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IMPACTS OF THE SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT
IN COLOMBIA

By Libbie DePastino

An Independent Study Thesis
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Advisors: Matthew Krain and Hernán Medina

Abstract

In the past few decades, political scientists have noticed a trend of actors linking the issue of development to security in order to emphasize its importance and legitimize action. This discursive act, known as securitization, transforms a lack of development into an existential threat that actors must protect against at all costs. Though scholars agree that this process of framing certain topics as security issues occurs, there is little information on what impact it may have on policy creation or policy outcomes. This study examines how the securitization of development impacts actual development outcomes. I hypothesize that securitization will cause greater prioritization of development because security issues draw greater attention and resources, but that it will not lead to improved development outcomes because of the instrumentalizing nature of securitization. I use the case study of Colombia during the 1990s to track the process of the securitization of development and any resulting changes in development. I find that though there are positive changes to prioritization of development, securitization does not impact development outcomes.

Resumen

En las últimas décadas, los científicos políticos han notado una tendencia de actores a conectar el tema del desarrollo con la seguridad para enfatizar su importancia y legitimar la acción. Este acto discursivo, conocido como securización, transforma una falta de desarrollo en una amenaza existencial contra la cual los actores deben protegerse a toda costa. Aunque los académicos están de acuerdo en que este proceso de enmarcar ciertos temas como problemas de seguridad ocurre, hay poca información sobre el impacto que podría tener en la creación de políticas o los resultados de las políticas. Este estudio examina cómo la securización del desarrollo impacta los resultados reales del desarrollo. Hipotetizo que la securización causará una mayor priorización del desarrollo porque los temas de seguridad atraen mayor atención y recursos, pero que no conducirá a mejores resultados de desarrollo por la naturaleza instrumentalizadora de la securización. Utilizo el estudio de caso de Colombia durante los años noventa para rastrear el proceso de securización del desarrollo y cualquier cambio resultante en el desarrollo. Encuentro que aunque hay cambios positivos en la priorización de desarrollo, la securización no impacta los resultados de desarrollo.

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Prefacio:

El proceso de un estudio interdisciplinario

Mi experiencia con el Estudio Independiente empezó hacia el principio de la pandemia de COVID-19. He tenido mucha suerte de salvarme de gran parte de la tragedia y las dificultades de la pandemia, pero ha transformado por completo mi experiencia de convertirme en adulto. Pasé más tiempo en mi casa de la infancia de lo que había planeado, no vi a personas de mi edad durante mucho tiempo, y cuando lo hacía, a menudo estábamos separados por pantallas. Como mucha gente de mi generación, me sentí aislada y que había perdido experiencias importantes: viajar, pasar tiempo con mis amigos e incluso tener una vida normal en la universidad.

Algunas de estas experiencias perdidas se relacionan con mi Estudio Independiente y causan algunas limitaciones en mi investigación. Completé mi Estudio Independiente Junior completamente en línea sin mucha interacción con mis compañeros de clase. No pude estudiar en el extranjero, un requisito típico de mi especialización de Estudios Globales e Internacionales y un beneficio definitivo para mi especialización en español. La experiencia extranjera también es una fuente común de inspiración para temas de los estudios independientes, quizás porque es una forma tan impactante de aprendizaje experiencial que inspira curiosidad. Imaginé que, como otros estudiantes, basaría mi investigación en algo que había observado o aprendido en el extranjero, pero lamentablemente no fue posible. Cuando empecé mi investigación, no pude viajar para recolectar datos, lo que limitó las opciones de temas. Estas limitaciones significaban que tuve que confiar en la experiencia de las clases para elegir y llevar a cabo un tema.

Afortunadamente, he tenido clases increíbles y diversas para elegir. Tengo el privilegio de tener dos especializaciones interdisciplinarias, a través de las cuales he tomado clases en ciencias políticas, economía, historia, lenguaje, literatura y cultura. En el curso de mi Estudio Independiente Junior y Senior, pensé en muchos temas. Como junior, estudié cómo la feminización del lenguaje podría afectar la política internacional sobre la trata de personas. Me interesaba el feminismo y cómo los políticos apelaban a los estereotipos sobre la vulnerabilidad de las mujeres para su propio beneficio. También consideré temas de cómo la economía política contribuye a externalizar los problemas ambientales y cómo se utiliza la maternidad como una herramienta para los movimientos sociales. El primero combinó temas interesantes de neocolonialismo y el medio ambiente, mientras que el segundo incluyó movimientos sociales, otra cosa que me pareció interesante.

Para finalizar mi tema, consideré más las clases pasadas y lo que encontré más interesante sobre cada una de ellas. En una clase sobre la economía del desarrollo, aprendí sobre la importancia del desarrollo humano informado y los peligros del paternalismo. Muchos individuos, estados y organizaciones utilizan suposiciones demasiado simplificadoras para crear políticas de desarrollo que terminan por no ayudar o incluso perjudicar a la gente. Leí sobre el término *segurización* y cómo el Consejo de Seguridad enmarcó el género como un tema de seguridad para una clase sobre el sistema de las Naciones Unidas. Este marco de seguridad puede hacer que un tema parezca más importante y urgente. En una clase que se llamó Sexo y Guerra, aprendí que el bienestar de ciertos grupos puede ser instrumentalizado, o cooptado para algún otro propósito. Por ejemplo, algunos activistas fomentan la educación de las niñas y las mujeres porque

mejorará la economía global, no simplemente porque las niñas y las mujeres son dignas de recibir educación. A través de varias clases de historia y español, leí fuentes primarias y teoría y vi cómo los pensamientos y acciones coloniales permanecen en la actualidad.

Esta experiencia interdisciplinaria me proporcionó mucho conocimiento e inspiración para elegir, a pesar de las limitaciones de la pandemia. Todos estos temas me parecieron particularmente interesantes y se cruzaron en mi tema final del Estudio Independiente: la securización del desarrollo. Este tema ciertamente puede ser estudiado sólo desde la perspectiva de la ciencia política, y los temas similares de securización han sido y están siendo estudiados actualmente por otros estudiantes de ciencias políticas. Sin embargo, mis especializaciones requieren un enfoque interdisciplinario, lo que hizo que el proyecto fuera mucho más interesante para mí.

La visión del proyecto evolucionó con el tiempo mientras trabajaba. Al principio, iba a seguir una estructura tradicional de ciencia política con un capítulo o dos escritos en español. Sin embargo, más tarde, quedó claro que una mayor perspectiva histórica y cultural enriquecería mi investigación. Estos cambios llevaron a la estructura final del estudio: una revisión de literatura, metodología y resultados que son comunes a las ciencias políticas, con una adición de un capítulo de contexto histórico del caso y un de las comprensiones locales, que incluyen perspectivas de las humanidades. Agregué el contexto histórico de los años noventa, que elegí porque es cuando se inicia el discurso securizador sobre el desarrollo. Para la parte sobre las perspectivas locales, recolecté información sobre las opiniones de la gente de Colombia sobre las políticas que había discutido. Fue muy importante porque ayudó a explicar que las políticas de desarrollo

fracasaron y por qué. Esta estructura cumplió mejor con los requisitos, pero más importante, condujo a resultados que de otro modo no habría encontrado.

Como llegué a esta estructura con la ayuda de mis asesores, empecé a ver más claramente el valor del pensamiento y la investigación interdisciplinarios. Mis clases de ciencias sociales y humanidades no solo me dieron diferentes lentes y diferentes formas de aprender y escribir, sino que se combinaron para formar nuevos conocimientos y una nueva metodología. No estaba estudiando la securización del desarrollo desde múltiples perspectivas, sino que estaba usando una combinación de herramientas de varios campos. Podría usar las humanidades para explicar un fenómeno de las ciencias sociales y visa versa. Esta comprensión motivó aún más mi investigación y me llevó a un producto del que estoy orgullosa que refleja las diversidades de mis estudios en Wooster.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In a 1992 address to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the importance of economic development, stating that “zones of poverty, which, far from shrinking, are constantly spreading, constitute potential hotbeds of violence and confrontation...the imperative of sustainable development is an essential factor in the establishment of peace and security in the world” (United Nations 1992, 151). Though this declaration in favor of development may seem commonplace now, Boutros-Ghali’s language was distinctive at the time. The speech came towards the beginning of a discursive trend that emerged during the 1990s which saw leaders linking security to issues that were previously considered unrelated. By appealing to security, which is largely considered the top priority in global politics, actors could bring greater attention and urgency to issues like public health, the environment, or development.

Ole Wæver coined the term securitization to describe this discursive act, which transforms an issue into an existential threat that actors must protect against at all costs (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde 1998). Since then, securitization has received great attention from political scientists who aim to better understand its process. Though scholars agree that actors strategically use securitization to garner attention and support for certain issues, there is little information on what impact it may have on policy creation or policy outcomes. It is important to understand potential benefits or consequences to securitization, as it affects vital issues like development. A change in the

discourse surrounding development could alter how policies working towards poverty reduction are designed or implemented, potentially impacting their success.

In this study, I will address the research question: *How does the securitization of development impact development outcomes?* I hypothesize that securitization will cause greater prioritization of development, but that it will not lead to improved development outcomes. In Chapter 2, I will present an overview of the literature on development, securitization, and their intersection. I will then introduce the theoretical argument and hypotheses that emerge from the literature. Chapter 3 will outline the methodology used to test the hypotheses and Chapter 4 gives context for the case study of Colombia. In Chapters 5 and 6 I will analyze the data collected and form conclusions about the hypotheses. Finally, Chapter 7 will summarize the results of the study and provide implications and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In order to study how the securitization of development impacts development outcomes, an understanding of its key components is required. This chapter will incorporate literature from the areas of development, securitization, and the securitization of development. First, I will examine the literature on development, including how it is measured, strategies for promoting development, and the controversy over the term and concept itself. Then, I will discuss securitization theory and its empirical applications. I will also introduce the intersection of these two topics with the securitization of development, including its possible benefits and costs. Finally, I will discuss the gaps in the current literature and form hypotheses based on the findings of previous authors.

Development

Development is an extremely broad, complex, and dynamic term without one agreed upon definition. Most scholars include the ideas of economic growth and poverty eradication in their understandings, but some choose to emphasize certain aspects like nutrition, education, sustainability, or equality, over others. The idea of development has also changed significantly over time, as the level of analysis moved from the state to the individual (Stanton 2007; Rayworth 2017). The word itself is controversial, as it implies a normative hierarchy that places “developed” states as superior to “less developed” states, a structure that typically aligns with colonial hierarchies. Despite this baggage, development has remained the preferred term to describe the economic wellbeing of states and individuals.

