involvement of self-interest (interest serving the national group). However, this section argues that neither the presence of strong emotions characterizing knowledge claims, nor the self-interest of the colonized groups can deny the credibility of claims made by these groups. This is for two reasons that will be elaborated on the

following sections. Firstly, that emotions and reasons can both supply good reasons for belief and action, and hence, the two are not mutually exclusive, and secondly, the *how* question of interest involvement in knowledge claims reveals that the unique interests of the colonized groups render them the positionality to provide better interpretations of colonial history.

1) Too Emotional to be Credible

It is easy to frame the epistemic disagreement in postcolonial disputes where ethnic nationalism is involved as an instance of ethnic conflict, a clash of collective memories or social constructs which can be recreated and undone. Indeed, the South Korean charges against Japan on Comfort Women are heavily laden with anger, resentment, and hate towards the Japanese for having committed such atrocious crimes against Korean women. In order to understand the nature of deep emotional involvement of the Korean public, the concept of *Han* (한, 恨) comes in handy.

Han is a concept that captures the suppressed yet strong resentment and grief. This concept captures the unique way in which Korean people address the injustice, oppression, and losses experienced through years of foreign invasion, Japanese occupation, the Korean war, and other hardships both on the collective and on an individual level (Bleiker and Yong-ju 248; Kim; Lee 160; Willoughby 18). While is not limited to Japanese colonization, the large chunk of Korean *Han* in its contemporary form that emphasizes the "nationalist, biologistic-oriented meaning", was formed during Japanese colonization (Kim 257). Although resentment and grief towards a history of oppression are not unique to Korean people, *Han* signifies the unique "the manner in which these feelings are understood and related to managing or solving conflict" (Bleiker and Hoang 248) by the Koreans. *Han* accounts for the strong presence of emotions in the psychology of the Korean people when issues like the Comfort Women that evoke painful memories of colonization are raised.

When such deep emotional force drives the claims made by South Korea, rationality seems to fall out of picture. Hence, it is easy to see those claims as an extension of resentment and bitterness of the colonized. Korean claims or accusations towards Japan could appear as an extension of their *Han*. Indeed, there is a word in Korean called *Hanpuri* which means pouring out the suppressed emotions - bitterness and resentment. This term also points to the highly emotional personality of the Korean nation and its people who regularly engage in expressing their kindled and unfathomable emotion. This close attachment to emotions (which also implies that the Korean people are prone to being inspired and affected by it) is inherently opposed to the values of the conventional conception of "knowledge" which is expected to embody objectivity and be detached from the polluting influences of emotion.

Under such view, Epistemic subjectivism seems to better characterize the dispute driven by angry claims coming from the South Koreans. Epistemic subjectivism is where knowledge is simply what anyone feels or desires as truth. In other words, the body of knowledge that exists merely reflects the subjective desires of the person or community making knowledge claims. This observation points to the general unease in the field of epistemology towards emotional charges made by the affected community about an unjust event: a reluctance to grant objectivity and the possibility of knowledge in cases where emotions associated with irrationality are clearly at work in motivating the group members to make claims about the issue.

Between the Rational and the Emotional

Western language has a long tradition of regarding emotion and reason as mutually distinct and opposing forces (Kim 253). Not only are they separate, but reason is considered to be a superior judge over matters compared to emotion when it comes to political deliberation (Staiger 232). Emotion is understood as a "corrupting force to the purity of reason" (Staiger 231) which must

be cleared from the political sphere for healthy and adequate interaction between actors. Therefore, under the Western tradition, the deep emotional force presupposed in ethnic nationalism constitutes a faulty trait on the group that advocates for remembering the injustices suffered by its past generation. Such a conclusion reflects the majority's evaluation of politics today: sophistry and emotional contestation with no place for truth. Even when truth is invoked in politics, it is likely not really the truth because truth shaped by power loses its color as a neutral property, over and beyond the arbitrary workings of power.

However, the clean separation between power and knowledge or power and truth is an imagination of idealized truth; truth does not and cannot exist in the ideal as one imagines, believes, and *needs* it to be (because truth assumes its authority, and knowledge gains its power in the human discourse only when truth and knowledge are perceived to be detached from power and thus idealized in the purest form). The primacy of reason in the political sphere makes a grave mistake of ignoring "the fundamental element of human experience: emotions" (Staiger 230). As Staiger states in his article, acknowledging the presence of emotions is not to approve of its harmful effects on politics; instead, by recognizing the undeniable role of emotions in politics, one could form a "better understanding of how [emotions] are at work politically" (Staiger 231).

This reflects one conception of reason to be completely detached from emotions and the force that should keep emotions (the irrational) under control. The other view follows the Humean tradition where emotions are believed to be separate from and unaffected by reason. But neither view captures the true essence of emotions and rationality and how humans employ them in their reasoning. In response to this dichotomy between reason and emotion, it should be noted that neither reason nor emotion is superior over the other; "they intertwine more intimately and

equally than that" (Lynch, *Neither Slave* 25). The first approach fails because it does not account for the strong emotional force that inspires people to make claims against the colonial narrative about colonization. The second approach also fails because it places the historical claims coming from colonial powers on an equal playing field against the colonized communities, challenging the attempts to differentiate the colonizer from the colonized in their knowledge claims. When rationality is believed to be independent of emotion and when rationality understood as such is sought in politics, it is highly likely that testimonial injustice will re-enter the scene: knowledge-claims charged with emotions will be dismissed as untrustworthy and lacking proper characteristics of what might be deemed as knowledge.

2) Self-Interest Hurts Neutrality

The legal tradition dismisses victims of crime at hand from joining the jury in fearing the lack of objectivity. For example, Jury selection on a sexual assault case excludes those who have been sexually assaulted in the past because that person would be biased in their opinion and biased towards the victim (Solnit). This legal arrangement was to prevent biased opinions from affecting jury decisions - a preventative measure against prejudice. However, such legal instruments reflecting the fact that "society's idea of prejudice is itself prejudiced" (Solnit). The prejudice here is the notion that victimized populations can offer nothing more than over-sympathize with victims in similar conditions. However, their first-hand experience can provide others with a better insight on empathizing with the victims and pointing to the flaws of the current legal system in supporting the victims. Prejudice is not built out of experience; most of the time, it is created and solidified from social values and through socialization processes. Moreover, the prejudice against the victims is often not visible or recognized; the prejudice against victims is simply taken for granted (Solnit). One of the prejudices reflected in the legal

system is the belief that "the unaffected are neutral" (Solnit) but this merely embodies the prejudice about the prejudiced; and as Solnit puts it, "neutrality itself is often a fiction."

Solnit's analysis was about legal procedures. Connecting Solnit's observation back to epistemology, it is really the merit attached to neutrality, viewing it as the ideal standard of justification, which is a fiction. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 and the opening section of this chapter, neutrality does not occupy a privileged position when it comes to judging between truth or falsity or moving towards a fairer account of historical knowledge. This is especially so when what it concerns is reflecting the voices and experiences of the colonized in the historical narrative. Justifying the prejudice against epistemic agents by asserting the necessity of neutrality in knowledge would perpetuate testimonial injustice and active ignorance. If the voices of the victimized population are silenced for the preservation of neutrality, the invaluable perspectives of people who have had similar experiences are buried and silenced. The irony of upholding the primacy of neutrality in epistemology (towards pure objectivity) is that knowledge is ultimately lost in being systematically closed off to the victimized population.

