


2013

# The Dao that can be Spoken is not the Eternal Dao: National Role Conceptions and the Effects on Chinese Foreign Policy Behavior

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“THE DAO THAT CAN BE SPOKEN IS NOT THE ETERNAL DAO”:  
NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND THE EFFECTS ON CHINESE FOREIGN  
POLICY BEHAVIOR

By Adam S. Jankowski

An Independent Study Thesis  
submitted to the Department of Political Science and the Department of Chinese  
at The College of Wooster  
March, 2013  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of I.S. Thesis

Advisors: Dr. Jeffrey S. Lantis and Dr. Rujie Wang



## Acknowledgments

This has been one of the most rewarding projects I have undertaken. Though stressful at times, many people were there to assist me to the finish. First and foremost, my advisors, Dr. Jeffrey Lantis and Dr. Rujie Wang (Wang Laoshi) deserve the utmost thanks. The conversations we had during the writing process stimulated my thinking, encouraged me to do my best, and helped me produce a project that I am extremely proud of completing. Dr. Lantis provided me with countless resources and assistance that without, I would still be on page one. Special thanks to Wang Laoshi for opening my eyes to China and accompanying me on my first journeys to the People's Republic of China. Caiju Wen deserves many thanks for editing my Chinese chapters. Without her, the Chinese chapters would not have the same weight and meaning. Many thanks go to the Henry J. Copeland Fund at The College of Wooster for allowing me the opportunity to travel to Beijing, China, in December 2012, to conduct firsthand research on my project. Thanks to my friends who were extremely supportive throughout the Independent Study process. Finally, my parents deserve special recognition. They have inspired me to travel and see the world while also motivating me to realize my potential. Without their generosity and support, this project would not have been possible.



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## Introduction

“道，可道也，非恒道也。”<sup>1</sup> “The [D]ao that can be spoken is not the eternal [D]ao.”<sup>2</sup> These words belong to Lao Tzu’s most famous text and Daoism’s staple cannon, the *Dao De Jing*.<sup>3</sup> Not only is the first sentence one of the most difficult sentences to translate from ancient Chinese into English, but it also encompasses many cultural values that the Chinese still hold dear today. Both Chinese and Western scholars have fought over the true meaning of this first verse for centuries and still have not reached a consensus on the correct meaning of the phrase. The ambiguity of the first sentence of the *Dao De Jing* can also be used to describe the way Chinese leaders view themselves in the world and Chinese foreign policy behavior. However, until there is global comprehension of the *Dao De Jing* and other Chinese cultural texts, the world will not completely understand China and its role in the international system.

One way to try to bridge Chinese culture and foreign policy behavior is through the use of role theory and national role conceptions. National role conceptions can be defined as the way in which foreign policy decision-makers perceive their actions in the international system.<sup>4</sup> Scholars are trying to determine the origins of Chinese foreign policy because it is becoming a more dynamic factor in today’s world. By using national role conceptions, role theorists attempt to juxtapose politics and cultures to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the development of Chinese foreign policy.

In this Independent Study Thesis, I will attempt to answer the question: “How do Chinese leaders’ national role conceptions affect the foreign policy behavior of China?” The



national role conception that Chinese leaders have plays an essential part in the development and implementation of Chinese foreign policy. These different national role conceptions create an understanding of how China views itself in the international system. Chinese foreign policy has undergone many transformations since the death of Mao Zedong. Instead of being a relatively isolationist country, China is now at the center of world politics.

However, different Chinese leaders have had differing opinions *vis-à-vis* the path China should follow in its global rise in power. Therefore, I hypothesize that the different national role conceptions of Chinese leaders lead to the changes in Chinese foreign policy behavior.

In the next chapter, I will review the relevant literature on role theory and foreign policy analysis. This literature review will start with the theoretical base for role theory and national role conceptions. K.J. Holsti's seminal study on national role conceptions and foreign policy will lay the foundation on which I will conduct my study.<sup>5</sup> Chih-yu Shih's scholarship using role theory and national role conceptions to understand the complexities of Chinese foreign policy and his empirical work on Chinese foreign policy will be essential in formulating my argument and will give me a helpful foundation from which I can build my own empirical research.<sup>6</sup>

Following the literature and theory review, I will detail my research design and methodology. For this project, I will be employing the comparative case study methodology. Because of the scope of my independent variable, I believe content analysis is the best way to determine the national role conceptions of Chinese leaders. Through this methodology, I will be able to analyze the works, speeches, documents, etc., of Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. I will then develop a national role conception for

each leader and see if their differing national role conceptions have led to different foreign policy behaviors.

In the next chapters I will display and critically analyze my data to determine if it shows support for my hypothesis. First, the case of Deng Xiaoping will be provided, followed by the case of Jiang Zemin. The case of Hu Jintao will end the case study portion of the study. Following the case studies will be my analysis and conclusion where I will provide possible policy implications for my research as well as provide different avenues to pursue for further research.

Throughout this project, the eternal words of the *Dao De Jing* will never be forgotten. Chinese foreign policy and Chinese leaders' national role conceptions have similar characteristics to the *Dao De Jing*. They each have a simplistic element and are mildly ambiguous when deeply analyzed while also being culturally based which shows the complexities and different dynamics of Chinese politics. It is necessary to gather a more complete understanding of all these subjects to better comprehend China and its role in the international system.

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<sup>1</sup> Robert T. Ames, and David L. Hall, *A Philosophical Translation: Dao De Jing, "Making This Life Significant"* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> Derek Lin, *Tao Te Ching: Annotated & Explained* (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths, 2006), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ames and Hall, *A Philosophical Translation*.

<sup>4</sup> K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14:3 (Sept. 1970), p. 246.

<sup>5</sup> Holsti, "National Role Conceptions."

<sup>6</sup> Chih-yu Shih, "National Role Conceptions as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy," *Political Psychology* 9:4 (Dec. 1988), p. 599-631; Chih-yu Shih, "Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus The Ego State," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8:1 (Jan. 2012), p. 71-91.



## 介绍

中国有一个很有意思的文化。它们的文化跟世界上别的国家都不一样。因为中国的历史很长，中国的政治和社会还经常改变。可是今天，中国是一个非常强大的国家。在世界上，中国的经济水平排名第二。而且，中国的军事比别的国家最大。这两个方面很有意思。现在，中国在世界上有一个非常重要的地位。如果一个学者想了解中国目前的情况，他们必须了解中国的历史和文化。

政治学家有很多很多方法了解文化和政治的关系。在美国和别的西方国家，政治学家用“national role conceptions (国家角色的概念)”来了解这个关系。国家角色的概念是一个国家领导自己的感觉。每个领导有一个国家角色的概念。

这些看法有很多影响。比如说，每个领导的外交政策跟他们的国家角色的概念有一个很有意思的关系。如果你能了解这个关系，就能了解中国和这个国家的国际关系。

在这个四年级的论文中，我想回答这个问题，“中国领导的国家角色的概念跟中国的外交政策有什么关系？”这个问题非常重要，因为中国是一个非常重要的国家，很多人想尝试了解这个国家。

下个章节我会讨论很重要的国家角色的概念和外交政策的文学。我会讨论一些很有名的学者。那些学者的观点会帮助我进一步完成我的论文。文学讨论以后，我会写我的研究设计和方法。很多用国家角色的概念的学者觉得内容分析是最好的方法。我会用内容分析的方法分析一些很重要和有影响力的中国领导的论文，演讲，文件，等等，并且发现一个国家角色的概念。那些领导是邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛。完成这一章节以后，我会展示和分析我的结果。之后，我会给出我的结论，并且为进一步的研究作准备。

## Chapter One: Literature Review and Theory

This chapter presents a general survey of the literature on foreign policy analysis and a specific examination of role theory and the importance it has in explaining different types of foreign policy behavior. The chapter then develops the different aspects of role theory that are necessary to understand foreign policy behavior, with a large emphasis on national role conceptions. Next, it provides an account of the literature on the different elements of national role conceptions and concludes with different types of national role conceptions an individual or state may hold.

### **The Study of Foreign Policy**

#### *Foreign Policy Defined*

Foreign policy is often a difficult subject to succinctly define. As Hermann points out, there are many different aspects to foreign policy and one agreed upon definition may not be the best for the scholarship.<sup>1</sup> Some definitions of foreign policy are very general, stating that they are the activities a state pursues in order to try to change the behavior of other states.<sup>2</sup> Other definitions are state-specific where one country, like the United States, is analyzed to look at the different actors, factors, and conditions that create that one nation's foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Definitions like this are at times too specific and are not always generalizable.

Most foreign policy scholars, however, believe that foreign policy consists of multiple dimensions that affect the foreign policy decision-making process.<sup>4</sup> These dimensions

include different domestic influences as well as external factors that allow a country to produce a certain foreign policy.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, in order to have the most cohesive definition of foreign policy, one must include both internal and external factors. Hermann's definition of foreign policy seems to satisfy this element of defining foreign policy. He states, foreign policy, "...consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a nation's government, or their agents, which are intended by the decision-makers to influence the behavior of international actors external to their own polity."<sup>6</sup> Hermann bridges nicely both the domestic and international factors that may determine foreign policy. Many academics, while studying foreign policy, have used his definition in order to conceptualize foreign policy.<sup>7</sup>

### *Foreign Policy Analysis*

According to many scholars of international relations, one of the most concrete ways to develop a clearer understanding of global politics is through foreign policy analysis (FPA).<sup>8</sup> Foreign policy analysis acts as a bridge between international relations and many other disciplines. Not only can FPA give students and scholars a more comprehensive overview of the world around them, but it also provides different methodologies for academics to use when trying to understand the relations between states.<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps the most important addition foreign policy analysis gives to the study of international relations is the idea that FPA is an actor-specific theory.<sup>10</sup> Many other disciplines and theories of international relations look solely at the system or state levels when describing the world. However, FPA scholars take a different approach and look at a

more micro-level of analysis, the individual.<sup>11</sup> According to Valerie M. Hudson, historically, foreign policy analysts would study the different methods of decision-making to interpret foreign policy behavior.<sup>12</sup> This reflects directly to the individual level of analysis and allows for different explanations of foreign policy behavior.

However, Hudson also points out that a more direct way of gaining more knowledge in international relations is to study foreign policy decision-makers. One could also look at the specific characteristics of the individual to try to understand the foreign policy behavior of a country such as Wish does in her 1980 study on national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. Essential to this individual level of analysis, as Hudson, Katzenstein, and Dellios point out, is the influence of culture on the decision-making process.<sup>13</sup> Both Hudson and Katzenstein cite the importance of having actor-specific theory regarding international relations and especially in the realm of foreign policy analysis.<sup>14</sup>

Breaking down the study of foreign policy to smaller, more specific pieces of analysis, provides more nuanced and specific ways of describing international relations. Foreign policy analysis is essentially the most comprehensive study of international relations. One cannot understand the complexities of international relations without first understanding the distinctions of foreign policies between different countries. Foreign policy analysis is quickly becoming a more important and useful tool in international relations. Foreign policy analysis has an explanatory power which other analyses of international relations lack, which has led to the development of many different theories that are helpful in explaining relations among states.



## **Role Theory: A Foundation in the Social Sciences**

Role theory has long been a staple theory in different social sciences including sociology, social psychology, and anthropology. Role theory takes its name directly from the theater where actors play certain parts which then encompass the entire show.<sup>15</sup> According to Eric S. Knowles, role theory is a perspective that scholars can use to develop different ways of understanding human relations.<sup>16</sup> Bruce Biddle, on the other hand, believes that role theory is, "...a science concerned with the study of behaviors..." which are given to each person depending on the context within which they live.<sup>17</sup> The different characteristics that are given to individuals are able to explain the distinct behaviors of said person or are affected by the certain type of behavior.<sup>18</sup>

Although there are differing standpoints regarding role theory, the varying interpretations come together to show that people are acting in specific ways based on the need for certain roles in the world. The different ideas and premises that role theorists use are very important to the development of the theory; Since there is not a single definition of the theory, the many different perspectives of role theory work together to allow it to be used in foreign policy analysis.

### *Elements of Role Theory*

Roles consist of many different elements. There are many aspects that one can use to determine their role in society. In some instances, roles are comprised of, "...a set of standards, descriptions, norms, or concepts held for the behaviors of a person or social position...."<sup>19</sup> At other times, roles are different behaviors that are expected of people.

Sarbin and Allen dictate that in order for people to be able to combine the differences between the structure of society and the behavior of certain roles, one must look at role expectations.<sup>20</sup> Role expectations, in the social sciences, are, "...comprised of the rights and privileges, the duties and obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to persons occupying other positions in the social structure."<sup>21</sup>

According to different social science literature, role theory, and the concept of role more generally, looks at the social conduct between many different actors in society at large.<sup>22</sup> All people in the world have a specific part that they must undertake in order for the world to function in a relatively peaceful manner. Roles have very important functions in the world and societal system. People are able to gain different perspectives on issues regarding the position they believe themselves to currently hold.

Members of a society must be able to understand and acknowledge the role they hold. Role location is the idea that people need to locate their specific role for themselves.<sup>23</sup> Citizens of the world need to know where they stand in society in order to better enact their part in the world. Role location is a very important point because if people were not able to gain a full understanding of where they stand in the societal structure, and why, then they would not be able to enact their role in a comprehensive manner.

### **Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis**

*Role Theory's Foundation in Political Science: What is a 'role'?*

Role theory has recently become a leading theory to use when studying foreign policy behavior. However, the use of role theory regarding political science more generally has not

been as widely researched; Since it is a newer approach when applied to political science, not as much has been written in the area of study. Role theory has much potential for explaining different phenomena in the world because of the many different avenues that scholars can pursue when using role theory *vis-à-vis* political science.<sup>24</sup>

According to Thies and Breuning, “[r]ole theory is premised on explaining and understanding the interaction between agents and structures.”<sup>25</sup> Thies and Breuning’s statement directly corresponds to Hudson’s view that foreign policy analysis is based directly on actor-specific theory.<sup>26</sup> When thinking about foreign policy decision-making, it is still essential to remember, as role theorists do, that individual people are making the decisions. The fact that role theory focuses directly on the decision-makers gives it a certain level of power that other theories of international relations may lack.

However, it is important to note that role theory does not only work on the individual level of analysis. Role theory is able to be used in all three levels of analysis including the system and state levels. At the system and state levels, the roles of the states would have much more value than the role of individual decision-makers. Using role theory at the system and state level would provide for broader analyses of political science. The individual level of analysis, on the other hand, gives a very nuanced description of role theory and its use in foreign policy analysis. Through the individual level of analysis, a more specified view of the world can be given which allows scholars to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how international relations and foreign policy work in the international system. Therefore, a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis provides the best framework for using role theory and foreign policy analysis.

*The Foundation of Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*

Role theory was first used in political science in the groundbreaking work of K.J. Holsti and his use of role theory to explain the foreign policy behaviors of different nations.<sup>27</sup> Holsti's work was one of the first and most influential pieces of scholarly literature that first combined role theory and foreign policy. While many have added different dimensions to Holsti's unprecedented study, the initial impact that Holsti had on foreign policy analysis as a discipline was extremely important.

Holsti first described role in a more normative sense by basing role on a single policy-maker's perception of what to do, how to do it, and when to pursue a certain action.<sup>28</sup> Holsti gave a more stylized and basic view of role that can be made applicable and useful to other aspects of political science. By only looking at the what, how, and when questions, Holsti allows other political scientists more room to develop their own concept of role, while still basing their scholarship on his work.

Holsti's most interesting contribution to role theory and foreign policy analysis, besides being one of the first works on the subject, was the fact that he focused his study on the individual rather than other levels of analysis.<sup>29</sup> Until his study was published, foreign policy scholars mainly looked at the state and systems level of analysis.<sup>30</sup> Finally, with Holsti's groundbreaking work, the door was opened for many scholars to attempt to understand international relations and foreign policy decisions at the individual level, which helped to broaden the scope of studies produced in the realm of foreign policy analysis.

Philippe G. Le Prestre expands on Holsti and the meaning of 'role.' According to Le Prestre, the word 'role' can have 6 different meanings with regards to foreign policy.<sup>31</sup> Roles

can be considered to be a contribution or function, an influence or impact, expected behavior, part of a larger course of action, policy decisions, or rank in the international system.<sup>32</sup> Le Prestre's vision of what a role is is more abstract. He is not looking directly at a decision-maker and the part that a decision-maker plays. Rather, Le Prestre is showing how complex and diverse role can be and how difficult it is to understand in a political science sense.

Other social scientists tend to more easily define role *vis-à-vis* the situation they are trying to understand. Political scientists, on the other hand, are not easily able to give role a definitive meaning because there are so many factors that can potentially be considered the role of a state or an individual.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Historical and Cultural Elements of Role*

History and culture play a large part in the development of roles, especially when political scientists use the concept.<sup>34</sup> This is seen in much of the empirical work conducted by scholars using role theory to describe and analyze foreign policy. For example, Shih and his 1988 work on the cultural and psychocultural elements of Chinese diplomacy delves into this area of study quite substantially.<sup>35</sup> In his work, Shih develops the different cultural aspects of Chinese leaders that can potentially impact the policies implemented by the decision-makers. Elements that he includes in his study are Confucianism, Daoism, and Marxism, all of which have deep historical backgrounds in Chinese history and culture.

Using Shih's work, Katzenstein and Dellios conduct further analysis on the importance of culture and historical factors on the foreign policies implemented by the Chinese government.<sup>36</sup> These scholars again highlight different historical factors that have

induced Chinese foreign policy since the death of Mao Zedong. Katzenstein develops his analysis of Chinese foreign policy from a strictly cultural and historical base. He cites many different myths and legends that the Chinese people hold deeply within their culture that have had profound impacts on the policies produced by different government officials.<sup>37</sup> Dellios' work falls in line more with Shih and the fact that she uses different Confucian principles to develop a framework for studying Chinese foreign policy.<sup>38</sup>

It is clear that the definition of role in political science has many different meanings despite the seeming ease with which other social sciences use the word. There are so many elements to the concept of role that it is impossible to have a definition general enough for all political scientists to use. Political scientists are at the mercy of their own conceptions of the word 'role' to conduct research using role theory as their main theoretical approach. Role theory has great potential to be a useful theory in political science, but it will still need to develop in more generalizable terms in order for it to be used to its utmost potential.

#### *Why Use Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis?*

Stephen G. Walker was one of the first political scientists to try to explain the utility of role theory in the study of foreign policy.<sup>39</sup> Walker asserts that role theory is, "...conceptually rich, but methodologically poor..." showing that role theory has some flaws that need to be addressed before it can be a strong theory in foreign policy analysis and international relations in general.<sup>40</sup> Walker's sentiment has been echoed by many different foreign policy scholars including, Thies, Le Prestre, Shih, Cantir and Kaarbo, and Thies and Breuning.<sup>41</sup> However, the flaws are not substantial enough to dismiss the theory as a whole.

Rather, the blemishes in the theory allow for different approaches to be used when studying foreign policy.

Walker states that role theory is a very good descriptive, organizational, and explanatory force for foreign policy analysts. Descriptively, Walker writes that, "...the concepts associated with role analysis provide a vocabulary of images which can focus upon foreign policy behavior at the national level of analysis, and also move up to the system level of analysis."<sup>42</sup> Role theory, therefore, has a great descriptive ability and has multiple ways that scholars can describe the foreign policies that are implemented throughout the world. Again, a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis can be used to further develop role theory. Organizationally, Walker asserts, "...the concepts associated with role analysis permit the analyst to adopt either a structure-oriented or a process-oriented perspective."<sup>43</sup> A structure-oriented perspective would allow the scholar to analyze the way in which the structure of the international system would allow for certain roles to arise which would then lead to the different foreign policy behavior of a country. The process-oriented perspective looks at decision-making processes to determine how a state's foreign policy was made. Finally, as an explanatory force, Walker states, "...role analysis appears to depend on whether its concepts are theoretically informed (a) by an appropriate set of self-contained propositions and methods, or (b) by the specification of an appropriate set of auxiliary limiting conditions and rules linking these conditions with role concepts."<sup>44</sup> The first of Walker's points asserts the need to have a clearly defined definition of role when conducting role theory research. Then, Walker acknowledges the need to have strict codes of operationalizing role and the concepts that make up a role.

### **Components of Role Theory: How it is Used in Foreign Policy Analysis**

As various social science scholars have stated, there are many different components that produce role theory. Included in this are role enactments, role location, role expectations, role demands, and the most useful for foreign policy analysis, role conceptions.<sup>45</sup> Role enactments, according to Sarbin and Allen can be classified in three different ways, the number of roles an individual holds, how much effort is used to display a certain role, and the amount of time an individual compares their role to other roles they could possibly hold.<sup>46</sup> These are the different ways that individuals can enact their specific roles. Role location, as stated before, is the ability for an individual to find their role in society.<sup>47</sup> Once a person is able to find their respective role, based on the socialization of the society, then they are more likely to perform their role in a more meaningful manner.

#### *Role Expectations and Role Demands*

Role expectations play a large part in the development of role theory and its application to foreign policy analysis. According to Thies, role expectations, "...consist of norms, beliefs, and preferences concerning the performance of any individual in a social position relative to individuals occupying other positions."<sup>48</sup> All of these ideas factoring into role expectations create what individuals are expected to do when holding a certain role in the international system. Thies also writes that role expectations, "...provide the conceptual bridge between the individual and societal structure."<sup>49</sup> Wish asserts that role expectations are one of the driving factors that can, "...influence role performance or behavior."<sup>50</sup> These



driving factors are necessary in order to gain a full understanding of why decision-makers develop certain policies.

Walker believes that role expectations are one way in which a decision-maker is able to select a role and then enact that certain role.<sup>51</sup> He defines role expectations as what a person is supposed to do in the international system based on other peoples' perceptions.<sup>52</sup> These role expectations manifest themselves in not only what decision-makers are presumed to do, but also in what they complete in reality. Role expectations give multiple dimensions to decision-makers and allow foreign policy leaders to be more prone to and able to develop different policies once they take into account the goals they are expected to pursue.

According to Sarbin and Allen, role demands are implicit demands for a specific role to be enacted.<sup>53</sup> Role demands, as stated by Thies, show the necessity of enacting a specific role when in certain situations.<sup>54</sup> Walker writes that role demands are also an important player in the determination of a person's role in the international system.<sup>55</sup> This plays into the number of roles that an individual would hold; The more diverse roles that an individual holds, the more able that individual would be to enact those roles when a situation demands that he/she did so. Having multiple roles allows for people to not be tied down to holding one certain position. With role demands, people can pick and choose the roles they wish to enact giving decision-makers more choice in what they decide to perform.

## **National Role Conceptions**

### *National Role Conceptions Defined*

All of the different aspects of role come together to form a role conception. Role conceptions, specifically national role conceptions, are the most used aspect of role theory when studying foreign policy behavior. Holsti is regarded as the first person to use national role conceptions in political science, and specifically in foreign policy analysis. His article, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” laid the foundation on which other foreign policy scholars would build their work.<sup>56</sup>

When using role theory to analyze foreign policy, many academics develop national role conceptions for leaders to gain a better sense of what type of foreign policy behavior will occur.<sup>57</sup> Holsti’s work is the most actively cited work regarding role conceptions and foreign policy analysis. The definitions of national role conceptions, however, differ slightly among academics using this to explain foreign policy behavior.

Holsti states that a national role conception, “...includes the policy-makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decision, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their, state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system....”<sup>58</sup> This definition is specific to the actual leaders that are producing foreign policy. Other scholars have used this definition as a starting point to build their own definitions of national role conceptions. For example, Wish states that national role conceptions, “...are defined as policy-makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system.”<sup>59</sup> Wish takes a larger approach to defining national role conceptions.

She is not as specific as Holsti in her definition which makes it more generalizable and useful for other scholars.

Marijke Breuning makes other important insights concerning national role conceptions. She defines national role conceptions as a decision-maker's, "...perspective from which they view the world and how they frame the issues that confront them..."<sup>60</sup> Breuning, in her 1992 doctoral dissertation, argues that national role conceptions are very structural in their development.<sup>61</sup> Role conceptions, as defined by Wish's 1980 article, are quite similar to the ideas pushed in structural realism.<sup>62</sup> The definition Wish provides for national role conceptions is directly related to the structure of the international system. If national role conceptions are seen to be perceptions of one's place in the international system, then without a doubt, the structure of the international system matters. Since structural realism states that the structure of the international system dictates certain aspects of international relations, Wish's definition of national role conceptions fits into the assumptions of that theoretical framework.

Another important insight that Breuning provides is that the roles decision-makers hold are predetermined because of the position those leaders hold in the international system.<sup>63</sup> Within the international system, people are members of different societal structures. The position each person holds in the society allows for the development of a certain role in that society for that person to uphold. The creation of a role, however, does not happen by itself. As Barnett points out, roles that decision-makers hold are made because of the different relationships that occur in a society.<sup>64</sup> In short, roles are developed in relation to other roles that have been created.<sup>65</sup>

Shih's definition of national role conceptions takes the concept to a deeper level. For him, national role conceptions consist of self-role conceptions. Included in these self-role conceptions are, "...a description of national mission in the world, specific notions of interstate relationships, and stability over time."<sup>66</sup> In addition, Shih believes that national role conceptions are one of the only ways that decision-makers are able to understand the world.<sup>67</sup> For Shih, a role conception is a lens through which decision-makers look to develop the policies they wish to use. However this lens, as Breuning states, can again be explained as a decision-maker's perception of the international environment in which they live.<sup>68</sup> Shih's definition of national role conceptions, focusing specifically on the self, acts as a bridge between multiple scholars' definitions. He allows for a more specified view of national role conceptions and helps develop more ways in which to conceptualize this idea.

Rosenau writes that national role conceptions are most useful to those who believe that the state is the primary actor in international relations.<sup>69</sup> He writes that in order to gain the best understanding of international relations and foreign policy behavior between states, one must look directly at the state level. Rosenau questions the assumptions that are later developed by Shih because he critically analyzes the usefulness of the individual level of analysis. However, he also maintains that national role conceptions are sometimes, "...confined to the attitudes, behaviors, and expectation that attach to top positions in the foreign policy-making process."<sup>70</sup> This seems to contradict what he writes later in the piece when he asserts that national role conceptions are best used when looking at international relations from the state level of analysis. However, this point also helps strengthen the

argument that a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis has the most utility when using role theory to describe foreign policy behavior.

Thies points out that Rosenau's idea that national role conceptions are best used at the state level may not necessarily be a contradiction. Rather, Thies argues that the state level of analysis is developed because of the different decisions that are made by policy-makers.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, the individual level of analysis leads to the development of the state level of analysis. Using his logic, then, the individual level of analysis and the national role conceptions developed by individual leaders, would then create the state level of analysis which then naturally leads itself to the systems level approach. National role conceptions, thus, can be interpreted as the building blocks of international relations and foreign policy behavior.

National role conceptions, therefore, are extremely important factors in the development of foreign policy behaviors of different states. There are many different ways that national role conceptions can affect the foreign policy outcomes of states and the conceptions that decision-makers hold of themselves is essential when analyzing the contrasting behaviors of states in the international system. However, there are many other factors that create national role conceptions that are larger than just the perceptions leaders hold of themselves and others.

### *Components of National Role Conceptions*

National role conceptions, as stated earlier, are not created out of thin air. There are many different factors that all come together in order to create different national role

conceptions for leaders. Wish, in her 1987 study on the sources of national role conceptions states that national attributes are an important factor in the development of national role conceptions.<sup>72</sup> In her previous work, Wish developed the idea that there were different factors that possibly drive national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. National attributes, Wish argues, are different socioeconomic conditions that lead to the development of different national role conceptions.<sup>73</sup>

The different socioeconomic factors that can result in contrasting national role conceptions are the size and capability of a country, the amount of economic development, and the country's political orientation.<sup>74</sup> If a country is deemed larger, then the leaders and decision-makers would have more resources at their disposal to use in developing their national role conception and ultimately their foreign policy behavior. A country that is larger and has more resources will then have more domestic factors influencing the national role conception of leaders.

Countries that have high levels of economic development would again have more opportunities for different national role conceptions. More economic development allows for more institutions to arise which gives more opportunity for national role conceptions to manifest in the policies of foreign policy decision-makers. A country that is more economically developed than other countries also allows for it to have more resources at decision-makers' disposal. Again, these resources may make it seem as though the state will have a higher level of responsibility in international politics.<sup>75</sup>

Finally, the political orientation of a country opens the doors for different national role conceptions to develop.<sup>76</sup> A nation that is more politically open will be more apt to

develop diverse role conceptions due to the fact that the government is more interconnected with other countries. The interconnectedness of states then may lead to more role conceptions that can be held by that state. Decision-makers in politically open countries will be able to develop perceptions based on what they see others in the world pursuing, ultimately having those different perceptions form their own national role conception.

At the other end of the spectrum, a state that is politically closed would be more apt to not change their role conceptions. In other words, a country that is politically closed does not have the necessary institutions put in place to develop different role conceptions. Closed countries are not looking at other countries in the international system for ideas on what the norms of international society are. Rather, decision-makers in this type of country are only thinking about their own country and the best way to pursue those policies. Interconnectedness and the conceptions that come with interdependence are not a factor for politically closed countries.

Wish postulates a new model for understanding foreign policy behavior which includes the national attribute model. National attributes give way to different national role conceptions which then affect the foreign policy behavior of a certain country. According to this model, "...a nation's foreign policy behavior is in large measure a product of its national capabilities..." which then affect the decisions that are made by foreign policy leaders.<sup>77</sup>

However, national attributes are not the only thing that can possibly affect the national role conceptions that foreign policy decision-makers hold. Shih posits that there are many other aspects that can have an effect on the national role conceptions of decision-makers. According to Shih, there is nothing more important than the history and culture of a

country when trying to see what types of policies a nation will gravitate towards pursuing. Psychocultural bases are extremely important in the development of national role conceptions. Not only do psychocultural bases have an effect on the perceptions decision-makers have of themselves, but they also have an enormous effect on the perceptions of others. Different principles of morality and judgement that are embedded within a certain culture allow for varying national role conceptions. However, it is important to note that since culture and history act as an umbrella under which society functions, foreign policy decision-makers would be more prone to having similar national role conceptions. Having a shared culture and historical background allows a decision-maker to hold national role conceptions that fall within those bounds.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, Margaret Hermann posits that there are six traits that can affect national role conceptions and, therefore, foreign policy behavior.<sup>79</sup> These six traits are: nationalism, the belief in a state's ability to control events in the international system, a need for power, a need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others.<sup>80</sup> Nationalism, as Hermann writes, refers to viewing the world like one's own country was at the center.<sup>81</sup> This notion leads countries to have very self-centered national role conceptions. Stemming from nationalism, the belief that one's country is able to control events in the international system also has the ability to influence the foreign policies created by leaders.