Because of the wide range of definitions and understandings, many different forms of measuring development exist. Older strategies emphasize the economic growth of the state, using measures like gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP). To allow for more complexity, GDP per capita was created, which divides the total economic output by the population of the state (Stanton 2007). However, none of these measures capture the welfare of a population, so they are no longer popular as measures of development. The concept of human development has largely replaced economic growth in development scholarship (Stanton 2007). Human development focuses on the individual's needs, rather than the state's economic success. The emergence of the human development index (HDI) reflects this change in ideology, as it has been adopted by states and international organizations as an alternative to GDP. HDI is a composite measure that uses various indicators to capture different aspects of human wellbeing (Stanton 2007).

Sustainable development is a more recent concept that builds off of human development to include factors of sustainability like equality and environmental concerns (Stanton 2007; Raworth 2017). Like HDI, the Gini coefficient aims to provide more complexity to the measure of development by including income inequality. It assigns a numerical value between 0 and 1 that ranks the income distribution in a state. 0 represents perfect equality, where all individuals hold equal income and 1 represents perfect inequality, where one individual holds all the income (Gastwirth 1972). Kate Raworth includes twelve different aspects of human development, along with environmental impact, to create the “doughnut model,” a visual representation of human and sustainable development (Raworth 2017). These are only a few examples of measures of

development that have gained and lost popularity over time with changing ideas about development.

These development indicators can help to evaluate the strengths of development strategies, which have also evolved with changing notions of development. Foreign aid is a relatively old strategy in which donor states give grants or loans to recipient states, often with conditions about how to use the money or certain policies to employ (Nunn 2019). Scholars have noted several major problems with foreign aid, including that conditions are limiting and paternalistic to recipient states, corruption can prevent the money from reaching its intended target, and it can create a dependent relationship, especially with the use of loans (Nunn 2019). Foreign direct investment (FDI) differs in that it involves mostly the private sector, but it has similar critiques. FDI occurs when a corporation moves a branch of operations to a foreign country, bringing monetary flows, jobs, and new technology to the host state. However, FDI can be impeded by corruption, create dependent relationships, foster exploitation of local populations, and threaten the environment of the host state (Habib and Zurawicki 2002; Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo 2017).

As seen with development indicators, development economists have tended to favor more individual-level approaches to development in recent years. One example is microfinance, where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or banks distribute small loans to people who otherwise do not have access to finance. This strategy is purported to encourage entrepreneurship and gender equality, but it has not been shown to lift people out of poverty, and in the most extreme cases, can even create insurmountable debt for recipients (Pantelić 2011). Cash transfers are an alternative that do not come with the risk

of debt, since they are not loans. NGOs and governments have implemented cash transfer programs, often with conditions on how to spend the money, as a more direct approach to poverty alleviation. Though they have not shown major results yet in eradicating poverty for large groups of people, the strategy is more successful than microfinance in reaching the poorest members of Latin American countries, and may continue to demonstrate improved results (Pantelić 2011).

The debates over these definitions, measures, and strategies are parts of a greater controversy over the concept of development itself. Development is a largely Western idea, even though it is typically applied to the Global South. Because of its origins in the Global North, its associated values and ideals align with Northern interests, which are not necessarily shared by the areas and people it claims to benefit (Goldsmith 2002; Dossa 2007). In fact, Dossa argues that development is not simply a case of misplaced good intentions, but rather a colonial scheme “to advance Western development and Western hegemony” (2007, 887). Though the dominant understanding of development in the Global North is that it “fixes” the damages of our colonial past by promoting poverty eradication and economic growth, in many cases, it only furthers colonial values and reinforces past damages (Goldsmith 2002; Dossa 2007; de Sousa Santos 2016).

These critiques are leveled mainly at versions of development that emphasize capitalist policies like foreign aid, loans, and FDI. However, the “capitalist model of development” is not the only version, as initiatives begun in the Global South have demonstrated (de Sousa Santos 2016, 30). For example, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative in Ecuador is an oil trade strategy that centers indigenous values of environmental conservation and economic support for the poor, rather than Western capitalist interests

(de Sousa Santos 2016). Despite its local popularity, the initiative ultimately failed because of its inability to generate as much money as the dominant oil trade plans. This case study, along with the more theoretical arguments, demonstrate that sustainable poverty eradication is not always the central goal of development. Plans that break the traditional idea of development by prioritizing local needs over Northern interests may fail because they do not conform to this eurocentric view of development. Though the measures and strategies discussed above are helpful in quantifying and studying development, it is important to consider whose values are included in the concept.

Securitization

One way that development has been discussed and understood is through the lens of security. While older notions of national and global security focus on physical threats and military defense, more recently, constructivists have redefined the concept. Constructivism is a theory of International Relations that argues that the international system is socially and historically constructed. Rather than accept actors' interests and motivations as a given like realists and liberals, constructivists ask how and why those motivations emerge and change (Matthews and Callaway 2019). Constructivism emphasizes intersubjective knowledge, where shared subjective ideas and understandings about the international system become accepted as reality over time (Wendt 1992; Matthews and Callaway 2019).

This intersubjectivity is related to norms, which are another important component of constructivism. Shared beliefs of what should be in the international system can form norms, or collective expectations that guide how actors should behave (Finnemore and

Sikkink 1998; Matthews and Callaway 2019). International actors can become “norm entrepreneurs” when they create and promote norms that successfully shape the thinking and behavior of other actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). When using this constructivist framework of intersubjectivity and norms, security becomes a construct whose meaning can change over time.

The Copenhagen School of constructivist theory introduced the term “securitization” to describe the discursive process by which security is constructed through “speech acts” (Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde 1998; Wæver 1995). Political elites transform a topic into a security issue, or an existential threat to the state or to the world, simply by declaring it as such. According to the first major work on securitization, *Security: A New Framework for Development*, securitization requires four main components:

1. A securitizing actor who makes “securitizing moves” to link an issue to security,
2. An existential threat to some entity,
3. A referent object, the entity that is threatened, and
4. An audience who observes the securitizing move. If the audience accepts the link to security, the issue is then securitized (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998).

In traditional notions of security, the referent object is typically the state and its sovereignty, which faces some existential military threat. However, actors can securitize other issues by naming different referent objects and their existential threats. By convincing the audience of the existential threat, the actor moves the issue from the realm

of “normal politics” to that of security, legitimizing the issue and giving elites permission to use “whatever means necessary” to stop the threat (Wæver 1995, 51).

Similar ideas of influencing public perceptions exist in the literature on framing. Changes in the way an issue is framed, often by political elites or advocacy groups, can greatly impact the way the audience views the issue (Mintz and Redd 2003; Chong and Druckman 2007). By communicating only positive or negative aspects of a topic, or linking the topic to certain values, actors create a frame that can reorient the audience’s thinking (Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, the public may have mixed opinions on the benefits and costs of a war in which their country is participating. Political leaders can choose to communicate that their involvement protects the rights and freedom of the home and local population, creating a human rights frame that may generate more public support for the war. The same strategy can be used to frame issues as security threats, thus beginning the process of securitization. If the security frame is accepted by the audience, securitization has occurred.

Critics of securitization theory point to overly restricting definitions and issues of eurocentrism. Balzacq, a scholar of the Paris School, argues that speech acts alone do not adequately capture the process, and that securitization is more dynamic, strategic, and informal than the original definition allows (2005). Baysal agrees with this critique of the overemphasis of speech acts and adds that the underemphasis of the audience and greater context limits securitization theory’s practicality (2020). The theory also has a history of eurocentrism, since scholars have nearly only observed these discursive practices in Western states or international organizations dominated by Western states (Baysal 2020; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). Howell and Richter-Montpetit argue that this bias

in the theory should be labeled more explicitly as racism or white supremacy, given the framework's disregard and acceptance of the "racial status quo" under which it operates (2019, 11).

Since its introduction by Buzan, Wæver, and Japp de Wilde, securitization theory and its frameworks have evolved, in part as a response to these criticisms. Scholars have proposed more nuanced ways of describing and analyzing the process, including the consideration of forms of communication besides speech, like images and videos (Balzacq 2005; Baysal 2020). Balzacq advocates for greater inclusion of four key concepts- audience, power, context, and practices and instruments- which help securitization theory to be more effectively applied. The audience has especially gained importance in the study and empirical application of securitization over time, with scholars emphasizing the need for the securitizing speech to be received and internalized before it is effective (Sjöstedt 2020). These new frameworks have added complexity to the original theory, allowing for more nuance when applied to real cases.

Scholars have used these theories of securitization to empirically study the securitization of a number of issues in International Relations. The concept of human security is one example of the shift in norms surrounding security, as it was produced by linking security to human rights. Human security is "a policy movement that seeks to place the individual... as the *referent* of security" (Newman 2001, 239). For most people in the world, threats to safety do not come from the military violence associated with traditional ideas of security. Rather, they are threatened by food insecurity, health problems, crime, and environmental hazards (Newman 2001). The focus on human security reflects those needs and seeks to address them. Human security became an

important concept when elite political actors, in particular the United Nations (U.N.), recognized an ethical need to prioritize the protection of everyday human safety and declared that need in speeches and resolutions (Newman 2001). In this way, human security is an example of a result of the discursive process of securitization.

More specific aspects of human rights have recently been securitized as well. In 2000, public health was securitized for the first time when U.S. President Bill Clinton suggested that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa could cause conflicts and even the dismantling of democracies (Sjöstedt 2011). Though the problem was based in a different continent, Clinton used a securitizing move to make it a matter of U.S. national security, granting it the attention reserved for serious threats to the state. Women's rights and gender equality have also been securitized, beginning with the U.N. and global advocacy groups like Amnesty International (Hudson and Budabin 2020). By labeling domestic and sexual violence as a "weapon," these groups brought particular attention and resources to the cause (Hudson and Budabin 2020).

Political leaders and advocates for climate action have also made appeals to security in regards to environmental problems (Boyer and Oculi 2020; Sahu 2021; Trombetta 2011). Discourse links climate issues like sea level rise, water scarcity, and agricultural problems to the potential outbreak of conflict in vulnerable areas (Trombetta 2011). Concern about environmental conflict was especially prominent following the Cold War, and focused primarily on national security. In this case, the securitizing moves were accepted, and they legitimized the creation of special committees and strategies to address the problem (Trombetta 2011). However, critics argue that the discourse surrounding environmental conflict places undue blame on the Global South where

conflict is perhaps more likely, rather than holding the Global North responsible for their larger role in creating environmental issues (Trombetta 2011). The actors working to prevent environmental conflict may have been less successful as a result of this uneven focus. In all three of these issue areas, political elites declared the issues to be matters of security, thus allowing them special priority. However, as seen in the case of environmental conflict, the results were not entirely positive. When empirically applied, securitization theory can help scholars to observe positive, negative, and neutral outcomes of securitizing moves.

