2022

Violent Means For Secure Ends: How An Absence Of State Social Safety Nets Impacts The Prevalence Of Violent Political Activity

Tabitha Skornik-Hayes
The College of Wooster, tskornik-hayes22@wooster.edu

Violent Means for Secure Ends:
How an Absence of State Social Safety Nets Impacts the Prevalence of Violent Political Activity

by
Tabitha Skornik-Hayes

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Senior Independent Study
for The Global & International Studies Program & Economics Concentration
at The College of Wooster

Advised by
Dr. Brooke Krause
Department of Economics

March 11th, 2022

ABSTRACT

I. ENGLISH

This thesis seeks to understand the influence of the provision of Social Safety Nets (SSNs) on the ability of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) to perpetuate violence. It argues that when NSAGs provide SSNs in the absence of state provision, individuals will be more likely to engage in and justify violent activity, resulting in the growth of the NSAG and the proliferation of violence overall. The absence of state provided SSNs is proposed to deteriorate the social contract between the state and its civilians and reinforce negative sentiments and promote distrust. The absence of the state-civilian contract culminates in the creation of ideological communities composed of individuals who experience communal disenchantment and thus seek alternate sources of social safety net and service provision. When these alternate sources are provided by NSAGs, an increase in operational capacity due to the growth in organizational population, and a widened divide between civilians in the state occurs. Involvement in services provided by NSAGs and separation from state institutions contributes to an overall rise in extremist narratives and in the ability for the NSAG to engage in politically violent activity. I explore this relationship using a single linear regression analysis of 110 Non-State Armed Groups, observing the connection between the services they provide, and the amount of people harmed from 1970 to 2013, this resulted in a positive correlation between number of services provided and level of violence. This large-scale estimation, paired, with the mixed methods case study of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) provides a historical example of this progression with essential context for the proliferation of violence in the name of socially motivated political agendas, and an analysis of the relationship between state social expenditure, distrust, and political violence.

II. FRANÇAIS

Cette thèse cherche à comprendre l'influence de la présentation des filets de sécurité sociale sur la capacité des groupes armés non étatiques (NSAG) à perpétuer la violence. Elle fait valoir que lorsque les NSAGs fournissent des SSN en l'absence de la fourniture de l'État, les individus seront plus susceptibles de s'engager et justifier les activités violentes, ce qui contribué à la croissance de la NSAG et la prolifération de la violence en général. L'absence de la fourniture par l'État est proposée de se détériorer le contract social entre l'État et ses civils et renforce les sentiments négatifs et en favorisent de la méfiance. L'absence de contrat entre l'État et ces civils culmine dans la création de communautés idéologiques composées d'individus qui connaître un désenchantement communautaire et cherchent d'autres sources de protection sociale et de prestation de services. Quand ces sources alternatives sont offertes par les NSAGs, une augmentation de la capacité opérationnelle due à la croissance de la population organisationnelle, et une augmentation du fossé entre les civils dans l'État se produit. La participation aux services fournis par les NGAS et la séparation des institutions de l'État contribue à une augmentation des discours extrémistes et à la capacité des NSAGs de s'engager dans des activités politiquement violentes. J'enquête sur cette relation en utilisant une analyse de régression linéaire unique de 110 groupes armés non étatiques. J'observe le lien entre les services qu'ils offrir, et le nombre de personnes blessées par une NSAG de 1970 à 2013, il en a résulté dans une corrélation positive entre le nombre de services offrir et le niveau de violence. Cette estimation associée à une étude de cas utilisant plusieurs méthodes axées sur la Colombie et des Forces Armées Révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) crée un exemple historique de cette progression avec contexte essentiel sur la prolifération de la violence sous le prétexte des objectifs politiques à motivation sociale, et une analyse de la relation entre les dépenses sociales de l'État, la méfiance et la violence politique.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to start by thanking my family for their continued support of my education and all my various collegiate pursuits. Your unconditional love and affection have made all of this possible. Thank you especially to my dad, Matt, for your help in the development of this project, your passion and investment in my research has been integral to my success.

To my friends and teammates, terms which are not mutually exclusive, thank you for your edits, your thoughts, your jokes, and all of the time spent together, I will cherish these memories forever.

To Tucker, thank you for inspiring me and loving me always.

To the Nate, Rachel, and Coleman, thank you for letting me work on IS at work and for always celebrating my successes no matter how small.

To my advisor, Brooke Krause, thank you for letting me lean on you and letting me talk about anything and everything when I just need to get things out. Thank you for believing in me and always helping me organize myself and my ideas. I feel so lucky to have worked on several projects with you and concluding my time at Wooster with you as my Independent Study advisor has been an honor.

TABLE OF FIGURES & TABLES

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, and how best to combat it, has been at the forefront of the agendas of international, regional, and state level policy makers for years. Academics and politicians have looked into a variety of solutions and possible mitigators in an attempt to better understand the drivers of militant activity and how best to combat it. Counter-terror policies have trended towards looking closer at the root causes and determinants of terror rather than simply engaging militarily. This trend is attempting to bring a close to the "war on terror" era focused on top-down counter terror efforts that peaked following the attacks on September 11. This analysis aims to build off the investigations that observe root causes such as poverty, lack of representation politically, ethnic and religious contentions, and resource scarcity and misallocation that allow for extremism and political violence to perpetuate. This study looks to understand the development of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs), the intuition behind their provision of Social Safety Nets (SSNs), how the group grows in support and operational capacity, and the role of individuals and the conditionalities of their willingness to justify violent activity.

Through this analysis I aim to explore such impacts through answering the question, "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" I hypothesize that a lack of state social safety nets creates a need for social protections, providing an opportunity for groups to form, characterized by similar plights with the state. This group formation creates an environment conducive to radicalization, and compounding distrust in the state, which in turn leads to violent activity, justified as a means to a political and ideological end. This hypothesis is theorized through a careful analysis of related literature on the harm that weak or absent state social

programs can have on individuals and communities, and the subsequent grievances that develop in the absence of support. This lends itself to an exploration of NSAG groups providing supplementary programs, and how that impacts their ability to recruit individuals and garner support for their efforts.

Following the investigation of relevant literature, I construct several theoretical models to explain the intuition behind these relationships. This is done through a basic supply and demand model that explores the provision of NSAG support as a substitute good to absent state provided SSNs. I theorize an expected utility model which develops the utility that individuals gain from using state versus non-state SSNs and how those preferences are developed through a deeper understanding of the needs of individuals by NSAG groups. Building off these theoretical frameworks and individual and communal utility, I employ theories of economic game theory to create an extended form to explore the sequential nature of the decision to provide and access SSNs.

Finally, I explore the compounding nature of extremism, and the relationship with time spent in environments designed by and for members of NSAGs. To further build on my investigation into the relationship between SSN provision and the amount of violence NSAGs perpetuate, I include a historical case study detailing the rise of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. This encompasses their relationship with the state and how they organize in ways that facilitate recruitment and establish social order with safety nets to further their ideological goals. This, paired with a multivariate regression and data analysis of the level of distrust in Colombia, and the level of social expenditure by the state aims to measure the influence of such conditions on the amount of violence that the FARC perpetuates. Developing an understanding of this relationship at a smaller level sets up the framework for exploring and developing the

results from the single linear regression that encompasses multiple NSAGs, the services provided, and the violent activity they engage in.

The combination of investigations into previous literature and studies understanding the proposed dynamics, in conjunction with the qualitative and quantitative evidence analyzed throughout allows for the creation of a solid understanding of the hypothesized relationship between the lack of state provision of SSNs, the substitute provision of them by NSAGs, and the ability of NSAGs to proliferate and engage in further violence.

LITERATURE REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION

The following literature review compiles a variety of studies and analyses that work in conjunction to formulate a coherent framework and build a rationale in support of my research question and hypothesis. Throughout this research, I aim to answer the question, "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" It proved difficult to find specific literature pertaining to this overarching research question, to mitigate these challenges, this literature review is broken down into three unique sections. Each section aims to answer a more specific question that fits into the broader framework of my research question, this allowed for a more robust and in-depth discussion of relevant literature, as well as greater development of the intuition behind my hypothesis and eventually in the theory section and beyond. Several of the articles and their investigations fit into multiple categories and are relevant throughout each section, despite at times being limited to one in-depth analysis. The three sections were broken down into the following topics,

I. What are the perils of weak/absent social programs?

II. Evidence of external armed/extremist groups providing substitute or supplemental programs.

III. How does support for anti-gov/armed groups grow? What catalyzes internal conflict?

While each section offers an array of research found on the specific topic or question posed, I provide an in-depth analysis of two specific articles within each section.

In answering the question, "What are the perils of weak/absent social programs" I turn to the work of Waseem Ishaque, Dr Saima Shaikh, and Dr. Akbar Ali Mahesar in their article, *Academic Construct of Social Welfare Services and Social Safety Net,* which offers academic insight and a useful definition of social welfare services, social safety nets, and the characteristics of these programs when they are successful. By first defining what the characteristics of a social safety net is, it is easier to conceptualize what their absence would entail for communities and individuals. To bolster their academic, definition-based analysis, Brian Burgoon in his article, titled *On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism,* looks into the economics of social welfare, specifically the impacts of spending in those sectors on terror and drivers of terror. This more economic based analysis pairs well with the academic intuition building done earlier on, and the two function to effectively answer the question regarding importance of social safety nets, and the concerns that arise in their absence.

The next section seeks to discover and provide evidence of NSAGs providing substitute or supplemental social safety net programs, as well as determine some of the intuition behind why they would provide, and the different ways the decision to provide alternate social safety nets can arise. The first article I observe in this section, titled, *Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity,* by Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund, offers

insight into this theory that grievances with the state can drive individuals and groups to provide their own kind of social programming, but also contribute to the justification and perpetration of violence. Observing the link between these phenomena offers valuable context to not just the decision to provide, but how these groups begin to form. To provide more literature in support of why NSAGs provide social safety nets, Alexus Grynkewich's article, *Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State* explains the goals of NSAGs, and the ways they use social services to achieve these goals and further establish control of people and resources.

The final section observes how support for armed groups grows, and how conflict and the rise in popularity of NSAGs is catalyzed. While this is somewhat explained in previous literature, particularly Dyrstad and Hillesund's work, I further explore this question with the in-depth analysis of Ana Arjona's article, *Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance,* which looks into the role of civilians in NSAGs and how they make decisions around them, and how NSAGs aim to manipulate those decisions. Their discussion of what it means to cooperate and inherently support is particularly pertinent to my research. To continue this discussion, I analyze the research done by Jennifer Kavanaugh in her article *Selection, Availability, and Opportunity: The Conditional Effect of Poverty on Terrorist Group Participation.* She observes the relationship between poverty and participation in terrorist groups, as well as other factors that may contribute to the growth of armed groups and helps build the intuition behind how willingness to justify violence can grow in certain conditions.

II. WHAT ARE THE PERILS OF WEAK/ABSENT SOCIAL PROGRAMS?

Social safety nets are essential parts of developing the strength of the state as it facilitates a positive relationship in the form of a social contract between the state and its civilians. This goes beyond the general positive outcomes that come about when governments support their civilians, invest in their well-being, and provide opportunities for increased social and economic mobility. In the article *Academic Construct of Social Welfare Services and Social Safety Net* by Waseem Ishaque, Dr Saima Shaikh, and Dr. Akbar Ali Mahesar, they define Social Safety Nets, or SSNs, as "public interventions, mostly non-contributory transfers, aiming at preventing the poor and the vulnerable from falling below a certain level of poverty. These interventions can be public or generated by private sources in an organized (formal) or informal manner" (Ishaque, Shaih, and Mahesar 2017). For the purposes of this paper, I will use and build upon this understanding of the role of social safety nets in society.

It is important to understand that safety nets, while effective and a useful part of the reduction of poverty, work most effectively in conjunction with other efforts. They can encompass efforts to provide adequate health care, education, housing, and resource access. The main goal of social safety nets is to mitigate the volatility of high-risk individuals and communities and reallocate in a way that ensures greater stability for at risk populations (Ishaque et. al 2017). Social safety nets, in the nature of their definition, are not limited to provision by the state, and it is the lack thereof that I argue results in the development of non-state armed groups, and the perpetration of further violence, often in the name of reallocation of resources, income, and power.

This article is used primarily in my exploration of the role of social safety nets and their importance to society, as well as their state building qualities and allegiance formation between the state and its population. It is very academic in nature which is essential for laying the

groundwork for conditions and assumptions made during the research and theory development process. They work to develop a contextualized definition of social safety nets, what they do, and what they look like when they function properly. Their overall definition is flexible enough to be applied in several aspects but is developed with the particular context of Pakistan in mind. This is only relevant in the later categories they use to formulate an understanding of social safety nets. The overall exploration of the paper is applicable under a number of lenses. After providing a succinct and general definition, Ishaque, Shaih, and Mahesar go on to develop a deeper working definition and how it differs from other kinds of relief aid. Detailed and generic all at once, this research paper helps to answer the driving questions that makeup my own research.

While my overarching research question is "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" this raises a number of other questions that in answering will help to bolster further research, the first being "what are the perils of weak/absent social programs?" In order to answer this question, we must first understand what social programs do, how they support people, how they function. By observing those that are successful and outlining their ideal conditions and results, we can better conceptualize what kind of harm may come about from their absence. Therefore, the Ishaque et. al article is essential to developing a complete understanding of the results of weak social programming, and how that will further influence the decisions of individuals and organizations. In this article their research questions fulfill this need, asking, "What is the importance of social safety net and how it contributes towards enhancing social security? What are the generally used terms defining the notions of social safety? [And finally] What are the generally accepted prerequisites of good safety net?" (Ishaque et. al 2017). By providing context to what the importance of social safety nets are, we are able to understand

what it may look like in their absence. This insight is necessary as the expectation that safety nets be provided directly by the state is not necessarily the norm world-wide. They dedicate an entire section to this investigation and make the case that safety net programs mitigate loses and allow for greater stability and an appropriate standard of living (Ishaque et. al 2017). Beyond the personal ramifications, it can aid the state and society overall by providing a solution to misallocations and inequities within the state, and further offers a way to rectify grievances that populations may possess towards the state for the inequities they perpetuate (Ishaque et. al 2017).

The following section outlines the theory of their research offering further description and concepts which drive social safety nets and how its design relates to function. They continually express how flexible both the nature and definition of SSNs are and how they can be manipulated to fit within the context of different needs and limitations so long as they address "three crucial features, i.e., those of income protection, health provision and child associated benefits. The other important feature of the concept of social security is that it is administered or monitored by the state as part of statutory schemes. The two main components of social security are social insurance and tax financed social benefits" (Ishaque et. al 2017). This interjection is interesting as it presses the need for a holistic approach to the safety net, that it cannot just offer aid financially, but must also work to encompass all social welfare pit falls. This includes health and the ability to access health care as well as the ability to maintain a good level of health be that through proper diet or environmental conditions. They also outline the role of children in society and their vulnerability as well as the associated increase in vulnerability of those with children to care for. They define this consideration and fulfillment of protections to those with children as essential to the formation of an SSN. While my exploration of social safety nets looks not only at what benefits they can provide, but also who is providing them, this article does not

spend much time observing the binary of formal versus informal safety nets or state versus non state provision. Though offering a basic analysis of the importance and ideal structure of safety nets, this article suffers from a lack of context and substantial evidence. Their descriptions are brief and succinct and though they get their point across, it is not done in a substantiated way and is difficult to pull greater ideas and information from. It serves its purpose well as an academic discussion on the general conditions of SSNs as well as their contributions to society but doesn't accomplish much beyond that. It is, however, useful as a starting point for my exploration of SSNs and what it means to provide them.

As their article continues, Ishaque, Shaikh, and Mahesar further develop the characteristics of successful social safety nets, which creates a framework for what weak or absent SSNs entail, and how this can further perpetuate unrest and inequality. They detail the need for SSNs to be appropriate, adequate, equitable, cost-effective, sustainable, and dynamic (Ishaque et. al 2017). All of these factors work in conjunction to create an effective safety net, which "must be designed on the basis of an understanding of the extent and nature of poverty. They must respond to the needs of those groups most likely to be affected by the process of structural adjustment" (Ishaque et. al 2017). Appropriate safety nets take into consideration the unique climate and dynamics of the country they are operating in, and the people they are operating for. It acknowledges the concerns and grievances of the populations and addresses those that are most prevalent, an appropriate SSN is one that fulfills the contextual requirements and functions within the limitations set by its environment. Adequate pertains to the coverage and accessibility, an appropriate program is of no use if it is inaccessible and does not offer the same protections to everyone in need, this also includes the equitable characteristic of SSNs, as

benefits should be universal and supplement at the appropriate level to increase the standards of living and opportunities for all who access the program. (Ishaque et. al 2017).

As is the case with any kind of programming or provision of a good or service, in order to be successful and sustainable, it must be cost-effective. They must function as intended, and provide the aid they claim to, but not without a realistic budget that fits the ability of the state, "they run efficiently with the minimum resources required to achieve the anticipated impact, but with adequate resources to execute all programme and functions" (Ishaque et. al 2017) as advertised. This cost effectiveness ensures the sustainability of the program, it cannot serve the population if it is not consistently accessible with stable longevity. This consistency does not mean the program cannot be flexible in order to fit the ever-changing needs of a population. One of the essential aspects of a SSN is the need for it to be dynamic, it must be able to shift and develop over time, it cannot remain stagnant in an environment that does not (Ishaque et. al 2017).