The need for power is the concept that all countries in the world wish to have power in order to impact others. Decision-makers that wish to have more power in the international system would be more likely to carry more powerful national role conceptions. The need for affiliation that Hermann states as a necessary component in the development of national role



conceptions refers to countries wanting good relations with other nations. Having good relations with other nations would allow countries to be more prone to develop conceptions that are based on the positive perceptions of relationships between countries.<sup>82</sup>

Conceptual complexity, “refers to the degree of differentiation which a person shows when observing or contemplating his environment.”<sup>83</sup> This shows that a decision-maker is actively trying to understand the world around him/her. Therefore, the perceptions the leader is gaining from that would impact greatly the national role conception the leader would hold. Finally, having a distrustful relationship with other countries would make the perceptions decision-makers have of other countries less likely to be friendly in nature. Doubting the doings or policies of other countries allows for national role conceptions to be more prone to change, depending on the amount of doubt countries hold for one another.

### *Types of National Role Conceptions*

In his seminal study of national role conceptions and the study of foreign policy, Holsti developed seventeen distinct types of national role conceptions. These conceptions range from very revolutionary, such as *bastion of revolution-liberator* and *liberator supporter*, to hegemonic in nature (*regional leader*), and everything in between (*mediator-integrator* and *defender of the faith*).<sup>84</sup>

Holsti’s national role conceptions try to fit every nation in the world at the time of his writing. Some of his conceptions are extremely specific, such as *anti-imperialist agent*, where only certain countries or leaders would fit the description. Other conceptions, such as *regional leader*, are so general that almost every country or decision-maker would hold that

conception.<sup>85</sup> Margaret Hermann builds on the conceptions that Holsti determined, but then also develops some of her own generalized national role conceptions.<sup>86</sup> Similar conceptions between the two scholars, such as *active-independent* and *mediator-integrator* allow scholars to see the continuities of national role conceptions.<sup>87</sup> Decision-makers throughout the world are able to potentially hold one of these national role conceptions since they are generalizable enough to cross multiple cultures and nations.

Hermann also developed some national role conceptions that were out of the scope of Holsti's study. Role conceptions such as *opportunist* and *developer* are not mentioned in great deal by Holsti. Role conceptions that are opportunist in nature, Hermann writes, "...take their cues from others, being interested in ascertaining what will receive widespread public support."<sup>88</sup> Leaders with this kind of national role conception place great emphasis on public opinion and often need a great deal of support in order to make decisions. The developer role conception emphasizes the desire of public officials to remain in office. Therefore, decision-makers with this role conception are likely to want advisors that have similar beliefs as themselves.<sup>89</sup> These different national role conceptions show how decision-makers have collectively changed their behavior since Holsti first wrote.

The following attempts to categorize Holsti's and Hermann's national role conceptions. It shows how Hermann has tried to fill a void in some of Holsti's work by developing and branching of the different national role conceptions he first advanced:

**Figure 1: Holsti and Hermann's National Role Conceptions**

<i><u>Revolutionary</u></i>	<i><u>Power-Related</u></i>	<i><u>Isolationist</u></i>	<i><u>Multilateral</u></i>	<i><u>Other</u></i>
<b>Anti-Imperialist Agent</b>	<b>Example</b>	<i>Active Independent</i>	<b>Bridge</b>	<b>Defender of the Faith</b>
<b>Bastion of Revolution-Liberator</b>	<u>Expansionist</u>	<b>Independent</b>	<b>Developer</b>	<u>Developmental</u>
<b>Liberation Supporter</b>	<u>Influential</u>	<b>Isolate</b>	<b>Faithful Ally</b>	<b>Internal Development</b>
	<b>Regional Leader</b>		<i>Mediator-Integrator</i>	<u>Opportunist</u>
	<b>Regional Protector</b>		<b>Regional-Subsystem Collaborator</b>	<b>Protectee</b>

Bold Indicates Holsti's Conceptions; Underline Indicates Hermann's Conceptions; Italics Indicate Shared Conceptions

Wish, in her 1980 article, sheds different light on the subject of types of national role conceptions. Instead of making broad generalizations like Holsti and Hermann, Wish gets more systematic in the classification of national role conceptions. One of the first ways of categorizing national role conceptions is through status. Wish believes that status is of extreme importance and can be the foundation for certain national role conceptions. Status is related to power and influence and can therefore be measured by, "...its domain of influence and its degree," to which the power of one state is felt on another."<sup>90</sup> Having great power status, she writes, requires a state to be, "...influential in large rather than small domains."<sup>91</sup> However, one must remember that status is not determined by other states, but rather from the perceptions of leaders within a state. This means that state leaders are looking at multiple aspects regarding power and influence in the international system. Because of this, Wish

develops six different ways for a state to perceive its status: domestic, bilateral, dominant bilateral, subordinate, subordinate other, and global.<sup>92</sup>

The second area Wish discusses regarding national role conceptions is motivational orientation. Wish states that foreign policy decision-makers have either individualistic, cooperative, competitive, or both a cooperative and competitive motivational orientation.<sup>93</sup> Roles that are motivated individually are manifested in isolationist states. Wish states that decision-makers in these states see domestic problems as having a higher priority than international issues. Cooperative and competitive roles are given similar criteria and are measured, in her study, by the percentage of external motivations that are cooperative, competitive, or both.<sup>94</sup> Also, in this category of national role conceptions, Wish cites that the motivation for change plays a large part in the overall motivational orientation of a foreign policy decision-maker.

The final category for the operationalization of national role conception is substantive problem areas.<sup>95</sup> In this group, Wish tries to surmise the different areas that may pose problems to a country regarding their foreign policies. These different areas include territorial/defense, ideological, political/diplomatic, universal values, and economic.<sup>96</sup> The different typologies of national role conceptions that Wish produces provides a very generalizable way to describe national role conceptions that all leaders in the world have the potential to hold.

Through Holsti, Hermann, and Wish, a good understanding of different national role conceptions arises. There are many different types of conceptions states can have and there are multiple ways of developing those same conceptions. These conceptions are able to help

further scholars' understandings of foreign policy behavior and the world surrounding them. The different types of national role conceptions allow for all types of leaders to be analyzed for a specific type of foreign policy. Each type of national role conception is posited to correspond to a certain type of foreign policy behavior. Whether that is the case or not leads scholars to conduct empirical tests to see if the relationships that Holsti, Hermann, and Wish hypothesize actually occur in the real world. More empirical testing on the subject should occur if academics and decision-makers want to gain a better appreciation for the international system.

Role theory, national role conceptions, and foreign policy analysis are all very important factors when trying to understand the world and the relations between states. Foreign policy analysis can be considered the backbone of international relations and is necessary to fully comprehend the behavior of states. Role theory and national role conceptions also help frame the arguments that attempt to explain foreign policy behavior. Using national role conceptions at the individual-state level to explain foreign policy behavior is something that is essential to furthering the understanding of how different actors, factors, and conditions allow for various types of foreign policy behavior between states.

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<sup>1</sup> Charles F. Hermann, "Policy Classification: A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in The Analysis of International Behavior, eds. James N. Rosenau et al. (New York: Free Press, 1972), p 70.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Naomi Bailin. Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions," International Studies Quarterly 24:4 (December 1980), p. 532-54.; Hermann, "Policy Classification."

<sup>5</sup> Hermann, "Policy Classification," 70.

<sup>6</sup> Hermann, "Policy Classification," 72.

<sup>7</sup> Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers," 540.

<sup>8</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," Foreign Policy Analysis 5:1 (January 2005), p. 1-30.; Juliet Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas," in Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20: A Symposium, ed. Jean A. Garrison, 156-163. (International Studies Review 5:1 (January 2003)).; Cameron G. Thies, and Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory.," Foreign Policy Analysis 8:1 (January 2012), p. 1-4.; Stephen G. Walker, "The Relevance of Role Theory to Foreign Policy Analysis," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 1-4.

<sup>9</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory," 2.

<sup>10</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory."

<sup>11</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory."; Kaarbo, "Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century."

<sup>12</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory," 7.

<sup>13</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda," in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p.1-24.; Lawrence C. Katzenstein, "Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China," in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 45-72.; Rosita Dellios, "'How May the World be at Peace?': Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture," in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 201-30.

<sup>14</sup> Hudson, "Culture and Foreign Policy," 1.; Katzenstein, "Change, Myth."; Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory."

<sup>15</sup> Theodore R. Sarbin and Vernon L. Allen. "Role Theory," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, eds. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968), p. 489.; Bruce J. Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> Eric S. Knowles, "From Individuals to Group Members: A Dialectic for the Social Sciences," in Personalities, Roles, and Behaviors, eds. William Ickes and Eric S. Knowles (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), p. 6.

<sup>17</sup> Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, 4.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, 9.

<sup>20</sup> Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory," 497.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 490.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 506.

<sup>24</sup> Cameron G. Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," International Studies Association Compendium Project (2009), p.2.

<sup>25</sup> Thies and Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis," 1.

<sup>26</sup> Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory," 2.

<sup>27</sup> K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14:3 (September 1970), p. 233-309.

<sup>28</sup> Philippe G. Le Prestre, "Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles After the Cold War," in Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition, ed. Philippe G. Le Prestre (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997); Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 246.

<sup>29</sup> Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," 2.

<sup>30</sup> See Section on Foreign Policy Analysis above.

<sup>31</sup> Le Prestre, "Author! Author!" 3-4.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>34</sup> Cameron G. Thies, "International Socialization Processes vs. Israeli National Role Conceptions: Can Role Theory Integrate IR Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis?" Foreign Policy Analysis 8:1 (January 2012), p. 29.

<sup>35</sup> Chih-yu Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy," Political Psychology 9:4 (December 1988), p. 599-631

<sup>36</sup> Katzenstein, "Change, Myth.,"; Dellios, "How May the World."

<sup>37</sup> Katzenstein, "Change, Myth," 53.

<sup>38</sup> Dellios, "How May the World," 209-11.

<sup>39</sup> Stephen G. Walker, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987)

<sup>40</sup> Walker, "The Relevance of Role Theory," 2.

<sup>41</sup> Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy.,"; Thies and Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis.,"; Cristian Cantir, and Juliet Kaarbo. "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory." Foreign Policy Analysis 5:1 (January 2012); Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy.,"; Le Prestre, "Author! Author!"

<sup>42</sup> Walker, "The Relevance of Role Theory," 2..

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory.,"; Holsti, "National Role Conceptions."

<sup>46</sup> Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory," 491-497.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 506.

<sup>48</sup> Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," 9.

<sup>49</sup> ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers," 534.

<sup>51</sup> Stephen G. Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes," in Psychological Models in International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 177.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory," 510.

<sup>54</sup> Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy," 10.

- <sup>55</sup> Walker, "National Role Conceptions," 177.
- <sup>56</sup> Holsti, "National Role Conceptions."
- <sup>57</sup> Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers."
- <sup>58</sup> Holsti, "National Role Conceptions," 245-46.
- <sup>59</sup> Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers," 533.
- <sup>60</sup> Marijke Breuning, "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward A Cognitive Model," (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1992), p. 30-31.
- <sup>61</sup> Breuning, "National Role Conceptions," 23.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.
- <sup>64</sup> Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," International Studies Quarterly 37:3 (September 1993), p. 275.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>66</sup> Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy," 600.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>68</sup> Breuning, "National Role Conceptions," 20.
- <sup>69</sup> James N. Rosenau, "Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 50.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.
- <sup>71</sup> Thies, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy." 14.
- <sup>72</sup> Naomi Bailin Wish, "National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation Model," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987).
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.
- <sup>78</sup> Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy."
- <sup>79</sup> Margaret G. Hermann, "Foreign Policy Role Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decision," in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 123.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 124



<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Holsti, "National Role Conceptions."

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Hermann, "Foreign Policy Role Orientations," 136-139.

<sup>87</sup> Hermann, "Foreign Policy Role Orientations.,"; Holsti, "National Role Conceptions."

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 138.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Wish, "Foreign Policy Makers," 536.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 537.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 539.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 540

## 第一章：有关的文献和理论

### 介绍

这篇文章介绍的是重要的外交政策和角色理论的概念。本段落只是一个简短的提要。文中会列举最重要的概念和及其提出者们并进行分析。首先，我会介绍外交政策。其次，我会介绍和解释角色理论和角色理论的重要性。最后，我会解释国家角色的概念。

### 外交政策的定义

外交政策有一个非常复杂的定义。很多外交家有多样的解释。有的定义是非常简单的，比如：外交政策是如果一个国家尝试改变别的国家的政策。有的定义是非常具体的。比如说，学者们学习一个国家和学习最重要的决策者，因素和环境的他们的外交政策行为。

不过，很多外交家认为外交政策跟外交政策的决策有多方面的关系。这些学者认为外部的因素跟外交政策的决策有关。另外，国内的因素也非常重要。很多美国的外交家觉得这个是最好的定义。如果你知道外交政策是跟外部和国内的因素都有关，就能很好地理解外交政策。

## 外交政策的分析

很多美国的国际关系者觉得如果你想了解全球政治，你必须了解如何分析外交政策。外交政策的分析跟国际关系有非常重要的关系。外交政策的分析和国际关系两者都有助于了解全球政治。

外交政策的分析体现了一个角色理论。我的意思是分析外交政策的时候你可以学习一个领导的决策过程。这有别于其他的国际关系理论。分析外交政策需要对国际关系进行非常全面地分析。这个国际关系的部分有些特殊。所以外交政策的分析是对国际关系一个非常全面的了解。

### 角色理论：社会学中的一个基本依据

角色理论不属于政治范畴。角色理论跟社会学，社会心理学，和人类学都相关。角色理论是一个非常重要和有用的理论。在世界上，每个人都有他们的角色。有的人是老师，有的人是律师。每个人在他们的工作中被分配了一个角色。一个历史老师教历史，一个经济教授教经济。所以角色理论跟其他人的看法有关系。

## 角色理论的基本因素

角色理论有很多的基本因素。在世界上人民有很多角色的决定因素。有的角色理论家说一个人的角色是可以预计的。那些理论家认为社会结构的不同和角色的行为一起是一个人的角色的预计。角色预计是由权利、和责任组成的。每个人有他们的权利责任。所以他们也有相应的角色预计。

在世界上，角色有非常重要的功能。人可以有多重的视角。这个是因为他们有多重角色和相应的角色预计。在社会中，每个人也应该有他们的角色。角色位置是一个概念，社会上的人必须找他们的角色，这个是非常重要的。如果他们不能找到他们的角色，他们就不能融入社会。

## **角色理论在社会学中的根据：角色是什么**

角色理论最近已成为一个领先的研究外交政策行为时使用的理论。角色理论有很多方法解释外交政策行为。而且角色理论可以用于解释世界上不同的现象。对外交政策来说，角色理论于决策人有很多相互作用。那些相互作用是跟一个表演一样的。每个人认为他们的表演非常重要所以他们能发展他们的角色。所以决策人有很多影响。

很多美国政治学家说角色理论用于外交政策的分析有一个很有意思的典故。1970 的时候，一个非常有名的美国政治学者写角色理论可以有助于了解别国的外交政策行为。这个政治学者说角色是一个决策人的看法。他们应该知道他们必须做什么，什么时候做一个决定，和怎么解决他们应该做什么。这个观点在政治学界有很大的影响。

## 国家角色的概念

为了用角色理论了解外交政策行为，很多政治学家用国家角色的概念。国家角色的概念“包括决策者自己定义的一般类型的决定、承诺、规则和操作适用于他们，国家和功能的如果有的话。国家角色的概念也必须继续，在国际体系中。”<sup>11</sup>这个是一个有广泛影响的定义。很多美国政治学家觉得这个定义是最好的。

有的美国政治学家有一点不认同以上定义。他们认为国家角色的概念是一个决策人的国际社会地位的看法。如果一个国家非常强，那个国家的领导会有一个非常强有力的国家角色的概念。再说，如果一个国家是世界上最重要，最强的国家之一，他们的国家角色的概念会反应他们的地位。别的政治学家觉得文化和历史给国家角色的概念非常有意思的影响。

每个领导在一个具体的文化中长大。文化和社会会影响一个领导的看法的形成。

## 国家角色的种类

国家角色的概念有很多种类。这些概念包括革命型，比如革命解放阵营或者解放志愿者，霸权型，比如说宗教领袖；还有两者之间的其他类型，比方说同盟会、维持会、保皇党等等。下面的图表用于表现这个不同的国家角色的概念：

第一个图表：不同的国家角色的概念

<u>革命的</u>	<u>跟强有观的</u>	<u>孤立主义的</u>	<u>多边的</u>	<u>别的</u>
反帝代理	榜样	积极独立	桥	信仰的捍卫者
革命解放者	扩张主义的	独立	发展的	国内发展
解放的支持者	有权势的	隔离	忠实盟友	机会主义者
	区域领袖		调解—合作	保护
	区域保护器			

每个国家角色的概念跟一个明显的外交行为有关系。比如说，一个区域的领袖国家角色会尝试在别的国际和区域的组织成为领导。而且他们会更倾向于对其他国家施加他们的影响。

角色理论和国家角色的概念都是非常关键的。如果你想了解别的外交政策，就必须了解该国领导的看法。国家角色的概念帮助学者了解国际关系。

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<sup>1</sup> K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy." International Studies Quarterly 14:3 (Sept. 1970): p. 233-309.

## **Chapter Two: Research Design and Methodology**

In the previous chapter I reviewed the relevant literature on national role conceptions and their usefulness in foreign policy analysis. This chapter details my research design and methodology. First, I will provide my hypothesis and a causal diagram of my argument. Following that, I detail the operationalization of my independent and dependent variables and then describe the case studies I will use and the content analysis methodology that will be employed for the project.

### **Research Design**

I hypothesize that different national leaders' "national role conceptions" lead to different foreign policy behavior. This hypothesis is based on many scholars' work on the importance of national role conceptions in describing foreign policy behavior. In his groundbreaking study, Holsti provides a general framework which other academics have been able to use to further the understanding of national role conceptions and their usefulness in studying foreign policy behavior. Holsti writes that a leader's national role conception pertains directly to the leader of a country and can be seen through different policies that are implemented. National role conceptions, according to Holsti, also have a large effect on the type of foreign policy that is produced by a leader.

Wish, Breuning, and others have built upon this framework regarding national role conceptions and foreign policy analysis. Wish, in her influential article on decision-makers and their national role conceptions, provides a more generalizable framework from which




one can gain better comprehension of the importance of national role conceptions when studying foreign policy analysis. Breuning demonstrates how national role conceptions are predetermined factors that are based on the position a leader holds in the international system. This insight from structural realism allows for a greater emphasis on the ways in which a leader is able to utilize their specific role.

Not only are national role conceptions seen through the position one holds in the global community but they are also evident in the historical and cultural contexts of which each country and leader are a part. Shih asserts that culture and history have powerful effects on the development of national role conceptions. Without a cultural context to which one can relate, national role conceptions do not hold as much merit as one would seem to believe.

Each national role conception that is developed also corresponds to certain foreign policy behavior. In essence, each national role conception is predictive of certain foreign policy behavior. As both Hermann and Holsti suggest, there are many different national role conceptions that one can hold that will determine the type of foreign policy behavior that one should expect from that conception.<sup>1</sup> These different conceptions and behaviors are essential in understanding the development of foreign policies and gaining more knowledge on the decisions that are made each day by leaders around the world.

Therefore, based on the available literature and theoretical arguments provided, I hypothesize that different national leaders' national role conceptions lead to different foreign policy behavior. The research hypothesis for this study is illustrated in the following casual diagram:



### **Independent Variable: Leaders' National Role Conception**

In order to develop national role conceptions for different leaders, it is essential to look at certain themes that correspond to certain national role conceptions. These themes will be determined by the time periods in which the leaders studied had power, crossing multiple decades from 1978 to 2012. Having multiple years accounted for in the study allows for a deeper analysis of the chosen leaders. In this study, three different indicators of national role conceptions will be used: socioeconomic status, perceptions on internationalism and isolationism, and interest in development. Each of these will be discussed separately to understand how they affect the development of national role conceptions.

When conceptualizing the independent variable, it is vital to understand that these themes do not necessarily need to manifest themselves through policy behavior. On the contrary, the themes that will be outlined below need to be viewed as important to the leader and important enough to merit *potential* policy implications. For this study, it is not the claim that national role conceptions will *result* in specific policy behavior. Rather, the literature points out that there is potential predictive ability of foreign policy behavior

through the use of national role conceptions. Therefore, it is the perceptions that leaders hold of themselves and of their country *vis-à-vis* these indicators of national role conceptions that will be determining the certain national role conceptions that the leaders hold and the potential foreign policy behavior.

### *Socioeconomic Status*

Many scholars, including Holsti and Hermann, assert that the socioeconomic status of a country has a large effect on the national role conception that the leader of said country will hold. As stated in Chapter One, countries that have a larger economy and a better overall socioeconomic status will have the ability to hold different national role conceptions. Countries with better socioeconomic status may be more apt to be influenced by more domestic and foreign factors when developing different foreign policies. The importance of socioeconomic status of a country on the development of national role conceptions with other states is, therefore, extremely important to leaders.

Socioeconomic status takes into account the different ways in which citizens within a state have developed. Included in this form of development are the state of living, the quality of education, life expectancy, etc. If the people within a state are better off socially, then the leader of the state may carry a certain role conception that is based on the social development of its citizens. One way to measure the social development of a state is through different elements of the Human Development Index (HDI). The Human Development Index is a composite score of different development indicators such as, life expectancy, average years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita.

If a country has higher HDI rankings, it can be assumed that the citizens of that country have better livelihoods and are less likely to be critical of decision-makers. Leaders in this situation would be more likely to develop national role conceptions that emphasize the need to become a more influential player on the international stage due to their domestic success. On the other hand, if a country has low HDI rankings, leaders will be more likely to hold national role conceptions that emphasize the internal development of the state. In order to keep citizens happy, decision-makers will be more likely to harbor national role conceptions that aim to better the livelihoods of their citizens.

Since national role conceptions are based, in large part, on the perceptions of different leaders, the HDI ratings, themselves, do not play a large role. However, the different components of HDI and the perceptions leaders have on these aspects do play a large role in the development of national role conceptions. Therefore, in order to see the perceptions national leaders hold in this area, the different indicators of the Human Development Index will be used. The best way to gauge the perceptions that leaders have on these issues is to see whether or not a leader deems these different aspects important. The importance of socioeconomic status to a leader can manifest itself through different areas. Using the components of HDI as useful indicators of the importance of socioeconomic status to a leader, one would be able to better their understanding of the national leaders' perceptions on the issue. The components of life expectancy, years of schooling, and GNI per capita will be some of the indicators of a leader's perception of socioeconomic status. If these different indicators are mentioned in a positive manner, then the leader will be said to hold socioeconomic status as an important part in the development of the state. If the leader

provides certain data on the different indicators, and that data is relatively good, then the leader will also be characterized as believing that socioeconomic status is important. The converse of both examples is also true. These indicators of a leader's perception on socioeconomic status will be tested in select time periods within the leader's rule in order to obtain a relative amount of importance linked to the issue. The different indicators of HDI and a leader's perception of these indicators allows for the best possible avenue to see the importance of socioeconomic status to a leader.

### *Internationalism versus Isolationism*

The world today is an ever interdependent system. One cannot travel anywhere without seeing the effects of interdependence on all countries and citizens in the world. Some countries have fully embraced the idea of globalization stating that it is necessary for all countries of the world to work together to develop strong relations amongst each other. Many countries in the world embrace this feeling of internationalism and feel as though it is their duty to be a fully cooperative member of the international system. Contrasting this belief are leaders that are not as open to the notion of interdependence. Some leaders do not believe that it is completely necessary to develop strong interdependent connections between nations. These countries are seen as more isolationist and do not attach a lot of importance to their relations with other states. In addition, some leaders fear that the world may be taken over by the strongest powers due to the influence these powers have on perpetuation globalization to other nations in the world.

While there are many different aspects to internationalist and isolationist countries, it is not possible to account for all of the different ways in which a country can view these concepts. Therefore, in order to gauge a leader's perception on whether their country is internationalist or not, and the importance of the subject, two distinct categories, views on intervention and interest in multilateral organizations, amongst others, will be analyzed. These categories will be conceptualized and operationalized in the following sections.

### Views on Intervention-Conceptualized

When thinking in terms of internationalism and isolationism, one may be able to look at the different ways in which a state will pursue interventionist policies. Intervention, in this sense, does not necessarily mean military, but can also be in the form of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Not all countries in the world are willing to intervene in conflicts in other nations. Whether it be in the form of peacekeeping or military intervention to overthrow a regime, states make the conscious decision to pursue policies of intervention. The views leaders hold on the importance, necessity, and legality of intervention plays a large role in the type of national role conception that a leader may hold. Leaders can see their country as playing an essential role in the upholding of the international system. Those who feel this way will be more likely to hold national role conceptions that are more interventionist in nature.

Not all leaders feel this way. Some leaders believe that sovereignty is the most important norm that has been established in the international system. To defy this norm is to defy all that the international system stands for and believes to be true. Also, some leaders

do not believe it is their responsibility to intervene on the policies of other countries. This may be based on material capabilities as well as on the norm of sovereignty. Leaders that hold such beliefs would be more likely to hold national role conceptions that emphasize the need to respect sovereignty and focus on the internal politics of the country, thus resulting in more isolationist views. Countries like this will not necessarily be seen as leaders, both regionally and internationally, though intervention is not the only way in which a country becomes a leader.

#### Views on Intervention-Operationalized

As with the importance of socioeconomic status, just seeing where a country has or has not intervened does not give a good representation of the perceptions of different leaders regarding the phenomena. As a result, one must be able to gauge the perceptions of these different aspects in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of intervention in the eyes of a leader. The views leaders hold on intervention policies will be determined through the different mentions of intervention. For example, if a leader states that their country will never intervene within the sovereign borders of another country, then that leader will be characterized as having negative views on intervention. However, if a leader states that it is necessary for their country to be an active leader on the world stage in terms of intervention, then the leader will be presented as holding positive views on intervention.

### Interest in Multilateral Organizations-Conceptualized

According to liberal and neoliberal theories of international relations, multilateral organizations are essential to the development of the international system. It is through these organizations that different forms of internationalism manifest themselves. Not all countries are required to be a member of these organizations, but international organizations, such as the United Nations, seemingly have so much power that it is almost necessary to be a member of this organization. However, the prospects for more becoming more interdependent and globalized, through these organizations, allows joining these organizations to be within the interests of some states.

The importance of the multilateral organization that a country joins also plays a large role in the development of a more globalized and interdependent international society. Leaders need to be able to gauge the importance and usefulness of a multilateral organization before being able to join the group and be an active participant. If the group seems superfluous, then leaders may not find it worth their while to use resources to join the organization. Leaders that are more actively involved in multilateral organizations would be more likely to develop national role conceptions that emphasize multilateralism. If a country is a leader within a certain organization, then the leader may hold national role conceptions that are consistent with leadership and expanding influence. Contrasting this, leaders who do not believe that multilateral organizations are important or do not hold active roles in the organizations will be more likely to hold national role conceptions that are more reserved and isolationist in nature.



### Interest in Multilateral Organizations-Operationalized

As with the operationalizations of the other indicators of national role conceptions, this indicator also cannot be determined by whether or not a country has or has not joined an international organization. Simply joining a multilateral organization does not constitute a comprehensive way to assess the importance of these organizations *vis-à-vis* a leader's national role conception. Again, it is the perception that needs to be studied, not the activity within the organization or if a country has joined at all. These perceptions, then, will be determined through a leader's perceived idea of importance of international organizations. If a leader seems to have positive views of international organizations, then the leader will be perceived to hold a high level of interest in the ability for multilateral organizations to shed positive light on internationalism. However, if a leader holds negative perceptions on international organizations, then the leader will be characterized as viewing multilateral organizations as a hindrance to internationalism and, thus, more isolationist.

### *Interest in Development-Conceptualized*

The level of development of one's country is essential to the understanding of how national role conceptions form and how different foreign policy behaviors are determined from these conceptions. Many times leaders are faced with the task of trying to improve the development of their country. The important factor within this is not if a country is developed but rather if it is interested in furthering its domestic development. If a country is willing to pursue more internal development, then that will be reflected in the national role conceptions that leaders hold. Those leaders that are more interested in development are

more likely to be very domestically oriented and try to make their country seem like a good place for investment.

Development does not only occur on the domestic level. The extent to which a leader will want to pursue external development will also play a role in that leader's national role conception. Many countries throughout the world try to help other countries, less fortunate economically than themselves, by assisting in development projects. Leaders that are more willing to hold an interest in helping develop other countries can result in different national role conceptions. These national role conceptions tend to be those that emphasize leadership, influence, and expansionary prowess.

#### *Interest in Development-Operationalized*

One of the most cohesive ways of seeing if a country is interested in assisting in the development of other nations is to look at the amount of foreign aid that a country gives to other countries. In addition, a country can be characterized as attaching importance to development through the amount of foreign direct investment that one country provides to another. These are both good indicators of whether or not a country is actively pursuing these goals. However, foreign aid and foreign direct investment do not help understand the perceptions that a leader holds on development. Therefore, I will gauge leaders' perceptions on development by determining their views of how their country should act in the realm of development. If a leader responds positively to development, then a high perception of development will be given. In contrast, if a leader does not believe that development is necessary, then a low perception of development will be given to the leader.

### *General Measurement of Indicators for Independent Variable*

All of these indicators will be measured separately to gauge the influence of each indicator on that leaders' national role conception. After each indicator has been given a ranking, the rankings will come together to determine a national role conception. For the complete list of words and phrases used while coding the speeches see the Appendix. Each national role conception will correspond to distinct perceptions within the indicators of the independent variable. In addition, these different indicators will be determined from a specific time period of when the leader was in power. Since I will be analyzing three different leaders, there will be multiple time periods that are analyzed, but each leader will have a distinct time period so that there will be consistency in the analysis.

### **Types of National Role Conceptions to be Analyzed**

As stated in Chapter One, there are many different national role conceptions that a leader can possibly hold. However, it is not possible to determine all of the different types of national role conceptions a leader can hold. In addition, leaders can hold multiple national role conceptions. There are many different national role conceptions that have the potential to fit the leaders I will analyze. However, I am confident that the leaders I analyze will fit into one or more of the following national role conceptions: Anti-Imperialist Agent, Regional Leader, Active Independent, and Internal Development.

