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It's About Time: Reading US-India Cold War Perceptions Through News Coverage of India

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Abstract

Recent attempts to recalibrate the U.S-India relationship require a clearer understanding of how this relationship began. To that end, this essay traces the themes characterizing early U.S.-India relations through a rhetorical analysis of Time magazine cover portraits and articles from 1951 to 1962 featuring the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Acting as an index of the U.S. administration and partly conveying the attitudes of its editor-in-chief toward India, Time advanced a set of arguments about India’s unreliability as a Cold War ally and the essential correctness of the U.S. administration’s stance against Communist nations and those who eschewed open alignment with U.S. during the Cold War. Time’s coverage formed a narrative arc that admonished India’s attempts at friendship with China and Cold War neutrality while vindicating the U.S. cause during this period. I conclude that Cold War themes linger in U.S. news reporting on India, argue for more scholarship on non-Western nations, and suggest that, along with verbal texts, images are rich sources of foreign policy rhetoric.

Keywords: foreign policy, news, India, China, Cold War, images, narrative
It’s About *Time*: Reading U.S.-India Cold War Perceptions Through News Coverage of India

In November 2009, the Obama administration held its first and largest state dinner for a foreign visitor: Dr Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India. *BBC News* reported that President Obama called India and the United States “two global leaders driven not to dominate other nations, but to build a future of security and prosperity for all nations,” a future in which “India is indispensable” (“Barack Obama”). White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs saw the event as “a show of respect for the value that we put on [the U.S.-India] relationship” (“Barack Obama”). These sentiments were reiterated in the President’s November 2010 trip to India when he described the U.S.-India relationship as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century” (“Remarks, 8 December 2010”).

Nor has this Indian turn been limited to the U.S. government. In September 2011 the *New York Times* launched its first-ever country-specific site: “India Ink,” a blog by journalists from the paper and writers from India seeking to produce “unbiased, authoritative reporting on the country and its place in the world.” *The Economist* released a special report on India in September 2012 followed by an online debate on India’s economy in October 2012. Mirroring Obama’s 2010 statements, *The Economist* noted in June 2012 that America and India sought to “define a new sort of relationship” that recognized India as crucial to the U.S.’s “rebalancing strategy” against China and to Afghanistan’s stability after NATO leaves in 2014 (“India and America”).

The upturn in news coverage of India reflects the U.S. government’s efforts to recalibrate a relationship that began rather unhappily when the U.S. pressured Britain unsuccessfully to grant India independence in World War II, only to find India unwilling to support the U.S. in the ensuing Cold War. Instead, India led a nonaligned bloc that seemed to support the U.S.’s major
rivals, the Soviet Union and China. Relations were complicated further by India’s nuclear program and U.S military support for India’s nemesis, Pakistan. Even after over more than 60 years of bilateral relations and a significant influx in Indian immigration, the U.S. remains unsure about how to picture, and hence, how to engage, emerging nations like India. President Clinton expressed this uncertainty in a series of antithetical descriptions before India’s Parliament in 2000: “From a distance, India often appears as a kaleidoscope of competing, perhaps superficial, images. Is it atomic weapons, or ahimsa1? Is it the handloom or the hyperlink?”(Clinton, “Remarks by the President”). Hence, India’s conceptualization and its place in the American imaginary remain a perennial theme in U.S. foreign policy.

One way to get at the roots of this complex relationship is to shift focus to the initial decades of bilateral relations captured in the U.S. media’s coverage of India. To that end, this essay investigates early U.S.-India relations between 1951 and 1962 through a rhetorical examination of three Time issues featuring Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. I find that the cover images and their corresponding articles presented American readers with a perception of India that reflected the Cold War attitudes of the U.S. administration (and partly that of Time’s then editor-in-chief) during this period. Specifically, my analysis reveals how Time traced the demise of India’s naïve attempts at Cold War neutrality and friendship with Communist China, while vindicating the U.S. government’s opposition to both efforts.

This case study of Time’s strategies of representation offers several contributions to rhetorical scholarship. First, I expand rhetorical literature on India and, in doing so, answer calls to “internationalize public address studies” (Zarefsky 76) and broaden communication scholarship to reach beyond Western nations. India’s growing value as a U.S. ally and global actor makes a study of the roots of the U.S.-India relationship especially pertinent. This is
particularly so given that much ink has been devoted to studying media treatment of the primary U.S. Cold War antagonists, China and the Soviet Union, while India’s interestingly problematic status as a neutral party remains overlooked. In providing this missing piece, this essay also expands the slim corpus on India, a country which provides rich scope for rhetorical study, but which has thus far been studied only in limited ways, focusing heavily on Mahatma Gandhi’s social movement rhetoric. I add a rhetorical perspective on Nehru, who has been studied much less, despite being the U.S.’s prime point of political contact with India for over twenty years.

Second, because *Time* crafted its portrayal of India in words *and* images, this study shows how visual elements can supplement rhetorical examinations of foreign relations. An image is a helpful resource for portraying attitudes because it uses a universal language of gestures and symbols to construct visual arguments about its subject. Birdsell and Groarke have explained that an image’s strategy of argumentation draws on contexts provided by other images and accompanying texts, as well as a society’s prevailing visual culture, to advance particular viewpoints (6). A visual culture as used here refers to the prevalent codes and “way[s] of seeing” (Hariman and Lucaites 298) with which readers interpret images enthymematically (Pineda and Sowards 166). For example, a red star during the Cold War was code for ‘communism,’ while a fiery dragon denoted ‘China,’ just as knotted brows have always signaled a person deep in thought, and a bowed head spells defeat. In drawing on shared interpretations of visual codes, images can reveal attitudes and thus provide useful insight into portrayals of other nations.

Third, this essay extends work on visual rhetoric by highlighting the role of images in depicting relations between rather than within countries. Thus far, scholars have looked at identity-formation within national boundaries, covering such questions as the power of images to provoke deliberation about citizenship and perceptions of national public figures. In their
discussion of the constitution of civic identity through iconic photographs, Hariman and Lucaites argued that citizens must be able to discuss “whether their … habits for viewing the world are helping them to sustain themselves as a public” (298). Similarly, Lubin’s work on the image culture of the Kennedy presidency, Brown’s examination of pictorial reporting in gilded age America and Erickson’s study of presidential styles as visual performance fragments underscored the importance of visual elements in publics’ perceptions of their nation. I add to this work by looking beyond images of the U.S. to images of other nations.4

The essay proceeds as follows: First, I outline early U.S-India Cold War relations. Next, I discuss images of India in U.S. popular culture in the 1940s-60s, highlighting Time’s role in the production and dissemination of arguments about India. The examination of Time is followed by an analysis of Time’s Nehru covers and articles, in which I uncover a narrative arc tracing the demise of India’s neutrality policy during the Cold War. I conclude by discussing the implications of this narrative and the value of images in rhetorical studies of foreign relations.