Finally, and particularly pertinent to the study at hand is the incentives behind the social safety net. While it should seem that the support and aid that comes from participating in a program or experiencing coverage of an SSN would be enough incentive in and of itself, that is not always the case. Making use of a SSN often demands a change in behavior from an individual, household, or entire community. It is not always a simple and easy transition, even if it will ultimately be of benefit (Ishaque et. al 2017). There must be a certain level of trust in the provider and in the outcomes of the service, if this rapport has not been built, then the social safety net cannot be effective if no one is participating or engaging with it.

The provision and participation in social safety programs begins to build what some theorize as the social contract, that having a social safety net helps to build rapport and trust

between civilians and the government. The provision of safety nets as a contributor to the social contract is a primarily western phenomena, as "In the case of modern Western governments, the social contract includes a requirement the state provide some degree of social welfare services," (Grynkewich 2008) while in east Asian societies for example, the idea of a social safety net usually falls within the realm of the family to provide. In the Middle East and primarily Islamic countries there exists a blend of social contract developed from Islamic law and religious beliefs coupled with post-colonial western influences Grynkewich 2008). It is thus important when observing a social contract and the impacts it may have on the success of social safety net provision, to consider the historical, political, and religious context of a nation in order to develop an accurate idea of the dynamics of such a service.

In the interest of empirical evidence regarding the importance of social welfare and the dangers that its weakness may have, Brian Burgoon in his article, titled *On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism* focuses on an analysis of the impacts of social welfare policy implementation and funding on rates of terror in both a regional and country-specific sense. The author does an excellent job of building off of previous research done in the field and utilizing prior knowledge to develop a conditional understanding of both an appropriate research question and an informed hypothesis. He acknowledges work done in terms of gauging the relationship between economics and terrorism but takes it a step further in narrowing down the impacts of economic development aid and funding into not just a financial assessment, but a policy assessment as well, with the goal of determining the impacts of social welfare policy specifically. He aims to argue that policies intent on improving the social welfare of a state's citizens will reduce inequity, poverty, and instability, which will then lead to lower incentives to join terrorist organizations.

Burgoon raises an interesting perspective regarding the origin of social welfare and the impact that has on terror. When the government insufficiently provides stability to its people, they are more likely to search for security in other sectors, and oftentimes these channels that offer support are religiously based. In seeking support from religious organizations, citizens are more likely to develop more extremist views through political and/or religious teachings and thus more likely to commit extremist acts. He hypothesizes that in line with increasing social welfare, it matters where this security comes from and that by creating security generated by the government rather than non-state sanctioned organizations, recruitment rates will be reduced.

There is a great deal of development done in order to create a robust assessment of the hypothesis, and it helps the reader of the article develop a clear understanding of the nuance required for the analysis, as well as delivers necessary information for comprehension of the theories assessed. Burgoon does a good job of acknowledging counter arguments to his hypothesis early on in referencing that it could be that better social welfare policies contribute to a higher level of terrorism as it frees up the time of would-be extremists as they are not in search of a means to survive as the government is taking care of those needs. He addresses that while that may be true, it's possible positive relationship with terror attacks is offset by the negatively correlated relationship of social welfare impacts and terror rates that will come from an increase in overall social welfare.

After an in-depth discussion of background knowledge and information, he formalizes his hypothesis as: "Higher social welfare spending should diminish poverty, inequality, economic insecurity, and religious-political extremism, thereby lowering the incidence of terrorism taking place in and perpetrated by those from countries with higher social policy spending" (Burgoon, 2006). For the purposes of his analysis, he observes terrorist incidents as his dependent variable,

however, he further identifies three different forms of incidents, “transnational incidents occurring in a country, total terrorist incidents occurring in a country, and “significant” transnational incidents by the country where the terrorists came from” (Burgoon, 2006). These distinctions are important as it allows for a more well-rounded analysis of terror origins and impacts. He also notes that the data set is heavily reliant on open-source material, and acknowledges that governments may not accurately report incidents, likely underreporting in efforts to give the illusion of stability. The final measure, which puts emphasis on significance is necessary to analyze impacts of social policy in relation to severe attacks, not just vandalism or smaller acts with lower levels of damage which would be included in the second measure of total incidents.

His independent variables are more macro-based, looking at “total spending/revenue, […] total transfers (social and health spending), […] and total welfare spending (total social security and health, plus education spending)” (Burgoon, 2006) all measured as percentages of GDP. He controls for Left-party government control, which typically coincides with higher social welfare spending, democracy, which has been studied in relation to terrorism through a variety of lenses, population, state capacity/government capability, conflict, and trade openness.

Burgoon’s data set is both cross-sectional and a pooled time-series and is thus estimated with a negative binomial regression. He does a good job of offering an in-depth discussion of his decision-making process in identifying the best estimation model for the data. He notes that social policy impacts are not instantaneous, and implementation does not correlate with immediate improvement, to avert any endogeneity caused by such a phenomenon, he puts social policy measures and controls on a lag of at least one year when conducting cross-sectional analysis. He further includes regional and year dummies to mitigate heteroskedasticity, and

lagged incident variables to mitigate serial correlation (Burgoon, 2006). Through this analysis, he finds that population, left party power, and government capacity are significantly and positively related to terrorist incidents, while democracy and social welfare spending correlate significantly negatively. Trade openness is an uneven correlation, with two positive measures and two negative measures. He found that the three included metrics to determine the effort of social policy were negatively correlated with incidents spanning across states, this indicates that under this model, a 1 percent increase in total revenue leads to a 2 to 5 percent decrease in the number of annual attacks, which though relatively small, is by no means insignificant.

The incentive behind and comparability of implementation and development aspects of social safety nets serves as an introduction to the discussion regarding provision and participation. What happens when a state fails to provide social safety nets? Or the population fails to engage? How does a non-state group make the decision to provide a social safety net? And how does an individual make the decision to participate in the program? This is discussed further in the following section which details these thought processes in the instance that SSNs are not provided, and the population consequently experiences disenchantment with their government.

III. EVIDENCE OF EXTERNAL ARMED GROUPS PROVIDING SUBSTITUTE OR SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMS.

A lack of social safety nets or programming offered within a state often leads to a high level of civil unrest caused by collective qualms with the lack of security, economic opportunity or mobility and political representation; these commodities typically fall upon the state to manage, control, and uphold. This unrest and malcontent with the state can result in several outcomes depending on the nature of the state itself. When the state fails to properly represent

their citizens, those with concerns begin to air grievances, these grievances are what Drystad and Hillesund use to measure the likelihood of civilians justifying or engaging in political violence in the name of their grievances. The key in determining the extent of which violence is seen as a valid, or even favorable, course of action is by observing perceptions that individuals have of their ability to be heard and accommodated by their governments. If the channels for which someone could enact political change, or even just make their issues known, are inaccessible and unfruitful, the prospect of violence to enact change becomes an increasingly reasonable option. Demonstrative political actions become much more attractive methods of communicating political grievances when it is the common perception that such issues pertaining to misallocations will not be addressed under the current institutional framework (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Alesina and LaFerrara 2005) (Justino and Martorano 2019). Additionally, as "Grievances are particularly conducive to support for violence among people who believe the political system offers them little chance to redress their discontent" (Drystad and Hillesund, 2020), by limiting access to outlets of political expression, the perceived opportunities, or methods of expressing these qualms is reduced and often narrowed down to more violent and extremist behavior.

It is important to note that the findings of this study are not limited to those who chose to act in a violent way in an effort to have their needs met, but also includes individuals who are not opposed to the idea of engaging in or supporting political violence when under duress caused by the state. While the decision whether to and how to engage with political institutions is highly dependent on individual perceptions, preferences, and external influences (Justino and Martorano 2019), Drystad and Hillesund attempt to categorize this duress and explain the role of perceptions, not only in the level of access to traditional forms of political participation, but of

the weakness of the state and of their own levels of risk and insecurity. Similarly, to the ways in which when surveyed, people in objective poverty do not always report that they are experiencing poverty, in cases of grievances, what people feel the experience may not be representative of the true conditions of the state. They determined that these perceptions are, however, successful indicators of the ways people engage and react to policies that de. If a community upholds the belief that they are subject to unfair treatment specifically targeted at their unique ethnic group, political violence is typically seen as a more attractive and viable course of action for which those feeling sentiments of disenfranchisement to engage with the government enacting such unfair policies. (Detges 2017; Miodownik and Nir 2016) (Drystand and Hillesund, 2020).

These sentiments may occur regardless of the "reality" in the state, what policies and civilian engagements look like on paper, does not necessarily translate to the implementation of said structures. In terms of this legislation and implementation, intended treatment could be completely fair, but if it is commonly believed and accepted that a certain group is marginalized or mistreated by the state, they will act in a way that is comparable to their perceived treatment, and "take it upon themselves to use violent means to help achieve their goals because they often feel shut out of the process and not able to use political means such as negotiating" (DiPaolo 2005), and seek other routes. With this in mind, it becomes clear that studying their perceptions and subsequent reactions is far more indicative of the decision-making process of individuals, as well as their likelihood to air grievances in any form, violent or not. This makes this kind of information a better measure to help predict support for political violence than non-qualitative statistical data that doesn't necessarily reflect the sentiments of the people its observing. The findings in Drystad and Hillesund's research was conducted through the collection of data in

survey format, drawing data from a number of marginalized populations with the goal of gauging their sentiments regarding violence in response to political grievances, as well as how closely they identified to or shared these grievances.

The research done within the article, *Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity* written in 2020 by Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund, is essential for understanding not only why civilians may endorse political violence, but also for building the intuition behind NSAGs providing social services. In the first lines of their article, they explain what support for political violence can look like, support is not limited only to engaging in the violence itself but can also be done "tacitly, by tolerating their presence; through the provision of shelter, supplies, or information; or through active participation in insurgency" (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020). It is important to acknowledge the different ways in which citizens can condone the behavior of NSAGs, and how complacency can be just as useful to extremist groups as the participants themselves. While the levels of support vary, so does an individual's "predisposition toward politically motivated violence" (Dyrstad and Hillesund 2020), and this predisposition is what Dyrstad and Hillesund are trying to identify. This is essential information in understanding conflict and formulating an answer to "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" as the factors that determine and individual's predisposition to supporting violence are heavily related to, as Dyrstad and Hillesund find, grievances towards the state and its institutions, or lack thereof. They initially hypothesize "that dissatisfaction (grievances) with the material and political situation and evaluations of the effectiveness of ordinary political channels for peaceful opposition work together to shape individual support for political violence [...] that support for political violence depends on a

combination of motivation and perceived efficacy of conventional political participation" (Dyrstad et. al 2020). To state it simply, societal satisfaction and accessibility to appropriate channels will result in lower support for violent extremism, while dissatisfaction, and inaccessibility to or perception of flawed political participation channels will result in higher support for the legitimacy of political violence (Dyrstad et. al 2020).

To test their hypotheses, they explored 3 different case studies and collected survey data for each. Their subjects were Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, with the survey data having been collected in 2016. They made these selections due to the nature of their political structure, as electoral democracies there is the implication that political participation should be a viable and fruitful option for citizens of a nation to air their grievances. Along with considering the style of government employed within the countries, they also sought out countries with a history of armed conflict as "compared to more peaceful societies, the risk of (renewed) political violence is higher in postconflict societies, but people are also more aware of its costs" (Dyrstad et. al 2020). The survey given to determine the level of support for political violence was a series of 4 questions which encouraged simple yes or no answers. It laid out four possible situations, and the respondent was to determine if they believed violence would be justified to defend oneself in each of the situations. The questions proposed were that violence would be justified...

I. If the state treated some groups or regions more favorably than others.

II. If the government turns repressive or violent.

III. If the economic inequality increases.

IV. If the military becomes too powerful.

The addition of the 'to defend oneself' following the proposed use of violence was used in order to make the question less provoking and mitigate potential sensitivity to the idea of overt

unwarranted violence (Dyrstad et. al 2020). They recognize that this adjustment may have a slight impact on the validity of the results, seeing as the terminology leaves a little more room for interpretation and thus could skew some of the responses on the basis of perception and understanding. This line of questioning allowed Dyrstad and Hillesund to determine not only the overall propensity for political violence, but to identify the specific instances and challenges civilians may face which may warrant stronger or weaker responses. They found that "in Guatemala, about 70 percent of the respondents are willing to justify the use of political violence in at least one scenario, compared to 63 percent in Nepal and 37 percent in Northern Ireland" (Dyrstad et. al 2020). There is only one instance in which there is a majority of the population that proclaim to justify violence in pursuit of political change, in scenario two, if the government were to turn repressive or violent, 54% of those surveyed in Nepal were willing to justify violence in return. Overall, through this survey measurement they found that "the latent support for violence is highest in Guatemala and lowest in Northern Ireland" (Dyrstad et. al 2020).

After determining a measure of support for violence under certain circumstances, they sought to identify the level of grievance for each participant. They did so by asking questions that prompted participants to consider issues and assigning it a level of concern relating to how problematic each issue was. Survey participants could choose one of the following options for level of concern they possessed...

A. Not a problem
B. Minor problem
C. Big problem
D. Severe problem

The questions proposed aimed to measure three forms of dissatisfaction, economic, social, and political. To determine the level of economic dissatisfaction, they asked whether respondents were concerned with unemployment and poverty, and where along the above range they would place those concerns. For social dissatisfaction they asked questions regarding access to health care and educational opportunities. Finally for their measure of political dissatisfaction, they asked about restrictions, corruption, and overall prevalence of democratic engagement (Dyrstad et. al 2020). Through these measures and analyses they "find that there is less willingness to justify political violence in Northern Ireland than in Guatemala and Nepal, where the political systems offer less opportunity for meaningful political participation, and where ethnic exclusion and widespread poverty provide ample motivation for political change. Consistent with this, we find that compared to citizens in Guatemala and Nepal, people in Northern Ireland overall report of higher political efficacy and are generally more satisfied" (Dyrstad et. al 2020). The results that are the most relevant to my analysis of individuals decision to engage in political violence in the face of weak state social programming are those that relate to those who justify violence in the instance that economic inequality increases, and if the state treated certain groups more favorably. This does not narrow down the dissatisfaction measure as it encompasses a number of intertwined factors relating to the support the state gives its populations.

They go on to discuss the role of perception in determining propensity to commit violence against the state, their first measure being the idea that if a group perceives themselves to me discriminated against, their responses may change. To account for this, they created a dummy variable based on "a question on whether the respondent would describe herself as a member of a group that is currently discriminated against or being treated unfairly" (Dyrstad et.

al 2020). They further explore perception by prompting questions regarding the perceived ability to enact political change through the existing channels. They measured this "with a question about whether politicians are interested in getting people's opinions or just their votes" (Dyrstad et. al 2020). These measures helped to understand how perceptions of one's government shapes subsequent reactionary decisions in the face of crises or failures of the state.

The article, *Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State* written in 2008 by Alexus Grynkewich further explores the reasoning behind provision of SSNs by NSAGs and the ways in which this is done to further undermine the legitimacy of and support for the state and establish stronger order over communities and states overall. He begins the article by prefacing the need to consider the social welfare implications of traditional counter-terrorist tactics, explaining that targeting funding that flows towards armed groups may impact their ability to provide social services and consequently increase extremism through increased suffering (Grynkewich 2008). Consistent with research done by Dyrstad and Hillesund, and Ana Arjona, Grynkewich makes the claim that NSAGs gain valuable community support through the provision of social programs and other traditionally state supplied goods and services (Grynkewich 2008). He goes further in discussing the implications of this provision beyond what it means in the name of civilian compliance, but what it means concerning the state and its legitimacy, and the deconstruction of the state's social contract. This article was written with the intention of building a narrative of support for displacement based counterterrorist strategy by drawing attention to the ways in which non-state armed groups can establish themselves within communities. To analyze this properly he looks at three case studies that explore the relative success of NSAGs in the face of displacement based counter terrorist strategies. While the investigation of these strategies is interesting, his discussion on the

provision of SSNs by armed groups as a rapport building strategy is far more integral to my study on the impacts of weak state SSNs.

Grynkewich's first section is dedicated to observing the ways in which NSAGs undermine the legitimacy of the state. His first point looks at social contract theory and how states and their citizens enter into a contract of sorts, a requirement of which is the provision of social welfare services (Grynkewich 2008). He goes on to describe the global context and development of the social contract theory, and the ways in which it can benefit the state, and the reality that insurgency groups have learned the benefits from creating social contracts of their own, particularly when the one extended by the state is perceived as weak by its civilians (Grynkewich 2008). He identifies three core benefits of this contract, the first being that "the creation of a social welfare infrastructure highlights the failure of the state to fulfill its side of the social contract, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the state. Second, non-state social welfare organizations offer the population an alternative entity in which to place their loyalty. Third, a group that gains the loyalty of the populace commands a steady stream of resources with which it can wage battle against the regime" (Gynkewich 2008). These benefits are consistent with the intuition built around individuals decision making regarding and lays the foundation for understanding compliance, cooperation, and the growth of NSAG civilian support.