As discussed in Chapter 5, even scientific knowledge rooted in the strict observance of absolute objectivity (objectivity in all four senses) was affected and shaped by social factors and values. The re-evaluation of scientific knowledge as social knowledge revealed another important characteristic of knowledge: that being interested in something is a necessary condition for knowledge. This role of interest in knowledge production needs to be qualified in terms of the object of interest. The mere fact that interest is involved is less significant than reflecting upon *how* interest is involved in the production of knowledge. Individuals or groups can be interested in the act of uncovering or knowing the subject itself or they can be interested in the change of power relations as an effect of knowledge production. While the two objects of

interest are not mutually exclusive, there is a definite difference in the nuance of how interest is involved in the epistemic behavior or the act of making knowledge claims.

The difference in the way interest is involved (how interest drives the kinds of knowledge produced or statements asserted as "knowledge") becomes visible when knowledge statements made by the colonizer and the colonized groups are compared. While both parties have a common stake in the use of knowledge with respect to political interests, the emphasis of the colonized community is placed on the content of the knowledge itself (how victims and their experiences are explained and interpreted) while the colonizer's focus is on the ramifications of accepting a particular version of historical knowledge, namely, one that is more explicit about the oppressive activities of its country during colonization. Self-interest in colonial powers relates to maintaining the status quo, avoiding legal responsibility, and resisting negative images about the group's past actions. This results in a desire to conceal certain historical events (or the accounts of the events described in the perspective of the victims) or actively ignore them. On the other hand, self-interest in colonized groups is externalized in the opposite direction: not to conceal or ignore but to reveal and remember the experiences of victims.

The motivation to challenge the historical fabrication of an event of colonization can fail to constitute a pure longing or desire after truth because the Korean motivation to engage in unresolved postcolonial disputes cam seem closer to finding truth that reflects more clearly what the Korean people had suffered. The focus is not on truth itself; truth is invoked *because* it intersects with making known the oppression of the Korean people during colonization. Given the strong nationalist motivations, South Korean knowledge claims appear to lack neutrality. Regardless, an important overlap exists between the Korean people's national interests expressed in the strong emotional connection to the past generation and the realm of ethics. Since ethnic

nationalism involves a deeply felt concern for one's national group, the injustice suffered by the Korean people during Japanese colonization can be brought into light by the relentless efforts made by Koreans to challenge the watered-down accounts of colonization.

Positionality - Advocates for Justice

The way in which interests are involved in making knowledge claims can be better understood if one considers "interest" in a different light. Interest is what renders particular social positionality to individuals, or rather, interest is the externalization of one's social positionality which makes some people better equipped and motivated than others to observe the hidden truth and care about the silenced voices in the discourse. Interest is crucial to drive epistemic inquiry or search for knowledge and truth (which is different from the interest to conceal and cover-up); in particular, the interest in a particular subject drives the dedication to inquire after truth and knowledge of the event that concerns the subject in question. While both claims attributed to colonized and colonial states involve the self-interest of group members, the kind of self-interest involved and the way it relates to the knowledge claims made are different.

Indeed, as Medina notes, "the experience of being hermeneutically disadvantaged itself can become an epistemic advantage [...] the springboard for learning processes that can lead to alternative epistemic perspectives or the expansion of existing ones" (*Resistance* 18). This positionality of the hermeneutically disadvantaged can be compared to the hermeneutically privileged. Given their dominance in society, the hermeneutically privileged did not have to experience the frustration of not having the conceptual tools to describe their experience. The consequence of this privilege is the limited "opportunity to realize (and little motivation to accept) that there is more to see and talk about than what the culturally available hermeneutical tools enable people to recognize" (Medina 18). This feeds into the epistemic vice of closed-

mindedness and laziness which informs the group's ignorance in not knowing that there are certain things to be known including the fact that the privileged group's ignorance perpetuates the dismissal of areas to be known.

In this sense, the hermeneutically privileged group has a "pronounced insensitivity to insensitivity, a sort of meta-blindness (or meta-insensitivity)" (Medina, *Resistance* 19). These groups have not experienced hitting the limits of the available concepts and resources, and hence, they lack the experience of feeling constrained as speakers. Whatever they feel, think, and say fits the conventions of the discourse which is itself rooted in the culture of the hermeneutically privileged. As a result, members of this group are reluctant "to acknowledge and engage epistemic counterpoints" (Medina 20). Medina refers to this as the resistance to epistemic friction which involves both the inability to see other forms of knowledge or ways of thinking and the "inability to see one's inability" (Medina 20). These groups will therefore feel uncomfortable when they encounter voices that challenge their accustomed ways of knowing and thinking, while unable to realize that such uneasiness is caused by their inability to be open to other people's lives and experiences.

On the other hand, the hermeneutically disadvantaged have an "acute attentiveness to hermeneutical gaps" (Medina, *Resistance* 18) based on their own experience of hitting the limits of the available hermeneutical concepts. Hence, these groups are "better positioned to […] exhibit an inchoate sensitivity to what is missing" (Medina 18). The limits of the available body of discourse endows them with a "special sensitivity to insensitivity" (Medina 18), which is an opposite quality of the hermeneutically privileged. This disposition to sensitivity does not mean the sensitivity is applied to all areas of knowing. However, this sensitivity enables and motivates the disadvantaged group with the following abilities:

> To go beyond the received dominant view, to recognize its limitations and flaws, and occasionally to develop an alternative viewpoint, a dual consciousness […] that can hold and maintain active multiple perspectives simultaneously. (Medina, *Resistance* 19)

The experience of oppression supplies these groups with the ability to identify the limitations and shortcomings of the established system of knowledge. In this sense, the perspective and contributions of the hermeneutically disadvantaged are much needed in epistemology which concerns the question of knowing and testing the body of knowledge.

An analogy can be drawn between Medina's account of the hermeneutically advantaged versus disadvantaged group and the colonizer and the colonized communities. Given the prevalence of historical accounts favoring the colonizer's perspective (Wane 99), the colonized group lacks the tools to make sense of its experience of colonization: the sufferings of countless people and the injustice of colonial rule have no place in the discourse of the colonizer, to whom the colonized community's suffering is of no concern. The colonizer is utterly uninterested in knowing the colonial history that reflects the experiences of the colonized.

While the colonizer is insensitive towards the experiences of the population it had mistreated, the colonized is better positioned to appreciate and sympathize with the victimized population's experiences and voices. And this positionality is informed by their experience of colonization, the frustration of not being able to communicate their experience within the discourse of the colonizer, and the motivation to pursue the interests of their group: an interest to make known and make sense of their experience, thoughts, and feelings. As Charles Mills (2013) discussed in his analysis of racism, the oppressed groups can be "epistemically advantaged [with] potential insight afforded from their social location" (Mills 29). Mills' judgment counters a common assumption attached to any claims where self-interest is involved: the expectation is

that interest-driven knowledge claims lose validity because they are biased and equivalent to the expression of individual desires and inclinations.