U.S.-India Cold War Relations

In 1947, India emerged from a century and a half of British rule. After a protracted war for self-determination in which India had been forced to contribute troops to Britain’s World War II effort and had parted violently from Pakistan, the battle-weary nation found herself in the middle of the Cold War. Years of colonization made India’s leaders adamant that the new nation avoid the entanglements of other countries’ foreign policies. Nehru’s autobiography revealed that even before India’s independence, he dreaded a “new kind of imperialism” by the “powerfully expansionist” post-war American economy (558). Consequently, India sought to remain free of the webs of other countries’ interests by adopting a policy of neutrality and “a prevailing conceptualization of non-alignment in global factions” (Kuracina 531).
Although India saw nonalignment as an indication of a “desire to live in peace and friendship” with others (Zaidi 450), her espousal of neutrality perplexed the U.S., who saw the Cold War as an ideological battle in the middle of which there could only be equivocation. By not aligning with the non-communist U.S., India indicated de facto support for the communist Soviet Union and China. Nehru’s belief in what his biographer Sarvepalli Gopal called the “containment of China through friendship” and his repeated efforts to win Mao Tse-Tung’s confidence often turned neutrality into alignment (Gopal quoted in Chaudhry and Vanduzer-Snow 41). Even as Beijing’s repeated border incursions into India made it difficult to defend China, Nehru remained “reluctant to characterize Communist China as other than a peaceful nation whose intentions had been misjudged by the West” (282). Intentional or not, India’s neutrality to the U.S. in effect became neutrality against it, with then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles calling the policy not only mistaken or unfortunate, but “immoral” (Isaacs xxvii).

The perceived immorality of Communism and the corresponding righteousness of the U.S. cause constituted the primary frame through which the U.S. viewed nations during the Cold War. Gerbner observed that “the image of Russia throughout the 1970s and 1980s [was] largely frozen into a frigid Cold War formula” (33), while Chang’s work on U.S. media representations of China between the 1950s and the 1980s revealed a similar attitude. In a famous illustration of the Cold War narrative espoused by the U.S. government and reproduced in news coverage, Entman (1991) argued that the U.S. media used contrasting frames to depict the U.S. downing of an Iranian plane in 1988 and the Soviet downing of a Korean jet in 1983 such that the Soviet action was depicted as an act of moral bankruptcy while the U.S. action was attributed to understandable human error. Thus, Cold War attitudes prevalent during the formative years of
U.S.-India engagement cast the U.S. in a favorable light while criticizing Communist nations and sympathizers such as India.

India’s nonalignment caused particular anxiety because it revealed that the U.S. could not assume allegiance from a country with historical similarities and shared political values. As a fellow secular democracy and former British colony, India’s support in the ideological tussle between communism and democracy had seemed inevitable. It is possible that the U.S. also saw in India’s push for freedom elements of her own revolution against Britain in the 18th century and expected India to feel a similar kinship. Thus, as Robert McMahon explained, “most administration planners were convinced that India’s eventual alignment with the West remained a logical expectation” (45). Naturally, suspicion and frustration arose when this hoped-for alignment did not manifest.  

A 1955 New York Times editorial cartoon aptly captured the U.S. befuddlement when it depicted Nehru sitting atop a rope curling upward to spell “neutrality” with a puzzled world looking on (Isaacs 247).

The U.S. Media’s Representation of India

In fact, the news and entertainment media were the primary lenses through which Americans encountered India in this period because Indian immigration to the U.S. and governmental engagement was minimal until the 1950s. This is not to say that India was absent from the U.S. popular consciousness. Rather, the American public had some, albeit limited, knowledge of India through books such as Katherine Mayo’s 1927 sordid account of Indian poverty in Mother India, Life photographer Margaret Bourke-White’s 1949 Halfway to Freedom, in which she spent two years chronicling India in photographs and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s 1953 survey of Asia in India and the Awakening East. These works varied in scope, tone, and purpose, but all presented a country that bewildered readers with its dual identity as a
secular democracy with deeply religious customs, its public worship of female deities alongside systematic gender discrimination against women and its juxtaposition of immense wealth with abject poverty. Thus, early constructions of India in the American popular imagination depicted it as a nation of conflicting identities and priorities.

Films such as *The Charge of the Light Brigade* (1936), *The Drum* (1938), and *The Bengal Brigade* (1954) presented American audiences with an additional sense of India not just as a country of confusing dualities, but one with a dangerous capacity for deceit. The films, which featured well-known actors such as Errol Flynn, Olivia de Havilland, and Rock Hudson, were replete with plotlines of Indian soldiers who rebelled against commanding officers, attacked British barracks, and committed fratricide and regicide. Hence, the image of India in U.S. popular literature and films was of a country difficult to fathom, encompassing numerous paradoxes, and possessing an unnerving potential for violent betrayal.

This image exemplified colonial discourses which characterized colonies by “qualities assigned to the individual savage – dishonesty, suspicion, superstition, lack of self-discipline” (Spurr 76). Such discourses used “the rhetorical debasement of the cultural Other” (Spurr 76) to fulfill what Hayden White called “the need for positive self-definition” that emerged “in times of sociocultural stress” (151) posed by an unknown and seemingly irrational set of foreign actors (such as wily, paradoxical and violent Indians). Thus, while *Time*’s themes of U.S. vindication and Indian naiveté resulted partly from the Cold War binary, they also echoed earlier colonial narratives that celebrated the righteousness of the West by denigrating those who were different.9

Few U.S. news sources made India as visually present as *Time* and to as wide an audience. *Time* was a popular national magazine whose weekly circulation soared from 641,000 copies in 1936 to 750,000 in 1940 (Herzstein 30) until it reached more than one million
American readers during World War II (50). As the only Time Inc. publication dedicated to politics and global affairs, Time was a staple reading resource during World War II and the Cold War, prompting William F. Buckley, Jr. to declare that “if it was in Time, it was important” (Herzstein xii). Time was also especially attentive to India. In addition to six covers of Nehru between 1942 and 1962, Time featured Mahatma Gandhi in 1930, 1931 and 1947. In contrast, partner magazine Life did not feature India or any of its leadership until its coverage of Nehru’s funeral in 1964. 10 Time claimed special expertise as an authority on India and prefaced its 1959 and 1962 cover stories with letters from the publisher attesting to the veracity of the articles and their writers’ deep knowledge of India. 11

The literature on media indexing and Time’s organizational structure suggest that Time’s coverage was informed partly by official U.S. foreign policy and partly by Time’s editor-in-chief, Henry Luce. In a seminal essay, Bennett argued that news organizations “‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints …according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate” (106). In short, the media tend to align their reporting to the interpretive frames provided by official government sources. 12 The tendency to index official policy is even greater, argued Gans, in coverage of foreign relations, where information about distant countries is harder to come by, such that American news media hew closer to the State Department on foreign issues than to the White House on domestic news (37).