### *Anti-Imperialist Agent*

Holsti, though writing during the Cold War, states that, “[w]here imperialism is perceived as a serious threat, many governments...see themselves as agents of “struggle” against this evil.”<sup>2</sup> This is the basic idea behind the national role conceptions of anti-imperialist agent. While the international community is currently not in the midst of the Cold War, the concept of the anti-imperialist agent can still manifest itself. Many leaders throughout the world view globalization as a new form of imperialism in the twenty-first century. Countries, especially those not in the West, fear that there is a rising influx of Western influence and power being expelled upon their nations. In nations such as this, one would see anti-Western sentiment and countries being completely against globalization and thus more isolationist.

Based on the indicators of national role conceptions introduced earlier, the anti-imperialist agent would exhibit a multitude of factors. First, a leader that holds the anti-imperialist agent would be more likely to perceive socioeconomic issues as important. Since socioeconomic status is not heavily based on the interests of other countries, an anti-imperialist agent would like to see an increase in the development of socioeconomic status. The internationalism versus isolationism holds a lot of power for an anti-imperialist agent. As seen by the name for this national role conception, leaders holding this conception would be more likely to be isolationist. Therefore, these leaders would exhibit strong views against any sort of intervention. However, in order to be seen as an anti-imperialist agent, leaders may be members of many multilateral organizations, but may go against the wishes of the ‘imperialist’ power. Finally, in terms of internal development, leaders with the anti-

imperialist agent role conception would perceive internal development as vital to their country's overall status in the international community.

### *Regional Leader*

According to Holsti, “[t]he themes for this national role conception refer to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself...” regarding states that are located in similar regions.<sup>3</sup> A regional leader exhibits characteristics that manifest themselves through different leadership qualities. In a sense, a leader that holds the regional leader national role conception is looking to expand their influence in countries in the surrounding area. In addition, a regional leader would be trying to show different leadership qualities through multilateral organizations.

Leaders who hold the regional leader national role conceptions experience distinct factors that contribute to the development of the conception. Regional leaders would attach high importance to socioeconomic status. These leaders would try to set their country as an example for other nations to look at when developing certain socioeconomic policies. In terms of internationalism versus isolationism, regional leaders would be very internationalist. They would believe that intervention is a necessary thing and would voice interest in leading interventions whether unilaterally or multilaterally. Regional leaders would also believe that multilateral institutions are of extreme importance. Leaders with this national role conceptions would want to take leading roles in multilateral institutions. This would be especially applicable to regional organizations. In terms of interest in development, regional leaders would be seen as very interested in the development of their own country. As with

socioeconomic status, regional leaders would want to set an example for development that other countries could follow.

### *Active Independent*

The active independent national role conception refers to the idea that, "...decisions will be made to serve national interests rather than the interests of others."<sup>4</sup> Leaders with the active independent conception feel as though their policies should not be seen as conforming to the different policies that large, influential powers may want to see. These leaders believe that their country is the only country that matters and that it does not need to have strong relations with other countries. Especially with regards to hegemonic powers, active independents would want to stray from the influence of leading countries. Additionally, active independents try not to align themselves with other countries and allow for a range of different policy outcomes to occur.

Regarding the indicators of national role conceptions, a leader that holds the active independent conception would again wish to better the socioeconomic status of their country. However, in terms of internationalism and isolationism, these countries would be more likely to be isolationist. Intervention would not be a high priority for active independent leaders. However, multilateral organizations may be more important. Active independents would go against the grain of what might be considered normal in international organizations. This could be seen as voting against certain policies or developing their own policies that go against the norms of society.

### *Internal Development*

The internal development national role conception is the idea that, “...most efforts of the government should be directed toward problems of internal development.”<sup>5</sup> This is not to say that a country will not have relations with other states, but rather that many of the country’s resources will be directed towards improving the livelihood of its citizens and overall improvement of the state. For this national role conception, all forms of development are seen as important. From the typical development standards of growth and GDP to the most nuanced themes of educational development and other human development issues, internal developers wish to see their country in the best possible position it could be.

Leaders that hold this national role conception would place heavy importance on socioeconomic status. All of the different indicators of human development would play a large role in the development of this national role conception. When thinking about an internal developer, one would believe that they would be more likely to be isolationist. However, in many cases countries that focus on internal development would be more dependent on the international system. Therefore, a leader with the internal development national role conception would be more likely to be internationalist. Finally, the internal developer would believe that internal development is essential for their state. Many of a country’s resources would be used to try to further that development. In order to more easily understand how the different national role conceptions manifest themselves, the following chart has been created. This chart shows the different national role conceptions that will be studied and the different indicators of these national role conceptions. The chart then shows whether a low, medium, or high level of each indicator is necessary in order to hold that

certain national role conception or if the national role conception is contingent upon isolationist or internationalist behavior.

**Figure 2: Relationship Between National Role Conceptions and Indicators**

	<b>Anti-Imperialist Agent</b>	<b>Regional Leader</b>	<b>Active Independent</b>	<b>Internal Development</b>
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>	Med-High	High	High	High
<b>Internationalism Versus Isolationism</b>	Isolationist	Internationalist	Isolationist	Internationalist
<b>Interest in Development</b>	High	High	High	High

Low= 0-9 References; Med= 10-19; High= 20+

### **Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior**

Foreign policy behavior encompasses many different details that are all extremely important when trying to understand the relations between states. Through foreign policy, countries are constantly interacting with each other trying to have solid relations but also balance the importance of domestic interests. Because it would not be possible to include all the indicators of foreign policy behavior within this study, I have chosen three distinct indicators that will act as indicators of different types of foreign policy behavior. These indicators are, diplomatic relations with great powers, military power, and economic power.



### *Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers*

For countries that are rising in status through the international system, it is essential that they have good diplomatic relations with those powers that have greater international status. In the case of China, it is quite apparent that it is rising in the international system. Therefore, its relations with other great powers, for example the United States of America, are of great importance. Without having good relations with great powers, China would not be able to have as much of a say on international events. Great powers would dismiss them and then China would not be in the position it wishes to hold.

While it is true that a country should attempt to have good relations with all countries in the world, it is equally important to say that sometimes a country's greatest goal should be to have good relations with great powers. In the case of China, it is apparent that its partnership with the United States is extremely important. Not only is the relationship between China and the US important, but the relations between China and other great powers, like the former Soviet Union and Russia, also play a large part in the foreign policy behavior of China.

If China and the US did not establish official diplomatic relations in the late 1970s, then China would most certainly be in a different position than it holds today. Having a well established foreign policy between the two countries is something that is essential to the overall development of the international community. The People's Republic of China and the United States are two of the most important countries in world politics today. It would be essential to analyze China's relations with the United States in order to receive a better understanding of how Chinese foreign policy operates.

In addition to the United States, the former Soviet Union/Russia act as an interesting case regarding China's relationship with great powers. China and Russia have had many ups and downs in their relationship. From the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet Pact, to the complete distrust the powers shared for each other, the relationship between the two countries has become a staple of how cooperation and cynicism among great powers manifests itself. While the relationship between China and the Soviet Union had many negative aspects, the fall of the Soviet Union created a new chapter in the Sino-Russian relationship. Since both countries boast great influence in the region, a stark dichotomy exists between whether China or Russia holds the most authority.

There are many different ways one can analyze relations between different states. Regarding the relationship between China and the United States and China and the Soviet Union/Russia, one interesting facet of the relationships is their diplomatic relationship and cooperation. The three nations have developed relations in different ways while also maintaining that their individual priorities play an essential role in the development of bilateral relations. For this study, the diplomatic relations between great powers will be measured by looking at the scope of agreements that were negotiated between each country. These agreements can come in the form of summit meetings or different dialogues between top decision-makers and can include any range of topics that indicate cooperation.

Understanding the relationships between China and the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, creates an avenue for greater better comprehension of Chinese foreign policy. These relationships also allow a good manner to understand the complexities of world

politics and gives excellent cases from which one can study many different elements of a country's relationship with great powers.

### *Military Power*

One of the most important and easily visible ways to see a foreign policy in action is through a country's military. For some countries, the military is the only means through which foreign policy is implemented. There are many different ways that one can measure military power. In this study, level of military spending, the number of armed service people, and military modernization will be the indicators of military power.

The amount of money a country spends on its military is a direct indicator of the strength and influence of a military. Those countries that spend large amounts on their militaries will be perceived to have stronger militaries and will be able to easily carry out certain foreign policies. Since the military is one of the easiest ways to pursue different foreign policies, then it is necessary to understand exactly how much money is spent on these forces.

Additionally, the amount of modernization that a military has experienced over the years can be an indicator of a country's military power. Military modernization can include many different aspects including an increase in the number of military members and an advancement in military technology. It is without a doubt that China's military has seen many changes over the past years. The People's Liberation Army is a very ample body that has vast military capabilities. Therefore, being able to compare the different militaristic aspects of a country can determine the amount of military power a country boasts. In terms

of foreign policy behavior, countries that spend more money on their military and have a more modernized military will be more active in their foreign policies and will have the ability to further the development of different facets of their country's foreign policy.

### *Economic Power*

Economic power is another good indicator of foreign policy behavior. Today, more and more foreign policies are based on economic relations between states. While military and other forms of diplomatic relations are still prevalent throughout the world, economic power is becoming an important indicator of foreign policy behavior as well as a good way to classify the nature of a states' foreign policy behavior.

Economics can hold a wide variety of roles in foreign policy. However, trade may be one of the most important aspects of foreign policy that is affected by economics. While the world is becoming more interdependent, it is necessary to understand the importance of trade between states. Most states are not able to support themselves without international trade. Therefore, if a country is able to trade with others, then they will be able to have stable relations with their trading partner and be able to further their country's economy through trade.

Another direct indicator of economic power in terms of foreign policy behavior is a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI). Both of these indicators show the direct strength of a country's economy. If a country's GDP and GNI are high, then they will be more likely to assume more power and be able to influence the international system. In contrast, countries whose GDP and GNI are decreasing would not

have the clout of other, more economically powerful, countries. This economic power, in turn, corresponds directly to certain foreign policy behavior that can be seen through different leaders and the decisions that are made by each leader during their time in power.

For both military and economic power, the foreign policies will manifest themselves through the certain policies that have been created by different leaders. The policies of Chinese leaders to invest in the military or to heavily invest in the economy will be what indicates whether China is exhibiting military or economic power. In order to see the proposed relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the following chart marks what type of foreign policy behavior would be exhibited by certain national role conceptions.

**Figure 3: Proposed Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables**

	<b>Anti-Imperialist Agent</b>	<b>Regional Leader</b>	<b>Active Independent</b>	<b>Internal Development</b>
<b>Diplomatic Relations With Great Powers</b>	Poor	Good	Indifferent	Indifferent
<b>Military Power</b>	High	High	High	Low
<b>Economic Power</b>	Medium	High	Med-High	High

### **Methodological Approach: Comparative Case Studies**

To test my hypothesis, I am going to perform a comparative case study that will look at three different Chinese leaders, their national role conceptions, and their foreign policies.

For this study, it is imperative that I look at the variation across time of the different leaders I

will study. A comparative case study allows me the best avenue to gather information on my independent and dependent variables and will enable the study to be as comprehensive as possible.

Within these case studies, I will be using the methodological approach of content analysis. This method will be used in order to test my independent variable. Because my hypothesis deals with a very personal element, in this case national role conceptions of leaders, it is necessary that I use a methodological approach that allows me to gather individuals' specific conceptions. To test my dependent variable, I will be employing traditional case study techniques. Since my dependent variable is not as contingent on personal characteristics, a more general research technique will be used. In the following sections, I will explain these separate approaches in more detail and will explain my criteria for selecting my cases.

### *Independent Variable*

In order to give my research question and hypothesis the best test possible, I will test my hypothesis using content analysis. According to Insch, Moore, and Murphy, content analysis is, "...a family of procedures for studying the contents and themes of written or transcribed text,"<sup>6</sup>. An important part of Insch, Moore, and Murphy's definition is that content analysis is a procedure that helps evaluate documents for their substance. Content analysis is being used because it allows for the easiest way to gain the perceptions of different leaders. Not being able to interview the leaders in question makes it difficult to gain the answers regarding which national role conception the leader would hold. Therefore,

through content analysis, I will be able to determine what national role conception these leaders hold.<sup>7</sup>

For my study, I will be looking at speeches given by my three cases. Speeches allow for the most direct way to test for the leaders' specific national role conceptions. Since speeches are the most direct account of a leader's feelings, they are the easiest way for me to develop national role conceptions. In order to control for different factors that may affect the rhetoric of speeches, I will only look at speeches given during certain time periods. The easiest and most effective way to control for these speeches is to determine when Chinese leaders consistently give speeches. The most consistent speech that all Chinese leaders give is the speech which opens the Chinese Communist Party National Congress. The National Party Congress meets every five years, and on the first day of every Congress, the paramount leader of China addresses the Congress. Since many Chinese leaders have made speeches in this regard, it is the most effective way to control for different factors that might affect why a speech was given or the content of the address. This study is designed so that the variance of my different cases across time can be analyzed. Therefore, with the speeches occurring every five years, I will be working in compliance with the importance of variance in time.

### *Dependent Variable*

To determine my dependent variable, I will be looking at articles published in prestigious journals of international affairs. Included in this is the Asian Survey journal. Every year, Asian Survey publishes reports on all countries in Asia. Within these reports are data that correspond to each of my three indicators of foreign policy behavior. Gaining

information from this source will allow the project to be as consistent as possible and remove certain bias from other sources. In addition to Asian Survey, other influential academic journals will be used. This will allow my project to receive data from reliable sources.

I will also look at official documents released by the Chinese military and finance ministry. To gain the official perspective on Chinese foreign policy behavior, it will be essential that I look at the bureaucracies that hold the information necessary to complete my study. Official reports and documents that are essential to the understanding of China's military and economic power, based on the criteria in the preceding pages, will be analyzed to develop the certain criteria for my dependent variable.

In order to be consistent with time periods, for each leader I will look at the policies implemented in the years following the speeches that are analyzed. By looking at the policies post-speech, I will be able to see if there is in fact a relationship between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. This allows for a more comprehensive study where the variance in time will be easily controlled.

### **Case Selection**

It is without a doubt that the People's Republic of China is quickly becoming one of the most influential countries in world politics. China's rise in status in the international system can be attributed to many different factors such as its vast economic growth, its military power, and its population. However, it is obvious that there have been different routes China has taken to develop the policies that are seen today. Ever since the death of



Mao Zedong, China has had different leaders take China in different directions in their development.

Therefore, in order to see if national role conceptions truly have an effect on foreign policy behavior, it is necessary to analyze different Chinese leaders. Since China has had three main political leaders since the death of Mao in 1976, each of these leaders will be analyzed to gain a greater perspective on their national role conceptions and the foreign policies established during their time in office. No other leaders have had absolute power in China since the death of Mao. They are considered the paramount leaders of China and are representative of all foreign policies the People's Republic of China has pursued since opening up in 1978. While China's decision-making process is quite extensive and has many different actors working together in order to create foreign policies, it is the supreme leaders of the country that allow these policies to occur. The leaders that I will analyze in this study are Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

#### *Deng Xiaoping: 1978-1992*

Many sinologists and academics attribute China's great growth in the last forty years to Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping is credited with the great 改革开放 "Open and Reform" policies that began in the late 1970s and are still evident in some areas of China today. While Deng had never assumed the role of president or premier of China, he is often cited as the most influential leader China has seen. After the death of Mao Zedong, China was in shambles due to the failures of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The country was closed to the outside world and China's economic development was small, if not non-

existent. Deng Xiaoping capitalized on these feelings of isolationism that came with the cult that surrounded Mao Zedong and tried to turn China into the great power that it once was.

Through his policies and ideas, Deng led China to grow in unprecedented economic proportions. His novel ideas of leading China in a different direction than Mao Zedong allowed him the ability to pursue greatness for China. Not only did Deng allow China to grow economically, but he also was a catalyst for China opening to having relations with other countries. Deng Xiaoping provides a good case of how different leaders from the same culture have different national role conceptions and differing foreign policies. He also provides a stark contrast to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao because Deng's policies were so focused on reform and opening China to the outside world.

#### *Jiang Zemin: 1993-2003*

Jiang Zemin led China throughout the early 1990s until the early 2000s. China, under his leadership, developed in many different ways. The economic policies continued to occur in the style of Deng Xiaoping but foreign relations saw a stark development. Jiang led China through many different political and diplomatic events that put China on the world stage. Events such as the handover of Hong Kong to the Chinese after one hundred years of British rule as well as the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade all allowed Jiang's presidency and his foreign policy to develop in different ways.

Jiang Zemin had a distinct view of China and what its place should be on the world stage and held true to those beliefs. Jiang differed from Deng Xiaoping because he was not solely focused on economic growth. Rather, he wanted China to pursue growth and

prosperity by playing a more active role in the international community. Jiang Zemin is representative of the change in foreign policies throughout the entire international community during the 1990s. Since he is the second leader to assume supremacy in the People's Republic of China, a variation across the decades preceding his rule is evident. Jiang also provides a good contrast with other Chinese leaders because of his distinct foreign policy behavior and vision for China in the coming years.

#### *Hu Jintao: 2003-2013*

The final leader that will be analyzed is Hu Jintao. Hu provides a different take on leadership in the People's Republic of China. Hu Jintao marks a new generation of leaders in China. This new generation of leadership has allowed for different perspectives on China's role in the international system because they experienced the China of Mao Zedong and the new China developed by Deng Xiaoping.

Hu Jintao has led China throughout the new millennium and through a myriad of different foreign policy challenges. These challenges stem from China's status as the second largest economy in the world as well as China becoming a more prominent and influential leader in world politics. Hu Jintao was one of the most active Chinese leaders in history and has tried to sell Chinese ideas and culture to the rest of the world. This is very different than Deng and Jiang because Hu has slowly become iconic of the Chinese view of international relations and the international system in general. The perspective of Hu and the policies under his leadership give a stark contrast of styles between different leaders of China throughout history.

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<sup>1</sup> For more information on types of national role conceptions, see pages 20-21 of Chapter One.

<sup>2</sup> K.J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14:3 (September 1970), p. 264.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 261.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 269.

<sup>6</sup> Gary S. Insch et al., "Content Analysis In Leadership Research: Examples, Procedures, And Suggestions For Future Use," Leadership Quarterly 8:1 (1997), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Other methodological approaches, such as case studies, sampling, or interviews could also be applicable to my research question. Sampling holds merit to my hypothesis, though I do not have all resources necessary to conduct polling of Chinese leaders. Interviewing Chinese leaders would be another possible methodological approach I could take, though leaders that I would need to interview have passed away. Therefore, the best way to gain a complete understanding of my research question and give my hypothesis the best possible test is through content analysis.



## 第二章：研究设计和方法论

### 介绍

上一章总结了有关的文献和理论。本章将介绍方法论和研究设计。


第一，我会表现我的假设和给一个原因的图解。之后，我会解释我的自变量和因变数是什么。最后，我会描述一个经典案例及其内容分析。

### 研究设计

我的假设是国家领导的国家角色的概念支配该国外交政策的行为。

我有这个假设，因为很多政治学者说国家角色的概念和外交政策的行为有微妙的关系。很多政治学者对文化和历史非常看重，因为这些都能给国家角色的概念产生影响。基本上，每个国家角色的概念总会支配外交政策的行为。

这个是一个原因的图解：



## 自变量：领导的国家角色的概念

为了印证领导的国家角色的概念，我参照了从1978年到2012年间的一些数据。这些数据集中在以下三个方面：经济情况，对外开放和自我封闭和内国的发展。领导的外交政策的行为看似与这些无关，但是国家领导必须考虑这些方面以制定外交策略。我不认为一个国家角色的概念和国家领导的外交政策的行为是一样的。我认为一个国家角色的概念可以预言其外交政策的行为。以下三个方面可以作为判断一个国家的角色概念的主要依据。

### 第一个方面：经济情况

一个经济情况很好的国家能影响很多外国和本国的外交政策。经济情况跟国家的人民有关。如果一个国家的经济情况很好，该国民众不会批评领导们的外交政策。所以经济情况会越来越好。

在本文中，我会用人类发展指数来综合评价一个国家。比如说，一个国家的民众有较高的寿命，平均受教育年限和国民总收入。如果一个国家有较高的人类发展指数，该国领导的国家角色的概念是成为在国际上有

影响的国家。但是如果一个国家的的人类发展指数很低，他们的国家角色的概念是差不多自我封闭的。

## 第二方面：对外开放和自我封闭

今天的世界是更复杂的。差不多每两个国家间都有外交关系。领导们应该决定如果他们的国家成为国际化的或者自我封闭的。有两个方法决定如果一个国家是国际化的或者自我封闭的。第一个是领导们怎么样干预。第二个是国际组织怎么样。

因为我们的世界是互相联系的，一个国家跟他们的军队在世界上有影响。领导们认为他们必须干预每个冲突。别的领导们没有这个看法。所以如果一个国家觉得必须干预，领导的国家角色的概念是非常国际制的。要不然他们的国家角色的概念非常自我封闭的。

其次，国际组织非常重要。国际组织决定更重要的世界政策和帮助国家发展。领导可以选择加入国际组织或者不加入。如果他们决定加入他们就在更大的舞台上有一个新的国家角色。有的国家觉得他们不应该加入任何国际组织。所以他们会有自我封闭的国家角色的概念。



### 第三个方面：国内的发展的重视程度

很多领导们重视他们国家的发展。一个非常发达的国家是一个强大的国家。如果领导觉得发展是最重要的问题，他们的国家角色的概念是围绕国家发展而定位的。但是要是领导觉得发展不太重要，他们可以有非常国际制的国家角色的概念。

### **国家角色的概念**

美国政治学者提出领导可以有很多国家角色的概念。如果世界有非常多的国家角色的概念，我只能列举其中四个。这四个是反帝代理，区域领袖，积极独立，和国内发展。

反帝代理的国家角色的概念认为帝国主义的国家不应该告诉别的国家应该做什么。反帝代理是奉行自我封闭的。区域领袖的国家角色的概念是领导觉得他们的国家强大因此其他国家在指定外交政策时必须尊重他们的国家的意见。积极独立的国家角色的概念不受其他的国家政策左右而做自己国家要做的。国内发展的国家角色的概念顾名思义，发展是国家最重要的问题。

这个图表表现领导的国家角色的概念的迹象和国家角色的概念的关系。

### 第二个图表：领导的国家角色的概念的迹象和国家角色的概念的关系

	反帝代理	区域领袖	积极独立	国内发展
经济情况	中—高	高	高	高
对外开放和自我封闭	自我封闭	对外开放	自我封闭	对外开放
内国发展的兴趣	高	高	高	高

### 因变数：外交政策的行为

政治学者会从有很多方面权衡外交政策的行为。本文主要关注三个方面：大国的关系，军事力量，和经济规模。

有的国家在世界上非常强大。其他的国家必须跟那些国家保持友好的关系。例如美国和俄罗斯／苏联就是这样的国家。中国，美国和俄罗斯／苏联有很重要的关系。如果美国和中国没有好的关系，他们两个国家不能成为重要的国家。俄罗斯／苏联和中国有非常长的历史。历史上两国关系有的时候好，有的时候坏。

军事实力非常重要。中国有世界最大规模的军队。他们可以在很多地方有影响。中国军费很高。所以我会看到别的领导花多少钱，我也会看

到中国的军事实力。在1970年，中国的军事不太现代化。但是今天，他们的军事差不多现代化了。所以我会看别的国家的现代版本的政策。

最后经济规模非常重要。今天的中国是世界第二大的经济体。但是他们在1970年经济规模还不是那么大。不同的领导有不同的经济政策。另外中国跟很多国家有好的外交贸易关系。贸易非常重要。不同的领导也有不同的贸易政策。所以我会看领导和贸易政策的关系，以及跟他们的国家角色的概念的关系。

这个是一个图表表现自变量和因变数的关系：

**第三个图表：自变量和因变数的关系**

	反帝代理	区域领袖	积极独立	国内发展
大国关系	坏	好	中	中
军权	高	高	高	低
经济权	中	高	中—高	高

## 方法论

这部分主要通过分析三位中国领导经典案例来解析。即邓小平，江泽民和胡锦涛时代中国的国家角色的概念及其外交政策的行为。为了了解

他们的国家角色的概念，我会用内容分析。通过内容分析，我会看到他们最重要的演说和决定他们的国家角色的概念。



## **Chapter Three: Deng Xiaoping and Chinese Foreign Policy after Mao's Death**

This chapter presents the case of Deng Xiaoping and the policies that were enacted while he was China's paramount leader from 1978-1992. The chapter first provides essential background information on the life of Deng, and then provides evidence of Deng's national role conceptions. An analysis of Deng's foreign policy behavior follows. Finally, a short analysis of the independent and dependent variables in relationship to the hypothesis of the study concludes the chapter.

### **Background Information**

Deng Xiaoping has become one of the most revered leaders in Chinese history. Deng created a path for China to become more prominent and influential on the world stage and developed ways in which the Chinese people could showcase their prowess in the international community. Though Deng Xiaoping was not always welcomed by high level members of the Communist Party of China, he cultivated a way of thinking and a personality that was able to overcome the skepticism surrounding his name. Deng Xiaoping, in many ways, is credited with creating the China that the world sees today. From the reform policies enacted during his rule, to the modernization efforts that took place under his watch, Deng will always be remembered for developing innovative ways for China to be more influential in the international community.

Deng Xiaoping was born on August 22, 1904, in Sichuan Province to a family of landlords.<sup>1</sup> Deng's father believed that he would accomplish many prominent things during his lifetime and sent Deng to get the best education possible.<sup>2</sup> After attending high school in Chongqing, Deng enrolled in a program to prepare him to study in France. At the age of 16, Deng traveled to France where he worked and studied. While in France, Deng's political career began to blossom. During Deng's time in France, he became more active in Communist affiliated affairs, and was able to work with many future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>3</sup>

In 1926, Deng's political aspirations and Communist ideology began to be further developed. Deng traveled to the Soviet Union in 1926 where he attended Eastern University and Sun Yat-sen University.<sup>4</sup> Both of these universities catered to potential revolutionaries that would spread the Communist revolution throughout all places in the world. It is speculated that Deng officially joined the Communist Party while attending these universities.<sup>5</sup>

During the throes of the Communist Revolution, Deng was sent with other young Chinese communists to help support the revolution.<sup>6</sup> Deng Xiaoping's talents were not used as a soldier, rather Deng provided political instruction for the young members of the revolutionary forces.<sup>7</sup> After receiving many promotions throughout the 1920s and 1930s, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Deng became closer to the leader of the Communist Revolution, Mao Zedong.<sup>8</sup> Deng Xiaoping was seen as a, "...[Communist] Party Man in the eyes of the troops, but simultaneously as a military man in the eyes of..." central Party leaders.<sup>9</sup>

When the People's Republic of China was officially established in 1949, Deng worked closely with Mao.<sup>10</sup> Deng Xiaoping helped establish communist principles throughout the country and worked tirelessly to spread Mao's ideology to all of China. However, Deng did not always agree with Mao's policies. After the Great Leap Forward and the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution, Deng became increasingly skeptical of what Mao thought was best for the country. In 1969, Deng was first purged by Mao and other high level officials.<sup>11</sup> Deng Xiaoping was sent to Jiangxi Province so that he and other higher level officials would not threaten the power and authority of Mao.<sup>12</sup> Deng was not invited back to Beijing until February 1973 after nearly seven years of Mao constantly criticizing him for his reformist ideology.<sup>13</sup> In December 1973, Mao seemingly had a change of heart regarding Deng and decided to elevate Deng to a full member of the Politburo as well as a member of the Central Military Commission.<sup>14</sup> Because of his new found status, Deng was able to meet with high ranking foreign officials and began to again become more prominent in Chinese politics.

In 1976, as Mao's health deteriorated and other high level members of the Chinese Communist Party passed away, Deng was again purged from the Party. After having a falling out with Mao in 1976, Deng was not chosen as Mao's successor.<sup>15</sup> Instead Deng was relieved of all his duties within the Communist Party of China on April 7, 1976.<sup>16</sup> After the death of Mao in September 1976, there was no prominent leader of China. However, in August, 1977, Deng regained his prominence as an influential leader in the Communist Party of China.<sup>17</sup>



It was after this point that Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of China. From late 1977 until his death in 1997, Deng Xiaoping created the many policies that credit China with the immense amount of growth and development that has occurred over the past thirty-five years. Deng's influence on the policies that China has undertaken throughout last quarter of the twentieth century are a testament of Deng's ability to cultivate strong relations within the Communist Party. In addition, Deng's reformist ideology and awareness of what the average Chinese citizen needed allowed him to gain the trust of the Chinese people. Though Deng Xiaoping was met with much criticism before his paramount rule, he will always be remembered as creating the China that has become so influential in the international community.

### **Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions**

Deng Xiaoping gave many influential speeches throughout his political career. Deng was known as a man of few words and gave many speeches revolving around themes that common people would understand. Two of Deng's most essential speeches were analyzed to develop his national role conceptions. These influential speeches displayed Deng's thoughts regarding all aspects of Chinese life. Deng's Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China provides important insights into the policies that were created that would start the economic growth that China would pursue in the coming years.<sup>18</sup> The Third Plenary Session, which occurred in October 1984, started the more comprehensive economic reforms that China would practice in the following years.

The other speech analyzed is a compilation of speeches given during Deng's Southern Tour in 1992. The Southern Tour was Deng's way of promoting the policies that he believed needed to be enacted even after not being in power.<sup>19</sup> All of the speeches revolved around similar themes including the need to further strengthen China's economy and improve the well-being of Chinese citizens. While there were many speeches given during his tour to cities and industrial centers in Southern China, the speeches provide the most direct way of seeing Deng's true thoughts on the path China should take in the coming years. Having nothing to lose, politically speaking, Deng was able to provide his take on what was necessary for China to pursue in order to become more influential in world politics. The exact document coded is the main talking points given during Deng's speech tour in Southern China.

*Deng Xiaoping's Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, 1984*

In the following section, an analysis of Deng's speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China is provided. For this speech and his speeches during his Southern Tour, the indicators of national role conceptions are analyzed in order to gain a more complete picture of Deng's remarks in terms of the independent variable. Some of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of each speech to give specific examples of how different words and phrases are used. By analyzing the data in this manner, a more comprehensive study of Deng's national role conceptions becomes apparent. This creates a better understanding of Deng Xiaoping and the development of his national role conceptions.

### Socioeconomic Status

Deng Xiaoping made six references to socioeconomic status in his speech at the Third Plenary Session. All of these references were made in terms of promoting more education in the People's Republic of China. Though the number of references to education may be small, the importance each mention holds signifies that Deng Xiaoping believed education was essential to the development of a strong China.