IV. HOW DOES SUPPORT FOR ANTI-GOV/ARMED GROUPS GROW? WHAT CATALYZES INTERNAL CONFLICT?

This collective unrest presents the opportunity to seize control of a population and mobilize them into a political movement on the basis of consolidated beliefs and exploitation of these grievances. These common issues create a need for organization in order to gain relevance in political and economic spheres. This is where the formation of NSAGs come into play, by

recognizing the potential base of support in the populations with shared grievances, they can offer the organization required for political movement and gain legitimacy and support from the population. This affiliation is built by offering relief of, and solutions to, those grievances, and providing channels to create the kind of change prompted by these failures of the state. It is important to remember that the commonality of the grievances applies to the non-state actors as well, their efforts to enact change and gain political legitimacy is bolstered by the communal support but is not derived from it. The NSAG's desire to air their grievances and to demand reparations for political misgivings is assumed to be inherent, as its existence depends on it, and the increased support by exploiting, exacerbating, and demonstrating the weaknesses and failures of the state allow them to further their raison-d'être.

The creation of non-state social safety nets by non-state armed groups is often done in an effort to establish control, gain support, and establish legitimacy. Particularly in times of civil unrest when people who share negative sentiments towards the operations of their government organize to reallocate the resources and services that the government has failed to adequately or evenly supply. Ana Arjona explores the relationship between civilians and NSAG's in their article titled, *Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non- State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance.* Which outlines methods used by NSAGs in order to gain obedience and maintain control, it also outlines the ways in which civilians can resist these kinds of tactics and their power and ability to do so. Arjona emphasizes need for near universal civilian support and cooperation for an NSAG to operate properly. Community and popular support are essential to the function of Non-State Armed Groups as "research on certain types of criminal groups has shown that these organizations also need civilian support to function: in fact, they make deliberate efforts to obtain it. Similarly, authorities aiming to combat criminal groups

have also recognized that civilian cooperation is essential to their success, and have therefore devised policies to promote it. So-called 'community approaches' to policing, for example, have combined the provision of security and basic services," (Arjona, 2017) offering communities aid to gain trust and mutual support. This sort of research and evidence is essential for the construction of my argument regarding why civilians may choose to participate in political violence through affiliation with non-state armed groups. As a key component of my hypothesis that " weak state social programs will result in an increase in extremist rhetoric and in the willingness to engage in and justify violence", the provision of social safety nets by NSAGs in the absence of state programming discussed in this article further informs and shapes my own research. The basis of my argument rests on the connection between the absence of state SSNs being substituted by extremist organizations, and subsequently increasing engagement with such organizations by the civilian populations and a further increase in violence towards the state. While this article explores the role of civilian obedience and resistance in non-state armed groups, from this investigation I can glean some of the intuition behind why NSAGs would provide SSNs and how that can further perpetrate violence.

The central argument of this analysis is "that the centrality of obedience and resistance needs to be incorporated in our conceptualization of civilian support and in our theories of rebel and criminal behavior, civilian agency, and the emergence, functioning, and demise of armed social orders" (Arjona 2017). This is valuable research for efforts in combatting armed groups, but by conceptualizing and identifying the role of obedience in civilians, they also explore methods in that such groups may engage in in order to gain that obedience. Similar to work done by Dyrstad and Hillesund, Arjona seeks to theorize what I refer to as the bystander effect, in exploring the intuition behind participation neutrality and conversely, resistance. In questions

regarding support and compliance, where do individuals who do nothing fall? For the purposes of my study, I concern myself primarily with the active engagement in extremist activity, but there is certainly room for exploring the role of neutrality in the perpetuation of violence.

Following their review of relevant literature, Arjona investigates the impacts that NSAGs have on local order, and how those contribute to the obedience or resistance of residents of those locales. They recognize the disruption that NSAG operations can have on communities as well as the possible changes to established social orders these interjections may have. They reinforce the intuition that the enforcement of order is done for the purpose of regulating "economic, political, and social behavior in ways that render valuable benefits, such as obtaining resources, accessing political and social networks, putting into practice their ideology, and gaining the recognition and reciprocity of local residents" (Arjona 2017) but this reciprocity cannot be formed without the NSAGs acting in a reciprocal manner. To create social order, individuals in the society must comply, and as Arjona argues, NSAGs are only able to maintain it with large-scale obedience, but how are they able to reach this level of obedience? Fear is certainly a factor and a tactic used by extremist organizations, but I argue that NSAGs exploit the grievances of civilians and the weaknesses of states to gain not only obedience, but support and participation. Arjona argues slightly differently, putting more emphasis on fear tactics, and is careful to describe and formulate terminology that encompasses participation in its many forms. She uses the terms Cooperation and Non-Cooperation to describe the two choices a civilian living under NSAG order may have. There is a third option as well, Migration, implying that neutrality does not exist under this theory, as that "insofar as NSAGs demand obedience, neutrality is akin to disobedience and thus is a form of opposition. In this context, the only possibility to avoid both cooperating and non-cooperating is to flee" (Arjona 2017). Civilian acts can thus fall into one of

these three categories and once the distinction between an act of cooperation or non-cooperation has been made, a subcategory is assigned. Arjona goes into careful detail regarding the characteristics of each subcategory and includes a flowchart to denote the options civilians have when existing under NSAG order.

Acts of cooperation will fall into one of the following three categories, obedience, spontaneous support, or enlistment. Acts of non-cooperation will be categorized as either disobedience, resistance, or defection. For the purposes of this study, migration has no subcategories as its singular act means that individual ceases to have local impacts. Though large-scale migrations would certainly have resounding effects on the ability of NSAGs to establish local order, Arjona focuses on the roles of civilians that remain. Arjona describes acts of obedience as "any action by a civilian after an armed group has ordered her to do so, either directly or by establishing a general rule" (Arjona 2017). Spontaneous support concerns actions such as "volunteering to do specific tasks that favor the armed group short of joining, without the latter having given the civilian, either explicitly or implicitly, the order to do so" (Arjona 2017). Enlistment, the third subcategory of acts of cooperation, pertains to "joining the armed organization as a full-time member with-out having received the order to do so" (Arjona 2017). The other option to acting in cooperation with NSAGs is non-cooperation. The first subcategory Arjona details is disobedience, which "entails failing to follow an order given by the group or a rule established by it" (Arjona 2017) the opposite of what obedience to an NSAG group looks like. Acts of resistance, which contains several variations and forms simply "consists of opposing or attacking the group" (Arjona 2017), as it encompasses such a variety of actions, a succinct definition is the most conducive to the simplification of categorization. The final subcategory, defection, are actions that aid "the enemy, either by offering its spontaneous

support or enlisting as a full-time member" (Arjona 2017) of an opposing organization. These categorical definitions are useful in determining the multiplicity of forms that cooperation and non-cooperation can take on, and with that understanding develop more thorough explanations and theories as to what causes these sorts of actions to take place.

Following the careful defining and outlaying of the roles of civilians in an NSAGs order, Arjona has two main sections that shed light on the decision-making process of these individuals pertaining to either the use of violence or governance. For the purposes of this section of research, which attempts to answer the question of how support for NSAGs grows, I offer greater consideration to their section titled *The Behavioral Effects of Governance* where they find that "In communities where central governance functions are lacking or are poorly executed, NSAGs can fill a vacuum and cultivate all forms of cooperation. By creating new institutions and providing basic services, the armed group gains the opportunity to shape beliefs in ways that render both obedience and spontaneous support," (Arjona 2017) which is consistent with my theories on the garnering of that support through the provision of SSNs. Arjona further states that "by giving the community what it lacks, the group gives locals a reason to form positive beliefs about its involvement in local affairs" (Arjona 2017). It is conducive to my hypothesis that a lack of state provides social welfare will offer NSAGs a foothold for which to garner civilian support through the provision of social safety programs that further undermine state authority by capitalizing on public grievances.

NSAGs aim to undermine and highlight the preexisting weakness of the state, and as their functionality is driven by civilian support, this goal is furthered by "non-state social welfare organizations offer[ing] the population an alternative entity in which to place their loyalty. Over time, as people receive services from these groups, they may begin to exhibit more loyalty to a

group than to the state" (Grynkewich 2008) which aides NSAGs in continually exploiting the failures of the state and increasing support of their mission, methods, and organization. In exploiting these failures, NSAGs intend to weaken the state, and do so further by testing the limits of the social contract between the state and its population, and "by providing social services, terrorist or guerrilla organizations threaten to supplant the social contract between the population and the state, thereby undermining a key source of state legitimacy" (Grynkewich 2008) through the shifting of allegiances from the state to non-state groups. In providing necessary social safety nets that the state lacks, they gain access to a large population that may be indifferent or lacking in terms of politically charged grievances. This encompasses those civilians who are not actively trying to enact political change, but simply require social aid. In instances where states are unable to provide these services, this population will have to access the support through a non-state actor that is politically and socially motivated, and often times violent. By controlling the programs, they gain control over the conditions and requirements of access, and with that the rhetoric and messaging surrounding both the service, and its sponsors—themselves. This furthers their intentions of creating submission and obedience from the civilian population.

To offer further insight regarding the impacts of economic conditions on the propensity to justify or engage in terror, Jennifer Kavanaugh in her article *Selection, Availability, and Opportunity: The Conditional Effect of Poverty on Terrorist Group Participation*, performs an empirical analysis of the relationship between poverty and education on participation rates in terrorist groups Her analysis is focused primarily on Lebanese insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s, looking specifically at data collected on Hezbollah during that time period. Previous research, a specific study done by Kreuger and Maleckova, has shown a lack of correlation

between poverty and participation in terrorist groups; however, Kavanagh hypothesizes that this correlation is conditional, and instead hinges upon the level of educational attainment. Meaning that those with higher education levels, who experience poverty are more likely to enlist than those who experience poverty and have received little to no education. By including education as an interaction variable, poverty can be given conditional significance as a determinate factor.

In order to test this hypothesis, Kavanagh made use of two data sets, which were then merged. The first included the demographic information of 129 deceased members of Hezbollah. This sample included martyrs aged 15 to 38 who passed between 1982 and 1994. The second data set used was the Lebanese Population Housing Survey, henceforth referred to as PHS, collected in 1996. The PHS sample was limited by age to fit the demographic represented by the Hezbollah sample to attain more accurate and empirically convincing results. Kavanagh makes several valuable justifications for combining the data sets despite the discrepancy in years collected but also recognizes that a number of assumptions must be considered during analysis. The argument presented for the merging of the samples, as well as the way that the assumptions are made very clear. This element of this study sets a valuable example for how to both recognize weak points in your analysis and solve them through strong argumentation and contextualized evidence to justify decisions made while describing methodology or cleaning data. There is a question of the reliability of the data especially as some of it is self-reported which can cause some endogeneity, particularly in reference to self-reporting poverty status. The Hezbollah sample had some gaps in the data, and is made up only of deceased members, and thus is not representative of the organization as a whole. Some additional sample issues are discussed further in the methodology section.

As Kavanagh is attempting to discover a conditionality in an analysis that has already been conducted and results reported, she makes use of this analysis heavily in her methodology. This work, done by Krueger and Maleckova in 2003 is titled, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?”. In analyzing this study, Kavanagh recognized that when comparing demographic determinants between Hezbollah and Non-Hezbollah members, it was the difference in the level of educational attainment rather than poverty that was most significant. Using this previous research, Kavanagh elected to use an interaction term in order to attempt to determine not only the predictive power of poverty, which was proven relatively insignificant but to find its predictive power on participation when the level of education is also considered. Education is hypothesized to have such an impact as Kavanagh makes several interdisciplinary based claims, that rest on the assumptions that terrorist organizations focus their energy on recruiting those they feel will make the most effective terrorists, meaning they would expend more to recruit those with higher educations and subsequently more skills. She analyzes the opportunity cost for those with higher education’s dependent on macro-economic conditions and finds that “in weak or impoverished economies, the lack of market options reduces the opportunity costs of group participation for highly educated individuals.” (Kavanagh, 2011) this implies that those with higher education are more susceptible to economic stress that may contribute to decisions to join extremist organizations, while those with lower education who face fewer volatile changes in opportunity cost with fluctuations in the macroeconomy. To test the hypothesis, Kavanagh used a logit model, as the poverty and education variables are binary, and is consistent with the previous analysis done by Krueger and Maleckova who also used a logit model for their hypothesis test. It should be noted that Kavanagh ran two separate regressions, one that included the entire sample, and another that included only those who

identified as Shia. This is valuable as it takes into consideration more interdisciplinary factors like religion and other cultural nuances that may serve as influential factors and determinants of terrorist group participation rates.

The results of this study found that poverty is actually shown to reduce participation from those with low educational attainment, while it increases the participation rate of individuals with greater education levels. She identifies that the population with the greatest probability of joining Hezbollah were those with high levels of educational achievement who experience poverty. “For individuals with high education, however, poverty has a significant positive marginal effect on the probability of participation and increases the likelihood of involvement in Hezbollah’s activities.” (Kavanagh, 2011). In looking at the Shia community sample individually, Kavanagh found that poverty had no interactive impact on those who were highly educated, however, higher education on its own was found to determine the likelihood of participation, regardless of income, which identified education as the strongest predictor in this particular subsample (Kavanagh, 2011). This analysis offers key information in observing the ways in which support for armed groups grows as well as the conflict that is associated with them.

V. CONCLUSION

This literature review, through breaking down my research question, “How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?” into 3 different categories, is able to provide an in-depth analysis of existing literature on terror and social programming that pertains to my research. The first section aimed to answer what the perils of weak or even absent social programs was. This was done through articles that first define social welfare and social safety nets, and then offered further insight into their characteristics and importance within society that translated into the

consequences of their lack. The next section found research that provided evidence of Non-State Armed Groups providing social services as a means to air political and social grievances and increase civilian support for organizations. This research led directly into the final section which observed how support for NSAG groups grow, and how conflict develops. Working in conjunction, the sub sections of this literature review provide a complete and extensive framework for which my hypothesis—That weak state social programs will result in an increase in extremist rhetoric and in the willingness to engage in and justify violence—can build upon.

THEORY

I. INTRODUCTION

In this section I offer theoretical evidence in answering the question, "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" To begin the discussion, I hypothesize that weak state social programs will result in an increase in extremist rhetoric and in the willingness to engage in and justify violence. More specifically, that a lack of state social safety nets will result in an increase in civilian grievances which allow for the exploitation of weak states and societal concerns by Non-State Armed Groups into the support and eventual justification of violent extremism as viable political action. These sequential occurrences further prevent the development of stronger social welfare programs due to the hypothesized increase in extremism in its initial absence. Figure 1 displays the flow of the relationships that will be explained throughout this theory section.

Fig. 1: Consequences of Weak State Social Safety Nets



Figure 1 shows the initial lack or weakness of state social programs as the starting point of the theory. This initial absence perpetuates grievances from populations and communities that perceive themselves to be disenfranchised by the policies enacted by the state, as discussed in Dyrstad and Hillesund's research on grievances and perceived opportunity. This disenfranchisement of communities that have been historically under-resourced and under-represented within their state. This leads to a distrust of the state overall, including policies in programs, I hypothesize that this increase in grievances results in 3 main outcomes. The first outcome being an increase in community amongst those who share common grievances, this formation of ideological based communities further solidifies belief structures and a weakening of the social contract between the state and its citizens. The next outcome of increased grievances is the development of a more robust non-state based social support network that better

represents the populations who require such support, I argue that these substitute social safety nets are often provided by NSAGs in an effort to gain political legitimacy and undermine the state. The final outcome of this grievance-based model is the rise of extremism, as with any kind of societal concerns there is the propensity for radicalization, and continuous incitement of grievances and disenfranchisement creates conditions in which extremist narratives can gain traction. In conjunction with the other two outcomes, extremism is further perpetrated as communities in which these ideologies can be shared are created, and organizations providing alternative social safety nets gain control of the narrative surrounding their programs and exacerbate extremist sentiments. These three outcomes work in conjunction to produce the result of weak social safety nets, which is an increased propensity to engage in or justify violence. When grievances and state failures are exacerbated, civilians feel increasingly limited in their opportunities to enact political change or to have their concerns addressed, these limitations lead to the narrowing of options and an increased justifiability of resorting to violence to gain representation.

To contextualize the lack of state social welfare programs and its connection to the creation of non-state substitutes, I begin by observing the relationship between the supply and demand of social welfare programs in a region, and the consequences of government sanctioned supply not satisfying the demand of the population through the appearance of inferior substitute goods in the form of religious and political organizations that perpetuate extremism and capitalize on weak states. I hypothesize that this will show that in states or regions that lack social welfare infrastructure, there will be a greater number of non-state programs that contribute to political and religious extremism and leverage welfare incentives to encourage participation in militant groups, resulting in higher propensity for violence in citizens. Thus, the dependent

variable of this analysis is justification of extremism and violence, while the independent variables are social welfare programs, and economic conditions/shocks.

Following this introduction to the impacts of weak state social welfare programs on the demand for non-state programs, I attempt to measure the utility that both kinds of programs would provide to an individual. This is done to further develop and contextualize the demand for non-state social welfare and offer an explanation of what factors drive individuals to make use of non-state programs over state programs other than just a lack thereof. This increase of demand for the more efficient program results in a subsequent increase in the supply of them, increasing the proliferation of non-state programs and increasing their efficiency and ability to attract more participants.