The media’s adoption of the administration’s lead in foreign policy has been borne out in numerous studies. Chang’s study of the New York Times and Washington Post from 1950 to 1984 found that variations in these outlets’ coverage of China followed the changing agenda and attitudes of the U.S. government. Similarly, Perlmutter found that “the political stance of the US government…was the consistent determinant of the connotative intent of the images” of China in
the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, and *Time* from 1949 to 1989 (*Photojournalism* 7). As Bernard Cohen once concluded, “the news media serve as a continuous and articulate link between foreign policy officials in the government and those people on the outside who follow events” (194).

Henry Luce also played a role in shaping *Time*’s coverage of India because he not only possessed a strong set of views on India but was an unusually interventionist editor-in-chief. His stringent supervision of *Time*’s stories, including occasionally co-writing editorials, distinguished *Time*’s reporting structure from that of other publications (Gans 96) and stamped the magazine with Luce’s views on India. His strongly pro-U.S., anti-communist stance made India and Nehru special “subjects of [*Time*’s] opprobrium for appeasing the People’s Republic of China and making self-righteous criticisms of U.S. anti-Communist policy” (Perlmutter, *Picturing China* 130). Therefore, *Time* was an important indicator, first, of the U.S. government’s views, and second, of the forceful *Time-Life* editor-in-chief’s stance on India.

A final reason to study *Time* is that it was famous for its iconic cover portraiture. *Time*’s trademark single-person cover portraits were key to the magazine’s construction of other countries in the minds of its readers. Even with the advent of mass reproduction of photographs in news magazines, *Time* reserved portraits for notable figures. Portraits gave *Time*’s artists and editors flexibility in depicting their subjects, especially because earlier portraits, such as those of Nehru, did not have sitters who could insist on being painted a certain way. Thus, portraits accorded *Time* the leeway to shape the images readers encountered and that the magazine wished them to associate with India via Nehru.

The tone of news coverage of India depended on whether U.S. administrations took a shine to Nehru – most did not. In the main, Nehru was recognized as an astute intellectual and
politician, but his frequent comments on the “narrower, more dogmatic Western mind” meant he was by no means loved in America (Krenn 103). To complicate matters, there was rarely a unified stance toward Nehru. Although his “tone of moral superiority in political affairs … infuriated Americans…and became the single most strongly negative factor in U.S.-Indian relations from the U.S. point of view,” he was also regarded by liberals as “as the finest example of humane leadership in Asia” (103, 104) Thus, while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles found Nehru an “utterly impractical statesman” (Chaudhry and Vanduzer-Snow 28), his predecessor Dean Acheson felt that “Nehru was so important to India and India’s survival, so important to all of us that if he did not exist—as Voltaire said of God—he would have to be invented” (336).

U.S. administrations’ conflicting views of Nehru heightened the uncertainty infusing his interpretation. While in prison, he wrote frankly about his political principles, often pre-empting the misgivings felt about him.14 As Harold Isaacs explained, “these attributes of the Nehru image impose[d] a peculiar discomfort” because Nehru himself identified the very failings for which he was criticized, thus asserting power over his observers (305). Hence, “from all these real or fancied contradictions [came] much of the defensive uneasiness of his friends and acute irritation felt by so many of his critics and foes” (305). Nehru’s tendency toward self-reflection, in which he was paradoxically both subject and critic, confounded attempts to understand his intentions, and by extension, those of his country.

In portraying this contradictory Cold War actor to U.S. readers, Time produced three portraits of Nehru which featured him alongside symbols of Communist China.15 In 1951, he was pensive while considering Red China next door. In 1959, he was anxious and straining to manage a fast-advancing China, and in 1962, he bowed his head as Mao loomed over him. These
covers and their accompanying articles form the core of my analysis because they dealt with the central question of how *Time* presented a justification of U.S. Cold War foreign policy that indexed the U.S. administration’s belief in the righteousness of its stance against communism and the error of countries that eschewed open alignment with the U.S..

The covers and their articles charted the disintegration of neutrality as Nehru was compelled to choose a side in the Cold War. First, *Time* argued that Nehru was a thinker rather than a doer and that his policy of neutrality was rooted in idealistic philosophy instead of practical politics. Hence, neutrality was bound to fail because it was the brainchild of a misguided and ineffectual philosopher. Second, when this thinker *did* act, his actions ran counter to his espoused philosophy, creating a perception of Nehru (and thus India) as a paradox not to be trusted because his words were inconsistent with his deeds. This argument was most prominent in discussions of Nehru’s advocacy of neutrality, but apparent support of communist nations. Together, these two arguments combined into a broader argument that cast doubt on Nehru’s credibility and judgment, particularly in light of his doomed neutrality policy. In this third argument, *Time* suggested that the U.S.’s stance in the Cold War was right, and that Nehru had been mistaken in his attempts to befriend Communist China. My analysis finds that these three themes—Thinker Nehru, Paradoxical India, and U.S. Vindication—combined to paint a narrative in which Indian neutrality was discredited. I now trace these themes across the *Time* issues from 1951, 1959, and 1962.

*Thinker Nehru*

The 1951 cover was painted after China’s 1950 invasion of Tibet, an event that gave Nehru cause for anxiety, but which subsided after Beijing agreed to a peaceful settlement. Hence, neutrality and the attempt to make China a friend had not backfired – yet. Nevertheless,
the cover portrait showed him deep in thought, with his brow furrowed and his wrist poised pensively below his chin as he considered the dawning problem of China from the shelter of his palace. His fingers were curled into his palm save for one, which reached out to press down on his already pursed lips – Nehru was conscious of the Chinese threat in his peripheral gaze but would not acknowledge it. Instead, he glanced away from the rising communist sun while indulging in what the accompanying article called “wistful fairy tales” of being left alone to chart India’s course (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Taken on its own, the cover presented India as painted into a corner by the imminent Chinese threat but still considering the problem from afar, seeking refuge in shadowed interiors and gazing away determinedly as though hoping the problem would resolve itself.

The accompanying article extended the argument of Nehru as a passive thinker unwilling to commit to definite action. Just as the cover painted Nehru ensconced in his palace, neither acknowledging China’s aggression nor remaining completely sanguine, the article recalled an incident from India’s colonial era where Nehru perched himself atop a British palisade separating Hindu pilgrims from the Ganges River; he protested the British action, but did little more for the Indians than sit where he was, literally not coming down on either side. For the Time writers, this moment was emblematic of Nehru’s “uncomfortable, prominent and median posture” (“Pandit’s Mind” 31). Instead of taking action, Nehru adopted a “legs-astride position…on the vast fence that runs through the world” and in doing so, frustrated U.S. onlookers who could not understand such ambivalence (“Pandit’s Mind” 31). More to the point, they could not understand the kind of mind that would produce such ambivalence. In trying to make sense of Nehru’s inscrutable inaction, the article made several references to Nehru’s mind and explained that “Americans, on whose affairs and prospects the mind of Jawaharlal Nehru
thus has considerable influence, would like to understand that mind” (34). “Sooner or later,” proclaimed Time, “[Nehru] must act” and “Nehru’s privileged balancing act cannot go on forever” because “it is evident that the world is going either in America’s direction or in Russia’s” (34). The fact that this situation was not evident to Nehru only confirmed his image as a leader who preferred ponderous thought to decisive action.