For example, Deng stated, “现在我们是捉襟见肘，要增加一点教育经费、科研经费，困难得很。至于人民生活，到本世纪末达到小康水平，比现在要好得多。”<sup>20</sup> This sentence emphasized the need for more funding in education to occur. Without substantial funding in terms of education, China would not be able to pursue the policies that have allowed the country to develop and flourish. Deng also displayed his awareness of the plight of citizens throughout China. In his speech at the Third Plenary Session in 1984, Deng described in detail the need for reforms to help citizens, specifically in Suzhou Province:<sup>21</sup>

我了解了一下苏州的生活水平。在苏州，第一是人不往上海、北京跑，恐怕苏南大部分地方的人都不往外地跑，乐于当地的生活；第二，每个人平均二十多平方米的住房；第三，中小学教育普及了，自己拿钱办教育；第四，人民不但吃穿问题解决了，用的问题，什么电视机，新的几大件，很多人也都解决了；第五，人们的精神面貌有了很大的变化，什么违法乱纪、犯罪行为大大减少

In this excerpt, Deng emphasized that he understood the conditions under which some people in the People's Republic of China were still living. Deng alluded to the need for education to become affordable and more accessible to all people.

Although the number of references to socioeconomic status is low, the data suggest that Deng Xiaoping holds socioeconomic status in very high regards. Deng attempted to bring the hardships of normal Chinese citizens to light for high ranking members of the Chinese government. Through this, he tried to develop a more cohesive understanding of the needs of Chinese citizens. Having acknowledged the difficulties that surround many Chinese citizens, especially regarding education, Deng believed the socioeconomic status of many Chinese citizens needed to be improved. This allowed Deng to place an important emphasis on the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens.

#### Internationalism versus Isolationism

In his speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Committee of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping made seven reference that showcased Deng holding a more internationalist perspective on world politics. There were not any references made to being more isolationist in his political thinking. All of the seven references to being more internationalist came in the form of emphasizing sovereignty.

Of the references to sovereignty made in Deng's speech at the Third Plenary Session, a majority were made regarding the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China that would occur in 1997. Deng stated, "...主权问题是不能谈判的..." which emphasized the importance that sovereignty played in the development of China's international presence.<sup>22</sup> Deng believed that protecting China's sovereignty was essential for the further expansion of China's influence throughout the world. In addition, the references to sovereignty displayed the awareness Deng had of the international system. In his speech

to the Third Plenary Session, Deng showed that sovereignty and the protection of sovereignty were essential to help China take on more prominent roles in the international system.

Overall, the data suggest that Deng was seemingly more internationalist in nature rather than isolationist. By stating the importance of sovereignty and retaining sovereignty over China's possessions, Deng alluded to the fact that sovereignty was essential to all aspects of life in China. The data show that Deng believed sovereignty was extremely important if China wished to become more influential in world politics.

### Interest in Development

Deng Xiaoping made three references that alluded to having a strong interest in development in his speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China. The references were all made in terms of economic development. Since the speech at the Third Plenary Session revolved around themes of China's economy, it is surprising that there were not more references made to development in Deng's remarks. However, the three references to economic development provided an insight into Deng's plan to create a more developed and prosperous China.

In his speech, Deng stated, "...经济发展是个基础，在这个基础上工作就好做了，" which displayed how important economic development was to Deng Xiaoping.<sup>23</sup> Deng believed that economic development would be the backbone of everything China would accomplish in the coming years. Without economic development, China would not be able to become the influential power that Deng so passionately wanted China to become. Deng also believed that, "再花三十年到五十年时间，就可以接近经济发达国家的水平，" which

emphasized that it would take time for China to become as developed as other countries in the world.<sup>24</sup> Deng also showed that without the policies that China was enacting at that time, China would not be able to reach that economic development he so desperately wanted China to achieve and stated, “你不开放, 再来个闭关自守, 五十年要接近经济发达国家水平, 肯定不可能.”<sup>25</sup>

In summary, while Deng did not make a large number of direct mentions of the different indicators of national role conceptions in his speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, he still made a direct effort to emphasize the need to improve the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens and improve China’s economic development. The data suggest that Deng believed these things to be very important as well as displays that Deng Xiaoping was seemingly more internationalist when thinking about world politics.

### *Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech, 1992*

#### Socioeconomic Status

In Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech, there were nine references made to socioeconomic status. These references ranged from promoting education to discussing the importance of the income of Chinese citizens. Although the number of references made to socioeconomic status is small, the importance of the references resonates throughout the entirety of Deng’s speech.

In his Southern Tour Speech, Deng made eight references to education. Deng believed that education was essential for all Chinese citizens so that China could become

more influential in the international community. Deng emphasized that education was of extreme importance, especially in terms of educating Chinese citizens on the ideas of Socialism and Communism, and stated, “所以，要把我们的军队教育好，把我们的专政机构教育好，把共产党员教育好，把人民和青年教育好。”<sup>26</sup> This statement displayed Deng’s thoughts about the education of all Chinese citizens and the need for an education to include an emphasis on the Communist Party of China. Without the CPC, China would not be able to develop into the important world power that Deng wished China to become.

In addition to education, Deng also stated, “...农民收入大幅度增加...” which displayed Deng’s commitment to improving the incomes of Chinese citizens living in rural areas. While Deng emphasized the need to develop China, he also understood that in order for all of China to become developed, people living in rural areas also needed to have an increase in income. This would allow for China’s development to be more comprehensive and affect the livelihood of all people.

Overall, the data show that Deng placed a low emphasis on socioeconomic status. However, as with his speech at the Third Plenary Session, the references to socioeconomic made Deng Xiaoping seem like he placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic status during his Southern Tour Speech. Deng realized the need to improve the socioeconomic status of all Chinese citizens and the speech reflects that realization. The data suggest that although there was a low number of references made, Deng still placed a very large emphasis on the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people.

### Internationalism versus Isolationism

In Deng's Southern Tour Speech, there were not any references made to Deng being more internationalist or isolationist. According to the coding scheme provided in Chapter Two, none of the terms or phrases appeared in the speech. Because of this, it cannot be determined if Deng was more internationalist or isolationist when thinking about world politics in 1992. However, it can be assumed that because China was growing at very fast rates during Deng's time in power, he would hold a more internationalist outlook on politics. Without having an internationalist view, Deng Xiaoping would not have adhered to the policies that promoted the growth and economic development of China.

### Interest in Development

Deng Xiaoping expressed an interest in development fourteen times in his Southern Tour Speech in 1992. These references mainly came in the form of promoting the idea of economic development in order to create a more influential China. However, there were other references made to having peaceful development as well. Though the number is low, Deng still displayed a large interest in trying to promote the economic development that has helped China develop since the beginning of his leadership.

Deng believed that China should strive to improve the economic development that had already made China more powerful than it had ever been. Deng stated, “我国的经济发  
展，总要力争隔几年上一个台阶，” which showed his dedication to improving the economic development that had already brought great prosperity to the country.<sup>27</sup> Deng also believed that economic development must rely on the developments that occur in science and



education and said, “经济发展得快一点, 必须依靠科技和教育。”<sup>28</sup> The data suggest that Deng seemed to understand the necessity of economic development in order to better Chinese society. Deng showed that economic development needed to be attained in order for China to become more competitive in the international community.

Deng also stated, “世界和平与发展这两大问题, 至今一个也没有解决。”<sup>29</sup> While this quote is directly pertaining to the peace and development that should be occurring through the world, it can also be applicable to Deng’s view of China. Without having development that is peaceful in nature, one would not be able to fully achieve what is necessary to make China more powerful in the international community. Developing in non-peaceful ways would hinder the overall development of the People’s Republic of China. Deng realized that China, and the world, need to pursue development that is peaceful in nature in order to keep a stable environment for all countries to better their economies.

In summary, the data suggest that Deng placed a low emphasis on socioeconomic status and a medium emphasis on interest in development. However, because of the importance of both categories, and the gravity of the words that he spoke during his Southern Tour, one can assume that Deng placed both categories in high regard. In addition, since the data show that there were not any references made to internationalism or isolationism, it can be assumed that Deng would be more internationalist. The policies that were enacted during Deng’s rule, like that of Opening and Reforming, are consistent with a more internationalist view.

### **Deng Xiaoping's National Role Conceptions**

Overall, in the two speeches analyzed, fifteen total references were made to improving the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens. While low numbers were displayed in each speech, the total number of references suggest that Deng placed a medium emphasis on socioeconomic status. However, the data suggest that while the number of references were rather low, the references were given with extreme importance. The data also suggest that Deng Xiaoping was seemingly more internationalist than isolationist when thinking about world politics. Deng referenced a more internationalist tone seven times and there were not any references made to being isolationist. This is not surprising given the reformist nature of Deng and the importance he placed on integrating China with the rest of the world. Finally, seventeen references were made in conjunction with having an interest in development. However, because of the reformist nature of Deng, this can be considered to be a high interest in development. Deng Xiaoping wished to have China become more powerful and thought that the best way to do that was through economic development. This alludes to the fact that Deng Xiaoping had a high interest in development.

Given the content of Deng's speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China and his Southern Tour Speech, Deng is best characterized as holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions. Deng wished to take China in a different direction than it had been going during the rule of Mao Zedong. He wanted China to become more influential and assume leadership positions throughout the world. Both the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions manifest themselves when the leader placed high emphasis on socioeconomic status, had an internationalist view on world politics, and had high interest in

development. The data suggest that Deng Xiaoping met the criteria in all three categories. The regional leader and internal development national role conceptions display what Deng hoped China would achieve in the future. These national role conceptions then, as hypothesized, should correspond to certain foreign policy behavior.

### **Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior**

Deng Xiaoping led China when it was undergoing substantial change in its foreign policy. During the Mao Zedong era, China was virtually cut off from the outside world and did not actively seek to express their power in different ways. However, once Deng came to power, he thought China should take a different stance on international affairs and become more involved with the rest of the international system. Understanding Deng's foreign policy enables a more complete understanding of China's standing in the international system to emerge. In line with the research design and methodology provided in Chapter Two, the three aspects of Chinese foreign policy during the Deng era that are analyzed are China's diplomatic relations with great powers, China's military power, and China's economic power. These three aspects of foreign policy provide a comprehensive understanding of Deng's foreign policy and the transformation that China was making during Deng Xiaoping's leadership.

#### *Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers*

Deng Xiaoping oversaw China go through substantial changes in its relations with great powers. From resuming official diplomatic relations with the United States to dealing

with the fall of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping led China through large shocks to the international system. In this study, China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union during the leadership of Deng are analyzed to give important insights to Chinese foreign policy at this time. While it is important to note that there are many facets to the relationship between the countries, the diplomatic relationship provides the most cohesive insights in the general relationship between the countries and China's foreign policy behavior.

### Sino-US Diplomatic Relations

Deng Xiaoping presided over a very important time in Sino-US relations. Starting in 1972, the United States and China began to show signs of rapprochement. After US President Nixon's historic visit to the People's Republic of China in 1972, almost fifty years of hostility began to come to a close.<sup>30</sup> Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, the United States officially recognized Taiwan as the true China. However, in the 1970s, that idea began to evolve and people began to believe that the United States should recognize the People's Republic of China as the true China. While President Nixon and Mao Zedong were the catalysts to this change, Deng Xiaoping led the official normalization of Sino-US relations.

On January 1, 1979, China and the United States officially normalized diplomatic relations.<sup>31</sup> This meant that the United States officially recognized the People's Republic of China as the true China. Deng Xiaoping played a large part in this normalization process and was invited to the United States soon after relations were restored.<sup>32</sup> With this trip, Deng

hoped to reflect, "...Chinese interests in American high technology..." rather than display affection to American life and values.<sup>33</sup> The trip was heralded as a great success and the establishment of official diplomatic relations between China and the United States brought two of the most powerful countries in the world closer together.

In the following years, Sino-US relations were beginning to make up for lost time. Perhaps the most important year following the normalization of relations was 1985. In 1985, the United States and China signed many agreements that would bring the countries closer together. Acting as an envoy of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States in July 1985.<sup>34</sup> During his trip to the United States, China and the United States signed multiple bilateral agreements. These agreements included a, "...pact opening the way for US nuclear technology, plant, and equipment sales to China," as well as, "...a new accord on cultural exchanges, a protocol on educational exchange, and a fisheries agreement."<sup>35</sup>

Deng Xiaoping also believed that China and the United States should create a stronger military partnership. To facilitate this, China and the US started exchange programs for Chinese and US military officers and the United States made China eligible for Foreign Military Sales.<sup>36</sup> This brought the relationship between the United States and China closer together and created a strong partnership for the development of future relations.

However, 1989 brought much turmoil to Sino-US relations. After Deng Xiaoping's crackdown on the Tian'anmen Square protests and the ensuing Tian'anmen incident, Sino-US relations started to unravel. The aftermath of the Tian'anmen Square incident brought economic and diplomatic sanctions to China.<sup>37</sup> The United States would not allow China to

perform such human rights abuses and President George H.W. Bush thought it was must appropriate to apply economic sanctions to China. Deng Xiaoping and other leaders in the Chinese government did not believe China deserved international punishment and they found ways around the sanctions that were imposed on them.<sup>38</sup>

Though China and the United States experienced some turbulence in their diplomatic relations, the data suggest that overall, Sino-US relations during the rule of Deng Xiaoping were good. From the normalization of bilateral relations to the establishment of many agreements between the two countries, China and the United States experienced good relations while Deng Xiaoping was in power. Through diplomacy and other measures, Sino-US relations developed in a way that suggests Deng was very aware of the importance of the partnership between the two countries.

### Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations

During the Mao era, China and the Soviet Union had gone through a rather tumultuous period regarding their relations. After having a strong bilateral partnership in the 1950s, the 1970s saw Sino-Soviet Relations deteriorate substantially.<sup>39</sup> Deng Xiaoping came to power at a time when China's differences with the Soviet Union needed to be reconciled so that both countries could become more powerful. In addition, Deng Xiaoping oversaw China's transition in relations with the Soviet Union to that of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Throughout Deng's time in power, Sino-Soviet Relations began to face the same rapprochement as Sino-US relations which manifested itself through China and the Soviet Union cooperating in many different areas.

The beginning of the 1980s saw China and the Soviet Union at odds over many things.<sup>40</sup> Differences over regional issues, such as the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet Union, brought Sino-Soviet Relations to almost a standstill.<sup>41</sup> However, at the end of 1984, the Sino-Soviet relationship began to improve. In December 1984, China saw its first high-level visitor from the Soviet Union in the past fifteen years. Soviet Vice-Premier Ivan Arkhipov traveled to Beijing where he signed, "...preliminary accords calling for trade expansion, Soviet-assisted modernization of Chinese factories, and scientific and technological exchanges."<sup>42</sup> While China and the Soviet did not have official normal relations at that time, Arkhipov's visit to Beijing marked the beginning of normalization efforts.

In July 1985, China's Vice-Premier Yao Yilin traveled to Moscow as an envoy of Deng Xiaoping. During his time in Moscow, China and the Soviet Union made a pact to begin educational exchange programs and called to boost trade between both countries.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to help China construct and modernize factories that specialized in, "...electrical power generation, metals, machinery manufacturing, coal, chemicals, and transportation."<sup>44</sup>

However, China and the Soviet Union also experienced some apprehension regarding whether their relations could be normalized. China was not happy that Soviet troops were stationed at the Chinese border and that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. Chinese leaders made clear that these obstacles would need to be removed in order for normalized relations to occur.<sup>45</sup>

The end of the 1980s saw China and the Soviet Union restore normal relations. In May 1989, China and the Soviet Union officially normalized relations.<sup>46</sup> This brought the end of the hostilities between the two countries that had been occurring since the 1970s. Border negotiations and arms control talks ensued after the official relations had resumed.<sup>47</sup> The fall of the Soviet Union saw a large threat disappear from China. Relations with Russia started on a much better note than China's relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup>

The data suggest that China's relations with the Soviet Union during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping were good overall. Though there were some tense moments in the relationship, China and the Soviet Union worked together to overcome the differences the countries shared. Because the data suggest Sino-US relations and Sino-Soviet relations were both good, China diplomatic relations with great powers can also be characterized as good while Deng Xiaoping was in power. This is not surprising given that Deng wanted to make China more open and accessible to countries throughout the world. The data suggest that Deng was successful in doing this and created strong partnerships with two of the most important countries in the world.

### *Military Power*

At the beginning of Deng's rise to power in 1978, the People's Republic of China had already seen a decrease in the country's military spending. Deng Xiaoping wished to decentralize political and economic decision-making and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was one of the many organizations Deng wanted to decentralize.<sup>49</sup> In order to do this, Deng sought to reverse the policies of Mao Zedong and began to cut military spending.



Throughout the 1980s, military spending decreased by about 3.5% every year though China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was steadily rising. Nolt writes that China's defense spending reached a high at nearly 10% of its GDP in the 1960s and 1970s, but since then it, "...has declined to about one quarter of that peak percentage."<sup>50</sup>

Though Deng was successful at decreasing China's military spending as a percentage of GDP, he also decided to improve the modernization of the Chinese military. During the Mao era, many of the weapons that were used by soldiers in the PLA were made in China. These designs became increasingly obsolete so Deng decided to cut Chinese production and decided to import more sophisticated weaponry from other countries.<sup>51</sup> In 1982, the People's Republic of China began to import weapons made in the United States which would substantially modernize the People's Liberation Army.<sup>52</sup> Though the defense spending cuts seemed to be harmful to China's overall military, they actually created avenues for a large military modernization effort which increased the real military power of China.

In addition to the spending cuts, Deng also believed that China should decrease the number of members of the People's Liberation Army. At the beginning of Deng's rule, the PLA had nearly four million members.<sup>53</sup> However, Deng realized that this number would not be sustainable and there needed to be a cut to the number of soldiers. Deng Xiaoping believed that large-scale war would not occur between either the Soviet Union and China or China and the United States and that there would be no need to harbor that many troops. Therefore, in 1985 the Chinese government decided to cut one million troops from the PLA.<sup>54</sup> This brought the total number of members of the People's Liberation Army to three million. Within this cut of one million troops would be a 10% decrease in the number of

officers in the PLA.<sup>55</sup> During the rest of Deng Xiaoping's rule, the number of soldiers in the PLA remained rather constant at three million.

Though Deng Xiaoping believed that the military should have less power and cut spending and the number of troops in the military, the effects of those changes allowed China's military to become more powerful than they were during the Mao era. Military modernization created a military that would be more capable of withstanding conflict with other countries. In addition, the cuts in military personnel allowed the People's Liberation Army to be more efficient which enabled the military establishment to be more powerful. The data suggest, that through all of the cuts in China's military, the overall military power during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping was high.

### *Economic Power*

As Deng Xiaoping ascended to the upper echelons of Chinese government, the Chinese economy was performing poorly. Due to the seemingly contradictory policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China's economy was not operating at its optimum level. Deng realized this and decided that instead of being the closed country that it was during Mao's rule, China should instead open its doors to foreign nations and reform some of the policies that almost led China to the brink of economic collapse. After being in power for only two years, Deng increased China's trade as a percentage of GDP from 5.3% in 1970 to nearly 21% in 1980.<sup>56</sup> This stark contrast to the policies of Mao Zedong suggests that Deng was determined to bring China out of the economic hole in which it saw itself and become more powerful on the world stage.

Economic growth in the People's Republic of China was slow during the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Dittmer asserts that China's growth in Gross National Product (GNP) decreased from nearly 12% in 1978 to only 5% in 1980.<sup>57</sup> Data from the World Bank suggest that China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the same time period rose from almost \$150 billion in 1978 to nearly \$190 billion in 1980.<sup>58</sup> Though the growth during those first two years of Deng's rule may have been slow, China's GDP increased by about \$40 billion. Continuing the trend of increasing GDP, in 1985, Deng's sixth year in power, China's GDP surpassed \$300 billion for the first time in history.<sup>59</sup> And in 1992, the final year of Deng Xiaoping's rule, China's GDP totaled over \$400 billion. In terms of per capita Gross National Income (GNI), China experienced healthy growth. In 1980, China's GNI per capita was only \$250. However, in 1992, Deng's policies allowed GNI per capita to increase to over \$1000.<sup>60</sup> This increase suggests that Deng's policies were developed to allow all people to feel the effects of China's rise in economic power. The dramatic increase in China's GDP and GNI per capita during Deng Xiaoping's time in power displays the importance Deng placed on opening China to the rest of the world and reforming different sectors of China's economy.

China's trade as a percentage of GDP also saw a substantial increase throughout the years of Deng's leadership. In 1980, trade was only 21% of China's GDP and increased to 22% of GDP in 1985. However, by the end of Deng's rule, trade accounted for over 36% of GDP.<sup>61</sup> Following this trend, China's trade with the United States also increased. In 1985, China had a \$6 million trade surplus with the United States. In 1992, that trade surplus increased to over \$18 billion.<sup>62</sup> These data suggest that China's opening to other countries

throughout the world was very prominent and helped China's economy become more powerful in the international system. Deng Xiaoping, and his reformist policies, created new waves of Chinese economic power that would help foster immense economic development over the following thirty years.

The changes in China's GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and China's trade surplus with the United States during a portion of Deng's time in power can be seen in the following table:<sup>63</sup>

**Figure 4: Changes in Deng Xiaoping's Economic Power**

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
GDP	\$306 billion	\$297 billion	\$270 billion	\$309 billion	\$343 billion	\$356 billion	\$379 billion	\$422 billion
GNI per Capita	\$500	\$550	\$620	\$700	\$750	\$800	\$890	\$1020
Trade as % of GDP	22.5%	22.5%	28.9%	30.9%	29.2%	29.1%	31.6%	36.1%
Trade Surplus	\$6 million	\$1.6 billion	\$2.7 billion	\$3.4 billion	\$6.2 billion	\$10.4 billion	\$12.6 billion	\$18.3 billion

The data suggest that because of the open and reform policies of Deng Xiaoping, China's economic power during Deng's rule was high. China saw large increase in its GDP as well as its trade which shows that China's economic power was steadily rising. Deng Xiaoping laid the foundation for the dramatic increase in economic power that China has experienced over the last decade. Because of his policies, Deng was able to create a China that would be able to exert its economic power throughout the rest of the international system.

## **Analysis**

According to the criteria of this study, Deng Xiaoping appears to hold the national role conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The data suggest that not all of the proposed relations between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were true. Of the possible six relationships that determine whether national role conceptions affect foreign policy behavior, four of them were found to be true. Since this is a majority of the relationships, there is an overall relationship between Deng Xiaoping's national role conceptions and his foreign policy behavior.

In terms of the regional leader national role conception, the data suggest that all of the relationships between the role conception and foreign policy behavior were true. With the regional leader national role conception, one would expect to see high levels of military and economic power as well as good diplomatic relations with great powers. Deng exhibited all of these traits. This suggests that Deng supported China becoming more influential in the region and throughout the rest of the world. With his reformist ideology and the open and reform policies that occurred under his watch, it is not surprising that Deng Xiaoping displayed all of the traits of a regional leader.

The internal development national role conception was not as convincing as the former conception. With the internal development role conception, the leader was predicted to pursue policies that included low levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and indifferent diplomatic relations with great powers. On this front, only one of these relationships was correctly predicted. Deng Xiaoping exhibited high levels of economic power, but did not show behavior that would indicate low levels of military power and

indifferent relations with great powers. Since a majority of the relationships within this national role conception were not true, the data suggest that the internal development role conception was only slightly related to Deng's foreign policy behavior.

Overall, four of the six proposed relations between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were correctly predicted. The regional leader national role conception manifested itself correctly in all three of Deng's foreign policy behavior that were studied. However, within the internal development national role conception, only one relationship was evident. This suggests that in the case of Deng Xiaoping, national role conceptions had a minimal effect on the foreign policy behavior of China during his leadership.

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<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Yang, "The Making of a Pragmatic Communist: The Early Life of Deng Xiaoping, 1904-1949," The China Quarterly 35 (September 1993), p. 444.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 445.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 446

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 447.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 448.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 453.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 42.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 200.

<sup>18</sup> Deng Xiaoping never gave the Opening Address to the Communist Party of China National Congress. Therefore, these two speeches were analyzed in lieu of the Opening Address.

<sup>19</sup> Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 664.

<sup>20</sup> Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, China, 22 October 1984, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69684/69696/4949937.html> (accessed February 2, 2013), p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>26</sup> Deng Xiaoping, Southern Tour Speech, Wuchang, China, 18 January 1992, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/69113/69684/69696/4950062.html> (accessed February 2, 2013), p. 6.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>30</sup> Huan Xiang, "On Sino-US Relations," Foreign Affairs 60:1 (Fall 1981), p. 36.

<sup>31</sup> Joyce K. Kallgren, "China in 1979: On Turning Thirty," Asian Survey 20:1 (January 1980), p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Baum, "China in 1985: The Greening of the Revolution," Asian Survey 26:1 (January 1986), p. 49.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> June Teufel Dreyer, "US-China Relations: Engagement or Talking Past Each Other?" Journal of Contemporary China 17:57 (November 2008), p. 597.

<sup>37</sup> Harry Harding, "China's American Dilemma," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 519 (January 1992), p. 14.

<sup>38</sup> Dreyer, "US-China Relations," 597.

<sup>39</sup> Gerald Segal, "China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union," Asian Survey 32:9 (September 1992), p. 848.

<sup>40</sup> Kallgren, "China in 1979," 15.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>42</sup> Baum, "China in 1985," 47.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>46</sup> Segal, "China and the Disintegration," 855.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 868.

<sup>49</sup> James H. Nolt, "China's Declining Military Power," The Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1 (Spring 2002), p. 323.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 324.

<sup>52</sup> Dreyer, "US-China Relations," 597.

<sup>53</sup> Nolt, "China's Declining," 326.

<sup>54</sup> China's National Defense, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, July 1998, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm> (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 15.

<sup>55</sup> Baum, "China in 1985," 37.

<sup>56</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/china> (accessed January 20, 2013).

<sup>57</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "China in 1980: Modernization and its Discontents," Asian Survey 21:1 (January 1981), p. 32.

<sup>58</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> "Trade in Goods with China," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html> (accessed January 30, 2012).

<sup>63</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China,; "Trade in Goods with China,"





### 第三章：邓小平和中国外交政策

#### 介绍

这一章是邓小平的经典案例。首先我会介绍邓小平的背景信息。之后，我会分析我的自变量和确定邓小平的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以后，我会介绍邓小平的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我的因变数，然后确定邓小平的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策行为有关。

#### 邓小平的背景信息

邓小平于1904年出生于四川省。他的家人有房产，所以邓能有很好的童年。邓小平16岁的时候去法国工作和留学。在法国，邓小平开始学共产主义。而且他能跟别的中国领导人，比如说周恩来，一起工作。可是1926年的时候，邓小平去俄罗斯。在俄罗斯，他上了东方大学和孙中山大学。这两个大学帮助了邓小平在政治上的看法，所以邓小平加入了共产党。

中国共产革命的时候，邓小平去支持中国共产党员。共产革命的时候邓小平跟毛泽东建立了一个好的关系。邓跟毛一起帮助建立中华人民共和国。文化革命的时候，邓小平倒台了。1973年邓小平被平反了。

毛泽东死了以后，中国人不知道谁是领导。1976年邓小平再次倒台。可是1977年8月，邓再次恢复工作。恢复工作以后，邓小平综合领导。他成为中国最重要的领导。邓小平开始中国的改革开放。这个政策给中国带来了巨大的影响。

### **自变量：国家角色的概念**

我看了邓小平的两个报告。这两个报告是在中央顾问委员会第三次全体会议上的讲话和在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点。在中央顾问委员会第三次全体会议上的讲话是，中国最重要的领导人决定他们必须执行邓小平的经济政策。在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点是，邓小平去中国的南部讲他的看法。

## 邓小平在中央顾问委员会第三次全体会议上的讲话和在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点

在这两个报告中，邓小平都说了他对经济和社会的看法。我会分析这个报告并确定他的国家角色的概念。

### 经济情况

在邓小平的两个重要的报告中，他提到了经济情况15次。他也说别的字，比如：他说‘教育’14次，和说‘收入’1次。

邓小平觉得教育是非常重要的。他在很多地方考虑到了教育。比如，他说，“要把我们的军队教育好，把我们的专政机构教育好，把共产党员教育好，把人民和青年教育好。”邓小平说中国必须提高他们的教育质量。邓小平觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须提高教育系统和质量。如果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在世界上竞争。邓小平认为人民的经济情况必须提高。他提到了经济情比较少，可是他的意思是非常重要，所以我能分类这个部分：高。

## 对外开放和自我封闭

在那些报告中，邓小平不提倡自我封闭。可是他提到了对外开放15次。邓说‘主权’7次。他不说“自我封闭”的字。说到“主权”的时候，邓说中国应该也必须保护他们的主权。邓小平是一个对外开放的领导，不是自我封闭的。

## 对国内发展的重视程度

在那些报告中，邓小平提到了“国内发展”17次。他认为中国必须发展经济，成为一个非常重要的国家。邓小平说到“经济发展”16次，“和平发展”1次。邓小平觉得中国必须改变他们的经济政策。所以他觉得国内发展是非常重要的。邓小平说，“就是因为我們搞了改革开放，促进了经济发展，人民生活得到了改善。”他的意思是中國必須改變經濟系統也嘗試提高人民的生活。邓小平觉得发展非常重要。因为他提到了“国内发展”很多次，我能分类这个部分：高。

## 邓小平的国家角色的概念

邓小平觉得经济情况和国内发展都很有意思，也非常重要。他也是一个对外开放的领导。所以邓小平的国家角色的概念是，区域领袖和国

内发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现了邓小平的个性。而且，邓的国家角色的概念可以告诉别的国家中国外交政策行为。

### **因变数：中国外交政策行为**

邓小平成为中国最重要的领导的时候，中国跟别的国家的关系不太好。中国没有跟美国建立友好的关系，中国和苏联的关系真的不好。可是邓要开始有好的关系。改革开放的时候，邓小平要修复中国和别的关系。

### **大国关系**

1979年1月1日中国和美国建立正式的外交关系。这个非常重要，因为中国终于跟世界上最大的国家建立了外交关系。邓小平也到了美国。在美国，他要告诉美国领导人，中国要跟美国发展贸易。这个访问表现中国的跟美国新的关系。

1985年，中国和美国签署了很多协议。这个协议是跟核技术核文化的交流有关。这个都帮助发展中美关系。可是1989年，中美关系不太好。天安门事件以后，美国对中国进行经济制裁。邓小平觉得中国不应该有这个制裁。总之，中美关系非常不好。

中国跟苏联的关系跟中美关系差不多一样。毛泽东的时候，中国和苏联没有好的关系。可是邓小平要发展好的关系。1984年中国和苏联签署很多非常重要的协议。那些协议跟贸易有关。那些协议非常重要，因为中国和苏联还没有好的贸易关系。所以中国和苏联能开始很多贸易。

总之邓小平时期的大国关系很好。这三个国家都一起合作，并且发展非常重要的关系。

## 军权

邓小平成为中国的主席的时候，中国的军事不是世界上最强大的。中国有差不多四百万的士兵。可是1985年的时候，邓小平说他要减少中国的士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以1985年，中国的军队只有3百万士兵。同时中国的军队有很多现代化建设。而且中国花很多钱在他们的军事方面。虽然中国没有那么多士兵，但中国的军队还是非常强大的。

## 经济权

邓小平要发展中国的经济。所以他开始中国改革开放的政策。1979年，中国的经济发展不太好。可是中国经济发展地很快。1985年，中国的

国内生产总值是300亿美元。在1992年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多400亿美元。这个非常好，表现中国的经济权。邓小平的时期，中国的经济提高得真快。邓小平和他的改革开放政策帮助中国的经济发展。

## 分析

从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设差不多是对的。我认为中国领导的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。邓小平的国家角色的概念，区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不对。





## **Chapter Four: Jiang Zemin and Chinese Foreign Policy in the 1990s**

This chapter presents the case of Jiang Zemin and the policies that were enacted during his time as President of China from 1993-2003. First, the chapter surveys relevant background information on the life of Jiang Zemin, and then provides evidence of Jiang's national role conceptions. Next, an analysis of Jiang's foreign policy behavior is provided. This chapter ends with a short analysis of the independent and dependent variables in relationship to the hypothesis of the study.