However, in applying both Mills's analysis of racism to the colonized community, an important question arises: are the people (those making the knowledge claims) of former colonies currently oppressed? If the experience of oppression is so central to the positionality argument, do the current members of the postcolonial state have direct access to the oppressive experience of the colonized population to offer special insights into the historical account of colonization? Medina's words are useful here:

> Epistemic injustices have robust temporal and social dimensions, which involve complex histories and chains of social interactions that go beyond particular pairs and clusters of subjects. The thick concepts of historicity and sociality are lost when the analysis is restricted to particular interactions between individuals at particular moments. (*Resistance* 5)

What Medina clarifies here is that epistemic injustice (a larger category under which hermeneutical injustice falls) is not limited to individuals in particular interactions at specific points in time. The problem of history and the past does not limit the application of epistemic injustices that span over time and space. Informed by Medina's astute observation on the nature of epistemic injustice, the answer to the question of whether the colonized group is entitled to the positionality in question is stated as the following: The colonized group is hermeneutically disadvantaged in the present given the dominance of a discourse that favors the colonizer (this discourse informs ways of knowing including the history written in the perspective of the colonizer whose facts are interpreted by the colonizer), and such disadvantage arises from the colonized group's deep attachment and identification with the oppression suffered by their past generation (thus the working of ethnic nationalism and national interest). The simple answer is

yes, the claim to the praised positionality of being sensitive to the gaps and limits of prevalent knowledge is preserved for the colonized community in the present.

The above discussion on Medina's positionality of the hermeneutically disadvantaged connects to the experience of Comfort Women victims. Despite the current publicity, the issue of Comfort Women had long been sealed from the public. Given the unique and tragic experience of Comfort Women, the victims lacked the conceptual tools by which they could communicate their stories and point to the unarticulated sense of injustice, wrongdoing, and frustration kindled in their memories of the experience. Therefore, it was not until the early 1990s that the issue was publicized in Asia as South Korean victims sought justice for former Comfort Women (Ahn 2; Hicks 210).

Shim (2017) notes that Comfort Women survivors had undergone an "enormous transformation" (253) since the time of them revealing their identities and starting their journey of advocating for the women raped and killed during the war. Comfort women victims were transformed into human rights activists, based on their personal experience of being exploited by the Japanese military as well as their interest in rectifying the past and helping those in similar situations. For example, as seen in the example of Comfort Women, the victims' experience, their interest in supporting the victims in similar situations, got them involved in advocacy movements and lawsuits against the Japanese government. Furthermore, like the experience of oppression, the close commitment to one's group (which is seen in the ethnonationalistic orientation of South Koreans) can generate similar effects. This is because the colonized communities voice the experiences of their past generation. For instance, the Korean public's emotional involvement with the comfort women issue was driven by their interest in defending the honor and well-being of their people (national group). This interest in turn left the public

committed to rectifying the past and addressing the disputed facts of the event (the truth about Comfort Women stations). The publicization of Comfort Women drew attention from other parts of the world. However, this cosmopolitan human rights movement for Comfort Women was not focused on "national identity" but on universal human rights. The motivation for the advocacy was human rights and it mattered less whether the women were Korean or Japanese.

Nevertheless, even in such a cosmopolitan movement in which no strong identification with one group exists, social interest is involved which generated efforts to support the victims' voice against historical fabrication and denial from the Japanese government. Likewise, the mere presence of self-interest in knowledge claims alone does not automatically dismiss the claim as lacking epistemic objectivity or truth. It is important to examine how the interest is involved in the making of the knowledge claim and what ends the "self-interest" serves in the kinds of knowledge claims generated and the contents of knowledge asserted. The interest of human rights activists, like the South Korean public, was geared towards uncovering the knowledge *about* the victimized women. Here, the interest is in uncovering the knowledge *about* the people. This points to a distinct type of knowledge that is critical to understanding the nature of knowledge claims made by the colonized.

Towards Ethical Epistemology

The above discussion directs to the need to re-evaluate the knowledge claims made by the colonized as distinguishable from those made by the colonizers. This is geared towards the ultimate purpose of extending the same level of recognition given to established knowledge to the knowledge asserted by the colonized. The need to explain and justify the epistemic significance of knowledge claims made by the affected population (the colonized country where ethnic nationalism levels are high) points to the neglected area in epistemology: knowledge

about the people (Thomson 43). In advocating for the move towards ethics, Thomson states that ethics as opposed to morality concern the revision of one's self-interest to "include others" and likewise "expand one's life by improving one's relationship with other people" (Thomson 46). Josephides voices a similar sentiment as Thomson in her article on ethical knowledge. According to Josephides, knowing "encompasses the act or process of acquiring and sharing knowledge [where] the content of that knowledge [is] a building block of a shared reality" (216). In other words, knowledge involves understanding the other person's experience and thus becoming cognizant of the "world shared by others" (Josephides 217).

The expansion or revision of interest for the colonizers would involve acknowledging the epistemic asymmetry arising from postcolonial asymmetry (being unaware and unaffected by the adverse structural and societal legacies of colonization in colonized countries). Thomson describes the epistemological asymmetry as the double standard by which one perceives oneself and the others: seeing only the good intention of one's actions while only the bad actions of others (Thomson 49). In this thesis, epistemic asymmetry also refers to the blanket inability of the colonial powers to recognize the knowledge claims made by the colonized as worthy of respect. Epistemic asymmetry is not only the inability to understand the other but the failure to recognize the colonized population's knowledge statements about the colonial period as knowledge deserving some serious attention.

While the colonized communities live through the persistent legacies of colonization that shape the people's socio-political reality, the colonizer remains effectively detached from its colonial history and the many lives affected by colonization. For example, as a result of arbitrarily drawn state borders after colonization, ethnic unrest and conflict which also pose serious economic problems are the reality for the majority of, if not all, African states (Wane

103). The colonizer communities are not aware of the intersecting histories of their country and its former colony. A more serious problem is in the meta-ignorance as explored earlier where the colonizers are ignorant about their active ignorance and colonial amnesia, and thus cannot even makes sense of their great unease and discomfit when faced with epistemic resistance from the colonized communities (or encountering the colonial history as recounted by the colonized group). In the context of such entrenched ignorance, communicating the responsibility to know to the colonizer group can be extremely hard.

Against Active Ignorance

The problematic nature of ignorance is that the ignorant person is usually also ignorant about their ignorance (Thomson 51-52). Apart from presenting active ignorance as an epistemic vice, ethical knowledge describes ignorance to involve the "failure to recognize that there exists something to be known [and] the inability to appreciate that there is something worthy of being known" (Thomson 56). Ignorance is therefore not a mere lack of information but "the lack of caring for something that constitutes an area of knowledge" (Thomson 56). Applying this to the diverging knowledge claims made by the colonizer and the colonized, the active ignorance of colonizers translates to a lack of caring about the colonized population and its oppression under colonization. Ethical epistemology provides a reason for listening to knowledge claims made by the colonized against the demands of the scientific model of knowledge which suppresses these knowledge claims from moving past the status of emotional, subjective political claims.

Contrary to the vice of ignorance, one should move towards the virtue of understanding: an understanding of the other and their stories as opposed to ignorance about their experiences. Thomson observed that the commissions set up for peace processes target truth and the perception of truth without responding to the need to explicitly recognize the people and their

hurtful experiences. In other words, framing knowledge in terms of truth and objectivity that do not reflect the nuances of the type of knowledge involved, ends up in a place where the pursuit of knowledge about a historical event tramples knowledge *about* the people involved in the event. An action that was morally insignificant or unproblematic for the colonial powers can affect the colonized population down the generation and hurt them in countless ways. Coupled with the active ignorance and closed-mindedness towards colonial history, the former colonizer community is largely unaware of the lasting effects of colonization or the importance of remembering and correcting the colonial injustice for the colonized countries.