It is additionally illuminating to note how this article was laid out inside the magazine. After seeing the cover, interested viewers turning to the follow-up story inside would see a page dominated by a cartoon depicting Truman and Stalin as naked swamis (Hindu holy men) sitting cross-legged, smoking a hookah. The cartoon’s caption read “Truman and Stalin hold a peace conference” (“Conferences” 34). Upon closer reading, viewers would find that the picture accompanied a report about a spiritual conference in Delhi which neither Truman nor Stalin attended. However, since it extended across two-thirds of the page, was placed among the text of the cover article, and depicted two key figures in the Cold War, the cartoon appeared to accompany the Nehru cover story. In fact, the text above the cartoon was the opening paragraph of the cover story and started with a sentence about Hindu pilgrims (this was the palisade incident referred to earlier), so it seemed paired with the Truman-Stalin swami cartoon. When viewed with its surrounding text the cartoon satirized India’s neutrality policy by suggesting that there was no need to pick sides in the Cold War because everyone could get along if they just sat and meditated.

In 1959, Nehru’s attempts at meditation were interrupted as he was brought into reluctant contact with the reality of Communist China – a reality in which China had breached a Sino-Indian border agreement, killed nine frontier policemen and taken an Indian prisoner in retaliation for Nehru offering asylum to the Dalai Lama. Relations in 1959 were hence at an
unprecedented low, a state of affairs reflected in *Time*’s cover that year. Nehru adopted a similar pose as in 1951, with his hand brushing against his mouth, this time tugging at his lower lip. He had finally turned his head to the communist presence next door, but still avoided direct confrontation.

Nehru’s gestures on the 1951 and 1959 covers echoed the ‘knuckles under the chin’ posture of pensive concentration codified in Auguste Rodin’s late nineteenth-century sculpture, *The Thinker* (Boegehold 24). David Lubin called such commonly-understood gestures the “visual language” of a society’s inescapable “artistic lineage,” one in which painters and “ancient Roman sculptors taught us what facial expression to wear and bodily postures to assume” when people wish to dedicate themselves to a certain cause (xi). In Rodin’s case, the thinker’s pose is so embedded in viewing culture that it has become shorthand for a person so absorbed in thought and in searching for a solution that he is oblivious to the world outside. The departure in Nehru’s case was that he was far from oblivious to China’s aggression, but insisted nonetheless on waiting and thinking. Nehru’s pose in these covers was lent further resonance by the fact that while Gandhi was called “Mahatma” (Great Soul) by his followers, Nehru was christened “Pandit” (Great Scholar), emphasizing his persona as a philosopher. The covers thus reflected *Time*’s framing of Nehru as a thinker but without this title’s positive connotations. Instead, *Time* portrayed a negative view of Nehru the thinker – rather than doer — and a frustration with what the 1951 cover story called the “Pandit’s Mind” (31).

The 1959 article extended the theme of Nehru’s inertia to suggest that he was incapable of movement, being limited to thinking and speaking without effecting change. The article reiterated some points we have encountered before, such as Nehru pausing in the face of clear danger. The writers remarked that “[the crisis with China] … was a threat that Nehru typically,
first tried not to see, then ignored and then tried to argue away” and described his “hesitant response to China’s calculated attack on the Indian patrol” on the border with China (“India: The Shade” 23). When Nehru did take a firm stance against China, the article described this as an uncharacteristic moment where “Nehru stunningly and surprisingly emerged from the cocoon of indecision” (23).

*Time* argued that Nehru did not just act slowly but that when he did act, he was unable to bring about real change. The article documented how he “tried, on occasion, to translate into action his vague and intensely personal theories about socialism” but failed to interest Indian businessman in his theories (“India: The Shade” 22). In various attempts to reform his administration, “he railed against the ingrained Indian habits of inefficiency…stormed at the prevalence of holidays…pleaded with his colleagues in the governing Congress Party” but all that happened was that “they listened and went back to their old ways” (22). Instead of taking action and making crucial decisions, he “gives long, rambling extemporaneous talks…full of digressions and schoolmasterly asides” (22). Nehru was cast as an ineffectual philosopher whose sphere of action was limited to railing, pleading, and schoolmasterly rambling.

The schoolmaster’s mind was no longer a point of note, let alone contention, by 1962, when China added to the violent border incursions of 1959 with multiple attacks along the Sino-Indian border. Nehru’s ponderous inaction in this last year of coverage, rather than a cause for frustration, merely confirmed his weakness as a politician. The 1962 article made a passing reference to Nehru “[sitting] chin in hand…his abstracted gaze, fixed on nothing” (“India: Never Again” 24) and to how “India moves at a different pace” (28), but it was less concerned with the puzzle of Nehru’s mind or his inept actions as were the previous articles. Thus, while “Thinker
Nehru” began as a fairly prominent theme, its importance dissipated as *Time* became more familiar with India and perhaps felt it had deciphered Nehru’s mind.

**Paradoxical India**

The second major argument was “Paradoxical India.” This theme described the paradox between Nehru’s words and deeds and suggested that this contradiction revealed the hypocrisy of neutralism and India’s capacity for deceit. Picking up the threads of “Thinker Nehru,” *Time’s* 1951 cover story suggested further that Nehru was not so much a thinker as a pontificator, and in this respect, a pale imitation of Gandhi. Where Gandhi was a true moral leader, Nehru’s injunctions against the evils of U.S. imperialism and the consequent need for neutrality merely aped Gandhi’s principles of peace while hiding a selfish politics of pragmatism.

The 1951 article argued that “Nehru has indeed tried to speak Gandhi’s language, but he has not acted by Gandhi’s faith” (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Instead of remaining true to its “Gandhi-like doctrine, Nehru’s government has fought one successful war (against Hyderabad) and maintains a large army, poised for fighting, in Kashmir” (33). The point was not so much that Nehru, contra-Gandhi, deployed violence, but that “Nehru is all for nonviolence – when it comes to governments other than his own” (34). The article complained that Nehru would defend the presence of the Indian army in Kashmir by saying that “to talk complacently of peace when something worse than war is possible is to be blind to facts,” while denying “the West’s right not to be blind to worldwide Communist aggression” (34). Nehru judged his country’s actions by a different set of standards than what he applied to other nations, suggesting that he was not the principled successor to Gandhi he pretended to be. *Time* saw inconsistency as a hallmark of Nehru, who seemed to take a stance only to reverse it in the next moment. Having spoken out against U.S. imperialism, Nehru was determined to “resist the onslaught of rapacious U.S.
business” into India after she gained independence in 1947 (33). When the expected onslaught did not materialize, Nehru was “more chagrined than relieved” and undertook a trip to the U.S. to interest American capital in India, reversing his previous attitude toward U.S. investment (33).