### **Background Information**

Becoming the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 1989, Jiang Zemin's rule over one of the most dynamic countries in the world began.<sup>1</sup> Though he did not attain leadership of all facets of the Chinese government, such as control of the People's Liberation Army and the elusive presidential title until the early 1990s, Jiang had already established himself as an important figure in Chinese political history. Jiang was able to prove that he was capable of leading one of the greatest economic transformations the world had seen.

Jiang Zemin was born in 1926, in Jiangsu Province to a family of intellectuals that highly valued Chinese culture.<sup>2</sup> Jiang placed large importance on the Confucian traditions of morality and filial piety. The Confucian traditions encompass many aspects of Chinese culture and Jiang embraced the ideals of morality that Confucius pursued. As Xiao writes, "[t]here is a practical demand of China to stand on a moral high ground," which shows the

importance of morality in the Chinese way of thinking.<sup>3</sup> Being moral also creates a justification for wanting to raise the socioeconomic status of a country's population. In this case, Jiang wanted to see China develop in a way that would allow for a higher socioeconomic status for the Chinese population.

Jiang grew up during the Japanese occupation of China (1931-1945).<sup>4</sup> This period was part of what has become known as the "century of humiliation" where China was essentially colonized by great powers throughout the world. Japan had arguably the largest role in this by forcing China to succumb to the demands of the Japanese empire. Growing up in this type of world, Jiang knew that he wanted China to become strong and independent in the international community. Seeing the atrocities that Japan committed on the Chinese people made Jiang want to try to change the way China was viewed by all people. Jiang felt as though China should be the country that would take a more prominent role in the international system and not be isolated by the needs of other countries instead of succumbing to the demands of an imperial power.<sup>5</sup>

Jiang joined the Communist Party of China in 1946, as a student studying electrical and power engineering in Shanghai.<sup>6</sup> While in college, Jiang assisted the Communist Party in many different ways. He led student movements promoting the ideals of the party and also worked underground as a low-level member in the political organization. After graduating from college, Jiang held many jobs in the growing industrial sector of Shanghai. He assumed many top leadership positions at different factories in Shanghai and was beginning to make a name for himself in that field. However, during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, Jiang experienced politics firsthand. In the midst of the Cultural

Revolution, Jiang was relieved of his position as Director of the Wuhan Power Engineering Research Institute and forced to spend the rest of the Cultural Revolution in fear.

While surviving the Cultural Revolution, Jiang was forced to attend a Communist Party cadre school to be politically reeducated. After his reeducation, Jiang traveled to Beijing and became the vice director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry. This was Jiang's first formal government position. From this point on, Jiang would become an important figure in Chinese politics and assume many leadership positions in the Communist Party of China.

During Jiang Zemin's time as president of China (1993-2003), many different foreign policy challenges faced the country. For example, Jiang had to oversee China's response to the United States' accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. In addition, Jiang was forced to deal with the collision of a United States Navy EP-3 and a Chinese Navy fighter jet over the South China Sea in 2001.<sup>7</sup> Both of these incidents created many problems that Jiang needed to overcome and showed the capabilities of Jiang as a leader. In addition, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States provided Jiang another opportunity to prove China's developing role as a leader in the international community.

Jiang Zemin did many things to try to help the Chinese people and attempted to develop China into a world power. From a focus on the economic development of the People's Republic of China to improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people, Jiang Zemin has been heralded as a very influential leader in Chinese history. From his unconventional background in engineering, to his political reeducation during the Cultural

Revolution, Jiang proved to be a true leader and helped China overcome many obstacles in order to become a leading country in international politics.

### **Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions**

Two speeches were coded and analyzed for the purpose of gaining insight into the way in which Jiang Zemin views himself and the role China holds in the international system. These speeches were the opening remarks Jiang gave at the 15th and 16th Community Party of China National Party Congress (NPC) given in 1997 and 2002 respectively. The opening address is the most important speech given during the National Party Congress. In the address, the President of China provides a look into the development of the country over the last five years. The address also lays out a plan for the further development of the country and sets areas that should be focused on in order for the People's Republic of China to become more influential in the international community.

As the opening speech acts as the 'state of the union' address, one can see how the country has changed since the last NPC and also can be used to develop a clearer understanding of how Jiang's impressions of China have also changed. This speech gives the rest of the world a look at China's aspirations in the international community and creates the impression that China is developing in ways that will not only assist the China but also assist the greater development of the world.

*Jiang Zemin's 15th National Party Congress Opening Address, 1997*

In the following section, an analysis of Jiang's opening remarks at the 15th National Party Congress is provided. For each address, the indicators of national role conceptions are analyzed in order to gain a full picture of his speech in terms of the independent variable. Some of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of his address to give specific examples of how different words and phrases are being used. By analyzing the data in this manner, a more comprehensive study of Jiang Zemin's national role conceptions can be provided. This allows for a better understanding of Jiang Zemin and the development of his national role conceptions.

Socioeconomic Status

For the first indicator of national role conceptions, socioeconomic status, Jiang's 15th National Party Congress Opening address made more references than expected. In total, in terms of the coding scheme used, there were forty-eight references to socioeconomic status. These references ranged from speaking about societal life, to the importance of education in the development of China, and the need for the incomes of Chinese citizens, mainly in rural areas, to be raised in the next years.

For example, Jiang made three references to the social life of Chinese citizens. The following quote provides Jiang's thoughts on the development of Chinese social life and makes two references to the social life of Chinese citizens:<sup>8</sup>

我国经济、政治、文化和社会生活各方面存在着种种矛盾，阶级矛盾由于国际国内因素还将在一定范围内长期存在，但社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛盾，这个主要矛盾贯穿我国社会主义初级阶段的整个过程和社会生活的各个方面。这就决定了我们必须把经济建设作为全党全国工作的中心，各项工作都要服从和服务于这个中心。

While this quote emphasized the need for socialism to create economic opportunity for the Chinese people, it also showed how Jiang wanted to place emphasis on the improvement of Chinese citizens' socioeconomic status through bettering their social livelihoods.

In addition to making references to societal life, Jiang also placed a large emphasis on education. In total, education was mentioned thirty-one times in this address. In this excerpt from Jiang's address, he emphasized the need for the development of education and an improvement of the quality of education in the People's Republic of China. In this excerpt alone, ten references are made to education:<sup>9</sup>

发展教育和科学，是文化建设的基础工程。培养同现代化要求相适应的数以亿计高素质的劳动者和数以千万计的专门人才，发挥我国巨大人力资源的优势，关系二十一世纪社会主义事业的全局。要切实把教育摆在优先发展的战略地位。尊师重教，加强师资队伍建设。发挥各方面的积极性，大力普及九年义务教育、扫除青壮年文盲，积极发展各种形式的职业教育和成人教育，稳步发展高等教育。优化教育结构，加快高等教育管理体制改革的步伐，合理配置教育资源，提高教学质量和办学效益。认真贯彻党的教育方针，重视受教育者素质的提高，培养德智体等全面发展的社会主义事业的建设者和接班人。努力提高科技水平，普及科技知识，引导人们树立科学精神，掌握科学方法，鼓励创造发明。消除愚昧，反对封建迷信活动。积极发展哲学社会科学，这对于坚持马克思主义在我国意识形态领域的指导地位，对于探索有中国特色社会主义的发展规律，增强我们认识世界、改造世界的能力，有着重要意义。

This section of Jiang's address exposed his commitment to the improvement to the education system of China and to the need to enhance the quality of education for the future leaders of China.

Finally, Jiang made fourteen references to income in his opening address to the 15th National Party Congress. Jiang seemed to stress the need to increase the income of Chinese citizens throughout the country. However, there was a strong emphasis placed on increasing the incomes of those living in the country side. Phrases such as, “农民收入增加,” displayed the importance Jiang has placed on the need to increase the income of Chinese citizens, especially those living rural areas.<sup>10</sup>

Overall, patterns of the indicators of national role conceptions suggest that the need to improve the general socioeconomic status of the Chinese people is considered to be a high priority for Jiang Zemin when this speech was given. The data included forty-eight references to improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people. Because of the data pattern, Jiang can be categorized as holding these ideals dear to him which would allow him to pursue policies that will increase the livelihood of Chinese citizens.

#### Internationalism versus Isolationism

In terms of the second indicator of national role conceptions, Jiang's opening address to the 15th National Party Congress made fewer references to China being more internationalist or isolationist. In fact, no terms or phrases were presented that made Jiang seem to be isolationist in nature. Though only five total references were made, each reference alluded to China being more internationalist in nature.



Jiang made three references to sovereignty. These were mainly given in terms of protecting China's national sovereignty and occurred in phrases such as, “维护国家主权的  
原则性。”<sup>11</sup> By speaking in this way about protecting the People's Republic of China, Jiang showed his realization that China is part of an international society where the most important thing is to protect the state's interests. While this could be interpreted as being isolationist, making these references to the protection of the state suggests that Jiang is aware of the international nature of the world in the twentieth century. References to sovereignty displayed Jiang's understanding of the international system and showed that the protection of the state is extremely important in the international system.

Jiang also made one remark in favor of international organizations and stated, “要积极参与多边外交活动, 充分发挥我国在联合国以及其他国际组织中的作用。”<sup>12</sup> This statement suggests Jiang wished for China to have a more active role in the United Nations and other international organizations. Jiang displayed the importance of international cooperation and globalization, thus alluding to the fact that he is more internationalist in nature. Finally, Jiang made one positive reference to globalization in his opening address. Jiang stated, “面对经济、科技全球化趋势, 我们要以更加积极的姿态走向世界, 完善全方位、多层次、宽领域的对外开放格局, 发展开放型经济, 增强国际竞争力, 促进经济结构优化和国民经济素质提高,” which showed that he believed globalization to be very important especially in terms of developing the economies of nations throughout the world.<sup>13</sup>

The data suggest that Jiang Zemin is seemingly more internationalist than isolationist. By stating the importance of globalization, international organizations, and sovereignty, Jiang Zemin seems to be more internationalist when thinking about global politics. The data did not provide any reference to being more isolationist proposing that Jiang deems an internationalist attitude more important in world politics. This should then be reflected in the policies that he would pursue as President of the People's Republic of China.

### Interest in Development

The third indicator of national role conceptions, interest in development, was not as prevalent as the first indicator, but occurred many times more than the second indicator. Jiang made twenty-four total references to increasing the development of the People's Republic of China during the next five years. The references made in this category were mainly economic in nature and were focused on the internal development of China.

Jiang Zemin made seventeen references to economic development in his opening address to the 15th National Party Congress. Some of these mentions of economic development referred to the need to enhance China's global standing in economics. Other references were made such as, “在经济发展的基础上，使全国人民过上小康生活...” stating that economic development was necessary in order to better the livelihood of the Chinese population.<sup>14</sup> Mentions of economic development also arose when speaking of rural areas and the need for the Chinese countryside to obtain the same amount of economic development as coastal China. Ever since the beginning Deng Xiaoping's Open and Reform policies, economic development has been a high priority for Chinese leaders. They realized

that in order to become a strong country in the international community, their economy must be strong and well developed. Jiang seemed to embrace this thinking which suggests he hopes to still pursue policies that promote the economic development of China.

In addition to economic development, Jiang also placed a strong emphasis on the need for China to pursue peaceful development. Peaceful development was mentioned seven times in his 1997 opening address. Peaceful development refers to the need for China to aspire to economic development for peaceful purposes, without trying to incite fear into other countries due to China's rise in power. Peace and development is used to describe China's internal growth as essential to the Chinese for its rise in the international system. Jiang also stated, “和平与发展已成为当今时代的主题,” which provides an important insight as to what is a priority for China, saying that peace and development are both essential to China becoming more prominent in the international community.<sup>15</sup> While it is evident that Jiang is placing an emphasis on internal development, it is surprising that there were not more references made to something that seems so important to the Chinese government.

In summary, the 15th National Party Congress opening address suggested that Jiang Zemin placed a high level of emphasis on socioeconomic status and had a high level of interest in development. These are both consistent with what China was experiencing at the time the remarks were given. In addition, the data showed that Jiang also expressed a more internationalist tone which displays his interest in a more globalized world and a need for all states to respect the sovereignty of all countries.

*Jiang Zemin's 16th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2002*

Socioeconomic Status

In Jiang's address to the 16th Communist Party of China National Party Congress in 2002, many similarities were shared with the speech given five years prior. In the 16th NPC speech, fifty-six references were made to socioeconomic status. These references were again made in relationship to education, income, and societal life but there were additional references to promoting health.

Jiang made thirty-four references to education, which is only three more than in the address given five years earlier. Again, a majority of the references were made to promoting the development of education and enhancing the quality of education in China. In the following excerpt, Jiang mentioned education fifteen times and in many different manners:<sup>16</sup>

大力发展教育和科学事业。教育是发展科学技术和培养人才的基础，在现代化建设中具有先导性全局性作用，必须摆在优先发展的战略地位。全面贯彻党的教育方针，坚持教育为社会主义现代化建设服务，为人民服务，与生产劳动和社会实践相结合，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主义建设者和接班人。坚持教育创新，深化教育改革，优化教育结构，合理配置教育资源，提高教育质量和管理水平，全面推进素质教育，造就数以亿计的高素质劳动者、数以千万计的专门人才和一大批拔尖创新人才。加强教师队伍建设，提高教师的师德和业务水平。继续普及九年义务教育。加强职业教育和培训，发展继续教育，构建终身教育体系。加大对教育的投入和对农村教育的支持，鼓励社会力量办学。完善国家资助贫困学生的政策和制度。制定科学和技术长远发展规划。加强科学基础设施建设。普及科学知识，弘扬科学精神。坚持社会科学和自然科学并重，充分发挥哲学社会科学在经济和社会发展中的重要作用。在全社会形成崇尚科学、鼓励创新、反对迷信和伪科学的良好氛围。

In this statement, Jiang mentioned the need to promote education in the countryside while also making sure that all people have access to education. Advocating education is a direct way of again showing Jiang's commitment to enhancing the socioeconomic status of China.

Jiang made eighteen references to income in the 2002 address. Income was again perceived as being important to all people, but Jiang made specific calls to increase the income of those living in the countryside. However, there were also phrases used that would refer to the incomes of citizens to rise such as, “提高低收入者收入水平.”<sup>17</sup> As income is a direct indicator of socioeconomic status, the data suggest Jiang placed high importance on socioeconomic status.

Finally, Jiang made three references to the health of Chinese citizens and one reference to improving societal life. The references to health were made in conjunction with promoting science and technology. However, the phrase, “支持健康有益文化,” displayed how Jiang wants to promote a healthy culture in Chinese society.<sup>18</sup> Doing so improves the socioeconomic status of the Chinese population.

Jiang, overall, again made socioeconomic status a high priority in his 2002 address. By making a total of fifty-six references to improving the socioeconomic status of China, the data suggest Jiang wanted to pursue policies that will enhance the image of China throughout the rest of the international community. Jiang again is perceived as wanting to deem these ideals as being very important and would possibly pursue policies that would enhance the socioeconomic development of Chinese citizens.

### Internationalism versus Isolationism

Jiang Zemin made ten total references to being more internationalist when looking at world politics in his opening address to the 16th National Party Congress. Again, the data showed that there were not any references made that were promoting an isolationist ideology. While more references were made to being internationalist than in the 1997 address, having given only five more references in 2002 does not substantially change Jiang's thoughts on being more internationalist.

Jiang Zemin made six references to sovereignty in the 2002 speech. Sovereignty was mentioned in terms of promoting the security of the country and protecting national interests. For example, the following statement showed that China's sovereignty is contingent upon the promotion of internationalist ideals in the international system, “我们从容应对一系列关系我国主权和安全的国际突发事件。”<sup>19</sup> This statement also showed that China is an important player in an international community that is becoming more and more interconnected.

Globalization was mentioned four times in Jiang's opening address. In 2002, China was becoming more and more economically powerful. Their economic growth was contingent upon the globalized nature of the international system. Jiang emphasized the need for economic globalization and said, “世界多极化和经济全球化趋势的发展,” and provided evidence of wanting the world to become more globalized.<sup>20</sup> A more globalized society would also help China's development and help China become more influential in the international community.

The patterns in the data suggest that Jiang was trying to promote more internationalist ideologies while not adhering to isolationist policies. Internationalist policies would allow China to become more powerful and influential on the world stage. Therefore, Jiang would hope to promote internationalist policies that would enhance China and create a better image of China in the international community.

### Interest in Development

Jiang Zemin mentioned words and phrases that would promote a high level of interest in development eighteen times. These included references to economic development and peaceful development. While this is less than the amount of times development was mentioned in 1997, it is still a high number that shows the importance Jiang placed on the development of his country. In order for China to be successful in the international community, the country must be developed in a way that will promote the improvement of China's image in the international community.

Jiang mentioned economic development fifteen times in the opening address of the 16th NPC. Economic development was mentioned as being extremely important to the development of the country and necessary in order to make China more influential on the world stage. Jiang also stated that the Chinese government should help promote the private sector of the Chinese economy and stated, “支持和引导非公有制经济发展.”<sup>21</sup> Though China officially heralds a socialist economy, through this statement, Jiang acknowledged the need for China to also embrace the private sector in the economic development of the country.

Jiang Zemin also made three references to peaceful development. Peaceful development references were made in terms of creating a world that can experience peace and development at the same time. A world that could develop in peaceful ways would allow for more comprehensive development of China's internal economy. Having a developed economy is extremely important to the People's Republic of China and is necessary in order for the country to be more influential in the global economy.

In summary, the data suggest that Jiang placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic status and a high level of interest in development. The data also indicate that he also expressed a more internationalist tone when giving this address which corresponds, again, to the speech given five years prior. These characterizations show how China had again been changing throughout the last five years and how Jiang had been embracing the new found status of China.

### **Jiang Zemin's National Role Conceptions**

Overall, in the two speeches, Jiang made a total of one hundred four references to improving the socioeconomic status of China's citizens. In both speeches, socioeconomic status was mentioned many times. In terms of internationalism versus isolationism, Jiang Zemin was starkly more internationalist with fifteen total references made. Finally, Jiang expressed high levels of interest in development in both speeches with a total of forty-two mentions of development. The combination of high levels socioeconomic status, high levels of interest in development, and an internationalist political view is not surprising given the



time the speeches were both given. China was improving its socioeconomic status and also its economy while also becoming more influential in world politics.

Given the content of two of Jiang Zemin's opening address to the Communist Party of China National Party Congress, Jiang is best characterized as holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions. Because Jiang provided a multitude of references to socioeconomic status in both speeches analyzed, an internationalist view in both speeches, and high references to development, the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions are quite fitting for what was being said at the two National Party Congresses. Holding these national role conceptions makes China seem to want more responsibility in the international system while also making sure that the country is able to sustain itself economically. The regional leader and internal development national role conceptions can be seen in the two speeches as working together in order to promote the creation of a powerful Chinese state. This state would not only be powerful in terms of political might, but also economically. These national role conceptions, then, as hypothesized, should correspond to certain foreign policy behavior.

### **Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior**

In order to gain a comprehensive perspective of the foreign policy behavior of China under Jiang Zemin's leadership, three categories were studied. In line with the research design and methodology provided in Chapter Two, the three aspects of Chinese foreign policy that are analyzed are China's diplomatic relations with great powers, China's military power, and China's economic power. These three indicators will allow for an overall picture

of China's foreign policy. While there are many different ways to analyze a country's foreign policy behavior, the areas of Chinese foreign policy that were analyzed provide important insights into the development of Chinese foreign policy during the Jiang era.

### *Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers*

One way to gauge the behavior of a country is to further understand the country's relations with other great powers. In the case of this study, China's relations with the United States and Russia during the presidency of Jiang Zemin are analyzed to give important insights to Chinese foreign policy during this time. While it is important to know many facets of the relationship between the two countries, the diplomatic relationship provides the most cohesive insights into the general relationship between the two countries

### Sino-US Diplomatic Relations

The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China during Jiang Zemin's time as President of China faced many different challenges. While there was much cooperation during the latter part of Jiang's term, the beginning of his time as President of China did not seem to herald the same optimism as the end of his time as president. From trade relations and human rights, to crises in the Taiwan Strait, China and the United States appeared to develop a stronger relationship as time passed.

When Jiang became the Chinese President in 1993, the relations between the United States and China were strained. According to David Shambaugh, after the Tian'anmen Square incident in the summer of 1989, the Sino-American relationship was very tense.

Economic sanctions were placed on China because of the alleged abuses occurring after student protests, which created much distress between the two countries.<sup>22</sup> In addition to the economic sanctions, the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade status of China towards the United States was soon to expire. Having MFN status meant that China would be able to trade more freely and easily with the United States. In the early 1990s, one of the most important aspects of the relationship between China and the United States was to see the renewal of the MFN status.<sup>23</sup>

Both countries knew that it was of utmost importance to renew this status, but US President Bill Clinton felt domestic opposition to doing so. Many people in the United States believed that renewing China's MFN status should only be allowed if China improved its human rights record.<sup>24</sup> However, both sides understood that not renewing China's MFN status would bring a wide variety of negative consequences to both countries.<sup>25</sup>

During this tense time, Jiang Zemin and President Clinton held their first summit meeting at the APEC conference which occurred in November, 1993. At this meeting, both sides tried to negotiate the renewal of China's MFN status. Clinton and the United States were determined to only renew the MFN status if China improved its human rights record. Contrasting that, China argued that renewal was necessary in order to keep their economy growing.<sup>26</sup> Both countries retained their position and nothing was made of the first meeting of the heads of state from both countries since 1989.

However, in the following year, President Clinton had a change of heart and decided to delink the renewal of China's MFN status to its human rights record.<sup>27</sup> On May 26, 1994, Clinton formally announced the severing of the connection between human rights and MFN

status.<sup>28</sup> This brought about a new era of Sino-American relations. After having a tense start to the beginning of the decade, China and the United States grew closer together and began to further develop their relationship.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Sino-American relations again began to see more cooperation.<sup>29</sup> Both China and the United States saw terrorism as a threat and started to cooperate on many different levels. The governments of China and the United States wanted to further improve their relationships and deemed cooperation on both nuclear nonproliferation policies and counterterrorism would be the best avenues to achieve a better relationship.<sup>30</sup> Through diplomacy and other means, the Chinese government, under Jiang was able to procure an important partnership in the United States. This culminated in the meeting of President Jiang and President George W. Bush at the APEC summit in 2001 where they agreed on cooperating on certain counterterrorism measures.<sup>31</sup>

Because of the use of diplomacy in renewing China's Most-Favored Nation status as well as the cooperation in the post-9/11 world, the diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China can be characterized as being good. While there were some tense events that could have tarnished the relationship, history shows that Jiang Zemin was able to cultivate a lasting, working, relationship between the United States and China. Diplomacy and other cooperative measures were essential in the development of this relationship and suggests that Jiang thought Sino-American relations were of utmost importance.

### Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations

During Jiang Zemin's leadership, Sino-Russian relations were experiencing something that had not occurred in recent memory. The disintegration of the Soviet Union created many hurdles for Jiang Zemin to overcome. However, for a majority of Jiang's rule, Russia and China developed another strong working partnership. From the beginning of the decade to the end, Sino-Russian relations remained relatively stable and allowed for much growth between the two countries.

Jiang Zemin presided over many different diplomatic agreements with Russia during his time as Chinese President.<sup>32</sup> In 1993, Jiang signed a five-year Military Cooperation pact which created many avenues for more cooperation to develop. Following that, in September 1994, China and Russia signed agreements for, "...mutual nonaggression, mutual detargetting of strategic weapons, and non-first use of nuclear force...."<sup>33</sup> Finally, in 1997, Russia and China signed, "...agreements on trade, oil, and gas development and cultural cooperation."<sup>34</sup> Needless to say, there was much cooperation between the Chinese and Russians. This cooperation suggests that both countries deemed the other country extremely important and would do what needed to be done in order to cultivate a working relationship.

Perhaps the most telling sign of Sino-Russian cooperation occurred at a Russia-China Summit meeting in 1996. At the meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin commented that he believed Sino-Russian relations should be elevated to a, "...strategic partnership for the twenty-first century."<sup>35</sup> Jiang agreed to this notion and Sino-Russian relations developed into an extremely important partnership that would benefit both nations. Following this groundbreaking cooperative effort, in 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-

Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.<sup>36</sup> This brought the China and Russia even closer together as strategic partners and allies in the international system.

Jiang's use of diplomacy in China's relations with Russia suggests that the overall relations between the countries were good. Many agreements were made which would strengthen the relationship between Russia and China. Because China's relations with both great powers were positive during Jiang's time in power, the overall diplomatic relations between China and the United States and Russia were also good. Many forms of cooperation between the countries was evident and history has shown that important relationships have developed over time because of the cultivation of relations during Jiang's leadership.

### *Military Power*

One of the most important aspects of a country's foreign policy comes from their military. In many cases, the military allows for a direct avenue for a specific foreign policy to be established. During Jiang's time as president, the Chinese military had undergone different forms of modernization as well as established itself as the largest group of armed forces in the world. This has not come without changes in policy that would show the military acting in ways pursuant of certain foreign policies.

When Jiang Zemin took office in the spring of 1993, the size of China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), ranked as the largest military force in the world with nearly 3 million members.<sup>37</sup> However, in September 1997, the Chinese government announced a plan to reduce the size of the PLA by 500,000 men.<sup>38</sup> This reduction would be a part of the larger movement to improve the modernization of the People's Liberation Army beginning in

the 1980s. The decrease in the number of soldiers in the PLA would come with a number of different disarmament moves that would take place over the next three years. According to Chinese National Defense white papers, once the reduction in troops took place, the total number of forces would number 2.5 million.<sup>39</sup>

This still makes China the country with the world's largest military. However, reducing the number of troops and increasing the modernization of the People's Liberation Army would allow for a different type of military to emerge. This military would be more powerful and better equipped to take on the tests that post-modern warfare creates. Nonetheless, even a large reduction of troops, accompanied by vast military modernizations shows the power that China's military still had in the middle of the 1990s.

During the same time period, the Chinese government increased total spending on the military. In 1995, during Jiang's second year as president, the Chinese spent 63.67 billion yuan on their military. Two years later, in 1997, China spent over 81 billion yuan on its defense. Over two years, the Chinese increased the total spending on defense by nearly 20 billion yuan.<sup>40</sup> Interestingly, the amount of money spent on national defense in terms of total national budget decreased from 9.3 percent to 8.8 percent during the same period.<sup>41</sup> While this statistic seems counterintuitive, it actually adheres to what was happening to the Chinese economy at the same time. As the Chinese economy grew, more money could be spent on China's national defense while at the same time increasing the amount of money spent in other sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, the increase in spending over two years from 1995 to 1997 showed that China was still placing a strong emphasis on the People's

Liberation Army and increasing the potential for foreign policy behavior based on the increasing value of the PLA.

In July 1997, China formally resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. After one hundred years of being a colony of the United Kingdom, the lease had ended and China was now able to regain control of the area. This meant that China had to place troops in the region in order to safeguard Hong Kong from external and internal threats. However, Hong Kong was placed in a special category regarding its relationship with mainland China. Hong Kong is officially known as a Special Administrative Region which gives it authority over certain policies that are enacted within the region. However, in agreements with the Hong Kong government, Jiang Zemin and mainland China were given control over the defense of the area. The members of the Hong Kong Garrison, as it is known, must abide by both PLA and Hong Kong regulations. This makes for an interesting dynamic when it comes to the protection of the people area.<sup>42</sup> The fact that the PLA has expanded to Hong Kong shows that Chinese military power was every increasing during the late 1990s and would be a potential indicator for military power to be a backbone of Jiang's foreign policies.

Having adhered to the military reduction policies stated in 1997, the People's Liberation Army totaled less than 2.5 million men in 2000.<sup>43</sup> However, China's annual defense spending for 2000 was over 121 billion yuan.<sup>44</sup> Again, this is almost a 20 billion yuan increase in defense spending over three years. It seemed as though Jiang was hoping to modernize and improve China's military in order to take on more important roles in the international system. Also, the percent of China's national budget dedicated to defense and armed service decreased from 8.8% in 1997 to 8.29% in 2000.<sup>45</sup> Expanding the amount of



money spent on national defense provides sufficient detail as to the certain policies that were enacted. Policies focusing on the need for a strong, modern military allowed the People's Liberation Army to become more important.

These increases in defense spending indicate that Jiang Zemin wanted China's military to grow and become a more powerful force in the international community. Jiang enacted policies that would emphasize the need to increase the modernization of China's military, while at the same time reducing the number of troops in order to have better, well-trained soldiers that would be able to display China's power on the world stage.

While the scope of this study is not to indicate all of the foreign policy challenges Jiang faced, having a powerful military indicates that the PLA would be more likely to assist in the pursuit of certain policies. A modernized military, with a large number of soldiers is indicative of the possibilities of foreign policy behavior that would include different facets of the military. The People's Liberation Army would have a strong presence in the development of certain policies given the amount of money spent on the defense forces as well as the modernization that has occurred throughout Jiang's rule.

