Abstract

This study aims to understand the motives behind states’ selectivity regarding international intervention during times of crisis. Using a quantitative statistical analysis, the study tests four hypotheses to see if the likelihood of military intervention increases during instances of politicide or genocide when the state experiencing the crisis contains economic incentives such as oil or a valuable trading relationship. The study investigates the instances of military intervention for cases of politicide and genocide between years 1956-2006. The findings reveal that a state’s likelihood for providing military intervention decreases when the state that is in need of help has large oil reserves. The results also show that a strong import based relationship does increase the likelihood of the state being provided with military intervention; while export based trading relationships show no significant results.

Advisor

Leiby, Michele

Department

International Relations; Political Science

Disciplines

International Relations

Publication Date

2014

Degree Granted

Bachelor of Arts

Document Type

Senior Independent Study Thesis

MASTER DATA SET my creation.xlsx (454 kB)
Dataset used for Regressions

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© Copyright 2014 Claire M. O'Malley