While such contradictory actions offered some indication of the unreliability of anything Nehru said, *Time* argued further that his neutrality was slanted toward communist nations and away from the U.S.. The 1951 story pointed out that Nehru condemned the 1950 North Korean attack on the Korean Republic – suggesting that he was not partial to communist governments—but “then refused to condemn the far larger attack by Communist China,” indicating that he was unwilling to take sides against Communist countries (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). Even his writings, *Time* believed, showed a clear preference for Communist nations, given that he “objects more to Communist methods than to Communist ideas” and “admits a strong emotional attraction toward Communism and the Soviet Union” (33). The flip-side of his pro-communist bias was tepid support for the U.S., and *Time* noted that Nehru wrote of the American Revolution “with polite admiration,” but with “none of the enthusiasm he has lavished on the…Russian Revolutions” (33). In a further instance of India’s problematic neutrality, the article described how “the Korean war surprised Nehru into another paradoxical position” (33). He first supported the U.S., saying that her soldiers “who are fighting and dying in Korea certainly do not represent dollar imperialism,” but, “once MacArthur’s men were across the 38th parallel, Nehru became more and more neutral against the U.S” (33).

“In the biggest moral challenge of his day, Moralist Nehru has declared his neutrality,” said *Time*, echoing John Foster Dulles’s view that neutrality was not only impossible, but immoral (“Pandit’s Mind” 34). By espousing Gandhian principles of nonviolence but dispatching troops to Kashmir, by preaching neutrality but appearing to favor one side over the other, and by
castigating the U.S.’s immorality but remaining blind to the immorality of his neutrality, Nehru had revealed his hypocrisy through his capacity for saying one thing and doing another. He had thus “dashed ...hopes” that India could be a potential ally who would “lead a non-Communist Asia into the Western camp” (31). Like his penchant for thinking over acting, Nehru’s paradoxes were more than just puzzling; *Time* suggested that they also raised suspicions about India’s deceitful intentions and capacity for betrayal in the Cold War.

In December 1959, *Time* published an extensive cover story on India to mark President Eisenhower’s visit that month. India had just suffered an unpleasant shock in a series of military skirmishes with China and Sino-Indian relations were the most tense they had been in recent history. Eisenhower’s trip thus aimed, as the banner on the 1959 cover stated, to “unify friends and win neutrals” such as India to the U.S.’s cause in the Cold War. The cover showed pictorially the situation that Nehru faced politically: he had the red dragon of Communist China advancing over the Himalayas on one side, and the blue U.S. banner on the other, seeking to make friends and “win neutrals.” Perhaps in aid of this American mission of friendship, *Time*’s criticisms of “Paradoxical India” were much less strident here than in 1951. Instead, the article was marked by a desire to identify with India to the point of casting her paradoxes in a positive light. *Time* took pains to portray a prevailing “atmosphere of unparalleled goodwill” between the two nations who, although different in many ways, “now find themselves accenting what they have in common: they are the world’s two largest democracies. Both threw off British rule. In Gandhi and in Lincoln, each has a national hero whose qualities of charity, compassion and gentleness both nations revere” (“India: The Shade” 20).

When speaking of “this land of paradox,” (“India: The Shade” 21) *Time* did, admittedly give in to some of the usual commentary about the country as a land of extremes. It was not only
hot there, but so hot that “it is as though the earth were dying of apoplexy” where “millions of
Indian villagers lie gasping in their mud huts” only to be drowned “in surging floods” and
“torrential downpours” (20). Equally troubling was that “in the midst of poverty there are polo-
playing maharajahs who are among the world’s richest men” (21). Ever India’s synecdoche,
Nehru was described as “a man [who] is as contradictory as India as a nation” (21). However,
these descriptions lacked the tone of anger and suspicion of 1951. The 1959 article even
attempted a positive view of India’s paradoxes by highlighting how, “next door to the…primitive
wooden plow lies an India as modern as Pittsburgh” and how, “for all its look of the past, the
ambitious young republic is forging ahead in atomic energy” (21). In contrast to earlier
arguments that such paradoxes reflected India’s inconsistency and unreliability, Time suggested
that India’s ability to encompass complexity showed an admirable capacity for progress amid
adversity.

Time’s arguments about “Paradoxical India” – particularly its emphasis on India’s
capacity for betrayal— started out negative in 1951, became more moderate in 1959, and all but
disappeared by 1962. In that final year of coverage, Time made just one reference to India’s
contradictions. Despite the new rapprochement with India, Time reported that “Americans
…were irritated by evidence that the Indian government still prefers equivocation to the plain
truth” (“India: Never Again” 28). The point of contention was that Nehru’s administration had
asked the Indian press “not to print photos showing the arrival of U.S. arms” and made “the
twelve U.S. Air Force transport planes sent by Washington to ferry Indian troops…sound like
leased aircraft flown by mercenaries” (28). India’s unwillingness to publicize her new allegiance
with the U.S. suggested that she still valued her relations with communist nations, and as such,
possessed divided loyalties. However, this incident was mentioned in a brief paragraph toward
the end of a six page article that made no other mention of Indian duplicity. India’s contradictions were irritating and still noticeable, but no longer worth the agony.

As with “Thinker Nehru,” the theme of “Paradoxical India” started as a key concern in Time’s coverage of India but lost prominence — dare one say it — as time went by. One gets the impression that Time had figured India out. Nehru’s mind was no longer an enigma, and India’s paradoxes had ceased to be worrisome. This confidence accompanied the gradual decline of the “Thinker Nehru” and “Paradoxical India” themes, and the rise of the theme of U.S. vindication.

U.S. Vindication

The sense that the U.S. had taken the right approach pervaded Time’s coverage of India, becoming more evident with each issue. Where Nehru was an ineffectual thinker, the U.S. was a pragmatic actor. Where Nehru was wily and hypocritical, the U.S. was dependable and consistent. Thus, as neutrality was proven unfeasible, the U.S.’s suspicion of it was justified. This theme was hinted at in Time’s earlier depictions of Nehru as a poor leader and of communist nations as unscrupulous aggressors, but became most clear in later descriptions of the U.S. as the righteous party in the Cold War.