### *Economic Power*

Ever since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China's economy has been steadily growing. After the isolationist policies of Mao, changes needed to occur in order to allow China to become a prominent member on the world stage. Through the policies of Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s, China's economic prowess continued to become more evident around the world. These policies did not stop after the end of the decade. When Jiang Zemin

became president in 1993, he continued to uphold the policies of Deng in order to create a China with a leading economy by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

According to David Bachman, “[t]he Chinese economy was already blooming at the start of 1993.”<sup>46</sup> China’s economy had grown at the almost alarming rate of 12.8% the previous year and had a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of nearly \$1600.<sup>47</sup> Through these numbers, it is apparent that policies were being created in order to gain the highest growth possible for the Chinese economy. The same year, the World Bank asserts that international trade accounted for nearly 42% of China’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>48</sup> At this time, China was enacting policies that would allow for trade to move more freely across borders and provide the Chinese markets with the opportunity to substantially grow. Jiang pursued policies that, “...withdrew regulatory taxes on imports and lowered import tariffs,” while also allowing more freedom in terms of exporting goods to other countries.<sup>49</sup>

In the following years, China’s economy began overheating. Jiang and others feared that inflation would become a large problem and could cause much unrest in the country. Therefore, “...tight fiscal and monetary policies were enforced to rein in the over-heating economy...” and allowed the Chinese to avoid extreme inflation that would have crippled its economy.<sup>50</sup> These measures, along with other programs, abled China to continue to grow and become more powerful during the mid-1990s.

After three years of the anti-inflationary policies, China’s growth rate remained fairly high at 8.8% in 1997.<sup>51</sup> China’s GNP per capita in 1997 also rose to about \$1820 which accompanied the high growth rates.<sup>52</sup> Trade was also increasing at extremely high rates

during the last years of the 1990s. In 1997, China had a trade surplus of almost \$14 billion which consisted of a 26% increase in the number of exports leaving China and a 1.2% decline in the number of imports coming into the country.<sup>53</sup> According to Canalog, a majority of the growth that China experienced during this time was a result of lessening restrictions on exports and imports.<sup>54</sup> Jiang pursued policies that would further open China's economy to other countries in the world.

However, perhaps the most telling factor of China's economic power during the rule of Jiang Zemin was Chinese ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.<sup>55</sup> After over ten years of wanting to join the WTO, China was finally able to assume the ranks of international economic recognition and became recognized as having economic power. By joining the WTO, China was able to gain access to different export markets and expand their economy even more.<sup>56</sup> Entering the World Trade Organization, while helping China's international reputation, also allowed for the potential of many problems to occur. Cheng wrote that during the first five years of China's membership, about 40 million Chinese citizens would lose their jobs because of the new restrictions that would be placed on the Chinese economy.<sup>57</sup> Though China had liberalized parts of their economy, there was still much work to be done in order to become a true free market system.

During Jiang Zemin's rule, China's economy grew substantially beginning with a GDP of over \$440 billion dollars in 1993 and rising to over \$1 trillion in Jiang's last full year in office in 2002.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, trade increased substantially which resulted in China becoming more globalized and interdependent. Because of the vast growth that China experienced during Jiang's rule, it is evident that China's economic power surged

substantially. China, by joining the WTO and pursuing policies that further opened their economy, was able to show the world how powerful their economy had become. This economic power resulted in policies that promoted trade between many countries, which allowed China's economy to flourish. For example, China's trade with the United States increased substantially during Jiang Zemin's rule. In 1994, China had a trade surplus of over \$29 billion.<sup>59</sup> Then, in 2002, Jiang's last full year in office, China's trade surplus with the United States increased to over \$103 billion.<sup>60</sup> The increase in China's trade surplus allowed China to gain more power in the international system. It also created more stable relations with the United States, adhering to Jiang's foreign policy wants.

The changes in China's GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and China's trade surplus with the United States during Jiang's time in power can be seen in the following tables:<sup>61</sup>

**Figure 5: Changes in Jiang Zemin's Economic Power**

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
GDP	\$440 billion	\$559 billion	\$728 billion	\$856 billion	\$952 billion	\$1.01 trillion	\$1.08 trillion	\$1.19 trillion
GNI per Capita	\$1170	\$1340	\$1480	\$1640	\$1820	\$1960	\$2120	\$2340
Trade as % of GDP	41.9%	41.2%	38.8%	38%	39%	36.3%	37.6%	44.2%
Trade Surplus	\$22.7 billion	\$29.5 billion	\$33.7 billion	\$39.5 billion	\$49.7 billion	\$56.9 billion	\$68.6 billion	\$83.8 billion

	2001	2002
GDP	\$1.32 trillion	\$1.45 trillion
GNI per Capita	\$2560	\$2840
Trade as % of GDP	43%	47.6%
Trade Surplus	\$83 billion	\$103 billion

With these policies, China's foreign policy behavior became more interdependent which allowed China to become more active in the region and the world. The data suggest that Jiang Zemin placed much emphasis on economic growth during his leadership.

Therefore, China's economic power during this time can be characterized as high.

### **Analysis**

According to the criteria of this study, Jiang Zemin seems to hold the national role conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The data suggest that not all of the proposed relationships between Jiang's national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior maintained themselves. In the case of the national role conceptions, a majority of the overall relationships were maintained which suggests that there is a relationship between the national role conceptions of Jiang Zemin and his foreign policy behavior.

In terms of the regional leader national role conception, the hypothesis correctly predicted the three relationships. With the regional leader conception, one would most likely see high levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and good relations with great powers. The data indicate Jiang Zemin had high levels of military and economic power and his diplomatic relations between great powers was good. Therefore, in the case of the

regional leader national role conception, Jiang Zemin's foreign policy behavior can possibly be attributed, in some way, to the regional leader national role conception

The internal development national role conception corresponded correctly to one of the three relationships. The internal development national role conception would be more likely to see indifferent diplomatic relations with great powers, low levels of military power, and high levels of economic power. However, the data suggest that Jiang exhibited good diplomatic relations with great powers and high levels of military power leading a majority of the internal development national role conceptions not corresponding to distinct foreign policy behavior. Though the data show that Jiang had strong economic power during his time in office, two of the three proposed relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were not evident. This suggests that the internal development national role conception did not lead to distinct foreign policy behavior as postulated. Since a majority of the relationships within this national role conceptions were not true, the data suggest that the internal development national role conception was only slightly related to Jiang's foreign policy behavior.

Overall, four of the six total proposed relationships were correctly predicted. Since this a majority of correctly predicted relationships, the data suggest that national role conceptions do have an effect on the foreign policy behavior of a leader. In the case of Jiang Zemin, the information on foreign policy behavior indicates a possible relationship between Jiang's national role conceptions and his foreign policy behavior. However, within the regional leader national role conception, all of the relationships between the role conception and Jiang's foreign policy behavior were true while only one relationship between the

internal development national role conception and foreign policy behavior was evident. This suggests that in the case of Jiang Zemin, national role conceptions had a marginal effect on the foreign policy behavior of China during his leadership.

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<sup>2</sup> Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004) p. 581.

<sup>3</sup> Ren Xiao, "The Moral Dimension of Chinese Foreign Policy," in New Frontiers in China's Foreign Relations, eds. Allen Carlson and Ren Xiao (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011): p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China, 581.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Paul H.B. Godwin, "Decisionmaking Under Stress: The Unintentional Bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy and the EP-3 Collision," in Chinese National Decisionmaking Under Stress eds. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), p. 161.

<sup>8</sup> Jiang Zemin, Opening Address at the 15th Communist Party of China National Party Congress, Beijing, China, 12 September 1997, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html> (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 21

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 15

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 23

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 26

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 17

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 2

<sup>16</sup> Jiang Zemin, Opening Address at the 16th Communist Party of China National Party Congress, Beijing, China, 8 November 2002, [http://www.ce.cn/ztpd/xwzt/guonei/2003/sljsanzh/szqhbj/t20031009\\_1763196.shtml](http://www.ce.cn/ztpd/xwzt/guonei/2003/sljsanzh/szqhbj/t20031009_1763196.shtml) (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 21.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 15

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 20

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 25

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 13

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- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 209.
- <sup>24</sup> Xiaoxiong Yi, "China's US Policy Conundrum in the 1990s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependence," Asian Survey 34:8 (August 1994), p. 677.
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- <sup>27</sup> David Bachman, "China in 1994: Marking Time, Making Money," Asian Survey 35:1 (January 1995), p. 43.
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- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.
- <sup>32</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "Ghost of the Strategic Triangle: The Sino-Russian Partnership," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 213.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 211
- <sup>36</sup> Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82:6 (Nov.-Dec. 2003), p. 25.
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- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 18
- <sup>43</sup> China's National Defense in 2000, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, October 2000, [http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content\\_17524.htm](http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm) (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 17.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.
- <sup>46</sup> Bachman, "China in 1993," 33.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*



- <sup>48</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/china> (accessed January 20, 2013).
- <sup>49</sup> Victor Franco M. Canalog, "The Dragon Takes Flight. China Trade Policies in the 1990s: Issues and Concerns in ASEAN and in the World," CAS Discussion Paper (March 1998), p. 7.
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- <sup>59</sup> "Trade in Goods with China," <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html> (accessed January 30, 2012).
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## 第四章：江泽民和中国外交政策

### 介绍

这一章是江泽民的经典案例。首先我会描述江泽民的背景信息。之后，我会分析我的自变量和确定江泽民的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以后，我会描述江泽民的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我的因变数，然后确定江泽民的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策行为有关。

### 江泽民的背景信息

江泽民于1926年出生于江苏省。他的家人非常聪明，他们都认为中国文化非常有意思。江觉得道德和孔子非常重要，江认为中国应该成为像孔子所说的那样的国家。江在上海上大学，学习电气工程。在1946年，江加入中国共产党。上大学的时候，江帮助了中国共产党。文化革命的时候，江被迫参加一个共产党学校。这个学校是关于政治再教育的。上这个学校以后，江去了北京。江泽民在一个外交组织工作。这个是江第一次从事政治工作。江泽民在1989年成为中国共产党总书记，在1993年江泽民成

为中华人民共和国的主席。作为主席的时候，江在外交方面有很多挑战。但是，江能在其中表现出中国的力量。

### **自变量：国家角色的概念**

我看了江泽民的两个报告。这两个报告是在中国共产党第全国代表大会上的报告。这些报告是差不多跟美国的国情报告一样的。这些报告有很多意思。每个五年，中国的领导会作一个报告，告诉中国人和世界人民，中国的未来的计划。

### 江泽民在中国共产党第十五次和第十六全国代表大会上的报告

1997年9月12日和2002年10月9日，江泽民在全国代表大会作了报告。我会分析这个报告和确定他的国家角色的概念。

### 经济情况

在江泽民的第十五次和第十六次全国代表大会上的报告，他提到了经济情况104次。他也说别的字，比如：他说‘社会生活’4次，‘健康’3次，他说‘教育’65次，和说‘收入’32次。

江泽民觉得教育是非常重要的。他在很多地方考虑到了教育。比如，他说：

发展教育和科学，是文化建设的基础工程。培养同现代化要求相适应的数以亿计高素质的劳动者和数以千万计的专门人才，发挥我国巨大人力资源的优势，关系二十一世纪社会主义事业的全局。要切实把教育摆在优先发展的战略地位。尊师重教，加强师资队伍建设。发挥各方面的积极性，大力普及九年义务教育、扫除青壮年文盲，积极发展各种形式的职业教育和成人教育，稳步发展高等教育。优化教育结构，加快高等教育管理体制改革的步伐，合理配置教育资源，提高教学质量和办学效益。认真贯彻党的教育方针，重视受教育者素质的提高，培养德智体等全面发展的社会主义事业的建设者和接班人。努力提高科技水平，普及科技知识，引导人们树立科学精神，掌握科学方法，鼓励创造发明。消除愚昧，反对封建迷信活动。积极发展哲学社会科学，这对于坚持马克思主义在我国意识形态领域的指导地位，对于探索有中国特色社会主义的发展规律，增强我们认识世界、改造世界的能力，有着重要意义。

这段话表明，江泽民觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须提高中国的教育系统和质量。如果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在世界上竞争。江泽民认为人民的经济情况必须提高。他参考了经济情况很多次，所以我能分类这个部分：高。

### 对外开放和自我封闭

在那些报告中，江泽民不参考了自我封闭。可是他参考了对外开放15次。江说‘主权’9次，‘国际组织’一次，和‘全球化’5次。说到主权的时候

候，江说，“维护国家主权的原则性”。这个表明江泽民保护国家主权的承诺。说国际组织的时候，江泽民说国际组织非常重要，并且中国应该成为一个全球的领导。最后，说全球化的时候，江泽民认为经济全球化非常重要，每个国家应该参加经济全球化。江泽民是一个对外开放的领导，不是自我封闭的。

### 对国内发展的重视程度

在那些报告中，江泽民提到了“国内发展”42次。他认为中国必须发展经济，成为一个非常重要的国家。江泽民说到“经济发展”32次，“和平发展”10次。在这两个报告之后，中国的经济得到了非常快的发展。所以江泽民认为中国必须再发展。江泽民说，“和平与发展已成为当今时代的主题”，他的意思是会有非常好和和平的发展。江泽民觉得发展非常重要。因为他参考了国内发展很多次，我能分类这个部分：高。

### 江泽民的国家角色的概念

江泽民觉得经济情况和国内发展都有意思，也非常重要。他也是一个对外开放的领导。所以江泽民的国家角色的概念是，区域领袖和国内

发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现了江泽民的个性。而且，江的国家角色的概念可以告诉别的国家中国外交政策行为。

### **因变数：中国外交政策行为**

江泽民成为中国的总统的时候，中国在世界上的地位比较低。可是他知道中国能提高他们的国际地位。为了知道江泽民的外交政策行为，我看了三个别的部分。那些部分是中国跟大国的关系，中国的军权，和中国的经济权。

### 大国关系

1993年的时候，国际关系改变了很多。冷战停了，苏联成为了俄罗斯，美国也是一个很重要的国家。为了了解中国的大国关系，我会学习中国跟美国和俄罗斯的关系。

1989年以后，中美关系不太好。天安门事件以后，美国对中国进行经济制裁。中国真的不喜欢这个制裁，所以中美关系越来越恶化。美国克林顿总统觉得美国不应该对中国实行经济制裁。可是，很多美国人认为他们必须实行经济制裁。而且，中国的最惠国待遇需要恢复。美国人认为美国不应该恢复中国的最惠国待遇，因为中国侵犯人权。但是1994年的时

候，克林顿总统告诉江泽民，美国会恢复中国的最惠国待遇。虽然中美关系开始不好，但是他们要一起合作来发展好的关系。

中俄关系也越来越好。苏联成为俄罗斯的时候，中国不知道怎么应对。可是江泽民和俄罗斯新的总统一起合作。他们一起签署了很多条约。比如说，1993年中国和俄罗斯签署了一个军事合作的条约。1994年他们一起签署一个核武器协议。最后和最重要的是在1996年，俄罗斯总统告诉江泽民他们应该有一个战略合作伙伴关系。

总之江泽民的大国关系很好。这三个国家都一起合作，并且发展非常重要的关系。

## 军权

江泽民成为中国的主席的时候，中国的军事是世界上最强大的。中国有差不多三百万的士兵。可是1997年的时候，江泽民说他要减少中国的士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以2000年，中国的军只有2500000士兵。同时中国的军有很多现代化建设。而且中国花很多钱在他们的军事方面。1997年的时候，中国花81亿元在军事方

面。2000年，中国花了121亿元。这个表明了江泽民的军事看法。中国的军队有很多权力，他们的军事很好。

## 经济权

从邓小平的改革开放到1993年，中国的经济发展越来越好。1993年的时候，中国经济发展地很快。1993年，中国的国内生产总值是440亿美元。但是在2002年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多万亿美元。这个非常好，表现中国的经济权。江泽民的时期，中国的经济提高的真快。

## **分析**

从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设是差不多对的。我认为中国领导的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。江泽民的国家角色的概念，区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不对。





## **Chapter Five: Hu Jintao and Chinese Foreign Policy in the New Millennium**

This chapter presents the case of Hu Jintao and the policies that were enacted during his time as President of China from 2003-2013. First, the chapter surveys relevant background information on the life of Hu Jintao, then provides evidence of Hu's national role conceptions. Next, an analysis of Hu's foreign policy behavior is issued. The chapter ends with a short analysis of the independent and dependent variables in relationship to the hypothesis of the study.

### **Background Information**

Hu Jintao has seemingly taken a more traditional approach to ascending the ranks of Chinese political leadership. Through the formation of friendships with top officials and upholding the Communist Party of China's (CPC) doctrine, Hu has become a true leader and what Ewing calls, "...one of China's most powerful politicians..."<sup>1</sup> While many of the personal details of Hu Jintao's life are unknown, Hu's political career is well-documented and displays his exceptional rise to power of the world's most populous country. From being the Communist Party Secretary in Guizhou province, to overseeing martial law in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Hu Jintao has upheld the traditional ideology of past political leaders of China and proved to be a trustworthy and diligent member of the CPC.

The birthplace of Hu Jintao is disputed, which shows the personal privacy that envelopes Hu. However, what is known is that Hu Jintao was born in December 1942,

during the midst of the Communist Revolution.<sup>2</sup> After Hu graduated from high school, he decided to move to Beijing and attend Tsinghua University, one of the most prestigious universities in China. At Tsinghua, Hu majored in, "...hydroelectric engineering and specialized in fluvial multi-purpose power stations."<sup>3</sup> Like his predecessor, Hu did not have a direct background in politics or government making his rise to power all the more interesting. However, Hu joined the Communist Party in 1964, during the course of the Cultural Revolution. His rise to leadership began to unfold after this life changing moment.

After graduating from Tsinghua in 1965, Hu Jintao accepted a position as a researcher and served as a political counselor. Although there was much chaos in the country and much disdain placed on educated citizens, having a a job at the university proved a form of protection for Hu. As a political counselor, Hu Jintao was recognized as a technical expert in his field as well as a growing political leader.<sup>4</sup>

In order to quell the chaos that was overtaking the country, many students and intellectuals were sent to the Chinese countryside. Hu was sent to a hydraulic power plant in the barren Gansu Province and worked there until Mao Zedong's death in 1976. When Hu first arrived in Gansu, he was a technician at the plant and also worked as the deputy CPC secretary in the engineering bureau of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power.<sup>5</sup> This was the first time that Hu Jintao had participated directly in the CPC.

After receiving many promotions and developing strong relationships with powerful leaders of the Communist Party, Hu left Gansu province and returned to Beijing where he enrolled at the Central Party School, China's primer school for cultivating the next generation of China's leaders.<sup>6</sup> Hu was elected as an alternate member to the Central Committee and

was appointed the Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee during the 12th National Party Congress. This occurred after a call was made by elder members of the Central Committee to allow younger political figures to join the Central Committee of the Communist Party.<sup>7</sup> Following that, in 1984, Hu ascended to the leader of the Chinese Communist Youth League, making him the leader of fifty million members throughout China.

Hu excelled as the leader of the Youth League, but when given the chance to become the Party Secretary of Guizhou Province in 1985, Hu leapt at the opportunity. In this capacity, Hu developed strong relationships with many of the ethnic minorities throughout the province and was determined to better the livelihood of China's poorest province.<sup>8</sup> He believed that the socioeconomic status of those living in Guizhou needed to be raised and that the province had more potential for economic development. While in Guizhou, Hu, "...began formulating his position towards maintaining social stability," by recognizing that in order for China and the Communist Party to be successful, social stability was essential. Finally, in 1988, Hu received his most challenging and important political promotion when he was asked to become the Party Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. With growing unrest in the region, Deng Xiaoping supported Hu in his ascension to Party Secretary. Because of his commitment to the Communist Party ideology and his well-forged relationship with minority groups, Deng believed Hu was the best choice to oversee a restoration of order in Tibet.

In Tibet, Hu wished to see the area become more economically developed. However, due to the unrest, he needed to focus on quelling the separatist movements. In order to do

this, Hu declared martial law in Tibet in March 1989. This was one of the most important decisions that Hu had made and catapulted him to a leading political figure. Due to the declaration of martial law, the uprisings ceased. The current leaders of China realized the great potential Hu had and were hopeful that we would lead the next generation of leadership.<sup>9</sup>

Hu Jintao was given many important tasks to achieve in Beijing after leaving Tibet in 1990. In addition to participating more in the Party, Hu also assumed leadership roles in the Communist Party Organization Department, one of the most important departments of the Party. Through this department, different rising leaders in politics are assigned to different areas and Hu was the person that would determine the placement of leaders within the Party. This allowed Hu Jintao to again cultivate many relationships with rising politicians. Then, in 1993, Hu became the president of the Central Party School, which he attended a decade earlier. As the president of the school, Hu became known as being a very skilled politician while also upholding the ideology of the Communist Party.<sup>10</sup> Through this position, Hu became the Vice-President of China in 1998 and the President of China in 2003.

One can see that Hu Jintao excelled in all facets of the Communist Party and became very well-respected. His focus on maintaining strong relationships with ethnic minorities, as well as his commitment to the economic development of China made him the perfect choice to lead China in the new millennium. Though conducting some controversial measures during his stint as Part Secretary in Tibet, Hu gained much respect by members of the Communist Party. During Hu's presidency, China has again experienced many foreign policy challenges. The global War on Terror and disputes over islands in the South China

Sea have been important foreign policy challenges that Hu has faced. Through his leadership and commitment to the communist ideology, Hu has been an important figure in the development of Chinese politics and will be remembered as one of China's greatest leaders during the beginning of the twenty-first century.

**Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions**

In order to develop national role conceptions for Hu Jintao, two speeches were analyzed. Hu's opening addresses given at the 17th and 18th Communist Party of China National Party Congress in 2007 and 2012 were investigated in order to gauge Hu's perspectives on the China's role in the international community. These speeches focused on the importance of China's rise in the international system and allowed other countries a chance to see how China has developed over the years following Jiang Zemin's address in 2002. As the opening speech displays what China has done and what it will do in the future, these speeches provide insight into the thoughts of China's highest leadership and allow the world to better gauge what policies China may pursue in the future.

*Hu Jintao's 17th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2007*

In the following section, an analysis of Hu Jintao's opening address at the 17th National Party Congress is provided. For both this address and the opening address at the 18th National Party Congress, the indicators of national role conceptions are analyzed in order to gain a complete perspective on China and its role in the international system. Some of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of his address to give specific

examples of how different words and phrases are being used. By analyzing the data in this manner, a more comprehensive study of Hu Jintao's national role conceptions can be provided.

### Socioeconomic Status

Regarding the first indicator of national role conceptions, socioeconomic status, Hu placed much emphasis on the importance of improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese population. In total, seventy-two references were made to advance the socioeconomic status of China. When looking at the improvements China had made in its economy in the years prior to 2007 and the enhancement of the lives of Chinese citizens, the number of references to socioeconomic status is not remarkably high. In this speech, Hu referenced the importance of education, the need to still improve the incomes of normal citizens, the need to have a healthy society, and the importance of having a cohesive society.

Hu Jintao mentioned education forty-seven times in his opening address to the 17th National Party Congress. Throughout the speech, Hu suggested that the further development of China's education was necessary in order to ascend to the ranks of a world power. In the following excerpt, Hu outlined what he deemed as essential to the development of China's education system and thus China's socioeconomic status:<sup>11</sup>

优先发展教育，建设人力资源强国。教育是民族振兴的基石，教育公平是社会公平的重要基础。要全面贯彻党的教育方针，坚持育人为本、德育为先，实施素质教育，提高教育现代化水平，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主义建设者和接班人，办好人民满意的教育。优化教育结构，促进义务教育均衡发展，加快普及高中阶段教育，大力发展职业教育，提高高等教育质量。重视学前教育，关心特殊教育。更新教育观念，深化教学内容方式、考试招生制度、质量评价制度改革，减轻中小学生课业负担，提高学生综合素质。坚持教育公益性质，加大财政对教育投入，规范教育收费，扶持贫困地区、民族地区教育，健全学生资助制度，保障经济困难家庭、进城务工人员子女平等接受义务教育。加强教师队伍建设，重点提高农村教师素质。鼓励和规范社会力量兴办教育。发展远程教育和继续教育，建设全民学习、终身学习的学习型社会。

Hu believed that in order for China to grow to its potential as a great power, the country should be full of talented citizens that would be able to use what they have gained through education in order to promote China's stature on the international stage. He also stressed the need for an improvement in all facets of education. Hu stated that the development of compulsory education is essential to having a well-rounded society and that it is essential to enhance the quality of education given in vocational schools and other forms of higher education such as universities. Mentioning vocational schools in this address shows Hu's commitment to the improvement of education in all of its variations. It also showed the importance that Hu placed on the socioeconomic status of his citizens.

In addition to education, Hu also stressed the importance of improving the incomes of his population. Hu mentioned income twenty different times in his 2007 remarks. Throughout the speech, Hu referenced the need for incomes to raise for all people across the



People's Republic of China. Not only are the rural residents specifically mentioned, but urban residents are referred to as well. The following excerpt displayed Hu's interest in improving the distribution of income throughout the country and his wishes to lower the amount of poverty throughout China:<sup>12</sup>

深化收入分配制度改革，增加城乡居民收入。合理的收入分配制度是社会公平的重要体现。要坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度，健全劳动、资本、技术、管理等生产要素按贡献参与分配的制度，初次分配和再分配都要处理好效率和公平的关系，再分配更加注重公平。逐步提高居民收入在国民收入分配中的比重，提高劳动报酬在初次分配中的比重。着力提高低收入者收入，逐步提高扶贫标准和最低工资标准，建立企业职工工资正常增长机制和支付保障机制。创造条件让更多群众拥有财产性收入。保护合法收入，调节过高收入，取缔非法收入。扩大转移支付，强化税收调节，打破经营垄断，创造机会公平，整顿分配秩序，逐步扭转收入分配差距扩大趋势。

The importance Hu places on income does not come as much of a surprise. As Party Secretary in Guizhou and Tibet, Hu worked hard in trying to improve the economic status of the residents of the provinces. Though some of Hu's policies during his time as Party Secretary of Guizhou and Tibet were met with criticism by the West, he still achieved much success in terms of increasing the socioeconomic status of the people in those provinces. This way of thinking has seemed to be carried through to the entire country since Hu has become president. As income is an extremely important part of a person's socioeconomic status, it is apparent that Hu values socioeconomic status very much and wished to help enhance the livelihoods of Chinese citizens in every possible way.

In addition to education and income, Hu also stated, “健康是人全面发展的基础, 关系千家万户幸福.”<sup>13</sup> This statement showed that Hu also believes health to be of extreme importance when it comes to the development of the country. Hu also indicated that it is necessary for the health level of all Chinese citizens to rise in order for China to become influential in the international community.

Because of the number of times socioeconomic status gets mentioned, in its various forms, it seems that Hu believed socioeconomic status to be extremely important. China must improve the livelihoods of all people if it wishes to stand a chance at being an important player in world politics. China’s rise in the international system is contingent upon China achieving an acceptable level of socioeconomic well-being. The data suggest that Hu seemed steadfast in his ideals, which should manifest themselves in the policies implemented by his leadership.

### Internationalism versus Isolationism

In his opening speech to the 17th National Party Congress, Hu Jintao made a total of twelve references to being more internationalist in nature rather than isolationist. As with Jiang Zemin, isolationism was not mentioned in the opening address. Instead, there are some instances referring to the internationalist nature of China and the importance of recognizing that the world is interconnected in many different ways.

Hu mentioned sovereignty six times in the 17th NPC opening address. Sovereignty is mentioned when talking about China’s determination to protect its national security and promote the well-being of the state. At many points Hu alluded to the fact that China should,

“...维护国家主权和领土完整...” acknowledging the fact that the world is internationalist in nature and that states have a duty to protect their citizens from any external threats.<sup>14</sup>

Recognizing that the world is interconnected suggests that Hu did not believe that China should hold isolationist ideologies but should rather pursue policies that work to the benefit of interdependent nature of the international system.

In addition to sovereignty, Hu also mentioned the benefits of interdependence and said, “... 国与国相互依存日益紧密...” and acknowledged the fact that the world is increasingly interdependent.<sup>15</sup> In the same light, Hu also mentioned the benefits of globalization five times in his opening address. Globalization is primarily mentioned in terms of the importance of economic globalization to the sustainability of economic growth. Hu again perceived the world as very internationalist by these statements and showed that China also wishes to be a well-respected member of the international system.

The data suggest that Hu Jintao is decidedly more internationalist than isolationist when thinking about world politics. Especially when it came to the globalization of economics, Hu seemed to believe globalization is necessary in order for China to become more powerful in the international system. Because of the more internationalist nature of Hu, the data imply that Hu’s policies would also follow this point of view.

### Interest in Development

As China is hoping to increase its economy and become more influential in the international community, it goes without saying that development would be central to that goal. To that end, Hu Jintao made nineteen total references to development in his opening

address given in 2007. These references are made in regards to China's economic development and the importance of peaceful development to China's rise in the international system.

Hu made eight references to the importance of China's economic development in creating a more powerful China. Hu stated, “实现未来经济发展目标，关键要在加快转变经济发展方式、完善社会主义市场经济体制方面取得重大进展,” which displayed Hu's affinity for the socialist ideology he upholds. There are also mentions of economic development that show that while the current economic situation in China is better than it has been in many years, there is still work to be done in order to make China the economic power that it wishes to be. Hu also made connections between the need for China's economic development in order to sustain the growing population of the country. Having the population that China does, economic development is essential to the creation of a more harmonious society.

In addition to economic development, Hu also made references to the need of developing in a peaceful manner. Hu indicated that China will develop in a peaceful way and that there is no need for other countries to fear the rise of China. Peaceful development goes hand in hand with the importance of internal development. If China is to develop in peaceful ways, then it goes without question that this peaceful development will benefit the internal development of the country and help China become more influential on the world stage.

Even though Hu referenced having an interest in development seventeen times, which registers as a medium amount on the scale being used, the importance of these references should not be undermined. Development is an essential policy for the Chinese government.

Though Hu did not mention development as many times as indicators of socioeconomic status, the references to development are just as, if not more, important. Having a well-developed country is essential to all aspects of a country's power in the international system. Therefore, in terms of this study, Hu will be considered of making development a high priority in his opening address to the 17th NPC.

In summary, the 17th National Party Congress opening address appeared to show that Hu Jintao believed improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people and improving the development of the economy were both extremely important. In addition, the data suggest that Hu is seemingly more internationalist than isolationist when thinking about world politics.

*Hu Jintao's 18th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2012*

Socioeconomic Status

In Hu Jintao's opening address to the 18th National Party Congress, seventy-three total references were made indicating that Hu wished to see the development of increased standards of socioeconomic. As with the address given five years prior, Hu emphasized education, income and the health of Chinese citizens. It is again not surprising that these indicators are so prevalent in Hu's remarks. Hu has been known to hold socioeconomic issues close to him, so it is correct to assume that Hu would again make many references to these ideals.