This connects back to Medina's work on epistemic resistance and epistemic injustice. The previously discussed problem of meta-blindness of the privileged group is not purely cognitive. Their blindness also reflects "an emotional problem: […] the failure to relate to others affectively" (Medina, *Resistance* 25). This reflects the general tendency of colonial powers and their inability to be interested in or open to societies that have been severely affected both materially and emotionally by colonization (regardless of how they view their own colonial history). Again, this reinforces the idea of not losing the grasp over the importance of knowledge about people in the context of postcolonial disputes. The accusation of self-interest attached to knowledge claims is no longer valid when the knowledge in question becomes the knowledge *about* the colonized and their suffering. Self-interest no longer constitutes a threat to neutrality; neutrality with respect to the knowledge claims made by the colonized is no longer a necessary condition for knowledge.

The knowledge about the affected population and their experience of colonization is not readily granted a place in the "truth" about colonial history, especially when those knowledge claims are brought forth by the colonized group itself. This is another instance where the

scientific model of knowledge obstructs the "understanding of each other in relationships" (Thomson 43). To summarize, ethical epistemology as applied to this thesis involves moving past the boundaries of the scientific model of knowledge, recognizing the epistemic struggle of the colonized in challenging the active ignorance of the colonizer (and the dominant historical narrative of the colonial period favoring the perspective of the colonizer) and revising the body of knowledge about colonization to better reflect the voices and experiences of the oppressed.

Responsibility to Know

Medina notes the importance of epistemic responsibility of people who inhabit a social space, whose history embodies the experiences of the oppressed and the legacies left behind by such oppression (*Epistemic Responsibility* 20). He gives an example of Vanderbilt University which has a history of African American people's struggles to gain equal rights within the institution. To be a responsible member of Vanderbilt University, one has the obligation to know at least the existence of a history "of exclusion and the symbolic traces it has left behind" (*Epistemic Responsibility* 20) in the institutional structures even if one cannot know the whole thing in detail. This is shockingly lacking in most colonial communities including Germany, a country that is known for its commendable efforts in addressing the history of Holocaust.

In line with Thomson's ethical epistemology, the notion of epistemic responsibility resurfaces. Ethical epistemology brings in the ethical concerns more explicitly in epistemology, departs from the Cartesian approach to epistemology, and complements the advances made by social epistemology and virtue epistemology. What is at stake with postcolonial disputes is the loss of knowledge forms that do not neatly fit the dominant paradigms of epistemology. The knowledge about others and their experiences inevitably involves emotions, self-interest, and a degree of subjectivity. These social factors and knowledge have been kept separate in the

traditional paradigm of knowledge which has accounted for the inability of the colonized groups to communicate their stories to have their knowledge claims heard and recognized by others.

The system of discourse that has effectively turned down knowledge claims from the colonized has thus benefited the colonizers who are insulated from the critical voices arising from their former colonies which challenge their ignorance, insensitivity, and blindness towards others. Dismissing the knowledge claims made by the colonized as irrational, illegitimate, and interest-driven, the colonizer group and their ally, the scientific paradigm of knowledge, successfully prevented the non-conventional voices from gaining epistemic credibility and respect, which would have shifted the political interaction between the colonized and the colonizer countries in terms of keeping up with the necessary legal and moral responsibilities to address the wrongdoings of colonization.

Conclusion

This chapter provided the analysis of the epistemic status of knowledge claims made by the colonizers and colonized groups. Although social values and interests are involved in the knowledge production of both colonizer and colonized countries, this chapter argued for the nuanced distinction between the two groups. The aversion of colonial powers towards colonial history was presented as an instance of active ignorance, connecting back to the example of German colonialism and Germany's denial of the Namibian genocide. The political interests of colonial powers to not assume legal and moral responsibility for the atrocities of colonization, accounted for their blatant ignorance, denial, and minimization of the colonial event including the mistreatment of the colonized people.

The knowledge claims made by the colonized constitute epistemic resistance to the recreation of colonial history driven by the colonizer's active ignorance. The South Korean

claims were evaluated in detail for the colonized group to make the claim that even in cases where strong emotional forces are involved, the claims about colonial history do not fall into epistemic subjectivism. Since not all postcolonial dyads are strongly engaged in the dispute, the South Korea- Japan postcolonial dyad was chosen as a case of a vocalized dispute which involved the association of a high level of ethnic nationalism. This chapter argued that the prejudice against knowledge claims imbued with strong emotions and thus a lack of neutrality should not justify the ignorance and denial of the affected population's colonial experience.

Here, a strong emotional factor (*Han)* that characterizes the Korean nation was discussed to state how this understanding of the Koreans affects the evaluation of their knowledge claims about Japanese colonization. The identification with strong emotional force was used to make the claim that the resulting knowledge claims were irrational in nature. However, this charge was challenged by noting the misleading understanding of emotions and reason as mutually exclusive concepts as well as the incorrect notion of reason having the exclusive right to providing good reasons for action. The second charge against the validity of knowledge claims of the colonized was the clear involvement of self-interest. However, it was argued that the self-interest of the colonized endowed them with a better positionality to notice the gaps and limits of the dominant discourse and to advocate for change which would better reflect the truth about colonial history, where truth refers to the knowledge about the colonized people and their experiences.

Furthermore, this chapter noted the novel efforts that can be made by the affected group in advocating for justice as seen in the example of Comfort Women victims. Their positionality also equips them with special insights into a fairer understanding of colonial history as well as their commitment to reviving the dearth of knowledge about the colonized experience in the current history of colonization. The need to consider seriously the colonized group's knowledge

claims was complemented by a discussion on the need to move towards ethical knowledge or knowledge about social relationships and the people. This chapter thus identified and addressed the deeper epistemological concern that undergirds postcolonial disputes and provided an analysis of the epistemic dynamic between the colonizer and the colonized involved in the process. But more importantly, this chapter has demonstrated the re-evaluation of the epistemic status of knowledge claims made by the colonized community against the misleading, yet prevalent assumptions attached to them, namely, that interest-driven knowledge claims can be dismissed as invalid.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis examined the converging realm between politics and epistemology in posing the following research question: "If ethnic nationalism intensifies postcolonial disputes, are postcolonial disputes an instance of epistemic subjectivism?" The comparative case study of the India-United Kingdom (UK) and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads supported the hypothesis: the intensity of postcolonial disputes was greater in the South Korea-Japan dyad which also demonstrated high levels of ethnic nationalism while both the intensity and the level of ethnic nationalism was low in the India-UK dyad. Two important caveats exist in the empirical study: Firstly, ethnic nationalism levels were only measured in the postcolonial state, and secondly, ethnic nationalism is limited to that which defines the whole state. Building from the empirical findings, this thesis argued that despite the strong involvement of political interest and social factors in the knowledge claims made in postcolonial disputes, postcolonial disputes do not fall into epistemic subjectivism and that it is possible to make a meaningful judgment about the interpretations of colonial history. This thesis ultimately argued for the need to re-evaluate knowledge claims made by the colonized, even in those cases characterized by a strong emotional attachment to the nation, as demonstrated in the example of South Korea.

