Abstract

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculates the voting power of a country by dividing the total of one member's votes by the total of all members' votes. This method of calculating the power of a state judges power as voting weight. However, voting weights are the total number of votes a country has in an institution, while voting power is the influence a country has on a policy decision. A better approach to calculate this voting power within an institution is by using voting power indices. However, literature only calculates the winning power, while voting power is defined as the ability of an actor to obtain its desired outcome. Thus, literature has only analyzed half of the voting power. This paper addresses this gap in the study of voting power literature by making a case for blocking power. In this paper, we have shown hypothetical examples to illustrate that blocking power is an important component of power, and the concept of voting power of a country cannot be fully understood without looking at the blocking power. We have also made improvements to the current models that discuss voting powers of members within an institution, and tested the new amended model on the voting data obtained from the IMF's website and explained observed results.

Advisor

Hartman, James

Second Advisor

Krain, Matthew

Department

Mathematics; Political Science

Disciplines

International Relations | Models and Methods | Other Applied Mathematics

Keywords

Voting Theory, Voting Index, Power Analysis, Power Index, Blocking Power, Blocking Coalitions, Preference Profile

Publication Date

2018

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis Exemplar

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© Copyright 2018 Shiwani Varal