Next, I aim to observe the decision to provide social safety nets as well as the individuals decision of which program to engage in through a sequential game, or extended form, which observes the outcomes and payoffs for each actor depending on their decision to provide or engage. This is done in an effort to conceptualize why organizations, or the state would provide SSNs and by constructing a theoretical model of the expected payoffs for engaging in the proliferation of SSN I lend some evidence to the intuition of offering SSNs.

This ability to serve more people and develop a community of like-minded individuals over longer periods of time will result in an increase in sentiments of disenfranchisement with a government who offers little support. Such sentiments can be exploited and lead to radicalization of such populations, increasing militant and terrorist recruitment power and activity within the state. This increase in activity further weakens state capacity as their resources are often reallocated to be used in counter-militant efforts rather than continuing to develop their strength of state and economic conditions. This is further modeled through the use of evolutionary game

theory where rather than evolutionary genetic changes over generations, I attempt to observe the ideological transitions caused by time spent in community as well as the impacts of the expected payoffs for engaging in state or non-state programs on ideological preference and composition of populations.

II. SUPPLY AND DEMAND: LACK OF STATE SOCIAL SAFETY NETS

In the following model, supply is representative of not only the number of welfare policies or programs in place, but also encapsulates the level of funding and attention paid to the maintenance and upholding of such policies and programs. These policies would entail programs such as free lunches, childcare, stimulus checks, or even protective services. Supply is a demonstration not only of simply having such policies, but their strength. A weakness of policy structure, or lack of funding is demonstrated by a decrease in supply, even if the quantitative number of policies or programs in existence doesn't change.

In a similar sense, demand isn't just an individual demanding a greater quantity of programs or policies, but the demand for effective support from those policies which may or may not already be in effect. If these programs lack sufficient funding or support to meet the needs of the people utilizing them, then the demand will increase. In times of economic hardship, the demand for these programs will further increase in the sense that a greater quantity of people will be depending on the services social welfare programs are intended to provide. The equilibrium point would thus be a combination of sufficient structural support of social welfare programs that meet the exact demand of both the quantity of people in need and the standard of quality necessary to aid those making use of the program. Price in this context is difficult to conceptualize, as it is the nature of social welfare to have no price to the consumer. In the case of this supply and demand representation, it should be assumed that the price is a cost born to the

provider of the welfare program. This is intuitive in that should demand of a program increase, the cost to the provider would also increase in order to maintain the supply, which is why typically, costs to consumers increase in goods that are to be purchased.

To further dissect the analysis, social welfare policies and programs are divided in two, those operated and funded by the government, and private, non-government sanctioned providers and/or programs. This distinction is necessary to understand the relationship between the demand for social welfare, and the payoff of participating in militant or extremist organizations. If the government is unable to support its people in times of economic hardship, its citizens will look elsewhere for the aid that they need to survive. In such an instance, populations may develop a sense of disenfranchisement with their own government due to its inability to serve its people. These sentiments will further incite civil unrest within the state.

In Figure 2, the relationship between government social safety net programs and their substitute, non-sanctioned organizations like church groups or political parties are demonstrated through a basic supply and demand substitute good model. Though it can be adequately represented through a substitute good model, Burgoon states that these non-sanctioned welfare programs are imperfect substitutes, as “beyond concrete social services, religious organizations and social policies are imperfect substitutes in providing less materially tangible support networks, as well as sources of security and hope for members” (Burgoon, 2006). For the purpose of this theory, and further developed throughout the analysis, the two programs are considered substitutes in that though the conditions in which the aid is given vary, the programs and policies implemented in either case are comparable and interchangeable.

Fig. 2: Supply and Demand of Government Social Safety Nets and Non-State Substitutes



In the instance demonstrated in Figure 2, assume that funding of SSN programs is decreased from the state budget, decreasing the supply in the terms laid out above. When the supply of SSN programs falls from S1 to S2, there is a subsequent move along the demand curve from point A to point B for such programs. This shows the demand, not necessarily increasing, but proportionately responding to the loss of funding. This loss of funding could have a number of impacts, by leaving a greater quantity of people in need of welfare support and lowering the effectiveness or quality of support that those utilizing the program have come to expect. This inability of the government to maintain the supply, further translates to an outward shift in demand on the non-sanctioned side, from D1 to D2, as more people seek SSNs from outside sources like NSAGs, where the demand can be sufficiently met when the government is unable to provide such support. Under this model, it thus follows, that should social safety net policy improve, the demand for non-state sanctioned programs will diminish. This may be an oversimplification, and the following section, which aims to measure the expected utility of the

two types of programs, explains further the draws of non-state programs, and looks to explain the possible affinity that individuals may develop or harbor for such an alternative form of support.

III. EXPECTED UTILITY MODEL

In order to further model the decision making between making use of state sanctioned social programs, and alternative non-state programs, I construct an expected utility function between the two programs to conceptualize why non-state programs may be an individual's preference. It is an oversimplification to assume that "if we build it, they shall come," though an overall lack of SSNs certainly contributes to feelings of unrest within a country, accessibility of these programs must also be considered. If local organizations are easier to access and receive aid from, the utility of that program would be intuitively higher than the utility of a program based in another neighborhood or town. In countries with high levels of political and religious contention, there may be groups who's discontent with the government prevent them from making use of support programs enacted by a regime they feel has capitalized on their identity's misfortune, or that the policies implemented are insufficient compensation. In such an instance, that group may look elsewhere for support, and likely towards an organization that shares a similar racial or ethnic background, and a commonality in opinions of malcontent. This also rests upon the grievance model, where citizens feel that they are unable to engage with the current political regime and are thus less likely to affiliate themselves with state programs. It also furthers the communities built in sharing common grievances which may then develop into programs that cater to the needs of those specific populations.

> "Religious fundamentalism also tends to positively affect perpetration or tolerance of communal violence, including terrorism. Heightened participation in politico-religious groups intensive in membership involvement and extreme in their ideological messages

> with respect to out-groups can inspire extremist political views and action, even terrorist violence (Berman 2003)" (Burgoon, 2006).

While an intuitive decision-making process, as Berman and Burgoon explain, such participation further deepens divides and unrest within a country, by pushing like-minded disenfranchised communities closer together through a shared experience such as experiencing poverty and a subsequent lack of support that further perpetuates conflict. With such consequences in mind, this utility model attempts to explain the intuition behind a lack of state welfare support, and the choice to participate in the substitute religious and/or political based programs.

$$(2.1) \quad U^{STATE} = U\,(X1_{ACCESSIBILITY}, X2_{RELIGIOUS\ AFFILIATION}, X3_{QUALITY}, X4_{SUPPLY/FREQUENCY}, X5_{ADDITIONAL\ PROGRAMS})$$

$$(2.2) \quad U^{NON\text{-}STATE} = U\,(X1_{ACCESSIBILITY}, X2_{RELIGIOUS\ AFFILIATION}, X3_{QUALITY}, X4_{SUPPLY/FREQUENCY}, X5_{ADDITIONAL\ PROGRAMS})$$

The above functions display an individual's utility from participating in a hypothetical free lunch program. The contributing variables to the program's overall utility outcomes are accessibility, religious affiliation, quality, supply/frequency, and the existence of additional programming. Proximity pertains to how far the individual may have to travel to participate in the program. Particularly for those experiencing poverty, time is often a function of that poverty, and SSNs must be easy and quick to access, especially in terms of accessing meals. State programs are likely to be less pervasive than non-State programs, meaning that the informal, imperfect substitute is likely to be more convenient and of more use to a greater number of people, thus increasing its overall utility to an individual in comparison to the more centralized and policy constrained state programs.

The next contributor is identified as Religious Affiliation, begging the questions of is the program operated by a non-secular government or organization? Is this religious affiliation something that is shared between the individual and the provider? Or is it a point of contention? In the case of state program utility, if a government is non-secular, those who do not identify with the state's official religion will likely feel ostracized by programs and policies implemented by a government whose views do not reflect their own. They will thus be more likely to seek out programs where they feel represented in the form on non-state programs. On the other hand, if they share such an affiliation, the utility of the state program would likely see no change as the other factors would then hold more weight in the decision-making process. Religious affiliation thus has greater potential to reduce utility of a state program than a non-state program, as non-state programs are more likely to be religiously affiliated and are able to operate under a variety of affiliations due to a lack of governmental constraints. Non-State programs profit in comparison to their state-based counterparts due to their abundance and freedom of operation.

Quality is the next impact variable and asks the following questions. How well prepared is the meal? Does it taste good or is it a minimal meal prepared solely to ensure caloric intake? How filling/balanced/nutritious is it? While this is certainly difficult to measure, it could play a large role in determining the utility of a welfare program. State meals are likely to be widely distributed and prepackaged, whereas I theorize that smaller community-based programs may be viewed as more comforting, nutritious and of better taste and value. Quality of a good plays an essential role in the decision-making process when selecting which item to purchase, or in this case which program to participate in. In the case of SSNs, there is no monetary price to participate, so quality is a variable that can render a program more competitive and attractive in comparison to other options.

The supply and frequency of the programs are also of great importance. How many meals are they able to provide and how often? Is it guaranteed or is it operated on a first-come first-serve basis? If the program is not conducted regularly enough, the utility is diminished in that it is an inconsistent support that does not guarantee any sort of reliable aid. Accepting aid can be a difficult task and trusting the providers of that aid plays into the decision to make use of it. Inconsistent provision can breed distrust and does not facilitate a consistent relationship between provider and receiver, for this reason, a daily meal program would likely be more popular than a weekly program. The supply of aid is also essential, because if there is not enough aid to cover those who qualify for it, and an individual is turned away, the utility is diminished. Furthermore, it may dissuade them from utilizing that particular form of aid, and consequently make them look elsewhere for support.

Finally, the existence, or lack, of additional programming through the support program. Are there more services provided at the location or during that time? Is it advertised? Does the support appear to extend beyond formalities? By offering additional services, aid programs can attract a greater number of people, as not all aid is the same and individuals likely demand a variety of services. In the context of a free lunch program, if an individual arrives at the service center and finds that they additionally provide child-care, that program will increase in utility for that individual in need of free lunch and free care.

To create a budget constraint under this utility function, I first conceptualize the price the SSN program poses to an individual who makes use of it. This is necessary as social safety net programs are inherently no-cost to participate in monetarily, but there are losses associated with inefficiencies, demonstrated through the utility of each program, that present a cost to an individual who chooses to engage in social welfare programs. The cost in this case is time,

energy, and wages lost to inefficiencies. The price, however, is a function of the inputs that determine the utility and efficiency of the program. There are costs associated with both programs regardless of who operates them, however, I hypothesize that in the case of state programs, their overall utility is lower than that of non-state programs, so the cost to the consumer to make use of the good is much higher for comparably inefficient state programs as the opportunity cost of the time spent and the outcomes of the two kinds of program are unequal.

The functions of price and its inputs are demonstrated in equations 2.3 and 2.4, with S denoting State Programs, and NS as the abbreviation for non-State social welfare programs.

(2.3) $$P_S = \in (accessibility, religious\ association, quality, supply, additional\ programs)$$

(2.4) $$P_{NS} = \in (accessibility, religious\ association, quality, supply, additional\ programs)$$

With the context of this price in mind, the budget constraint is set up like so.

(2.5) $$Y = P_S * Q_S + P_{NS} * Q_{NS}$$

As Berman and Burgoon imply, state programs and non-state programs are to be considered substitutes, but imperfect ones, despite this a budget constraint modeling the pay-off of the utility would look fairly balanced. For simplicities case, in this instance we will assume that the cost to make use of state or non-state programs are the same, thus it is assumed that

(2.6) $$P_S = P_{NS}$$

This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 3, where the indifference curve rests along the budget constraint demonstrated by the above equations 2.5 and 2.6, making contact at point A, representing the maximum utility bundle of the two kinds of programs calculated by the intersection of the two function's slopes.

Fig. 3 Utility Model: State and Non-State SSN Program Utility



In this utility model, it is maximized at point A, meaning the quantity demanded for non-state programs is shown at point NS_1, whereas the quantity demanded for state programs is shown at S_1. With this understanding of the budget constraint and indifference curves in mind, in the event that there are changes in the price to an individual to participate in a program, the slope of the budget constraint will be impacted and flatten or steepen depending on the adjustments made to the inputs of consumer costs.

To demonstrate such a shift, I theorize that greater accessibility of non-state programs will decrease the costs associated to the consumer to participate, so in states with weak social welfare policy, non-state programs are likely to be much more accessible to a greater number of people. When the inputs of the price change, the price itself changes overall, so an increase of 'x' in the accessibility of non-state programs will result in a decrease in the price, or cost to the

individual to participate. The new equation to calculate non-state program costs is shown in equation 2.7.

$$(2.7) \qquad P'_{NS} =$$

$$\in (accessibility'(x), religious\ association, quality, supply, additional\ programs)$$

This change carries over into the new budget constraint, where the newly calculated price is denoted by P'_{NS} in equation 2.8.

$$(2.8) \qquad Y = P_S * Q_S + P'_{NS} * Q_{NS}$$

An increase in the accessibility of a program lowers the cost to an individual, as less time has to be spent, or fewer conditions must be met in order to make use of the program. Thus, it must be assumed here that the original price associated is greater than the newly derived price.

$$(2.9) \qquad P_{NS} > P'_{NS}$$

This change in accessibility relative to the lack of change in state program accessibility means that to make use of state programs would cost an individual more than a non-state program would if we continue to assume that the initial price of the state program was equal to the price of the non-state program. This is essential in demonstrating that changes in program structure and qualities will directly change the prices of either program, and leaves one with a lower cost to the consumer than the other. In this case, as the non-state program has become more accessible, its price decreases relative to the price of the state program. This is shown mathematically in equations 2.10-2.12.

$$(2.10) \qquad P_S = P_{NS}$$

$$(2.11) \qquad P_{NS} > P'_{NS}$$

$$(2.12) \qquad P_S > P'_{NS}$$

The subsequent shift in the budget constraint due to the change in price of one of the 'goods' is displayed graphically in Figure 4, the intuition behind the change in the slope of budget constraint is derived from the initial equation itself. The slope of the line is originally defined as $-\frac{P_{NS}}{P_S}$ and is derived as follows.

$$(2.13) \qquad Y = P_S * Q_S + P_{NS} * Q_{NS}$$

The first step is to subtract $P_{NS} * Q_{NS}$ from either side.

$$(2.14) \qquad Y - P_{NS} * Q_{NS} = P_S * Q_S$$

Divide both sides by P_S.

$$(2.15) \qquad \frac{Y - P_{NS} * Q_{NS}}{P_S} = \frac{P_S * Q_S}{P_S}$$

This allows the two P_S variables to cancel out, leaving

$$(2.16) \qquad \frac{Y - P_{NS} * Q_{NS}}{P_S} = Q_S$$

Expanding the equation results in

$$(2.17) \qquad \frac{Y}{P_S} - \frac{P_{NS}}{P_S} * Q_{NS} = Q_S$$

Which simplifies to

$$(2.18) \qquad -\frac{P_{NS}}{P_S} * Q_{NS} = Q_S$$

It thus follows that a decrease in the price of non-state programs (P_{NS}) will result in a decrease in the slope of the budget constraint. The slope flattens from being represented by $-\frac{P_{NS}}{P_S}$ to being represented by $-\frac{P'_{NS}}{P_S}$. As the relationship between P_{NS}, P_S and P'_{NS} has been previously derived in equations 2.11 and 2.12, the outcomes of such adjustments are demonstrated by the shift in the budget constraint line displayed in Figure 4.

Fig. 4: Utility Model: Lower Price of Non-State Programs



As previously explained, the slope of the budget constraint flattens, moving from L_1 to L_2. The budget constraint is not shifting, as the total income has not changed. Instead, as shown in the equations above, an increase in accessibility of non-state programs has rendered the program cheaper to use than the state-run counterpart. Without a change in income, non-state SSNs then become more attractive as there is more welfare to be had at a lower cost to the individual. These changes must be proportionate, and an increase in quantity of non-state programs demanded produces a proportionate decrease in the quantity of state programs demanded. With the new budget constraint L_2, the indifference curve (IC_1 to IC_2) and its interception with the budget constraint moves from point A to B. This movement to point B is a movement of the indifference curve, indicating an increase in preference of non-state programs over state programs caused by an increase in the overall utility to an individual of the non-state

program. This initial shift, caused by the change in the price of non-state programs, results in an increase in the quantity demanded for such programs from NS_1 to NS_2, and the quantity of state programs demanded to fall from S_1 to S_2.

This example of a budget constraint is somewhat limiting and fails to demonstrate the reality that individuals cannot pick and choose between aspects of SSNs provided by the state or non-state armed groups, they are limited in participating in either one or the other. This theory makes the argument that the utility and thus overall preference for non-state social welfare means that individuals will select the SSNs from non-state groups before they participate in the state provided programs (if they even exist). This limitation of the model results in a corner solution as seen below in Figure 5.