It was hypothesized in the empirical study that in a postcolonial dyad with high levels of ethnic nationalism, the intensity of postcolonial disputes would be greater compared to a postcolonial dyad with low levels of ethnic nationalism. A comparative case study of India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads supported the hypothesized relationship between levels of ethnic nationalism and the intensity of postcolonial disputes. As discussed in Chapter 4, the South Korea-Japan dyad which demonstrated high levels of ethnic nationalism showed a

strong intensity in postcolonial disputes compared to the India-UK dyad. Postcolonial disputes about factual history and policies (apologies and reparation) remained unresolved for both postcolonial dyads. However, the India-UK bilateral relationship was unaffected by the unresolved dispute where the two countries engaged in active cooperation and exchange on various socio-cultural, economic, and political areas. Several public surveys taken in India had no questions that directly asked for the Indian people's perspective on bilateral relations with the UK (compare this to South Korea where many questions explicitly addressed the hostile relationship between Japan and South Korea). At most, questions would ask about evaluating the other country in terms of economic and political importance. This lack of data indicated the low involvement of the public in the unresolved controversy around the Amritsar Massacre and that the realm of other political matters (concerning India's material advantages from cooperating with the UK) was detached from the disputed colonial event.

In sharp contrast, the South Korean public felt strongly about the disputed events of colonization. The public's interest is gauged by the fact that the majority of public opinion poll questions asked for evaluations about Japan and the bilateral relationship with Japan. The public prioritized historical issues over stabilizing relationships with Japan, often pressuring the South Korean government to confront Japan whenever necessary. The magnitude of postcolonial disputes in the South Korea-Japan bilateral relationship was so great to the point that negative sentiments spilled over to other realms of politics, obstructing important trade and security agreements, and determining the overall atmosphere of the bilateral relationship which was characterized by mutual bitterness and hostility.

The high intensity of postcolonial disputes is also implied in the failure to forge a stable relationship *despite* strong geopolitical and economic reasons to do so: a common alliance with

the United States, economic interdependence, and regional security threat from North Korea (Glosserman and Snyder 92). On several occasions, the US had attempted to foster a strong alliance between South Korea and Japan for geopolitical stability in East Asia, urging the two countries to resolve their historical animosity (Cooney or Scarbrough 181). Unfortunately, the US efforts have not yielded much success in stabilizing the relationship between the two countries that continue to remain divided in the "psychological and emotional gaps" (Glosserman and Snyder 95) concerning colonial history. Interestingly, the strong political and economic reasons for cooperation with Japan were well recognized by the South Korean public as reflected in the joint survey conducted by Genron NPO (Kim and Kang 11). However, despite this awareness, historical issues took priority over material advantages from cooperation (Genron NPO and East Asia Institute 4) for the Korean public. This was likely due to the nature of cooperation with Japan that would involve or require South Korea's silence about what constitutes a historical fabrication about the nature of Japanese colonization of Korea.

If ethnic nationalism is likewise responsible for the intensification of postcolonial disputes, then given the concept of rationality and reason detached from emotions, it is easy to reach a conclusion that knowledge contestations in postcolonial disputes are mere expressions of political desires and emotions that arise from a bitter experience of colonization. Contrary to this seemingly common-sense conclusion, this thesis argued that the contents of postcolonial disputes are more than social constructs including collective memories that lack a basis of reality and strong ethnonational sentiments, both of which can be deconstructed and rebuilt. To this objective, postcolonial disputes were framed as driven or initiated by the former colonizers' unwillingness to accept the injustices of colonization and their active ignorance of the affected people and their hurtful experiences and stories.

Postcolonial disputes start with an asymmetry (in power and knowledge at the simplest level) between the colonizer and the colonized. The intensity of postcolonial disputes depends on the responses from the colonized communities. This was not to assert a clean division and attribution of the onset and evolution of postcolonial disputes to the colonizer and the colonized respectively. Rather, its spirit was to situate the groups in areas where their involvement and effects were greater and more pronounced relative to the other. Doing so was a starting point to analyze the distinction between the interest-driven knowledge claims of colonizer and colonized countries.

In Chapter 6, the disposition of former colonizers to deny and minimize the colonial history was analyzed using Medina's concept of *active ignorance*, a defense mechanism which was explained by the social identity theory (aversion to a negative group image and the experience of collective guilt). This was compared to the postcolonial state, South Korea, which demonstrated a strong presence of ethnic nationalism as seen in the public's strong engagement with rectifying the past and addressing historical disputes with Japan. Ethnic nationalism with respect to postcolonial disputes involves the prioritization of in-group members over others but it is also not entirely about emotions. It also concerns the knowledge production about the colonial history and people's experiences of colonization. This explains the South Korean public's responses to the survey where their resentment was directed towards Japan's denial of history (Kim and Kang 11) and not so much for what was committed back in time.

The central role "knowledge" plays in shaping the dynamics of postcolonial disputes was explicitly addressed in this thesis. The power dynamics in postcolonial disputes between the colonial power and the colonized were also examined. This involved the discussion of how knowledge claims made by the colonized communities challenge or resist the dominance of the

colonizer's claims about colonial history. This discussion culminated into the question of whether it is possible to evaluate knowledge claims in a contested terrain where strong self-interests are involved on both sides. The thesis rejected the scientific paradigm in understanding postcolonial disputes. It was argued that without overcoming the basic assumptions about knowledge, it is highly unlikely to recognize the complexities of postcolonial disputes and the nature of interest-driven knowledge claims. Moving from a metaphysical problem to the epistemological problem of discriminating between better and worse interpretations of history, this thesis discussed the possibility of adjudicating truth in historical knowledge claims. This discussion was geared towards making the case for the colonized groups to be heard in the statements they make about their experience of colonization.

Implications for the Literature

This thesis addressed several gaps in the literature on ethnic nationalism, postcolonial interaction (postcolonial disputes), and epistemic injustice. Postcolonial dyads face the complexity of navigating the path of bilateral relationships in the context of a shared history of colonization. The colonial powers and postcolonial states have transitioned from a relationship of power imbalance and subordination to sovereign states on equal terms (theoretically). This newly defined relationship is characterized by the difficulties of resolving the divide in historical knowledge. This study offered an analysis of postcolonial dyadic relations that moves beyond the politics of postcolonial disputes to identify the effects of ethnic nationalism on the intensity of disputes. Furthermore, it offered an epistemological analysis of the nature of postcolonial disputes both on the general sense of addressing the knowledge divergence and in the more specific case of South Korea and Japan where heavy emotional engagement of the public to the national group informed the knowledge claims made by the formerly colonized group.

Ethnic Nationalism and Postcolonial Dyadic Interaction

This thesis addressed the under-examined relationship between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial dynamics between countries via observing the intensity of postcolonial disputes. By demonstrating the difference between the India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads on postcolonial interaction, the thesis revealed how ethnic nationalism can be a factor that explains the difference. In other words, the empirical study showed how ethnic nationalism alters the dynamic between the colonizer and the colonized in the postcolonial era. The role of ethnic nationalism had not been explicitly acknowledged in the postcolonial relationship nor have the studies of nationalism considered how colonial history interacted with the development and expression of nationalism. By establishing the conceptual connection between ethnic nationalism and postcolonial relationship (by examining the intensity of postcolonial disputes), this study sheds light on the analysis of both ethnic nationalism and postcolonial studies which the literature should take into account.

Furthermore, examining the South Korean case supports the ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism in important ways. Firstly, it proves the centrality of ethnicity in both the formation of a nation and nationalism. The durability of the nation is not only tested in the objective sense (enduring ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation) but also in the subjective experience of the national members. This refers to the sense of Korean nationhood rooted in the notion of *Hanminjok* (or single ethnic group) that is readily recognized and internalized by the Korean people even to the present day. National solidarity built around shared memories, culture, and values persists and national identity rooted in ethnic consciousness takes center stage in the knowledge claims made by the South Korean public against the Japanese government to a great extent as examined in Chapter 4.