Unlike the later issues, the 1951 Time issue did not spend much time advocating the superiority of the Western camp in the Cold War. Instead, the theme of U.S. vindication was manifested indirectly in arguments seeking to discredit Nehru or to locate the source of his successes in the U.S. Time cast a disparaging eye on Nehru’s grasp of world politics, pointing out that his view of the world was “based on the standard British Socialist reading of 19th Century economic history,” that “his understanding of 20th Century American capitalism [was] negligible,” and that he had just “a fair textbook knowledge” of American history (“Pandit’s Mind” 32). In an effort to claim the moral high ground for the U.S., Time commented that “it was
Western influences that made Nehru a nationalist,” commenting that “Garibaldi was his hero long before Gandhi was” (32). Nehru was slowly downgraded as the article progressed; he started off as “the Asian statesman” but ended as a “well-meaning intellectual,” an “accident of history,” and finally, nothing more than a “nominal spokesman” (34). Thus, the West was home to the true leaders of the world, while Nehru was proclaimed “a disappointment” (31).

By 1959, it was not just the U.S. who was disappointed in Nehru but Nehru himself, having begun to suspect the error in his judgment. He was under noticeably greater stress in the 1959 cover, in which he was painted with his head straining at his collar and with the sharp creases in his shirt revealing the tension he faced. Where he was contemplative in 1951, he was in severe doubt by 1959. The cover showed that he had left the shelter of his residence and the severity of the situation had dawned upon him. The cover article reported that “the ruthlessness of Red China’s behavior made a wreckage of some cherished convictions” and that “the national disillusionment was so great that even Nehru took off his rose-colored glasses and looked hard at his giant neighbor to the north” (“India: The Shade” 20). As Nehru found himself at “one of those peak events in history when a plunge has to be taken in some direction” (20), the cover picture showed the red ridges of dragon China’s back, the grey ridges of the Himalayas and the fiery orange ridges below creating a triple set of peaks and plunges that illustrated his tumultuous situation.

Nehru’s panicked expression on the 1959 cover was matched by the article’s tone of triumphant vindication, in which Time noted how India finally admitted they “were playing with fire in wooing the Chinese” (“India: The Shade” 20). The implication of course, was that the U.S. had been a worthy ally from the beginning, something which Nehru would have realized if he were a better leader. Continuing the tale of Nehru’s decline begun in the 1951 issue, Time in
1959 declared that Nehru was “flat and stale” (21) and had “lost his once unshakeable hold on the nation’s intellectuals (23).

The dimming of Nehru’s star was rendered bleaker by the rising communist presence in November 1962, when *Time* featured Nehru on its cover just a week after China concluded two victorious military offenses across its disputed border with India. The final cover was stark and bereft of symbols save one: Mao Tse-Tung looming in angry red tones over Nehru, who was shown with his head bowed and shoulders slumped in defeat. No longer the urgent statesman, he was drawn as a beaten opponent, unhappy to have been so wrong for so long. A banner in the top right corner drove the point home by announcing “India’s Lost Illusions.” The cover forced Nehru to concede defeat, reflecting a celebratory vindication not just over communism, but over Nehru’s resistance to the U.S.

More so than the other articles, the 1962 cover story diminished Nehru’s status in order to claim ascendancy for the U.S., announcing that “Nehru’s power will be circumscribed from now on. His long years of unquestioned, absolute, personal rule are at an end” (“India: Never Again” 27). Where Nehru used to be India’s biggest man, he was now “physically and mentally spent. His hair is snow-white and thinning, his skin greyish and his gaze abstracted” (27). *Time* gloated that “India’s catastrophic unreadiness for war stems directly from the policy of nonalignment” (25) which had “ceased to have any meaning” (28) and was “ending in disaster” (23). The article made much of Nehru’s “agony” and the shattering of the “morally arrogant pose from which he had endlessly lectured the West on the need for peaceful coexistence with Communism” (23). Nehru had been unseated and his policy of neutrality had tumbled after him.

Having proclaimed victory in this sub-battle of the Cold War, the 1962 article focused, like its cover, on Nehru’s poor choice of allies. In particular, *Time* emphasized that Nehru’s
courtship of China was foolish because it had blinded him to the obvious wisdom of friendship with the U.S.. The article described how Nehru “no longer defended his old policies, denounced China as an ‘imperialist of the worst kind’ and at last thanked the U.S. and Britain by name for arms aid” (“India: Never Again” 24). The “at last” was telling; it hinted at the long-standing U.S. desire for recognition as a benefactor. In reporting how “frantic Indian officers…drove round to the U.S. embassy with…pleas for arms and supplies,” *Time* pointed out that the U.S. had finally been acknowledged as the righteous party in the Cold War, one who, unlike China, “moved swiftly and without recrimination to India’s defense” (24). This point was also mirrored in the layout of the cover story and the magazine’s choice of photographs to accompany the article. A 1957 photograph of Nehru and Mao’s deputy Chou En-Lai was captioned “No more Hindi Chini bhai bhai” (a Hindi phrase which loosely translates to “Hindu-Chinese are brothers”), reminding readers of India’s unwise friendships. The photograph was juxtaposed strategically against another whose caption spoke for itself: “U.S. military supplies being loaded at Calcutta: Discovering who one’s friends are” (27).

Together, *Time*'s covers and articles crafted a narrative arc which traced the seemingly inevitable demise of India’s Cold War foreign policy, a perspective which aligned with the anti-communist, pro-U.S. convictions of *Time*'s editor-in-chief. At the same time, this narrative endorsed and reaffirmed the U.S. government’s view of the correctness of its cause and the error of those who did not side with the U.S. against communism. *Time*'s coverage portrayed the U.S.’s unhappiness at India’s tolerance of China’s territorial incursions and her failure to respond forcefully to such belligerence. Eventually, the depictions of U.S. frustration give way to exultation. Nehru was compelled to admit that neutrality had proven impossible, allowing *Time* to paint a story in which the U.S. had been right all along.
Conclusion

This rhetorical analysis of early perceptions of India as depicted by a prominent news outlet has revealed three arguments about India’s policy of Cold War neutrality. The first, “Thinker Nehru,” criticized India’s Prime Minister for his tendency to favor deliberation over deliberate action, a trait which suggested that his neutrality policy was flawed because it was the outcome of philosophical inertia rather than effective political leadership. The second theme, “Paradoxical India,” described discrepancies between Nehru’s words and deeds, such as between his supposed neutrality and his tilt toward Communist countries, or his advocacy of non-violence while approving Indian military action. This argument saw Nehru’s equivocations and his country’s ability to accommodate contradictions as signs of India’s capacity for deceit. Thus, neutrality was not just flawed, but false. Finally, the theme of “U.S. Vindication” showed how neutrality had failed by highlighting China’s aggression toward India, Nehru’s reluctant admittance of defeat, and his recognition of the need for U.S. assistance.

*Time*’s arguments combined to form a narrative arc tracking the demise of Nehru’s neutrality policy while affirming the U.S. position in the Cold War and promoting the essential correctness of the U.S. administration’s stance. This narrative tells us several things about how the U.S. viewed itself as well as other countries during the Cold War —particularly those whose allegiance was expected but elusive— and how certain themes of the Cold War persist in the U.S.’s relations with India today.