Education was mentioned a total of forty-three times in Hu's 2012 address. Education still remained essential to helping China become a major power in the

international community. Hu made many references to education and the fact that it is necessary in order to evolve Chinese society into the influential country it wishes to be in the international system. Hu's first mention of power came as a call to reform both the rural and urban education systems. Hu stated, “教育事业迅速发展, 城乡免费义务教育全面实现,” and provided more nuanced discussion of the topic later in his address.<sup>16</sup> Hu also considered education to be a vital interest of the Chinese people because through education, China will be able to create the means to become an assertive power in world politics. As with his speech given in 2007, Hu believed that in order for China to fulfill its goals of comprehensive development, improving the quality of education in the country and expanding on the number of people who are able to receive a quality education are essential.

Hu also made frequent mentions of still improving the incomes of Chinese citizens. Twenty-one total references were made which promote Hu's interest in putting more money into the pockets of all Chinese citizens. Hu first mentioned income by stating that over the last years, the incomes of the Chinese population has increased. However, he went on to say that there is still work to be done in terms of improving the income of the populace. For example, Hu stated,<sup>17</sup>

必须坚持走共同富裕道路。共同富裕是中国特色社会主义的根本原则。要坚持社会主义基本经济制度和分配制度, 调整国民收入分配格局, 加大再分配调节力度, 着力解决收入分配差距较大问题, 使发展成果更多更公平惠及全体人民, 朝共同富裕方向稳步前进。

This excerpt exhibited that Hu believed that there is more work to be done regarding the enhancement of incomes throughout the country. Not only is he trying to uphold the socialist

principles that he holds dear, but he displayed his belief that socioeconomic status is very important for China.

Finally, Hu made nine references to health, the most out of any leader analyzed. Hu believed that the health of his citizens was very important in developing and improving the socioeconomic status of the country. In the following passage, Hu asserted his beliefs on the importance of health in Chinese society:<sup>18</sup>

提高人民健康水平。健康是促进人的全面发展的必然要求。要坚持为人民健康服务的方向，坚持预防为主、以农村为重点、中西医并重，按照保基本、强基层、建机制要求，重点推进医疗保障、医疗服务、公共卫生、药品供应、监管体制综合改革，完善国民健康政策，为群众提供安全有效方便价廉的公共卫生和基本医疗服务。健全全民医保体系，建立重特大疾病保障和救助机制，完善突发公共卫生事件应急和重大疾病防控机制。巩固基本药物制度。健全农村三级医疗卫生服务网络和城市社区卫生服务体系，深化公立医院改革，鼓励社会办医。扶持中医药和民族医药事业发展。提高医疗卫生队伍服务能力，加强医德医风建设。改革和完善食品药品安全监管体制机制。开展爱国卫生运动，促进人民身心健康。坚持计划生育的基本国策，提高出生人口素质，逐步完善政策，促进人口长期均衡发展。

This excerpt showed that the need for improving the level of health in Chinese society is paramount to China becoming a power on the world stage. In this passage alone, health was mentioned five times. The dedication Hu has to the health of the Chinese population is, therefore, very evident.

Because of the number of times Hu Jintao mentioned these indicators in his 18th NPC opening speech, the data suggest that he deeply valued the improvement of China's socioeconomic status. Again, this does not come as a surprise because of Hu's background in trying to improve the livelihoods of people in Guizhou and Tibet. Socioeconomic status had

always been important for Hu and it is quite evident that he hoped it will improve in China over the coming years.

### Internationalism versus Isolationism

As with the address given in five years earlier, Hu Jintao did not make any references to being isolationist in the policies that China will pursue. Hu made seven references that affirm his internationalist mindset when it comes to the international system. A majority of those references came in the form of mentioning the need to protect China's national interests while some again recognize the importance of globalization.

Sovereignty was mentioned five times in Hu's address to the 18th NPC. Again, the mentions of sovereignty came in the form of China needing to protect its national interests and doing whatever it takes to ensure the safekeeping of its borders. Hu stated, “我们坚决维护国家主权、安全、发展利益，决不会屈服于任何外来压力，” astutely reassuring his country and the world that China will not capitulate to the demands of other countries.<sup>19</sup> Hu recognized that in this ever more interdependent world, threats could come from anywhere and he wanted the world to know that China will do anything necessary in order to protect itself from threats.

Hu also mentioned the importance of globalization twice. As with the 17th NPC opening address, he proclaimed that economic globalization is a key to the development of China and the world. He asserted that economic globalization is essential to promoting China's ideas of development and economic prosperity. With economic globalization, China will be able to pursue the policies they need in order to develop their nation.



The data suggest that with the references to sovereignty and globalization, Hu Jintao holds a more internationalist view of the world. Knowing that the interconnectedness of the world is what helps spur the growth of China, Hu seemed to have embraced the thoughts of an interdependent and cooperative world. These references again displayed the importance that Hu places on the interconnected nature of the world and the ways in which China can benefit from such a world structure.

### Interest in Development

Interest in development was another indicator of national role conceptions that received a lot of attention in Hu's address in 2012. Hu expressed an interest in development twenty-eight times throughout the address. These expressions came in terms of economic development and the idea of peaceful development. With these references to both kinds of development, Hu provided insight into his thinking and the way in which China should work to promote these ideas.

Economic development was mentioned fifteen times in the opening address of the 18th National Party Congress. Hu believed that in order for sufficient economic development to be achieved, China must, “推进经济结构战略性调整。”<sup>20</sup> This statement showed that economic development begins with a change in the economic structure of China. As China's economy is becoming larger, the Chinese government has realized that it is important for the private sector to have a more influential input on the economic policies China pursues. The economic development of China is contingent upon both the public and private sectors of China. Hu showed that it is important for both sides to work together in order to for China to grow and become more developed.

In addition to economic development, Hu made references to peaceful development thirteen times. These references again promoted the need for China to achieve development peacefully. Hu Jintao stated that the Chinese government must support peaceful development. Through this kind of development, China will be able to assume the ranks of a powerful player in the international system. Peaceful development is essential for the overall development in the People's Republic of China.

The data suggest that Hu Jintao has a high interest in development. This also corresponds to the past policies of Hu Jintao where he emphasized the development of Guizhou and Tibet. Because of these references to development, one should be able to see many policies that are implemented which support these ideals. For China to be influential in world politics, it is extremely important for the country to be developed in all ways possible. Hu realizes this and one would expect policies to be put into action that revolve around achieving this goal.

In summary, the data suggest that Hu placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic status and a high level of interest in development. The data also appears to indicate that Hu was more internationalist in nature when giving this address which corresponds, again, to the speech given five years prior. These data seem to provide insight into the ideas Hu Jintao embraces.

### **Hu Jintao's National Role Conceptions**

Overall, in Hu Jintao's two addresses to the Communist Party of China National Party Congress in 2007 and 2012, one hundred forty-five total references were made to improving the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens. Extremely high numbers were expressed in

both speeches which was not of much surprise due to Hu's history of promoting the enhancement of society. Hu Jintao also did not express any thoughts of being isolationist in either speech. Rather he made nineteen references to being more internationalist in nature. Again, these findings were not of much surprise because much of China's current rise in power had been due to the interdependence of the international community. Finally, a large interest in development was mentioned in both speeches. Hu alluded to a need for economic and peaceful development a total of forty-five times in both speeches. Because of China's growing economic power in the international system, it is not of much surprise that Hu displayed a high interest in development.

Therefore, because of the content of both speeches at the National Party Congresses of 2007 and 2012, Hu Jintao can be best characterized as holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions. Displaying high levels of interest in the improvement of the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens, having a more internationalist view of the world, and displaying a strong interest in development, the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions are good characterizations of the ideas and role that Hu sees China holding in the world. Not only does China hold these roles, but Hu himself is likely to hold these roles as well. The regional leader and internal development national role conceptions allow China to again assert its power on other countries in the world. While China promises to do this peacefully, the regional leader conception allows China to take more of an influential role in world politics. At the same time, by holding the internal development national role conception, Hu Jintao is upholding the policies that have governed China since the Open and Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping. Together, the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions allow Hu to take on more

responsibility in the international system while also making sure his country is as developed as possible.

### **Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior**

Understanding the foreign policy behavior of Hu Jintao provides valuable insight into what he deems important to China. In line with the research design and methodology provided in Chapter Two, the three aspects of Chinese foreign policy during the Hu era that are analyzed are China's diplomatic relations with great powers, China's military power, and China's economic power. While there are many different ways to analyze a country's foreign policy behavior, the areas of Chinese foreign policy that were analyzed provide important insights into the development of Chinese foreign policy during Hu's leadership.

#### *Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers*

As with Jiang Zemin, the diplomatic relations between China and the United States and China and Russia are a telling example of China's general foreign policy behavior. By having relatively stable relations with the United States and Russia, China was able to assert itself more strongly in the international system. While China's relations with both countries contains many different facets, the diplomatic relations provide the most cohesive explanation for the overall relationship between China and the United States and Russia.

#### Sino-US Diplomatic Relations

The People's Republic of China and the United States experienced many challenges throughout Hu Jintao's leadership of China. From debates on the value of China's currency,

to creating different avenues for dialogue between the two nations, Hu Jintao and the United States leadership were forced to cooperate on many issues. China and the United States seemed to aware of the importance of having stable diplomatic relations and worked to uphold a cooperative relationship.

Ever since China's economy was becoming stronger, the United States had remained skeptical about the value of China's currency. During Hu's time as president, China experienced a massive increase in its trade surplus with the United States. Many people in the United States believed that this increase in China's trade surplus was due to China undervaluing its currency. Some leaders in the United States believed that China's currency was nearly 20% undervalued and should be revalued in order to create more trade competition between the United States and China.<sup>21</sup> Both the Bush and Obama Administrations in the United States had pressured China to revalue its currency in order to create a fairer trading environment. While China had not completely revalued its currency to the standards of some in the United States, it has been slowly doing so, thus appeasing to the demands of the United States.<sup>22</sup>

One of the strongest signs of Sino-US cooperation was the beginning of the US-China Senior Dialogue and the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue.<sup>23</sup> The Senior Dialogue, which functions through the US State Department, and the Strategic Economic Dialogue, working through the US Treasury Department, are designed for top decision-makers in both China and the United States to come together to discuss key issues that affect not only both countries, but also the rest of the world.<sup>24</sup> The first talks of the Senior Dialogue occurred in 2005 while the Strategic Economic Dialogue began in 2008. These dialogues, while

officially meeting twice a year, also include many other summits that occur more regularly throughout the year. These include, the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the US-China Joint Economic Committee, the US-China Joint Commission on Science and Technology, the US-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue, and the US-China Energy Policy Dialogue.<sup>25</sup>

As both dialogues were initiated by Hu Jintao, one can see that Hu was attempting to strengthen China's relations with the United States. These forms of bilateral diplomacy have become hallmarks of Sino-US diplomatic relations. In addition, China and the US have cooperated in negotiating with North Korea about their clandestine nuclear weapons program.<sup>26</sup> While China and the United States have faced many challenges and disagreements regarding recent international events such as the crisis in Syria, the overall relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China during Hu Jintao's leadership has been one of cooperation.<sup>27</sup> Starting bilateral dialogues and general cooperation suggest that China's diplomatic relations with the United States were good during Hu Jintao's leadership.

### Sino-Russia Diplomatic Relations

Sino-Russian relations under Hu Jintao can be best characterized as being, "highly cooperative, moderately competitive."<sup>28</sup> After developing strong relations during the 1990s, Sino-Russian relations again seemed to flourish in the new millennium. The strong working partnership developed by Jiang Zemin with Russian President Yeltsin remained when

leadership in both countries changed.<sup>29</sup> Throughout Hu Jintao's leadership, China and Russia worked together in order to maintain the security of both nations.

Strategic cooperation became a very important theme in Sino-Russian relations when Hu Jintao became president.<sup>30</sup> China and Russia remained close partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which created more open dialogue between the two countries. In addition, like with the United States, China and Russia have created different avenues for more discussion and cooperation through the establishment of regular meetings between top decision-makers.<sup>31</sup> This has allowed China and Russia to understand each others strategic interests while also allowing both powers to have the means to openly communicate with one another.

As recently as June 2012, Chinese and Russian leaders met in order to create a path for sustainable relations in the next decade. At this meeting Hu Jintao and Russian President Putin signed eleven different cooperative agreements. These agreements ranged a multitude of areas including, "...energy, nuclear power and technology, tourism, journalism, investment, banking, industrial park management, and insurance."<sup>32</sup> At the end of the summit, both Hu and Putin agreed to maintain, "close high-level exchanges," between the two countries while also stating the importance of retaining positive relations in many other sectors.<sup>33</sup>

While China and Russia are both trying to assume more power in Asia, the high level exchanges between the countries suggest that China's diplomatic relations with Russia are very good. Both countries seem to understand the importance of maintaining a close, positive relationship and are working to sustain their favorable relationship. Hu Jintao and

the Russian leadership have generated many ways to remain in a close partnership. This has allowed the diplomatic relations between the two countries to flourish.

The data suggest that China's overall relations between great powers during the leadership of Hu Jintao are good. Having good relations with both the United States and Russia demonstrates that both countries were working together in order to achieve cooperation and stability in the international community. Establishing good relations between two of the world's great powers displays China's commitment to becoming a more influential member in world politics. It also exhibits a foreign policy behavior which leans towards cooperation with other countries.

### *Military Power*

As the President of China, Hu Jintao oversaw a large increase in the modernization of the Chinese military.<sup>34</sup> After the reductions in troops during the Jiang era, Hu Jintao, the data suggest that Hu wanted China's military to modernize in stark ways. He believed that in order for China to be successful in all its endeavors, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would need to be a prominent force on the world stage. Because of this, Hu deemed more reductions of troops necessary while also increasing the budget of China's defense forces, modernizing its weapons arsenal, and undertaking more United Nations (UN) missions.

In 2003, after becoming China's President, Hu believed that China's military, the People's Liberation Army, should again reduce the number of personnel. While Jiang oversaw the reduction of 500,000 troops from 1997 to 2000, Hu considered another reduction of 200,000 troops to be necessary in order for China's military to be as powerful as



possible.<sup>35</sup> This reduction was to take place over a two year period and by 2005, the People's Liberation Army had been reduced in size from 2.5 million personnel to 2.3 million troops.<sup>36</sup> By doing this, Hu Jintao was essentially allowing for money to be spent on modernization efforts rather than on taking care of the members of the PLA.

However, while the number of troops in the People's Liberation Army decreased, China spent progressively more money on their national defense budget every year. In 2004, a year after Hu Jintao assumed leadership, China spent over 220 billion yuan on national defense.<sup>37</sup> Two years later, in 2006, that budget had increased by over 63 billion yuan to nearly 283 billion yuan.<sup>38</sup> According to the Chinese National Defense White Paper of 2006, the increase in spending was mainly needed for improving the salaries of those in the PLA as well as, "[i]ncreasing investment in weaponry and equipment and infrastructure."<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the White Paper suggests that a large portion of the increase in the national defense budget in 2006 was needed in order to enhance the modernization efforts of the military.

In 2009, China's national defense budget increased to over 495 billion yuan, an 18.5% increase in spending from the previous year.<sup>40</sup> This increase of over 200 billion yuan was used to further modernize China's military. At this time, the People's Liberation Army active members still numbered about 2.3 million. While Hu did believe a small reduction in troops was necessary, the increase in defense spending shows how important Hu believed the military was for China's future.

In addition to putting a large emphasis on the development of the military, Hu also increased China's military presence throughout the world. In 2008, nearly 2,000 Chinese

soldiers were actively participating in United Nations Peacekeeping operations.<sup>41</sup> These peacekeeping forces took the form of medical personnel, engineers, as well as on the ground peacekeepers. A majority of these troops were stationed in Africa, which is not surprising considering China's new found economic affinity with many countries on the continent.

Participating in many UN peacekeeping missions displays China's military power to the rest of the world. Hu Jintao succeeded in modernizing the People's Liberation Army and making it a more cohesive force in the international system. Since the number of troops in the PLA remained relatively constant over Hu's time as President of China and more money was spent every year of his leadership, Hu seems to be placing a high emphasis on the need for Chinese military power to improve. This all culminates with providing Chinese troops to participate in UN Peacekeeping missions, creating a new direction for Chinese foreign policy. Increasing military power displays a foreign policy behavior that is attempting to project China's military prowess on the world stage. In line with the coding scheme provided in Chapter Two, the data suggest that China's military power during the leadership of Hu Jintao was high.

### *Economic Power*

Following the stark economic growth that characterized Jiang Zemin's time as President of China, Hu Jintao was also a firm believer in the importance of economic growth. From his time as Party Secretary of Guizhou and Tibet, Hu had emphasized economic growth and development. This emphasis was again evident in the policies that Hu initiated to enhance China's economic power. Through increasing China's economic power, Hu allowed

China to take more responsibility in the international community and show the rest of the world China's economic potential.

After Hu assumed power in 2003, China was still developing at the remarkable rates that characterized Jiang Zemin's economic policies. However, as Saich asserts, there was, "...a clear urban bias to development, as well as a coastal bias..." which Hu needed to remedy in order to maintain the social stability that is so important for the Chinese government.<sup>42</sup> In 2005, the Chinese National Statistics Bureau indicated that the wealthiest 10% of the Chinese population held 45% of China's wealth.<sup>43</sup> This massive disparity between the rich and poor created incentive for Hu to create policies that would try to benefit all people in China.

Hu began his quest to improve the livelihood of all Chinese people by first promoting policies that would allow all citizens to earn more money. In 2005, the World Bank estimates China's per capita Gross National Income (GNI) to be over \$4000.<sup>44</sup> This is a huge increase from only ten years before when China's GNI per capita was less than \$1500.<sup>45</sup> The same year (2005), China's GDP neared \$2.3 trillion, the first time China's GDP had ever surpassed \$2 trillion. This is a testament to the growing economic power of China and the rise of China in the international system.

During the global recession beginning in 2008, China's economy still fared relatively well. Through large amounts of government investment in different industries, China was able to fend off many effects of the recession that almost crippled some of the world's strongest economies.<sup>46</sup> Two years after the recession, China finally became the economic power that it had hoped to become. During the first half of 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world's largest economy.<sup>47</sup> China's GNI increased to over \$7500, while the

country's GDP increased to nearly \$7.4 trillion dollars.<sup>48</sup> This stark increase proved that China was assuming much of the power and recognition that it wanted to hold in the international system.

Though China's trade as a percent of GDP decreased from 68% (2005) to 57% (2010), China's presence in international trade did not diminish.<sup>49</sup> According to a World Trade Organization report produced in 2012, "China has been committed to developing all-around foreign economic and trade relations," with other countries throughout the world.<sup>50</sup> Hu Jintao and the Chinese government had realized that an essential part of their foreign policies had come through its trade relations. Perhaps the most significant statistic regarding China's international trade is its large trade surplus with the United States. In 2005, China experienced a trade surplus of over \$202 billion dollars with the United States. That surplus increased substantially to over \$273 billion dollars in 2010.<sup>51</sup>

The changes in China's GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and China's trade surplus with the United States during Hu's time in power can be seen in the following table:<sup>52</sup>

**Figure 6: Changes in Hu Jintao's Economic Power**

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
GDP	\$1.64 trillion	\$1.93 trillion	\$2.25 trillion	\$2.71 trillion	\$3.49 trillion	\$4.52 trillion	\$4.99 trillion	\$5.93 trillion	\$7.31 trillion
GNI per Capita	\$3180	\$3590	\$4090	\$4750	\$5580	\$6230	\$6840	\$7520	\$8390
Trade as % of GDP	56.9%	65.3%	68.6%	70.5%	68.0%	62.2%	49.0%	57.3%	58.6%
Trade Surplus	\$124 billion	\$126 billion	\$202 billion	\$234 billion	\$258 billion	\$268 billion	\$226 billion	\$273 billion	\$295 billion

Chinese economic power during Hu Jintao's leadership rose substantially. China became the second largest economy in the world and continued to grow at astonishingly quick rates. While China did see some declines in trade as a percent of GDP and still experienced much inequality, overall, the data suggest that China's economic power was high during Hu Jintao's leadership. China's foreign relations with the United States, in terms of international trade, also increased substantially over the ten years Hu was in power. Chinese foreign policy in terms of economic power, therefore, can be characterized as high because of the policies implemented by Hu that called for China to still improve its economic standing in the international community.

### **Analysis**

According to the criteria set forth in this study, Hu Jintao seems to hold the national role conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The above data suggest that

not all of the proposed relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were true. Of the possible six relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior, four were true. Since this a majority of the relationships, there is an overall relationship between Hu Jintao's national role conceptions and his foreign policy behavior.

Regarding the regional leader national role conception, the data suggest that all of the relationships between the role conception and foreign policy behavior were true. With the regional leader national role conception, one would expect to see high levels of military and economic power and good diplomatic relations with great powers. Hu exhibited all of these traits. This suggests that Hu was embracing the idea of being a leader in the region and hoped to gain more influence throughout the region and the world.

The internal development national role conception was not as persuasive as the former conception. The internal development national role conception would be evident if the foreign policy behavior exhibited low levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and indifferent diplomatic relations between great powers. In the case of Hu Jintao, high levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and good diplomatic relations with great powers were evident. The data suggest that since only one of the three possible relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior was displayed, the internal development national role conception has a slight relationship with Hu's foreign policy behavior.

Overall, four of the possible six relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were correctly predicted. The regional leader national role

conception perfectly correlated with the foreign policy behavior expected with that national role conception. However, the data suggest that in the case of the internal development national role conception, only one relationship was evident. This indicates that the hypothesis of the study is marginally correct when analyzing Hu Jintao. While the hypothesis cannot be completely refuted, it also cannot be completely correct due to only the slight relationship between the internal development national role conception and Hu's foreign policy behavior.

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Daniel Ewing, "Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary," *The China Quarterly* 173 (March 2003) p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>11</sup> Hu Jintao, Opening Address at the 17th Communist Party of China National Party Congress, Beijing, China, 15 October 2007, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content\\_6938568.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568.htm) (accessed 15 January 2013), p. 19.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>16</sup> Hu Jintao, Opening Address at the 18th Communist Party of China National Party Congress, Beijing, China, 8 November 2012, [http://china.caixin.com/2012-11-08/100458021\\_all.html](http://china.caixin.com/2012-11-08/100458021_all.html) (accessed 15 January 2013), p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>21</sup> Tony Saich, "China in 2005: Hu's in Charge," Asian Survey 46:1 (Jan.-Feb. 2006), p. 46.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Kerry Dumbaugh, "China-US Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy," Congressional Research Service (March 2008), p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>26</sup> Bonnie Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, "US-China Relations: Xi Visit Steadies Ties; Dissident Creates Tension," Comparative Connections (May 2012), p. 29.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Chen Ou, "Russian Political Challenges on Security During Hu Jintao's Age," Asian Social Science 7:10 (October 2011), p. 84.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>32</sup> Yu Bin, "China-Russia Relations: Succession, SCO, and Summit Politics in Beijing," Comparative Connections (September 2012), p. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> John J. Tkacik, Jr., "China's Military Power," Testimony Before the Committee on Armed Services United States House of Representatives (July 2005), p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> China's National Defense in 2006, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm> (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 10.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> China's National Defense in 2010, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, March 2011, [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7114675.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm) (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 29.

<sup>41</sup> China's National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, January 2009, [http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content\\_1210227.htm](http://english.gov.cn/official/2009-01/20/content_1210227.htm) (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 49.

<sup>42</sup> Saich, "China in 2005," 41.

<sup>43</sup> Saich, "China in 2005," 42.



<sup>44</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/china> (accessed January 20, 2013).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Guoguang Wu, “China in 2010: Dilemmas of ‘Scientific Development,’” Asian Survey 51:1 (Jan.-Feb. 2011), p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>48</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Report By China,” World Trade Organization (May 2012), p. 24.

<sup>51</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China.

<sup>52</sup> World Bank, World Bank Data on China; “Trade in Goods with China,”

## 第五章：胡锦涛和中国外交政策

### 介绍

这一章是关于胡锦涛的分析。首先我会介绍胡锦涛的背景信息。之后，我会分析我的自变量和确定胡锦涛的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以后，我会介绍胡锦涛的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我的因变数，然后确定胡锦涛的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策有关。

### 胡锦涛的背景信息

胡锦涛出生于1942年。高中毕业以后，胡锦涛去北京上大学。他上了清华大学。他的专业是水利水电工程。1964年胡锦涛加入中国共产党。文化革命以后，胡锦涛在中国共产党里有了很高的地位。比如他是共产党年轻人的领导，也是中央委员会委员。可是1985年的时候，胡成为甘肃省的党委书记。在甘肃省的时候，胡要提高甘肃人民的经济水平。而且甘肃省有很多少数民族，所以胡要发展和少数民族的关系。三年以后，胡成为西藏的党委书记。在西藏，胡锦涛有很多挑战。可是他还是提高了西藏的经济水平。在西藏，胡需要表现中国共产党的权力，中国的最高的领导认为胡锦涛可以担当更多的责任。最后，2003年的时候，胡锦涛成为中国的

主席。作为主席的时候，胡有在外交方面有很多的挑战。但是，胡能在世界上表现出中国的力量。

### 自变量：国家角色的概念

我看了胡锦涛的两个报告。这两个报告是在中国共产党全国代表大会上的报告。这些报告是差不多跟美国的国情咨文报告一样的。那些报告有很多意思。每个五年，中国的领导作这个报告，并且告诉中国人和世界，中国的未来的计划。

### 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十五次和第十六全国代表大会上的报告

2007年10月15日和2012年11月8日，胡锦涛在全国代表大会上作报告。我会分析这个报告，并且确定他的国家角色的概念。

### 经济情况

胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次和第十八次全国代表大会上的报告，提到了经济情况145次。他说别的字，比如：他说‘社会生活’1次，‘健康’13次，他说‘教育’90次，和说‘收入’41次。

胡锦涛觉得教育是非常重要的。他在很多地方也考虑到了教育。比如，他说：

优先发展教育，建设人力资源强国。教育是民族振兴的基石，教育公平是社会公平的重要基础。要全面贯彻党的教育方针，坚持育人为本、德育为先，实施素质教育，提高教育现代化水平，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主义建设者和接班人，办好人民满意的教育。优化教育结构，促进义务教育均衡发展，加快普及高中阶段教育，大力发展职业教育，提高高等教育质量。重视学前教育，关心特殊教育。更新教育观念，深化教学内容方式、考试招生制度、质量评价制度改革，减轻中小学生课业负担，提高学生综合素质。坚持教育公益性质，加大财政对教育投入，规范教育收费，扶持贫困地区、民族地区教育，健全学生资助制度，保障经济困难家庭、进城务工人员子女平等接受义务教育。加强教师队伍建设，重点提高农村教师素质。鼓励和规范社会力量兴办教育。发展远程教育和继续教育，建设全民学习、终身学习的学习型社会。

这一段说明，胡锦涛觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须改善中国的教育系统，并且提高教育质量。如果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在上世界上竞争。胡锦涛认为人民的经济情况必须提高。他提到了经济情况很多次，所以我能分类这个部分：高。

### 对外开放和自我封闭

在那些报告中，胡锦涛不参考自我封闭。可是他参考了对外开放19次。胡说到‘主权’11次，‘互相依存’1次，和‘全球化’7次。说到主权的时候

候，胡说中国应该，“维护国家主权和领土完整”。这个说明胡锦涛保护国家主权。说到相互依存的时候，胡锦涛说中国跟别的国家必须在经济上相互依存。如果中国要经济发展，他们必须跟别的国家一起合作。最后，说全球化的时候，胡锦涛认为经济全球化非常重要，每个国家应该参加经济全球化。胡锦涛是一个对外开放的领导，不是自我封闭的。

### 对国内的发展的重视程度

在那些报告中，胡锦涛提到了“国内发展”47次。他认为中国必须发展经济，并且成为一个非常重要的国家。胡锦涛说到“经济发展”23次和“和平发展”24次。在这两个报告后，中国的经济有非常快的发展。所以胡锦涛认为中国必须再发展。胡锦涛说中国必须“推进经济结构战略性调整”。他的意思是，中国必须有更多经济上的发展，而且中国的经济结构必须改变。胡锦涛觉得发展非常重要。因为他提到了“国内发展”很多次。我能分类这个部分：高。

### **胡锦涛的国家角色的概念**

胡锦涛觉得经济情况和国内发展都很有意思，也很重要。他也是一个对外开放的领导。所以胡锦涛的国家角色的概念是，区域领袖和国内

发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现出了胡锦涛的个性。而且，胡的国家角色的概念可以告诉别的国家，中国的外交政策。

### **因变数：中国外交政策行为**

胡锦涛成为中国的总统的时候，中国在世界上的地位还比较低。可是他知道中国还应该提高他们的国际地位。为了知道胡锦涛的外交政策，我看了三个别的部分。那些部分是，中国跟大国的关系，中国的军权，和中国的经济权。

### 大国关系

胡锦涛成为中国主席的时候，中国的国际地位在慢慢的提高。美国，俄罗斯和中国都是世界的大国。如果我们了解中美和中俄关系，我们就可以了解今天的世界。

胡锦涛成为主席的时候，中美关系没有那么多的问题。最大的问题是跟中国的货币有关。中国和美国是最好的贸易伙伴。中美关系表现在贸易上。可是中国跟美国有一个非常大的贸易顺差。很多美国人觉得中国有贸易顺差，因为他们低估了他们的货币。美国人觉得中国必须升值人民

币。中国不要突然让人民币升值。可是中国慢慢的升值人民币。这个表现了中美合作。

而且中国和美国开始战略对话。胡锦涛和美国布什总统开始了这个对话。通过这个对话，中国和美国能一起聊天和创造非常好的关系。他们能讨论他们的经济情况，政治情况，也能一起合作。中国是一个非常大的国家所以他们必须跟美国有好的关系。

胡锦涛的时候，中俄关系也非常好。他们一起合作，也有一些竞争。因为中国和俄罗斯都在东亚，他们必须有一个好的关系。胡开始了领导之间的对话，所以中国的领导人和俄罗斯的能一起谈话。每年胡锦涛和俄罗斯的普京总统见面。他们一起签署非常重要的协议。而且在国际组织上，中国和俄罗斯一起合作。

胡的时候，中国和别的国家有非常好的关系。他们都一起合作，也开始重要的对话。这个表现了胡锦涛的大国外交政策。他觉得中国应该跟别的大国有非常好的关系。

## 军权

胡锦涛成为中国的总统的时候，中国的军队是世界上最大的。中国有差不多两百五十万的士兵。可是2003年的时候，胡锦涛说，他要减少中国的士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以2005年，中国的军队里只有两百三十万士兵。同时中国的军队有很多现代化的建设。而且中国花很多钱在他们的军队建设上。2004年的时候，中国花了220亿元在军队上。2009年，中国花了495亿元。这个说明了胡锦涛对军队看法。中国的军队有很多权力，他们的军队也很强大。

## 经济权

从邓小平的改革开放到2003年，中国的经济发展得越来越快。胡锦涛觉得中国必须继续非常快的发展经济。2005年，中国的国内生产总值是2.3万亿美元。但是在2010年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多7.4万亿美元。而且中国成为了世界第二大的经济国。这个非常好，可以说明中国的经济情况。胡锦涛的时候，中国的经济提高的真快。



## 分析

从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设是差不多对的。我认为中国领导的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。胡锦涛的国家角色的概念，区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不对。

## **Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion**

This chapter presents an analysis and conclusion for the study. First, the chapter presents a survey of the results of the case studies and general patterns, trends, and tendencies that were existent throughout the studies. The project resulted in similar outcomes for the three cases: Each leader appeared to hold the same national role conceptions and their foreign policy behaviors were very alike which confirms the hypothesis of the study. The overall conclusions provide nuanced connections based on the scholarly foundations of the project that can further the study of foreign policy analysis. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the limitations of the study and ideas for further research.