Secondly, by discussing how the historical experience of Japanese colonization shaped the national identity of Korean people, the thesis supports Smith's notion of an objective *ethnie* history and the long duration by which nations are formed (deeper history of nations), contrary to modernist accounts of nations. Korean ethnic nationalism was the product of an interaction between subjective socialization around the external historical events: Ethnic nationalism was informed by the objective national history that involved the nation's experience of foreign invasions which solidified the ethnic consciousness of the Korean people. The findings reinforce the ethnosymbolist theoretical tradition which emphasizes the importance of the *ethnie* history in perpetuating national identity through generations beyond the social imaginings of a nation.

Thirdly, the dynamics of relationship between South Korea and Japan sheds light on the dynamics of interaction between the elites and the masses that reaffirm the ethnosymbolist theory of nationalism. To gain public support, all South Korean Presidents had to take strong actions against Japan at some point in their office despite their preference for a future-oriented relationship. In 2019, 56 percent of the Korean public supported the Moon administration's responses towards Japan's retaliation in trade policies. Many Koreans engaged in the "NO Japan" movement of boycotting Japanese products, Japanese food, and trips to Japan (Choi). The widespread support for the government's policies was despite the fact that many recognized the need to address pressing security problems, where 52 percent of the respondents believed that cooperation with Japan was important (Kim and Kang 11).

As illustrated in the example of South Korea, public sentiments against Japan concerning the colonial history directly contradicted and constrained the Korean government's efforts to stabilize relationships with Japan (Glosserman and Snyder 99-103). The South Korean case demonstrates that national solidarity and strong public sentiments rooted in ethnic nationalism is

not an exclusive product of elite mobilization because the mobilizing efforts of the elites themselves are situated in the larger web of public culture, memories, and national values (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 25). It is therefore encouraged that the literature on ethnic nationalism should reflect the interaction between public sentiments and elite performance without making the generalizing assumption that public sentiments are entirely the products of elite mobilization. While this thesis followed the ethnosymbolist tradition to define ethnic nationalism, other studies might follow different theories of nationalism, resulting in different conclusions reached about the nature of ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, the findings of this study lend strong support for the ethnosymbolist tradition in capturing the core characteristics of ethnic nationalism which the literature should take into consideration.

Social Identity and Social Categorization Theories

If ethnic nationalism accounted for the emotional reaction and strong attachment of the Korean public to the disputed events of colonization, social identity theory was used to describe the disposition of colonial powers in denying the historical event of colonization. According to the social identity theory, individuals derive their identity from group identity (the group they belong to or identify with). Since a person's "self-image is intricately tied to his or her social identity [...] people strive for a positive self-image" (Cottam and Cottam, *The Political Psychology* 89) which involves defending the group's faulty or morally problematic actions. The desire to defend the group is multiplied by the experience of "collective guilt" (Branscombe and Doosje 3) among in-group members. In-group members can feel guilty for their past generation's wrongdoings due to their belonging to the group. This explained the universal tendency of colonial powers to remain silent or ignorant about their colonial history or resist the knowledge claims made by the colonized communities that focused on the atrocious aspects of colonization.

The literature social identity theory was connected to the literature on epistemic vice and active ignorance. José Medina discussed how groups belonging to the privileged class often adopt active ignorance (willfully shutting off to certain facts or historical events) as a self-defense mechanism against difficult truths that have negative implications on their identity (or, their group's identity). This also explains why collective guilt lurks behind the colonizer group and how stronger levels of identification with the group will translate into ignoring or suppressing collective guilt. This is because collective guilt can be dismissed without denying one's group identity if the event is denied altogether.

Explaining the reasons behind active ignorance in colonial powers is not to establish a causal relationship between the behavioral implications of social identity theory and the existence of postcolonial disputes. Rather, social identity theory explains the need for self-protection in the privileged groups by pointing to the experience of collective guilt in members whose personal identity is attached to and perceived to be defined by group identity. The convergence of information provided by the social identity theory and social epistemology (the concept of testimonial injustice) should be an important topic for the literature on collective guilt, group identification, and testimonial injustice to consider as the two camps could complement each other in a meaningful way.

Objectivity, Truth, Knowledge

This thesis challenged the absolutist paradigm of knowledge and operated under the reasonable assumption that this paradigm defines the large majority of today's discourse about knowledge. The epistemological analysis of postcolonial disputes supported the literature in epistemology that pointed out the pitfalls of the absolutist paradigm of knowledge. As illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6, the scientific paradigm of knowledge and appeals to absolute objectivity fail to extend

recognition to other forms of knowledge that deserves it. Meeting the criteria of objectivity in all four senses reflects the tenets of the scientific paradigm. Hence, the literature on objectivity and knowledge should clearly account for this distinction. Truth is another area in the literature needing several flags with respect to qualifications and disclaimers because the complexity of the concept of truth is often underappreciated relative to how frequently the term is used.

Objectivity and truth are the defining characteristics of knowledge according to the conventional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. Clearly, objectivity, truth, and knowledge are interconnected concepts but the literature outside of epistemology tends to confound the three terms. While there are convergences, the three concepts are distinct from each other in important ways and the literature pertaining to political science should also reflect the intricacies of knowledge and the related concepts when discussing knowledge or truth in politics.

Lastly, the epistemological analysis of postcolonial disputes in this thesis has supported Medina's argument on the mutually reinforcing linkages between politics, ethics, and epistemology. In this thesis, epistemological questions concerning objectivity were raised and applied in the realm of politics (postcolonial disputes intensified with ethnic nationalism). This discussion was extended to cover the ethics of knowing about other people (ethical epistemology). This analytical orientation resonated with Medina's argument about linking the epistemic to the political and the epistemic to the ethics, a tripartite complex that illustrates the convergence of three realms. The literature should similarly account for the intersection of politics, ethics, and epistemology so that the complexity of the matter in question is not brushed past whether it concerns politics, epistemology, or ethics.

Policy Implications

Given the conflicting interests of countries engaged in postcolonial dyads, resolving the divergence of historical knowledge and the legacy of colonization remains highly unlikely. In this section, several policy implications are suggested following the findings of the study. Both the South Korean and Japanese governments should recognize the unmeasurable extent to which the South Korean public remains engaged with historical issues that concern their national group including the past generation and its experience of Japanese colonization. The general concern for public sentiment on the issue applies to the India-UK dyad as well. However, given the vocal engagement of the South Koreans, Japan and South Korean governments should make extra efforts to understand the extent to which historical issues provoke the Korean people's emotional and psychological bond to their past generation and how this preserves the unwillingness to compromise with historical narratives that minimize or deny the sufferings caused to the colonized population.

All four governments are addressing an issue that can be easily politicized but those that also concern the establishment or production of knowledge about the colonial past. Ignoring the epistemic inspiration of the colonized community to make known their experience of colonization will produce adverse effects on seeing progress in resolving postcolonial disputes. Policies suggested in the past have ignored the "persistent differences between South Korea and Japan over the historical, territorial, and perception issues that continue to divide them" (Glosserman and Snyder 96). Consistent with this observation, while India and UK have moved towards a cooperative relationship, South Korea and Japan have faltered in normalizing bilateral relations. This study is not optimistic about either government giving in to the demands of the other or working in favor of the other country's preference with historical knowledge or what

form it takes in the understanding of colonization. Intervention efforts by the United States (the common ally of Japan and South Korea) have not seen much success in the past and growing needs to cooperate in the geopolitical and economic sphere have been turned down by bitter public sentiments against Japan.