Securitization of Development

Economic development is another issue area that actors have securitized. Fear about terrorism and “new wars” post-Cold War and particularly post-9/11 led political elites to consider the causes behind such violence. One solution that emerged was improving development, and as a result, development became a referent object of the securitization process (Wilkinson 2015). The U.S. and the European Union increased aid flows to Central Africa in the early 2000s with the explicit goal of protecting their own security interests as they relate to terrorism (Thede 2013; Wilkinson 2015). In this case, development resources were used to solve security issues, but in other cases, the mobilization of security resources is used to address development problems. China, for example, has mobilized military forces to protect development and environmental interests like natural resources and disaster relief (Sahu 2021). The securitization of development does not necessarily have to involve appeals to national security or military threats, especially in recent years. Security is mentioned in the U.N. Millennium

Development Goals and later the Sustainable Development Goals, which tend to emphasize more individual-level human security rather than state-level security (Stern and Öjendal 2010).

Scholars have used the term “security-development nexus” to refer to this intersection of security and development (Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Wilkinson 2015). Proponents of the concept emphasize that the relationship is reciprocal: more development ensures a better chance for security, and in turn more security ensures a better chance for development (Keukeleire and Raube 2013).

Wilkinson defines three different levels at which the security-development nexus operates: the macro level, involving the discourse of political elites and international organizations, the meso level, which describes the state-level strategies of foreign aid and security institutions, and the micro level, where specific programs are created and implemented to address security-development issues (2015). The term and its levels of operation create a helpful analytical tool for empirical application.

Empirical studies of the securitization of development find differing conclusions on the effectiveness of securitizing development issues. Some scholars find that the link is helpful. Securitizing moves cause an issue to shift from normal politics to the realm of security, where more attention and resources are granted (Thede 2013; Fisher and Anderson 2015). When observing the securitization of aid effectiveness strategies, Thede found that the link to security did in fact place aid effectiveness higher on the agenda of political leaders (Thede 2013). Fisher and Anderson argue that in the case of state building in Africa and African relationships to Western donors, securitization has been a positive force (2015). While others view securitization as something the Global North

imposes upon the Global South, they find that African governments have actually initiated this connection in their policies (Fisher and Anderson 2015). Securitization was welcomed locally and resulted in improved state building, providing evidence for its potential for positive impact in other cases (Fisher and Anderson 2015).

Other studies find that securitization is not effective in improving development outcomes, and in fact reinforces problematic relationships between the Global North and Global South. Enloe discusses the issue of instrumentalization, when certain people or issues are used as instruments to serve the self-interests of people in power (2013). The problem with this self-interested approach is that “anything that is used instrumentally can be put back on the shelf once its users no longer find that instrument useful for their own ends” (Enloe 2013, 14). Though she is using the concept to discuss feminism, the same thinking can be applied to the securitization of development. Thede uses this concept to describe how actors from the Global North instrumentalize the development goals of foreign aid to further their own interests of using aid strategies to stabilize economic power structures (2013).

Even without obvious instrumentalization, securitization can make the problem more about the risk to the Global North rather than the wellbeing of the people in the Global South (Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Wilkinson 2015). Keukeleire and Raube find that the European Union has remained less involved in conflict areas as a result of securitization, suggesting their primary intention is not to solve development issues, but rather to create policies that center themselves (2013). This case reflects the tendency of states in the Global North to create “self-referential” policies, rather than seriously consider the real needs of the Global South (Keukeleire and Raube 2013, 557). Wilkinson

finds that the European Union's securitization of development in Central Asia created harmful policy results, which is common among cases of securitization (2015). Rather than improve development and as a result, security, "the practices that result from the securitization of development are frequently highly problematic and may actually reduce rather than enhance security" (Wilkinson 2015, 40).

Scholars also criticize the practice of securitization as reinforcing colonial hierarchies (Thede 2013; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). Thede observes securitization between the European Union and Central Asia as a tool to stabilize neoliberal economic relationships, which benefit the Global North at the expense of the Global South (2013). Howell and Richter-Montpetit study this hierarchy in terms of race, arguing that the practice, along with the theory itself, is based in white supremacy. They note that securitization often involves "racialized threat imaginaries" against which actors aim to protect (2019, 6). In other words, the Global North operates using racist assumptions about the level of threat posed by the Global South and securitizes development in response to that racism. Though full consensus does not exist in the literature surrounding the securitization of development, some patterns emerge in the empirical findings of studies, including the prioritization of development strategies as a result of securitization and the problematic implementation of these strategies.

Critiques and Suggestions for Further Research

Though securitization theory has been thoroughly analyzed, applied, and refined since its emergence in the 1990s, there are still areas that would benefit from further study. Many case studies of the process and impacts of securitization have focused on the

environment and health. Though these areas are connected to development, the literature would benefit from a more specific examination of how securitization can affect development outcomes. Critiques about eurocentrism and colonialism have become more common in recent years, but there is still room for further discussion, especially regarding the securitization of development. Both securitization and development are concepts with deep ties to eurocentrism and colonialism, so discussing their intersection is valuable in studying these issues further.

Finally, these case studies have been focused heavily in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, primarily as a way to investigate U.S. and E.U. concerns about instability and terrorism in those areas. As previously discussed, however, securitization can involve many different issues other than terrorism and conflict, so it is important to consider these other concerns and other locations where they may exist. Latin America is one area that has received less attention in the securitization literature, despite its large presence in the development literature. Because the governments, development strategies, and international involvement of Latin America differ from those of other regions, it is very possible that the results of securitization of development may differ as well. To better understand how securitization can behave differently in different contexts, it is important to include deeper research into other areas like Latin America.

Theoretical Argument

Two clear hypotheses emerge from the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of previous literature. Securitization moves an issue from the realm of “normal politics” to the realm of security through the naming of an existential threat and referent

object, which increases its perceived importance. This move legitimizes the use of any means necessary to stop the threat (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). Using this logic, I hypothesize first that the securitization of development will move the issue of development up on the agenda, causing greater priority and resources to be paid to it.


However, the prioritization does not necessarily translate into improved development outcomes. Securitization inherently instrumentalizes the people who could benefit from development strategies, as the securitizing actors protect their own interests through naming others' issues. The eurocentrism and colonialism in both securitization and development practices limit their ability to actually help in areas where they are applied. The securitizing actors and others responding to the securitization may not understand the needs and values of the areas they are targeting. As a result, I also hypothesize that development strategies implemented as a result of securitization will not be successful in improving development outcomes.

Chapter 3: Methods

Hypotheses


This study will test whether securitization of development leads to an increase in the prioritization of development and/or an improvement in development outcomes. My first hypothesis is that the securitization of development will lead to greater prioritization of development.

Figure 1: Arrow diagram of Hypothesis 1



To reject this hypothesis, I would have to observe no change or a negative change in the prioritization of development caused by securitization. My second hypothesis is that the securitization of development will have no effect on development outcomes.

Figure 2: Arrow diagram of Hypothesis 2



To reject this hypothesis, the study would need to find a change in development outcomes caused by securitization. These hypotheses contain three variables to define and evaluate. The independent variable, securitization of development, the first dependent variable, the prioritization of development, and the second dependent variable, improvement in development outcomes.

Independent Variable

The independent variable, the securitization of development, contains multiple observable components. First, I must observe a securitizing move by an actor. In this study, the securitizing actors will be international governmental organizations (IGOs), states, and individuals representing an IGO or state. NGOs may also play a role in the securitization discourse, but will not be considered securitizing actors in this study. These actors must include the communication of an existential threat to the referent object of development in order to be deemed a securitizing move (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). To communicate an existential threat, actors must include two general themes. First, they must emphasize impending danger to states or individuals if the threat is not stopped. Second, they must include a sense of urgency in addressing the threat. If these themes appear in a communication by a securitizing actor, it will be categorized as a securitizing move.

Communication may come in the form of a speech act, as referenced in more traditional theories of securitization. Speech acts may be observed in speeches, press conferences, resolutions, and other forms of verbal and written communication. More recently, scholars have suggested the examination of different forms of communication like images and videos (Balzacq 2005; Baysal 2020). This study will not include visual communication because of a lack of existence of and access to such documents in this specific case study.

Securitization also requires the acceptance of the securitizing move from an audience (Balzacq 2005; Baysal 2020). The idea of the audience tends to be vague in the securitization literature, but it generally refers to those who observe the securitizing move

and may or may not adopt a similar rhetoric of security. In this study, the audience will be defined as states, state leaders, and regional leaders, as long as that actor has not been determined to be the securitizing actor.

Audience acceptance occurs when an audience member, whether knowingly or unknowingly, uses similar securitizing rhetoric in response to the securitizing actor. This factor will be measured in comparison to previous samples of communication by the audience actor. If their communication becomes more securitizing after a securitizing move by the securitizing actor, it will be categorized as a response to the securitizing move, and thus a sign of audience acceptance. The presence of security rhetoric in the audience's communication will be determined based on the same criteria previously defined for the securitizing actor. This focus on rhetoric, rather than actions like policy creation, allows for greater separation between the measurement for the independent variable and the dependent variable of prioritization, which will be measured through action.

Incorporating all of these components, the independent variable of securitization of development is observed if:

1. There is a securitizing actor of an IGO, state, or a representative of an IGO or state,
2. The securitizing actor names an existential threat to the referent object of development, including appeals to danger and urgency, through a verbal or written form of communication, and
3. The audience, whether a state, state leader, or regional leader, accepts the securitizing move by adopting similar securitizing rhetoric.

Dependent Variable 1: Prioritization

The first dependent variable, prioritization, is defined by how the issue of development is treated once it is securitized. This variable can be observed in several different forms, since there are many ways to prioritize issues. First, legislation may indicate greater prioritization. New legislation, whether domestic or international, may be passed in response to securitization. The rate of legislation on development may increase in comparison to before the issue was securitized, which would also suggest the prioritization of development. Even if international or state bodies do not change how often they pass legislation, the topic of development may arise in debates within these bodies more than before the issue was securitized. To observe these potential changes, I will examine passed legislation, bills, and debates within legislative bodies from states and relevant IGOs.

Changes in prioritization can also be observed through funding. If a state or IGO dedicates more funding to development, they demonstrate greater prioritization of development. Similarly, the creation of new development organizations, projects, or initiatives suggests that the issue has moved up on the agenda of the actor. These processes may be related to legislation, but they may also occur outside of legislative bodies. I will look at budgets and development plans to include these factors of prioritization.

Dependent Variable 2: Development Outcomes

As discussed in Chapter 2, the second dependent variable, development outcomes, has many different interpretations and indicators. In order to capture a variety of different

perspectives and potential impacts, I will use three different indicators in this study. First, I will include GDP per capita. Though this is a poor measure for observing wellbeing or sustainability, it is important in understanding how development initiatives work. A strategy may increase economic growth while having no benefit or even a negative effect for individuals. To observe this potential contradiction in development outcomes that may result from securitization, GDP per capita is necessary.