Fig. 5: Utility Model: Corner Solution



The corner solution above is indicative of the overall preference for non-State SSNs as in accordance with the expected utility model that details the greater marginal utility of the non-State program when compared to the State program. These means in a situation where a bundle

of goods is not achievable, as is the one above, the greater utility of the non-State program means that an individual will select that particular good rather than its competition. The intuition behind selection and decision making for all the actors involved is explored further in the following section.

IV. EXTENDED FORM: THE SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING OF ACTORS

This section outlines the sequential nature that the decision to provide social safety nets takes. In following with the flowchart that serves as the introduction to this theoretical analysis, I argue that non-state groups will not make the decision to offer social programing until the state has established its positioning, and it is only after both the state and the NSAG have made their position known that the individual can then engage in the game and select which program they will choose to engage in. As is aligned with the corner solution seen above, there is no option for an individual to choose a mix—or bundle—of goods, but there are situations where there is no choice to the individual, depending on the decisions of actors made prior to their turn. Figure 6 below contains a decision tree, which outlines the possible choices of all the actors involved as well as the theorized payoffs of each outcome.

Fig. 6: Extended Form: Sequential Decision-Making Outcomes



This sequential game theorizes the possible payoffs for a single round of decision making regarding the provision and utilization of social safety nets. In this instance the state acts first and can make one of 3 choices:

a— The state provides Social Safety Nets

b— The state provides Social Safety Nets weakly, in a manner that undermines its effectiveness and utility to the consumer

c— The state does not offer any kind of Social Safety Net

Following the initial decision made by the state, non-state actors, depending on the prior choices of the state can select one of the following options:

a— The non-state group provides Social Safety Nets.

x— The non-state group supplements the existing state provided Social Safety Nets

c— The non-state group does not provide Social Safety Nets

For further clarification, option *x* is to supplement the existing state provided SSN, the non-state group are not providing a full array of societal protections but are beginning to break into the sector in an effort to undermine the state and build a community-based following. I also denote it separately from full provision to maintain the nuance that should the state offer some level of SSN, the non-state actor cannot fully provide their own SSNs so long as the state maintains some level of operation.

After these two actors have made their move, the individual civilian gets their turn. In this instance they have only two options, as we are assuming that the individual participating in this game is an individual who requires the use of a social safety net of some form. Thus, dependent on the previous actors' choices, they can either select options I or II:

π— Individuals use the State Social Safety Net

y — Individuals use the non-State Social Safety Net

With each possible sequence of actions assumed in our model laid out above, we can hypothesize on the likely payoffs of each decision and determine the equilibrium path for all parties. However, as each actor has their own agenda this is not synonymous with the ideal outcomes for everyone involved. The motivation of each actor is different causing the desired outcomes and payoffs to vary. The intuition behind the choices available to each actor, as well as their payoffs is based on the following assumptions in addition to the ones expressed above; If an actor does

not provide a service, another actor will always take over in its provision. An individual cannot select to use a service that is not provided. Figure 7 below uses the roll-back method to determine the optimal courses of action for the greatest outcomes for all actors involved.

Fig. 7: Extended Form: Optimal Outcomes for All Actors



With the payoffs assumed here, we use the roll back method to determine that the optimal path to take is "a—*x*—π" which yields a payoff of 8 for the State, 2 for the non-State group, and 6 for the individual, and is highlighted in orange above in Figure 7. This is dependent on the state providing a social safety net program and is conducive with my hypothesis that should states

provide strong social welfare, the ability for non-state groups to propagate is greatly reduced. It is always an incentive of the state to provide social safety programming of some sort, as that limits non-state group's ability to monopolize the provision and exploit preexisting state weaknesses and exacerbate societal fractures, however, weak programming is less effective and in considering the weakness of the state, individuals will receive a higher payoff from using the non-state program. This is shown by the optimal payoff if states are unable to provide SSNs, even an attempt at programming reduces the payoffs for non-state groups, with the new path being "b—*x*—*y*" with a payoff of 2 for the State, 8 for the non-State group, and 7 for the individual, highlighted in Figure 7.

These two examples allow us to investigate the intuition behind the hypothetical payoffs. In the first optimization if the state provides well-constructed SSNs the most a non-state actor will be able to do is supplement and provide uncompetitive substitute programs that offer less to the individual who acts in their own self-interest and selects the state program that offers the higher of the two payoffs. In the second optimization, the state provides some level of SSN programming, limiting the ability of the NSAG to provide, but in its weakness, offering the opportunity for an NSAG to provide a more competitive and favorable program, resulting in the payoffs to the individual shifting in favor of selecting the non-state provided SSNs. This demonstrates just how tenuous the competition between State SSNs and Non-State SSNs are, as any amount of weakness in provision will result in the increased favorability of the non-state provided social safety net. This is a result of the origins of support for NSAGs coming from the increased flexibility of their provision and the reality that they originate from communities who share common grievances and coalesce on this basis. In being closer to the problems at hand they

can more easily identify and provide solutions to the grievances that populations may have towards the state.

These payoffs operate under the assumption that to the state the payoffs for any option must satisfy that a>b>c, while for non-state groups a>*x*>c, and for individuals y>π if the non-state group offers any provision—their payoff is *x* or a. This affinity for non-state group social services is demonstrated by the expected utility function, and the theorized intuition of preference in section III. For state or non-state groups, if they select option c, the payoff is always 0 as they fail to provide a service that could generate a payoff. The example payoffs used above satisfy all of these conditions for theorizing the model.

Payoffs are a vague generalization of the results that each actor will receive under the allotted possible circumstances. It is essential to give context as to what these payoffs take the form of for each actor, they must always be incentives in order to satisfy the rational actor model where individuals will always select the highest possible payoff. For state actors, when they provide social safety nets in a manner that gives appropriate consideration to the nuanced needs of a diverse population with a variety of concerns, they see an overall positive payoff, hence why a>b>c. This payoff is civilian support through the utilization of the program, they receive a state that is healthier economically, politically, and socially and produces fewer grievances. As the offer less and less social services, their payoff will naturally diminish, if there is no provision of any services, there can be no payoff, so their returns would be zero.

For NSAGs the payoffs are a little more complex. They are not incentivized by stability and strength of state, their goal is to capitalize on grievances, offer solutions to those concerns, and in turn gain civilian support, which effectively undermines the strength of state and perpetrates their own. The more services they provide, the more successful they will be in

gaining allegiances, the higher their payoff will be. In the event they provide no social services, their payoff would be zero, even if they sought to gain support in other ways, this model is limited to the hypothetical provision of SSNs. The intuition behind the payoffs for non-state groups satisfies the a>*x*>c condition.

For individuals in this model, we assume there is always some level of provision of social safety nets, therefore there is a constant payoff for these actors. As argued above, their payoff is impacted by the expected utility function for usage of each service, meaning that unless one of the previous actors offers complete provision of SSNs, the individual will demonstrate a higher propensity for services provided by NSAGs as the payoff to the individual will be higher due to the increased utility of the option.

V. COMPOUNDING COMMUNAL EXTREMISM

The previous section theorized factors that contribute to the decision making of individuals to participate in non-state-run SSN programs, this increase in quantity demanded for non-state programs in instances where state safety net policy is weaker and less pervasive, results in a decrease in government trust, an increase in grievances, and creates more opportunities for groups to organize and radicalize. This is due to the nature of "some social policies, especially public housing or means-tested poor relief, might tend to cluster welfare recipients in particular settings, bringing together groups in a setting of common experience and sustained living that can further facilitate terror organizing among the disenchanted, net of income benefits" (Burgoon, 2006). This hypothesis demands quantitative analysis to determine the validity by analyzing the relationship between state safety net policy strength, non-state SSN participation rates, and rates of terror attacks within the state. I believe that time spent participating in non-

state SSNs will follow an exponential curve over time in terms of the development of potential extremism.

(2.19) $$Potential\ Level\ of\ Extremism = Initial\ Level\ of\ Extremism * NSProgram^{rt}$$

The outcome variable is the potential level of extremism or radicalization, which is a function of the original level of extremism, multiplied by the dummy variable of 1 or 2, 1 being no participation in non-state social welfare programs, and two being participation in non-state social welfare programs. This dummy variable is then put to the power of $r * t$, where t is the time spent making use of the social welfare program, and r is the rate of growth. Original level of extremism, along with the rate of growth is subjective to an individual and is likely different for each person depending on susceptibility to radicalization, and previous exposure. Regardless of these starting levels, I hypothesize that all initial level values and r values are positive, and that over any amount of time there will be an increase in extremism, supporting the theory that the more time a person spends in religious and politically based community welfare programs, the greater their potential to be radicalized. An example of this curve is shown in Figure 8.

Fig. 8: Radicalization Due to Time Spent Participating in Non-State SSN Programs



This relationship describes the theorized impact that time spent at non-state social welfare programs has on radicalization, extremism, and the ability of terrorist organization to recruit from these disenfranchised populations. It is exponential in that once this kind of indoctrination and conditioning starts, it quickly compounds and builds upon itself.

VI. CONCLUSION

This section begins with a broad theoretical framework that describes the relationship between a lack of state social safety nets, and the willingness to justify violence. As shown in Figure 1, there are several steps and influential factors that flow into this outcome. By breaking down this section into 4 different explorations each theory is treated as a piece of the more broad and general relationship. The first is an extrapolation of the traditional relationship between supply and demand and demonstrates the appearance of substitute and supplementary social

safety net programs in the absence of strong state provided options. It reinforces the idea that in the presence of high demand, someone will always have the incentive to provide.

In the second section I dig a little deeper into this relationship and explore the utility of the two goods, State SSNs and non-State SSNs, this is done through the construction of an expected utility model which takes into account characteristics unique to each kind of social safety net and how that translates into the relative utility of each good depending on the individual. It demonstrates how certain people, consistent with the grievance model constructed by Dyrstad and Hillesund, may find a greater utility in social programming offered by non-State groups more attuned with their political sentiments and who identities are closer to their own.

Based off of these assumed relationship between program type and level of provision, the next section explores the sequential nature of decision making made by the State, non-State groups, and individuals. This extended form model measures the kinds of decisions each group can make, how the previous decisions of others impact the next players choices, and what the expected payoffs of those decisions would mean to each player. I perform two hypothetical optimizations based off of the decisions of the State in order to demonstrate the intuition behind the behavior of non-State groups in the face of prior decisions made by the State, and how individuals maximize their own payoffs in following.

Finally, I close with a discussion of the compounding nature of extremism and time spent in a communal ideological setting, I describe how individuals who participate in social programming provided by organizations with political agendas can result in the increase in shared ideas and sentiments and creates greater opportunities for radicalization and extremism to be perpetuated. These factors that flow into the relationship between social safety nets and willingness to justify violence are explored further and more precisely in the methodology

section, which describes the eventual quantitative approach that will be taken to measure this relationship.

METHODOLOGY

This section will cover the methods I will use to demonstrate the link between the willingness of individuals and communities to justify violence, and a lack of state social welfare. While my ideal equation includes a number of factors that may contribute to or influence an individuals' decision to justify or engage in violence, in order to perform a large-scale regression to determine trends across a number of countries, the available data was limited and required heavy interpretation. My data came from two separate databases, the first being the Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Social Services Dataset or TIOS. This dataset, put together by the organization, One Earth Future and written by Lindsay L. Heger and Danielle F. Jung included over 400 organizations with data on the type of social programming provided by each group. This was essential to my regression equation attempting to observe the link between non-state provision of social programs and an increase in violent activity. They determined the evidence of social program provision and type by filtering through printed news coverage. All available coverage was found on LexisNexis, filtered to only display English language sources. In observing the news coverage, they used a variety of keywords and phrases for the determination of the presence of social programs. The frequency of these keywords in any given year were recorded and listed as a respective summation. To have a complete dataset, information was only collected through documentation generated between 1969 and 2013. The intuition behind this correlation was that if a group provides more services, there will subsequently be more news articles referencing these programs and their provision (Herger and Jung, 2015). To better understand the kind of services being provided by organizations, they consolidated their

comprehensive list of variables into subcategories. The services referenced to be provided by an organization were categorized as either religious, infrastructural, health related, educational, financial, security based, or social programs and services. In order to determine these variables, they assigned each keyword to a category, added up a sum of all mentions of the keywords, and divided by the number of keywords for each category, creating an average of the services that fit in each category. These mean valuations are the primary variables used in my study.

Using the provided data, I generated a new variable *totalnosocialmean* or Total Mean w/o Social, which takes the total keyword mentions from all categories except for the social section. The intuition behind this decision to have an average of all services not containing *socialmean* was that mentions of social services would far outweigh others in instances where groups were engaging in violent activity with the intention of changing the current societal operations. This intuition was reinforced in observing the data, wherein the social category often had values far greater than any other category. By having the option to not include it in an observation of total services, it demands greater specificity in mentioning the services which should lend itself to greater accuracy in the results.

Along with this data, I used the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in order to determine the kinds of attacks and damages that the groups included in the TIOS dataset were carrying out in conjunction with their service provision. From this incredibly comprehensive database, I narrowed down the necessary observations by collapsing by year and organization. This was done to determine the overall sum of damages done by a single organization in a single year and to render the data more compatible with the TIOS set, which listed the services provided by year. The GTD set contained a number of variables, but for the purpose of my investigation, I use only the variables that determine the damage done by the group. This included *nkill, nwound*, and

totalharm. nkill refers to the number of people killed in attacks by the organization in a year, *nwound*, the number of people wounded, and *totalharm* refers to the number of people both wounded and killed in a single year. In merging the two datasets, I was left with 768 unique observations, and 111 organizations spanning 62 countries, listed as *bases*. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all variables included from the original TIOS and GTD datasets in my own analysis. This demonstrates the range in number of services provided and in what sectors such services that are most frequently offered in.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Services Provided and Harm Done by all NSAGs

Variable	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
Health Services	768	20.485	91.466	0	1056.667
Religious Services	768	9.357	33.141	0	443.2
Infrastructural Services	768	0.781	3.446	0	32
Educational Services	768	91.542	423.38	0	4684
Financial Services	768	5.724	20.31	0	208
Security Services	768	93.03	422.197	0	4922
Social Services	768	2092.931	2072.121	0.333	7120.667
Total Services	768	337.136	321.466	0.05	1347.8
Total Services w/o Social	768	24.417	98.236	0	1134.421
Number Killed	768	54.228	189.563	0	2740
Number Wounded	768	57.943	199.988	0	3019
Number Harmed	768	112.171	374.526	0	5535

All "services" are the total mean of the number of written mentions in articles of social services provided by a given NSAG group that fall within the respective categories.

Figures 9 and 10 below contain graphs which display the average provision of services by NSAGs by year, as well as the average number of people killed by year from 1970 to 2013. A breakdown of further services provided as well as other measures of violence are provided in bar charts listed in the Appendix. In line with the intuition explained above regarding the distribution

of mentions of different kinds of service activity, I selected to display the average provision of services not including social to provide a more accurate depiction of the average levels in any given year.

Fig. 9: Total NSAG Services without Social Mentions from 1970 to 2013



Figure 10 depicts the average number of people killed by violent extremist activity each year. It is an essential part of both regression equations in determining the level of violence exhibited by an NSAG group, distributions on the number wounded and damages to property are available in the appendix.

Fig. 10: Number of People Killed by NSAGs from 1970 to 2013



As demonstrated in my theory, I argue that a lack of State Social Safety Nets results in an increase in grievances, ideological groupings, substitute safety nets, and extremism. The initial regression, attempting to view trends across multiple regions and organizations with unique motivations and contexts, is simplified in order to allow for this flexibility. I perform a simple linear regression which looks to determine the correlation between the presence of NSAG social program provision and an increase in violent activity. The equation is...

(4.1) $Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Death$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \varepsilon$$

(4.2) $Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Injury$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \varepsilon$$

(4.3) $Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Any\ Harm$

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \varepsilon$$

This will aid in determining whether there is a common correlation between increased extremism and increased social safety nets provided by non-state groups rather than the state itself. This is consistent with my hypothesis that by participating in the social programs provided by NSAGs, individuals will have a higher propensity to engage in or justify violent activity, resulting in its proliferation.

In addition to this linear regression model, I will provide evidence of the correlation between the willingness of individuals and communities to justify violence, and a lack of state social welfare through a historical and empirical investigation into the state of Colombia and The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As demonstrated in my theory, I argue that a lack of State Social Safety Nets results in an increase in grievances, ideological groupings, substitute safety nets, and extremism, by offering an in-depth exploration of these factors in a historical context, I hope to bolster the findings of my first regression model, and the second one performed solely on relationship between the FARC and the state of Colombia. This secondary multi-variate regression equation will be:

$$(4.4)\ Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Death = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \beta_2 Social\ Expenditure\ as\ Percent\ of\ GDP + \beta_3 Percent\ Distrust\ of\ Government + \varepsilon$$

$$(4.5)\ Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Injury = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \beta_2 Social\ Expenditure\ as\ Percent\ of\ GDP + \beta_3 Percent\ Distrust\ of\ Government + \varepsilon$$

$$(4.6)\ Violent\ Activity\ Resulting\ in\ Any\ Harm = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Prevalence\ of\ NSAG\ social\ safety\ nets + \beta_2 Social\ Expenditure\ as\ Percent\ of\ GDP + \beta_3 Percent\ Distrust\ of\ Government\ +\ \varepsilon$$

By including the variable that indicates the amount of spending the Colombian Government expends on social service programs, I hope to measure the correlation between how much a government invests in social services, and the amount of safety nets provided by NSAGs and how that influences the execution of violent activity by NSAGs. Also included in this multivariate regression is an indicator of surveyed distrust of the Colombian government. The initial data was separated by gender, and an average of the distrust in a single year across both genders to determine a level of overall distrust. These results are in percentage of respondents who indicated they did not trust their government, I use this variable to determine the level of affiliation and connection individuals have with their government, and how that influences the operations of NSAGs and their level of violence. Both sets of data were collected by the ECLAC, *The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean*. It lists the amount of social expenditure as percentage of the nation's total GDP. Social expenditure includes resources in 6 categories, "i) environmental protection, ii) housing and community amenities, iii) health, iv) recreation, culture, and religion, v) education and vi) social protection" (ECLAC UN, 2016) which indicates overlap between the kind of resources offered by NSAG groups, in this case the FARC.