The South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyad differed from the India-UK postcolonial dyad in being unable to stabilize bilateral relations. Recognizing the difference between the South Korea-Japan dyad and India-UK dyad acts as a buffer against making oversimplified generalizations over all postcolonial dyads and suggest policies that might not best fit the dyad in question. In other words, comparing the India-UK dyad with the South Korea-Japan dyad and trying to implement exactly the foreign policies adopted by India and the UK in South Korea and Japan would not yield success with respect to addressing the problem of persistent postcolonial disputes and more broadly, the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Hence, it is suggested that policymakers be sensitive to the unique characteristics of the South Korea-Japan dyad and the nature of their relationship rather than trying to reciprocate policies that had worked for other postcolonial dyads in improving bilateral relations.

Although not optimistic about the future bilateral relations between the divided countries of South Korea and Japan, this thesis suggests that formal political disputes with respect to reparations and apologies more directly involve and engage the public and the affected groups such as former Comfort Women. The sensitivity to public sentiments on the issue is an important policy consideration for the India-UK dyad as well. In August 2021, a public outcry broke out against Indian Prime Minister Modi's plans to renovate the Jallianwala Bagh site. The critics called this plan an extremely insensitive move as well as a distortion of history ("Jallianwala Bagh"), an act of painting over the painful history of India under British colonization.

Public sentiments can explain why intervention by third parties (an outside player who lacks understanding of the in-group sentiments about the event) would garner minimal success. The US had made consistent efforts to encourage South Korea and Japan "to stabilize the estranged relationship" (Glosserman and Snyder 108). As noted in Chapter 4, US intervention did not assuage the public's outrage against Japan on historical issues. The Korean public often expressed disappointment with the US whenever it took a mild stance on controversial issues between South Korea and Japan. Likewise, unless public sentiments are better understood and accounted for, policies concerning the colonial event in dispute will not be sustainable. This reinforces the importance of studying ethnic nationalism informed by ethnosymbolism to understand the "inner world of the participants" (Smith, *Ethno-symbolism* 16).

Following this observation, it is suggested that policies respond to public demands (by engaging them in the process) when signing deals or agreements about the disputed event. The question of representation is crucial when governments engage in negotiating agreements over issues of colonization. When engaging the public or getting their demand in the negotiation table is hard to accomplish given the pushback from the other government, a refrain from committing to a formal agreement is recommended rather than signing it. This is to not repeat the aggravation and complication of postcolonial disputes and the negotiation process as demonstrated in the example of the 2015 Comfort Women deal signed between Japan and South Korea which only worsened the contestations about Comfort Women because it did not involve the victims or respond to their demands.

The analytical goal of evaluating the epistemic status of knowledge claims made by the colonized community was to empower their voice against attempts to silence and cover up the injustice, oppression, and violence inflicted upon the colonized. This meant the objective of this

thesis was not after proving the truth of their claims in the theoretical or conceptual field but to see the effects in the socio-political world of their claims being recognized and respected as knowledge. However, neither challenging the absolutist notion of knowledge nor adopting a largely narrative-based approach to discussing colonial experiences are effective ways for being heard seriously on their own. Since the goal is not about the realism of true knowledge versus others but to be heard and respected (where validation is earned via established knowledge statements about the history and events of colonization), it is still necessary for these groups to engage in demonstrating objectivity and truth for their knowledge claims to be seen by others.

Although this thesis attempted to challenge the absolutist paradigm of knowledge, its tenets are still widely held by many. "Credibility and authority are forms of social recognition" (Medina, *Resistance* 9) and to realize the goal of being heard and taken seriously, the credit-giving part of knowledge which adds authority to knowledge claims should be observed as well. Appealing to the standards of absolute knowledge earns the attention of those who are after absolutist notions of "Truth", "Objectivity", and "Knowledge". On the other hand, appealing to personal experiences that reflects the ethical values (such as respect for human life and dignity) would earn the support of those invested in pursuing such values (for example, human rights activists). Hence, the colonized communities face the need to negotiate between appealing to standards of absolute objectivity (for authority and credibility as recognized by the dominant epistemic discourse) and preserving the narrative-based storytelling of the events (which is emotionally effective but not sufficient given the prevalence of absolutist ideals of knowledge).

This points to the need of a converging horizon of interests to earn recognition from groups that have nothing to do with a nation's experience of colonization or subjective (subjective used to mean the nation's unique experience of the event that others do not share in)

memories of interacting with the colonizer. This implies that the colonized communities would be able to gain support from the international community more easily in those areas where interests converge. For example, the women's rights movement and human rights activists converged with the Korean public's efforts to find justice for Comfort Women. An external support might be harder to acquire on issues that lack shared interests, for example, disputes over claiming national culture or territories. This limitation of forging common interests for recognition should be noted by policymakers and activist groups moving forward.

Strengths and Limitations

This interdisciplinary thesis found the intersection of the disciplines of political science and philosophy. One of the obvious strengths of the study is its novel approach to studying ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and epistemology. The study demonstrated how postcolonial disputes can differ in intensity between postcolonial dyads that share important similarities (such as regime type, economic capacity, and shared interest in cooperation), depending on the levels of ethnic nationalism. By specifying the scope of ethnic nationalism to be limited to that which defines the whole state and not ethnic groups that can exist within state boundaries, this study also accounted for a more defined scope of measurement to note the effects of ethnic nationalism in postcolonial disputes between states.

This study also moved beyond the empirical project to provide an analytical depth into the study of postcolonial disputes by discussing the central role knowledge contestations play in postcolonial disputes. Rather than dismissing postcolonial disputes as an instance of strong subjective interests driving parties in opposite directions, this thesis provided a more nuanced account of the epistemic behavior of parties and the re-evaluation of the status of interest-driven knowledge claims. Therefore, counter the scientific model of knowledge that flattens distinction

between different forms and types of knowledge, this thesis contributed to the study of knowledge by exploring the political phenomenon of postcolonial disputes which is not commonly touched on by philosophers. It also contributed to the field of ethical epistemology which is developing but not yet pronounced or established within epistemology. Given the interdisciplinary approach to studying the distinct camps of ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and epistemology, this study established new conceptual links that in turn gave rise to an abounding number of new research areas and possibilities. This potential to shed light on new areas of research and inquiry for both political science and philosophy is a major contribution to the academia which adds to the strengths of the study.

However, important limitations must be noted for the same reason of being an interdisciplinary thesis. The first and overarching limitation is the lack of depth on both empirical and philosophical ends given the scope of the study. Addressing and combining two disciplines meant the limited space to effectively address concepts in epistemology and come up with a robust empirical study. On the epistemological end, the concept of truth, epistemic vice, and epistemic responsibility could have been further developed if it had not been for the wide range of materials to tackle. Similarly, the empirical study did not account for other variables defining the case selection which could have impacted the results: the economic independence of the colonized states, the democratic regime, and ethnic nationalism levels in colonizer states.