This study will also look at HDI to incorporate more individual level aspects of development. This measure is taken by the UN Development Programme, which may suggest that like GDP, it reflects the values of the Global North. However, its value as a composite measure is important, as each of its thirteen components are measured and reported separately, with each category broken down into even narrower factors. This style allows this study to clearly follow specific goals of development strategies and evaluate their success or failure. HDI includes important environmental factors in its “environmental sustainability” component. As noted in Chapter 2, environmental issues are often of greater concern to local populations than IGOs or states consider. As a result, it is important to emphasize this component more than many conventional measures do. HDI is also measured frequently in comparison to other nuanced indices, which is beneficial for tracking change over time.

I will also consider local conceptions of development in my measure. As previously discussed, dominant ideas about development are typically Northern and not always shared by the populations they address. In examining the case, I will aim to determine whether or not local needs and goals for development are addressed alongside the more conventional conceptions of what development should be. Including this

cultural context is crucial in understanding whether development strategies are successful. Though no measure of economic development is truly complete, given the wide range of definitions of development, these three considerations provide a strong set of factors that can be observed and compared over time.

Case Selection

This study will employ a longitudinal case study of Colombia from 1992 to 1998. By using a longitudinal study, or a comparison across time, the study can minimize confounding variables that may arise from a comparison between two different states. Differences between states may contribute to changes in my dependent variables, prioritization and development outcomes, unrelated to my independent variable of securitization. These factors are less likely to be present when observing securitization of development within one state. The time period chosen reflects the years when securitization can first be observed in IGOs and Colombia, with several years added before and after to observe any resulting changes. Though the documents collected end in 1998, I will include findings into the early 2000s in order to track potential later impacts. To collect the data needed to measure each of my variables in the ways previously discussed, I will gather and analyze documents and information in both English and Spanish. These documents will come from various levels and actors of the Colombian government as well as relevant IGOs like the U.N., the World Bank, and the Organization of American States (OAS).

In determining a case through which to observe the securitization of development, I first considered factors that limit the viability of certain cases. Because this study uses

states and state leaders as major actors in the process of securitization, it was important to choose a state, rather than a region of Latin America. I also aimed to avoid time periods with extreme changes in the regime type of the state and/or politics of state leaders. The actors I defined ruled out much of Central America and Mexico, because this study will not consider foreign governments as securitizing actors, and the United States plays a more major role in these cases. States in the Southern Cone were also eliminated as options, as they generally experienced their most major changes in development further back in time, making data less accessible. Though Bolivia is a strong case with its more recent development strategies, the country is much more stratified than other Latin American states, with extreme social and economic gaps between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. This distinction would make measures of development less reliable, as it would be difficult to determine which populations are impacted. Peru is also a viable case for this study, however its somewhat recent civil conflict and changes in regime type would likely significantly alter development outcomes in ways unrelated to securitization.

Of course, Colombia carries some of these same qualities that problematize the case. Like Peru, the country is also experiencing ongoing civil conflict. However, because it is so long lasting and relatively steady in terms of intensity and lethality, changes in development are less likely to be impacted by conflict or regime type, allowing the variable of securitization to be better isolated. Colombia has significant social and economic divisions within its population, though not to the degree of Bolivia. The United States may also play a role in the securitization of development in this case, but U.S. foreign policy does not focus as much on Colombia as Central America or

Mexico. The political landscape of Colombia and its importance in the international arena allow this study to limit confounding variables in comparison to other Latin American states, but several control variables still remain, including the factors of the level of lethality of conflict, social stratification, influence of foreign state actors, and change in domestic leaders.

Capítulo 4: Contexto de Colombia

Para entender la securización del desarrollo y la retórica de los líderes en Colombia, es importante considerar las condiciones en las que actúan. Este capítulo proveerá información sobre el contexto político y económico de Colombia, con especial énfasis en los años noventa, el período que el siguiente capítulo examinará. Primero, se discutirá el entorno político de Colombia desde 1990 a 2000, incluyendo la estructura gubernamental, el papel de los militares, y los líderes claves. Luego, daré una breve descripción del conflicto civil en Colombia, un aspecto importante en el contexto del país. Finalmente, examinaré la economía política de Colombia y el estado del desarrollo durante los años noventa. Esta información será útil para analizar la retórica de los actores de Colombia.

El contexto político

En 1990, Colombia había experimentado más de tres décadas de democracia constante. La estructura de gobierno, con un presidente y tres ramas del gobierno, es parecida a muchos gobiernos democráticos. Sin embargo, los problemas con la desigualdad de poder y la corrupción han limitado la estabilidad y la paz de la política en Colombia. Algunos se refieren a la estructura de poder de Colombia como una oligarquía a causa de su centralización de poder y los conflictos de intereses entre las élites económicas y políticas (LaRosa y Mejía 2012; Avilés 2001). Aunque muchos políticos han tratado de crear un gobierno más justo y representativo, los problemas persisten. Colombia implementó una constitución nueva en 1991 con la intención de descentralizar

la administración y priorizar los derechos humanos. El objetivo era transferir más poder al congreso para reducir el potencial control ejecutivo (LaRosa and Mejía 2012). A pesar de este esfuerzo, 1991 marcó el inicio de una tendencia ascendente en la violencia política en Colombia. El fracaso de la democracia y la paz política en esta época es más complejo que una cuestión de estructura de gobierno e involucra otras dinámicas de poder y economía. A través de un examen de la fuerza militar y los líderes políticos importantes, se pueden ver algunas de estas dinámicas.

El poder del militar es una razón importante de la corrupción y la violencia en Colombia. El militar colombiano tiene muchos privilegios sin mucha supervisión o intervención de la política civil (Avilés 2001). Este poder significa que los militares tienen mucha inmunidad en sus acciones. Aunque son responsables de la mayoría de los asesinatos políticos y las violaciones de los derechos humanos, los líderes militares casi nunca enfrentan enjuiciamiento por parte del gobierno civil (Avilés 2001). Según el informe de Human Rights Watch, los líderes fueron más propensos a ser promovidos que de ser procesados después de una violación de los derechos humanos (Avilés 2001).

Históricamente, los líderes militares también tienen papeles poderosos en el gabinete ejecutivo, permitiendo un control político aún mayor a los militares (Avilés 2001). Estas posiciones tienen responsabilidades de hacer los presupuestos. Como resultado, los líderes militares tienen el poder de aumentar el presupuesto militar a expensas de otras áreas del presupuesto (Avilés 2001). Aunque el gobierno es técnicamente civil, los líderes militares pueden tener mucha influencia política. Esta falta de equilibrio entre los poderes militares y civiles ha contribuido a la tendencia a la corrupción y la violencia en la política colombiana.

Colombia tuvo tres presidentes durante los años noventa. El primero, César Gaviria, fue un candidato liberal que priorizó las políticas económicas liberales del comercio y el desarrollo. Estos esfuerzos fueron a veces en contra de los trabajadores, muchos de los cuales se opusieron a sus políticas de privatización y fueron encarcelados por hacer huelga (Cockroft 1996). Por ejemplo, los huelguistas de una empresa estatal de los teléfonos impidieron con éxito la privatización, pero el gobierno encarceló a los líderes de la huelga y permitió la competencia extranjera en el sector de los teléfonos (Cockroft 1996). Los proyectos del desarrollo de Gaviria mostraron mejoras en las tasas de pobreza, pero hay evidencia del Banco Mundial que estas medidas fueron infladas (Cockroft 1996). Durante su mandato, la violencia política continuó con mayor intensidad a causa de un aumento en el poder y dinero de los carteles de drogas. Estos años vieron una expansión del poder de los carteles Cali y Medellín, dos actores importantes en el conflicto (LaRosa y Mejía 2012; Cockroft 1996). Este factor alimentó la violencia durante la presidencia de Gaviria.

La violencia aumentó aún más durante el mandato del sucesor de Gaviria, Ernesto Samper, otro miembro del partido Liberal. La financiación de Samper por las élites industriales era bien conocida, pero más tarde se reveló que su campaña también recibió una gran financiación del cartel Cali (Avilés 2001; Cockroft 1996). Según Avilés, el cartel dio “extensive financing” a otras campañas durante esa misma elección, mostrando su determinación de influir en la política (Avilés 2001, 36). Esta corrupción de los carteles, junto con un gran aumento en el presupuesto militar y el poder, contribuyó a la violencia en Colombia durante esta época (Cockroft 1996). En 1998, Andrés Pastrana, un conservador, fue elegido presidente. El poder extremo del militar continuó con

Pastrana, quien también fomentó la participación militar de los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.) con el Plan Colombia, una operación de contrainsurgencia que continuó la participación de EE. UU. en la década nueva (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Como las dos presidencias anteriores, la corrupción y la violencia política continuó con Pastrana.

Las relaciones internacionales de Colombia son un componente importante de su política. A pesar de la violencia interna, sus relaciones con otros países en los años noventa fueron tranquilas. Tenía una economía liberal y libre comercio con muchos socios interdependientes. Aunque otros estados y organizaciones internacionales condenan la corrupción en Colombia, esta recibe apoyo financiero de estados como EE. UU. y organizaciones como el Banco Mundial (Lindsay-Poland 2018; Mendes Pereira 2020). Después del final de su presidencia en 1994, César Gaviria se convirtió en secretario general de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), demostrando aún más relaciones positivas con organizaciones internacionales. Colombia participa en la comunidad internacional con un alto grado de normalidad y aceptación a pesar de tantos años de violencia.

El conflicto civil

El conflicto civil en Colombia tiene orígenes complejos. Aunque hay un debate sobre cuál fecha de inicio es la más correcta, un año importante es 1946, cuando ocurrió la elección del presidente Mariano Ospina. Un conservador, Ospina ordenó la violencia, llevada a cabo por grupos militares y paramilitares, contra los liberales, quienes luego lucharon contra Ospina, creando un conflicto civil (Cockroft 1996). La violencia se inflamó aún más cuando el líder del partido liberal, Jorge Gaitán, fue asesinado en 1948

(Cockroft 1996). En estos años tempranos, el conflicto civil se conocía comúnmente como “La Violencia”. Esta época del largo conflicto terminó alrededor de 1958 con la creación del Frente Nacional, un plan que permitiría a los partidos liberales y conservadores rotar dentro y fuera de la presidencia cada cuatro años con elecciones. Aunque esta política fue pensada como una solución a La Violencia, y redujo la violencia al principio, también creó espacio para que surgieran nuevos partidos (LaRosa and Mejía 2012). En los años sesenta, partidos políticos de la extrema izquierda (que también actuaron como grupos guerrilleros) como las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) y el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) emergieron. Estos diferentes grupos guerrilleros controlaban ciertas partes de la tierra y contribuyeron a la violencia en Colombia con asesinatos (La Rosa y Mejía 2012).