Figure 11 visually depicts this data, demonstrating the percent of GDP spent on social services from 1990 to 2013.

Fig. 11: Colombian Government Social Expenditure from 1990 to 2013



Figure 12 depicts the percent of people over the age of 18 who distrust their political and state institutions from years 1996 to 2013, with data missing from 1999 and 2012.

Fig. 12: Distrust of Colombian Government from 1996 to 2013



As data within Colombia is limited, the data I was able to collect on distrust and social expenditure overlaps from 1996-1998, 2000-2011, and 2013, a total of 16 observations. Social expenditure included 23 observations, and spanned the years of 1990 through 2013, data in 1993 was dropped as there was no data on the activity of the FARC that year in the original dataset. This data was sourced from the UN website, specifically the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), data on social expenditure as apart of GDP was provided in conjunction with the Colombian Ministry or Finance and Public Credit, while data on distrust of political and state institutions came in conjunction with the Statistics and Economic Projects Division, Social Statistics Unit, with special tabulations from the Latinobarometro Corporation Survey.

This quantitative analysis will work in conjunction with the historical Colombian case study which expands on a variety of factors that may influence individuals and shift alliances and social contracts that were unable to be measured or determined through quantitative methods. This includes a more qualitative investigation into the perceived grievances of Colombian citizens, the historical development of ideologies and cultural groupings, state fallacies and the social contract with citizens, and the ways that the FARC manipulates these factors to recruit and proliferate.

RESULTS

I. ALL NSAGs: SINGLE LINEAR REGRESSION

The larger dataset containing information on 111 Non-State Armed Groups from years 1990 to 2013 garnered statistically sound evidence pointing towards the relationship between NSAG provision of social services, and an increase in their ability to enact violence. Figure 13

helps to develop and understanding of the distribution of services, and what kind of categories the services typically fall under.

Fig. 13: Mean of Services by Category Provided Yearly from 1970 to 2013



As we will later see in the case of the FARC, it is educational and security-based services that see the greatest number of mentions, and subsequently, assumed provision. Because of this distribution I will primarily look into the influence of these kinds of services on the amount of harm done by NSAG groups, as well as observing the impact of the totals. I performed a single univariate regression with estimation results shown below in Tables 2 through 4.

Table 2: Estimated Impact of Social Service Categories on Number of People

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	0.0599*	0.867***	0.944***	1.720***	19.24***	0.225***	3.719***	0.0594*	-0.00273
	(0.0319)	(0.298)	(0.288)	(0.572)	(6.864)	(0.0717)	(0.309)	(0.0309)	(0.00221)
Constant	34.05***	33.07***	34.88***	38.14***	39.19***	33.62***	32.94***	48.70***	59.94***
	(8.775)	(5.811)	(5.215)	(5.480)	(5.062)	(5.478)	(4.947)	(5.683)	(9.459)
Observations	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768
R-squared	0.010	0.202	0.208	0.090	0.122	0.253	0.159	0.018	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Estimated Impact of Social Service Categories on Number of People

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	0.0947***	0.944***	1.042***	1.769**	21.30***	0.244***	4.126***	0.0649*	0.00176
	(0.0362)	(0.350)	(0.337)	(0.686)	(7.955)	(0.0840)	(1.200)	(0.0346)	(0.00252)
Constant	26.01***	34.89***	36.60***	41.39***	41.30***	35.63***	34.33***	51.91***	54.26***
	(8.101)	(6.319)	(5.464)	(5.748)	(5.218)	(5.899)	(4.991)	(5.876)	(8.764)
Observations	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768
R-squared	0.023	0.215	0.227	0.086	0.135	0.266	0.176	0.019	0.000

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Estimated Impact of Social Service Categories on Number of People Harmed

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	0.155**	1.811***	1.986***	3.489***	40.54***	0.469***	7.845***	0.124*	-0.000972
	(0.0670)	(0.645)	(0.662)	(1.250)	(7.955)	(0.155)	(2.249)	(0.0651)	(0.00440)
Constant	60.05***	67.95***	71.48***	79.53***	80.50***	69.25***	67.27***	100.6***	114.2***
	(15.99)	(11.48)	(9.948)	(10.53)	(9.497)	(10.68)	(9.146)	(10.86)	(17.46)
Observations	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768	768
R-squared	0.018	0.226	0.235	0.095	0.139	0.281	0.181	0.020	0.000

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the relationship between total service mentions other than social, I found that a one unit increase in services will result in an increase in number of people killed by 0.867 people, statistically significant at the 1% level. For educational services, each additional unit of

educational mentions coincides with an increase in number killed by 0.255, statistically significant at the 1% level. Security services offered a less significant and smaller positive correlation, indicating that a one unit increase in security service mentions resulted in an increase of 0.0594 deaths. This was significant only at the 10% level. Of note is the incredibly high coefficient of 19.24 seen in relation to infrastructural services, the likelihood that it has that level of significance on the deaths of individual is unlikely and is likely due to the low number of infrastructural services provided, as seen in Table 1, infrastructural services have a mean of 0.781, and are not reportedly provided often by NSAGs. This means that the presence of such a service may seem much more impactful than a service with a higher frequency of mentions.

The regression estimated in relation to number of people wounded also yielded significant results, with total services not including the social skew, indicating an increase of 0.944 people wounded in relation to a one unit increase in service mentions, significant at the 1% level. When observing a combination of the two, creating a variable called *total harm* which includes both deaths and people wounded, it was significant at the 1% level that a one unit increase in any kind of service would result in an increase in 1.811 people harmed in some way.

This shows that there is certainly a correlation with the provision of social services by NSAGs and the level of violent activity they engage in. Further data collection and research is required to fully understand the influence that state social spending has on NSAG group's abilities to provide such services, as well as how that impacts their ability to recruit and proliferate their ideology. In this instance the following case study concerning Colombia and the qualitative evidence contained therein offers the best insight into how the provision of social services by Non-State Armed Groups influences their operational abilities, as well as the perpetuation of violence by larger groups of people. This study serves as a starting point into the

discussion of how these pieces interact, as well as what kinds of services NSAG groups offer and the development of the intuition behind this provision and the growth of the group's ability to perpetuate violence.

II. COLOMBIA AND THE FARC: CASE STUDY

The Colombian people have suffered a long history of violence at the hands of ever shifting ideologies and the lack of reception of those ideas and their diverse needs is reflected in their governments. The history and development of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, referred to as the FARC going forward, begins following a period of civil unrest and violence referred to as *La Violencia*, spanning from 1948 to 1958 (Molano, 2018). Fueled by violent governments and an encouragement of civilian warfare— including the provision of weaponry (Molano, 2018)— the peasant populations of Colombia found ways to organize under a common ideology and a common threat. This resulted in the formation of several Non-State Armed Groups, The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC. This history of intrastate conflict and ideological disputes made the state of Colombia and the FARC an excellent case study for observing the relationship between Non-State Armed Groups, Social Safety Nets, and violence.

For the purposes of this case study, I focus primarily on the FARC and their role in Colombian history. Using the framework laid out by my theory and methodology, I look to compare how the historical narratives and actions of the FARC demonstrate the connection between social service provision, or lack thereof, and the amount of violence enacted by NSAGs. I seek to develop contextual evidence, through the use of this case study, to use in response to my research question of "How do weak state social safety nets, or a lack thereof, perpetuate an increase in extremism and the propensity to engage in and justify violent activity?" This includes

a historical synopsis of the origins of the FARC, and their continued development in the mid 20th century. While the Colombian political landscape has remained fluid, the FARC's ideologies are steadfast; what has changed are their operations, and monetary endeavors. Their involvement in the world of drug cartels allows for greater operational capacity and service provision but has impacted the rhetoric surrounding the organization as well as opened discussions on the legitimacy of their political goals.

In line with my hypothesis that provision of services makes individuals more likely to engage in or justify violence, I discuss the recruitment methods used by the FARC and the ways in which they manipulate grievances and fallacies of civilian life to offer promises and opportunities to those who join the organization. This is done through an investigation on reports collected and discussed by Keith Stanski in his research titled "Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)" which includes first-hand accounts of what it is like to be a woman recruited to and involved in the FARC. These tactics and organizational strategies work in combination to contribute to their goal of damaging the state as a whole, as well as serving to weaken the social contract between the state and its civilians, this in turn reinforces their contested legitimacy and creates a platform for which to enact and spread their ideology and governing beliefs.

The FARC is an insurgent group born out of the peasant struggle during and following the period of Colombian history known as *La Violencia*. This violent history originated over land disputes and the polarization of political parties. Before the start of *La Violencia*, the Liberal party attempted to address the rampant disputes over land distribution and various crop crises from 1930 to 1946. The reforms enacted by the Liberal party increased restrictions of land in order to redistribute and minimize the accumulation of generational wealth in smaller sects of the

population. This move was met by opposition from the Colombian Conservatives. The Liberals succumbed to the more organized Conservative party in 1946, resulting in a government takeover by the Conservatives. Reestablishing power and ancestral lands through political violence, the Conservatives faced little opposition until the assassination of popular Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. This sparked *La Violencia*, with large insurrections rising across Colombia that lasted the next decade and resulted in over 300,000 deaths (Molano, 2018). This period came to an official end in 1958 with an agreement to alternate presidencies between the Conservatives and Liberals (Molano, 2018). While a power sharing agreement was reached between the two parties, those with more extremist political leanings felt excluded and unrepresented from the political process (Renwick, 2014). The recent armament of liberal peasants presented an opportunity for organization, a unification under a common ideology, threatened by a common enemy.

From these peasant-based insurrections, came a leader, first known as Pedro Antonio Marin, then Manuel Marulanda Velez, also known as "Tirofijo" ("Sure Shot" in English), and the group he became chief commander of the FARC, was founded (Molano, 2018). Despite a long history of civil wars, the revolutionary groups that followed *La Violencia* were different in the longevity of their aspirations. They sought long term change and goals hoping to "change the political, economic, and social structures of Colombia. Another element that promoted the emergence of the guerrillas was that a significant sector of Colombian intellectuals supported the use of violence" (Giraldo, 2015) (Luna, 2019) which indicated the disenchantment with traditional avenues of enacting change democratically. This is consistent with my hypothesis that in instances where civilian contribution to political processes is inaccessible, violent measures become a more viable option for communicating problems to state institutions.

The trust that reforms could occur within the limitations of the democratic system was further weakened by the ELN's limited success in advancing their agenda of societal reforms. They reached a peace agreement within the democratic context, but the government fell short on their "attempt to transform rural areas. Similar to what happened during the 1930s, the effort to promote agrarian reform found resistance from landowners who imposed an authentic counter-reform" (Luna, 2019) further indicating that available democratic channels were unproductive for promoting reform. Peasant frustrations and the need for agrarian reform only grew in the early 1970s as President Misael Pastrana opened up rural regions to development and investment. This took further land out of the hands of peasants and reduced opportunities for smaller local production operations (Molano, 2018). This resulted in a further increase in civilian grievances, and the FARC capitalized on this, growing their organization and their influence. From 1970 to 1982 the FARC saw a steep rise in recruitment and participation from 500 to 3,000 people. With this growth came the need for centralization done through the development of an extensive hierarchy, training and political programs, and an organizational code (Molano, 2018). This demonstrates a flow of people harmed by their state by reforms that failed to address land distribution and displacement issues towards extremist organization founded on achieving the reformation of civilian grievances.

To further investigate the draw peasant populations felt towards the FARC in the midst of the civilian's political struggle, I turn to Alexandra Phelan's research titled "FARC's Pursuit of "Taking Power": Insurgent Social Contracts, the Drug Trade and Appeals to Eudaemonic Legitimation" where she discusses the ways the FARC incurs support from civilians and builds their legitimacy and platform for the proliferation of their ideologies. She argues "that insurgents, like states, can appeal to eudaemonic legitimation in seeking to justify their activities

by demonstrating positive effectiveness and performance in the social and economic realm, with the aim of mobilising popular support" (Phelan, 2021) the provision of security through social welfare services and safety nets generates further support and recruitment efforts.

In discussing social services, it is important to acknowledge how an NSAG group is able to provide such services and where support comes from outside of civilian populations. In the case of the FARC, their monetary generation practices play a further role in creating security and opportunity for their followers. Their involvement in the coca (the plant used to create cocaine) production industry and the subsequent drug trade, beginning in the early 1980s, became ingrained with their mission to enact communist reforms and break down state-civilian social contracts and form their own amongst Colombian citizens (Luna, 2019; Phelan, 2021). The instance of widespread support and operational capacity of the FARC cannot be fairly assessed without an investigation into the role that the coca boom had on their ability to proliferate their ideology. While many attributed the FARC's involvement in the drug industry to be a detriment to their legitimacy and ability to justify their actions as ideologically motivated. Phelan's article argues the opposite and claims that the FARC's political framework has remained unchanged despite involvement in such black-market operations. To support this, they posit the inclusion of key items from the FARC's first political agenda in 1964 in the 2016 Peace Agreement made with the Colombian government (Phelan, 2021). Luna also acknowledges that the coca industry greatly increased the FARC's base of support in the '80s, and attributes it to their provision of protection and security to industry workers from traffickers—an essential element of social safety nets.

Similar to my discussion on the work of Ana Arjona on elements of civilian cooperation with NSAG groups, Phelan cites works done by Fall and Killcullen on the creation of pseudo-

state social ordinances and coined an overarching term for the phenomena called “competitive system of control.” This entails methods used to control large populations and encourage obedience by imitating state systems and creating an environment where safety is ensured by following the rules. Phelan explains that these methods exist on a spectrum, but offers examples in the form of categories of systems of control that include,

I. Persuasion: The mobilization of political ideologies through use of propaganda to create an argument and appeal for the imposed system of control,

II. Administration: Creating systematic limitations to facilitate obedience and providing economic opportunities and social services.

III. Coercion: The implications of punishment for disobedience and disrespect of rules and institutions. (Phelan, 2021)

These methods can be used in varying degrees in various combinations but offer insight into the methodologies and theories of NSAG groups in creating environments of established dominance, control, and affiliation. This offers further understanding of the ways armed groups can establish social contracts with civilians that put tension on contracts with the state. In the instance of the FARC, their provision of protection and social order eliminates the individuals need to depend on the state for their necessities and instead establishes this contract and affiliation between the individual and the NSAG, and in turn increases the propensity to engage in or justify violent activity in exchange for such order. The FARC took advantage of regions where the Colombian state was absent or the target of grievances to establish control and proliferate their base of support, in growing their organization, they were able to extend to regions where the government was more present, but by having a stronger more appealing system of control, denied the

government access to those populations (Phelan, 2021) as is consistent with the expected payoff model found in my theory section.

In successfully creating this social order, they were able to define the norms of this order, and this in turn aided them in legitimizing the funding that the coca trade provided as a valid and an essential part of their mission in proliferating their ideology. The FARC "used funding from [the coca trade] to demonstrate its effectiveness and performance vis-à-vis the Colombian state by providing social and economic benefits and material goods" (Phelan, 2021), reinforcing my hypothesized relationship between provision of social safety nets and support of Non-State Armed Groups. This is furthered by how dependent rural peasant populations became on the coca trade for income and security, in turn developing a dependence and affiliation for the FARC as the organization providing the opportunities.

While the FARC developed a large group of support through this industry and in conjunction with the monetary gains that they saw from engaging in this illicit activity, the growth of their organization called for administrative positions and greater hierarchical structure that demanded the rise of other methods of recruitment. Keith Stanski's article offers first-hand accounts from women who were recruited to, joined, and fled the FARC. This offers insight into the methods used to recruit as well as what the civilian appeal was in joining the organization. A large part of the FARC's recruitment power and draw comes from the shared notions of the Colombian people. As discussed in my literature review and theory sections, people who share common ideas often organize and continue to generate similar ideas when in proximity created by organizations.