Although relevant, these variables were not considered because the goal of this thesis was to connect the divergence of knowledge (intervening variable) to the deeper epistemological analysis of knowledge claims made in postcolonial disputes. The unaccounted variables also point to the lack of generalizability in the case selection of India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads to other cases. While this thesis examined the effects of ethnic nationalism on

postcolonial disputes, ethnic nationalism that maps onto state borders is rare in most postcolonial states. The cases selected for this study are generalizable in one sense but not so much in the other. The postcolonial dyad of India-UK represents the reality of most postcolonial states: arbitrarily drawn borders, ethnocultural diversity within the state borders, and a relatively stable bilateral relationship defined by the Commonwealth.

However, the South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyad constitutes an anomaly in the population of postcolonial dyads: ethnic homogeneity within state borders prior to and after independence. Likewise, the South Korean case is not so easily generalizable across other postcolonial states. Nevertheless, it points to the distinct circumstances and characteristics of the South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyad in an important sense which will be useful for policymakers to consider. Another area lacking generalizability is observed for both India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads. Many postcolonial states lack independence from their former colonizers and do not have a stable democratic regime. The relative economic and political independence of India and South Korea could have been a variable to affect the interaction between with the colonizer. However, for the purposes of the study that sought to address the overarching question of epistemic objectivity in postcolonial disputes, dyads that best illustrated the divergence in ethnic nationalism levels and intensity of postcolonial disputes, yet being comparable to each other (shared similarities apart from ethnic nationalism) had to be chosen. As stated in Chapter 3, a comparative case study was employed *to develop a theory* rather than understanding the individual cases. Given this objective, the case selection of the empirical study is justified despite the lack of generalizability to other postcolonial dyads.

Lastly, the time factor was not considered in this study. Postcolonial disputes were not resolved for both dyads and the "intensification" implied an open future with regards to the

evolution of disputes. For this reason, this study does not provide a definitive conclusion about the association between ethnic nationalism and the intensification of postcolonial disputes and how they will develop in the future. The lack of a definite conclusion does not necessarily weaken the validity of the study because it still captures the present reality. However, it is still important to note the open-ended nature of the study to better inform future research in this area.

Future Research

Integrating the convergence of different disciplines adds an analytical strength to any field of study. Similar integration of subjects and areas of studies that accounts for the interconnected nature of problems raised in social sciences is further encouraged. In this spirit, this section outlines several areas for future research building from the study undertaken in this joint thesis. Future research in epistemology should further explore the intersectionality of ethics, epistemology, and politics. Medina examined this interconnection with respect to the marginalized groups of color and gender identity while this thesis applied his interdisciplinary approach to the topic of postcolonial disputes intensified by ethnic nationalism (because the involvement of ethnic nationalism makes postcolonial disputes more visible by intensifying it).

This thesis did not delve deeper into the complexities of the notion of *truth* or give a robust account of what constitutes knowledge under different paradigms of knowledge given the focus of the study. In answering the research question, this thesis explored a small portion of the large body of work done on the diverse conceptions and arguments about truth. Future research on the epistemology of postcolonial disputes should also address the thorough discussion that exists in the field on the nature of truth in relation to objectivity and knowledge.

The analysis of epistemic vice in this study did not cover the discussion of responsibility and culpability for groups or individuals exhibiting epistemic vice. These topics fell beyond the

scope of this thesis but are nevertheless important issues to discuss and develop in future research. If the work done in this thesis was to challenge the surface-level understanding of postcolonial disputes and identify the distinct place for epistemology to intervene, future research should expand upon the *ought* question: what should the colonizer groups do, given their active ignorance and how should active ignorance be combated? This thesis has only briefly touched upon epistemic responsibility under ethical epistemology and future research should complement this area of inquiry. The only caution is to note the importance of ethics in epistemology as discussed by Medina and Thomson. This would preserve the goal of attaining knowledge *about others* in the analysis of postcolonial disputes, which would loosen the limiting grip of traditional epistemology on the discussion of epistemic vice and responsibility.

The importance of philosophical analysis in what appears as a distinctively political phenomenon (postcolonial disputes) was demonstrated, namely the epistemic analysis of knowledge claims in highly politicized postcolonial disputes imbued with ethnic nationalism. Future studies of postcolonial disputes in the realm of political science should aim towards addressing the importance of knowledge and how the divergence in knowledge constitutes the persistence of disputes in other postcolonial dyads. Noting the centrality of questions about knowledge in understanding postcolonial disputes will illuminate the conceptual depth and complexities of the political phenomenon.

Future research should also investigate cases of knowledge contestations in postcolonial disputes within other postcolonial dyads over the world. The effects of power dynamics in the production or suppression of historical knowledge should be examined, noting any similarities or differences compared to the study undertaken in this thesis. Furthermore, while this study's unit of analysis was limited to states, future studies should account for the fact that postcolonial

disputes can also exist on other levels including individuals and groups that do not readily align with the state as seen in the case of South Korea (where the public would involve their government and pressure their leaders into action in postcolonial disputes). This is especially pertinent for many postcolonial states that are multicultural and multiethnic including India and countries in the African and Latin American region. Studies about other postcolonial dyads, when also accounting for different actors involved in postcolonial disputes, would paint a more holistic picture of postcolonial interaction, ethnic nationalism, and epistemology.

While remaining focused on the effects of ethnic nationalism on postcolonial disputes, there are several variables that were not covered in the empirical study. The first is the level of economic independence from the colonial powers or the self-sufficiency of postcolonial states. Both India and South Korea had achieved economic and political independence from their former colonizer (in the sense that compliance with the former colonizer is no longer necessary for survival). If this independence is absent, the ability or capacity to challenge the former colonizer on past aggression could be limited or compromised. While this power dynamic was only theoretically captured in Chapter 5, further empirical research could lend support to this observation. Economic factors shaping the interaction of postcolonial dyads with respect to knowledge contests could be a potential area for future research to examine.

Secondly, both India-UK and South Korea-Japan postcolonial dyads consist of democratic states where public opinion plays a major role in shaping state behavior. Therefore, regime type could be another variable. Future studies can explore how ethnic nationalism fares in autocratic states where the political leader is not bound to the public or its interests. The direction of policies with regards to unresolved postcolonial disputes would depend largely on the leader. Lastly, future research that uses a comparative case study method as employed in this thesis

should account for ethnic nationalism levels in the colonizer states as well. Doing so would capture the possible interaction of ethnic nationalism levels between the colonizer and the colonized. It would also capture the effects of the combination of ethnic nationalism levels in a postcolonial dyad. The postcolonial dyads examined in this study showed similarities in the ethnic composition between the colonizer and the colonized states: both India and the UK were multicultural states while both South Korea and Japan were closer models of nation-states. However, the effects of the colonial power's ethnic nationalism levels and how it interacts with the colonized state's ethnic nationalism levels have not been the focus of this study. Exploring this area would offer a more comprehensive analysis and could suggest an alternative conclusion.

This thesis has formulated the conceptual linkages between ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and knowledge. Common expectations about the three terms were questioned, tested, and revised to argue that objectivity, or the possibility of truth and falsity as opposed to individual desires and tastes, is preserved in knowledge disputes, even those intensified (and perceived to be driven) by ethnic nationalism where strong subjective values and social factors are attached. Combining the disciplines of political science (international relations) and philosophy (epistemology) produced complex discussion and analysis, identified new areas for future research, and most importantly, formulated a novel and nuanced outlook on the topics of ethnic nationalism, postcolonial disputes, and the nature of knowledge and its making. The questions raised in this thesis about the widely undoubted values and concepts surrounding knowledge and the epistemic landscape of the postcolonial reality should illustrate the pleasant possibility of developing new ways of thinking about politics and the world at large.

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