Con este desarrollo, el conflicto civil tenía muchos lados: el gobierno, los militares, los grupos paramilitares y los grupos guerrilleros. También había influencias de fuerzas como los carteles y países extranjeros como EE. UU. (Cockroft 1996; LaRosa and Mejilla 2012). Como se discutió anteriormente, el dinero de los narcóticos a menudo sirvió como fondos políticos y de campaña. Los carteles también cometieron violencia política con asesinatos y participación en grupos paramilitares y guerrilleros (LaRosa and Mejilla 2012; Richani 1997). Aunque los carteles y sus líderes no se consideran lados oficiales, su influencia fue significativa. Según Cockroft, muchos expertos “agreed that the key ‘structural’ causes of Colombia’s violence were large-scale narcotics consumption in the United States and Western Europe” (Cockroft 1996, 409). Esta demanda permitió una gran riqueza y poder de los cárteles, quienes usaron esta influencia en el conflicto.

Además de la demanda, EE. UU. contribuyó a la violencia de maneras más directas. La intervención militar de EE. UU. en Colombia estaba presente desde el siglo 19, y más ayuda militar viene de EE. UU. durante La Violencia y después en el conflicto civil siguiente (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Un objetivo principal de EE. UU. y sus asociados del gobierno colombiano fue la supresión de los guerrillas de izquierda. En los años cincuenta y hasta el siglo 20, EE. UU. entrenaron militares colombianos, proporcionaron armas y financiaron operaciones de contrainsurgencia (Cockroft 1996; Lindsay-Poland 2018). A pesar de la intención oficial de reducir la violencia, el resultado de la intervención de EE. UU. fue en gran parte el empoderamiento del militar y los paramilitares para cometer violencia política brutal (Cockroft 1996; Lindsay-Poland 2018).

En los años noventa, el conflicto vio un aumento de la violencia por un número creciente de los guerrillas y un aumento de acción militar (Cockroft 1996; Richani 1997). Una causa de estos cambios fue el desarrollo económico capitalista que estaba ocurriendo rápidamente en áreas rurales. Muchos campesinos se arruinaron financieramente y fueron reclutados más fácilmente como guerrilleros (Richani 1997). La FARC comenzó a controlar algunas áreas urbanas también, extendiendo las zonas de guerra (Cockroft 1996). A la misma vez, el presupuesto militar se triplicó durante los años noventa y el militar de EE. UU. estableció una mayor presencia en Colombia (Cockroft 1996). Estos cambios hicieron de los años noventa una época especialmente violenta en el conflicto civil colombiano.

La economía política

La estructura económica de Colombia en los años noventa reflejó la cultura política en su parecido con la oligarquía. La industrialización fue más avanzada que mucha de América Latina, con una posición en el cuarto lugar en el ranking latinoamericano, sólo más baja que Brasil, México y Argentina (Cockroft 1996). Sin embargo, el nivel de desigualdad económica también fue muy alto. La estratificación de las haciendas coloniales de los siglos pasados persistió en el siglo 20 y más allá en grupos financieros que controlaban las industrias más grandes (Cockroft 1996). Había mucha superposición entre los individuos de la élite económica y la élite política. Estas industrias controladas por pocas personas financiaban tanto al partido liberal como al conservador, creando mucha corrupción. Decisiones sobre la economía política involucraron a los jefes de las principales industrias, por lo que se tomaron decisiones para beneficiar aún más a la oligarquía (Cockroft 1996; LaRosa and Mejía 2012).

Aunque esta organización del poder puede verse como un legado de las haciendas, las haciendas todavía existían en la práctica, si no de nombre, en las áreas rurales de Colombia. Tres por ciento de los terratenientes poseían alrededor del setenta por ciento de la tierra cultivable, mientras que la mayoría de la población rural no poseía ninguna tierra o poseía parcelas de tierra demasiadas pequeñas para sustentarlos por sí mismos (Cockroft 1996; Mendes Pereira 2020). Esta estructura mantiene la pobreza rural. Un esfuerzo del Banco Mundial para descentralizar la tierra ocurrió en los años noventa. El proyecto “Market-Assisted Land Reform” (MALR) fue un plan neoliberal de usar los mercados para reducir la desigualdad y la pobreza rural. La implementación de MALR fue rechazado por la mayoría de los campesinos colombianos, quienes apoyaron una

democratización más extrema sin agenda neoliberal (Mendes Pereira 2020). El gobierno de Colombia ayudó con MALR, pero socavó los objetivos con una implementación muy centralizada que no cumplió con las expectativas del Banco Mundial. Como resultado, MALR no logró los objetivos de descentralización y reducción de la pobreza establecidos por el Banco Mundial, y la estructura de la economía rural sigue siendo similar (Mendes Pereira 2020).

El desarrollo económico

Estos retos políticos y económicos han creado barreras al desarrollo económico. La historia de la colonización en América Latina sigue impidiendo el desarrollo, tanto por la explotación pasada como por los sistemas actuales que reflejan esa historia colonial (Howard, Hume, and Oslender 2007; Pérez Caldenty and Vernengo 2017). La estructura oligárquica significa que mucha de la gente con el poder de formular políticas de desarrollo no se beneficia de una mayor igualdad (LaRosa and Mejía 2012). La corrupción entre las élites industriales, las élites políticos y los carteles complica aún más los esfuerzos del desarrollo, especialmente en los años noventa. No fomenta la priorización del desarrollo y crea un ambiente más susceptible a la violencia (Cockroft 1996; LaRosa and Mejía 2012).

La violencia del conflicto civil ha dañado el desarrollo de Colombia también. Es una carga para los servicios públicos que son necesarios para el bienestar de la gente y los recursos dedicados a luchar la guerra toma de la financiación para el desarrollo (Howard, Hume, and Oslender 2007). Por ejemplo, según datos de 1997, “the cost of violence reached one quarter of the annual GDP, thus removing resources from other key areas for

public developmental spending, such as education and healthcare” (Howard, Hume, and Oslender 2007, 718). En definitiva, el conflicto tuvo prioridad sobre el desarrollo por parte del gobierno colombiano y la comunidad internacional (Cockroft 1996; Howard, Hume, and Oslender 2007). Este desequilibrio en el presupuesto fue impopular entre el público colombiano. Una encuesta de 1982 muestra que dos tercios de los encuestados creyeron que la mejor solución para el problema de las guerrillas era combatir el desempleo y la pobreza (Cockroft 1996). Este dato revela un problema cíclico con el desarrollo y la violencia.

La mayoría está de acuerdo en que la violencia causa un mal desarrollo, pero algunos argumentan que este efecto también puede funcionar en la dirección opuesta. Howard, Hume y Oslender afirman que el desarrollo en su definición capitalista o neocolonial es un proceso violento (2007). Por ejemplo, usan el caso de estudio de las áreas en la costa de Colombia donde ocurrió mucha privatización corporativa de la tierra como parte de un plan del desarrollo. Similar al caso de MALR, los residentes pobres que dependían de la tierra sufrieron daños por el proceso (Howard, Hume, and Oslender 2007). Este análisis sugeriría que la violencia y los esfuerzos de desarrollo equivocados casi funcionan en un ciclo de retroalimentación, dañando el bienestar general en Colombia. Incluso cuando el desarrollo se utiliza para combatir la violencia, la población general puede sufrir.

A pesar de estas luchas con el desarrollo, muchas estrategias diferentes han sido empleadas en Colombia. En los años noventa, el enfoque principal fue el desarrollo sostenible y el medio ambiente. La nueva constitución en 1991 influyó en esta atención ambiental, ya que incluyó un compromiso con el medio ambiente que impactó en los

planes de desarrollo posteriores (Eschenhagen 1998; O'Brien 1995). Al mismo tiempo, el desarrollo sostenible se ha convertido en un tema popular en la comunidad internacional, y organizaciones intergubernamentales como las Naciones Unidas priorizaron estos planes (Eschenhagen 1998; O'Brien 1995). Un ejemplo de esta tendencia es la creación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible en 1993, un departamento que involucró a los sectores público, privado y de ONG (O'Brien 1995). Trabajó con organizaciones intergubernamentales y países norteamericanos y europeos para crear políticas neoliberales que protegerían el medio ambiente (O'Brien 1995).

Sin embargo, los críticos de los proyectos del desarrollo capitalistas nos recuerdan que las poblaciones locales pueden ser dañadas por estas estrategias. Howard, Hume y Oslender argumentan que esta organización, como otras políticas del desarrollo sostenible, fue basada en los valores de “those who rule, instead of through local respect for surrounding landscape” (2007, 715). Una alternativa a las estrategias de innovación macroeconómica que dominaron en los años noventa sugerida por Montero et al. es la consideración de diferentes tipos de innovación (2021). Se necesita incluir “a los históricamente invisibilizados o marginados como sociedad civil” y reconocer que “la innovación en ciudades pequeñas e intermedias y en zonas rurales del país tiene lugar de manera muy diferente a la innovación pensada desde las instituciones de las grandes ciudades” (Montero et al. 2021, 158). Estos tipos de sugerencias se han manifestado en políticas más individuales como los programas de transferencias o de microfinanzas, que se volvieron más comunes después de los años noventa. Estos esfuerzos no incluyen inversión a gran escala ni un cambio significativo al GDP, pero crean cambios macroeconómicos e individuales.

Conclusión

El contexto político y económico de Colombia es crucial para el entendimiento del proceso de la securitización del desarrollo. La historia de corrupción y violencia en Colombia, especialmente en los años noventa, crea una falta de desarrollo y de seguridad. Como se discutió, estos factores del desarrollo y la seguridad pueden funcionar en un ciclo, donde la falta de seguridad puede provocar una falta de desarrollo y viceversa. Los actores de Colombia responden a este entorno, que permite una posibilidad de securitización del desarrollo. Este contexto sobre los líderes y su entorno será útil para el análisis de su retórica en el próximo capítulo.

Chapter 5: Results and Analysis

This chapter will examine the data collected for each variable and their implications. The data for the independent variable, securitization, consists of documents that demonstrate the language surrounding development used by international and Colombian actors. These are presented in a mostly chronological progression to show the securitization process and its impacts. An overview of these documents is also provided in Table 1; documents showing Colombia's language, or audience acceptance, are shaded gray. First, I will review the period before securitization of development, when IGOs and Colombia alike discussed development and security as separate issues. Then, I will examine the introduction of securitizing language by IGOs, and how and when that language was adopted by Colombia. Data for the dependent variables, implementation and development outcomes, will be presented alongside the independent variable in each section. Finally, I will examine how these variables may connect, and their implications for securitization and development.

1992-1994: Before Securitization

IGOs

In the early 1990s, IGOs had not yet securitized development for the most part.

Development was considered an important issue with connections to other items on the international agenda, but not quite a matter of security. In a 1992 speech, World Bank president Lewis T. Preston discussed the importance of sustainable development, along with the challenges of achieving it. Preston links development to environmental issues:

“promoting development is the best way to protect the environment -- and vice-versa. Policies that make economic sense often make environmental sense” (Preston 1992, 1). Though he emphasizes this relationship between development and the environment, he makes no mention of security or related topics like violence, conflict, or threats to peace. His language is forceful, but lacks the urgency typically associated with securitized language.