The political origins of the FARC are essential in understanding where their base of support comes from, and the FARC's mission of equality in not only a socio-economic sense, but

in a gendered sense, presented a huge draw for women. Their code and demands were further reinforced during negotiations occurring between 1999 and 2002 where they spoke on the development and modernization of economic infrastructure in the name of social justice, as well as pressing the importance of democratic participation at all levels of government (Stanski, 2006). Along with these outlooks on society, Stanski frames the façade that the FARC presents of itself as taking advantage of the hardships faced by women in Colombian society, that they claim to be "a relief from everyday discrimination and a solution for women committed to solving inequality. The group describes its political project as a means for women to fight for equal treatment and the protection of their rights" and this protection from the oppression faced in their daily lives appeals to a number of young Colombian women (Stanski, 2006). A core part of their performative equality is that FARC training processes and assigned duties are identical for both women and men, and Stanski notes that the FARC has seen the involvement of women grow steadily, with "several estimates suggest[ing] that upwards of 40 percent of the 18,000-member movement are women, with some units approaching 50 percent" (Stanski, 2006) indicating the successful development and appeal generation of this rhetoric of equality. Stanski goes beyond just recruitment into the niche tactics that NSAG groups like the FARC use to retain women combatants and indoctrinate them into the limitations of their societal norms, but for the purposes of this case study I will observe only the accounts of women regarding their initial recruitment to the FARC.

The first account comes from a woman referred to as 'Laura' who left her self-proclaimed boring and uneventful rural life in favor of joining the FARC. The recruiter who contacted her promised her and her sister that they "would give us schooling and all this other stuff. Since we were in my mother's house and she didn't give us education or anything else, I

joined the group" (Stanski, 2006) as it presented to her an opportunity to receive an education that was otherwise not provided. This shows the appeal of providing social services in recruitment and retention efforts, especially in instances where the service is not available to individuals in a different setting. A similar situation presented itself for a woman called 'María Clara' who dreamed of becoming a doctor but knew she would be unable to if she stayed in her community, "because of this, I [she] made the decision to leave [for the FARC]. When I [she] was there everything seemed cool" (Stanski, 2006) even if medicine remained out of reach, the FARC offered a different, more exciting path in life than her rural community could offer. Stanski also makes the realization that for many women, it is less about the recruitment methods and more about flight, some may consider life in the insurgency group as a better option to the violence, oppression, and lack of opportunities faced in their communities (Stanski, 2006). The FARC clearly capitalizes on the failures of the state in supporting and protecting women and exacerbates these fallacies into honed recruitment methods to garner increased support. While their promises may go unmet and are riddled with inaccuracies framed to create the perception of equality, their message and provision of security and opportunities demonstrate a large enough appeal to begin the process of recruitment, retention, and indoctrination.

III. COLOMBIA AND THE FARC: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION

As stated in my methodology section, in addition to the large-scale regression containing several armed groups, I conducted a multi-variate regression containing just the state of Colombia and the FARC. This regression sought to observe the relationship between the provision of social services by the FARC and the amount of violence committed by the group. This regression also included the percentage of GDP the Colombian government spent on social expenditure from 1990 to 2013, as well as the total civilian distrust from 1996 to 2013. This

additional data will provide more holistic context to the situation and circumstances in which the FARC is operating in. To contextualize the data further, Figure 14 displays the total categorical services provided by the FARC in the years 1990 to 2013. Consistent with the intuition presented in my methodology, I refrain from including any of the variables containing totals as well as the social variable in order to deliver a more accurate representation of the distribution of the kinds of services being provided by the FARC.

Fig. 14: Sum of Services by Category Provided by the FARC from 1970 to 2013



Figure 15 observes the average number of services in each category provided on a yearly basis by the FARC. This offers insight into where their attention is focused in terms of creating social order and offering of social protections to grow their base of support. Their focus on educational services seen in both their total and average yearly provision is consistent with my qualitative findings of women being drawn to the opportunities for educational advancement that

the FARC promised to them. The next largest service provided is security services, which is demonstrated throughout my case study by the FARC's involvement in the illicit drug trade and the protections they offer to the populations that aid in the growth and production of coca and cocaine.

Fig. 15: Mean of Services by Category Provided by the FARC from 1970 to 2013



Developing an understanding of the distribution of the kinds of services being offered by the FARC helps in interpreting the results from the regressions run concerning just the FARC listed below in Tables 5 through 7.

Table 5: Impact of Provision of Services, Distrust, and Colombian Social Expenditure on Number of People Killed

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	-0.0325	0.868	-0.372	2.012**	7.967	0.00674	0.000512	0.400	-0.00516
	(0.0499)	(1.201)	(1.054)	(0.748)	(36.02)	(0.522)	(3.245)	(0.393)	(0.00758)
Total Distrust	2.342	1.506	2.578	0.374	2.330	2.442	2.464	1.115	2.299
	(2.955)	(2.523)	(2.973)	(2.156)	(2.672)	(2.974)	(3.113)	(2.339)	(2.926)
Social Expenditure	-33.82**	-36.93***	-35.90***	-36.47***	-36.58***	-36.32***	-36.29***	-37.34***	-33.70**
	(12.05)	(11.28)	(11.05)	(11.57)	(11.18)	(10.23)	(11.29)	(11.52)	(12.19)
Constant	348.4	402.3*	350.1	459.3**	361.5	355.7	354.4	428.4*	349.8
	(252.1)	(208.3)	(244.2)	(197.4)	(225.1)	(213.9)	(247.3)	(199.6)	(251.2)
Observations	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
R-squared	0.579	0.591	0.575	0.669	0.575	0.573	0.573	0.611	0.580

Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Impact of Provision of Services, Distrust, and Colombian Social Expenditure on Number of People Wounded

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	-0.0720	2.018	1.113	3.717***	72.16*	0.492	-4.662	0.787	-0.0115
	(0.0756)	(1.484)	(1.302)	(1.060)	(38.23)	(0.753)	(4.386)	(0.566)	(0.0116)
Total Distrust	10.61**	8.650**	10.54**	7.017**	9.667**	9.302**	12.10**	8.219**	10.51**
	(4.620)	(3.858)	(4.663)	(4.051)	(3.941)	(3.400)	(4.213)	(3.770)	(4.524)
Social Expenditure	25.24	18.27	18.61	19.44	17.18	17.46	22.39	17.71	25.53
	(16.61)	(13.72)	(12.00)	(11.19)	(9.817)	(11.31)	(12.71)	(11.06)	(16.80)
Constant	-767.6*	-642.9*	-741.2*	-560.4	-690.3**	-660.2*	-821.0**	-608.4*	-764.4*
	(406.9)	(321.2)	(385.0)	(328.7)	(315.8)	(306.2)	(351.0)	(321.3)	(404.0)
Observations	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
R-squared	0.439	0.492	0.432	0.666	0.590	0.436	0.463	0.527	0.443

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Impact of Provision of Services, Distrust,
and Colombian Social Expenditure on Number of People Harmed

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1) Total Services	(2) Total Services w/o Social	(3) Health Services	(4) Religious Services	(5) Infrastructural Services	(6) Educational Services	(7) Financial Services	(8) Security Services	(9) Social Services
Coefficient	-0.105	2.886	0.741	5.730***	80.12	0.499	-4.661	1.187	-0.0166
	(0.0977)	(2.025)	(1.937)	(1.492)	(70.86)	(1.075)	(6.732)	(0.860)	(0.0154)
Total Distrust	12.95*	10.16*	13.12*	7.391	12.00**	11.74**	14.56**	9.333**	12.81*
	(6.626)	(5.264)	(6.575)	(4.262)	(5.056)	(4.960)	(6.349)	(3.882)	(6.487)
Social Expenditure	-8.586	-18.66	-17.30	-17.03	-19.40	-18.86	-13.90	-19.63	-8.177
	(20.51)	(18.71)	(13.70)	(12.76)	(12.72)	(12.43)	(14.68)	(13.06)	(20.84)
Constant	-419.2	-240.6	-391.1	-101.1	-328.9	-304.5	-466.6	-180.0	-414.6
	(539.5)	(438.3)	(502.6)	(346.4)	(384.2)	(390.3)	(483.2)	(338.2)	(535.1)
Observations	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
R-squared	0.489	0.541	0.467	0.754	0.569	0.475	0.487	0.588	0.493

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5, Column (1) shows the relationship between services provided by the FARC and the number of people killed by the group when all services are considered. The coefficient for this relationship was -0.0325, this implies that for each additional service added, the number of people killed will fall. However, this includes the variable *social* which appears at a much greater frequency than any others, but as discussed above, it is more likely that NSAG groups committed to their ideologies to enact societal change will mention social services as a broader term and more frequently. To take this into consideration, I generated a variable that calculated all mentions of services other than social. This resulted in a positive correlation, indicating that for each additional unit of service provided, 0.868 more deaths would occur. I also observed the relationship between distrust and the number of people killed and found that when all services except social mentions are provided, a one unit increase in civilian distrust will result in the deaths of 1.506 people. To demonstrate how the provision of social services by the state can negatively impact the operations of NSAG groups, I measure the relationship between Colombian social expenditure as a percent of total GDP and using the total services without

social mentions from the FARC, I found that a one percent increase in social expenditure saves the lives of roughly 37 people.

As Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate, the FARC is most occupied with providing Educational and Security based services. With educational services as the independent variable, I found a slight positive correlation, but nothing overly significant, with a one unit increase in the service resulting in only 0.00674 more killed. It did however increase the relationship between distrust in state institutions and increased the relationship in number killed to 2.442 people, an increase of 0.936 when compared to considering all services. This is somewhat intuitive as receiving education from non-government bodies will change the positionality of the rhetoric being taught in favor of the providing institution or organization. There is little difference in the impact of social expenditure by the Colombian government on number killed across any of the independent variables.

When security services serve as the independent variable, the coefficient shows a stronger positive correlation with a one unit increase in security services resulting in the deaths of 0.4 people. However, security services had less of an impact on the relationship between total distrust and number killed. This is in line with the discussion presented above, and indicates that for many, their involvement in the FARC resides only in being provided security from traffickers and opposing cartels when they are directly involved in the illicit drug trade portion of the FARC's operations. This would limit the educational and ideological influence that the FARC has on such individuals, making total distrust of the Colombian government less dependent upon the provision of that service.

In running this regression, it was difficult to determine the statistical significance of this data as the number of data points were severely limited by the limited availability of the data

itself. As explained in my methodology, there were few records of social expenditure and of measures of distrust of the Colombian people for the years available in the larger more comprehensive dataset on a greater number of NSAG groups. By having limited observations, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the data alone. But in conjunction with the in-depth qualitative analysis on the historical relationship between Colombian citizens and the state, and the FARC's manipulation of state fallacies for promotion of their ideology, recruitment, retention and actions, there is a clear relationship between the NSAG group's ability to operate and their provision of socially based services.

CONCLUSION

This exploration into the implications of root causes of terror, and the formation and continuation of Non-State Armed Groups proposes relevant framework and opportunities for continued research. I investigate the intuition behind a lack of state offered social protections and how this creates communities centered around common deficiencies and grievances. These grievances, without perceived proper channels to enact political change can contribute to the growth of extremist ideologies and rhetoric. Such rhetoric can be used to facilitate recruitment and encourage the growth of NSAGs, furthering the provision of their social services, their reach, and their ability to commit acts of political violence. This study took a very broad-based approach in the review of relevant literature, as well as in the theory explaining the nuanced mechanisms of these complex relationships. The historical investigation of the state of Colombia and their experiences with civil conflicts, civilian grievances, and Non-State Armed Groups provided essential context for the relationships theorized and discussed herein. Through the qualitative analysis of the experiences of young women in the FARC done by Stanski, the evidence that suggests that provision of social services that were absent or limited in their

provision by the state, were used as a method to recruit and retain individuals as members of the FARC. In particular, the provision of educational and security-based services was found to be the most cited by individuals as reasoning for association with the FARC and were reported to be offered the most frequently by the FARC, as well as NSAGs overall.

This study hypothesizes that an increase in provision of social safety nets by Non-State Armed Groups will result in an increase in violent activity, and in running regression models, there was evidence to suggest that there is a positive correlation between the two. Due to the limitations of the data and large error term due to the inability to assess other external factors in the single linear regression, I hesitate to declare the full statistical significance of this investigation. It provides evidence that there may be a correlation between the two and offers the opportunity for a deeper more comprehensive investigation of this facet of NSAGs' relationship with violence and social service provision. When paired with the mixed-methods nature of the Colombian case study, the evidence is even more convincing, but further highlighting the opportunities for further research due to the limited historical data and the insignificant regression estimation results.

Given a larger scope and additional resources, this research could expand to include data on the social expenditure of states beyond just Colombia to provide further indication of the relationship between a lack of funding by the state and the supplementary provision by NSAGs, and the further inclusion and investigation into the role of civilian distrust in state institutions could offer valuable insights into the multitudes of mechanisms at play, and how they operate in conjunction with one another. This study provides excellent framework in the form of relevant investigations, historical context, theoretical constructs, and estimated correlations for the

continued research into the role of Social Safety Nets in maintaining state social contracts and reducing violent activity and opportunities for the growth of Non-State Armed Groups.

APPENDICES

I. Appendix A

Bar charts displaying the average of each service provided and the kind of harm done each year by all NSAGs from 1970 to 2013






Educational Services
Mean
400
300
200
100
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Financial Services
Mean
15
10
5
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Health Services
Mean
0
20
40
60
80
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013


Infrastructural Services
Mean
0
1
2
3
4
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013


Religious Services
Mean
0
10
20
30
40
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Security Services
Mean
0
200
400
600
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Social Services
Mean
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Number Killed
Mean
200
150
100
50
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Number Wounded
Mean
250
200
150
100
50
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Number Harmed
Mean
400
300
200
100
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

II. Appendix B

Table of All NSAG groups included in the dataset

Descriptive statistics - sum by(name)

Name	Number Killed	Number Wounded	Total Services w/o Social
1920 Revolution Brigades	15	19	0.789
23rd of September Communist ~g	9	5	0.000
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	10	0	0.421
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	572	1209	248.895
Action Directe	6	69	4.158
Albanian National Army (ANA)	2	0	3.579
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	8	6	0.737
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	88	48	0.211
Amal	24	46	556.053
Ansar al-Islam	89	170	61.053
Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ)	0	0	0.105
Arab Communist Organization	0	0	0.000
Army of God	3	87	73.474
Asbat al-Ansar	5	2	18.000
Babbar Khalsa International ~I	67	165	0.579
Bersatu	1	23	3.053
Black Brigade	33	89	0.316
Black Panthers	6	68	2.632
Black Revolutionary Assault ~m	0	0	0.000
Black September	0	0	0.053
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)	0	2	0.000
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (~)	8	14	0.526
Che Guevara Brigade	0	0	0.000
Democratic Front for the Lib~t	53	207	44.789
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Mo~e	25	32	0.053
Fedayeen Khalq (People's Com~d	0	3	0.263
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	138	180	134.947
Gazteriak	0	0	0.000
Guadeloupe Liberation Army	1	0	0.053
Guatemalan National Revoluti~r	115	81	7.842
Hezbollah	361	955	3166.158
Hizb-I-Islami	64	188	15.789
Informal Anarchist Federation	0	7	3.000
Iparretarrak (IK)	0	4	0.632
Irish National Liberation Ar~(	6	0	11.263
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	38	2	894.737
Islamic Movement of Uzbekist~(	20	40	1.684
Islamic Renewal Movement	0	1	0.000
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (J~)	0	0	0.105
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	5	16	10.684
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Fr~t	21	91	1.263
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	283	851	263.316
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	4	61	25.000
Jordanian Islamic Resistance	0	3	0.316
Justice Commandos for the Ar~i	1	0	0.000
Kach	6	24	28.842
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	11	52	0.632
Khmer Rouge	353	312	393.737
Komando Jihad (Indonesian)	4	0	0.000

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	0	0	62.737
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)	0	0	0.000
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	3752	2401	318.263
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	789	1741	105.842
Laskar Jihad	12	8	45.316
Lebanese Liberation Front	5	27	0.263
Lebanese National Resistance~o	58	47	1.684
Liberation Battalion	1	1	0.000
Liberation Tigers of Tamil E~m	10716	10656	574.000
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	33	0	134.316
Macheteros	6	9	1.737
Mahdi Army	65	205	873.684
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	226	63	3.368
Maruseido (Marxist Youth Lea~)	0	7	0.000
Morazanist Front for the Lib~t	31	0	0.000
Moro Islamic Liberation Fron~M	734	1503	273.789
Moro National Liberation Fro~(	622	885	74.526
Movement for Democracy and J~i	77	0	0.211
Movement for the Emancipatio~f	280	98	105.105
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	232	191	4.789
National Socialist Council o~a	59	42	0.579
New People's Army (NPA)	3590	2197	186.947
Ogaden National Liberation F~t	111	77	12.421
Omega-7	4	16	1.737
Orange Volunteers (OV)	0	4	10.000
Palestine Liberation Organiz~o	12	151	325.368
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (P~)	207	1046	91.579
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan~U	128	182	9.053
People's Revolutionary Organ~t	1	4	0.211
People's United Liberation F~t	4	1	0.000
Popular Forces of April 25	10	16	0.421
Popular Front for the Libera~n	47	168	214.421
Popular Movement for the Lib~t	54	26	17.579
Popular Resistance Committees	2	56	57.474
Real Irish Republican Army (~A	1	1	25.789
Red Brigades	69	131	30.263
Red Flag (Venezuela)	31	2	0.947
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	9	7	86.263
Resistenza Corsa	0	0	0.000
Revolutionary Armed Forces o~o	5502	4001	475.263
Revolutionary Eelam Organiza~n	1	0	0.368
Revolutionary Nuclei	1	3	0.105
Revolutionary Struggle	1	4	4.842
Saif-ul-Muslimeen	0	0	0.000
Salafia Jihadia	45	100	0.684
Save Kashmir Movement	10	30	0.316
Sekihotai	0	0	0.105
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	60	47	5.421
South Londonderry Volunteers~L	0	0	0.263
Students Islamic Movement of~d	63	243	3.000
Taliban	10122	10356	8512.263
The Extraditables	181	411	4.053
Tigray Peoples Liberation Fr~	317	200	2.579
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army ~T	3	0	0.000
Turkish Hezbollah	9	4	0.579
Turkish Islamic Jihad	1	2	0.000