Embedded in the overlying arc is the story of the U.S. perception of India as the new nation picked her role on the international stage. *Time*’s castigation of Nehru’s mistaken friendship with China relayed the admonitory attitude of post-war America toward new democracies who failed to accept the U.S. as an ally. In doing so, the magazine echoed John F.
Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address in which he said about former colonial nations: “We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view, but we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside (emphasis mine)” (192). The U.S. administration thus warned newly independent nations like India that in their drive to escape former colonial masters and new ‘U.S. imperialists’, they risked even greater enslavement by pursuing allegiances with the Soviet Union and China.18

The belief in the value of alignment with the U.S. raised complicated questions about how to engage countries who did not subscribe to this belief. Instead of seeing the U.S. as the best candidate with which to seek a Cold War alliance, a 1956 *Time* article stated bitterly that “Nehru [was] not particularly a friend of the U.S., nor [did] he ask to be so measured” (“India: The Uncertain Bellwether” 17). The U.S.’s unhappiness with India’s neutrality was about more than defending democracy over communism. It also stemmed from a belief that nations like India, who charted courses away from the U.S., would fail because they had denied the superiority of the U.S. cause – they were doomed to end up inside the tiger because they had not flocked to the bald eagle.

*Time*’s coverage revealed traits of U.S. foreign policy which continue to characterize the U.S.’s conduct in the twenty-first century: an insistence on either full allegiance from another country or complete enmity with it, and a tendency to personalize foreign policy by making a single public figure the focus of policy efforts. U.S. administrations have consistently viewed neutrality as a betrayal of universal ideals championed by the U.S.. Just as Cold War administrations saw neutrality as immoral, President George W. Bush declared famously in 2001 that countries were either with or against the U.S. in deterring terrorism, once again denying the
validity of the middle path in global affairs. The criticism of India’s Cold War neutrality was ironic given that India’s primary reason for it—to avoid being pulled into wars of others’ making—was the same reason the U.S. passed its 1935 and 1939 Neutrality Acts: that the country wished to guard itself from being drawn into Europe’s political conflicts after being pressured to intervene in World War I. Hence, despite an earlier history of neutrality, the U.S. continues to view neutrality by other countries with suspicion.

U.S. foreign policy, particularly when seeking to criticize or attack, also tends to take as its focus not so much the other party involved as its leader. Hence, the U.S.’s stance on India was often conflated with attitudes toward Nehru. To a degree, this makes sense, as leaders are the primary contact between nations and thus serve as a useful focus of foreign policy. Nehru was what Kenneth Burke referred to as the “noblest” synecdoche, in which an individual is treated as a microcosm of the larger universe that he represents (508). When *Time* magazine depicted Nehru on its covers and when the U.S. administration interacted with him, they were, to all intents and purposes, engaging India. However, as I argued earlier, U.S. relations with India were often influenced by the opinions incumbent administrations had of Nehru: if neutrality didn’t work, it was partly because Nehru was an impractical statesman, and if India was to be courted as an ally, it was partly because Nehru was so important to the survival of India and other democracies. Even beyond relations with India, the milestones of U.S foreign policy are easily read as a roll call of individuals who have earned the ire of the U.S.: Adolf Hitler, Fidel Castro, Kim Jung II, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Tse-Tung, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chavez, and Osama bin Laden. Thus, *Time*’s depictions of U.S.-India relations are a useful reminder that U.S. foreign policy has changed little from previous habits of eschewing neutrality by other nations and personalizing foreign relations.
It has been my intention to shed more light on this way of conceptualizing relationships with other nations through an examination of how a prominent U.S. media outlet reflected the U.S. government’s perception of India during the Cold War. The essay’s choice of India highlights the importance of expanding work on U.S. foreign policy to consider developing nations more closely, either by evaluating how the U.S. communicates with these nations or by placing greater emphasis on the discourses of countries other than traditional allies of the U.S.

Not only does this approach offer fresh ground for future rhetorical scholarship, but is necessary in a world where a country’s political future is determined ever more by its ability to communicate successfully with a wider swathe of nations than before.

This analysis also drew on verbal and visual elements to excavate a series of arguments about another nation. Just as the messages of diplomacy are often encoded in visual forms—a statue of liberty, a photographed handshake, a row of flags outside the United Nations—so are the discourses of news reporting. Cover images like *Time*’s are important texts which condense the content of written articles into a single, enthymematic visual argument that draws on universal symbols such as the philosopher-thinker or ‘dragon China’ to make its case. This case study has shown how an examination of images and their interaction with words can enrich close textual studies. As Murray Edelman once observed, “politics is a series of pictures in the mind,” (5) and although pictures do not act alone, my aim has been to show how, in addition to verbal discourse, images can inform studies of political communication between nations.

The world today presents a different picture than it did when Nehru stared out at U.S. viewers from the cover of *Time*. China, still the world’s largest communist regime, is now the U.S.’s second largest trading partner. India, still the world’s largest democracy, has at various points in the past 50 years, had communist governments hold power in the key states of Kerala
and West Bengal, but is a closer ally of the U.S. than ever before. India’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement has been replaced by its membership in a new nexus of influence made up of the emergent B.R.I.C. (Brazil-Russia-India-China) countries. Yet, the manner in which U.S.-India interactions are depicted in U.S. news media still displays anxieties of the Cold War.

The theme of “Paradoxical India” has proven especially enduring. In the main, this theme manifests itself in the persistent tendency to portray India as a nation seeking to reconcile opposing dualities and divergent goals. In 2012, Foreign Policy described India as a nation of contrasts by reporting that “India’s identity as an international donor is a downright confounding phenomenon” because it “disbursed over $1.5 billion in traditional foreign aid in 2011…even while it remained the world’s largest recipient of multilateral assistance”(Mullen & Ganguly). In “India’s Deadly Shopping Spree,” the magazine recounted India’s latest military escalation while reminding readers that the country was one of the world’s largest contributors of UN peacekeeping troops. Similarly, the New York Times ran an article in May 2012 about how Indian leaders met with Iranian businessmen while hosting U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had just called on India to reduce trade with Iran (Yardley). The article called this “diplomatic choreography” conducted “seemingly in open defiance of Mrs Clinton’s hard line” (Yardley). According to these portrayals, India’s openness with Clinton was circumscribed by its closed door meetings with Iran, just as its foreign contributions were newsworthy because they provided a stark contrast to India’s poverty rate, and its donation of peacekeeping troops was significant only when set against the context of the nation’s military buildup. Hence, India continues to be viewed and understood through a lens which emphasizes how one set of her actions is negated or thrown into notable relief by a counter action.
To an extent, the “Paradoxical India” theme has shifted to recognize India’s numerous political pressures rather than indict her ‘confusing’ or deceitful nature. Readers of the *Times* article on Iran and India would see from further reading that the U.S. administration realized India could not cut ties with Iran just to assuage the U.S.. In an evolution of “Paradoxical India,” the *Times* noted that “the Obama administration…recognizes that India has its own interests to defend” and that her leaders wish to maintain relations with Washington while sustaining the Indian economy through trade with Iran (Yardley). Perhaps such recognition signals a willingness to accept that other nations should chart their own paths as they see fit, regardless of whether that path leads toward the bald eagle, the tiger, Iran, or all of the above.