Like the World Bank, the UN does not use securitizing language during this period. Four General Assembly documents from 1993 and 1994 show a strong commitment towards development, but no link to security. These documents all call for increased international cooperation, promotion of development, and greater assistance for “developing countries” (UN GA 1993a; UN GA 1993b; UN GA 1994a; UN GA 1994c). Unlike the other three documents, A/49/L.35 does reference security and development within the same document, but does not imply that the two issues impact one another: “Convinced of the hopes that inspire the peoples of Central America to achieve peace, reconciliation, development and social justice” (UN GA 1994c). This draft resolution treats security and development as two separate problems impacting Central America, rather than related issues.

Similarly, a document from the UN Security Council in 1993 comes close to securitizing language, but does not directly link the issues: “The Security Council supports the view that the United Nations, in order to meet its responsibilities in the context of international peace and security, should view its objectives in respect of economic and social cooperation and development with the same sense of responsibility

Table 1: Securitization of development documents (documents showing audience acceptance are shaded gray)

Document Name	Year	Document Type	Actor	Securitizing Language?
Colombia: Bridging the Gap between Environment and Development	Jan. 1992	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Rodríguez Becerra)	No
Poverty 'threatens world'	Feb. 1992	Coverage of Statement	UN Secretary General (Boutros-Ghali)	Yes
The Challenge of Sustainable Development	Dec. 1992	Speech	World Bank (Preston)	No
A/RES/47/181	Mar. 1993	UN General Assembly Resolution	UN General Assembly	No
S/25696	Apr. 1993	UN Security Council Note	UN Security Council	No
A/C.2/48/L.74	Dec. 1993	UN General Assembly Draft Resolution	UN General Assembly	No
A/CONF.171/PC/4	Mar. 1994	UN General Assembly Report	UN General Assembly	No
Colombia: President-Elect to Face Challenges of Violence, Poverty	Jun. 1994	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Samper)	No
A/C.1/49/L.47/Rev.2	Nov. 15 1994	UN General Assembly Draft Resolution	UN General Assembly	Yes
A/49/L.35	Nov. 22 1994	UN General Assembly Draft Resolution	UN General Assembly	No
New Directions and New Partnerships Address to the Board of Governors	Oct. 1995	Speech	World Bank (Wolfensohn)	Yes
Zimbabwe: President Samper announces measures to combat violence	Aug. 1995	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Samper)	No
A/C.1/50/PV.16	Nov. 1995	UN General Assembly Debate	UN General Assembly	Yes
César Gaviria Trujillo... at the Inaugural Session...	Jun. 3 1996	Speech	OAS Secretary General (Gaviria)	No
S/RES/1063 (1996)	Jun. 28 1996	UN Security Council Resolution	UN Security Council	Yes
A/51/338	Sep. 1996	UN General Assembly Report	UN General Assembly	Yes
Colombia: Samper says force will not be used in Caguan after soldiers' release	Jun. 1997	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Samper)	Yes
New president pledges clean government, peace, equality	Aug. 1998	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Pastrana)	Yes
National Press Club Luncheon Andres Pastrana...	Oct. 1998	Coverage of Statement	Colombia (Pastrana)	Yes
César Gaviria Trujillo... at the V Conference...	Nov. 1998	Speech	OAS Secretary General (Gaviria)	Yes

and urgency as its commitments in the political and security areas” (UN SC 1993).

Though this passage contains the appeal to urgency that is consistent with securitizing language, it only suggests that development should be treated in a manner similar to security issues, not that development *is* a security issue.

One exception to the trend of IGOs not securitizing development in this time period is a statement given by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The press coverage of the statement is titled “Poverty ‘threatens world,’” and it reports on Boutros-Ghali’s warning that “There will be no peace and stability without development...Zones of poverty . . . constitute potential arenas for violence and confrontation” (Herald Sun 1992). The use of the words “threat,” “peace and stability,” and “violence and confrontation” are all typical of securitizing language, and he uses them to clearly frame development as a security issue. However, this language is an outlier for its time, as most IGO actors were not using it.

Colombia

Like the IGOs, Colombia did not use securitizing language to refer to development in the early 1990s. Instead, actors tend to speak of the issues separately and link development to other issues. The emphasis on the connection between the environment and development, as previously discussed in the World Bank document, is seen in Colombian discourse as well. In press coverage of a 1992 statement by Colombia’s Minister of the Environment and Sustainable Development Manuel Rodríguez Becerra notes the “indissoluble relationship between environment and

development” (Inter Press Service 1992). Rodríguez Becerra also argues that “the best way to save the environment is to eliminate poverty” (Inter Press Service 1992). Rather than discussing how development can impact security and vice versa, he focuses on a similar relationship between development and the environment.

When security and development are discussed together by Colombian actors, they are treated as two separate issues. 1994 press coverage of a statement by Ernesto Samper, who at the time was Colombia’s President-elect, shows that while he listed poverty and violence as two important problems to solve during his presidency, he did not suggest that development could improve security: “Samper also announced that he would increase social investment in regions affected by guerrilla violence, and promised to strengthen security forces if a peace agreement is not reached” (Inter Press Service 1994). The social investment he promises is to alleviate problems caused by guerrilla violence, but not directly to solve the issue of violence and make the areas more secure. Like IGOs, Colombian actors tend not to make this direct connection in these years.

At this time before securitization of development in Colombia, development initiatives focused heavily on liberalization and macroeconomic growth. These policies included promoting free trade and foreign investment, privatizing public industries, and granting independence to the central bank. In 1990, Colombia implemented reforms to trade including lowering and removing tariffs and other barriers to trade, which allowed for more imports and freer trade (Lozano Espitia 2001). Certain enterprises that had been owned by the government were sold to private corporations during the early 1990s, including parts of the telecommunications industry, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Cockcroft 1996; Lozano Espitia 2001). The new constitution of 1991 included the establishment of

an independent central bank, rather than the previous model, which was more accountable to the government of Colombia (Lozano Espitia 2001). This reform granted the central bank, el Banco de la República, more freedom to create monetary policy without as much influence from changes in administration. Its autonomy also opened up Colombia's financial sector to foreign investment, another step towards liberalization and participation in the global economy (Lozano Espitia 2001). As seen in Figure 3, Colombia experienced a steady rise in GDP during this period, indicating positive results in economic growth (FRED 2022). Figure 4 shows that HDI also rose between 1990 and 1995 (United Nations Development Programme 2020). The difference of about 0.03 is not very substantial, but it does suggest that at least some development occurred alongside growth.

1994-1998: After Securitization

IGOs

Besides the previously mentioned case of Boutros-Ghali in 1992, the first real instance of securitization of development by IGOs appeared in 1994. UN General Assembly draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.47/Rev.2 “Recognizes that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development as well as other obstacles in the Mediterranean are will contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries through the existing forums” (UN GA1994b). This clause uses securitizing language very clearly, including the words development and security and how one contributes to the other. It is not as forceful and urgent as the statement by

Boutros-Ghali, but this difference can be attributed to the fact that UN resolution language is generally more passive.

This instance of the securitization of development in the UN is quickly followed by several other UN documents that use a similar discourse. UN document A/C.1/50/PV.16, which covers General Assembly debate from a session in 1995, focuses on “disarmament and international security agenda items” (UN GA 1995). In it, a delegate from Peru notes the “obvious relationship between the arms build-up and underdevelopment” (UN GA 1995). Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali also links development to a specific security issue in a 1996 report, showing his continued use of securitizing language:

These circumstances place the countries of Central America in a favourable position from which to pursue economic growth, social justice and further democratization. However, the gravity of the challenges facing the region makes it evident that they will only be overcome if they are approached with the dedication and sense of urgency brought to bear on civil war and regional tensions in the past (UN GA 1996).

The UN Security Council contributes to securitizing discourse in a resolution from 1996, highlighting the “the link between peace and development and stressing that a sustained commitment by the international community and the international financial institutions to assist and support the economic, social and institutional development in Haiti is indispensable for long-term peace and stability in the country” (UN SC 1996). These three examples demonstrate a pattern within the UN of discussing development as a security issue, with the intention of drawing attention and a sense of urgency. However, it

is important to note that draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.47/Rev.2 was written a few days before draft resolution A/49/L.35, the non-securitized document previously discussed. Though securitization of development becomes more common in the UN in 1994, it does not appear in all documents relating to development.

The World Bank also implemented securitizing language around this time. In a 1995 speech, the president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, states that “we must be aware of the close relation between peace and development” and that “investment and job creation must be part of any lasting peace” (Wolfensohn 1995). Though he uses the word peace instead of security, Wolfensohn’s language still securitizes development by suggesting that it is necessary to prevent future conflict. The UN is the first major IGO to consistently use securitizing language, but this document shows that other IGOs also picked up on the discourse.

Though the UN and the World Bank had already been using securitizing language surrounding development for a few years, it took regional organizations longer to adopt the discourse. In 1996, César Gaviria Trujillo, who at this time was the Secretary General of the OAS and not the president of Colombia, spoke at an OAS session and discussed development and security as entirely separate issues (Gaviria Trujillo 1996). In 1998, however, Gaviria begins to implement securitizing language at a different address to an OAS session: “It is undeniable that poverty remains a major obstacle to development and constitutes a threat to social peace and political stability in the Hemisphere” (Gaviria Trujillo 1998). The OAS only began securitizing development four years after it became normalized in the UN, suggesting a possible progression of securitization from international to regional levels.

Colombia

Similarly, Colombia does not implement securitizing language until a few years after IGOs. In 1995, President Ernesto Samper discussed security, violence, and crime, but only offered carceral solutions, rather than any related to poverty or development (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1995). The first evidence of securitization of development by Colombia arrives in 1997, with another statement from Samper. He states that a policy of his “will benefit the area with development programmes, which will contribute to the creation of an atmosphere that will foster peace and progress” (BBC Monitoring International Reports 1997). More securitization of development by Colombia appears in 1998, with two different statements from President Andres Pastrana. In the first, he asserts that “peace will be the axis of the next development plan. This will entail large social and infrastructure investments in conflict zones” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1998). A few months later, he argues in a speech to the National Press Club that “the root cause of Colombia's present crisis is not violence or even drugs. It is a poverty that fuels both guerilla recruitment and the drug trade. The key solution is an all-out frontal assault on that poverty” (Federal News Service 1998). These two samples, in particular the second, demonstrate an urgent appeal to security in relation to development. Language like “all-out frontal assault” shows a very clear use of securitizing language.

Samper and Pastrana’s adoption of securitizing language follow the predicted progression of the securitization process, as a securitizing actor (in this case IGOs) begins the securitizing discourse, and the audience actor (in this case Colombia) picks up similar language afterwards. Though there is no evidence to confirm that the IGOs’ use of

securitization directly caused Colombia's, the lack of securitizing language from Colombia before development was securitized by IGOs suggest that there may be some influence. Even if Colombian actors did not use securitizing language with the express purpose to imitate the language of IGOs, it is still possible that they simply followed that changing norm in the discourse.