### **Case Study Analysis**

Constancy was apparent throughout the three cases regarding the independent and dependent variables. Because of this, the hypothesis of the study is confirmed. Throughout the study, important insights are evident that create opportunity to further the study of Chinese foreign policy. The results of the three case studies suggest that although Chinese foreign policy is a very dynamic factor, some constants have been evident throughout the post-Mao era. These constants allow for a more complete understanding of Chinese foreign policy.

*Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions*

The cases of national role conceptions and Chinese foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all resulted in similar findings. Each leader seemed to hold the same national role conceptions, “regional leader and internal development,” that display China’s evolving status in the international system. While these national role conceptions are not surprising given the changing nature of China after the death of Mao Zedong, they still have some puzzling aspects that can further one’s comprehension of Chinese foreign policy and China in general.

The national role conceptions for each leader were determined by three distinct indicators. These indicators included the leader’s perception on socioeconomic status, the leader’s political views judged by being more internationalist or isolationist, and the leader’s interest in development. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each showcased similar results regarding the three indicators. Each leader placed a large emphasis on socioeconomic status, held more internationalist views on politics, and believed that development was essential for the growth of Chinese power in the international system.

For example, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao referenced socioeconomic status many times in each speech that was analyzed. By referencing education, income, health, and the need to have a harmonious society, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao seemed to believe that improving the socioeconomic status of all Chinese citizens was extremely important. Through the cases of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, one can see the tendency for Chinese leaders after the death of Mao to promote an enhancement of socioeconomic status throughout China. This trend

corresponds with the fast development and growth that China has been experiencing since the late 1970s.

In the third case, though, Deng Xiaoping did not directly mention the selected words and phrases that would indicate a high emphasis on socioeconomic status as many times as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Deng Xiaoping can be characterized as a man of few words, but whose words hold much weight and are heavily revered. Therefore, it is not surprising that he did not make many precise mentions of socioeconomic status. However, what Deng Xiaoping did provide in the two speeches that were coded showed how deeply he believed that the socioeconomic status of all Chinese citizens needed to be improved. By mentioning the importance of quality education and improving the incomes of China's rural citizens, Deng Xiaoping displayed his commitment to opening and reforming China in a way that would improve the livelihood of all Chinese people.

Regarding the second indicator of national role conceptions, internationalism versus isolationism, the three leaders all seemed to adhere to an internationalist view of the global political environment. In the six total speeches that were coded and analyzed, isolationism did not manifest itself in any way based on the coding scheme used. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao displayed their understanding of the international system through promoting the ideas of economic interdependence and economic globalization. In addition, each leader believed that the sovereignty of all nations in the world should be respected. This displayed a changed stance of international politics from that of Mao Zedong. Instead of being more isolationist, as were many of the founders of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao displayed a pattern of more nuanced thought

regarding the international system. While this trend strayed from the traditional view of leaders of the People's Republic of China, it appears to display the changing nature of the international system and the development that China is experiencing both politically and economically.

Finally, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each seemed to harbor high levels of interest in development. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao made many references to China developing its economy and developing in a peaceful way. Because they were in power after the beginning of the Open and Reform policies, a trend which places a large emphasis on development emerges. As China's economy has been growing at remarkable rates over the past thirty years, stressing the importance of development has become an even more important part of being the leader of the People's Republic of China.

Deng Xiaoping, in many ways, can be seen as the architect of the policies that have led to more growth throughout China. Though he did not directly mention development as many times as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as China's leader through the beginning of the Open and Reform period, Deng Xiaoping displayed the importance of development in creating a more prosperous and powerful China. His commitment to developing China was evident throughout the speeches.

Because of the three leaders' stance on the issues of socioeconomic status, internationalism and isolationism, and their interest in development, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each held the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions. These national role conceptions seem to display an evolution of Chinese politics. In addition, since each leader seemed to hold the same national role conceptions,

one can see that the three leaders seemed to learn from the past to help develop China in ways that would promote a rise in power in the international system.

In Chapter Two, it was posited that the Chinese leaders could hold many different national role conceptions. While many national role conceptions have already been developed by leading scholars, the scope of this study was not large enough to include every conception that has been created. Therefore, it was proposed that the three leaders studied in this project would have the possibility of holding one or more national role conceptions including, anti-imperialist agent, regional leader, active independent, and internal development. Though Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao could hold other national role conceptions, such as those described by Holsti and Hermann, the anti-imperialist agent, regional leader, active independent, and internal development conceptions seemed to be the most likely to occur.

The anti-imperialist and active independent national role conceptions were not present in the speeches analyzed for each leader. The lack of these national role conceptions appears to display the evolving nature of the Chinese political landscape. From the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to Mao Zedong's death in 1976, China was virtually cut off from the rest of the world. However, that began to change with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and subsequent Chinese leaders. Through the scope of this study, a trend appeared which seemed to depict how the perspectives of Chinese leaders had changed which resulted in what can be considered an improvement of China's international standing. Since Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all appeared to hold the regional leader national role conception, it seems that these leaders wished for China to become more

active in the international system. By being more active and assuming more leadership roles, China would be able to ascend to the ranks of being a great power in the international community.

However, just because the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role conceptions did not manifest themselves does not mean that they do not appear in other forms of the Chinese government. Those leaders that fully believe in the traditional Maoist ideology would be likely to foster the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role conceptions. The fact that China's main political leaders after the death of Mao did not appear to hold those national role conceptions demonstrates a change in ideology that occurred throughout China. Though China still operates under a socialist system, the definitions under which China works have been loosened to include all of the practices that China pursues today. Therefore, the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions held by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to correctly indicate the transformation of China after the death of Mao Zedong.

*Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior*

Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao expressed many similarities in their respective foreign policy behaviors. Overall, the three leaders displayed good diplomatic relations with great powers, high military power, and high economic power. By exhibiting these characteristics, China's change over the last forty years is again apparent. The isolationist policies of Mao did not allow for China to assert itself strongly in the international community. On the contrary, the policies that were in practice from the

establishment of the People's Republic of China to the death of Mao Zedong did not allow for the emergence of a strong China. However, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each developed foreign policies that appeared to create a powerful China in the international community.

As foreign policy behavior represents a myriad of different actors, factors, and conditions, only three aspects of foreign policy were analyzed. China's diplomatic relations with great powers, China's military power, and China's economic power were studied in order to gain an understanding of each leader's foreign policy behavior. While these categories do not encompass all aspects of foreign policy, diplomatic relations, military power, and economic power provide a uniform way of comprehending the foreign policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each seemed to foster good diplomatic relations with other great powers during their rule. China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia developed in ways that promoted a strong partnership between the states. Starting with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China and the United States, and China and the Soviet Union, normalized relations. Strategic partnerships developed between China and the Soviet Union and between the United States and China. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Sino-Russian relations developed even further and the strategic cooperation that began in the 1980s continued to manifest itself. Boasting good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia demonstrates that China was trying to avoid the almost catastrophic policies that characterized the Mao era. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao appeared to realize that the only way for China to reach its full potential would be



through the advancement of positive relations with great powers. A trend developed where each leader seemed to preside over ground breaking cooperation developments while also managing tense times in the relationship. However, overall, the Sino-US and Sino-Soviet/Russian relationships suggest that China was confident in its ability to grow with the assistance of two of the most important countries in the world.

Military power was also an area where many similarities were evident between the three leaders. Each leader presided over large cuts to the number of soldiers in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Though one may think that cutting the number of soldiers in a country's armed forces would be a sign of decline, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all increased the amount of money that was spent on the PLA. By allocating more money to the military, the leaders were able to create a more modernized army that would be able to face many challenges throughout the world. Again, a pattern emerged where near the beginning of each leader's time in office, the number of soldiers was cut while spending increased. This suggests that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao realized that for China to become more powerful, the People's Liberation Army would need to modernize. For these reasons, each leader's boasted high military power during their rule.

Regarding economic power, the three leaders each saw large rises of China's economic might during their time in power. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping's Open and Reform policies in the late 1970s, each subsequent leader placed a large emphasis on the development of China's economy. After years of policies that did not allow for development, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each brought unique ideas to advance China's economic growth. This pattern was very evident when analyzing China's trade with the

United States as well as China's Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income.

China's economy grew substantially larger indicating that policies were being made to help develop China into an important player in the international community.

*Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables*

As stated in Chapter Two, the hypothesis of this study is that different national role conceptions lead to different foreign policy behaviors. Each leader appeared to hold the same national role conceptions which displays constancy between the independent variable. In addition, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seemed to adhere to similar foreign policy behaviors which shows constancy in the dependent variable. Since there was constancy between the independent and dependent variables, the hypothesis of the study is upheld. Certain trends also developed which can allow for a better understanding of Chinese foreign policy.

By holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions, one would expect certain foreign policy behavior to be practiced. With the regional leader national role conception, the leader was hypothesized to have good diplomatic relations with great powers, high levels of military power, and high levels of economic power. Regarding the internal development national role conception, one would expect to see indifferent relations between great powers, low levels of military power, and high levels of economic power.

In this study, only one national role conception corresponded correctly to all aspects of foreign policy behavior. For Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, the regional

leader national role conception correctly predicted the three indicators of foreign policy behavior. Each leader exhibited good diplomatic relations with great powers, high levels of military power, and high levels of economic power. With the regional leader national role conception, one would expect these three indicators to be evident.

Since the regional leader national role conception correctly predicted the foreign policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, the hypothesis of the study is confirmed. Through the three leaders, constancy was evident between the independent and dependent variables. The foreign policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all corresponded correctly to the regional leader national role conception. Because the regional leader role conception was evident in their foreign policy behavior, Chinese leaders tended to place more emphasis on being a leader in East Asia. By being a leader in the area, China would be able to assume more responsibility and develop into a strong country in the international system.

Contrasting the regional leader national role conception, the internal development national role conception did not manifest itself in the same way. The foreign policy behavior of a leader with the internal development national role conception would be that of indifferent relations with great powers, low levels of military power, and high levels of economic power. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed high levels of economic power but did not show foreign policy behavior that would verify the other indicators of foreign policy behavior. Again, constancy was evident between the independent and dependent variables which confirms the hypothesis.

The data suggest that the regional leader national role conception was more dominant in the manifestation of foreign policy behavior. However, the internal development national role conception was not completely nonexistent. In terms of economic power, both the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions would result in high levels. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed this kind of power which shined light onto the validity of the internal development national role conception.<sup>1</sup>

### **Conclusions**

As previously stated, the hypothesis for this study is that different national role conceptions lead to different foreign policy behavior. The independent and dependent variables were consistent throughout the cases of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. It is apparent that national role conceptions play some part in the development of foreign policy behavior. The exact role that national role conceptions have in the development of foreign policy behavior may not be large. However, this study shows that national role conceptions do indeed play a part in the development of foreign policy behavior.

After Holsti's work on national role conceptions and the study of foreign policy, many scholars have advanced the discipline in different ways. Some scholars that use national role conceptions to study foreign policy behavior believe that the national role conceptions lead to the difference in foreign policy behavior between different leaders and countries. While national role conceptions may not be the only factor in the development of foreign policy, it

is still a very important part of understanding the foreign policy decision-making process in many countries.

Role theory has many applications to the study of leadership and foreign policy behavior. Role theory has been able to classify Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao into two distinct categories that play a part in the development of the policies that occurred under their leadership. The data suggest that each leader saw himself and China in ways that would promote the further development of a great power. Since the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role conceptions were not evident, the data suggest that China was going through and is still experiencing a transformation.

As Shih asserted in his work, history and culture play large parts in the development of a leader's role. For China, history and culture are essential in understanding why Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to hold the national role conceptions they do. From China's historical 'middle kingdom' ideology to its foundation in Confucian thought, the roles that the three leaders seem to hold appear to confirm the importance of China's history and culture. Without having the history that China has, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao would not hold the same role conceptions that they do today. In addition, Chinese culture creates a dichotomy that is hardly present in other countries throughout the world. By using national role conceptions to try to understand the development of Chinese foreign policy, the importance of history and culture can be accounted for which allows for more complete comprehension of foreign policy and the roles Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao hold in the international system.

Each leader seemed to hold the same national role conceptions. As Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all developed within the Chinese culture, it is not surprising that they appeared to hold the same national role conceptions. Shih posited that there are many psychocultural bases that affect the perceptions decision-makers have of themselves. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to epitomize this notion. Because each leader grew up within the same cultural context, it is not surprising that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao appeared to develop the same national role conceptions. Therefore, Shih's assertion that a shared culture and history play a role in the development of perceptions and role conceptions appears to be confirmed. Though each leader grew up in different time periods, the culture of China was the same for each leader. This seems to display the notion that culture and history have a part in the development of the national role conceptions of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

Role expectations, as argued by Thies, appeared to play a role in the development of national role conceptions for China's three main leaders after the death of Mao. After Mao's death and the beginning of the Open and Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping, subsequent leaders have been expected to carry out certain policies. For example, it would be impossible for a rising political star in China to denounce economic development. A precedent has already been set which would force the future political leaders of China to adhere to the policies that have allowed China to experience vast economic growth. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, each have displayed this expectation through their national role conceptions as well as their foreign policy behavior. By holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions and displaying certain types of foreign policy

behavior, they have upheld the role expectations that have become a prerequisite for assuming the top positions of Chinese leadership.

In the same light, role demands also manifest themselves in the national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior of the three leaders analyzed. As a leader, the state which they govern and the international system demand certain things from the leadership. In the case of the People's Republic of China, the results of the study suggest that the Chinese people were demanding a more prosperous country. After living on basically nothing during the rule of Mao Zedong, a change occurred which helped foster the development of Deng Xiaoping's Open and Reform policies. Since the beginning of the Open and Reform period, Chinese people of all walks of life have wished to improve their livelihood. The data suggest that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao attempted to help the Chinese citizens reach the goal of a better life. Though China is still not on par with many other countries throughout the world, steps have been taken to fulfill the demands the citizens have to better their livelihoods. The role demands that are placed upon Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao display the change in Chinese thought and the importance of working within the role demands that are essentially a part of their national role conceptions.

Role theory has great utility in political science because it can be used at the individual, state, and system level of analysis. However, many scholars, including Holsti and Hudson, believe that in order to utilize role theory at its full potential, the individual level of analysis is the most helpful when attempting to explain foreign policy behavior. In addition to the individual level of analysis, though, the state level of analysis can also be employed to

further understand the foreign policy behavior of different nations. While mainly using role theory at the individual level of analysis, this study has confirmed that both the individual and state levels of analysis are beneficial when applying role theory to foreign policy analysis. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed characteristics that provide support for the importance of the individual level of analysis. By analyzing each leader on an individual level, one can see the potential for role theory to explain a leader's foreign policy behavior. The three leaders seemed to believe that leadership and development were extremely important for the growth of China on the international stage which was displayed through each leader's foreign policy behavior. Likewise, through the use of the state level of analysis, China's role in East Asia and the international system became more evident. Using the regional leader national role conception on the state level of analysis displays China's willingness to pursue more active roles in the development of its relations with East Asia and the world.

Both Holsti and Hermann have conducted extensive work on national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. Their studies developed different national role conceptions that can be used to analyze the foreign policy behavior of a leader or country. This study has confirmed that the regional leader national role conception has utility in explaining foreign policy behavior. The regional leader national role conception that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seemed to hold correctly predicted the foreign policy behavior that occurred under each leader's rule. This further supports Holsti's original research by confirming the utility and predictability of the regional leader national role conception regarding foreign policy behavior. The internal development national role



conception, however, did not completely predict the foreign policy behavior of each leader. This national role conception only correctly predicted one aspect of each leader's foreign policy behavior. Because of this, the internal development national role conception, though having some utility, is not as persuasive in predicting the foreign policy behavior of a leader.

This study has developed a typology for national role conceptions which has utility for studying foreign policy behavior throughout the world. Much evidence was noticeable in support for the regional leader national role conception which could allow for the use of that typology in many other cases. The regional leader national role conception has been used before in other scholarly works but not in the same manner and without the same results as this study. Because of this, the typology of the regional leader national role conception could be used to further the understanding of leaders' foreign policy behavior in countries throughout the world.

In addition, the internal development national role conception could be applied to leaders in other countries. While the supporting evidence for the internal development role conception is not as persuasive, the fact that one of the possible relationships between national role conception and foreign policy behavior appeared shows that there is a practical application for the use of the internal development role conception.

Because the regional leader national role conception correctly predicted the foreign policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, this national role conception can be used to predict the foreign policies of leaders throughout the world. If a political leader seems to hold the regional leader national role conception, a foreign policy behavior that consists of good diplomatic relations with great powers, high military power, and high

economic power would be most likely to appear. Since each of the leaders after the death of Mao Zedong appeared to hold the regional leader national role conception, one would expect that China's current leader, Xi Jinping, as well as future leaders, to display the same foreign policy behavior if the regional leader national role conception was evident. This predictive ability displays the importance of national role conceptions in the study of foreign policy behavior.

While Holsti, Wish, Breuning, Shih, and others have used national role conceptions to further their understandings of foreign policy behavior, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, specifically, are not regularly studied through role theory. Other leaders have been analyzed using national role conceptions while China seems to be ostracized from that group. Some Chinese leaders, from the Mao era, have been analyzed by scholars using role theory, but Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have seldom appeared together in a study of national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. By studying China's three most recent leaders, this project has developed in ways that add to the scholarly work using role theory to study foreign policy. Understanding the more recent leadership of the People's Republic of China is just as important as understanding the policies of Mao Zedong.

This study analyzes Chinese foreign policy through a different lens. China's foreign policy behavior is an extremely dynamic feature. The stark differences between the foreign policies of Mao Zedong and Hu Jintao display the evolution China's growth and development within the international system. Being able to further one's understanding of the subject is essential to comprehending international relations. Foreign policy analysis is considered to be the backbone of the study of international relations. It is through foreign

policy that one is able to see international relations at work. By trying to better one's understanding of foreign policy, all aspects of the study of international relations benefit. From using different levels of analysis to explain certain issues, to understanding ethnic conflict, foreign policy analysis helps explain those important issues. This study has used national role conceptions and foreign policy analysis to understand one of the most dynamic countries in the world, the People's Republic of China.

### **Ideas for Further Research**

This study faced some limitations in its overview of the foreign policies of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. However, these limitations do not take away from the overall results of the study. Questions of the number of national role conceptions used, the leaders studied, the speeches analyzed, and the operationalization of China's foreign policy all pose challenges to this study. These challenges, however, do not reduce the validity of the study. Rather, they provide ways to enhance further research on national role conceptions and foreign policy.

Holsti and Hermann develop twenty-one distinct national role conceptions.<sup>2</sup> While in a perfect world, each leader could hold every national role conception, this study could not afford to potentially analyze twenty-one national role conceptions. Instead, only four national role conceptions had the potential to be analyzed. However, this study could be replicated using the different national role conceptions that have been developed by Holsti and Hermann. This could add another layer to the study of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao's national role conceptions and possibly explain contrasts in foreign policy

behavior. This study has built upon the ideas of Holsti and Hermann and has further confirmed the results of their important scholarly work.

In addition, the leaders that were studied could pose certain limitations. China has only experienced three paramount leaders since the death of Mao Zedong. In that light, these leaders should be the only leaders studied. However, Chinese foreign policy is not determined solely by the head politician in the People's Republic of China. Many other actors are present in the development of China's foreign policy. In order to remedy this, future studies could research the role different bureaucratic organizations play in the development of Chinese foreign policy. By looking at Chinese foreign policy in this way, more aspects of China's foreign policy could be analyzed allowing for more understanding of China.

In line with the leaders, the selection of speeches analyzed could pose some methodological difficulties. First, Deng Xiaoping never gave the same type of opening address to the Communist Party China National Party Congress. His only opening address was very short and did not have the same policy implications as the remarks given by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Therefore, different speeches were chosen to try to ascertain Deng Xiaoping's national role conceptions. Deng Xiaoping gave many influential addresses while in power making the decision regarding which speeches to use very difficult. However, the chosen speeches provide a good overview of Deng Xiaoping's development over time. In future studies, different speeches could be used to develop Deng Xiaoping's national role conceptions. This would allow for broader understandings of Deng Xiaoping and the policies that he developed.

In addition, the opening addresses by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao may pose some issues when being used to develop national role conceptions. The opening address to the National Party Congress is highly vetted by other top members of the Communist Party of China. Because of this, the true beliefs of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao may not totally appear. However, analyzing the opening address allows for less bias to manifest itself in the remarks because of the uniformity of all the remarks. In future studies of national role conceptions and Chinese foreign policy, a more diverse selection of speeches could provide different insights into Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao's national role conceptions while also creating means for additional study of Chinese foreign policy.

It should also be noted that the People's Liberation Army is the army for the Communist Party of China. While it also acts as the army for the state, the People's Liberation Army's first goal is to protect the party. This could be the reason why certain policies were developed by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Whereas most military forces are bound by the constitution of the state, the People's Liberation Army is sworn to uphold the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.

Finally, foreign policy behavior is extremely difficult to conceptualize and operationalize. There are so many aspects that constitute foreign policy that looking at only three features may not give a complete representation of the foreign policy that was adhered to by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Further research could be done using the same national role conceptions but changing that aspects of foreign policy that are analyzed. This would potentially produce results that could help generalize the utility of the national role conceptions used.

The results of the study suggest that more work should be done in the area of national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. While using role theory to study foreign policy is still in its infancy, it is important that scholars continue answering difficult questions using role theory and national role conceptions. The utility of national role conceptions is seemingly endless. They can be used to understand a leader's behavior, a state's behavior, or even an organization's behavior in the international system. This study only touches upon one aspect of role theory and the benefits of using national role conceptions to understand foreign policy behavior. However, much work needs to be done in order to advance the efficacy of role theory and international relations.

### **Summary Conclusion**

Looking back on this study, the immortal words of the *Dao De Jing* still ring true. Chinese foreign policy is an extremely complex portion of China's international relations. As with the *Dao De Jing*, there is not only one way to analyze Chinese politics. This study attempts to capture certain aspects of China's relations to the rest of the world. The national role conceptions of Chinese leaders are also very intricate which forces scholars to analyze many facets of China's history and culture. The *Dao De Jing* is an important piece of the Chinese foreign policy and national role conception puzzle. Like the *Dao De Jing*, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have placed an important mark on Chinese society. Understanding these aspects of the People's Republic of China, foreign policy, and international relations create paths for future generations to follow. Through these paths, they will be able to produce their mark on society and better the world in which we live.

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<sup>1</sup> Since the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role conceptions did not appear, the hypothesis regarding those conceptions is neither confirmed or denied.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter One page 26 for all national role conceptions.

## 第六章：分析和结论

### 介绍

这一章是关于我的文章的分析 and 结论。首先我会给出我的研究的结论。之后，我会说明我研究的局限性和提出进一步研究的想法。

### 研究的分析

我的文章的结论很有意思。我发现了我的自变量和因变数有一个很有意思的关系。我发现国家角色的概念和领导的外交政策有关。这个关系不是那么大，可是非常重要。

我的假设是国家领导的国家角色的概念支配该国外交政策的行为。这个假设差不多是对的。通过对邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛几位领导人的分析研究，都表明他们的国家角色的概念和他们的外交政策的行为有关系。从建立中华人民共和国到现在，中国有很多的变化。比如说，1978年邓小平开始改革开放政策和中国的经济发展得越来越好。江泽民也有这个政策，并且他帮助中国的经济发展。而且，胡锦涛也开始了非常重要的政策。



在国家系统中，中国的角色有很大的变化。1949年到1978年中国是自我封闭的国家。可是，现在中国是一个对外开放的国家。这个表现出了中国和中国领导人的角色的变化。这个角色的变化让中国的外交政策也发生了变化。我的文章和研究显示了中国在世界上的新水平。中国是一个非常强和大的国家。中国的领导人，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都发挥出了中国的潜力。因为他们知道中国是世界上的最重要的国家之一，他们必须有很多的责任。

#### 自变量：国家角色的概念

关于我的自变量，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都有一样的结果。他们都有区域领袖的国家角色的概念和内部发展的国家角色的概念。邓，江，和胡都觉得中国人的经济情况和中国的经济发展是非常重要的问题。而且，他们都觉得中国应该跟别的国家有一个非常好的关系。因为他们觉得中国人的经济情况和中国的经济发展很有意思，而且他们觉得中国应该成为对外开放的国家，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛有区域领袖的国家角色的概念和内部发展的国家角色的概念。

### 因变数：外交政策行为

邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都有差不多一样的外交政策的行为。他们都跟大国有好的关系。而且，他们的军权和经济权也非常大。1976年以后，中国的国际形式改变了。中国不是自我封闭的国家。中国跟苏联／俄罗斯有比较好的关系。另外，中美关系也越来越好。邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛的时候，中国的军事很现代。虽然人民解放军没有那么多人，中国的军对也很强。中国的经济也有很大的发展。那些外交政策的指针表现出中国的新的外交政策。

### 关于国家角色的概念和外交政策行为的关系

中国领导人的国家角色的概念跟外交政策有一个很有意思的关系。通过对邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛三位领导人的分析，都显示出我的假设差不多是对的。关于他们的第一个国家角色的概念区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是关于第二个，他们的国家角色的概念是不对的。所以我的假设是差不多对的。一个国家角色的概念是对的，和一个是不对的。这个显示国家角色的概念跟外交政策的行为有一点关系。

## 研究的局限性和进一步研究的想法

我的研究有一点局限性。一是，我只能分析四位中国的领导人的国家角色概念。很多美国的国际学者创造很多国家角色的概念。可是我的研究不能包括每个国家角色的概念。所以，我只能用这四个分析。在未来，政治学者能用别的国家角色的概念分析中国领导人的外交政策。

而且，外交政策有很多定义。差不多每个政治学者有别的定义。另外，外交政策是非常广阔的类别。我只能用三个外交政策的部分分析中国领导人的外交政策。可是别的政治学者可以用别的外交政策行为分析中国的领导人。

我的研究的结论告诉人们，我们应该常常学习国家角色的概念和外交政策。我们的世界有很多的变化。可是，了解别的国家的政策非常必要。如果我们要成为全球公民，我们必须一起向别的国家学习。中国是一个非常重要的国家。了解邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛的国家角色的概念和外交政策帮助人们了解我们的世界。这个研究表明，我们都是互为联系的，每个可以改变我们的世界。

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## Appendix

In order to be as consistent as possible during the coding process, only the specific words and phrases listed below for each indicator of the independent variable were used to determine the national role conception(s) that a leader may hold.

### **Socioeconomic Status:**

The following words and phrases were used to determine if socioeconomic status is deemed important by the leader being analyzed.

English	Mandarin Chinese	Pinyin Translation
Life Expectancy	预计寿命	<i>yuji shouming</i>
Health	健康	<i>jiankang</i>
Healthy Culture	健康文化	<i>jiankang wenhua</i>
Society Life	社会生活	<i>shehui shenghuo</i>
Average Years of Schooling	平均受教育年限	<i>pingjun shou jiaoyu nianxian</i>
Education	教育	<i>jiaoyu</i>
Attend College (Higher Education)	上大学	<i>shang daxue</i>
Gross National Income	国民总收入	<i>guomin zong shouru</i>
Income	收入	<i>shouru</i>
Economic Consumption	经济消费	<i>jingji xiaofei</i>

### Internationalism versus Isolationism

The following words and phrases were used to determine if a leader is more internationalist or isolationist in nature.

English	Mandarin Chinese	Pinyin Translation
Internationalism	国际主义	<i>guoji zhuyi</i>
Isolationism	孤立	<i>guli</i>
Intervention	干预	<i>ganyu</i>
Military Intervention	军事干预	<i>junshi ganyu</i>
Humanitarian Intervention	人道主义干预	<i>rendao zhuyi ganyu</i>
Peacekeeping	维持和平	<i>weichi heping</i>
Sovereignty	主权	<i>zhuquan</i>
International Organizations (Good)	国际组织 (好)	<i>guoji zuzhi (hao)</i>
International Organizations (Bad)	国际组织 (怀)	<i>guoji zhuyi (huai)</i>
Interdependence (Good)	相互依存 (好)	<i>xianghu yicun (hao)</i>
Interdependence (Bad)	相互依存 (怀)	<i>xianghu yicun (huai)</i>
Globalization (Good)	全球化 (好)	<i>quanqiu hua (hao)</i>
Globalization (Bad)	全球化 (怀)	<i>quanqiu hua (huai)</i>

## Interest in Development

The following words and phrases were used to determine how important development is to a leader.

English	Mandarin Chinese	Pinyin Translation
Economic Development (Good)	经济发展 (好)	<i>jingji fazhan (hao)</i>
Economic Development (Bad)	经济发展 (怀)	<i>jingji fazhan (huai)</i>
Peaceful Development	和平发展 / 和平与发展	<i>heping fazhan/heping yu fazhan</i>
Internal Development (Good)	内部发展 (好)	<i>neibu fazhan (hao)</i>
Internal Development (Bad)	内部发展 (怀)	<i>neibufazhan (huai)</i>
External Development (Good)	外部发展 (好)	<i>waibu fazhan (hao)</i>
External Development (Bad)	外部发展 (怀)	<i>waibu fazhan (huai)</i>
Foreign Aid (Good)	外援 (好)	<i>waiyuan (hao)</i>
Foreign Aid (Bad)	外援 (怀)	<i>waiyuan (huai)</i>
Foreign Direct Investment (Good)	外国直接投资 (好)	<i>waiguo zhijie touzi (hao)</i>
Foreign Direct Investment (Bad)	外国直接投资 (怀)	<i>waiguo zhijie touzi (huai)</i>