However, such concessions occur in a climate that, despite stated aims of defining a new relationship, continues to show vestiges of Cold War preoccupations. Tellingly, the *Times* article was titled, “Indians Host Hillary Rodham Clinton While Also Wooing Iran,” (Yardley) an echo of Cold War reports of India wooing China and the Soviet Union while declaring neutrality. Even the *Times*’s new India Ink blog is subtitled “Notes on the World’s Largest Democracy,” evoking the longstanding U.S. fascination with India’s size and potential as a democratic ally. Thus, while Cold War news frames of India may have undergone adaptation, they remain, in several ways, rooted in the past. Such discourses require closer attention and alteration given that the U.S. is now firmly in a “post-American world” (Zakaria 2) in which it must cooperate more closely with India and former Cold War adversaries on multiple fronts. It is in this world that the images and discourses of the past gain new relevance for efforts to forge “defining partnerships of the 21st century” (“Remarks, 8 December 2010”).
Works Cited


“Conferences: Om-Om-Om-Om.” *Time* 7 May 1951: 34. Print.


Notes

1. Ahimsa, the Hindi word for the avoidance of violence, was a central principle of Mahatma Gandhi’s freedom movement.

2. For a sampling of existing rhetorical work on India, see Yamabhai’s examination of Gandhi’s non-violence rhetoric, Merriam’s discussion of Gandhi’s non-verbal persuasion and Carlson’s application of Burke’s comic frame to Gandhi’s independence movement.

3. The dragon was one of the most common symbols used to portray China to American audiences in this period. Between 1950 and 1970, one third of Time’s covers of China used the image of a dragon to denote China. Since then, China has been depicted by either an image of one of its leaders, or its flag’s yellow star.

4. I do not wish to imply that visual rhetoric scholarship has ignored images of other countries. Hariman and Lucaites’s No Caption Needed looked at how photographs of Chinese protestors in Tiananmen Square and victims of napalm attacks in the Vietnam War how the American public talked about specific events such as the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and how these photographs were appropriated in evaluations of subsequent U.S. military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan. I hope to contribute to such work in two ways: first, by studying how a series of texts creates a narrative of one country’s relationship with another, rather than examining an event captured in a single image. Second, while the visual element is important in this study, I wish to consider it alongside a close reading of textual elements.

5. Chang found that in the 1950s, when the Communist party’s rise to power was freshest and the U.S.’s relations with China were at their most volatile, the President referred to China as “Red China” or the “Chinese Communist Regime,” indicating the illegitimacy of the Party’s rule
and the danger it posed. It was only during rapprochement in the 1970s that U.S. leaders referred to China as the “People’s Republic of China,” removing the earlier negative connotations.

6. For details, see Kux on the “estranged democracies” of India and the U.S, and the complex relations between India, Britain and the U.S. at the onset of World War II.

7. In 1922, there were just 2,600 Indians in the United States, 2,400 in 1940 and approximately 3,000 in 1950, attributable to the restrictive Immigration Act of 1917 which excluded all Indians as immigrants. It was only in 1946 that Congress restored to Indians the chance to enter the United States as immigrants and become naturalized citizens. However, this opportunity was restricted to 100 Indians a year, so interaction between the American public and Indians remained limited (Isaacs 283 & 285).

8. Isaacs reported in Images of Asia that Mother India was “a sensation in the United States, in Great Britain and in India. It became the center of a storm that raged for half a dozen years, in the newspapers, the periodical press, and on the lecture platforms in all three countries,” and went through 27 editions (268-9).

9. *Time* played heavily into such discourses. In the late 1970s and 80s, postcolonial narratives resisting the cultural hegemony of the West rose to prominence through works such as Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) and Gayathri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). *Time*, perceiving a slippage in U.S. power, published an editorial in 1981 titled “American Renewal,” touting the U.S.’s potential to rescue other nations from themselves. As Spurr noted, “at a moment of crisis in the postcolonial world, *Time* revive[d] a traditionally American rhetoric of self-affirmation” (119).
10. Before 1962, India appeared on *Life*’s covers as the setting for other events, such as the Dalai Lama’s escape to India (4 May 1959) or Queen Elizabeth II’s visit (3 February 1961). The specific *Life* covers mentioned in this essay are available at the links below:


11. The 1959 and 1962 cover issues were prefaced by letters from the publisher attesting to *Time*’s expertise on India. *Time*’s New Delhi foreign press corps, declared the letters, “time and again crossed footsteps with Nehru” and “traveled through more of India than most Indian journalists” (“A Letter,” 1959).

12. In 2007, when studying why prominent U.S. news organizations parroted the Bush administration’s reasons for the Second Gulf War despite there being other, more plausible explanations, Bennett found that “the U.S. mainstream press has trouble with information that has not passed through some government source for its seal of approval” (4). For more, see Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston.

13. Luce “not only edited but also censored,” practicing an “advocacy journalism” (Herzstein, xiv) to advance his “fervent faith in America’s God-ordained global mission in Asia” (1). He “used his vastly successful journalism as a kind of secular pulpit from which he preached the virtues of American engagement in Asia” (1).
14. An anonymous 1936 article in the Indian magazine *Modern Review* issued this severe judgment: “Men like Jawaharlal, with all their capacity for great and good work, are unsafe in a democracy. Jawahar has all the makings of a dictator in him – vast popularity, a strong will, ability, hardness, an intolerance for others and a certain contempt for the weak and insufficient. Is it not possible that Jawahar might fancy himself as a Caesar?” Years later, the writer was revealed as Nehru himself. From “India: The Uncertain Bellwether,” 18.

15. The covers came from *Time* issues published on May 7, 1951, December 4, 1959, and November 30, 1962. An image of each cover can be accessed at the links below:

May 7, 1951: [http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19510507,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19510507,00.html)

December 4, 1959: [http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19591214,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19591214,00.html)

November 30, 1962: [http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19621130,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19621130,00.html)

16. While the three *Time* issues sometimes contained more than one article on India, most were incidental references. To make justifiable claims about the connection between the visual elements of the covers and the arguments in the magazine, I focused my analysis on the cover images and their corresponding article. I examined the covers following an approach outlined by Cara Finnegan in which I analyzed the composition of each image, focusing on content, color, and spatial organization. For more methodological details, see Finnegan. I analyzed the articles using a thematic content analysis in which I identified each article’s key arguments and compared these arguments to identify recurrent themes across the three articles.

17. Ibid., 25. “*Hindi Chini bhai bhai*” was a cry of solidarity with China that used to be taken up in India’s streets prior to China’s incursions into Tibet and the Himalayas.

18. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this essay for this helpful insight.