Alongside the securitization of development in Colombia came changes in development projects and legislation. Though the government still emphasized neoliberal growth strategies, other plans that focused more on development also emerged. One of these policies was the Peace Fund, which was proposed by Pastrana at the beginning of his presidency as an effort to ensure that foreign aid and investment was used in a way that could further development, and as a result, peace (Federal News Service 1998). The plan was realized in 1999 with funding primarily from the U.S., and began issuing small grants to Colombian organizations that were working on peace and development projects (US Aid 2021).

Plan Colombia, a U.S. aid initiative backed by the Pastrana administration, was proposed in 1999 and implemented in 2000, around the same time as the Peace Fund. The plan included mostly military aid, but also foreign aid for the purpose of development. The publicized incentive for the U.S.'s contribution to Plan Colombia was to restore peace in Colombia, but the initiative also aligned heavily with U.S. interests like the war on drugs, combating leftist extremism, and eventually the war on terror (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Plan Colombia was implemented after securitization of development was common in Colombia, and even uses securitizing language in describing its strategy: "The strategic theory of Plan Colombia is very simple. It links economic development and

security to the peace process” (Marcella 2001). Plan Colombia’s primary development strategy was to provide for alternative employment for farmers no longer able to produce coca (Marcella 2001).

Also in 1999, the Colombian army began adding human development initiatives to their counterinsurgency operations. The military had long targeted rural communities vulnerable to guerrilla influence with pro-government propaganda, but this new strategy saw “soldiers...go to the poorest communities to deliver medicinal drugs and medicines and to pave the streets” (BBC 1999). This strategy aimed to create government allies of rural communities, but also had the result of providing necessary services in those areas.

These three examples of development policy post-securitization show a change in the approach to development, whether or not they caused any improvement in development. Though liberalization and growth were still the focus of the government, there were also alternative strategies that promote human development by targeting individuals. Though the emergence of these policies does suggest some increase in prioritization of development, there is no evidence that the securitization of development was its direct cause. Given that the initiatives all fall under the Pastrana administration, it is also possible that the change in government, rather than the change in discourse, accounts for the different prioritization.

Development outcomes in Colombia also changed during this time period. Figure 3 shows an unsteady rise in GDP from 1994-1999, and GDP actually decreases for a

period between 1997 and 1999 (FRED 2022). GDP plateaus after 2000 and then begins rising again

Figure 4: GDP of Colombia, 1990-2005 (Source: FRED)





Figure 3: HDI of Colombia, 1990-2005 (Source: UNDP)



from 2003-2005. This volatility in growth makes it difficult to find any connection to the development strategies in Colombia, whether before or after securitization. Additionally, there is no clear causal mechanism to link growth directly to securitization of development or a change in the prioritization of development.

Unlike GDP, HDI increased steadily during this period, as seen in Figure 4. The measure increases by around 0.03 over each five-year period, which is consistent with the measures from the pre-securitization period (United Nations Development Programme 2020). Because there is no change in the trajectory of HDI, there is no evidence that the securitization of development impacted HDI significantly. Again, there is also no direct cause to suggest that securitization or prioritization had an impact on human development.

Conclusions

After analyzing the data for each variable, this evidence of this study supports both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Within the independent variable of securitization of development, the progression of securitizing language in the discourse does demonstrate the existence of a securitizing actor and an audience that accepts the securitization, although there is no evidence of direct cause. Between the independent variable and the first dependent variable, prioritization of development, there does seem to be an impact. Colombia's development strategies changed to include more human development initiatives, rather than just liberalization efforts, although no causal mechanism is seen in that data. Between the independent variable and the second dependent variable, development outcomes, there is no evidence that suggests any impact of the securitization

of development. The GDP is too volatile to see any pattern, and the trajectory of HDI is too steady to suggest any improvement as a direct result of securitization. Chapter 6 will analyze the third measure of development outcomes, local perspectives, in order to include more cultural context and to observe whether or not outcomes vary depending on what measure of development is used.

Capítulo 6: Perspectivas y prácticas locales

En su libro *Justicia entre Saberes: Epistemologías del Sur contra el epistemicidio*, Boaventura de Sousa Santos argumenta que el Norte global cree que sus ideas y teorías son universales, y que “el colonialismo ha incapacitado al Norte global para el aprendizaje desde un punto de vista no colonial, es decir desde aquel que permite la existencia de historias distintas de las de la historia universal eurocéntrica” (de Sousa Santos 2016, 42). La mentalidad colonial impacta todas las creencias que vienen del Norte. Para crear verdaderamente un mundo con mayor igualdad y bienestar, necesitamos considerar perspectivas del Sur. Aunque de Sousa Santos se refiere a la teoría y la historia, este marco teórico puede aplicarse a la política de desarrollo y seguridad. Los planes del desarrollo discutidos en el capítulo previo son nortños en sus valores y estrategias, pero este capítulo considerará prácticas que desafíen esta forma de pensar. Primero, discutiré las reacciones locales a las políticas segurizadas del Capítulo 5. Luego, examinaré alternativas para abordar los problemas de desarrollo y seguridad que fueron propuestos o llevados a cabo por las poblaciones locales.

Reacciones a las políticas segurizadas

Políticas neoliberales

Las políticas de liberalización económica fueron comunes en los años noventa y después fueron favorecidas por las organizaciones internacionales y las élites políticas en Colombia, pero recibieron oposición de las poblaciones locales. En 2001, hubo grandes protestas contra una ley de Colombia y el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI). Esta

política trataba sobre la reforma presupuestaria, porque el FMI ordenó una reducción del déficit a cambio de préstamos (Associated Press 2001). Este tipo de préstamo condicional es común con el FMI. Colombia quería más préstamos y así cumplieron con las reglas del FMI sobre responsabilidad fiscal. La política fiscal tenía el riesgo de cortar la financiación de sectores importantes como la educación y la salud. En ese momento, la ley estaba en el congreso y estaría firmado por el presidente Pastrana. La posibilidad de esta ley se encontró con cientos de miles de manifestantes en diferentes partes de Colombia (Associated Press 2001). Alrededor de 300.000 maestros y 125.000 trabajadores de la salud pública declararon una huelga contra esta ley (Associated Press 2001). Estos trabajadores temían recortes presupuestarios en sus sectores y posible desempleo si se aprobaba la ley. Argumentaban que mejoras económicas no deben sacrificar importantes programas de bienestar social como la educación y la salud. Estas grandes manifestaciones demuestran la desconexión entre los deseos de la gente y las políticas creadas.

Plan Colombia

Aún más desacuerdo vino con el Plan Colombia, la iniciativa de EE.UU. sobre la ayuda militar y del desarrollo. Aunque el propósito oficial del plan era disminuir la violencia y aumentar el bienestar, en realidad, aumentó la violencia mucho, lo que dañó el desarrollo (Mondragón 2002; Lindsay-Poland 2018). Con más armas y más entrenamiento, los militares tenían más poder para hacer daño. Como resultado, el Plan Colombia se volvió muy impopular entre muchos de los colombianos. Hay explicaciones diferentes para la discrepancia entre la intención reportada y los resultados. Mondragón

argumenta que las motivaciones de EE.UU. incluyen el precio del petróleo (Mondragón 2002). Este interés apoya un desarrollo capitalista que no ayuda a la mayoría de los colombianos.

Otros dicen que eventualmente, el Plan Colombia se convirtió más en una parte de la “guerra en terror” de EE.UU. (Larosa & Mejiía 2012; Lindsay-Poland 2018).

Especialmente con el presidente Bush después del once de septiembre, la iniciativa fue otro ejemplo de la violencia perpetrada para la ganancia política. Este desarrollo se opuso a la política original que dice “whether the distinction between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations can be maintained in the fog of the battlefield is another issue... U.S. officials are optimistic that the operational distinction can be made” (Marcella 2001, 12). El objetivo propuesto era disminuir el tráfico de los narcóticos, y no para eliminar la insurrección. Sin embargo, estos temas están interconectados, y a medida que avanzaba la operación, la distinción disminuyó. Cuando aumentaron los esfuerzos de contrainsurgencia, también lo hizo la violencia general en Colombia.

La tesis de *Cruel Modernity* por Jean Franco provee una explicación de la perspectiva de las humanidades. Argumenta que una característica de la modernidad es que el establecimiento del Estado y las fronteras estatales crea una división artificial que nos permite superar el instinto humano de no causar daño a otros humanos (Franco 2013). Franco escribe que “neither cruelty nor the exploitation of cruelty is new, but the lifting of the taboo, the acceptance and justification of cruelty and the rationale for cruel acts, have become a feature of modernity” (Franco 2013, 2). El Estado moderno es responsable de “levantar el tabú”. La mayoría de la gente son rechazadas naturalmente por la idea de lastimar a otros, pero el Estado ha entrenado con éxito a muchas personas

para que sean asesinos y mutiladores. La construcción del Estado puede generar violencia de la gente, lo que puede ayudar a explicar cómo Colombia se volvió tan violenta con el Plan Colombia.

Mientras el estado sancionaba la violencia, grupos no estatales se opusieron a la participación de EE.UU. y la violencia que se generó. Las redes comunitarias como la Red de Comunidades en Ruptura y Resistencia, o RECORRE, compartían una perspectiva similar sobre el Estado. Es una organización grande que se compone de varias comunidades indígenas, afrocolombianas y campesinas de Cauca, César, Chocó, Bolívar y Antioquia (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Se enfocaron en la construcción de la comunidad y el mantenimiento de la paz en lugar de la política a nivel estatal (Lindsay-Poland 2018). La violencia extrema de Plan Colombia y la oposición de la gente de Colombia otra vez demuestran el fracaso de las políticas de desarrollo securizadas para traer beneficios a la gente.

Alternativas locales

Encuesta “Voices of the Poor”

Los informes “Voices of the Poor” fueron un esfuerzo del Banco Mundial para capturar opiniones locales en varias partes del mundo. Un informe sobre Colombia fue investigado en 2002 y publicado en 2004. Participantes del estudio, todos gente en la pobreza, entregaron 252 propuestas para planes de desarrollo (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004). Los temas comunes de estas propuestas fueron el empleo, la violencia y la educación. La siguiente tabla (Table 2) muestra las sugerencias más comunes en cada área de desarrollo.

Table 2: Resumen de las sugerencias comunes

Área de desarrollo	Sugerencias comunes
El empleo	• Inversión del gobierno en grupos y negocios comunitarios • Reforma agraria • El cuidado de los niños
La violencia	• Programas locales para reducir la vulnerabilidad de los jóvenes a la violencia • La protección comunitaria no violenta • Sistemas de alerta comunitarias
La educación	• Entrenamiento vocacional • Bajar el costo de las escuelas • Más universidades públicas • Reconocimiento de las diferencias regionales en la educación

Para el empleo, los participantes sugirieron la inversión en grupos y negocios comunitarios, reforma agraria y oportunidades para el cuidado de los niños (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004). La inversión en grupos locales podría tener impactos a corto plazo en comparación con las inversiones a largo plazo en la educación o la salud (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004). La reforma agraria otorgaría la propiedad y la soberanía de la tierra a más campesinos para que puedan beneficiarse más de su trabajo. Más oportunidades del cuidado de los niños podrían cambiar el empleo porque proporcionarían un lugar de trabajo y una oportunidad para que más madres trabajen fuera de la casa. Aunque se puede pensar en el empleo a nivel estatal, la mayoría de estos propuestos son de nivel comunitario.