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	301	24	93.895
Ummah Liberation Army	0	0	0.000
United Liberation Front of A~m	580	1949	18.105
United People's Democratic S~d	16	22	0.158
Vigorous Burmese Student War~r	1	3	0.000
Youth Action Group	0	0	0.000

III. Appendix C

Do File Codes and Descriptions

```
/*          File Name:          SeniorISDoFile.do
              Author: Tabitha Skornik-Hayes
             Written: 12/04/22
                                        Stata Version 17.0
 Description:       Cleaning of Dataset on Dyadic Conflicts */

clear all
set more off
*Starts log file

use "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/TIOS Stata Data.dta", clear

use "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/NameMatchGTDStata.dta", clear

import excel "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/PARSEDglobalterrorismdb_0221distCOPY.xlsx",sheet("Data") firstrow
clear

order country iyear gname nkill nkillter nwound nwoundte property propextent propvalue

drop imonth - INT_ANY

*Reduces all individual instances to the sum of instances for each year to better match the TIOS database*
collapse (sum) nkill nkillter nwound nwoundte property propextent propvalue, by(country iyear gname)

*Renames variables capable of uniquely identifying observations to match those same variables in the TIOS Data Set*
rename country gtd_countrycode
rename iyear year
rename gname name


save "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/SuperCleanGTDData.dta", replace

use "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/SuperCleanGTDData.dta", clear

rename country gtd_countrycode

rename iyear year

rename gname name

merge 1:1 year name gtd_countrycode using "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/TIOS Stata Data.dta"

*This drops all variables that did not have a unique match across both datasets, left with 768 observations*
keep if _merge==3

*Drop excess variables not conduicive to analysis*
drop marob_orgid acled_name2 acled_name3 acled_name4 acled_name5 acled_name6 acled_name7 acled_name8 _merge

*Generating new variable that measures the total mentions of services other than social*
gen totalnosocial = (total-social)

gen totalnosocialmean = totalnosocial/19

*Creates new variable that measures the total amount of harm, the combination of number killed and number wounded*
gen totalharm = nkill+nwound

*Label vars for accurate graphing and table labels*
label var religionmean "Religious Services"
label var infrastructuremean "Infrastructural Services"
label var healthmean "Health Services"
label var educationmean "Educational Services"
label var financemean "Financial Services"
label var securitymean "Security Services"
```

```
label var socialmean "Social Services"
label var totalmean "Total Services"
label var totalnosocialmean "Total Services w/o Social"
label var nkill "Number Killed"
label var nwound "Number Wounded"
label var totalharm " Number Harmed"

save "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/IS DataSet TIOS+GTD.dta"
*Save the merged data as one dataset ready to be used for analysis, then use*
use "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/IS DataSet TIOS+GTD.dta", clear

*Creates Table of all NSAG orgs in the data set with the sum of people killed and wounded by the group, as well as the total service mentions they list that do not contain social*
asdoc tabstat nkill nwound totalnosocialmean, stat(sum) by(name) replace


*All NSAG Regression Estimations with robust standard errors*
reg nkill totalmean, r
outreg2 using Regression1.doc, replace ctitle(`var')
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean totalnosocialmean {
reg nkill `var', r
outreg2 using Regression1.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}

reg nwound totalmean, r
outreg2 using Regression2.doc, replace ctitle(Total Social)
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean totalnosocialmean {
reg nwound `var', r
outreg2 using Regression2.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}

reg totalharm totalmean, r
outreg2 using Regression3.doc, replace ctitle(Total Social)
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean totalnosocialmean {
reg totalharm `var', r
outreg2 using Regression3.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}

*Changes Graph Settings to Preferred Font and Colors*
graph set window fontface "Garamond"
grstyle color background white
grstyle color major_grid dimgray
grstyle color p1bar gs10
grstyle color p1barline sienna
grstyle init


*Graphs the mean provision or harm done by category each year, offers better insights than the histogram method into how many services are provided and how much harm is done each year by all NSAGs*

graph bar securitymean, over (year) ytitle(Mean) title (Security Services, color (black))
graph export securitymean.png, replace
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean socialmean totalmean totalnosocialmean nkill nwound totalharm{
        graph bar `var', over (year) ytitle(Mean) title (`:variable label `var", color(black))
        graph export `var'.png, replace
}

*Generates summary statistic table of relevant data*
asdoc sum healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean totalmean totalnosocialmean nkill nwound totalharm, replace

*Adding Colombia Specific Data*
merge 1:1 year name using "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/COLsocialspending.dta"
drop if _merge==2

*Imports excel file on Male/Female Distrust and saves as Stata Data*
import excel "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLSocData.xlsx", sheet("data") firstrow case(lower)
keep in 1/20
save "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLStataData.dta", replace

*Imports excel file on Social Spending and saves as Stata Data*
import excel "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLSocialOnly.xlsx", sheet("Sheet1") firstrow case(lower)
save "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLSocialOnlyStata.dta", replace

*Merges Colombian data on Distrust to rest of dataset*
use "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/Data Sets/IS DataSet TIOS+GTD.dta"
merge 1:1 name year using "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLStataData.dta"
```

```
drop if _merge==2
drop _merge
*Merges Colombian Social Expenditure Data to rest of dataset*
merge 1:1 name year using "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/COLSocialOnlyStata.dta"
drop if _merge==2

save "/Users/tabitha/Desktop/s IS/IS DataSet TIOS+GTDCOMPLETE.dta", replace

*Generates bar chart of the Percent of GDP that Colombia spends on social expenditure each year*
graph bar socialexpenditure, over (year) ytitle("Percent of GDP") title (Colombian Government Social Expenditure, color
(black)) , if year>1989

*Generates bar chart of the Percent Distrust in state and political institutions civilians experience each year*
graph bar totaldistrust, over (year) ytitle("Percent Distrust") title (Distrust of Colombian Government, color (black)) , if
year>1995

*Generates bar chart of the average number of people harmed by the FARC each year*
graph bar totalharm, over (year) ytitle("Average Harm") title ("Number of People Harmed by the FARC")


*Colombia specific regresiion estimations*
reg nkill totalmean totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionHelp.doc, replace ctitle(`var')
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean
totalnosocialmean {
reg nkill `var' totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionRobust.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}


reg nwound totalmean totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionRobust2.doc, replace ctitle(`var')
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean
totalnosocialmean {
reg nwound `var' totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionRobust2.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}


reg totalharm totalmean totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionRobust3.doc, replace ctitle(`var')
foreach var in healthmean religionmean infrastructuremean educationmean financemean securitymean socialmean
totalnosocialmean {
reg totalharm `var' totaldistrust socialexpenditure, r
outreg2 using ColombiaRegressionRobust3.doc, append ctitle(`var')
}


log close
```

REFERENCES

Alakoc, B. P., Werner, S., & Widmeier, M. (2021). Violent and Nonviolent Strategies of Terrorist Organizations: How Do Mixed Strategies Influence Terrorist Recruitment and Lethality? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *0*(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1935706

Alderman, H., & Yemtsov, R. (2014). How Can Safety Nets Contribute to Economic Growth? *The World Bank Economic Review*, *28*(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lht011

Arjona, A. (2017a). Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *28*(4–5), 755–778. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1322328

Asal, V., Flanigan, S., & Szekely, O. (2020). Doing Good while Killing: Why Some Insurgent Groups Provide Community Services. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *0*(0), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1745775

Basedau, M., Fox, J., Pierskalla, J. H., Strüver, G., & Vüllers, J. (2017). Does discrimination breed grievances—and do grievances breed violence? New evidence from an analysis of religious minorities in developing countries. *Conflict Management & Peace Science*, *34*(3), 217–239. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215581329

Berman, Eli. 2000. Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: An economist's view of ultra-orthodox Jews. *Quarterly*

Journal of Economics 65 (3): 905-53.

——. 2003. Hamas, Taliban, and the Jewish underground: An economist's view of radical religious

militias. Mimeo, University of California, Los Angeles.

Berti, B. (2015). Non-State Actors as Providers of Governance: The Hamas Government in Gaza between Effective Sovereignty, Centralized Authority, and Resistance. *The Middle East Journal*, *69*(1), 9–31. https://doi.org/10.3751/69.1.11

Bowie, Neil G. "40 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets: A New Inventory." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 15, no. 2 (2021): 147–61.

Burgoon, B. (2006). On welfare and terror: Social welfare policies and political-economic roots of terrorism. *Journal of conflict resolution*, *50*(2), 176-203.

Brock Blomberg, S., Hess, G. D., & Weerapana, A. (2004). An economic model of terrorism. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *21*(1), 17-28.

Castano, Arturo Herrera, and Shane Tarrant. "Are the Guerrillas Gone? A Historical Political Economy and Social Analysis of the Rise and Demise of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC), 1964–2010," n.d., 96.

"CEPALSTAT | Bases de Datos y Publicaciones Estadísticas." https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard.html?lang=en.

Chiang, A. Y. (2021). Violence, non-violence and the conditional effect of repression on subsequent dissident mobilization. *Conflict Management & Peace Science*, *38*(6), 627–653. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894221995481

Daly, S. Z. (2018). Determinants of ex-combatants' attitudes toward transitional justice in Colombia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *35*(6), 656–673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218788084

Davis, D. E. (2009). Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *30*(2), 221–245. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903059757

Deener, A. (2016). The Ecology Of Neighborhood Participation and The Reproduction Of Political Conflict. *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research*, *40*(4), 817–832. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12434

Delgado Maldonado, S. (2013). Political Participation: An Implied Condition for Enduring Peace in Colombia. *International Law: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional*, *23*, 267–318.

DiPaolo, A. (2004). Battle for State Control: Lessons from Violent Nonstate Actors Imitating the State: Colombia, Nicaragua, and Lessons for Iraq. *World Affairs*, *167*(4), 163–174.

Dyrstad, K., & Hillesund, S. (2020). Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *64*(9), 1724–1753. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720909886

Ellis, B. H., Sideridis, G., Miller, A. B., Abdi, S. M., & Winer, J. P. (2021). Trauma, Trust in Government, and Social Connection: How Social Context Shapes Attitudes Related to the Use of Ideologically or Politically Motivated Violence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *44*(12), 1050–1067. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1616929

Flores, T. E. (2014). Vertical Inequality, Land Reform, and Insurgency in Colombia. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, *20*(1), 5–31. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2013-0058

Grossman, H. I. 1991. A general equilibrium model of insurrections. American Economic Review 81: 912–921.

Grynkewich, A. G. (2008). Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *31*(4), 350–370. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100801931321

Heger, Lindsay L. and Danielle F. Jung (2015) Negotiating with Rebels: The Effect of Rebel Service Provision on Conflict Negotiations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution.* Published online first.

Heger, Lindsay L, Danielle F Jung, and William A Wagstaff. "Terrorist and Insurgent Organizations," n.d., 31.

Heinrich, T., Martinez Machain, C., & Oestman, J. (2017). Does Counterterrorism Militarize Foreign Aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(4), 527–541.

Hess, G. D., and A. Orphanides. 1995. War politics: An economic, rational-voter framework. American Economic Review 85: 828–846. Hess, G. D., and A. Orphanides. 2001. Economic conditions, elections and the magnitude of foreign conflicts. Journal of Public Economics 80: 121–140.

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. "A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30, no. 3 (April 1, 2007): 249–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100601148456.

Ippolito, M., & Cicatiello, L. (2019). Political instability, economic inequality and social conflict: The case in Italy. *Panoeconomicus*, *66*(3), 365–383. https://doi.org/10.2298/PAN1903365I

Ishaque, W., Shaikh, D. S., & Mahesar, D. A. A. (2017). Academic Construct Of Social Welfare Services And Social Safety Net. *The Government - Annual Research Journal of Political Science.*, *5*(5). https://sujo-old.usindh.edu.pk/index.php/THE-GOVERNMENT/article/view/3384

Jegede, F., Bampton, K., & Todd, M. (2015). *State vs non-state armed groups—A political economy of violence*. https://doi.org/10.5176/2251-2403_PSSIR15.44

Justino, P., & Martorano, B. (2019). Redistributive Preferences and Protests in Latin America. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *63*(9), 2128–2154. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719827370

Kavanagh, J. (2011). Selection, availability, and opportunity: The conditional effect of poverty on terrorist group participation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *55*(1), 106-132.

Krueger, A. B., & Malečková, J. (2003). Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?. *Journal of Economic perspectives*, *17*(4), 119-144.

Larratt-Smith, C. (2020). Navigating Formal and Informal Processes: Civic Organizations, Armed Nonstate Actors, and Nested Governance in Colombia. *Latin American Politics and Society*, *62*(2), 75–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2019.61

Loaiza Quintero, O. L., Muñetón Santa, G., & Vanegas López, J. G. (2018). An exploratory assessment of the relationship between multidimensional poverty and armed conflict: The case of Antioquia, Colombia: Un análisis exploratorio de la relación entre pobreza multidimensional y conflicto armado: el caso de Antioquia en Colombia. *Desarrollo y Sociedad*, *80*, 11–51. https://doi.org/10.13043/DYS.80.1

Luna, L. (2019). Colombian Violent Conflict: A Historical Perspective. *International Journal on World Peace*, *36*(4), 53–83.

Maldonado, S. D. (2013). *POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN IMPLIED CONDITION FOR ENDURING PEACE IN COLOMBIA*. 52.

Masullo, J. (2021). Civilian Contention in Civil War: How Ideational Factors Shape Community Responses to Armed Groups. *Comparative Political Studies*, *54*(10), 1849–1884. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912285

McCarthy, Sean M. "Colombia's FARC: More Than Just Opportunistic Criminals." Air War College Air University Maxwell AFB United States, February 14, 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1018816.

McKeown, S., & Taylor, L. K. (20171204). Beyond the irony of intergroup contact: The effects of contact and threat on political participation and support for political violence in Northern Ireland. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, *21*(4), 234. https://doi.org/10.1037/gdn0000074

Meagher, K. (2012). The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa. *Development and Change*, *43*(5), 1073–1101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01794.x

Meernik, J., Henao, J. G., & Baron-Mendoza, L. (undefined/ed). Insecurity and the reintegration of former armed non-state actors in Colombia. *European Political Science Review*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773921000230

Miodownik, D., & Nir, L. (2016). Receptivity to Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies: A Micro-Level Mechanism of Perceived Horizontal Inequalities. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *39*(1), 22–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1084162

Molano, Alfredo. "The Evolution of The FARC: A Guerrilla Group's Long History." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 50, no. 3 (September 2018): 279–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2018.1525054.

Munson, Z. (2001). Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *42*(4), 487–510.

Nandwani, B. (2019). Decentralisation, Economic Inequality and Insurgency. *Journal of Development Studies*, *55*(7), 1379–1397.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. (2019). The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Phelan, Alexandra. "FARC's Pursuit of 'Taking Power': Insurgent Social Contracts, the Drug Trade and Appeals to Eudaemonic Legitimation." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44, no. 12 (December 2, 2021): 971–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1616928.

Rawlings, L. B. (2003). *Colombia: Reforming the Social Safety Net*. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/10394

Rinehart, C. S. (2009). Volatile Breeding Grounds: The Radicalization of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *32*(11), 953–988. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903262773

Rosenau, William, Ralph Espach, Román D. Ortiz, and Natalia Herrera. "Why They Join, Why They Fight, and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia's Database of Demobilized Militants." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 277–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700658.

Schock, K. (1996). A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *40*(1), 98–133. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040001006

Stanski, Keith. “Terrorism, Gender, and Ideology: A Case Study of Women Who Join the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),” n.d., 16.

Thomson, V. (2012). *Boko Haram and Islamic Fundamentalism in Nigeria*.

Tornell, A. 1998. Reform from within. Working Paper 6497, NBER, Cambridge, MA.

Tovar, J., & Urrutia, M. (2017). The Impact of Social Safety Net Programs on Household Savings in Colombia. *The Developing Economies*, *55*(1), 23–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/deve.12119

University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland), Wajzer, M., Cukier-Syguła, M., & University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland). (2020). Studying Political Violence Using Game Theory Models: Research Approaches and Assumptions. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, *49*(2), 143–157. https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2020208

Velez, L., McAlister, A., & Shaohua Hu. (1997). Measuring Attitudes Toward Violence in Colombia. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *137*(4), 533–534. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224549709595472

Vivian, J. (1994). *Social safety nets and adjustment in developing countries* (Working Paper No. 1). UNRISD Occasional Paper: World Summit for Social Development. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/148791

Which Grievances Make People Support Violence against the State? Survey Evidence from the Niger Delta: International Interactions: Vol 44, No 3. (n.d.). Retrieved October 7, 2021, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2017.1369411