Similarmente, las sugerencias para disminuir la violencia no involucraron mucho al Estado. Fueron programas locales para reducir la vulnerabilidad juvenil, la protección comunitaria no violenta y sistemas de alerta en comunidades (Arboleda, Petesch, and

Blackburn 2004). Jóvenes pobres a menudo son vulnerables a la violencia de los narcóticos o los grupos guerrilleros, lo que hace importante la formación de las oportunidades alternativas. Sistemas de alerta y protección también podrían mantener más paz en comunidades donde violencia es común. Estos programas han tenido éxito en áreas como Cauca y se pueden implementar en otros lugares (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004).

Para la educación, los participantes sugirieron más entrenamiento vocacional, que las escuelas deberían ser más baratas, más universidades públicas y reconocimiento de las diferencias regionales en la educación (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004). El entrenamiento vocacional idealmente permitiría a los estudiantes trabajar de inmediato en un oficio como costura, cocina, electricidad y mecánica (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004). El cambio propuesto a las escuelas que las haría más sensibles a las diferencias regionales responde a un sentimiento común de que “school curricula are imposed inappropriately from the outside, do not correspond to regional realities, and erode rather than strengthen local identity” (Arboleda, Petesch, and Blackburn 2004, 52). Para que la educación beneficie a las poblaciones locales, debe reflejar las realidades locales. Algunas de estas propuestas de empleo, violencia y educación son de un nivel más alto, pero todavía consideraron las diferencias regionales y necesidades locales. Este informe revela que las áreas del desarrollo más importantes para la gente colombiana en pobreza están interconectadas y principalmente del nivel de comunidad, no del Estado.

Redes comunitarias

Como se mencionó anteriormente, RECORRE es una red de comunidades rurales en oposición a la violencia, el poder del Estado y el desarrollo capitalista tradicional (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Su misión es apoyar el bienestar de las comunidades. Comparte información y recursos y también crea programas e iniciativas para mejorar las comunidades. En 2004, empezó una “universidad campesina”, un evento que apoyó la soberanía alimentaria para enseñar habilidades importantes a los campesinos (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Aunque usaron el nombre “universidad”, el propósito del proyecto fue “radically different from ordinary academic universities, which the communities viewed as based on formal degrees, knowledge used for exploitation and exclusion, and the logic of consumerism” (Lindsay-Poland 2018, 124). En lugar de seguir el modelo de la educación del Norte global, priorizaron las necesidades locales y la fuerza de la comunidad.

Otra creación de RECORRE fue una fuerza de defensa de la comunidad no violenta (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Este proyecto fue similar a otros en varias partes del país. Por ejemplo, la Guardia Indígena es un colectivo de defensa en comunidades indígenas de Cauca. Junto con la protección de violencia armada, la Guardia Indígena trabaja en las áreas de “education, traditional medicine, earthquake and flood response, human rights training, and community development” (Lindsay-Poland 2018, 131). Grupos similares existen en otras formas, incluyendo colectivos afrocolombianos y colectivos feministas (Lindsay-Poland 2018). Estos proyectos no violentos priorizan el bienestar de las comunidades y los individuos y rechazan los esfuerzos dirigidos por el Estado, demostrando un enfoque muy diferente al desarrollo.

Agencia cultural

Lindsay-Poland también discute la importancia del arte, teatro y baile en los movimientos comunitarios durante esta época, especialmente porque “Making art was often conceived as the antithesis of making war” (Lindsay-Poland 2018, 125). Doris Sommer teoriza sobre este concepto en su libro *Cultural Agency in the Americas*. Usa el término “cultural agency”, o agencia cultural, y lo define como “a range of social contributions through creative practices” (Sommer 2006, 1). La agencia cultural fue introducida por primera vez por Antanas Mockus, el alcalde de Bogotá de 1995 a 1997. La idea es que donde las políticas económicas y seguridad tradicional fallan, la formación de una unidad civil a través de la agencia cultural puede crear las condiciones para las políticas exitosas (Sommer 2006).

Para probar esta teoría, Mockus infundió Bogotá con arte, incluyendo mimos que actuaron el comportamiento de tráfico apropiado y se burlaron de los peatones que no siguieron las reglas (Sommer 2006; Romero 2010). Si los mimos no funcionaban, también había tarjetas para evaluar otros conductores (Sommer 2006). En lugar de más policía, usó el arte de performance para promover y hacer cumplir las leyes de tránsito. Mockus también estableció programas de arte en las escuelas y conciertos públicos en los parques (Sommer 2006). El arte en la escuela proporcionó enriquecimiento y actividades alternativas para los jóvenes y el arte público creó un mejor sentido de comunidad. Ambos objetivos son bases para una ciudad menos violenta que no dependen de incentivos carcelarios.

Otras políticas no se trataban de arte, pero eran creativos en su énfasis de la acción voluntaria, como los días de desarmamiento, donde se animó a la gente a entregar las armas (Romero 2010). También había impuestos voluntarios, en los que participaron 63.000 personas (Romero 2010). Estas políticas no tradicionales, y en algunas veces muy excéntricas, ayudó a crear una comunidad a través del arte y la acción colectiva. En lugar de imponer leyes nuevas y más duras, usó el arte y el humor para tratar de cambiar el comportamiento en la ciudad. Después de la introducción de estos proyectos, la tasa de homicidios en Bogotá cayó por 65 por ciento (Sommer 2006). Este ejemplo de la agencia cultural sugiere que los esfuerzos creativos y locales pueden tener más efecto en el bienestar que las políticas tradicionales.

Figure 5: Foto de un mimo de tráfico en Bogotá (El Tiempo 1995)



Conclusión

La inclusión de estas perspectivas locales cambia los resultados y las implicaciones de este estudio. Aunque las medidas tradicionales del desarrollo no proveen cualquier resultado real, una revisión de datos cualitativos locales muestra que las políticas que se crearon con la segurización del desarrollo no son útiles para el desarrollo e incluso pueden empeorar el bienestar. Al final, no importa si el desarrollo está priorizado a través de la segurización si la consecuencia no apoya las necesidades del colombiano medio. Mirando las sugerencias alternativas para el desarrollo, está claro por qué la segurización no tiene un impacto positivo. La segurización es inherentemente vertical porque es iniciada y difundida por los élites políticos. Sin embargo, la necesidad local es para el desarrollo liderado por la comunidad, que está en desacuerdo con la naturaleza de la segurización. Las medidas tradicionales tienen valor, pero estas perspectivas son cruciales para capturar la historia completa.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study has attempted to determine how securitization of development impacts development outcomes. Previous literature on development shows many ways to think of and measure development, and that many are eurocentric and ignore the perspectives and needs of the people they address. While exact definitions vary, the securitization literature generally argues that actors securitize an issue or “referent object” by framing it as an existential threat. This appeal to security allows the actor to use any means necessary to stop the threat. The intersection of securitization and development is less prevalent in the literature, and scholars disagree on whether or not the securitization of development is helpful to development outcomes. Some believe that the greater attention is beneficial, while others see it as instrumentalizing or even racist.

I hypothesized that securitization would move the issue of development up on the agenda, allowing for greater prioritization and resources, but that securitization would not lead to improved development outcomes. To test these two hypotheses, I used the case of Colombia. I first measured the independent variable, securitization, by tracking discourse surrounding development. Securitization was observed if there was a securitizing actor of an IGO, state, or a representative of either, the securitizing actor communicates an existential threat to the referent object of development, and an audience (state, state leader, or regional leader) accepted the securitizing move by adopting similar securitizing rhetoric. Through collecting documents from IGOs and Colombian leaders, I was able to identify that this process had occurred. The first dependent variable, prioritization, was observed through a change in Colombian policy strategy. Though I did not find a causal

link, the change in development policy during this period supports Hypothesis 1. The second dependent variable, change in development outcomes, was measured through GDP, HDI, and local perspectives. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the fact that GDP and HDI showed no change as a result of securitization. The insight gained from local perspectives helps to explain this lack of impact, as the policies created after development was securitized did not match the needs of the majority.

In addition to the results of the hypotheses, several important implications emerge. First, it demonstrated the value of examining securitization's impact on less studied areas, not just the major focuses of health and environment. Securitization exists outside of those areas, and it is important to understand how it may affect the securitized issue. Analyzing the securitization discourse also revealed that IGOs play a major role in securitizing topics. This trend was not discussed very often in the securitization literature, but this study suggests that IGOs have significant power to influence discourse.

The study was not able to determine any impact on development outcomes, but did find some evidence of a change in policy as a result of securitization. This finding suggests that securitization may have an impact, not necessarily on economic outcomes, but rather the policies that governments create. However, if those policies do not contain effective development strategies, then securitizing development will not improve development outcomes. Ultimately, securitizing and prioritizing development may not be sufficient in creating change.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides implications about the importance of cultural context, specifically of looking at development from various perspectives, not just the dominant Western view. For research, this means considering local voices and needs, rather than

standard measures widely used, even if they are thorough composite indicators like HDI. Without hearing directly from the people who policies affect, studies cannot fully report on their impacts. This implication also extends to policy creation. Policymakers must consider the responses to development policy along with the wishes of local populations in order to see improvement in wellbeing.

Several limitations impacted the validity of this study. The time period of the 1990s made access to digital records more difficult than if the study had focused on a more recent period. There are fewer digitized speeches and statements from the time, so it is possible that important speech acts were not considered. This limitation also impacted the collection of local perspectives, as I had to rely on more widely digitized sources like academic journals and newspapers. Another major limitation was the difficulty in showing causal relationships between variables. Using mostly qualitative data was beneficial in examining the process of securitization and capturing a more nuanced story in the local perspectives, but also made proving a direct cause more complicated.

Future research could improve upon and add to the findings of this study by focusing on a different region or time period. Changing either or both of those factors may influence how securitization occurs or how it impacts development, providing valuable insight on how the process works. Other studies could also include a wider variety of actors like NGOs or advocacy groups, who could be important in beginning or spreading securitizing discourse. It is possible that the process of securitization is more complicated than the story created with only states and IGOs. Finally, much of the previous literature on securitization examines securitized discourse, but not its impacts. Future research could evaluate the effect of securitization on other topic areas like health,

environment, or gender to determine the policy outcomes, not just the policy creation, that results from securitizing an issue. These suggestions would help to create a more complete understanding of securitization and its impacts.

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